Red: shared collections arrive as sealed boxes with no keyDecryptionNonce
Collections shared with the account are not encrypted with the master
key: the sharer only knows the recipient's public key, so the server
delivers encryptedKey as crypto_box_seal to that key and omits
keyDecryptionNonce entirely. decryptCollection assumed the owned-only
wire format and crashed on fromBase64(undefined) for any account with
an incoming shared album, taking down listCollections and every
command built on it (backup, backup-metadata, ...).
The previous "shared" fixture was unfaithful (secretbox + nonce with a
foreign ownerID, a shape the server never sends), which is why the
suite stayed green. These tests model the real wire format and change
decryptCollection to take the full key material {masterKey, publicKey,
secretKey} so it can unseal shared collection keys.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -7,12 +7,27 @@
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*
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* ## Collection decryption
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*
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* The server stores each collection's encryption key sealed under the
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* owner's master key (secretbox). The collection's name is then sealed
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* under that collection key (also secretbox). `decryptCollection`:
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* How a collection's key is encrypted depends on who owns it:
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*
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* 1. decryptBox(encryptedKey, keyDecryptionNonce, masterKey) -> collectionKey
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* 2. decryptBox(encryptedName, nameDecryptionNonce, collectionKey) -> name (UTF-8)
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* OWNED collections (owner == current user): the collection key is a
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* secretbox under the owner's master key, and `keyDecryptionNonce`
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* carries the nonce.
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*
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* SHARED collections (owned by someone else, shared with us): the owner
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* does not have our master key, so the server instead carries the
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* collection key as an anonymous SEALED BOX (crypto_box_seal) to our
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* X25519 public key, and `keyDecryptionNonce` is ABSENT from the wire
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* (sealed boxes embed an ephemeral public key instead of a nonce).
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*
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* `decryptCollection` therefore takes the full key material (master key
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* plus keypair) and dispatches on the presence of `keyDecryptionNonce`:
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*
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* 1a. nonce present: decryptBox(encryptedKey, keyDecryptionNonce,
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* masterKey) -> collectionKey
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* 1b. nonce absent: decryptSealed(encryptedKey, publicKey, secretKey)
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* -> collectionKey
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* 2. decryptBox(encryptedName, nameDecryptionNonce, collectionKey)
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* -> name (UTF-8)
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* 3. Maps the string `type` field to a CollectionType union member
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* 4. Returns a Collection with decrypted key, name, and type
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*
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@@ -38,12 +53,28 @@ import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers-sumo";
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import { beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { init, toBase64 } from "../../src/crypto/index.js";
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import { decryptCollection, decryptFile } from "../../src/model/index.js";
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import type { RawCollection, RawEnteFile } from "../../src/model/index.js";
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import type {
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KeyMaterial,
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RawCollection,
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RawEnteFile,
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} from "../../src/model/index.js";
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Helpers
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// The full set of key material a logged-in client holds: the master key
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// (decrypts owned collection keys) and the X25519 keypair (unseals shared
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// collection keys and the auth token).
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const buildKeys = (): KeyMaterial => {
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const kp = sodium.crypto_box_keypair();
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return {
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masterKey: sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen(),
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publicKey: kp.publicKey,
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secretKey: kp.privateKey,
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};
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};
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const secretboxEncrypt = (
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plaintext: Uint8Array,
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key: Uint8Array,
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@@ -80,6 +111,38 @@ const buildRawCollection = (
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return { raw, collectionKey };
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};
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// A collection shared with us by another user. The wire format differs
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// from owned collections in two ways, both verified against the live
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// api.ente.io: `encryptedKey` is an anonymous sealed box to OUR public
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// key (80 bytes for a 32-byte key, vs 48 for a secretbox), and
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// `keyDecryptionNonce` is entirely ABSENT from the JSON.
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const buildSharedRawCollection = (
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recipientPublicKey: Uint8Array,
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opts?: { name?: string; ownerID?: number },
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): { raw: RawCollection; collectionKey: Uint8Array } => {
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const collectionKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
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const sealedKey = sodium.crypto_box_seal(collectionKey, recipientPublicKey);
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const name = opts?.name ?? "Shared Album";
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const { ciphertext: encName, nonce: nameNonce } = secretboxEncrypt(
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new TextEncoder().encode(name),
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collectionKey,
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);
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const raw: RawCollection = {
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id: 101,
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owner: { id: opts?.ownerID ?? 99 },
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encryptedKey: toBase64(sealedKey),
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// NOTE: no keyDecryptionNonce. Do not "fix" this fixture by adding
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// one: its absence is exactly what the real server sends, and an
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// unfaithful fixture here previously masked a crash on every
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// account with an incoming shared album.
