1 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
user
0bcc711a92 feat: add per-IP rate limiting to login endpoint
All checks were successful
check / check (push) Successful in 59s
Add a token-bucket rate limiter (golang.org/x/time/rate) that limits
login attempts per client IP on POST /api/v1/login. Returns 429 Too
Many Requests with a Retry-After header when the limit is exceeded.

Configurable via LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT (requests/sec, default 1) and
LOGIN_RATE_BURST (burst size, default 5). Stale per-IP entries are
automatically cleaned up every 10 minutes.

Only the login endpoint is rate-limited per sneak's instruction —
session creation and registration use hashcash proof-of-work instead.
2026-03-19 23:13:52 -07:00
11 changed files with 935 additions and 663 deletions

501
README.md
View File

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ Everything else is IRC. `PRIVMSG`, `JOIN`, `PART`, `NICK`, `TOPIC`, `MODE`,
Joining a nonexistent channel creates it. Channels disappear when empty. Nicks
are unique per server. Identity starts with a key — a nick is a display name.
Accounts are optional: you can create an anonymous session instantly, or
set a password via the PASS command for multi-client access to a single session.
register with a password for multi-client access to a single session.
### On the resemblance to JSON-RPC
@@ -149,62 +149,63 @@ not arbitrary choices — each one follows from the project's core thesis that
IRC's command model is correct and only the transport and session management
need to change.
### Identity & Sessions — Cookie-Based Authentication
### Identity & Sessions — Dual Authentication Model
The server uses **HTTP cookies** for all authentication. There is no separate
registration step — sessions start anonymous and can optionally set a password
for multi-client access.
The server supports two authentication paths: **anonymous sessions** for
instant access, and **optional account registration** for multi-client access.
#### Session Creation
#### Anonymous Sessions (No Account Required)
The simplest entry point. No registration, no passwords.
- **Session creation**: client sends `POST /api/v1/session` with a desired
nick → server sets an **HttpOnly auth cookie** (`neoirc_auth`) containing
a cryptographically random value (64 hex characters) and returns the user
ID and nick in the JSON response body. No auth credential appears in the
JSON body.
- The auth cookie is HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, and Secure when behind TLS.
Browsers handle cookies automatically. **CLI clients (curl, custom HTTP
clients) must explicitly save and send cookies** — e.g., using curl's
`-c`/`-b` flags or an HTTP cookie jar in their language's HTTP library.
- Sessions start anonymous — no password required. When the session expires
or the user QUITs, the nick is released.
nick → server assigns an **auth token** (64 hex characters of
cryptographically random bytes) and returns the user ID, nick, and token.
- The auth token implicitly identifies the client. Clients present it via
`Authorization: Bearer <token>`.
- Anonymous sessions are ephemeral — when the session expires or the user
QUITs, the nick is released and there is no way to reclaim it.
#### Setting a Password (Optional, for Multi-Client Access)
#### Registered Accounts (Optional)
For users who want to access the same session from multiple devices:
For users who want multi-client access (multiple devices sharing one session):
- **Set password via IRC PASS command**: the authenticated client sends
`POST /api/v1/messages` with `{"command":"PASS","body":["mypassword"]}`.
The server hashes the password with bcrypt and stores it on the session.
Password must be at least 8 characters.
- **Login from another client**: `POST /api/v1/login` with nick and password →
server verifies the password, creates a new client for the existing session,
and sets an auth cookie. Channel memberships and message queues are shared.
Login only works while the session still exists — if all clients have logged
out or the user has sent QUIT, the session is deleted and the password is
lost.
- **Registration**: client sends `POST /api/v1/register` with a nick and
password (minimum 8 characters) → server creates a session with the
password hashed via bcrypt, and returns the user ID, nick, and auth token.
- **Login**: client sends `POST /api/v1/login` with nick and password →
server verifies the password against the stored bcrypt hash and creates a
new client token for the existing session. This enables multi-client
access: logging in from a new device adds a client to the existing session
rather than creating a new one, so channel memberships and message queues
are shared. Note: login only works while the session still exists — if all
clients have logged out or the user has sent QUIT, the session is deleted
and the registration is lost.
- Registered accounts cannot be logged into via `POST /api/v1/session`
that endpoint is for anonymous sessions only.
- Anonymous sessions (created via `/session`) cannot be logged into via
`/login` because they have no password set.
#### Common Properties
#### Common Properties (Both Paths)
- Nicks are changeable via the `NICK` command; the server-assigned user ID is
the stable identity.
- Server-assigned IDs — clients do not choose their own IDs.
- Auth cookies contain opaque random bytes, **not JWTs**. No claims, no expiry
encoded in the cookie value, no client-side decode. The server is the sole
authority on cookie validity.
- Tokens are opaque random bytes, **not JWTs**. No claims, no expiry encoded
in the token, no client-side decode. The server is the sole authority on
token validity.
**Rationale:** IRC has no accounts. You connect, pick a nick, and talk.
Anonymous sessions preserve that simplicity — instant access, zero friction.
But some users want to access the same session from multiple devices without
a bouncer. The PASS command enables multi-client login without adding friction
for casual users: if you don't need multi-client, just create a session and
go. Cookie-based auth simplifies credential management — browsers handle
cookies automatically, and CLI clients just need a cookie jar (e.g., curl's
`-c`/`-b` flags). Note: both anonymous
and password-protected sessions are deleted when the last client disconnects
(QUIT or logout). Identity verification at the message layer via cryptographic
signatures (see [Security Model](#security-model)) remains independent of
password status.
a bouncer. Optional registration with password enables multi-client login
without adding friction for casual users: if you don't want an account,
don't create one. Note: in the current implementation, both anonymous and
registered sessions are deleted when the last client disconnects (QUIT or
logout); registration does not make a session survive all-client
removal. Identity verification at the message layer via cryptographic
signatures (see [Security Model](#security-model)) remains independent
of account registration.
### Hostmask (nick!user@host)
@@ -212,13 +213,13 @@ Each session has an IRC-style hostmask composed of three parts:
- **nick** — the user's current nick (changes with `NICK` command)
- **username** — an ident-like identifier set at session creation (optional
`username` field in the session request; defaults to the nick)
`username` field in the session/register request; defaults to the nick)
- **hostname** — automatically resolved via reverse DNS of the connecting
client's IP address at session creation time
- **ip** — the real IP address of the session creator, extracted from
`X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, or `RemoteAddr`
Each **client connection** (created at session creation or login)
Each **client connection** (created at session creation, registration, or login)
also stores its own **ip** and **hostname**, allowing the server to track the
network origin of each individual client independently from the session.
Client-level IP and hostname are **not displayed to regular users**. They are
@@ -262,22 +263,23 @@ A single user session can have multiple clients (phone, laptop, terminal).
- The server fans out all S2C messages to every active client queue for that
user session.
- `GET /api/v1/messages` delivers from the calling client's specific queue,
identified by the auth cookie.
identified by the auth token.
- Client queues have **independent expiry/pruning** — one client going offline
doesn't affect others.
```
User Session
├── Client A (cookie_a, queue_a)
├── Client B (cookie_b, queue_b)
└── Client C (cookie_c, queue_c)
├── Client A (token_a, queue_a)
├── Client B (token_b, queue_b)
└── Client C (token_c, queue_c)
```
**Multi-client via login:** The `POST /api/v1/login` endpoint adds a new
client to an existing session (one that has a password set via PASS command),
enabling true multi-client support (multiple cookies sharing one nick/session
with independent message queues). Sessions without a password cannot be
logged into.
client to an existing registered session, enabling true multi-client support
(multiple tokens sharing one nick/session with independent message queues).
Anonymous sessions created via `POST /api/v1/session` always create a new
user with a new nick. A future endpoint to "add a client to an existing
anonymous session" is planned but not yet implemented.
**Rationale:** The fundamental IRC mobile problem is that you can't have your
phone and laptop connected simultaneously without a bouncer. Server-side
@@ -384,22 +386,19 @@ over binary is measured in bytes per message, not meaningful bandwidth. The
canonicalization story (RFC 8785 JCS) is also well-defined for JSON, which
matters for signing.
