3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak c3f2a7ab16 resolver: never resend a refused query asking for recursion (closes #206)
check / check (push) Failing after 2m28s
queryDNS resent a query that a server refused, this time asking for
recursion, so on a network that intercepts DNS the answers could come
from a recursive resolver without anyone knowing. A refusal is now only
a refusal, and the server is passed over for the next.

When every server of a zone refuses, the error says so. When every root
server refuses, the error is ErrIntercepted: root servers refuse no
query, so something on the network is answering in their place.
FindAuthoritativeNameservers stops at that error instead of trying each
parent name, so the watcher's log line says it.

A live test asks Quad9, which refuses a query not asking for recursion,
so that the resend cannot come back unnoticed.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-02 01:16:46 +00:00
clawbot af81f2ac76 README: correct claims the code does not bear out (closes #108)
check / check (push) Failing after 2m12s
Checked every README claim against the code on next and fixed the ones
that were wrong or missing: what /metrics serves and when, what
DNSWATCHER_MAINTENANCE_MODE does, CORS on the public routes,
notification retries and the in-memory alert history, the certificate
error field and old port entries in the state file, and the Design
tree's missing files. Also corrected: CNAMEs are not followed for
watched names, the root server list is never refreshed, the NS set is
the delegation from the domain's parent zone, notification contents,
and the system resolver being used for webhooks. Code problems found
are filed separately.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-02 03:14:26 +02:00
clawbot 56c4395a39 config: watch a target listed twice only once (closes #207)
check / check (push) Successful in 1m50s
ClassifyTargets kept a name every time it appeared in DNSWATCHER_TARGETS,
so example.com,Example.com. put example.com in the domain list twice and
every check looked it up and checked its certificates twice, sending two
expiry warnings per TLS check (port checks were already grouped by address
and port). It now skips a name it has already kept, comparing after the
lower-casing and trailing-dot removal it already did; the list keeps the
order of first appearance.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-02 02:56:11 +02:00
5 changed files with 238 additions and 55 deletions
+102 -46
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ dnswatcher watches configured DNS domains and hostnames for changes, monitors
TCP port availability, tracks TLS certificate expiry, and delivers real-time
notifications via Slack, Mattermost, and/or ntfy webhooks.
It performs all DNS resolution itself via iterative (non-recursive) queries,
It resolves the names it watches itself via iterative (non-recursive) queries,
tracing from root nameservers to authoritative servers directly—never relying on
upstream recursive resolvers.
@@ -69,14 +69,14 @@ notification endpoint set, changes show only on the dashboard; see
- Accepts a list of DNS domain names (apex domains, identified via the
[Public Suffix List](https://publicsuffix.org/)).
- Every **1 hour**, performs a full iterative trace from root servers to
discover all authoritative nameservers (NS records) for each domain.
- Every **1 hour** by default, performs a full iterative trace from root servers
to discover all authoritative nameservers (NS records) for each domain.
- Queries **every** discovered authoritative nameserver independently.
- Stores the NS record set as observed by the delegation chain, and the IPv4 and
IPv6 addresses each nameserver's name resolves to.
- Stores the domain's NS record set, as its parent zone's servers delegate it,
and the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses each nameserver's name resolves to.
- Any change triggers a notification:
- NS added to or removed from the delegation.
- NS address change: a nameserver that stays in the delegation resolves to
- NS added to or removed from that set.
- NS address change: a nameserver that stays in the set resolves to
different addresses than on the previous check. A nameserver added or
removed gets only the NS change notification. When the lookup of a
nameserver's addresses fails or finds none, its previous addresses are
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ notification endpoint set, changes show only on the dashboard; see
- Accepts a list of DNS hostnames (subdomains, distinguished from apex domains
via the Public Suffix List).
- Every **1 hour**, performs a full iterative trace to discover the
- Every **1 hour** by default, performs a full iterative trace to discover the
authoritative nameservers of the zone the hostname is in, which is not always
its last two labels (a name under `co.uk`, or in a delegated subdomain).
- Queries **each** authoritative nameserver independently for **all** record
@@ -125,13 +125,16 @@ notification endpoint set, changes show only on the dashboard; see
### TCP Port Monitoring
- For every configured domain and hostname, constructs a deduplicated list of
all IPv4 and IPv6 addresses resolved via A, AAAA, and CNAME chain resolution
across all authoritative nameservers.
the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in the A and AAAA records its authoritative
nameservers returned. A CNAME is not followed: a name whose CNAME points into
another zone usually has no addresses here, so its ports and certificate are
not checked.
