check / check (push) Successful in 1m18s
/metrics is behind a password, and REPO_POLICIES.md requires rate limiting on password logins. Each client address may now send it 30 requests a minute, counted by httprate before Basic Auth, so failed logins use up the allowance and a request over it gets 429 without the password being checked. The address is the one the existing trusted-proxy logic in internal/middleware works out, with IPv6 addresses grouped by /64; an IPv4 address a proxy reports in IPv6-mapped form counts as the plain IPv4 address. A Prometheus server scraping every 15 seconds sends 4 requests a minute. Model: opus-5-5
327 lines
8.5 KiB
Go
327 lines
8.5 KiB
Go
// Package middleware provides HTTP middleware.
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package middleware
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import (
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"log/slog"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/netip"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/99designs/basicauth-go"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
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"github.com/go-chi/cors"
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"github.com/go-chi/httprate"
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"go.uber.org/fx"
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"sneak.berlin/go/dnswatcher/internal/config"
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"sneak.berlin/go/dnswatcher/internal/globals"
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"sneak.berlin/go/dnswatcher/internal/logger"
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)
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// corsMaxAge is the maximum age for CORS preflight responses.
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const corsMaxAge = 300
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// Rate limit for /metrics: each client address may send
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// metricsRequestLimit requests per metricsRequestWindow. Every request
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// counts, so password guessing gets at most 30 tries a minute per
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// address. One Prometheus server scraping every 15 seconds sends 4
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// requests a minute, and two scraping every 5 seconds from one address
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// send 24, so normal scraping stays under the limit.
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const (
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metricsRequestLimit = 30
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metricsRequestWindow = time.Minute
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)
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// Security response header values applied to every response.
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//
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// The CSP is as strict as the dashboard allows: the template ships no
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// JavaScript, no inline styles, no inline event handlers and no images,
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// and its only subresource is the embedded stylesheet at
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// /s/css/tailwind.min.css, which style-src 'self' permits. Neither
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// unsafe-inline nor unsafe-eval is used. frame-ancestors 'none' is the
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// primary anti-framing control; X-Frame-Options is the legacy fallback.
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const (
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// hstsValue is emitted unconditionally, including over plain HTTP,
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// because the service runs behind a TLS-terminating proxy and the
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// browser must still enforce HTTPS end to end.
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hstsValue = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
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cspValue = "default-src 'self'; " +
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"script-src 'none'; " +
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"style-src 'self'; " +
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"img-src 'self'; " +
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"font-src 'none'; " +
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"connect-src 'none'; " +
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"object-src 'none'; " +
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"base-uri 'none'; " +
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"form-action 'none'; " +
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"frame-ancestors 'none'"
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frameOptionsValue = "DENY"
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contentTypeOptionsValue = "nosniff"
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// referrerPolicyValue is stricter than the policy minimum of
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// strict-origin-when-cross-origin: the dashboard has no
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// cross-origin navigation needs and its URL may name internal
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// hosts.
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referrerPolicyValue = "no-referrer"
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permissionsPolicyValue = "accelerometer=(), " +
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"autoplay=(), " +
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"camera=(), " +
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"display-capture=(), " +
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"encrypted-media=(), " +
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"fullscreen=(), " +
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"geolocation=(), " +
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"gyroscope=(), " +
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"magnetometer=(), " +
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"microphone=(), " +
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"midi=(), " +
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"payment=(), " +
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"picture-in-picture=(), " +
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"publickey-credentials-get=(), " +
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"screen-wake-lock=(), " +
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"usb=(), " +
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"xr-spatial-tracking=()"
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)
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// Params contains dependencies for Middleware.
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type Params struct {
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fx.In
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Logger *logger.Logger
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Globals *globals.Globals
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Config *config.Config
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}
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// Middleware provides HTTP middleware.
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type Middleware struct {
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log *slog.Logger
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params *Params
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}
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// New creates a new Middleware instance.
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func New(
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_ fx.Lifecycle,
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params Params,
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) (*Middleware, error) {
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return &Middleware{
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log: params.Logger.Get(),
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params: ¶ms,
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}, nil
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}
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// loggingResponseWriter wraps http.ResponseWriter to capture status.
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type loggingResponseWriter struct {
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http.ResponseWriter
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statusCode int
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}
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func newLoggingResponseWriter(
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writer http.ResponseWriter,
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) *loggingResponseWriter {
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return &loggingResponseWriter{writer, http.StatusOK}
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}
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func (lrw *loggingResponseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
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lrw.statusCode = code
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lrw.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
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}
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// Logging returns a request logging middleware.
