feat: add per-IP rate limiting to login endpoint

Add a token-bucket rate limiter (golang.org/x/time/rate) that limits
login attempts per client IP on POST /api/v1/login. Returns 429 Too
Many Requests with a Retry-After header when the limit is exceeded.

Configurable via LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT (requests/sec, default 1) and
LOGIN_RATE_BURST (burst size, default 5). Stale per-IP entries are
automatically cleaned up every 10 minutes.

Only the login endpoint is rate-limited per sneak's instruction —
session creation and registration use hashcash proof-of-work instead.

README.md

@@ -2203,6 +2203,8 @@ directory is also loaded automatically via
 | `NEOIRC_HASHCASH_BITS` | int | `20`                               | Required hashcash proof-of-work difficulty (leading zero bits in SHA-256) for session creation. Set to `0` to disable. |
 | `NEOIRC_OPER_NAME` | string | `""`                                 | Server operator (o-line) username. Both name and password must be set to enable OPER. |
 | `NEOIRC_OPER_PASSWORD` | string | `""`                              | Server operator (o-line) password. Both name and password must be set to enable OPER. |
+| `LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT` | float   | `1`                                  | Allowed login attempts per second per IP address. |
+| `LOGIN_RATE_BURST`  | int    | `5`                                  | Maximum burst of login attempts per IP before rate limiting kicks in. |
 | `MAINTENANCE_MODE` | bool    | `false`                              | Maintenance mode flag (reserved) |
 
 ### Example `.env` file
@@ -2607,6 +2609,49 @@ creating one session pays once and keeps their session.
 - **Language-agnostic**: SHA-256 is available in every programming language.
   The proof computation is trivially implementable in any client.
 
+### Login Rate Limiting
+
+The login endpoint (`POST /api/v1/login`) has per-IP rate limiting to prevent
+brute-force password attacks. This uses a token-bucket algorithm
+(`golang.org/x/time/rate`) with configurable rate and burst.
+
+| Environment Variable | Default | Description |
+|---------------------|---------|-------------|
+| `LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT`  | `1`     | Allowed login attempts per second per IP |
+| `LOGIN_RATE_BURST`  | `5`     | Maximum burst of login attempts per IP |
+
+When the limit is exceeded, the server returns **429 Too Many Requests** with a
+`Retry-After: 1` header. Stale per-IP entries are automatically cleaned up
+every 10 minutes.
+
+> **⚠️ Security: Reverse Proxy Required for Production Use**
+>
+> The rate limiter extracts the client IP by checking the `X-Forwarded-For`
+> header first, then `X-Real-IP`, and finally falling back to the TCP
+> `RemoteAddr`. Both `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` are **client-controlled
+> request headers** — any client can set them to arbitrary values.
+>
+> Without a properly configured reverse proxy in front of this server:
+>
+> - An attacker can **bypass rate limiting entirely** by rotating
+>   `X-Forwarded-For` values on each request (each value is treated as a
+>   distinct IP).
+> - An attacker can **deny service to a specific user** by spoofing that user's
+>   IP in the `X-Forwarded-For` header, exhausting their rate limit bucket.
+>
+> **Recommendation:** Always deploy behind a reverse proxy (e.g. nginx, Caddy,
+> Traefik) that strips or overwrites incoming `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP`
+> headers with the actual client IP. If running without a reverse proxy, be
+> aware that the rate limiting provides no meaningful protection against a
+> targeted attack.
+
+**Why rate limits here but not on session creation?** Session creation is
+protected by hashcash proof-of-work (stateless, no IP tracking needed). Login
+involves bcrypt password verification against a registered account — a
+fundamentally different threat model where an attacker targets a specific
+account. Per-IP rate limiting is appropriate here because the cost of a wrong
+guess is borne by the server (bcrypt), not the client.
+
 ---
 
 ## Roadmap

go.mod

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/spf13/viper v1.21.0
 	go.uber.org/fx v1.24.0
 	golang.org/x/crypto v0.48.0
+	golang.org/x/time v0.6.0
 	modernc.org/sqlite v1.45.0
 )
 

