Rate limit password attempts on /metrics (closes #104)

Each client address may make 60 requests to /metrics a minute,
through the same httprate middleware and TRUSTED_PROXIES
resolution the report route uses, with an allowance of its own.
The limit runs before the basic auth, so past it the answer is 429
and the password is not checked. backend/README.md says so; a test
uses up one client's allowance on wrong passwords, gets 429 with
the right one, and checks that another client behind the same
nginx still gets in.

Model: opus-5-5

TODO.md

@@ -23,6 +23,13 @@ latest run passes.
 
 # Completed Steps
 
+- 2026-10-04: password guesses at `/metrics` are rate limited (issue #104): each
+  client address, resolved through `TRUSTED_PROXIES` as for reports, may make 60
+  requests to `/metrics` a minute, counted by `go-chi/httprate` apart from its
+  reports; past that it gets 429 and its basic auth credentials are not checked.
+  The limit is a constant in `backend/internal/server/routes.go`. A test uses up
+  one client's allowance on wrong passwords, gets 429 with the right one, and
+  checks that another client behind the same nginx still gets in
 - 2026-10-04: the backend reports errors to Sentry (issue #95). With
   `SENTRY_DSN` set, it sets up `sentry-go` with the release `netwatch-server-`
   and its version, reports each panic in a handler through `sentryhttp`, the

backend/README.md

@@ -199,6 +199,14 @@ is recorded and `/metrics` answers 404. One without the other stops the server
 from starting, with an error naming both; so does a `METRICS_USERNAME`
 containing `:`, which basic auth cannot carry, with an error naming it.
 
+`/metrics` is rate limited, so that its password cannot be guessed quickly: each
+client address, resolved through `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, may make 60 requests to it a
+minute, whatever their credentials. Past that it gets 429 with
+`Retry-After: 60`, and its credentials are not checked. The minute slides as it
+does for reports (see [Report limits](#report-limits)), so a scraper polling
+every 2 seconds or less often is never refused. This allowance is apart from the
+one for reports.
+
 ### Sentry
 
 With `SENTRY_DSN` set, the server sends its errors to that Sentry project: each

backend/internal/server/export_test.go

@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ func (s *Server) Router() *chi.Mux {
 // external tests.
 const MaxRequestBodyBytes = maxRequestBodyBytes
 
+// MetricsRequestsPerMinute exposes the /metrics rate limit to the
+// external tests.
+const MetricsRequestsPerMinute = metricsRequestsPerMinute
+
 // ListenAddr exposes the address the server listens on to the
 // external tests.
 func (s *Server) ListenAddr() string {

backend/internal/server/routes.go

@@ -18,6 +18,12 @@ const (
 	// can mount s.mw.MaxBodyBytes with a smaller value to lower
 	// its bound, but cannot raise it: this cap runs first.
 	maxRequestBodyBytes int64 = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
+
+	// metricsRequestsPerMinute is how many requests to /metrics each
+	// client address may make a minute, whatever their credentials. A
+	// scraper polling every 2 seconds sends half of it, which httprate
+	// never refuses.
+	metricsRequestsPerMinute = 60
 )
 
 // SetupRoutes configures the chi router with middleware and
@@ -66,9 +72,13 @@ func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
 			Post("/api/v1/reports", s.h.HandleReport())
 	})
 
+	// The rate limit comes before the basic auth, so a client past it
+	// gets 429 and its password is not checked.
 	if s.params.Config.MetricsUsername != "" {
-		s.router.With(s.mw.MetricsAuth()).
+		s.router.With(
-			Get("/metrics", promhttp.HandlerFor(
+			s.mw.RateLimit(metricsRequestsPerMinute),
+			s.mw.MetricsAuth(),
+		).Get("/metrics", promhttp.HandlerFor(
 			registry, promhttp.HandlerOpts{},
 		).ServeHTTP)
 	}

backend/internal/server/routes_test.go

@@ -188,6 +188,50 @@ func TestMetricsBehindBasicAuth(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestMetricsAreRateLimited: a client that has used up its /metrics
+// allowance on wrong passwords gets 429 even with the right one, which
+// is then not checked, while another client behind the same nginx
+// still gets in.
+func TestMetricsAreRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("METRICS_USERNAME", "prometheus")
+	t.Setenv("METRICS_PASSWORD", "right")
+	// As in the container: nginx connects from loopback and names the
+	// client in X-Forwarded-For.
+	t.Setenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES", "127.0.0.1/32")
+
+	srv := newServer(t)
+	srv.SetupRoutes()
+
+	get := func(client, password string) int {
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(),
+			http.MethodGet, "/metrics", http.NoBody)
+		req.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:40000"
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", client)
+		req.SetBasicAuth("prometheus", password)
+		srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+		return rec.Code
+	}
+
+	for i := range server.MetricsRequestsPerMinute {
+		if code := get("203.0.113.7", "wrong"); code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+			t.Fatalf("guess %d: status = %d, want %d",
+				i+1, code, http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if code := get("203.0.113.7", "right"); code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+		t.Fatalf("right password past the limit: status = %d, want %d",
+			code, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
+	}
+
+	if code := get("203.0.113.8", "right"); code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("another client: status = %d, want %d",
+			code, http.StatusOK)
+	}
+}
+
 // TestMetricsInTwoServers: two servers in one process can both have
 // metrics on.
 func TestMetricsInTwoServers(t *testing.T) {