POST /api/v1/reports stays unauthenticated but is bounded. Each client
address, as the trusted-proxy logic resolves it, may send
REPORTS_PER_MINUTE reports a minute (default 60, all at once if it
likes), using golang.org/x/time/rate; past that it gets 429 with
Retry-After. Buckets that have refilled are dropped once a minute, so
idle addresses do not pile up. reportbuf refuses a report that would
take the report files past DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES (default 1 GiB) with
ErrFull, answered with 507; the count starts from the files already in
DATA_DIR, and reports not yet written count at their uncompressed size.
CORS adds nothing unless CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS lists origins. A limit
that is not a positive number stops the server from starting.
Model: opus-5-5
A report the buffer refuses now returns 500 instead of a false `ok`.
Reports reach disk later, so a failed disk write is still answered 200
and shows in the log, and at shutdown as a failed stop with a non-zero
exit. An over-limit body returns 413; malformed JSON stays 400. A
MaxBodyBytes middleware caps every route at 1 MiB; a route group can
only lower that limit. The raw geo blob is no longer logged; client_id,
timestamp and decode error text are cut to 128 bytes before logging.
Panic recovery logs the panic value and stack through slog.
Model: opus-5-5
clawbot