go.sum

@@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ golang.org/x/text v0.7.0/go.mod h1:mrYo+phRRbMaCq/xk9113O4dZlRixOauAjOtrjsXDZ8=
 golang.org/x/text v0.14.0/go.mod h1:18ZOQIKpY8NJVqYksKHtTdi31H5itFRjB5/qKTNYzSU=
 golang.org/x/text v0.34.0 h1:oL/Qq0Kdaqxa1KbNeMKwQq0reLCCaFtqu2eNuSeNHbk=
 golang.org/x/text v0.34.0/go.mod h1:homfLqTYRFyVYemLBFl5GgL/DWEiH5wcsQ5gSh1yziA=
+golang.org/x/time v0.6.0 h1:eTDhh4ZXt5Qf0augr54TN6suAUudPcawVZeIAPU7D4U=
+golang.org/x/time v0.6.0/go.mod h1:3BpzKBy/shNhVucY/MWOyx10tF3SFh9QdLuxbVysPQM=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20180917221912-90fa682c2a6e/go.mod h1:n7NCudcB/nEzxVGmLbDWY5pfWTLqBcC2KZ6jyYvM4mQ=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20191119224855-298f0cb1881e/go.mod h1:b+2E5dAYhXwXZwtnZ6UAqBI28+e2cm9otk0dWdXHAEo=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.1.12/go.mod h1:hNGJHUnrk76NpqgfD5Aqm5Crs+Hm0VOH/i9J2+nxYbc=

internal/config/config.go

@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ type Config struct {
 	HashcashBits       int
 	OperName           string
 	OperPassword       string
+	LoginRateLimit     float64
+	LoginRateBurst     int
 	params             *Params
 	log                *slog.Logger
 }
@@ -82,6 +84,8 @@ func New(
 	viper.SetDefault("NEOIRC_HASHCASH_BITS", "20")
 	viper.SetDefault("NEOIRC_OPER_NAME", "")
 	viper.SetDefault("NEOIRC_OPER_PASSWORD", "")
+	viper.SetDefault("LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT", "1")
+	viper.SetDefault("LOGIN_RATE_BURST", "5")
 
 	err := viper.ReadInConfig()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -110,6 +114,8 @@ func New(
 		HashcashBits:       viper.GetInt("NEOIRC_HASHCASH_BITS"),
 		OperName:           viper.GetString("NEOIRC_OPER_NAME"),
 		OperPassword:       viper.GetString("NEOIRC_OPER_PASSWORD"),
+		LoginRateLimit:     viper.GetFloat64("LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT"),
+		LoginRateBurst:     viper.GetInt("LOGIN_RATE_BURST"),
 		log:                log,
 		params:             &params,
 	}

internal/handlers/api_test.go

@@ -2380,6 +2380,121 @@ func TestSessionUsernameDefault(t *testing.T) {
 	_ = token
 }
 
+func TestLoginRateLimitExceeded(t *testing.T) {
+	tserver := newTestServer(t)
+
+	// Exhaust the burst (default: 5 per IP) using
+	// nonexistent users. These fail fast (no bcrypt),
+	// preventing token replenishment between requests.
+	for range 5 {
+		loginBody, mErr := json.Marshal(
+			map[string]string{
+				"nick":     "nosuchuser",
+				"password": "doesnotmatter",
+			},
+		)
+		if mErr != nil {
+			t.Fatal(mErr)
+		}
+
+		loginResp, rErr := doRequest(
+			t,
+			http.MethodPost,
+			tserver.url("/api/v1/login"),
+			bytes.NewReader(loginBody),
+		)
+		if rErr != nil {
+			t.Fatal(rErr)
+		}
+
+		_ = loginResp.Body.Close()
+	}
+
+	// The next request should be rate-limited.
+	loginBody, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
+		"nick": "nosuchuser", "password": "doesnotmatter",
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	resp, err := doRequest(
+		t,
+		http.MethodPost,
+		tserver.url("/api/v1/login"),
+		bytes.NewReader(loginBody),
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+		t.Fatalf(
+			"expected 429, got %d",
+			resp.StatusCode,
+		)
+	}
+
+	retryAfter := resp.Header.Get("Retry-After")
+	if retryAfter == "" {
+		t.Fatal("expected Retry-After header")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoginRateLimitAllowsNormalUse(t *testing.T) {
+	tserver := newTestServer(t)
+
+	// Register a user.
+	regBody, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
+		"nick": "normaluser", "password": "password123",
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	resp, err := doRequest(
+		t,
+		http.MethodPost,
+		tserver.url("/api/v1/register"),
+		bytes.NewReader(regBody),
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	_ = resp.Body.Close()
+
+	// A single login should succeed without rate limiting.
+	loginBody, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
+		"nick": "normaluser", "password": "password123",
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	resp2, err := doRequest(
+		t,
+		http.MethodPost,
+		tserver.url("/api/v1/login"),
+		bytes.NewReader(loginBody),
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	defer func() { _ = resp2.Body.Close() }()
+
+	if resp2.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		respBody, _ := io.ReadAll(resp2.Body)
+		t.Fatalf(
+			"expected 200, got %d: %s",
+			resp2.StatusCode, respBody,
+		)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestNickBroadcastToChannels(t *testing.T) {
 	tserver := newTestServer(t)
 	aliceToken := tserver.createSession("nick_a")

