4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
clawbot	02dbd1a89b	nginx: trust X-Forwarded-For only from TRUSTED_PROXIES (closes #64) ... nginx trusted X-Forwarded-For from every RFC1918 address, so a client reaching it from one could write a new address on each request and get a fresh rate-limit allowance. The container's TRUSTED_PROXIES now names the reverse proxies nginx trusts, none by default. bin/entrypoint.sh makes each entry a CIDR, checks it with the new "netwatch-server check-cidr", which runs the server's own TRUSTED_PROXIES parsing, and writes one set_real_ip_from line per entry into /etc/nginx/trusted-proxies.conf, which nginx.conf includes. The backend is started with TRUSTED_PROXIES=127.0.0.1/32, since nginx is its only client. The viewport test mounts an empty file there. Model: opus-5-5	2026-09-29 05:48:43 +00:00
clawbot	ea66caf338	fix(backend): rate-limit and cap report ingest, drop wildcard CORS (closes #20) ... POST /api/v1/reports stays unauthenticated but is bounded. Each client address, as the trusted-proxy logic resolves it, may send REPORTS_PER_MINUTE reports a minute (default 60, counted by go-chi/httprate over a sliding minute); past that it gets 429 with Retry-After. reportbuf refuses a report that would take the report files past DATA_DIR_MAX_BYTES (default 1 GiB), counting the files already in DATA_DIR and unwritten reports at their uncompressed size; the handler answers 507. CORS adds nothing unless CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS lists origins. A limit that is not a positive number, or an origin that is not a plain scheme://host[:port], stops the server from starting. Model: opus-5-5	2026-09-29 04:22:19 +02:00
clawbot	503399e020	fix(backend): report ingest correctness: 500 on a refused report, 413 on oversize, global body cap (closes #23) ... A report the buffer refuses now returns 500 instead of a false `ok`. Reports reach disk later, so a failed disk write is still answered 200 and shows in the log, and at shutdown as a failed stop with a non-zero exit. An over-limit body returns 413; malformed JSON stays 400. A MaxBodyBytes middleware caps every route at 1 MiB; a route group can only lower that limit. The raw geo blob is no longer logged; client_id, timestamp and decode error text are cut to 128 bytes before logging. Panic recovery logs the panic value and stack through slog. Model: opus-5-5	2026-09-28 20:39:39 +02:00
clawbot	f3895789d2	feat(backend): server hardening: timeouts, security headers, trusted-proxy client IP (closes #19) ... Add ReadHeaderTimeout and IdleTimeout to the http.Server as named constants beside the existing timeouts. Add a SecurityHeaders middleware (HSTS, a JSON-API CSP of default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none', X-Frame-Options DENY, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy), registered before CORS so preflight responses carry it. Resolve the client IP from X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP only when the direct peer is in the trusted-proxy allowlist (loopback plus RFC1918 by default, configurable via TRUSTED_PROXIES); an untrusted peer's forwarded headers are ignored. Uses net/netip; no new dependency. Model: opus-4-8 (implementation and review); claude-fable-5 (merge)	2026-09-21 15:05:25 +02:00