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Author SHA1 Message Date
88510a3ff5 Add TODO.md
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check / check (push) Failing after 5s
2026-07-06 20:35:46 +02:00
6c26e3ccb7 Merge: skip deleted-collection tombstones in listCollections 2026-06-10 11:49:48 -07:00
d0b4ee979e Green: filter isDeleted tombstones out of listCollections 2026-06-10 11:49:45 -07:00
cb9ac29cb4 Red: listCollections must drop deleted-collection tombstones
/collections/v2 is a sync API: deleted collections remain in the
response forever with isDeleted: true, and their /collections/v2/diff
endpoint returns HTTP 404. A long-lived account accumulates hundreds
of tombstones, so any caller that iterates listCollections() output
(backup, backup-metadata) dies on the first one.
2026-06-10 11:49:11 -07:00
6a9e41a2ee Merge: decrypt collections shared by other users (sealed-box keys) 2026-06-10 11:46:54 -07:00
15d2effc2d Green: unseal shared collection keys with the account keypair
decryptCollection now takes the full key material {masterKey,
publicKey, secretKey} and dispatches on keyDecryptionNonce: present
means an owned collection (secretbox under the master key), absent
means a shared collection (sealed box to our public key). Client
already held the keypair for unsealing the auth token, so it just
passes it through.
2026-06-10 11:46:51 -07:00
59e0aa7d47 Red: shared collections arrive as sealed boxes with no keyDecryptionNonce
Collections shared with the account are not encrypted with the master
key: the sharer only knows the recipient's public key, so the server
delivers encryptedKey as crypto_box_seal to that key and omits
keyDecryptionNonce entirely. decryptCollection assumed the owned-only
wire format and crashed on fromBase64(undefined) for any account with
an incoming shared album, taking down listCollections and every
command built on it (backup, backup-metadata, ...).

The previous "shared" fixture was unfaithful (secretbox + nonce with a
foreign ownerID, a shape the server never sends), which is why the
suite stayed green. These tests model the real wire format and change
decryptCollection to take the full key material {masterKey, publicKey,
secretKey} so it can unseal shared collection keys.
2026-06-10 11:41:36 -07:00
b86ac2cd20 Merge: fix dual-2FA login against real server (empty-string fields) 2026-06-10 11:26:18 -07:00
68d8cfb7fe Green: treat empty-string 2FA session fields as absent
Use || instead of ?? when picking the TOTP session ID. The server
sends "" for unset 2FA fields (no omitempty), and "" ?? v2
short-circuits to "", which made dual-2FA accounts fall through to
the unsupported passkey branch.
2026-06-10 11:26:15 -07:00
2c51074294 Red: mock server must serialize empty 2FA fields like Go does
The museum server's EmailAuthorizationResponse declares
passkeySessionID, accountsUrl, twoFactorSessionID, and
twoFactorSessionIDV2 without `omitempty`, so Go always sends them,
as "" when unset. The previous mock omitted the unset fields
entirely, which let the ?? -based dispatch pass in tests while the
real server's "" defeated it and dual-2FA logins fell through to
the unsupported passkey branch.
2026-06-10 11:25:25 -07:00
11 changed files with 344 additions and 51 deletions

44
TODO.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
# Status
pre-1.0
# Next Step
Implement the download retry policy from the README TODO: no retry on 4xx,
exponential backoff on 5xx and network errors. Apply it to file and
thumbnail downloads, cover it with mock-server tests, and update the
README TODO checkbox.
# Completed Steps
- 2026-06-10: Decrypted collections shared by other users (sealed-box
keys); listCollections drops deleted-collection tombstones.
- 2026-06-10: Login hardening: dual-2FA empty-string fields handled, TOTP
preferred when a passkey is also enrolled, interactive input via
@inquirer/prompts.
- 2026-06-10: Replaced sharp with pure JS (jpeg-js + exif-reader); added
single-binary bun build and make install.
- 2026-06-09: Added backup-metadata command (ML data always included,
--exif opt-in); rewrote README to match the implementation; added
thumbnail helper tests.
- 2026-05-13: Full CLI surface: login, backup with dedup symlink layout,
collections, files, get, get-thumb, thumbnail repair helpers.
- 2026-05-13: Client OO API with literate usage tests; file download and
decryption; all three metadata layers decrypted and persisted; renamed
quack to quak.
- 2026-05-11: SRP login flow (email OTP + TOTP) and ApiClient.
# Future Steps
- Retry policy: no retry on 4xx, exponential backoff on 5xx and network
errors (the Next Step).
- Update the README API reference section to match the current
implementation.
- Make `make docker` green.
- Tag v1.0.0.
- Future desktop client, separate repo:
- Electron app skeleton consuming this library.
- Local SQLite cache keyed on (collectionID, fileID, updationTime).
- Background sync worker streaming new files into the cache.
- Gallery UI: thumbnails, full-image view, basic search.
- Upload, delete, and share operations in the library.

