TODO.md

@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ files, so merging it also closes most compliance gaps.
 
 # Completed Steps
 
+- 2026-09-21: backend HTTP hardening (issue #19): added `ReadHeaderTimeout` and
+  `IdleTimeout` to the server, a `SecurityHeaders` middleware (HSTS, tight CSP,
+  frame/sniff/referrer/permissions headers) registered before CORS, and
+  trusted-proxy client IP resolution honouring `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP`
+  only from a `TRUSTED_PROXIES` allowlist (loopback plus RFC1918 by default)
 - 2026-08-10: every interactive control now meets the 44x44 CSS px minimum tap
   target (`.pin-btn`, `#interval-select`, the debug-log label and, on narrow
   viewports, `#pause-btn`). The pin button's hit area grows via matching

backend/README.md

@@ -43,10 +43,16 @@ Internal packages in `internal/` follow standard Go project layout:
 ### Configuration
 
 | Variable          | Default              | Description                                                                                              |
-| ---------- | ------------------ | --------------------------------- |
+| ----------------- | -------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | `PORT`            | `8080`               | HTTP listen port                                                                                         |
 | `DATA_DIR`        | `./data/reports`     | Directory for compressed reports                                                                         |
 | `DEBUG`           | `false`              | Enable debug logging                                                                                     |
+| `TRUSTED_PROXIES` | loopback + RFC1918   | Comma-separated CIDRs whose `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` headers are trusted for client IP resolution |
+
+`TRUSTED_PROXIES` defaults to `127.0.0.1/32,::1/128,10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`.
+The loopback entries cover the reverse proxy that shares the container; the
+RFC1918 ranges match `nginx.conf`. A request whose direct peer is outside this
+set has its forwarded headers ignored, and the direct peer is logged instead.
 
 ### Report storage
 

backend/internal/config/config.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ package config
 import (
 	"errors"
 	"log/slog"
+	"strings"
 
 	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/globals"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/logger"
@@ -14,6 +15,14 @@ import (
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 )
 
+// defaultTrustedProxies lists the networks whose forwarded
+// headers are honoured by default. It covers the RFC1918
+// ranges (to match nginx.conf) plus IPv4 and IPv6 loopback,
+// because the reverse proxy shares the container and reaches
+// the backend over loopback.
+const defaultTrustedProxies = "127.0.0.1/32,::1/128," +
+	"10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16"
+
 // Params defines the dependencies for Config.
 type Params struct {
 	fx.In
@@ -30,6 +39,7 @@ type Config struct {
 	MetricsUsername string
 	Port            int
 	SentryDSN       string
+	TrustedProxies  []string
 	log             *slog.Logger
 	params          *Params
 }
@@ -56,6 +66,7 @@ func New(
 	viper.SetDefault("SENTRY_DSN", "")
 	viper.SetDefault("METRICS_USERNAME", "")
 	viper.SetDefault("METRICS_PASSWORD", "")
+	viper.SetDefault("TRUSTED_PROXIES", defaultTrustedProxies)
 
 	err := viper.ReadInConfig()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -73,6 +84,7 @@ func New(
 		MetricsUsername: viper.GetString("METRICS_USERNAME"),
 		Port:            viper.GetInt("PORT"),
 		SentryDSN:       viper.GetString("SENTRY_DSN"),
+		TrustedProxies:  splitList(viper.GetString("TRUSTED_PROXIES")),
 		log:             log,
 		params:          &params,
 	}
@@ -84,3 +96,19 @@ func New(
 
 	return s, nil
 }
+
+// splitList turns a comma-separated setting into a trimmed
+// slice, dropping empty entries.
+func splitList(raw string) []string {
+	parts := strings.Split(raw, ",")
+
+	out := make([]string, 0, len(parts))
+	for _, p := range parts {
+		p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
+		if p != "" {
+			out = append(out, p)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return out
+}

backend/internal/middleware/export_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+package middleware
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
+)
+
+// Test-only wrappers exposing unexported helpers to the
+// external middleware_test package.
+
+func ClientIP(
+	remoteAddr string,
+	header http.Header,
+	trusted []netip.Prefix,
+) string {
+	return clientIP(remoteAddr, header, trusted)
+}
+
+func ParseTrustedProxies(cidrs []string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
+	return parseTrustedProxies(cidrs)
+}

backend/internal/middleware/middleware.go

@@ -3,9 +3,12 @@
 package middleware
 
 import (
+	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/config"
@@ -19,6 +22,15 @@ import (
 
 const corsMaxAgeSec = 300
 
+// Security header values. The backend is a JSON API with no
+// HTML surface, so the CSP forbids every resource type and
+// framing outright.
+const (
+	hstsValue              = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
+	cspValue               = "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'"
+	permissionsPolicyValue = "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()"
+)
+
 // Params defines the dependencies for Middleware.
 type Params struct {
 	fx.In
@@ -32,6 +44,7 @@ type Params struct {
 type Middleware struct {
 	log            *slog.Logger
 	params         *Params
+	trustedProxies []netip.Prefix
 }
 
