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AutistMask/src/shared/approvalTx.js
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fix: failed requests reach the page with an error code and the node's data (closes #533)
A request the node refuses now reaches the page with the node's own JSON-RPC code and data: a reverting eth_call, an eth_sendTransaction whose gas estimate reverts, a failed broadcast. Every other refusal from the background carries a code too: 4100 when there is no address, -32603 for a failure inside the wallet, -32602 for a transaction request the wallet refuses as malformed. On the transaction path the page keeps the wallet's own sentence.

nodeError(), which finds the node's error inside an ethers error, lives in src/shared/approvalVerify.js beside failureTexts(), which did the same lookup.

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Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-18 22:12:10 +02:00

276 lines
11 KiB
JavaScript

// Preparation of the transaction an approval screen displays.
//
// A dApp's eth_sendTransaction normally fixes `to`, `value` and `data`, and
// sometimes the gas limit. The nonce, the fees, and the gas limit when the
// site gives none have to be filled in from the network before anything can
// be signed, and whoever fills them in decides what the user is shown. That
// work used to happen in the popup, after the user had already approved: the
// numbers on the approval screen came from the popup and were compared against
// nothing, so a compromised popup could display one fee and sign another, and
// the ceilings in approvalVerify.js were all that stood between the user and a
// fee that hands the validator the balance.
//
// So it happens here instead, in the background, before the approval window is
// opened. The background populates the transaction, shows that object, and
// verifies the signed artifact against that same object — the popup is handed
// a finished transaction and signs it as given. Every field the user reads is
// then a field that is compared.
//
// The cost is an RPC round trip before the approval window exists. Nothing is
// displayed while it is in flight, and a failure — an unreachable node, a
// reverting gas estimate, a transaction type this wallet does not sign, a fee
// past the ceilings — means no approval and no window at all: the error goes
// back to the requesting page, which is where the user's click came from. That
// is deliberate. The alternative, opening the window first and populating
// behind a spinner, needs a pending approval that exists before it can be
// displayed or signed, and a half-initialised approval is exactly the state
// the settle interlock in the background exists to keep out of that record.
// The failure also lands earlier than it used to rather than later: the same
// estimate previously failed after the user had typed their password.
const {
VoidSigner,
accessListify,
getAddress,
getBigInt,
getBytes,
hexlify,
toQuantity,
} = require("ethers");
const {
ALLOWED_TX_TYPES,
SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
assertWithinCeilings,
nodeError,
} = require("./approvalVerify");
// How long the population may take before the request is failed back to the
// page. Without a bound a hung RPC endpoint leaves the dApp's promise pending
// forever with nothing on screen to explain it; ethers' own request timeout is
// minutes long, which is not a wait anyone will sit through.
const POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS = 20000;
// The request fields taken from the page, plus `gas`, which requestFrom()
// takes as the gas limit. Anything else is dropped rather than passed to
// ethers: the object is page-controlled, and a future ethers that learns to
// carry a new transaction field must not start picking one up out of it
// without this module knowing.
//
// The nonce is not taken from the page; it is always the account's next nonce
// from the network. A page that chose it could replace one of the user's
// pending transactions (the same nonce at a higher fee) or leave this one stuck
// behind a gap (a nonce above the next one).
const REQUEST_FIELDS = [
"to",
"value",
"data",
"gasLimit",
"gasPrice",
"maxFeePerGas",
"maxPriorityFeePerGas",
"chainId",
"accessList",
"type",
];
// EIP-1474's code for invalid parameters: what the page is given when the
// site asked for a transaction this wallet refuses as it was asked for.
const INVALID_PARAMS_CODE = -32602;
// Why no approval can be raised. The message is the sentence the page is
// shown. `code` and `data` are the JSON-RPC ones it is given with it: the
// node's own, unchanged, when the node refused the transaction, so a site can
// decode a revert; INVALID_PARAMS_CODE when the site's request is refused;
// none when the failure is the wallet's own, which the background answers as
// an internal error.
class ApprovalPrepareError extends Error {
constructor(message, code, data) {
super(message);
this.name = "ApprovalPrepareError";
if (code !== undefined) this.code = code;
if (data !== undefined) this.data = data;
}
}
function fail(message, code, data) {
return new ApprovalPrepareError(message, code, data);
}
function present(v) {
return v !== null && v !== undefined && v !== "";
}
// Whether two quantities from the page are the same number. One that is not a
// number matches nothing.