### Why Opaque Cookies Instead of JWTs
### Why Opaque Tokens Instead of JWTs
JWTs encode claims that clients can decode and potentially rely on. This
creates a coupling between token format and client behavior. If the server
needs to revoke a token, change the expiry model, or add/remove claims, JWT
clients may break or behave incorrectly.
Opaque auth cookies are simpler:
- Server generates 32 random bytes → hex-encodes → stores SHA-256 hash
sets raw hex as an HttpOnly cookie
- On each request, server hashes the cookie value and looks it up
- Revocation is a database delete (cookie becomes invalid immediately)
Opaque tokens are simpler:
- Server generates 32 random bytes → hex-encodes → stores SHA-256 hash
- Client presents the raw token; server hashes and looks it up
- Revocation is a database delete
- No clock skew issues, no algorithm confusion, no "none" algorithm attacks
- Cookie format can change without breaking clients
- Browsers and HTTP cookie jars manage cookies automatically; CLI clients
must explicitly save and resend cookies (e.g., curl `-c`/`-b` flags)
- Token format can change without breaking clients
---
@@ -423,18 +422,17 @@ The entire read/write loop for a client is two endpoints. Everything else
### Session Lifecycle
#### Session Creation
#### Anonymous Session
```
┌─ Client ──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │
│ 1. POST /api/v1/session {"nick":"alice"} │
│ → Set-Cookie: neoirc_auth=<random_hex>; HttpOnly; ...
│ → {"id":1, "nick":"alice"} │
│ → {"id":1, "nick":"alice", "token":"a1b2c3..."}
│ │
│ 2. POST /api/v1/messages {"command":"JOIN","to":"#gen"} │
│ → {"status":"joined","channel":"#general"} │
│ (Cookie must be sent on all subsequent requests)
│ (Server fans out JOIN event to all #general members)
│ │
│ 3. POST /api/v1/messages {"command":"PRIVMSG", │
│ "to":"#general","body":["hello"]} │
@@ -451,37 +449,31 @@ The entire read/write loop for a client is two endpoints. Everything else
│ 6. POST /api/v1/messages {"command":"QUIT"} │
│ → {"status":"quit"} │
│ (Server broadcasts QUIT, removes from channels, │
│ deletes session, releases nick, clears cookie)
│ deletes session, releases nick)
│ │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
#### Multi-Client via Password
#### Registered Account
```
┌─ Client A ────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
┌─ Client ──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │
│ 1. POST /api/v1/session {"nick":"alice"}
→ Set-Cookie: neoirc_auth=<cookie_a>; HttpOnly; ...
│ → {"id":1, "nick":"alice"}
│ 2. POST /api/v1/messages │
│ {"command":"PASS","body":["s3cret!!"]} │
│ → {"status":"ok"} │
│ (Password set via IRC PASS command) │
│ 1. POST /api/v1/register
{"nick":"alice", "password":"s3cret!!"}
│ → {"id":1, "nick":"alice", "token":"a1b2c3..."}
(Session created with bcrypt-hashed password)
│ │
│ ... use the API normally (JOIN, PRIVMSG, poll, etc.) ... │
│ │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌─ Client B (another device, while session is still active) ┐
│ (From another device, while session is still active) │
│ │
3. POST /api/v1/login │
2. POST /api/v1/login │
│ {"nick":"alice", "password":"s3cret!!"} │
│ → Set-Cookie: neoirc_auth=<cookie_b>; HttpOnly; ...
│ → {"id":1, "nick":"alice"} │
│ → {"id":1, "nick":"alice", "token":"d4e5f6..."}
│ (New client added to existing session — channels │
│ and message queues are preserved.)
│ and message queues are preserved. If all clients
│ have logged out, session no longer exists.) │
│ │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
@@ -768,35 +760,6 @@ Change the user's nickname.
**IRC reference:** RFC 1459 §4.1.2
#### PASS — Set Session Password
Set a password on the current session, enabling multi-client login via
`POST /api/v1/login`. The password is hashed with bcrypt and stored
server-side.
**C2S:**
```json
{"command": "PASS", "body": ["mypassword"]}
```
**Behavior:**
- `body[0]` is the password. Must be at least 8 characters.
- On success, the server responds with `{"status": "ok"}`.
- If the password is too short or missing, the server sends
ERR_NEEDMOREPARAMS (461) via the message queue.
- Calling PASS again overwrites the previous password.
- Once a password is set, `POST /api/v1/login` can be used with the nick
and password to create additional clients on the same session.
**Response:** `200 OK`
```json
{"status": "ok"}
```
**IRC reference:** Inspired by RFC 1459 §4.1.1 (PASS), repurposed for
session password management.
#### TOPIC — Set Channel Topic
Set or change a channel's topic.
@@ -863,9 +826,9 @@ Destroy the session and disconnect from the server.
quitting user. The quitting user does **not** receive their own QUIT.
- The user is removed from all channels.
- Empty channels are deleted (ephemeral).
- The user's session is destroyed — the auth cookie is invalidated, the nick
- The user's session is destroyed — the auth token is invalidated, the nick
is released.
- Subsequent requests with the old auth cookie return HTTP 401.
- Subsequent requests with the old token return HTTP 401.
**Response:** `200 OK`
```json
@@ -1192,8 +1155,8 @@ to compute stamps. Higher bit counts take exponentially longer to compute.
## API Reference
All endpoints accept and return `application/json`. Authenticated endpoints
require the `neoirc_auth` cookie, which is set automatically by
`POST /api/v1/session` and `POST /api/v1/login`.
require `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header. The token is obtained from
`POST /api/v1/session`.
All API responses include appropriate HTTP status codes. Error responses have
the format:
@@ -1228,18 +1191,11 @@ the connecting client's IP address at session creation time. Together these form
the hostmask used in WHOIS, WHO, and future ban matching (`+b`).
**Response:** `201 Created`
The response sets an `neoirc_auth` HttpOnly cookie containing an opaque auth
value. The JSON body does **not** include the auth credential.
```
Set-Cookie: neoirc_auth=494ba9fc...e3; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict
```
```json
{
"id": 1,
"nick": "alice"
"nick": "alice",
"token": "494ba9fc0f2242873fc5c285dd4a24fc3844ba5e67789a17e69b6fe5f8c132e3"
}
```
@@ -1247,16 +1203,7 @@ Set-Cookie: neoirc_auth=494ba9fc...e3; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict
|---------|---------|-------------|
| `id` | integer | Server-assigned user ID |
| `nick` | string | Confirmed nick (always matches request on success) |
**Cookie properties:**
| Property | Value |
|------------|-------|
| `Name` | `neoirc_auth` |
| `HttpOnly` | `true` (not accessible from JavaScript) |
| `SameSite` | `Strict` (prevents CSRF) |
| `Secure` | `true` when behind TLS |
| `Path` | `/` |
| `token` | string | 64-character hex auth token. Store this — it's the only credential. |
**Errors:**
@@ -1270,18 +1217,71 @@ Set-Cookie: neoirc_auth=494ba9fc...e3; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict
**curl example:**
```bash
# Use -c to save cookies, -b to send them
curl -s -c cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/session \
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/session \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"nick":"alice","pow_token":"1:20:260310:neoirc::3a2f1"}'
-d '{"nick":"alice","pow_token":"1:20:260310:neoirc::3a2f1"}' | jq -r .token)
echo $TOKEN
```
### POST /api/v1/register — Register Account
Create a new user session with a password. The password is hashed
with bcrypt and stored server-side. The password enables login from
additional clients via `POST /api/v1/login` while the session
remains active.
**Request Body:**
```json
{"nick": "alice", "username": "alice", "password": "mypassword"}
```
| Field | Type | Required | Constraints |
|------------|--------|----------|-------------|
| `nick` | string | Yes | 132 characters, must be unique on the server |
| `username` | string | No | 132 characters, IRC ident-style. Defaults to nick if omitted. |
| `password` | string | Yes | Minimum 8 characters |
The `username` and hostname (auto-resolved via reverse DNS) form the IRC
hostmask (`nick!user@host`) shown in WHOIS and WHO responses.