View File

@@ -76,8 +76,12 @@ const srpHandshake = async (
// twoFactorSessionIDV2 is set (instead of twoFactorSessionID) when the
// account has BOTH passkeys and TOTP. Prefer TOTP: a CLI cannot perform
// a WebAuthn ceremony, and the user has a TOTP secret enrolled.
//
// The server marshals these fields without `omitempty`, so unset fields
// arrive as "" rather than being absent. Use || (not ??) so empty
// strings are treated as not-set.
const totpSessionID =
verifyResponse.twoFactorSessionID ??
verifyResponse.twoFactorSessionID ||
verifyResponse.twoFactorSessionIDV2;
if (totpSessionID) {
return { kind: "totp", sessionID: totpSessionID };

View File

@@ -155,9 +155,21 @@ export class Client {
const { collections } = await this.api.getJSON<{
collections: RawCollection[];
}>("/collections/v2", { sinceTime: 0 });
return collections.map((raw) =>
decryptCollection(raw, this.masterKey, this.userID),
);
// The sync API keeps returning deleted collections as tombstones
// (isDeleted: true); their diff endpoint 404s, so drop them.
return collections
.filter((raw) => !raw.isDeleted)
.map((raw) =>
decryptCollection(
raw,
{
masterKey: this.masterKey,
publicKey: this.publicKey,
secretKey: this.secretKey,
},
this.userID,
),
);
}
async listFiles(

View File

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ export type {
FileBlob,
FileMetadata,
FileType,
KeyMaterial,
Microseconds,
RawCollection,
RawEnteFile,

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,16 @@
import { decryptBlob, decryptBox, fromBase64 } from "../crypto/index.js";
import {
decryptBlob,
decryptBox,
decryptSealed,
fromBase64,
} from "../crypto/index.js";
import type {
Collection,
CollectionType,
EnteFile,
FileMetadata,
FileType,
KeyMaterial,
RawCollection,
RawEnteFile,
RawMagicMetadata,
@@ -30,14 +36,25 @@ const parseFileType = (n: number): FileType => FILE_TYPE_MAP[n] ?? "unknown";
export const decryptCollection = (
raw: RawCollection,
masterKey: Uint8Array,
keys: KeyMaterial,
currentUserID?: number,
): Collection => {
const key = decryptBox(
fromBase64(raw.encryptedKey),
fromBase64(raw.keyDecryptionNonce),
masterKey,
);
// Owned collections carry their key as a secretbox under our master
// key, with the nonce in keyDecryptionNonce. Collections shared with
// us carry it as an anonymous sealed box to our public key and have
// no keyDecryptionNonce at all (sealed boxes embed an ephemeral
// public key instead).
const key = raw.keyDecryptionNonce
? decryptBox(
fromBase64(raw.encryptedKey),
fromBase64(raw.keyDecryptionNonce),
keys.masterKey,
)
: decryptSealed(
fromBase64(raw.encryptedKey),
keys.publicKey,
keys.secretKey,
);
let name = "";
if (raw.encryptedName && raw.nameDecryptionNonce) {

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@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ export type {
FileBlob,
FileMetadata,
FileType,
KeyMaterial,
Microseconds,
RawCollection,
RawEnteFile,