internal/handlers/auth.go

@@ -168,6 +168,21 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleLogin(
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	request *http.Request,
 ) {
+	ip := clientIP(request)
+
+	if !hdlr.loginLimiter.Allow(ip) {
+		writer.Header().Set(
+			"Retry-After", "1",
+		)
+		hdlr.respondError(
+			writer, request,
+			"too many login attempts, try again later",
+			http.StatusTooManyRequests,
+		)
+
+		return
+	}
+
 	type loginRequest struct {
 		Nick     string `json:"nick"`
 		Password string `json:"password"`
@@ -198,6 +213,16 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleLogin(
 		return
 	}
 
+	hdlr.executeLogin(
+		writer, request, payload.Nick, payload.Password,
+	)
+}
+
+func (hdlr *Handlers) executeLogin(
+	writer http.ResponseWriter,
+	request *http.Request,
+	nick, password string,
+) {
 	remoteIP := clientIP(request)
 
 	hostname := resolveHostname(
@@ -207,8 +232,7 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleLogin(
 	sessionID, clientID, token, err :=
 		hdlr.params.Database.LoginUser(
 			request.Context(),
-			payload.Nick,
+			nick, password,
-			payload.Password,
 			remoteIP, hostname,
 		)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -224,18 +248,18 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) handleLogin(
 	hdlr.stats.IncrConnections()
 
 	hdlr.deliverMOTD(
-		request, clientID, sessionID, payload.Nick,
+		request, clientID, sessionID, nick,
 	)
 
 	// Initialize channel state so the new client knows
 	// which channels the session already belongs to.
 	hdlr.initChannelState(
-		request, clientID, sessionID, payload.Nick,
+		request, clientID, sessionID, nick,
 	)
 
 	hdlr.respondJSON(writer, request, map[string]any{
 		"id":    sessionID,
-		"nick":  payload.Nick,
+		"nick":  nick,
 		"token": token,
 	}, http.StatusOK)
 }

internal/handlers/handlers.go

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/hashcash"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/healthcheck"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/logger"
+	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/ratelimit"
 	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/stats"
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 )
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ type Handlers struct {
 	broker          *broker.Broker
 	hashcashVal     *hashcash.Validator
 	channelHashcash *hashcash.ChannelValidator
+	loginLimiter    *ratelimit.Limiter
 	stats           *stats.Tracker
 	cancelCleanup   context.CancelFunc
 }
@@ -63,6 +65,16 @@ func New(
 		resource = "neoirc"
 	}
 
+	loginRate := params.Config.LoginRateLimit
+	if loginRate <= 0 {
+		loginRate = ratelimit.DefaultRate
+	}
+
+	loginBurst := params.Config.LoginRateBurst
+	if loginBurst <= 0 {
+		loginBurst = ratelimit.DefaultBurst
+	}
+
 	hdlr := &Handlers{ //nolint:exhaustruct // cancelCleanup set in startCleanup
 		params:          &params,
 		log:             params.Logger.Get(),
@@ -70,6 +82,7 @@ func New(
 		broker:          broker.New(),
 		hashcashVal:     hashcash.NewValidator(resource),
 		channelHashcash: hashcash.NewChannelValidator(),
+		loginLimiter:    ratelimit.New(loginRate, loginBurst),
 		stats:           params.Stats,
 	}
 
@@ -162,6 +175,10 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) stopCleanup() {
 	if hdlr.cancelCleanup != nil {
 		hdlr.cancelCleanup()
 	}
+
+	if hdlr.loginLimiter != nil {
+		hdlr.loginLimiter.Stop()
+	}
 }
 