**Response:** `201 Created`
```json
{
"id": 1,
"nick": "alice",
"token": "494ba9fc0f2242873fc5c285dd4a24fc3844ba5e67789a17e69b6fe5f8c132e3"
}
```
| Field | Type | Description |
|---------|---------|-------------|
| `id` | integer | Server-assigned user ID |
| `nick` | string | Confirmed nick |
| `token` | string | 64-character hex auth token |
**Errors:**
| Status | Error | When |
|--------|-------|------|
| 400 | `invalid nick format` | Nick doesn't match allowed format |
| 400 | `invalid username format` | Username doesn't match allowed format |
| 400 | `password must be at least 8 characters` | Password too short |
| 409 | `nick already taken` | Another active session holds this nick |
**curl example:**
```bash
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/register \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"nick":"alice","password":"mypassword"}' | jq -r .token)
echo $TOKEN
```
### POST /api/v1/login — Login to Account
Authenticate with a nick and password (set via the PASS IRC command). Creates a
new client for the existing session, preserving channel memberships and message
queues. This is how multi-client access works: each login adds a new client to
the session with its own auth cookie and message delivery queue.
Authenticate with a previously registered nick and password. Creates a new
client token for the existing session, preserving channel memberships and
message queues. This is how multi-client access works for registered accounts:
each login adds a new client to the session.
On successful login, the server enqueues MOTD messages and synthetic channel
state (JOIN + TOPIC + NAMES for each channel the session belongs to) into the
@@ -1294,37 +1294,37 @@ new client's queue, so the client can immediately restore its UI state.
| Field | Type | Required | Constraints |
|------------|--------|----------|-------------|
| `nick` | string | Yes | Must match an active session with a password set |
| `password` | string | Yes | Must match the session's password |
| `nick` | string | Yes | Must match a registered account |
| `password` | string | Yes | Must match the account's password |
**Response:** `200 OK`
The response sets an `neoirc_auth` HttpOnly cookie for the new client.
```json
{
"id": 1,
"nick": "alice"
"nick": "alice",
"token": "7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f"
}
```
| Field | Type | Description |
|---------|---------|-------------|
| `id` | integer | Session ID |
| `id` | integer | Session ID (same as when registered) |
| `nick` | string | Current nick |
| `token` | string | New 64-character hex auth token for this client |
**Errors:**
| Status | Error | When |
|--------|-------|------|
| 400 | `nick and password required` | Missing nick or password |
| 401 | `invalid credentials` | Wrong password, nick not found, or session has no password set |
| 401 | `invalid credentials` | Wrong password, nick not found, or account has no password |
**curl example:**
```bash
curl -s -c cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/login \
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"nick":"alice","password":"mypassword"}'
-d '{"nick":"alice","password":"mypassword"}' | jq -r .token)
echo $TOKEN
```
### GET /api/v1/state — Get Session State
@@ -1368,13 +1368,13 @@ Each channel object:
**curl example:**
```bash
curl -s http://localhost:8080/api/v1/state \
-b cookies.txt | jq .
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
```
**Reconnect with channel state initialization:**
```bash
curl -s "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/state?initChannelState=1" \
-b cookies.txt | jq .
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
```
### GET /api/v1/messages — Poll Messages (Long-Poll)
@@ -1434,12 +1434,14 @@ real-time endpoint — clients call it in a loop.
**curl example (immediate):**
```bash
curl -s -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=0&timeout=0" | jq .
curl -s "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=0&timeout=0" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
```
**curl example (long-poll, 15s):**
```bash
curl -s -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=42&timeout=15" | jq .
curl -s "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=42&timeout=15" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
```
### POST /api/v1/messages — Send Command
@@ -1466,7 +1468,6 @@ reference with all required and optional fields.
| `JOIN` | `to` | | 200 OK |
| `PART` | `to` | `body` | 200 OK |
| `NICK` | `body` | | 200 OK |
| `PASS` | `body` | | 200 OK |
| `TOPIC` | `to`, `body` | | 200 OK |
| `MODE` | `to` | | 200 OK |
| `NAMES` | `to` | | 200 OK |
@@ -1482,14 +1483,14 @@ All IRC commands return HTTP 200 OK. IRC-level success and error responses
are delivered as **numeric replies** through the message queue (see
[Numeric Replies](#numeric-replies) below). HTTP error codes (4xx/5xx) are
reserved for transport-level problems: malformed JSON (400), missing/invalid
auth cookies (401), and server errors (500).
auth tokens (401), and server errors (500).
**HTTP errors (transport-level only):**
| Status | Error | When |
|--------|-------|------|
| 400 | `invalid request` | Malformed JSON or empty command |
| 401 | `unauthorized` | Missing or invalid auth cookie |
| 401 | `unauthorized` | Missing or invalid auth token |
| 500 | `internal error` | Server-side failure |
**IRC numeric error replies (delivered via message queue):**
@@ -1584,11 +1585,11 @@ events). Event messages are delivered via the live queue only.
```bash
# Latest 50 messages in #general
curl -s "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/history?target=%23general&limit=50" \
-b cookies.txt | jq .
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
# Older messages (pagination)
curl -s "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/history?target=%23general&before=100&limit=50" \
-b cookies.txt | jq .
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
```
### GET /api/v1/channels — List Channels
@@ -1619,22 +1620,18 @@ List members of a channel. The `{name}` parameter is the channel name
**curl example:**
```bash
curl -s http://localhost:8080/api/v1/channels/general/members \
-b cookies.txt | jq .
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
```
### POST /api/v1/logout — Logout
Destroy the current client's session cookie and server-side client record.
If no other clients remain on the session, the user is fully cleaned up:
parted from all channels (with QUIT broadcast to members), session deleted,
nick released. The auth cookie is cleared in the response.
Destroy the current client's auth token. If no other clients remain on the
session, the user is fully cleaned up: parted from all channels (with QUIT
broadcast to members), session deleted, nick released.
**Request:** No body. Requires auth cookie.
**Request:** No body. Requires auth.
**Response:** `200 OK`
The response clears the `neoirc_auth` cookie.
```json
{"status": "ok"}
```
@@ -1643,11 +1640,12 @@ The response clears the `neoirc_auth` cookie.
| Status | Error | When |
|--------|-------|------|
| 401 | `unauthorized` | Missing or invalid auth cookie |
| 401 | `unauthorized` | Missing or invalid auth token |
**curl example:**
```bash
curl -s -b cookies.txt -c cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/logout | jq .
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/logout \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
```
### GET /api/v1/users/me — Current User Info
@@ -1671,7 +1669,7 @@ Return the current user's session state. This is an alias for
**curl example:**
```bash
curl -s http://localhost:8080/api/v1/users/me \
-b cookies.txt | jq .
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
```
### GET /api/v1/server — Server Info
@@ -1916,21 +1914,20 @@ authenticity.
### Authentication
- **Cookie-based auth**: Opaque HttpOnly cookies (64 hex chars = 256 bits of
entropy). Cookie values are hashed (SHA-256) before storage and validated on
every request. Cookies are HttpOnly (no JavaScript access), SameSite=Strict
(CSRF protection), and Secure when behind TLS.
- **Session auth**: Opaque bearer tokens (64 hex chars = 256 bits of entropy).
Tokens are hashed (SHA-256) before storage and validated on every request.
- **Anonymous sessions**: `POST /api/v1/session` requires only a nick. No
password, instant access. The auth cookie is the sole credential.
- **Password-protected sessions**: The PASS IRC command sets a bcrypt-hashed
password on the session. `POST /api/v1/login` authenticates against the
stored hash and issues a new client cookie.
password, instant access. The token is the sole credential.
- **Registered accounts**: `POST /api/v1/register` accepts a nick and password
(minimum 8 characters). The password is hashed with bcrypt at the default
cost factor and stored alongside the session. `POST /api/v1/login`
authenticates against the stored hash and issues a new client token.
- **Password security**: Passwords are never stored in plain text. bcrypt
handles salting and key stretching automatically. Sessions without a
password cannot be logged into via `/login`.