View File

@@ -50,13 +50,25 @@ export interface EnteFile {
updationTime: Microseconds;
}
// The key material a logged-in client holds, everything needed to decrypt
// any collection: the master key (secretbox for owned collection keys) and
// the X25519 keypair (sealed box for collection keys shared with us).
export interface KeyMaterial {
masterKey: Uint8Array;
publicKey: Uint8Array;
secretKey: Uint8Array;
}
// Raw shapes as they arrive from the Ente API, before decryption.
export interface RawCollection {
id: number;
owner: { id: number };
encryptedKey: string;
keyDecryptionNonce: string;
// Absent for collections shared with us: their encryptedKey is a
// sealed box to our public key, which embeds an ephemeral public key
// instead of using a nonce.
keyDecryptionNonce?: string;
encryptedName?: string;
nameDecryptionNonce?: string;
type: string;

View File

@@ -200,11 +200,25 @@ const buildMockFetch = (
srpServer.checkM1(Buffer.from(body.srpM1, "base64"));
const M2 = srpServer.computeM2();
// IMPORTANT: the museum server's EmailAuthorizationResponse
// (server/ente/user.go) declares passkeySessionID, accountsUrl,
// twoFactorSessionID, and twoFactorSessionIDV2 WITHOUT the
// `omitempty` JSON tag. Go therefore always serializes them,
// sending "" (empty string, NOT null/absent) for any that do
// not apply. These mocks must reproduce that faithfully: a
// client that distinguishes fields with `??` instead of `||`
// passes against an omitting mock but breaks against the real
// server.
if (opts?.requireTOTP) {
return new Response(
JSON.stringify({
id: 42,
srpM2: M2.toString("base64"),
passkeySessionID: "",
accountsUrl: "",
twoFactorSessionID: "totp-session-999",
twoFactorSessionIDV2: "",
}),
{
status: 200,
@@ -218,11 +232,14 @@ const buildMockFetch = (
// server sets passkeySessionID + twoFactorSessionIDV2 (not
// twoFactorSessionID -- that's deliberate, so old clients
// that only know the V1 field keep using the passkey flow).
// The V1 field is still present on the wire as "".
return new Response(
JSON.stringify({
id: 42,
srpM2: M2.toString("base64"),
passkeySessionID: "passkey-session-123",
accountsUrl: "https://accounts.ente.io",
twoFactorSessionID: "",
twoFactorSessionIDV2: "totp-session-v2-456",
}),
{
@@ -238,6 +255,10 @@ const buildMockFetch = (
id: 42,
keyAttributes: fixture.keyAttributes,
encryptedToken: fixture.encryptedToken,
passkeySessionID: "",
accountsUrl: "",
twoFactorSessionID: "",
twoFactorSessionIDV2: "",
}),
{
status: 200,