 func (hdlr *Handlers) cleanupLoop(ctx context.Context) {

internal/ratelimit/ratelimit.go

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+// Package ratelimit provides per-IP rate limiting for HTTP endpoints.
+package ratelimit
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/time/rate"
+)
+
+const (
+	// DefaultRate is the default number of allowed requests per second.
+	DefaultRate = 1.0
+
+	// DefaultBurst is the default maximum burst size.
+	DefaultBurst = 5
+
+	// DefaultSweepInterval controls how often stale entries are pruned.
+	DefaultSweepInterval = 10 * time.Minute
+
+	// DefaultEntryTTL is how long an unused entry lives before eviction.
+	DefaultEntryTTL = 15 * time.Minute
+)
+
+// entry tracks a per-IP rate limiter and when it was last used.
+type entry struct {
+	limiter  *rate.Limiter
+	lastSeen time.Time
+}
+
+// Limiter manages per-key rate limiters with automatic cleanup
+// of stale entries.
+type Limiter struct {
+	mu       sync.Mutex
+	entries  map[string]*entry
+	rate     rate.Limit
+	burst    int
+	entryTTL time.Duration
+	stopCh   chan struct{}
+}
+
+// New creates a new per-key rate Limiter.
+// The ratePerSec parameter sets how many requests per second are
+// allowed per key.  The burst parameter sets the maximum number of
+// requests that can be made in a single burst.
+func New(ratePerSec float64, burst int) *Limiter {
+	limiter := &Limiter{
+		mu:       sync.Mutex{},
+		entries:  make(map[string]*entry),
+		rate:     rate.Limit(ratePerSec),
+		burst:    burst,
+		entryTTL: DefaultEntryTTL,
+		stopCh:   make(chan struct{}),
+	}
+
+	go limiter.sweepLoop()
+
+	return limiter
+}
+
+// Allow reports whether a request from the given key should be
+// allowed.  It consumes one token from the key's rate limiter.
+func (l *Limiter) Allow(key string) bool {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	ent, exists := l.entries[key]
+
+	if !exists {
+		ent = &entry{
+			limiter:  rate.NewLimiter(l.rate, l.burst),
+			lastSeen: time.Now(),
+		}
+		l.entries[key] = ent
+	} else {
+		ent.lastSeen = time.Now()
+	}
+	l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	return ent.limiter.Allow()
+}
+
+// Stop terminates the background sweep goroutine.
+func (l *Limiter) Stop() {
+	close(l.stopCh)
+}
+
+// Len returns the number of tracked keys (for testing).
+func (l *Limiter) Len() int {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	return len(l.entries)
+}
+
+// sweepLoop periodically removes entries that haven't been seen
+// within the TTL.
+func (l *Limiter) sweepLoop() {
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(DefaultSweepInterval)
+	defer ticker.Stop()
+
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ticker.C:
+			l.sweep()
+		case <-l.stopCh:
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// sweep removes stale entries.
+func (l *Limiter) sweep() {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	cutoff := time.Now().Add(-l.entryTTL)
+
+	for key, ent := range l.entries {
+		if ent.lastSeen.Before(cutoff) {
+			delete(l.entries, key)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/ratelimit/ratelimit_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+package ratelimit_test
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"git.eeqj.de/sneak/neoirc/internal/ratelimit"
+)
+
+func TestNewCreatesLimiter(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(1.0, 5)
+	defer limiter.Stop()
+
+	if limiter == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected non-nil limiter")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAllowWithinBurst(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(1.0, 3)
+	defer limiter.Stop()
+
+	for i := range 3 {
+		if !limiter.Allow("192.168.1.1") {
+			t.Fatalf(
+				"request %d should be allowed within burst",
+				i+1,
+			)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAllowExceedsBurst(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// Rate of 0 means no token replenishment, only burst.
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(0, 3)
+	defer limiter.Stop()
+
+	for range 3 {
+		limiter.Allow("10.0.0.1")
+	}
+
+	if limiter.Allow("10.0.0.1") {
+		t.Fatal("fourth request should be denied after burst exhausted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAllowSeparateKeys(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// Rate of 0, burst of 1 — only one request per key.
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(0, 1)
+	defer limiter.Stop()
+
+	if !limiter.Allow("10.0.0.1") {
+		t.Fatal("first request for key A should be allowed")
+	}
+
+	if !limiter.Allow("10.0.0.2") {
+		t.Fatal("first request for key B should be allowed")
+	}
+
+	if limiter.Allow("10.0.0.1") {
+		t.Fatal("second request for key A should be denied")
+	}
+
+	if limiter.Allow("10.0.0.2") {
+		t.Fatal("second request for key B should be denied")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLenTracksKeys(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(1.0, 5)
+	defer limiter.Stop()
+
+	if limiter.Len() != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 0 entries, got %d", limiter.Len())
+	}
+
+	limiter.Allow("10.0.0.1")
+	limiter.Allow("10.0.0.2")
+
+	if limiter.Len() != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 2 entries, got %d", limiter.Len())
+	}
+
+	// Same key again should not increase count.
+	limiter.Allow("10.0.0.1")
+
+	if limiter.Len() != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 2 entries, got %d", limiter.Len())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStopDoesNotPanic(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(1.0, 5)
+	limiter.Stop()
+}