- **Cookie security**: Auth cookies should only be transmitted over HTTPS in
production. If a cookie is compromised, the attacker has full access to the
session until QUIT or expiry.
handles salting and key stretching automatically. Anonymous sessions have
an empty `password_hash` and cannot be logged into via `/login`.
- **Token security**: Tokens should be treated like session cookies. Transmit
only over HTTPS in production. If a token is compromised, the attacker has
full access to the session until QUIT or expiry.
### Message Integrity
@@ -1967,10 +1964,8 @@ authenticity.
- **HTTPS is strongly recommended** for production deployments. The server
itself serves plain HTTP — use a reverse proxy (nginx, Caddy, etc.) for TLS
termination.
- **CORS**: The server allows all origins with credentials
(`Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`), reflecting the request Origin.
This enables cookie-based auth from cross-origin clients. Restrict origins
in production via reverse proxy configuration if needed.
- **CORS**: The server allows all origins by default (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`).
Restrict this in production via reverse proxy configuration if needed.
- **Content-Security-Policy**: The server sets a strict CSP header on all
responses, restricting resource loading to same-origin and disabling
dangerous features (object embeds, framing, base tag injection). The
@@ -2096,16 +2091,16 @@ The database schema is managed via embedded SQL migration files in
Index on `(uuid)`.
#### `clients`
| Column | Type | Description |
|--------------|----------|-------------|
| `id` | INTEGER | Primary key (auto-increment) |
| `uuid` | TEXT | Unique client UUID |
| `session_id` | INTEGER | FK → sessions.id (cascade delete) |
| `token` | TEXT | Auth cookie value (SHA-256 hash of the 64-hex-char cookie) |
| `ip` | TEXT | Real IP address of this client connection |
| `hostname` | TEXT | Reverse DNS hostname of this client connection |
| `created_at` | DATETIME | Client creation time |
| `last_seen` | DATETIME | Last API request time |
| Column | Type | Description |
|-------------|----------|-------------|
| `id` | INTEGER | Primary key (auto-increment) |
| `uuid` | TEXT | Unique client UUID |
| `session_id`| INTEGER | FK → sessions.id (cascade delete) |
| `token` | TEXT | Unique auth token (SHA-256 hash of 64 hex chars) |
| `ip` | TEXT | Real IP address of this client connection |
| `hostname` | TEXT | Reverse DNS hostname of this client connection |
| `created_at`| DATETIME | Client creation time |
| `last_seen` | DATETIME | Last API request time |
Indexes on `(token)` and `(session_id)`.
@@ -2166,7 +2161,7 @@ skew issues) and simpler than UUIDs (integer comparison vs. string comparison).
- **Client output queue entries**: Pruned automatically when older than
`QUEUE_MAX_AGE` (default 30 days).
- **Channels**: Deleted when the last member leaves (ephemeral).
- **Sessions**: Both anonymous and password-protected sessions are deleted on `QUIT`
- **Sessions**: Both anonymous and registered sessions are deleted on `QUIT`
or when the last client logs out (`POST /api/v1/logout` with no remaining
clients triggers session cleanup). There is no distinction between session
types in the cleanup path — `handleQuit` and `cleanupUser` both call
@@ -2174,7 +2169,7 @@ skew issues) and simpler than UUIDs (integer comparison vs. string comparison).
after `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`
(default 30 days) — the server runs a background cleanup loop that parts
idle users from all channels, broadcasts QUIT, and releases their nicks.
- **Clients**: Individual client auth cookies are invalidated on `POST /api/v1/logout`.
- **Clients**: Individual client tokens are deleted on `POST /api/v1/logout`.
A session can have multiple clients; removing one doesn't affect others.
However, when the last client is removed (via logout), the entire session
is deleted — the user is parted from all channels, QUIT is broadcast, and
@@ -2322,7 +2317,7 @@ with an HTTP client library.
A complete client needs only four HTTP calls:
```
1. POST /api/v1/session → get auth cookie
1. POST /api/v1/session → get token
2. POST /api/v1/messages (JOIN) → join channels
3. GET /api/v1/messages (loop) → receive messages
4. POST /api/v1/messages → send messages
@@ -2331,59 +2326,68 @@ A complete client needs only four HTTP calls:
### Step-by-Step with curl
```bash
# 1a. Create a session (cookie saved automatically with -c)
curl -s -c cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/session \
# 1a. Create an anonymous session (no account)
export TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/session \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"nick":"testuser"}'
-d '{"nick":"testuser"}' | jq -r .token)
# 1b. Optionally set a password for multi-client access
curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
# 1b. Or register an account (multi-client support)
export TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/register \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"command":"PASS","body":["mypassword"]}'
-d '{"nick":"testuser","password":"mypassword"}' | jq -r .token)
# 1c. Login from another device (saves new cookie)
curl -s -c cookies2.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/login \
# 1c. Or login to an existing account
export TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"nick":"testuser","password":"mypassword"}'
-d '{"nick":"testuser","password":"mypassword"}' | jq -r .token)
# 2. Join a channel
curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"command":"JOIN","to":"#general"}'
# 3. Send a message
curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"command":"PRIVMSG","to":"#general","body":["hello from curl!"]}'
# 4. Poll for messages (one-shot)
curl -s -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=0&timeout=0" | jq .
curl -s "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=0&timeout=0" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
# 5. Long-poll (blocks up to 15s waiting for messages)
curl -s -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=0&timeout=15" | jq .
curl -s "http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages?after=0&timeout=15" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .
# 6. Send a DM
curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"command":"PRIVMSG","to":"othernick","body":["hey!"]}'
# 7. Change nick
curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"command":"NICK","body":["newnick"]}'
# 8. Set channel topic
curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"command":"TOPIC","to":"#general","body":["New topic!"]}'
# 9. Leave a channel
curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"command":"PART","to":"#general","body":["goodbye"]}'
# 10. Disconnect
curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"command":"QUIT","body":["leaving"]}'
```
@@ -2393,25 +2397,27 @@ curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/messages \
The key to real-time messaging is the poll loop. Here's the pattern:
```python
# Python example — using requests.Session for automatic cookie handling
import requests, json, time
# Python example
import requests, json
BASE = "http://localhost:8080/api/v1"
session = requests.Session() # Manages cookies automatically
token = None
last_id = 0
# Create session (cookie set automatically via Set-Cookie header)
resp = session.post(f"{BASE}/session", json={"nick": "pybot"})
print(f"Session: {resp.json()}")
# Create session
resp = requests.post(f"{BASE}/session", json={"nick": "pybot"})
token = resp.json()["token"]
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
# Join channel
session.post(f"{BASE}/messages",
json={"command": "JOIN", "to": "#general"})
requests.post(f"{BASE}/messages", headers=headers,
json={"command": "JOIN", "to": "#general"})
# Poll loop
while True:
try:
resp = session.get(f"{BASE}/messages",
resp = requests.get(f"{BASE}/messages",
headers=headers,
params={"after": last_id, "timeout": 15},
timeout=20) # HTTP timeout > long-poll timeout
data = resp.json()
@@ -2428,14 +2434,14 @@ while True:
```
```javascript
// JavaScript/browser example — cookies sent automatically
async function pollLoop() {
// JavaScript/browser example
async function pollLoop(token) {
let lastId = 0;
while (true) {
try {
const resp = await fetch(
`/api/v1/messages?after=${lastId}&timeout=15`,
{credentials: 'same-origin'} // Include cookies
{headers: {'Authorization': `Bearer ${token}`}}
);
if (resp.status === 401) { /* session expired */ break; }
const data = await resp.json();
@@ -2467,10 +2473,11 @@ Clients should handle these message commands from the queue:
### Error Handling
- **HTTP 401**: Auth cookie expired or invalid. Re-create session or
re-login (if a password was set).
- **HTTP 401**: Token expired or invalid. Re-create session (anonymous) or
re-login (registered account).
- **HTTP 404**: Channel or user not found.
- **HTTP 409**: Nick already taken (on session creation or NICK change).