View File

@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ interface ServerState {
thumbHeader: Uint8Array;
thumbCiphertext: Uint8Array;
collectionKey: Uint8Array;
sharedCollectionKey: Uint8Array;
}
let server: ServerState;
@@ -211,6 +212,69 @@ const buildServer = async (): Promise<ServerState> => {
updationTime: 1700000000000000,
};
// A collection another user shared WITH us. The sharer does not have
// our master key, only our public key, so the real server delivers the
// collection key as an anonymous sealed box (crypto_box_seal) to our
// public key and the response carries NO keyDecryptionNonce. Every
// account with an incoming shared album has one of these in its
// /collections/v2 response, so the mock must include one too.
const sharedCollectionKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const sealedSharedKey = sodium.crypto_box_seal(
sharedCollectionKey,
kp.publicKey,
);
const sharedNameNonce = sodium.randombytes_buf(
sodium.crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES,
);
const encSharedName = sodium.crypto_secretbox_easy(
new TextEncoder().encode("Friend's Wedding"),
sharedNameNonce,
sharedCollectionKey,
);
const rawSharedCollection = {
id: 2,
owner: { id: 99 },
encryptedKey: toBase64(sealedSharedKey),
encryptedName: toBase64(encSharedName),
nameDecryptionNonce: toBase64(sharedNameNonce),
type: "album",
updationTime: 1700000000000000,
};
// A DELETED collection. /collections/v2 is a sync API: deleted
// collections stay in the response forever as tombstones with
// isDeleted: true (a long-lived real account accumulates hundreds).
// Their keys still decrypt, but /collections/v2/diff returns
// HTTP 404 for them, so they must never surface from
// listCollections(); a client that naively iterates them dies on
// the first deleted album.
const deletedKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const dkNonce = sodium.randombytes_buf(sodium.crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES);
const encDeletedKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_easy(
deletedKey,
dkNonce,
masterKey,
);
const deletedNameNonce = sodium.randombytes_buf(
sodium.crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES,
);
const encDeletedName = sodium.crypto_secretbox_easy(
new TextEncoder().encode("Old Album"),
deletedNameNonce,
deletedKey,
);
const rawDeletedCollection = {
id: 3,
owner: { id: 42 },
encryptedKey: toBase64(encDeletedKey),
keyDecryptionNonce: toBase64(dkNonce),
encryptedName: toBase64(encDeletedName),
nameDecryptionNonce: toBase64(deletedNameNonce),
type: "album",
updationTime: 1700000000000000,
isDeleted: true,
};
const rawFile = {
id: 100,
collectionID: 1,
@@ -230,6 +294,10 @@ const buildServer = async (): Promise<ServerState> => {
// can return them. This is ugly plumbing; in a real program you
// never see any of it.
(globalThis as Record<string, unknown>).__mockRawCollection = rawCollection;
(globalThis as Record<string, unknown>).__mockRawSharedCollection =
rawSharedCollection;
(globalThis as Record<string, unknown>).__mockRawDeletedCollection =
rawDeletedCollection;
(globalThis as Record<string, unknown>).__mockRawFile = rawFile;
return {
@@ -253,6 +321,7 @@ const buildServer = async (): Promise<ServerState> => {
thumbHeader: thumbPush.header,
thumbCiphertext,
collectionKey,
sharedCollectionKey,
};
};
@@ -303,9 +372,14 @@ const buildMockFetch = (s: ServerState) => {
});
}
if (path === "/collections/v2") {
const raw = (globalThis as Record<string, unknown>)
.__mockRawCollection;
return json({ collections: [raw] });
const g = globalThis as Record<string, unknown>;
return json({
collections: [
g.__mockRawCollection,
g.__mockRawSharedCollection,
g.__mockRawDeletedCollection,
],
});
}
if (path === "/collections/v2/diff") {
const raw = (globalThis as Record<string, unknown>).__mockRawFile;
@@ -412,6 +486,10 @@ describe("quak Client usage guide", () => {
* encryption key. `listCollections()` fetches them from the server,
* decrypts the keys and names, and returns typed objects.
*
* This works transparently for both kinds of collection: ones you
* own (key encrypted with your master key) and ones shared with you
* (key sealed to your public key, flagged with `isShared: true`).
*
* ```ts
* const collections = await client.listCollections();
* for (const c of collections) {
@@ -419,7 +497,7 @@ describe("quak Client usage guide", () => {
* }
* ```
*/
it("3. list and decrypt collections", async () => {
it("3. list and decrypt collections, owned and shared", async () => {
const client = await Client.login({
email: TEST_EMAIL,
password: TEST_PASSWORD,
@@ -428,12 +506,25 @@ describe("quak Client usage guide", () => {
const collections = await client.listCollections();
expect(collections.length).toBe(1);
expect(collections[0]!.name).toBe("Vacation");
expect(collections[0]!.type).toBe("album");
expect(collections[0]!.id).toBe(1);
// The mock server also returns a deleted collection (id 3).
// Deleted collections are tombstones in the sync protocol: their
// file diff endpoint 404s, so listCollections must drop them.
expect(collections.length).toBe(2);
expect(collections.find((c) => c.id === 3)).toBeUndefined();
const owned = collections.find((c) => c.id === 1)!;
expect(owned.name).toBe("Vacation");
expect(owned.type).toBe("album");
expect(owned.isShared).toBe(false);
// The decrypted collection key is available for advanced use.
expect(collections[0]!.key.length).toBe(32);
expect(owned.key.length).toBe(32);
const shared = collections.find((c) => c.id === 2)!;
expect(shared.name).toBe("Friend's Wedding");
expect(shared.isShared).toBe(true);
// The key was unsealed with our keypair; the decrypted name above
// already proves it round-trips, but check it exactly too.
expect(shared.key).toEqual(server.sharedCollectionKey);
});
/**

