Honour forwarded headers only from trusted proxies (closes #259)
check / check (push) Failing after 7s

A new ClientIP middleware sets request.RemoteAddr to the client's
address before the request is logged. X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP
count only when the peer is in TRUSTED_PROXIES, which defaults to the
RFC 1918 ranges. The login rate limit, the session's IP address and
hostname, and the request log all use that address.

Model: opus-5-5
This commit is contained in:
sneak committed 2026-11-10 20:11:29 +00:00
1 parent bc8aa6bb96
commit c27a193bb4
10 files changed
+528 -42

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+2 -18
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@@ -42,25 +42,9 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) maxBodySize() int64 {
return defaultMaxBodySize
}
// clientIP extracts the connecting client's IP address
// from the request, checking X-Forwarded-For and
// X-Real-IP headers before falling back to RemoteAddr.
// clientIP returns the IP address in request.RemoteAddr, which the
// ClientIP middleware has set to the client's address.
func clientIP(request *http.Request) string {
if forwarded := request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); forwarded != "" {
// X-Forwarded-For can contain a comma-separated list;
// the first entry is the original client.
parts := strings.SplitN(forwarded, ",", 2) //nolint:mnd
ip := strings.TrimSpace(parts[0])
if ip != "" {
return ip
}
}
if realIP := request.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"); realIP != "" {
return strings.TrimSpace(realIP)
}
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(request.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
return request.RemoteAddr