- **HTTP 409**: Nick already taken (on session creation, registration, or
NICK change).
- **HTTP 400**: Malformed request. Check the `error` field in the response.
- **Network errors**: Back off exponentially (1s, 2s, 4s, ..., max 30s).
@@ -2487,11 +2494,10 @@ Clients should handle these message commands from the queue:
4. **DM tab logic**: When you receive a PRIVMSG where `to` is not a channel
(no `#` prefix), the DM tab should be keyed by the **other** user's nick:
if `from` is you, use `to`; if `from` is someone else, use `from`.
5. **Reconnection**: If the poll loop fails with 401, the auth cookie is
invalid. For sessions without a password, create a new session. For
sessions with a password set (via PASS command), log in again via
`POST /api/v1/login` to get a fresh cookie on the same session. If it
fails with a network error, retry with backoff.
5. **Reconnection**: If the poll loop fails with 401, the token is invalid.
For anonymous sessions, create a new session. For registered accounts,
log in again via `POST /api/v1/login` to get a fresh token on the same
session. If it fails with a network error, retry with backoff.
---
@@ -2693,10 +2699,8 @@ guess is borne by the server (bcrypt), not the client.
331-332 TOPIC, 352-353 WHO/NAMES, 366, 372-376 MOTD, 401-461 errors)
- [ ] **Max message size enforcement** — reject oversized messages
- [ ] **NOTICE command** — distinct from PRIVMSG (no auto-reply flag)
- [x] **Multi-client sessions** — set a password via PASS command, then
login from additional devices via `POST /api/v1/login`
- [x] **Cookie-based auth** — HttpOnly cookies replace Bearer tokens for
all API authentication
- [ ] **Multi-client sessions** — add client to existing session
(share nick across devices)
### Future (1.0+)
@@ -2809,12 +2813,13 @@ neoirc/
build a working IRC-style TUI client against this API in an afternoon, the
API is too complex.
2. **Passwords optional** — anonymous sessions are instant: pick a nick and
2. **Accounts optional** — anonymous sessions are instant: pick a nick and
talk. No registration, no email verification. The cost of entry is a
hashcash proof, not bureaucracy. For users who want multi-client access
(multiple devices sharing one session), the PASS command sets a password
on the session — but it's never required. Identity verification at the
message layer uses cryptographic signing, independent of password status.
(multiple devices sharing one session), optional account registration
with password is available — but never required. Identity
verification at the message layer uses cryptographic signing,
independent of account status.
3. **IRC semantics over HTTP** — command names and numeric codes from
RFC 1459/2812. If you've built an IRC client or bot, you already know the

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/cookiejar"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -29,19 +28,16 @@ var errHTTP = errors.New("HTTP error")
// Client wraps HTTP calls to the neoirc server API.
type Client struct {
BaseURL string
Token string
HTTPClient *http.Client
}
// NewClient creates a new API client with a cookie jar
// for automatic auth cookie management.
// NewClient creates a new API client.
func NewClient(baseURL string) *Client {
jar, _ := cookiejar.New(nil)
return &Client{
return &Client{ //nolint:exhaustruct // Token set after CreateSession
BaseURL: baseURL,
HTTPClient: &http.Client{ //nolint:exhaustruct // defaults fine
Timeout: httpTimeout,
Jar: jar,
},
}
}
@@ -83,6 +79,8 @@ func (client *Client) CreateSession(
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode session: %w", err)
}
client.Token = resp.Token
return &resp, nil
}
@@ -123,7 +121,6 @@ func (client *Client) PollMessages(
Timeout: time.Duration(
timeout+pollExtraTime,
) * time.Second,
Jar: client.HTTPClient.Jar,
}
params := url.Values{}
@@ -148,6 +145,10 @@ func (client *Client) PollMessages(
return nil, fmt.Errorf("new request: %w", err)
}
request.Header.Set(
"Authorization", "Bearer "+client.Token,
)
resp, err := pollClient.Do(request)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("poll request: %w", err)
@@ -303,6 +304,12 @@ func (client *Client) do(
"Content-Type", "application/json",
)
if client.Token != "" {
request.Header.Set(
"Authorization", "Bearer "+client.Token,
)
}
resp, err := client.HTTPClient.Do(request)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("http: %w", err)

View File

@@ -10,8 +10,9 @@ type SessionRequest struct {
// SessionResponse is the response from session creation.
type SessionResponse struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Nick string `json:"nick"`
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Nick string `json:"nick"`
Token string `json:"token"`
}
// StateResponse is the response from GET /api/v1/state.

View File

@@ -21,28 +21,86 @@ var errNoPassword = errors.New(
"account has no password set",
)
// SetPassword sets a bcrypt-hashed password on a session,
// enabling multi-client login via POST /api/v1/login.
func (database *Database) SetPassword(
// RegisterUser creates a session with a hashed password
// and returns session ID, client ID, and token.
func (database *Database) RegisterUser(
ctx context.Context,
sessionID int64,
password string,
) error {
nick, password, username, hostname, remoteIP string,
) (int64, int64, string, error) {
if username == "" {
username = nick
}
hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword(
[]byte(password), bcryptCost,
)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("hash password: %w", err)
return 0, 0, "", fmt.Errorf(
"hash password: %w", err,
)
}
_, err = database.conn.ExecContext(ctx,
"UPDATE sessions SET password_hash = ? WHERE id = ?",
string(hash), sessionID)
sessionUUID := uuid.New().String()
clientUUID := uuid.New().String()
token, err := generateToken()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("set password: %w", err)
return 0, 0, "", err
}
return nil
now := time.Now()
transaction, err := database.conn.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
if err != nil {
return 0, 0, "", fmt.Errorf(
"begin tx: %w", err,
)
}
res, err := transaction.ExecContext(ctx,
`INSERT INTO sessions
(uuid, nick, username, hostname, ip,
password_hash, created_at, last_seen)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
sessionUUID, nick, username, hostname,
remoteIP, string(hash), now, now)
if err != nil {
_ = transaction.Rollback()
return 0, 0, "", fmt.Errorf(
"create session: %w", err,
)
}
sessionID, _ := res.LastInsertId()
tokenHash := hashToken(token)
clientRes, err := transaction.ExecContext(ctx,
`INSERT INTO clients
(uuid, session_id, token, ip, hostname,
created_at, last_seen)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
clientUUID, sessionID, tokenHash,
remoteIP, hostname, now, now)
if err != nil {
_ = transaction.Rollback()
return 0, 0, "", fmt.Errorf(
"create client: %w", err,
)
}
clientID, _ := clientRes.LastInsertId()
err = transaction.Commit()
if err != nil {
return 0, 0, "", fmt.Errorf(
"commit registration: %w", err,
)
}
return sessionID, clientID, token, nil
}
// LoginUser verifies a nick/password and creates a new

View File

@@ -6,65 +6,126 @@ import (
_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
)
func TestSetPassword(t *testing.T) {
func TestRegisterUser(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
database := setupTestDB(t)
ctx := t.Context()
sessionID, _, _, err :=
database.CreateSession(ctx, "passuser", "", "", "")
sessionID, clientID, token, err :=
database.RegisterUser(ctx, "reguser", "password123", "", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err = database.SetPassword(
ctx, sessionID, "password123",
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Verify we can now log in with the password.
loginSID, loginCID, loginToken, err :=
database.LoginUser(ctx, "passuser", "password123", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if loginSID == 0 || loginCID == 0 || loginToken == "" {
if sessionID == 0 || clientID == 0 || token == "" {
t.Fatal("expected valid ids and token")
}
// Verify session works via token lookup.