- Checks TCP connectivity on ports **80** and **443** for each IP address.
- Every **1 hour**, re-checks all ports.
- Every **1 hour** by default, re-checks all ports.
- Any change in port availability triggers a notification:
- Port transitioned from open to closed (or vice versa).
- New IP appeared (from DNS change) and its port state was recorded.
- New IP appeared (from DNS change): its port state is recorded without a
port notification; the DNS change notification shows the new address.
- IP disappeared (from DNS change) — noted in the DNS change notification;
port state for that IP is removed. When none of a name's nameservers
answered, its addresses are not known, so the port state saved for them is
@@ -139,14 +142,14 @@ notification endpoint set, changes show only on the dashboard; see
### TLS Certificate Monitoring
- Every **12 hours**, for each IP address listening on port 443, connects via
TLS using the correct SNI hostname.
- Every **12 hours** by default, for each IP address listening on port 443,
connects via TLS using the correct SNI hostname.
- Records the certificate's Subject CN, SANs, issuer, and expiry date.
- Any change triggers a notification:
- Certificate is expiring within **7 days** (warning, repeated each check
until renewed or expired).
- Certificate is expiring within **7 days** by default (warning, repeated
each check until renewed or expired).
- Certificate CN, issuer, or SANs changed (replacement detected, reports old
and new values).
and new CN and issuer).
- TLS connection failure to a previously-reachable IP:443 (handshake error,
timeout, connection refused after previously succeeding).
- TLS recovery: a previously-failing IP:443 now completes a handshake again.
@@ -178,15 +181,25 @@ includes:
- **NS recoveries**: Which nameserver recovered, which hostname/domain.
- **NS inconsistencies**: Which nameservers disagree, what each one returned,
which hostname affected.
- **Port changes**: Which IP:port, old state, new state, all associated
hostnames.
- **TLS expiry warnings**: Which certificate, days remaining, CN, issuer,
associated hostname and IP.
- **TLS certificate changes**: Old and new CN/issuer/SANs, associated hostname
and IP.
- **Port changes**: Which IP:port, its new state, all associated hostnames.
- **TLS expiry warnings**: Expiry date and days remaining, CN, associated
hostname and IP.
- **TLS certificate changes**: Old and new CN and issuer, associated hostname
and IP. A change to the SANs alone is notified, but the SANs are not listed.
- **TLS connection failures/recoveries**: Which IP:port, error details,
associated hostname.
Each endpoint is sent each notification on its own, in the background. A
delivery that fails (a network error, no reply within 10 seconds, or an HTTP
status of 400 or more) is retried up to 5 times: the first retry after about 1
second, each wait after that twice as long up to 60 seconds, every wait varied
at random by up to 25%. A delivery still failing after that is logged and
dropped.
The last 100 notifications, delivered or not, are kept in memory for the
dashboard's Recent alerts. They are not saved to the state file, so a restart
clears them.
### State Management
- All monitoring state is kept in memory and persisted to a JSON file on disk
@@ -230,7 +243,16 @@ dnswatcher exposes a lightweight HTTP API for operational visibility:
| `GET /.well-known/healthcheck` | Health check (JSON) |
| `GET /health` | Health check (JSON, legacy) |
| `GET /api/v1/status` | Current monitoring state |
| `GET /metrics` | Prometheus metrics (optional) |
| `GET /metrics` | Prometheus metrics, see below |
`/metrics` is served only when `DNSWATCHER_METRICS_USERNAME` is set, behind
Basic Auth. It has the Prometheus Go client's default metrics only (Go runtime,
process, and counts of `/metrics` requests); dnswatcher records no metrics of
its own.
Every route but `/metrics` may be read from a page on any origin: a cross-origin
`GET` gets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`. Only `GET` is allowed cross-origin,
and without credentials. `/metrics` sends no CORS headers.