View File

@@ -25,7 +25,10 @@ const main = async () => {
process.exit(1);
}
const { masterKey, token } = await unwrapAuth(challenge.response, PASSWORD);
const { masterKey, secretKey, publicKey, token } = await unwrapAuth(
challenge.response,
PASSWORD,
);
api.setAuthToken(token);
console.log("Logged in, user ID:", challenge.response.id);
@@ -37,7 +40,7 @@ const main = async () => {
const userID = challenge.response.id;
const collections = rawCollections.map((raw) =>
decryptCollection(raw, masterKey, userID),
decryptCollection(raw, { masterKey, publicKey, secretKey }, userID),
);
console.log(`${collections.length} collection(s):`);

View File

@@ -7,12 +7,27 @@
*
* ## Collection decryption
*
* The server stores each collection's encryption key sealed under the
* owner's master key (secretbox). The collection's name is then sealed
* under that collection key (also secretbox). `decryptCollection`:
* How a collection's key is encrypted depends on who owns it:
*
* 1. decryptBox(encryptedKey, keyDecryptionNonce, masterKey) -> collectionKey
* 2. decryptBox(encryptedName, nameDecryptionNonce, collectionKey) -> name (UTF-8)
* OWNED collections (owner == current user): the collection key is a
* secretbox under the owner's master key, and `keyDecryptionNonce`
* carries the nonce.
*
* SHARED collections (owned by someone else, shared with us): the owner
* does not have our master key, so the server instead carries the
* collection key as an anonymous SEALED BOX (crypto_box_seal) to our
* X25519 public key, and `keyDecryptionNonce` is ABSENT from the wire
* (sealed boxes embed an ephemeral public key instead of a nonce).
*
* `decryptCollection` therefore takes the full key material (master key
* plus keypair) and dispatches on the presence of `keyDecryptionNonce`:
*
* 1a. nonce present: decryptBox(encryptedKey, keyDecryptionNonce,
* masterKey) -> collectionKey
* 1b. nonce absent: decryptSealed(encryptedKey, publicKey, secretKey)
* -> collectionKey
* 2. decryptBox(encryptedName, nameDecryptionNonce, collectionKey)
* -> name (UTF-8)
* 3. Maps the string `type` field to a CollectionType union member
* 4. Returns a Collection with decrypted key, name, and type
*
@@ -38,12 +53,28 @@ import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers-sumo";
import { beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { init, toBase64 } from "../../src/crypto/index.js";
import { decryptCollection, decryptFile } from "../../src/model/index.js";
import type { RawCollection, RawEnteFile } from "../../src/model/index.js";
import type {
KeyMaterial,
RawCollection,
RawEnteFile,
} from "../../src/model/index.js";
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// The full set of key material a logged-in client holds: the master key
// (decrypts owned collection keys) and the X25519 keypair (unseals shared
// collection keys and the auth token).
const buildKeys = (): KeyMaterial => {
const kp = sodium.crypto_box_keypair();
return {
masterKey: sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen(),
publicKey: kp.publicKey,
secretKey: kp.privateKey,
};
};
const secretboxEncrypt = (
plaintext: Uint8Array,
key: Uint8Array,
@@ -80,6 +111,38 @@ const buildRawCollection = (
return { raw, collectionKey };
};
// A collection shared with us by another user. The wire format differs
// from owned collections in two ways, both verified against the live
// api.ente.io: `encryptedKey` is an anonymous sealed box to OUR public
// key (80 bytes for a 32-byte key, vs 48 for a secretbox), and
// `keyDecryptionNonce` is entirely ABSENT from the JSON.
const buildSharedRawCollection = (
recipientPublicKey: Uint8Array,
opts?: { name?: string; ownerID?: number },
): { raw: RawCollection; collectionKey: Uint8Array } => {
const collectionKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const sealedKey = sodium.crypto_box_seal(collectionKey, recipientPublicKey);
const name = opts?.name ?? "Shared Album";
const { ciphertext: encName, nonce: nameNonce } = secretboxEncrypt(
new TextEncoder().encode(name),
collectionKey,
);
const raw: RawCollection = {
id: 101,
owner: { id: opts?.ownerID ?? 99 },
encryptedKey: toBase64(sealedKey),
// NOTE: no keyDecryptionNonce. Do not "fix" this fixture by adding
// one: its absence is exactly what the real server sends, and an
// unfaithful fixture here previously masked a crash on every
// account with an incoming shared album.
encryptedName: toBase64(encName),
