Honour forwarded headers only from trusted proxies (closes #259)

Before, the server took the client's address from X-Forwarded-For or X-Real-IP whoever sent them, so a direct client could get past the login rate limit and choose the address and hostname recorded for its session.

A new ClientIP middleware, run before request logging, resolves the address once: forwarded headers count only when the peer is in TRUSTED_PROXIES, which defaults to the RFC 1918 ranges. A set list replaces the default, the empty string trusts nothing, and an invalid entry stops startup. The request log, login rate limiter and session creation all use the resolved address.

A proxy on the same host as a server outside Docker connects from 127.0.0.1 or ::1, which the default does not trust; the README says to list it.

Model: opus-5-5

go.sum

@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.2 h1:DzmwEr2rDGHl7lsFgAHxmNz/1NlQ7xLIrlN2h5d1eGI=
 go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.2/go.mod h1:081UH+NErpNdqlCXm3TtEran0rJZGxAYx9hb/ELlsPU=
 go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4 h1:tfq32ie2Jv2UxXFdLJdh3jXuOzWiL1fo0bu/FbuKpbc=
 go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4/go.mod h1:DhzuOOF2ATzADvBadXxruRBLzYTpT36CKvDb3+aBEFg=
+go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20260823151212-3075585bcbeb h1:XBM4hvfwGAttkkiTIFfeigdfcL1xIfdKXqFdgiHGtDs=
+go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20260823151212-3075585bcbeb/go.mod h1:PLyyIXexvUFg3Owu6p/WfdlivPbZJsZdgWZlrGope/Y=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190308221718-c2843e01d9a2/go.mod h1:djNgcEr1/C05ACkg1iLfiJU5Ep61QUkGW8qpdssI0+w=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210921155107-089bfa567519/go.mod h1:GvvjBRRGRdwPK5ydBHafDWAxML/pGHZbMvKqRZ5+Abc=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.48.0 h1:/VRzVqiRSggnhY7gNRxPauEQ5Drw9haKdM0jqfcCFts=