#### Server timeouts
@@ -321,8 +343,8 @@ following precedence (highest to lowest):
| `DNSWATCHER_TLS_INTERVAL` | TLS check interval, a positive duration such as `6h`; empty means the default, anything else stops startup | `12h` |
| `DNSWATCHER_TLS_EXPIRY_WARNING` | Days before expiry to warn | `7` |
| `DNSWATCHER_SENTRY_DSN` | Sentry DSN for error reporting | `""` |
| `DNSWATCHER_MAINTENANCE_MODE` | Enable maintenance mode | `false` |
| `DNSWATCHER_METRICS_USERNAME` | Basic auth username for /metrics | `""` |
| `DNSWATCHER_MAINTENANCE_MODE` | Only sets `maintenanceMode` in the health check response; changes nothing else | `false` |
| `DNSWATCHER_METRICS_USERNAME` | Basic auth username for /metrics, which is served only when this is set | `""` |
| `DNSWATCHER_METRICS_PASSWORD` | Basic auth password for /metrics | `""` |
| `DNSWATCHER_SEND_TEST_NOTIFICATION` | Send a test notification after first scan completes | `false` |
@@ -330,7 +352,8 @@ following precedence (highest to lowest):
monitoring targets are configured. A monitoring daemon with nothing to monitor
is a misconfiguration, so dnswatcher fails fast with a clear error message
rather than running silently. Set `DNSWATCHER_TARGETS` to a comma-separated list
of DNS names before starting.
of DNS names before starting. A name listed more than once, in any letter case
or with a trailing dot, is watched once.
**`/metrics` is rate limited.** Each client address may send it 30 requests a
minute, failed logins included; beyond that it answers `429 Too Many Requests`
@@ -372,13 +395,15 @@ DNSWATCHER_SEND_TEST_NOTIFICATION=true
## DNS Resolution Strategy
dnswatcher never uses the system's configured recursive resolver. Instead, it
performs full iterative resolution:
dnswatcher never uses the system's configured recursive resolver for the names
it watches. Instead, it performs full iterative resolution:
1. **Root servers**: Starts from the IANA root nameserver list (hardcoded, with
periodic refresh).
1. **Root servers**: Starts from the IPv4 addresses of the 13 root servers,
built into the binary; the list is not refreshed.
2. **TLD delegation**: Queries root servers for the TLD NS records.
3. **Domain delegation**: Queries TLD nameservers for the domain's NS records.
The delegation they give, from the domain's parent zone, is the domain's NS
record set.
4. **Authoritative query**: Queries all discovered authoritative nameservers
directly for the requested records.
@@ -387,10 +412,13 @@ This approach ensures:
- Independence from any upstream resolver's cache or filtering.
- Ability to detect split-horizon or inconsistent responses across authoritative
servers.
- Visibility into the full delegation chain.
For hostname monitoring, the resolver follows CNAME chains (with a depth limit
to prevent loops) before collecting terminal A/AAAA records.
CNAME chains are followed (with a depth limit to prevent loops) only to find the
addresses of nameservers. A watched name's records are stored as its nameservers
return them, CNAME included, without following it.
Sending a notification or a Sentry report is the one use of the system's
resolver: the HTTP client looks up the webhook's or Sentry's host name with it.
---
@@ -472,12 +500,17 @@ reachability:
A nameserver that answers NXDOMAIN or with no records has status `ok` and empty
`records`. A nameserver whose query failed, or that only referred it to other
nameservers, has status `error`, empty `records`, and the reason in `error`.
nameservers, has status `error`, empty `records`, and the reason in `error`. A
certificate entry whose TLS connection or handshake failed likewise has status
`error`, the reason in `error`, and the certificate fields left empty or zero.
`nameserverAddresses` lists, by nameserver, the sorted addresses its name
resolves to. A state file without it loads, and the next check fills it in
without a notification.
A port entry in the older format, with one `hostname` instead of the `hostnames`
list, loads as a list of that one name.
---
## Entrypoints
@@ -615,9 +648,10 @@ docker run -d \
- Port checks: every `DNSWATCHER_DNS_INTERVAL`, after DNS completes.
- TLS checks: every `DNSWATCHER_TLS_INTERVAL` (default 12h), after DNS
completes.
- Port and TLS checks always use freshly resolved IP addresses from the DNS
phase that immediately precedes them — never stale IPs from a previous
cycle.
- Port and TLS checks use the IP addresses found by the DNS phase that
immediately precedes them. When that phase cannot find a name's
nameservers at all, the addresses an earlier check saved for the name are
used.
4. **On change detection**: Send notifications to all configured endpoints,
update in-memory state, persist to disk.
