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Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 096a8cf5a7 Validate session snapshots and wipe keys on logout (closes #10)
check / check (push) Successful in 17s
Client.fromJSON checks every snapshot field and each key's decoded length
and throws an error naming the bad field. toJSON reads the token through a
new ApiClient.getAuthToken and throws when there is none. logout zeroes the
key buffers in place; collectionsSince re-checks for logout after its
request so it never decrypts with zeroed keys. The CLI now reports a
corrupt session file separately from a missing one.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-22 23:42:28 +00:00
15 changed files with 44 additions and 381 deletions
-8
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@@ -25,14 +25,6 @@ Tag v1.0.0.
key buffers, and `collectionsSince` re-checks for logout after its request so
it never decrypts with zeroed keys. The CLI reports a corrupt session file
separately from a missing one (`src/cli-session.ts`).
- 2026-09-22: Sanitized file names taken from server metadata (issue 9). A new
`src/filename.ts` holds the one sanitizer, used by `quak get`/`get-thumb`
without `--out`, `downloadFile`/`downloadThumbnail` without `outPath`, and the
backup and metadata backup trees; it removes separators, control characters,
leading dots and Windows device names, and falls back to a name built from the
ID for an empty title. Originals-cache extensions are letters and digits only,
else `.bin`. A user-supplied path is used as is. `decryptFile` reads a missing
or non-string title as "" and rejects metadata that is not a JSON object.
- 2026-09-22: Rewrote the README API reference (and the Getting Started / usage
snippets) to match the shipped cache/API library on `next` (issue 53, issue
13). Documented `Library.open` and its options, the default-read vs `fresh()`
+11 -8
View File
@@ -40,9 +40,8 @@ import {
symlinkSync,
writeFileSync,
} from "node:fs";
import { basename, dirname, join, relative } from "node:path";
import { basename, dirname, extname, join, relative } from "node:path";
import { safeExtension, sanitizeFileName } from "./filename.js";
import type { Collection, EnteFile } from "./model/types.js";
export type ProgressCallback = (message: string) => void;
@@ -109,11 +108,16 @@ interface FailureEntry {
const LEDGER_VERSION = 1;
const sanitizePath = (name: string): string =>
name.replace(/[/\\:*?"<>|]/g, "_").replace(/^\.+/, "_");
// The originals/ filename for a file: `<id><ext>`, the extension taken from the
// title (or `.bin`). Matches the content cache's own naming so a present check
// lines up with what a fetch would write.
const originalName = (file: EnteFile): string =>
`${file.id}${safeExtension(file.metadata.title)}`;
const originalName = (file: EnteFile): string => {
const ext = extname(file.metadata.title || "") || ".bin";
return `${file.id}${ext}`;
};
// A regular file with content is treated as complete. A zero-byte file is not:
// it is the shape an aborted write leaves and must be re-fetched.
@@ -366,7 +370,7 @@ export const runBackup = async (
// Then the per-collection symlink trees and JSON.
for (const c of collections) {
const colDirName = sanitizeFileName(c.name, `collection-${c.id}`);
const colDirName = sanitizePath(c.name || `collection-${c.id}`);
const colDir = join(collectionsDir, colDirName);
mkdirSync(colDir, { recursive: true });
@@ -377,9 +381,8 @@ export const runBackup = async (
if (!includeOriginals) continue;
const orig = join(originalsDir, originalName(file));
if (!isPresent(orig)) continue;
const linkName = sanitizeFileName(
file.metadata.title,
`file-${file.id}`,
const linkName = sanitizePath(
file.metadata.title || `file-${file.id}`,
);
const linkPath = join(colDir, linkName);
try {
+3 -6
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
// `metadata.title`, and issue #52 requires that output stay byte-identical, so
// the commands shape their output from the raw `EnteFile` through here.
import { sanitizeFileName } from "./filename.js";
import type { EnteFile, FileType, Microseconds } from "./model/types.js";
// One row of `quak files --json`.
