docs: add reverse proxy security note to login rate limiting section
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21
README.md
21
README.md
@@ -2472,6 +2472,27 @@ When the limit is exceeded, the server returns **429 Too Many Requests** with a
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`Retry-After: 1` header. Stale per-IP entries are automatically cleaned up
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every 10 minutes.
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> **⚠️ Security: Reverse Proxy Required for Production Use**
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>
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> The rate limiter extracts the client IP by checking the `X-Forwarded-For`
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> header first, then `X-Real-IP`, and finally falling back to the TCP
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> `RemoteAddr`. Both `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` are **client-controlled
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> request headers** — any client can set them to arbitrary values.
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>
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> Without a properly configured reverse proxy in front of this server:
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>
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> - An attacker can **bypass rate limiting entirely** by rotating
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> `X-Forwarded-For` values on each request (each value is treated as a
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> distinct IP).
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> - An attacker can **deny service to a specific user** by spoofing that user's
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> IP in the `X-Forwarded-For` header, exhausting their rate limit bucket.
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>
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> **Recommendation:** Always deploy behind a reverse proxy (e.g. nginx, Caddy,
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> Traefik) that strips or overwrites incoming `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP`
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> headers with the actual client IP. If running without a reverse proxy, be
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> aware that the rate limiting provides no meaningful protection against a
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> targeted attack.
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**Why rate limits here but not on session creation?** Session creation is
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protected by hashcash proof-of-work (stateless, no IP tracking needed). Login
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involves bcrypt password verification against a registered account — a
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