fix(backend): report ingest correctness — propagate storage failure, 413 on oversize, global body cap (closes #23)

A buffer failure on POST /api/v1/reports now returns 500 instead of a
false {"status":"ok"}, so clients can retry. Decode errors are split:
an over-limit body returns 413 (via errors.As on *http.MaxBytesError),
malformed JSON stays 400. A new MaxBodyBytes middleware caps every
route (1 MiB default; rejects an oversized Content-Length up-front and
caps the read otherwise), replacing the per-route reader so the health
check and future routes are bounded too. The raw attacker-controlled
geo blob is no longer logged — only its byte length — and client_id and
timestamp are length-bounded before logging. A decodeJSON handler helper
is added per the HTTP server conventions. Panic recovery is now a local
middleware that routes the stack through slog as structured JSON rather
than chi's plain-text stderr. Error bodies still leak nothing internal.

Chosen failure code for a storage failure: 500, since a full buffer or
write error is server-side and retryable, not the client's fault.

Model: opus-4-8

backend/internal/handlers/report.go

@@ -2,10 +2,14 @@ package handlers
 
 import (
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"net/http"
 )
 
-const maxReportBodyBytes = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
+// maxLoggedFieldBytes bounds untrusted string fields before they
+// are logged, so a caller cannot inflate log volume with an
+// oversized value.
+const maxLoggedFieldBytes = 128
 
 type reportSample struct {
 	T       int64   `json:"t"`
@@ -35,48 +39,76 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleReport() http.HandlerFunc {
 	}
 
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
-			w, r.Body, maxReportBodyBytes,
-		)
-
 		var rpt report
 
-		err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&rpt)
+		err := s.decodeJSON(w, r, &rpt)
 		if err != nil {
-			s.log.Error("failed to decode report",
-				"error", err,
-			)
 			s.respondJSON(w, r,
 				&response{Status: "error"},
-				http.StatusBadRequest,
+				s.decodeErrorStatus(err),
 			)
 
 			return
 		}
 
-		totalSamples := 0
-		for _, h := range rpt.Hosts {
-			totalSamples += len(h.History)
-		}
+		s.logReportReceived(rpt)
 
-		s.log.Info("report received",
-			"client_id", rpt.ClientID,
-			"timestamp", rpt.Timestamp,
-			"host_count", len(rpt.Hosts),
-			"total_samples", totalSamples,
-			"geo", string(rpt.Geo),
-		)
-
-		bufErr := s.buf.Append(rpt)
-		if bufErr != nil {
-			s.log.Error("failed to buffer report",
-				"error", bufErr,
+		err = s.buf.Append(rpt)
+		if err != nil {
+			s.log.Error("failed to buffer report", "error", err)
+			s.respondJSON(w, r,
+				&response{Status: "error"},
+				http.StatusInternalServerError,
 			)
+
+			return
 		}
 
-		s.respondJSON(w, r,
-			&response{Status: "ok"},
-			http.StatusOK,
-		)
+		s.respondJSON(w, r, &response{Status: "ok"}, http.StatusOK)
 	}
 }
+
+// decodeErrorStatus logs a report decode failure and returns the
+// status to send: 413 when the body exceeded the size limit,
+// otherwise 400 for malformed JSON.
+func (s *Handlers) decodeErrorStatus(err error) int {
+	var tooLarge *http.MaxBytesError
+	if errors.As(err, &tooLarge) {
+		s.log.Warn("report body too large", "limit_bytes", tooLarge.Limit)
+
+		return http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge
+	}
+
+	s.log.Error("failed to decode report", "error", err)
+
+	return http.StatusBadRequest
+}
+
+// logReportReceived logs an accepted report. Untrusted fields are
+// bounded (client_id, timestamp) or reduced to a length
+// (geo_bytes) so the raw attacker-controlled body never reaches
+// the log.
+func (s *Handlers) logReportReceived(rpt report) {
+	totalSamples := 0
+	for _, h := range rpt.Hosts {
+		totalSamples += len(h.History)
+	}
+
+	s.log.Info("report received",
+		"client_id", boundedForLog(rpt.ClientID),
+		"timestamp", boundedForLog(rpt.Timestamp),
+		"host_count", len(rpt.Hosts),
+		"total_samples", totalSamples,
+		"geo_bytes", len(rpt.Geo),
+	)
+}
+
+// boundedForLog truncates an untrusted string to a fixed byte
+// bound so an attacker-controlled field cannot dominate the log.
+func boundedForLog(s string) string {
+	if len(s) > maxLoggedFieldBytes {
+		return s[:maxLoggedFieldBytes]
+	}
+
+	return s
+}