@@ -33,11 +32,9 @@ export const fileListRow = (file: EnteFile): FileListRow => ({
export const fileListLine = (file: EnteFile): string =>
`${file.id}\t${file.metadata.fileType}\t${file.metadata.title}`;
// Default output path for `quak get` when `--out` is not given. The title comes
// from the server, so it is sanitized; `--out` is the user's and is used as is.
export const originalName = (file: EnteFile): string =>
sanitizeFileName(file.metadata.title, `file-${file.id}`);
// Default output path for `quak get` when `--out` is not given.
export const originalName = (file: EnteFile): string => file.metadata.title;
// Default output path for `quak get-thumb` when `--out` is not given.
export const thumbnailName = (file: EnteFile): string =>
`thumb_${originalName(file)}`;
`thumb_${file.metadata.title}`;
+2 -8
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import {
streamTagFinal,
} from "../crypto/index.js";
import { TruncatedStreamError } from "../errors.js";
import { sanitizeFileName } from "../filename.js";
import { withRetry } from "../retry.js";
import type { ApiClient } from "../api/client.js";
import type { EnteFile } from "../model/types.js";
@@ -287,10 +286,7 @@ export const downloadFile = async (
outPath?: string,
onProgress?: ProgressCallback,
): Promise<DownloadResult> => {
// `outPath` is the caller's and is used as is; the title is the server's
// and is sanitized so it can only name a file in the current directory.
const resolvedPath =
outPath ?? sanitizeFileName(file.metadata.title, `file-${file.id}`);
const resolvedPath = outPath ?? file.metadata.title;
const header = fromBase64(file.file.decryptionHeader);
const bytesWritten = await fetchAndDecrypt(
api,
@@ -309,9 +305,7 @@ export const downloadThumbnail = async (
outPath?: string,
onProgress?: ProgressCallback,
): Promise<DownloadResult> => {
const resolvedPath =
outPath ??
`thumb_${sanitizeFileName(file.metadata.title, `file-${file.id}`)}`;
const resolvedPath = outPath ?? `thumb_${file.metadata.title}`;
const header = fromBase64(file.thumbnail.decryptionHeader);
const bytesWritten = await fetchAndDecrypt(
api,
-37
View File
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
// File names built from server-supplied metadata.
//
// A file's title and a collection's name are decrypted from data the server
// hands us, and quak does not trust the server. Any name taken from them and
// used on disk goes through here, so it can only ever name one file inside the
// directory the caller chose: never a path, never `..`, never hidden, never a
// Windows device name.
//
// A path the user typed (`--out`, `outPath`) is not passed through here: the
// caller is trusted, the server is not.
import { extname } from "node:path";
// Path separators, characters Windows forbids in file names, and control
// characters (NUL included).
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
const UNSAFE_CHARACTERS = /[/\\:*?"<>|\x00-\x1f\x7f]/g;
// Names Windows reserves for devices, with or without an extension.
const RESERVED_DEVICE_NAME = /^(con|prn|aux|nul|com[1-9]|lpt[1-9])(\.|$)/i;
// `name` made safe to use as a single file name. Each unsafe character becomes
// `_`, a leading run of dots becomes one `_`, and a device name gets a leading
// `_`. A name with none of these comes back unchanged. An empty name becomes
// `fallback`, which the caller derives from the record's ID.
export const sanitizeFileName = (name: string, fallback: string): string => {
if (name === "") return fallback;
const cleaned = name.replace(UNSAFE_CHARACTERS, "_").replace(/^\.+/, "_");
return RESERVED_DEVICE_NAME.test(cleaned) ? `_${cleaned}` : cleaned;
};
// The extension of `title` (".jpg"), or ".bin" when it has none or it holds
// anything but letters and digits.
export const safeExtension = (title: string): string => {
const ext = extname(title);
return /^\.[A-Za-z0-9]+$/.test(ext) ? ext : ".bin";
};
+4 -3
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ import {
downloadThumbnail,
type ProgressCallback,
} from "../download/index.js";
import { safeExtension } from "../filename.js";
import type { EnteFile } from "../model/types.js";
import type { Priority, RequestPools } from "./pools.js";
@@ -210,8 +209,10 @@ class AbortDrop extends Error {
}
}
const originalName = (file: EnteFile): string =>
`${file.id}${safeExtension(file.metadata.title)}`;
const originalName = (file: EnteFile): string => {
const ext = extname(file.metadata.title || "") || ".bin";
return `${file.id}${ext}`;
};
// The fileID a cache filename encodes, or undefined when the name is not one
// the cache writes (`<digits><ext>`).