nameDecryptionNonce: toBase64(nameNonce),
type: "album",
updationTime: 1700000000000000,
};
return { raw, collectionKey };
};
const buildRawFile = (
collectionKey: Uint8Array,
opts?: { title?: string; fileType?: number; creationTime?: number },
@@ -137,13 +200,13 @@ describe("model.decryptCollection", () => {
await sodium.ready;
});
it("decrypts the collection key and name from a raw server response", () => {
const masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const { raw, collectionKey } = buildRawCollection(masterKey, {
it("decrypts an owned collection key and name from a raw server response", () => {
const keys = buildKeys();
const { raw, collectionKey } = buildRawCollection(keys.masterKey, {
name: "Summer Photos",
});
const col = decryptCollection(raw, masterKey, 1);
const col = decryptCollection(raw, keys, 1);
expect(col.id).toBe(100);
expect(col.key).toEqual(collectionKey);
@@ -154,49 +217,73 @@ describe("model.decryptCollection", () => {
expect(col.isShared).toBe(false);
});
it("sets isShared when owner != current user", () => {
const masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const { raw } = buildRawCollection(masterKey, { ownerID: 99 });
it("decrypts a shared collection via sealed box when keyDecryptionNonce is absent", () => {
// A collection shared TO us is not encrypted with our master key:
// the sharer only knows our public key, so the collection key
// arrives as crypto_box_seal(collectionKey, ourPublicKey) and the
// response has NO keyDecryptionNonce. decryptCollection must
// recover the key with the keypair, then decrypt the name with it
// as usual. Accounts with any incoming shared album hit this path
// on every listCollections call.
const keys = buildKeys();
const { raw, collectionKey } = buildSharedRawCollection(
keys.publicKey,
{ name: "Friend's Wedding", ownerID: 99 },
);
const col = decryptCollection(raw, masterKey, 1);
const col = decryptCollection(raw, keys, 1);
expect(col.key).toEqual(collectionKey);
expect(col.name).toBe("Friend's Wedding");
expect(col.ownerID).toBe(99);
expect(col.isShared).toBe(true);
});
it("maps known type strings to CollectionType", () => {
const masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const keys = buildKeys();
for (const type of ["album", "folder", "favorites", "uncategorized"]) {
const { raw } = buildRawCollection(masterKey, { type });
const col = decryptCollection(raw, masterKey, 1);
const { raw } = buildRawCollection(keys.masterKey, { type });
const col = decryptCollection(raw, keys, 1);
expect(col.type).toBe(type);
}
});
it("maps unrecognised type strings to 'unknown'", () => {
const masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const { raw } = buildRawCollection(masterKey, {
const keys = buildKeys();
const { raw } = buildRawCollection(keys.masterKey, {
type: "someFutureType",
});
const col = decryptCollection(raw, masterKey, 1);
const col = decryptCollection(raw, keys, 1);
expect(col.type).toBe("unknown");
});
it("handles a collection with no encrypted name gracefully", () => {
// Some special collections (e.g. uncategorized) may have no name.
const masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const { raw } = buildRawCollection(masterKey);
const keys = buildKeys();
const { raw } = buildRawCollection(keys.masterKey);
delete raw.encryptedName;
delete raw.nameDecryptionNonce;
const col = decryptCollection(raw, masterKey, 1);
const col = decryptCollection(raw, keys, 1);
expect(col.name).toBe("");
});
it("throws when the master key is wrong", () => {
const masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const wrongKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
const { raw } = buildRawCollection(masterKey);
it("throws when the master key is wrong for an owned collection", () => {
const keys = buildKeys();
const { raw } = buildRawCollection(keys.masterKey);
expect(() => decryptCollection(raw, wrongKey, 1)).toThrow();
// buildKeys() generates fresh random key material, so this is a
// client holding the wrong master key.
expect(() => decryptCollection(raw, buildKeys(), 1)).toThrow();
});
it("throws when the keypair is wrong for a shared collection", () => {
const keys = buildKeys();
const { raw } = buildSharedRawCollection(keys.publicKey);
// A different keypair must not be able to unseal the key.
const wrongKeys = buildKeys();
expect(() => decryptCollection(raw, wrongKeys, 1)).toThrow();
});
});