sid, cid, nick, err :=
database.GetSessionByToken(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if sid != sessionID || cid != clientID {
t.Fatal("session/client id mismatch")
}
if nick != "reguser" {
t.Fatalf("expected reguser, got %s", nick)
}
}
func TestSetPasswordThenWrongLogin(t *testing.T) {
func TestRegisterUserWithUserHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
database := setupTestDB(t)
ctx := t.Context()
sessionID, _, _, err :=
database.CreateSession(ctx, "wrongpw", "", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err = database.SetPassword(
ctx, sessionID, "correctpass",
sessionID, _, _, err := database.RegisterUser(
ctx, "reguhost", "password123",
"myident", "example.org", "",
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
loginSID, loginCID, loginToken, loginErr :=
database.LoginUser(ctx, "wrongpw", "wrongpass12", "", "")
if loginErr == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for wrong password")
info, err := database.GetSessionHostInfo(
ctx, sessionID,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_ = loginSID
_ = loginCID
_ = loginToken
if info.Username != "myident" {
t.Fatalf(
"expected myident, got %s", info.Username,
)
}
if info.Hostname != "example.org" {
t.Fatalf(
"expected example.org, got %s",
info.Hostname,
)
}
}
func TestRegisterUserDefaultUsername(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
database := setupTestDB(t)
ctx := t.Context()
sessionID, _, _, err := database.RegisterUser(
ctx, "regdefault", "password123", "", "", "",
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
info, err := database.GetSessionHostInfo(
ctx, sessionID,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if info.Username != "regdefault" {
t.Fatalf(
"expected regdefault, got %s",
info.Username,
)
}
}
func TestRegisterUserDuplicateNick(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
database := setupTestDB(t)
ctx := t.Context()
regSID, regCID, regToken, err :=
database.RegisterUser(ctx, "dupnick", "password123", "", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_ = regSID
_ = regCID
_ = regToken
dupSID, dupCID, dupToken, dupErr :=
database.RegisterUser(ctx, "dupnick", "other12345", "", "", "")
if dupErr == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for duplicate nick")
}
_ = dupSID
_ = dupCID
_ = dupToken
}
func TestLoginUser(t *testing.T) {
@@ -73,26 +134,23 @@ func TestLoginUser(t *testing.T) {
database := setupTestDB(t)
ctx := t.Context()
sessionID, _, _, err :=
database.CreateSession(ctx, "loginuser", "", "", "")
regSID, regCID, regToken, err :=
database.RegisterUser(ctx, "loginuser", "mypassword", "", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err = database.SetPassword(
ctx, sessionID, "mypassword",
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_ = regSID
_ = regCID
_ = regToken
loginSID, loginCID, token, err :=
sessionID, clientID, token, err :=
database.LoginUser(ctx, "loginuser", "mypassword", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if loginSID == 0 || loginCID == 0 || token == "" {
if sessionID == 0 || clientID == 0 || token == "" {
t.Fatal("expected valid ids and token")
}
@@ -108,6 +166,110 @@ func TestLoginUser(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestLoginUserStoresClientIPHostname(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
database := setupTestDB(t)
ctx := t.Context()
regSID, regCID, regToken, err := database.RegisterUser(
ctx, "loginipuser", "password123",
"", "", "10.0.0.1",
)
_ = regSID
_ = regCID
_ = regToken
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_, clientID, _, err := database.LoginUser(
ctx, "loginipuser", "password123",
"10.0.0.99", "newhost.example.com",
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
clientInfo, err := database.GetClientHostInfo(
ctx, clientID,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if clientInfo.IP != "10.0.0.99" {
t.Fatalf(
"expected client IP 10.0.0.99, got %s",
clientInfo.IP,
)
}
if clientInfo.Hostname != "newhost.example.com" {
t.Fatalf(
"expected hostname newhost.example.com, got %s",
clientInfo.Hostname,
)
}
}
func TestRegisterUserStoresSessionIP(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
database := setupTestDB(t)
ctx := t.Context()
sessionID, _, _, err := database.RegisterUser(
ctx, "regipuser", "password123",
"ident", "host.local", "172.16.0.5",
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
info, err := database.GetSessionHostInfo(
ctx, sessionID,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if info.IP != "172.16.0.5" {
t.Fatalf(
"expected session IP 172.16.0.5, got %s",
info.IP,
)
}
}
func TestLoginUserWrongPassword(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
database := setupTestDB(t)
ctx := t.Context()
regSID, regCID, regToken, err :=
database.RegisterUser(ctx, "wrongpw", "correctpass", "", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_ = regSID
_ = regCID
_ = regToken
loginSID, loginCID, loginToken, loginErr :=
database.LoginUser(ctx, "wrongpw", "wrongpass12", "", "")
if loginErr == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for wrong password")
}
_ = loginSID
_ = loginCID
_ = loginToken
}
func TestLoginUserNoPassword(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()

View File

@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ const (
defaultMaxBodySize = 4096
defaultHistLimit = 50
maxHistLimit = 500
authCookieName = "neoirc_auth"
)
func (hdlr *Handlers) maxBodySize() int64 {
@@ -104,18 +103,23 @@ func resolveHostname(
return strings.TrimSuffix(names[0], ".")
}
// authSession extracts the session from the auth cookie.
// authSession extracts the session from the client token.
func (hdlr *Handlers) authSession(
request *http.Request,
) (int64, int64, string, error) {
cookie, err := request.Cookie(authCookieName)
if err != nil || cookie.Value == "" {
auth := request.Header.Get("Authorization")
if !strings.HasPrefix(auth, "Bearer ") {
return 0, 0, "", errUnauthorized
}
token := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer ")
if token == "" {
return 0, 0, "", errUnauthorized
}
sessionID, clientID, nick, err :=
hdlr.params.Database.GetSessionByToken(
request.Context(), cookie.Value,
request.Context(), token,
)
if err != nil {
return 0, 0, "", fmt.Errorf("auth: %w", err)
@@ -124,46 +128,6 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) authSession(
return sessionID, clientID, nick, nil
}
// setAuthCookie sets the authentication cookie on the
// response.
func (hdlr *Handlers) setAuthCookie(
writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
token string,
) {
secure := request.TLS != nil ||
request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "https"
http.SetCookie(writer, &http.Cookie{ //nolint:exhaustruct // optional fields
Name: authCookieName,
Value: token,
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: secure,
SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
})
}
// clearAuthCookie removes the authentication cookie from
// the client.
func (hdlr *Handlers) clearAuthCookie(
writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
) {
secure := request.TLS != nil ||
request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "https"
http.SetCookie(writer, &http.Cookie{ //nolint:exhaustruct // optional fields
Name: authCookieName,
Value: "",
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: secure,
SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
MaxAge: -1,
})
}
func (hdlr *Handlers) requireAuth(
writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
@@ -331,11 +295,10 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) executeCreateSession(
hdlr.deliverMOTD(request, clientID, sessionID, nick)
hdlr.setAuthCookie(writer, request, token)
hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request, map[string]any{
"id": sessionID,
"nick": nick,
"id": sessionID,
"nick": nick,
"token": token,
}, http.StatusCreated)
}
@@ -1040,11 +1003,6 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) dispatchCommand(
writer, request,
sessionID, clientID, nick, bodyLines,
)
case irc.CmdPass:
hdlr.handlePass(
writer, request,
sessionID, clientID, nick, bodyLines,
)
case irc.CmdTopic:
hdlr.handleTopic(
writer, request,
@@ -2180,8 +2138,6 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleQuit(
request.Context(), sessionID,
)
hdlr.clearAuthCookie(writer, request)
hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request,
map[string]string{"status": "quit"},
http.StatusOK)
@@ -3103,8 +3059,6 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) HandleLogout() http.HandlerFunc {
)
}
hdlr.clearAuthCookie(writer, request)
hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request,
map[string]string{"status": "ok"},
http.StatusOK)

View File

@@ -40,16 +40,15 @@ func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
}
const (
commandKey = "command"
bodyKey = "body"
toKey = "to"
statusKey = "status"
privmsgCmd = "PRIVMSG"
joinCmd = "JOIN"
apiMessages = "/api/v1/messages"
apiSession = "/api/v1/session"
apiState = "/api/v1/state"
authCookieName = "neoirc_auth"
commandKey = "command"
bodyKey = "body"
toKey = "to"
statusKey = "status"
privmsgCmd = "PRIVMSG"
joinCmd = "JOIN"
apiMessages = "/api/v1/messages"
apiSession = "/api/v1/session"
apiState = "/api/v1/state"
)
// testServer wraps a test HTTP server with helpers.