+4 -2
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import * as jpeg from "jpeg-js";
import exifReader from "exif-reader";
import type { Client } from "./client.js";
import type { Library, Photo } from "./library/index.js";
import { sanitizeFileName } from "./filename.js";
import { fetchMLData } from "./mldata-fetch.js";
import type { EnteFile } from "./model/types.js";
@@ -15,6 +14,9 @@ export interface MetadataBackupOptions {
onProgress?: ProgressCallback;
}
const sanitizePath = (name: string): string =>
name.replace(/[/\\:*?"<>|]/g, "_").replace(/^\.+/, "_");
// Extract the raw EXIF APP1 segment from JPEG bytes. Returns the EXIF
// data buffer (starting after the APP1 length field, at the "Exif\0\0"
// header) or undefined if no APP1 marker is found.
@@ -149,7 +151,7 @@ export const runMetadataBackup = async (
const col = lib.getCollection(album.collectionID);
if (!col) continue;
const dirName = `${col.id}-${sanitizeFileName(col.name, "unnamed")}`;
const dirName = `${col.id}-${sanitizePath(col.name || "unnamed")}`;
const colDir = join(outDir, "collections", dirName);
mkdirSync(colDir, { recursive: true });
+1 -10
View File
@@ -98,18 +98,9 @@ export const decryptFile = (
key,
);
const metadataJSON = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(metadataBytes));
if (
typeof metadataJSON !== "object" ||
metadataJSON === null ||
Array.isArray(metadataJSON)
) {
throw new Error(`file ${raw.id}: metadata is not a JSON object`);
}
const metadata: FileMetadata = {
// The server controls this JSON: a title that is missing or not a
// string becomes "", never an arbitrary value.
title: typeof metadataJSON.title === "string" ? metadataJSON.title : "",
title: metadataJSON.title ?? "",
fileType: parseFileType(metadataJSON.fileType ?? -1),
creationTime: metadataJSON.creationTime ?? 0,
modificationTime: metadataJSON.modificationTime ?? 0,
+2 -53
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ import {
lstatSync,
mkdirSync,
mkdtempSync,
readdirSync,
readFileSync,
readlinkSync,
rmSync,
@@ -108,29 +107,6 @@ class MockClient {
}
}
// A server that names an album and a file so as to climb out of the backup
// directory.
class HostileClient extends MockClient {
override async collectionsSince(): Promise<CollectionsPage> {
const page = await super.collectionsSince();
return {
...page,
collections: page.collections.length
? [collection(3, "../escape")]
: [],
};
}
override async filesSince(args: {
collectionID: number;
}): Promise<FilesPage> {
const files =
args.collectionID === 3
? [file(300, 3, "../../.ssh/authorized_keys")]
: [];
return { files, deleted: [], cursor: 1 };
}
}
// A content source that writes byte buffers of the expected length and can be
// told to fail one fileID's original, to exercise per-file resilience.
interface StubSource extends ContentSource {
@@ -160,12 +136,9 @@ const stubSource = (): StubSource => {
let root: string;
const openLibrary = (
source: ContentSource,
client: MockClient = new MockClient(),
): Promise<Library> =>
const openLibrary = (source: ContentSource): Promise<Library> =>
Library.open({
client,
client: new MockClient(),
cacheDirectory: join(root, "cache"),
contentSource: source,
refreshIntervalSeconds: 3600,
@@ -270,30 +243,6 @@ describe("lib.backup", () => {
lib.close();
});
it("keeps server-supplied album and file names inside the backup", async () => {
const lib = await openLibrary(stubSource(), new HostileClient());
const outDir = join(root, "backup");
const result = await lib.backup({ downloadDirectory: outDir });
expect(result.failed).toBe(0);
// The title has no usable extension, so the original is `.bin`.
expect(existsSync(join(outDir, "originals", "300.bin"))).toBe(true);
const link = join(
outDir,
"collections",
"__escape",
"__.._.ssh_authorized_keys",
);
expect(lstatSync(link).isSymbolicLink()).toBe(true);
expect(existsSync(join(outDir, "collections", "__escape.json"))).toBe(
true,
);
// Nothing landed beside or above the backup directory.
expect(readdirSync(root).sort()).toEqual(["backup", "cache"]);
lib.close();
});
it("is an idempotent no-op when every original is already present", async () => {
const source = stubSource();
const lib = await openLibrary(source);
+3 -5
View File
@@ -165,15 +165,14 @@ const buildMetaMock = async (): Promise<MetaMockState> => {
},
};
// Collection 2: "../Work" with no magic metadata. The server chose a name
// that tries to climb out of the backup directory.