 // New creates a Middleware instance.
@@ -39,13 +52,38 @@ func New(
 	_ fx.Lifecycle,
 	params Params,
 ) (*Middleware, error) {
+	trusted, err := parseTrustedProxies(params.Config.TrustedProxies)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
 	s := new(Middleware)
 	s.params = &params
 	s.log = params.Logger.Get()
+	s.trustedProxies = trusted
 
 	return s, nil
 }
 
+// parseTrustedProxies converts CIDR strings into prefixes,
+// failing fast on any malformed entry.
+func parseTrustedProxies(cidrs []string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
+	prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(cidrs))
+
+	for _, cidr := range cidrs {
+		prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(cidr)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+				"trusted proxy %q: %w", cidr, err,
+			)
+		}
+
+		prefixes = append(prefixes, prefix.Masked())
+	}
+
+	return prefixes, nil
+}
+
 type loggingResponseWriter struct {
 	http.ResponseWriter
 
@@ -72,6 +110,70 @@ func ipFromHostPort(hostPort string) string {
 	return host
 }
 
+// clientIP resolves the caller's address. X-Forwarded-For and
+// X-Real-IP are honoured only when the direct peer is a
+// trusted proxy; otherwise the direct peer is returned so a
+// spoofed header cannot forge the logged address.
+func clientIP(
+	remoteAddr string,
+	header http.Header,
+	trusted []netip.Prefix,
+) string {
+	peer := ipFromHostPort(remoteAddr)
+
+	if !addrInAny(peer, trusted) {
+		return peer
+	}
+
+	if xff := firstForwardedFor(header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")); xff != "" {
+		return xff
+	}
+
+	if xr := strings.TrimSpace(header.Get("X-Real-IP")); validIP(xr) {
+		return xr
+	}
+
+	return peer
+}
+
+// firstForwardedFor returns the left-most valid address in an
+// X-Forwarded-For list (the original client), or "" if none.
+func firstForwardedFor(value string) string {
+	for part := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ",") {
+		candidate := strings.TrimSpace(part)
+		if validIP(candidate) {
+			return candidate
+		}
+	}
+
+	return ""
+}
+
+func validIP(s string) bool {
+	_, err := netip.ParseAddr(s)
+
+	return err == nil
+}
+
+// addrInAny reports whether s parses as an address contained
+// in any of the trusted prefixes.
+func addrInAny(s string, trusted []netip.Prefix) bool {
+	addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(s)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	addr = addr.Unmap()
+
+	for _, prefix := range trusted {
+		if prefix.Contains(addr) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+
+	return false
+}
+
 // Logging returns middleware that logs each request with
 // timing, status code, and client information.
 func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
@@ -96,7 +198,11 @@ func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 						"referer", r.Referer(),
 						"proto", r.Proto,
 						"remote_ip",
-						ipFromHostPort(r.RemoteAddr),
+						clientIP(
+							r.RemoteAddr,
+							r.Header,
+							s.trustedProxies,
+						),
 						"status", lrw.statusCode,
 						"latency_ms",
 						latency.Milliseconds(),
@@ -109,6 +215,27 @@ func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	}
 }
 