@@ -268,7 +267,7 @@ func doRequest(
func doRequestAuth(
t *testing.T,
method, url, cookie string,
method, url, token string,
body io.Reader,
) (*http.Response, error) {
t.Helper()
@@ -286,11 +285,10 @@ func doRequestAuth(
)
}
if cookie != "" {
request.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{ //nolint:exhaustruct // only name+value needed
Name: authCookieName,
Value: cookie,
})
if token != "" {
request.Header.Set(
"Authorization", "Bearer "+token,
)
}
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(request)
@@ -333,19 +331,17 @@ func (tserver *testServer) createSession(
)
}
// Drain the body.
_, _ = io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
// Extract auth cookie from response.
for _, cookie := range resp.Cookies() {
if cookie.Name == authCookieName {
return cookie.Value
}
var result struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Token string `json:"token"`
}
tserver.t.Fatal("no auth cookie in response")
decErr := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&result)
if decErr != nil {
tserver.t.Fatalf("decode session: %v", decErr)
}
return ""
return result.Token
}
func (tserver *testServer) sendCommand(
@@ -502,10 +498,10 @@ func findNumeric(
func TestCreateSessionValid(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
cookie := tserver.createSession("alice")
token := tserver.createSession("alice")
if cookie == "" {
t.Fatal("expected auth cookie")
if token == "" {
t.Fatal("expected token")
}
}
@@ -627,7 +623,7 @@ func TestCreateSessionMalformed(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestAuthNoCookie(t *testing.T) {
func TestAuthNoHeader(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
status, _ := tserver.getState("")
@@ -636,11 +632,11 @@ func TestAuthNoCookie(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestAuthBadCookie(t *testing.T) {
func TestAuthBadToken(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
status, _ := tserver.getState(
"invalid-cookie-12345",
"invalid-token-12345",
)
if status != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("expected 401, got %d", status)
@@ -1837,6 +1833,90 @@ func assertFieldGTE(
}
}
func TestRegisterValid(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
body, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
"nick": "reguser", "password": "password123",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := doRequest(
t,
http.MethodPost,
tserver.url("/api/v1/register"),
bytes.NewReader(body),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
respBody, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
t.Fatalf(
"expected 201, got %d: %s",
resp.StatusCode, respBody,
)
}
var result map[string]any
_ = json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&result)
if result["token"] == nil || result["token"] == "" {
t.Fatal("expected token in response")
}
if result["nick"] != "reguser" {
t.Fatalf(
"expected reguser, got %v", result["nick"],
)
}
}
func TestRegisterDuplicate(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
body, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
"nick": "dupuser", "password": "password123",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := doRequest(
t,
http.MethodPost,
tserver.url("/api/v1/register"),
bytes.NewReader(body),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_ = resp.Body.Close()
resp2, err := doRequest(
t,
http.MethodPost,
tserver.url("/api/v1/register"),
bytes.NewReader(body),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp2.Body.Close() }()
if resp2.StatusCode != http.StatusConflict {
t.Fatalf("expected 409, got %d", resp2.StatusCode)
}
}
func postJSONExpectStatus(
t *testing.T,
tserver *testServer,
@@ -1871,102 +1951,36 @@ func postJSONExpectStatus(
}
}
func TestPassCommand(t *testing.T) {
func TestRegisterShortPassword(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
token := tserver.createSession("passuser")
// Drain initial messages.
_, _ = tserver.pollMessages(token, 0)
// Set password via PASS command.
status, result := tserver.sendCommand(
token,
map[string]any{
commandKey: "PASS",
bodyKey: []string{"s3cure_pass"},
postJSONExpectStatus(
t, tserver, "/api/v1/register",
map[string]string{
"nick": "shortpw", "password": "short",
},
http.StatusBadRequest,
)
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf(
"expected 200, got %d: %v", status, result,
)
}
if result[statusKey] != "ok" {
t.Fatalf(
"expected ok, got %v", result[statusKey],
)
}
}
func TestPassCommandShortPassword(t *testing.T) {
func TestRegisterInvalidNick(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
token := tserver.createSession("shortpw")
// Drain initial messages.
_, lastID := tserver.pollMessages(token, 0)
// Try short password — should fail.
status, _ := tserver.sendCommand(
token,
map[string]any{
commandKey: "PASS",
bodyKey: []string{"short"},
postJSONExpectStatus(
t, tserver, "/api/v1/register",
map[string]string{
"nick": "bad nick!",
"password": "password123",
},
http.StatusBadRequest,
)
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d", status)
}
msgs, _ := tserver.pollMessages(token, lastID)
if !findNumeric(msgs, "461") {
t.Fatalf(
"expected ERR_NEEDMOREPARAMS (461), got %v",
msgs,
)
}
}
func TestPassCommandEmpty(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
token := tserver.createSession("emptypw")
// Drain initial messages.
_, lastID := tserver.pollMessages(token, 0)
// Try empty password — should fail.
status, _ := tserver.sendCommand(
token,
map[string]any{commandKey: "PASS"},
)
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d", status)
}
msgs, _ := tserver.pollMessages(token, lastID)
if !findNumeric(msgs, "461") {
t.Fatalf(
"expected ERR_NEEDMOREPARAMS (461), got %v",
msgs,
)
}
}
func TestLoginValid(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
// Create session and set password via PASS command.
token := tserver.createSession("loginuser")
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: "PASS",
bodyKey: []string{"password123"},
})
// Login with nick + password.
loginBody, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
// Register first.
regBody, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
"nick": "loginuser", "password": "password123",
})
if err != nil {
@@ -1974,6 +1988,26 @@ func TestLoginValid(t *testing.T) {
}
resp, err := doRequest(
t,
http.MethodPost,
tserver.url("/api/v1/register"),
bytes.NewReader(regBody),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_ = resp.Body.Close()
// Login.
loginBody, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
"nick": "loginuser", "password": "password123",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp2, err := doRequest(
t,
http.MethodPost,
tserver.url("/api/v1/login"),
@@ -1983,33 +2017,31 @@ func TestLoginValid(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
defer func() { _ = resp2.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
respBody, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if resp2.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
respBody, _ := io.ReadAll(resp2.Body)
t.Fatalf(
"expected 200, got %d: %s",
resp.StatusCode, respBody,
resp2.StatusCode, respBody,
)
}
// Extract auth cookie from login response.
var loginCookie string
var result map[string]any
for _, cookie := range resp.Cookies() {
if cookie.Name == authCookieName {
loginCookie = cookie.Value
_ = json.NewDecoder(resp2.Body).Decode(&result)
break
}
if result["token"] == nil || result["token"] == "" {
t.Fatal("expected token in response")
}
if loginCookie == "" {
t.Fatal("expected auth cookie from login")
// Verify token works.
token, ok := result["token"].(string)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("token not a string")
}
// Verify login cookie works for auth.
status, state := tserver.getState(loginCookie)
status, state := tserver.getState(token)
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d", status)
}
@@ -2025,22 +2057,49 @@ func TestLoginValid(t *testing.T) {
func TestLoginWrongPassword(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
// Create session and set password via PASS command.
token := tserver.createSession("wrongpwuser")
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: "PASS",
bodyKey: []string{"correctpass1"},
regBody, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
"nick": "wrongpwuser", "password": "correctpass1",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
postJSONExpectStatus(
t, tserver, "/api/v1/login",
map[string]string{
"nick": "wrongpwuser",
"password": "wrongpass12",
},
http.StatusUnauthorized,
resp, err := doRequest(
t,
http.MethodPost,
tserver.url("/api/v1/register"),
bytes.NewReader(regBody),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_ = resp.Body.Close()
loginBody, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
"nick": "wrongpwuser", "password": "wrongpass12",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp2, err := doRequest(
t,
http.MethodPost,
tserver.url("/api/v1/login"),
bytes.NewReader(loginBody),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp2.Body.Close() }()
if resp2.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf(
"expected 401, got %d", resp2.StatusCode,
)
}
}
func TestLoginNonexistentUser(t *testing.T) {
@@ -2056,74 +2115,13 @@ func TestLoginNonexistentUser(t *testing.T) {
)
}
func TestSessionCookie(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
body, err := json.Marshal(
map[string]string{"nick": "cookietest"},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := doRequest(
t,
http.MethodPost,
tserver.url(apiSession),
bytes.NewReader(body),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
t.Fatalf(
"expected 201, got %d", resp.StatusCode,
)
}
// Verify Set-Cookie header.