// Collection 2: "Work" with no magic metadata
const ck2 = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const { ciphertext: encCK2, nonce: ck2N } = encryptSecretbox(
ck2,
masterKey,
);
const { ciphertext: encCN2, nonce: cn2N } = encryptSecretbox(
new TextEncoder().encode("../Work"),
new TextEncoder().encode("Work"),
ck2,
);
const rawColl2 = {
@@ -497,8 +496,7 @@ describe("quak backup-metadata", () => {
await runBackup(outDir);
const collDirs = readdirSync(join(outDir, "collections"));
// "../Work" is sanitized into one directory name.
expect(collDirs.sort()).toEqual(["10-Vacation", "20-__Work"]);
expect(collDirs.length).toBe(2);
// Find the Vacation collection dir (prefixed with ID)
const vacDir = collDirs.find((d) => d.includes("Vacation"))!;
-18
View File
@@ -64,24 +64,6 @@ describe("CLI file output (issue #52)", () => {
expect(thumbnailName(renamedFile)).toBe(`thumb_${RAW_TITLE}`);
});
it("sanitizes the title when naming `quak get` downloads", () => {
// Without `--out`, the server-supplied title names the file, so it must
// not be able to point outside the working directory.
const hostile = {
...renamedFile,
metadata: { ...renamedFile.metadata, title: "../../.bashrc" },
};
expect(originalName(hostile)).toBe("__.._.bashrc");
expect(thumbnailName(hostile)).toBe("thumb___.._.bashrc");
const untitled = {
...renamedFile,
metadata: { ...renamedFile.metadata, title: "" },
};
expect(originalName(untitled)).toBe("file-100");
expect(thumbnailName(untitled)).toBe("thumb_file-100");
});
it("does not use the editedName/editedTime projection", () => {
const record = deriveRecords([], [renamedFile]).photos.get(100);
// The projection prefers the edits and reports milliseconds; the CLI
+11 -78
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@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@
import {
existsSync,
mkdirSync,
readdirSync,
readFileSync,
rmSync,
@@ -502,22 +501,6 @@ const entryPoints = [
{ name: "downloadThumbnail", download: downloadThumbnail },
];
// With no `outPath`, the destination is named after `metadata.title`, relative
// to the working directory. Such tests run inside a temporary directory:
// `make check` must not create files in the repo root.
const inDirectory = async <T>(
dir: string,
run: () => Promise<T>,
): Promise<T> => {
const previous = process.cwd();
process.chdir(dir);
try {
return await run();
} finally {
process.chdir(previous);
}
};
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -553,59 +536,26 @@ describe("downloadFile", () => {
});
it("uses metadata.title as filename when outPath is omitted", async () => {
// With no `outPath`, the destination is `metadata.title`, used
// verbatim as a path. The title here is therefore given inside the
// test's temporary directory: a bare relative name would resolve
// against the process working directory, i.e. the repo root, and
// `make check` must not create files in the repo — a failure between
// the write and any cleanup would leave one behind.
const plaintext = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]);
const key = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();
const { header, ciphertext } = encryptFileBody(plaintext, key);
const thumbPush =
sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_push(key);
const file = buildMockEnteFile(key, header, thumbPush.header);
file.metadata.title = "fallback-name.png";
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(testDir, "title-"));
const titlePath = join(testDir, "fallback-name.png");
file.metadata.title = titlePath;
const api = new ApiClient({ fetch: mockFetchForBody(ciphertext) });
const result = await inDirectory(dir, () => downloadFile(api, file));
const result = await downloadFile(api, file);
expect(result.path).toBe("fallback-name.png");
expect(readFileSync(join(dir, "fallback-name.png"))).toEqual(
Buffer.from(plaintext),
);
});
it("keeps a hostile title inside the working directory", async () => {
// The server controls the title. `../escaped.png` must not write to
// the parent directory; it becomes one file name in the current one.
const { api, file } = fixtureFor(
multiChunkKey,
multiChunk.header,
multiChunk.body,
);
file.metadata.title = "../escaped.png";
const parent = mkdtempSync(join(testDir, "hostile-"));
const dir = join(parent, "cwd");
mkdirSync(dir);
const result = await inDirectory(dir, () => downloadFile(api, file));
expect(result.path).toBe("__escaped.png");
expect(readdirSync(dir)).toEqual(["__escaped.png"]);
expect(readdirSync(parent)).toEqual(["cwd"]);
});
it("uses an explicit outPath verbatim, even one with ..", async () => {
// The caller is trusted: its path is not sanitized.