+// SecurityHeaders returns middleware that sets response
+// security headers. It runs before CORS so the headers are
+// present on preflight responses the CORS handler writes.
+func (s *Middleware) SecurityHeaders() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+		return http.HandlerFunc(
+			func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+				h := w.Header()
+				h.Set("Strict-Transport-Security", hstsValue)
+				h.Set("Content-Security-Policy", cspValue)
+				h.Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
+				h.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
+				h.Set("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
+				h.Set("Permissions-Policy", permissionsPolicyValue)
+
+				next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+			},
+		)
+	}
+}
+
 // CORS returns middleware that adds permissive CORS headers.
 func (s *Middleware) CORS() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return cors.Handler(cors.Options{

backend/internal/middleware/middleware_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+package middleware_test
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/netwatch/internal/middleware"
+)
+
+func mustPrefixes(t *testing.T, cidrs ...string) []netip.Prefix {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	prefixes, err := middleware.ParseTrustedProxies(cidrs)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ParseTrustedProxies(%v): %v", cidrs, err)
+	}
+
+	return prefixes
+}
+
+func TestParseTrustedProxiesRejectsMalformed(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	_, err := middleware.ParseTrustedProxies([]string{"not-a-cidr"})
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for malformed CIDR, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+type clientIPCase struct {
+	name       string
+	remoteAddr string
+	xff        string
+	xRealIP    string
+	want       string
+}
+
+func clientIPCases() []clientIPCase {
+	return []clientIPCase{
+		{
+			name:       "trusted proxy uses forwarded-for",
+			remoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:5000",
+			xff:        "203.0.113.7",
+			want:       "203.0.113.7",
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "trusted proxy uses left-most of chain",
+			remoteAddr: "10.1.2.3:5000",
+			xff:        "203.0.113.7, 10.1.2.3",
+			want:       "203.0.113.7",
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "trusted proxy falls back to x-real-ip",
+			remoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:5000",
+			xRealIP:    "203.0.113.9",
+			want:       "203.0.113.9",
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "untrusted peer ignores forwarded-for",
+			remoteAddr: "198.51.100.4:5000",
+			xff:        "203.0.113.7",
+			want:       "198.51.100.4",
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "untrusted peer ignores x-real-ip",
+			remoteAddr: "198.51.100.4:5000",
+			xRealIP:    "203.0.113.9",
+			want:       "198.51.100.4",
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "trusted proxy with no headers uses peer",
+			remoteAddr: "10.1.2.3:5000",
+			want:       "10.1.2.3",
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "trusted proxy with garbage header uses peer",
+			remoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:5000",
+			xff:        "not-an-ip",
+			want:       "127.0.0.1",
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+func TestClientIP(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	trusted := mustPrefixes(t, "127.0.0.1/32", "::1/128", "10.0.0.0/8")
+
+	for _, tc := range clientIPCases() {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			header := http.Header{}
+			if tc.xff != "" {
+				header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", tc.xff)
+			}
+
+			if tc.xRealIP != "" {
+				header.Set("X-Real-IP", tc.xRealIP)
+			}
+
+			got := middleware.ClientIP(tc.remoteAddr, header, trusted)
+			if got != tc.want {
+				t.Errorf("ClientIP() = %q, want %q", got, tc.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSecurityHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	handler := (&middleware.Middleware{}).SecurityHeaders()(
+		http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		}),
+	)
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", http.NoBody)
+	handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	want := map[string]string{
+		"Strict-Transport-Security": "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains",
+		"Content-Security-Policy":   "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'",
+		"X-Frame-Options":           "DENY",
+		"X-Content-Type-Options":    "nosniff",
+		"Referrer-Policy":           "no-referrer",
+		"Permissions-Policy":        "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()",
+	}
+
+	for name, value := range want {
+		if got := rec.Header().Get(name); got != value {
+			t.Errorf("header %s = %q, want %q", name, got, value)
+		}
+	}
+}

backend/internal/server/http.go

@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ import (
 
 const (
 	readTimeout       = 10 * time.Second
+	readHeaderTimeout = 5 * time.Second
 	writeTimeout      = 10 * time.Second
+	idleTimeout       = 60 * time.Second
 	maxHeaderBytes    = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
 )
 
@@ -21,7 +23,9 @@ func (s *Server) serveUntilShutdown() {
 		Handler:           s,
 		MaxHeaderBytes:    maxHeaderBytes,
 		ReadTimeout:       readTimeout,
+		ReadHeaderTimeout: readHeaderTimeout,
 		WriteTimeout:      writeTimeout,
+		IdleTimeout:       idleTimeout,
 	}
 
 	s.SetupRoutes()

backend/internal/server/routes.go

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
 	s.router.Use(middleware.Recoverer)
 	s.router.Use(middleware.RequestID)
 	s.router.Use(s.mw.Logging())
+	s.router.Use(s.mw.SecurityHeaders())
 	s.router.Use(s.mw.CORS())
 	s.router.Use(middleware.Timeout(requestTimeout))