5. **Shutdown**: The watcher stops checking and saves the final state to disk,
@@ -666,29 +700,51 @@ file, so it survives a restart without an external database.
cmd/dnswatcher/main.go Entry point (uber/fx bootstrap)
internal/
config/config.go Viper-based configuration
config/
config.go Viper-based configuration
classify.go Splits targets into domains and hostnames
(Public Suffix List)
globals/globals.go Build-time variables (version)
logger/logger.go slog structured logging (TTY detection)
healthcheck/healthcheck.go Health check service
middleware/middleware.go HTTP middleware (logging, CORS, security
middleware/middleware.go HTTP middleware (logging, CORS, security
headers, metrics auth and rate limit)
handlers/handlers.go HTTP request handlers
handlers/
handlers.go Shared handler setup and JSON responses
dashboard.go Web dashboard
templates/dashboard.html Dashboard template (embedded)
status.go /api/v1/status
healthcheck.go Health check handler
server/
server.go HTTP server lifecycle
routes.go Route definitions
state/state.go JSON file state persistence
resolver/resolver.go Iterative DNS resolution engine
resolver/
resolver.go Resolver setup and query status values
iterative.go Iterative DNS resolution engine
dns_client.go UDP and TCP DNS clients
errors.go Resolver errors
portcheck/portcheck.go TCP port connectivity checker
tlscheck/tlscheck.go TLS certificate inspector
notify/notify.go Notification service (Slack, Mattermost, ntfy)
watcher/watcher.go Main monitoring orchestrator and scheduler
tlscheck/tlscheck.go TLS certificate inspector
notify/
notify.go Notification service (Slack, Mattermost, ntfy)
retry.go Delivery retries with backoff
history.go Last 100 notifications, for the dashboard
shutdown.go Waits for deliveries at shutdown
watcher/
watcher.go Main monitoring orchestrator and scheduler
interfaces.go The resolver, checkers and notifier it uses
livednstest/livednstest.go Retry and concurrency limit for tests
against live DNS (imported only by tests)
static/
static.go Embeds the CSS served under /s/
css/tailwind.min.css Dashboard stylesheet
```
### Design Principles
- **No recursive resolvers**: All DNS resolution is performed iteratively,
- **No recursive resolvers**: The watched names are resolved iteratively,
tracing from root nameservers through the delegation chain to authoritative
servers.
- **No external database**: State is persisted as a single JSON file.
+4 -1
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ trial run of the finished image: https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/dnswatcher/issues/149
- 2026-10-02: a query a server refuses is not resent asking for recursion, and
every root server refusing is reported as DNS interception (closes #206).
- 2026-10-02: a name listed more than once in `DNSWATCHER_TARGETS`, in any
letter case or with a trailing dot, is watched once (closes #207).
- 2026-10-01: README checked against the code and corrected: metrics, CORS,
notification retries, CNAMEs, state file fields, Design tree (closes #108).
- 2026-10-01: a certificate within the expiry warning period is warned about on
every TLS check, where some checks used to skip it at random (closes #204).
- 2026-10-01: a domain's NS set is its delegation from the parent zone's
@@ -129,6 +133,5 @@ trial run of the finished image: https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/dnswatcher/issues/149
- 1.0 readiness: run it with a real config and read the logs:
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/dnswatcher/issues/66
- README accuracy sweep: https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/dnswatcher/issues/108
- fixed root server order: https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/dnswatcher/issues/138
- review toward 1.0: https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/dnswatcher/issues/144
+7 -2
View File
@@ -57,17 +57,22 @@ func ClassifyDNSName(name string) (DNSNameType, error) {
// ClassifyTargets splits a list of DNS names into apex domains and
// hostnames using the Public Suffix List. It returns an error if any
// name cannot be classified.