const { api, file } = fixtureFor(
multiChunkKey,
multiChunk.header,
multiChunk.body,
);
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(testDir, "explicit-"));
mkdirSync(join(dir, "sub"));
const outPath = join(dir, "sub", "..", "explicit.bin");
const result = await downloadFile(api, file, outPath);
expect(result.path).toBe(outPath);
expect(existsSync(join(dir, "explicit.bin"))).toBe(true);
expect(result.path).toBe(titlePath);
expect(readFileSync(result.path)).toEqual(Buffer.from(plaintext));
});
it("handles a larger single-chunk file (random binary payload)", async () => {
@@ -667,23 +617,6 @@ describe("downloadThumbnail", () => {
expect(result).toEqual({ path: outPath, bytesWritten: 4 });
expect(readFileSync(outPath)).toEqual(Buffer.from(plaintext));
});
it("names the thumbnail thumb_ plus the sanitized title", async () => {
const { api, file } = fixtureFor(
multiChunkKey,
multiChunk.header,
multiChunk.body,
);
file.metadata.title = "/etc/passwd";
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(testDir, "thumb-title-"));
const result = await inDirectory(dir, () =>
downloadThumbnail(api, file),
);
expect(result.path).toBe("thumb__etc_passwd");
expect(readdirSync(dir)).toEqual(["thumb__etc_passwd"]);
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-93
View File
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
// File names built from server-supplied metadata.
//
// quak does not trust the server. A file's title and a collection's name are
// decrypted from data the server hands us, and a hostile server (or a
// compromised account) can set them to anything. quak uses them to name files
// on disk: `quak get` without `--out`, `downloadFile` without `outPath`, the
// backup's symlink and collection directories, and the extension of every file
// in the originals cache. Each of those goes through `sanitizeFileName` or
// `safeExtension`, so a title can only ever name one file inside the directory
// the caller chose.
//
// A path the user supplies (`--out`, `outPath`) is never sanitized: the caller
// is trusted, the server is not.
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { safeExtension, sanitizeFileName } from "../../src/filename.js";
const FALLBACK = "file-42";
describe("sanitizeFileName", () => {
it("passes a normal title through unchanged", () => {
expect(sanitizeFileName("IMG_0001.HEIC", FALLBACK)).toBe(
"IMG_0001.HEIC",
);
expect(sanitizeFileName("Holiday 2024 (1).jpg", FALLBACK)).toBe(
"Holiday 2024 (1).jpg",
);
expect(sanitizeFileName("café.jpg", FALLBACK)).toBe("café.jpg");
});
it("cannot climb out of the directory with ../", () => {
// Without sanitizing, this would overwrite the user's SSH keys.
expect(sanitizeFileName("../../.ssh/authorized_keys", FALLBACK)).toBe(
"__.._.ssh_authorized_keys",
);
expect(sanitizeFileName("..", FALLBACK)).toBe("_");
expect(sanitizeFileName("..\\..\\x", FALLBACK)).toBe("__.._x");
});
it("cannot name an absolute path", () => {
expect(sanitizeFileName("/etc/passwd", FALLBACK)).toBe("_etc_passwd");
expect(sanitizeFileName("C:\\Windows\\x.dll", FALLBACK)).toBe(
"C__Windows_x.dll",
);
});
it("replaces embedded separators, so the name stays one file", () => {
expect(sanitizeFileName("a/b\\c.jpg", FALLBACK)).toBe("a_b_c.jpg");
});
it("replaces NUL and other control characters", () => {
// A NUL truncates the path in C code and makes Node's fs throw.
expect(sanitizeFileName("evil\0.jpg", FALLBACK)).toBe("evil_.jpg");
expect(sanitizeFileName("line\nbreak\x7f.jpg", FALLBACK)).toBe(
"line_break_.jpg",
);
});
it("does not produce a hidden file", () => {
expect(sanitizeFileName(".bashrc", FALLBACK)).toBe("_bashrc");
});
it("does not produce a Windows device name", () => {
expect(sanitizeFileName("CON", FALLBACK)).toBe("_CON");
expect(sanitizeFileName("nul.txt", FALLBACK)).toBe("_nul.txt");
expect(sanitizeFileName("LPT1", FALLBACK)).toBe("_LPT1");
// Only the exact names are reserved.