function sameQuantity(a, b) {
try {
return getBigInt(a) === getBigInt(b);
} catch {
return false;
}
}
// These strings reach the user through the requesting page, so they are full
// sentences even when the tail of one came from ethers or from the node.
function sentence(text) {
return /[.!?]$/.test(text) ? text : text + ".";
}
// Reject a promise that has taken too long, and never leave the timer behind.
async function withTimeout(promise, ms, message) {
let timer = null;
try {
return await Promise.race([
promise,
new Promise((_resolve, reject) => {
timer = setTimeout(() => reject(fail(message)), ms);
}),
]);
} finally {
if (timer !== null) clearTimeout(timer);
}
}
// The page's request, reduced to the fields this wallet acts on.
function requestFrom(txParams, from) {
const request = { from: getAddress(from) };
for (const key of REQUEST_FIELDS) {
if (present(txParams[key])) request[key] = txParams[key];
}
// JSON-RPC calls the gas limit `gas`, and that is the name sites send.
// ethers only reads `gasLimit`: left as `gas` it would be dropped and an
// estimate signed in its place.
if (present(txParams.gas)) {
if (
present(request.gasLimit) &&
!sameQuantity(request.gasLimit, txParams.gas)
) {
throw fail(
"The site asked for two different gas limits for this transaction.",
INVALID_PARAMS_CODE,
);
}
request.gasLimit = txParams.gas;
}
if (
present(request.type) &&
!ALLOWED_TX_TYPES.includes(Number(request.type))
) {
throw fail(
"The site asked for a transaction of a type this wallet does not sign.",
INVALID_PARAMS_CODE,
);
}
return request;
}
// Turn a populated transaction into the object that crosses to the popup, is
// displayed, and is compared with the signed artifact. It carries exactly the
// fields its type serializes, plus the address it is to be signed by, and
// every quantity as a hex string: extension messaging is JSON, which has no
// bigint, and a field that did not survive the trip would be a field the user
// was shown and nothing compared.
function serializeApprovedTx(populated, from) {
const type = Number(populated.type);
if (!ALLOWED_TX_TYPES.includes(type)) {
throw fail(
"This transaction would have to be sent as a type this wallet does not sign.",
);
}
const approved = { type, from: getAddress(from) };
for (const key of SERIALIZED_FIELDS[type]) {
if (key === "to") {
approved.to = present(populated.to)
? getAddress(populated.to)
: null;
} else if (key === "data") {
approved.data = present(populated.data)
? hexlify(getBytes(populated.data))
: "0x";
} else if (key === "accessList") {
approved.accessList = accessListify(populated.accessList || []);
} else if (key === "value") {
approved.value = toQuantity(populated.value || 0);
} else if (!present(populated[key])) {
// Unreachable while populateTransaction() fills every quantity of
// the type it produced. If it ever does not, the approval must not
// be raised: an unfixed quantity is one the artifact cannot be
// checked against.
throw fail(
"The transaction could not be prepared: the network did not supply a " +
key +
".",
);
} else {
approved[key] = toQuantity(populated[key]);
}
}
return approved;
}
// Populate the transaction a site asked for, as the address it will be signed
// by, and return the object to display, sign and verify against. Throws with a
// full sentence when no approval can be raised.
async function prepareApprovalTx(provider, from, txParams) {
if (!present(from)) {
throw fail("There is no active address to send this transaction from.");
}
const request = requestFrom(txParams || {}, from);
const signer = new VoidSigner(getAddress(from), provider);
let populated;
try {
// The sequence ethers' own sendTransaction() runs internally, so the
// nonce, gas, fee and chain id are populated exactly as they were when
// the popup did this. VoidSigner cannot sign, which is the point: the
// background prepares, the popup signs.
//
// ethers asks the node for a gas estimate only when the request has
// no gas limit, and that estimate is the only check that the
// transaction does not revert. So a request carrying the site's gas
// limit is estimated first, with that limit: one that reverts, or
// needs more gas than the site gave it, fails here as well. The
// site's gas limit is still the one populated.
populated = await withTimeout(
(async () => {
if (present(request.gasLimit)) {
await signer.estimateGas(request);
}
return signer.populateTransaction(request);
})(),
POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS,
"The transaction could not be prepared: the network did not answer in time.",
);
} catch (e) {
if (e instanceof ApprovalPrepareError) throw e;
// A refusal from the node, such as a reverting gas estimate, keeps
// the node's code and revert data.
const fromNode = nodeError(e);
throw fail(
sentence(
"The transaction could not be prepared: " +
(e.shortMessage ||
e.message ||
"the network did not answer"),
),
fromNode?.code,
fromNode?.data,
);
}
const approved = serializeApprovedTx(populated, from);
// The backstop, applied before the user is shown anything rather than
// after they have approved it: what is displayed here is what gets signed,
// so an RPC node reporting an absurd fee has to be refused here.
assertWithinCeilings(approved);
return approved;
}
module.exports = {
prepareApprovalTx,
serializeApprovedTx,
ApprovalPrepareError,
POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS,
REQUEST_FIELDS,
};