var authCookie *http.Cookie
for _, cookie := range resp.Cookies() {
if cookie.Name == authCookieName {
authCookie = cookie
break
}
}
if authCookie == nil {
t.Fatal("expected neoirc_auth cookie")
}
if !authCookie.HttpOnly {
t.Fatal("cookie should be HttpOnly")
}
if authCookie.SameSite != http.SameSiteStrictMode {
t.Fatal("cookie should be SameSite=Strict")
}
// Verify JSON body does NOT contain token.
var result map[string]any
_ = json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&result)
if _, hasToken := result["token"]; hasToken {
t.Fatal("JSON body should not contain token")
}
}
func TestSessionStillWorks(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
// Verify anonymous session creation still works.
token := tserver.createSession("anon_user")
if token == "" {
t.Fatal("expected cookie for anonymous session")
t.Fatal("expected token for anonymous session")
}
status, state := tserver.getState(token)
@@ -2230,7 +2228,7 @@ func TestWhoisShowsHostInfo(t *testing.T) {
}
// createSessionWithUsername creates a session with a
// specific username and returns the auth cookie value.
// specific username and returns the token.
func (tserver *testServer) createSessionWithUsername(
nick, username string,
) string {
@@ -2264,19 +2262,13 @@ func (tserver *testServer) createSessionWithUsername(
)
}
// Drain the body.
_, _ = io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
// Extract auth cookie from response.
for _, cookie := range resp.Cookies() {
if cookie.Name == authCookieName {
return cookie.Value
}
var result struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
}
tserver.t.Fatal("no auth cookie in response")
_ = json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&result)
return ""
return result.Token
}
func TestWhoShowsHostInfo(t *testing.T) {
@@ -2454,13 +2446,25 @@ func TestLoginRateLimitExceeded(t *testing.T) {
func TestLoginRateLimitAllowsNormalUse(t *testing.T) {
tserver := newTestServer(t)
// Create session and set password via PASS command.
token := tserver.createSession("normaluser")
tserver.sendCommand(token, map[string]any{
commandKey: "PASS",
bodyKey: []string{"password123"},
// Register a user.
regBody, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
"nick": "normaluser", "password": "password123",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := doRequest(
t,
http.MethodPost,
tserver.url("/api/v1/register"),
bytes.NewReader(regBody),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_ = resp.Body.Close()
// A single login should succeed without rate limiting.
loginBody, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{

View File

@@ -5,11 +5,151 @@ import (
"net/http"
"strings"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/pkg/irc"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/db"
)
const minPasswordLength = 8
// HandleRegister creates a new user with a password.
func (hdlr *Handlers) HandleRegister() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(
writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
) {
request.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
writer, request.Body, hdlr.maxBodySize(),
)
hdlr.handleRegister(writer, request)
}
}
func (hdlr *Handlers) handleRegister(
writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
) {
type registerRequest struct {
Nick string `json:"nick"`
Username string `json:"username,omitempty"`
Password string `json:"password"`
}
var payload registerRequest
err := json.NewDecoder(request.Body).Decode(&payload)
if err != nil {
hdlr.respondError(
writer, request,
"invalid request body",
http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
payload.Nick = strings.TrimSpace(payload.Nick)
if !validNickRe.MatchString(payload.Nick) {
hdlr.respondError(
writer, request,
"invalid nick format",
http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
username := resolveUsername(
payload.Username, payload.Nick,
)
if !validUsernameRe.MatchString(username) {
hdlr.respondError(
writer, request,
"invalid username format",
http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
if len(payload.Password) < minPasswordLength {
hdlr.respondError(
writer, request,
"password must be at least 8 characters",
http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
hdlr.executeRegister(
writer, request,
payload.Nick, payload.Password, username,
)
}
func (hdlr *Handlers) executeRegister(
writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
nick, password, username string,
) {
remoteIP := clientIP(request)
hostname := resolveHostname(
request.Context(), remoteIP,
)
sessionID, clientID, token, err :=
hdlr.params.Database.RegisterUser(
request.Context(),
nick, password, username, hostname, remoteIP,
)
if err != nil {
hdlr.handleRegisterError(
writer, request, err,
)
return
}
hdlr.stats.IncrSessions()
hdlr.stats.IncrConnections()
hdlr.deliverMOTD(request, clientID, sessionID, nick)
hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request, map[string]any{
"id": sessionID,
"nick": nick,
"token": token,
}, http.StatusCreated)
}
func (hdlr *Handlers) handleRegisterError(
writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
err error,
) {
if db.IsUniqueConstraintError(err) {
hdlr.respondError(
writer, request,
"nick already taken",
http.StatusConflict,
)
return
}
hdlr.log.Error(
"register user failed", "error", err,
)
hdlr.respondError(
writer, request,
"internal error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
}
// HandleLogin authenticates a user with nick and password.
func (hdlr *Handlers) HandleLogin() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(
@@ -117,66 +257,9 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) executeLogin(
request, clientID, sessionID, nick,
)
hdlr.setAuthCookie(writer, request, token)
hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request, map[string]any{
"id": sessionID,
"nick": nick,
"id": sessionID,
"nick": nick,
"token": token,
}, http.StatusOK)
}
// handlePass handles the IRC PASS command to set a
// password on the authenticated session, enabling
// multi-client login via POST /api/v1/login.
func (hdlr *Handlers) handlePass(
writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
sessionID, clientID int64,
nick string,
bodyLines func() []string,
) {
lines := bodyLines()
if len(lines) == 0 || lines[0] == "" {
hdlr.respondIRCError(
writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
irc.ErrNeedMoreParams, nick,
[]string{irc.CmdPass},
"Not enough parameters",
)
return
}
password := lines[0]
if len(password) < minPasswordLength {
hdlr.respondIRCError(
writer, request, clientID, sessionID,
irc.ErrNeedMoreParams, nick,
[]string{irc.CmdPass},
"Password must be at least 8 characters",
)
return
}
err := hdlr.params.Database.SetPassword(
request.Context(), sessionID, password,
)
if err != nil {
hdlr.log.Error(
"set password failed", "error", err,
)
hdlr.respondError(
writer, request,
"internal error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request,
map[string]string{"status": "ok"},
http.StatusOK)
}

View File

@@ -126,23 +126,18 @@ func (mware *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
}
// CORS returns middleware that handles Cross-Origin Resource Sharing.
// AllowCredentials is true so browsers include cookies in
// cross-origin API requests.
func (mware *Middleware) CORS() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return cors.Handler(cors.Options{ //nolint:exhaustruct // optional fields
AllowOriginFunc: func(
_ *http.Request, _ string,
) bool {
return true
},
AllowedOrigins: []string{"*"},
AllowedMethods: []string{
"GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "OPTIONS",
},
AllowedHeaders: []string{
"Accept", "Content-Type", "X-CSRF-Token",
"Accept", "Authorization",
"Content-Type", "X-CSRF-Token",
},
ExposedHeaders: []string{"Link"},
AllowCredentials: true,
AllowCredentials: false,
MaxAge: corsMaxAge,
})
}

View File

@@ -75,6 +75,10 @@ func (srv *Server) setupAPIv1(router chi.Router) {
"/session",
srv.handlers.HandleCreateSession(),
)
router.Post(
"/register",
srv.handlers.HandleRegister(),
)
router.Post(
"/login",
srv.handlers.HandleLogin(),

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ const (
CmdNick = "NICK"
CmdNotice = "NOTICE"
CmdOper = "OPER"
CmdPass = "PASS"
CmdPart = "PART"
CmdPing = "PING"
CmdPong = "PONG"