expect(sanitizeFileName("console.jpg", FALLBACK)).toBe("console.jpg");
});
it("falls back to the given name for an empty title", () => {
expect(sanitizeFileName("", FALLBACK)).toBe(FALLBACK);
});
});
describe("safeExtension", () => {
it("keeps a normal extension", () => {
expect(safeExtension("IMG_0001.HEIC")).toBe(".HEIC");
expect(safeExtension("clip.mp4")).toBe(".mp4");
});
it("uses .bin when there is no extension", () => {
expect(safeExtension("")).toBe(".bin");
expect(safeExtension("README")).toBe(".bin");
});
it("uses .bin when the extension holds anything but letters and digits", () => {
expect(safeExtension("x.j\\..\\pg")).toBe(".bin");
expect(safeExtension("x.jp g")).toBe(".bin");
expect(safeExtension("x.jpg\0")).toBe(".bin");
});
});
-19
View File
@@ -226,25 +226,6 @@ describe("ContentCache.original / thumbnail", () => {
expect(skips).toEqual(["skipped"]);
});
it("takes only a letters-and-digits extension from the title", async () => {
// The title comes from the server; an extension such as `.\..\x`
// must not reach the cache file name, so it becomes `.bin`.
const { cache } = buildCache({
files: [file(1, "a.jpg"), file(2, "b.\\..\\x"), file(3, "")],
});
await cache.open();
expect((await cache.original(1)).path).toBe(
join(cacheDir, "originals", "1.jpg"),
);
expect((await cache.original(2)).path).toBe(
join(cacheDir, "originals", "2.bin"),
);
expect((await cache.original(3)).path).toBe(
join(cacheDir, "originals", "3.bin"),
);
});
it("serves a file already present in the download directory without fetching", async () => {
const downloadDirectory = join(root, "backup");
mkdirSync(join(downloadDirectory, "originals"), { recursive: true });
+3 -33
View File
@@ -146,13 +146,10 @@ const buildSharedRawCollection = (
const buildRawFile = (
collectionKey: Uint8Array,
opts?: {
// Any JSON value; `undefined` leaves the title out of the metadata.
title?: unknown;
title?: string;
fileType?: number;
creationTime?: number;
info?: { fileSize?: number; thumbSize?: number };
// Replaces the whole metadata JSON value.
metadata?: unknown;
},
): RawEnteFile => {
const fileKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
@@ -161,8 +158,8 @@ const buildRawFile = (
collectionKey,
);
const defaultMetadata = {
title: opts && "title" in opts ? opts.title : "IMG_0001.jpg",
const metadata = {
title: opts?.title ?? "IMG_0001.jpg",
fileType: opts?.fileType ?? 0,
creationTime: opts?.creationTime ?? 1700000000000000,
modificationTime: 1700000000000000,
@@ -170,8 +167,6 @@ const buildRawFile = (
longitude: 2.3522,
hash: "abcdef1234567890",
};
const metadata =
opts && "metadata" in opts ? opts.metadata : defaultMetadata;
// File metadata is encrypted as a single-chunk secretstream blob
// (not secretbox). The decryptionHeader is the secretstream init header.
const metadataBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(metadata));
@@ -326,31 +321,6 @@ describe("model.decryptFile", () => {
expect(file.metadata.longitude).toBeCloseTo(2.3522);
});
it("reads a missing or non-string title as an empty string", () => {
// The server controls the metadata JSON. A title that is not a
// string must not reach code that builds file names from it.
const masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const { collectionKey } = buildRawCollection(masterKey);
for (const title of [undefined, null, 42, ["a"], { x: "../y" }]) {
const file = decryptFile(
buildRawFile(collectionKey, { title }),
collectionKey,
);
expect(file.metadata.title).toBe("");
}
});
it("rejects metadata that is not a JSON object", () => {
const masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const { collectionKey } = buildRawCollection(masterKey);
for (const metadata of [null, "IMG_0001.jpg", 7, []]) {
const raw = buildRawFile(collectionKey, { metadata });
expect(() => decryptFile(raw, collectionKey)).toThrow(
"file 200: metadata is not a JSON object",
);
}
});
it("maps fileType numbers to FileType strings", () => {
// Ente uses: 0=image, 1=video, 2=livePhoto
const masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();