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func (m *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(
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writer http.ResponseWriter,
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request *http.Request,
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) {
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start := time.Now()
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lrw := newLoggingResponseWriter(writer)
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ctx := request.Context()
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defer func() {
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latency := time.Since(start)
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reqID := middleware.GetReqID(ctx)
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m.log.InfoContext(ctx, "request",
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"request_start", start,
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"method", request.Method,
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"url", request.URL.String(),
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"useragent", request.UserAgent(),
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"request_id", reqID,
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"referer", request.Referer(),
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"proto", request.Proto,
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"remoteIP", realIP(request),
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"status", lrw.statusCode,
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"latency_ms", latency.Milliseconds(),
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)
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}()
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next.ServeHTTP(lrw, request)
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})
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}
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}
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func ipFromHostPort(hostPort string) string {
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(hostPort)
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if err != nil {
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return hostPort
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}
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return host
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}
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// trustedProxyNets are RFC1918 and loopback CIDRs.
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//
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//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level constant nets parsed once
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var trustedProxyNets = func() []*net.IPNet {
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cidrs := []string{
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"10.0.0.0/8",
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"172.16.0.0/12",
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"127.0.0.0/8",
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"::1/128",
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"fc00::/7",
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}
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nets := make([]*net.IPNet, 0, len(cidrs))
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for _, cidr := range cidrs {
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_, n, _ := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
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nets = append(nets, n)
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}
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return nets
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}()
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func isTrustedProxy(ip net.IP) bool {
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for _, n := range trustedProxyNets {
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if n.Contains(ip) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// realIP extracts the client's real IP address from the request.
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// Proxy headers are only trusted from RFC1918/loopback addresses.
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func realIP(r *http.Request) string {
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addr := ipFromHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
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remoteIP := net.ParseIP(addr)
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if remoteIP == nil || !isTrustedProxy(remoteIP) {
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return addr
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}
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if ip := strings.TrimSpace(
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r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"),
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); ip != "" {
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return ip
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}
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if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
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if parts := strings.SplitN(
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xff, ",", 2, //nolint:mnd
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); len(parts) > 0 {
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if ip := strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]); ip != "" {
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return ip
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}
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}
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}
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return addr
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}
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// CORS returns middleware that lets any origin read a response. It is
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// for the public, read-only routes only, so it allows only the
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// methods those routes serve and no Authorization header.
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func (m *Middleware) CORS() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return cors.Handler(cors.Options{
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AllowedOrigins: []string{"*"},
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AllowedMethods: []string{"GET", "OPTIONS"},
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AllowedHeaders: []string{"Accept", "Content-Type"},
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ExposedHeaders: []string{"Link"},
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AllowCredentials: false,
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MaxAge: corsMaxAge,
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})
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}
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// SecurityHeaders returns middleware that sets the security response
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// headers required for production internet exposure on every response.
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//
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// The headers are set before the request reaches the next handler so
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// that they are present on every response, including panics recovered
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// by chi's Recoverer and timeouts produced by chi's Timeout.
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func (m *Middleware) SecurityHeaders() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(
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writer http.ResponseWriter,
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request *http.Request,
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) {
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header := writer.Header()
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header.Set("Strict-Transport-Security", hstsValue)
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header.Set("Content-Security-Policy", cspValue)
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header.Set("X-Frame-Options", frameOptionsValue)
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header.Set(
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"X-Content-Type-Options",
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contentTypeOptionsValue,
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)
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header.Set("Referrer-Policy", referrerPolicyValue)
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header.Set(
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"Permissions-Policy",
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permissionsPolicyValue,
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)
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next.ServeHTTP(writer, request)
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})
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}
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}
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// MetricsRateLimit returns middleware for /metrics that answers 429
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// Too Many Requests to a client address over the rate limit. The
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// address is the one realIP works out, so a client that is not a
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// trusted proxy cannot get a fresh allowance by sending its own
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// X-Real-IP or X-Forwarded-For. CanonicalizeIP counts all IPv6
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// addresses in one /64 as one client, since a client usually holds a
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// whole /64. An IPv4 address a proxy reports in IPv6-mapped form
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// (::ffff:203.0.113.1) is turned back into plain IPv4 first, as every
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// such address is in the same /64.
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func (m *Middleware) MetricsRateLimit() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return httprate.LimitBy(
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metricsRequestLimit,
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metricsRequestWindow,
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func(request *http.Request) (string, error) {
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ip := realIP(request)
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addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(ip)
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if err == nil {
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ip = addr.Unmap().String()
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}
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return httprate.CanonicalizeIP(ip), nil
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},
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)
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}
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// MetricsAuth returns basic auth middleware for /metrics.
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func (m *Middleware) MetricsAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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if m.params.Config.MetricsUsername == "" {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return next
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}
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}
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return basicauth.New(
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"metrics",
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map[string][]string{
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m.params.Config.MetricsUsername: {
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m.params.Config.MetricsPassword,
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},
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},
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)
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}
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