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encryptedName: toBase64(encName),
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nameDecryptionNonce: toBase64(nameNonce),
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type: "album",
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updationTime: 1700000000000000,
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};
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return { raw, collectionKey };
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};
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const buildRawFile = (
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collectionKey: Uint8Array,
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opts?: { title?: string; fileType?: number; creationTime?: number },
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@@ -137,13 +200,13 @@ describe("model.decryptCollection", () => {
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await sodium.ready;
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});
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it("decrypts the collection key and name from a raw server response", () => {
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const masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
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const { raw, collectionKey } = buildRawCollection(masterKey, {
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it("decrypts an owned collection key and name from a raw server response", () => {
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const keys = buildKeys();
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const { raw, collectionKey } = buildRawCollection(keys.masterKey, {
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name: "Summer Photos",
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});
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const col = decryptCollection(raw, masterKey, 1);
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const col = decryptCollection(raw, keys, 1);
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expect(col.id).toBe(100);
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expect(col.key).toEqual(collectionKey);
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@@ -154,49 +217,73 @@ describe("model.decryptCollection", () => {
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expect(col.isShared).toBe(false);
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});
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it("sets isShared when owner != current user", () => {
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const masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
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const { raw } = buildRawCollection(masterKey, { ownerID: 99 });
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it("decrypts a shared collection via sealed box when keyDecryptionNonce is absent", () => {
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// A collection shared TO us is not encrypted with our master key:
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// the sharer only knows our public key, so the collection key
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// arrives as crypto_box_seal(collectionKey, ourPublicKey) and the
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// response has NO keyDecryptionNonce. decryptCollection must
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// recover the key with the keypair, then decrypt the name with it
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// as usual. Accounts with any incoming shared album hit this path
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// on every listCollections call.
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const keys = buildKeys();
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const { raw, collectionKey } = buildSharedRawCollection(
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keys.publicKey,
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{ name: "Friend's Wedding", ownerID: 99 },
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);
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const col = decryptCollection(raw, masterKey, 1);
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const col = decryptCollection(raw, keys, 1);
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expect(col.key).toEqual(collectionKey);
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expect(col.name).toBe("Friend's Wedding");
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expect(col.ownerID).toBe(99);
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expect(col.isShared).toBe(true);
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});
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it("maps known type strings to CollectionType", () => {
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const masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
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const keys = buildKeys();
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for (const type of ["album", "folder", "favorites", "uncategorized"]) {
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const { raw } = buildRawCollection(masterKey, { type });
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const col = decryptCollection(raw, masterKey, 1);
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const { raw } = buildRawCollection(keys.masterKey, { type });
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const col = decryptCollection(raw, keys, 1);
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expect(col.type).toBe(type);
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}
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});
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it("maps unrecognised type strings to 'unknown'", () => {
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const masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
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const { raw } = buildRawCollection(masterKey, {
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const keys = buildKeys();
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const { raw } = buildRawCollection(keys.masterKey, {
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type: "someFutureType",
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});
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const col = decryptCollection(raw, masterKey, 1);
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const col = decryptCollection(raw, keys, 1);
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expect(col.type).toBe("unknown");
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});
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it("handles a collection with no encrypted name gracefully", () => {
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// Some special collections (e.g. uncategorized) may have no name.
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const masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
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const { raw } = buildRawCollection(masterKey);
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const keys = buildKeys();
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const { raw } = buildRawCollection(keys.masterKey);
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delete raw.encryptedName;
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delete raw.nameDecryptionNonce;
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const col = decryptCollection(raw, masterKey, 1);
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const col = decryptCollection(raw, keys, 1);
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expect(col.name).toBe("");
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});
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it("throws when the master key is wrong", () => {
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const masterKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
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const wrongKey = sodium.crypto_secretbox_keygen();
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const { raw } = buildRawCollection(masterKey);
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it("throws when the master key is wrong for an owned collection", () => {
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const keys = buildKeys();
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const { raw } = buildRawCollection(keys.masterKey);
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expect(() => decryptCollection(raw, wrongKey, 1)).toThrow();
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// buildKeys() generates fresh random key material, so this is a
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// client holding the wrong master key.
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expect(() => decryptCollection(raw, buildKeys(), 1)).toThrow();
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});
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it("throws when the keypair is wrong for a shared collection", () => {
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const keys = buildKeys();
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const { raw } = buildSharedRawCollection(keys.publicKey);
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// A different keypair must not be able to unseal the key.
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const wrongKeys = buildKeys();
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expect(() => decryptCollection(raw, wrongKeys, 1)).toThrow();
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});
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});
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