netwatch

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3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
clawbot	ea66caf338	fix(backend): rate-limit and cap report ingest, drop wildcard CORS (closes #20 ) check / check (push) Successful in 11s Details POST /api/v1/reports stays unauthenticated but is bounded. Each client address, as the trusted-proxy logic resolves it, may send REPORTS_PER_MINUTE reports a minute (default 60, counted by go-chi/httprate over a sliding minute); past that it gets 429 with Retry-After. reportbuf refuses a report that would take the report files past DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES (default 1 GiB), counting the files already in DATA_DIR and unwritten reports at their uncompressed size; the handler answers 507. CORS adds nothing unless CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS lists origins. A limit that is not a positive number, or an origin that is not a plain scheme://host[:port], stops the server from starting. Model: opus-5-5	2026-09-29 04:22:19 +02:00
clawbot	503399e020	fix(backend): report ingest correctness: 500 on a refused report, 413 on oversize, global body cap (closes #23 ) check / check (push) Successful in 10s Details A report the buffer refuses now returns 500 instead of a false `ok`. Reports reach disk later, so a failed disk write is still answered 200 and shows in the log, and at shutdown as a failed stop with a non-zero exit. An over-limit body returns 413; malformed JSON stays 400. A MaxBodyBytes middleware caps every route at 1 MiB; a route group can only lower that limit. The raw geo blob is no longer logged; client_id, timestamp and decode error text are cut to 128 bytes before logging. Panic recovery logs the panic value and stack through slog. Model: opus-5-5	2026-09-28 20:39:39 +02:00
clawbot	f3895789d2	feat(backend): server hardening: timeouts, security headers, trusted-proxy client IP (closes #19 ) check / check (push) Failing after 1s Details Add ReadHeaderTimeout and IdleTimeout to the http.Server as named constants beside the existing timeouts. Add a SecurityHeaders middleware (HSTS, a JSON-API CSP of default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none', X-Frame-Options DENY, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy), registered before CORS so preflight responses carry it. Resolve the client IP from X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP only when the direct peer is in the trusted-proxy allowlist (loopback plus RFC1918 by default, configurable via TRUSTED_PROXIES); an untrusted peer's forwarded headers are ignored. Uses net/netip; no new dependency. Model: opus-4-8 (implementation and review); claude-fable-5 (merge)	2026-09-21 15:05:25 +02:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

clawbot

ea66caf338

fix(backend): rate-limit and cap report ingest, drop wildcard CORS (closes #20 )

check / check (push) Successful in 11s

Details

POST /api/v1/reports stays unauthenticated but is bounded. Each client
address, as the trusted-proxy logic resolves it, may send
REPORTS_PER_MINUTE reports a minute (default 60, counted by
go-chi/httprate over a sliding minute); past that it gets 429 with
Retry-After. reportbuf refuses a report that would take the report
files past DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES (default 1 GiB), counting the files
already in DATA_DIR and unwritten reports at their uncompressed size;
the handler answers 507. CORS adds nothing unless CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS
lists origins. A limit that is not a positive number, or an origin
that is not a plain scheme://host[:port], stops the server from
starting.

Model: opus-5-5

2026-09-29 04:22:19 +02:00

clawbot

503399e020

fix(backend): report ingest correctness: 500 on a refused report, 413 on oversize, global body cap (closes #23 )

check / check (push) Successful in 10s

Details

A report the buffer refuses now returns 500 instead of a false `ok`.
Reports reach disk later, so a failed disk write is still answered 200
and shows in the log, and at shutdown as a failed stop with a non-zero
exit. An over-limit body returns 413; malformed JSON stays 400. A
MaxBodyBytes middleware caps every route at 1 MiB; a route group can
only lower that limit. The raw geo blob is no longer logged; client_id,
timestamp and decode error text are cut to 128 bytes before logging.
Panic recovery logs the panic value and stack through slog.

Model: opus-5-5

2026-09-28 20:39:39 +02:00

clawbot

f3895789d2

feat(backend): server hardening: timeouts, security headers, trusted-proxy client IP (closes #19 )

check / check (push) Failing after 1s

Details

Add ReadHeaderTimeout and IdleTimeout to the http.Server as named constants beside the existing timeouts. Add a SecurityHeaders middleware (HSTS, a JSON-API CSP of default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none', X-Frame-Options DENY, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy), registered before CORS so preflight responses carry it. Resolve the client IP from X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP only when the direct peer is in the trusted-proxy allowlist (loopback plus RFC1918 by default, configurable via TRUSTED_PROXIES); an untrusted peer's forwarded headers are ignored. Uses net/netip; no new dependency.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation and review); claude-fable-5 (merge)

2026-09-21 15:05:25 +02:00