// name cannot be classified. A name given more than once, in any letter
// case or with a trailing dot, is kept once.
func ClassifyTargets(targets []string) ([]string, []string, error) {
var domains, hostnames []string
seen := make(map[string]bool)
for _, t := range targets {
normalized := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSpace(t), "."))
if normalized == "" {
if normalized == "" || seen[normalized] {
continue
}
seen[normalized] = true
typ, classErr := ClassifyDNSName(normalized)
if classErr != nil {
return nil, nil, classErr
+24
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package config_test
import (
"slices"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/dnswatcher/internal/config"
@@ -93,6 +94,29 @@ func TestClassifyTargets(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestClassifyTargetsKeepsEachNameOnce(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
domains, hostnames, err := config.ClassifyTargets([]string{
"example.org",
"Example.org.",
"www.example.org",
"EXAMPLE.ORG",
"WWW.Example.org.",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if !slices.Equal(domains, []string{"example.org"}) {
t.Errorf("domains = %v, want [example.org]", domains)
}
if !slices.Equal(hostnames, []string{"www.example.org"}) {
t.Errorf("hostnames = %v, want [www.example.org]", hostnames)
}
}
func TestClassifyTargetsRejectsPublicSuffix(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+101 -6
View File
@@ -274,16 +274,55 @@ func TestQueryNameserver_Refused(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, "server returned REFUSED", resp.Error)
}
// TestQueryServers_EveryServerRefused asks all of google.com's
// nameservers about cloudflare.com, a zone they do not serve, which
// they all refuse. The error says every server refused; it is not
// ErrIntercepted, which only the root servers refusing shows.
func TestQueryServers_EveryServerRefused(t *testing.T) {
// TestQueryNameserverIP_RecursiveResolverRefused asks Quad9, a public
// recursive resolver, about google.com at both of its addresses. Quad9
// refuses a query that does not ask for recursion and answers one that
// does. The resolver never asks for recursion, so it must be reported
// as refusing, never as answering.
func TestQueryNameserverIP_RecursiveResolverRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := newTestResolver(t)
// The resolver asks servers only at their IPv4 addresses.
for _, ip := range []string{"9.9.9.9", "149.112.112.112"} {
var resp *resolver.NameserverResponse
livednstest.Retry(
t,
"QueryNameserverIP("+ip+", google.com)",
func(ctx context.Context) error {
var err error
resp, err = r.QueryNameserverIP(
ctx, ip, ip, "google.com",
)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// A timeout or a network error is no reply at all.
if resp.Status == resolver.StatusTimeout ||
strings.HasPrefix(resp.Error, "network error") {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s: %s",
livednstest.ErrNoAnswer, ip, resp.Error,
)
}
return nil
},
)
assert.Equal(t, resolver.StatusError, resp.Status, ip)
assert.Equal(t, "server returned REFUSED", resp.Error, ip)
}
}
// googleNameserverIPv4s returns the IPv4 addresses of google.com's
// nameservers. The resolver asks servers only at their IPv4 addresses.
func googleNameserverIPv4s(t *testing.T, r *resolver.Resolver) []string {
t.Helper()
var servers []string
for _, ns := range liveFindAuthoritative(t, r, "google.com") {
@@ -294,6 +333,19 @@ func TestQueryServers_EveryServerRefused(t *testing.T) {
}
}
return servers
}
// TestQueryServers_EveryServerRefused asks all of google.com's
// nameservers about cloudflare.com, a zone they do not serve, which
// they all refuse. The error says every server refused; it is not
// ErrIntercepted, which only the root servers refusing shows.
func TestQueryServers_EveryServerRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := newTestResolver(t)
servers := googleNameserverIPv4s(t, r)
var err error
livednstest.Retry(
@@ -327,6 +379,49 @@ func TestQueryServers_EveryServerRefused(t *testing.T) {
)
}
// TestQueryServers_EveryRootServerRefused passes google.com's
// nameservers to QueryServers as the servers of the root zone. They
// refuse a query about cloudflare.com, as root servers would if
// something on the network answered in their place, so the error is
// ErrIntercepted.
func TestQueryServers_EveryRootServerRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := newTestResolver(t)
servers := googleNameserverIPv4s(t, r)
var err error
livednstest.Retry(
t,
"QueryServers(google.com servers as root servers, cloudflare.com)",
func(ctx context.Context) error {
_, err = r.QueryServers(
ctx, servers, ".", "cloudflare.com.", dns.TypeNS,
)
// When not every server refused, one may have given no
// reply at all, so the attempt is tried again. Both errors
// for every server refusing say "refused a query for".
if err != nil &&
!strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refused a query for") {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %w", livednstest.ErrNoAnswer, err,
)
}
return nil
},
)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, resolver.ErrIntercepted)
require.EqualError(
t, err,
"every root server refused a query for cloudflare.com.: "+
"this network intercepts DNS queries",
)
}
func TestQueryNameserver_RecordsSorted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()