// What the floor under each persisted field actually guarantees — as a table
// that RUNS, one row per field.
//
// This file replaces a hand-written per-field justification in the header of
// src/shared/stateSchema.js. That comment shipped a false claim in three
// consecutive changes: every author wrote plausible prose about thirty fields,
// every reviewer re-derived it by hand, and it kept being wrong in a different
// place each time. The artifact was the problem. A claim nobody can execute is
// worse than no claim, because it is believed.
//
// So the claim is a row here instead:
//
//   KIND.REFUSED   assertStateUsable() refuses the record outright. Proven by
//                  stateProblem() naming a problem for every hostile value.
//   KIND.ENTRIES   normalizePersisted() floors the container AND its entries.
//                  Proven by holds() over the normalized value.
//   KIND.SCALAR    normalizePersisted() floors it to one scalar type, or to a
//                  fixed fallback. Proven the same way.
//   KIND.LOOSE     `saved.x || default`, no type check at all. The claim is
//                  that no structural dereference of it is reachable from a
//                  stored record — which cannot be argued, only driven, so the
//                  proof is a boot of the REAL popup entry point over a stored
//                  record carrying the hostile value, ONTO EVERY RESTORABLE
//                  VIEW. Home is not where this class of defect lives.
//
// Every row is driven through a boot regardless of kind, but only a LOOSE row
// (or a row that sets `alsoSweep`) is swept across the restore path: that is
// what declaring LOOSE costs. ENTRIES and SCALAR rows are proven by their
// holds() instead, because a floored value is not hostile by the time a
// renderer sees it. A LOOSE row must additionally prove it is loose: if
// someone floors the field — even partially — and leaves the row saying LOOSE,
// the "survives verbatim" assertion fails. A field added to PERSISTED_FIELDS
// with no row fails the first test in the file.
//
// The sweep is what makes a LOOSE row falsifiable, so read how it is driven
// before trusting it. A row the ROUTER reads (`routes`) gets its own boot per
// view, because a hostile value in it legitimately changes which view renders.
// Every other swept field is corrupted on the SAME boot, one boot per view per
// hostile slot, and that boot has to land on the view it stored — so a field
// that does move the routing cannot hide in the crowd, and a field that is
// dereferenced by any renderer reachable from a stored record turns this file
// red. Booting each of them separately would be about six hundred boots and
// half a minute; this is thirty-three.
//
// The three claims this replaced, all false, all caught here by construction:
// rpcUrl reaching `new JsonRpcProvider()` (a synchronous throw, not a caught
// request); viewData's ENTRIES being dereferenced by four restore branches
// that gate on one truthy field each; and selectedWallet, where a stale
// integer index is the SAFE case and `wallets["map"]` is the throwing one.

const {
    PERSISTED_FIELDS,
    normalizePersisted,
} = require("../src/shared/persistedState");
const { stateProblem } = require("../src/shared/stateSchema");
const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/shared/restorableViews");
const {
    bootPopup,
    cleanupPopup,
    unversionedValidProfile,
    ADDRESS,
    TOKEN_ADDRESS,
} = require("./support/popupBoot");

const KIND = {
    REFUSED: "refused by the gate",
    ENTRIES: "container and entries type-checked",
    SCALAR: "scalar type-checked",
    LOOSE: "loosely floored; safety proven by driving the popup",
};

const isText = (v) => typeof v === "string";
const isRecord = (v) =>
    typeof v === "object" && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
const isIndexOrNull = (v) => v === null || (Number.isInteger(v) && v >= 0);
const isTextOrNull = (v) => v === null || (isText(v) && v !== "");
const everyEntry = (v, fn) => Array.isArray(v) && v.every(fn);

// A row is SWEPT — driven onto every restorable view rather than only onto
// Home — when its claim is that no restore path dereferences the field. That
// is what LOOSE means. The two index rows opt in with `alsoSweep` although
// they are floored, because the restore path is precisely why they gained a
// floor and the sweep is the regression guard on it.
const swept = (row) => row.kind === KIND.LOOSE || Boolean(row.alsoSweep);

// ------------------------------------------------------------------ the table
//
// `hostile` is values a stored record can carry that nothing in src/ ever
// writes. Each one is driven through the floor AND through a real popup boot —
// and, for a swept row, through one boot per restorable view — so keep the
// list short and pointed. `floorOnly` is extra values checked against the
// floor alone, which is pure and free. `hostileRestore` is extra values driven
// through the restore path only, for a value that means nothing until a
// particular branch's gate has let it past.

const CONTRACT = [
    {
        field: "wallets",
        kind: KIND.REFUSED,
        hostile: [42, "notastructure", { a: 1 }, [null], [{ addresses: 1 }]],
    },
    {
        field: "networkId",
        kind: KIND.REFUSED,
        hostile: [42, "notanetwork", { a: 1 }, "__proto__"],
    },
    {
        field: "trackedTokens",
        kind: KIND.ENTRIES,
        hostile: [42, "notalist", { a: 1 }],
        floorOnly: [[1, 2], [null], [{}], [[TOKEN_ADDRESS]]],
        holds: (v) => everyEntry(v, (t) => isRecord(t) && isText(t.address)),
    },
    {
        field: "allowedSites",
        kind: KIND.ENTRIES,
        hostile: [42, "notarecord", { [ADDRESS]: "notalist" }],
        floorOnly: [
            [ADDRESS],
            { [ADDRESS]: 42 },
            { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, {}] },
            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}'),
        ],
        holds: siteMapHolds,
    },
    {
        field: "deniedSites",
        kind: KIND.ENTRIES,
        hostile: [42, "notarecord", { [ADDRESS]: "notalist" }],
        floorOnly: [
            [ADDRESS],
            { [ADDRESS]: 42 },
            { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, {}] },
            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}'),
        ],
        holds: siteMapHolds,
    },
    {
        field: "fraudContracts",
        kind: KIND.ENTRIES,
        hostile: [42, "notalist", { a: 1 }],
        floorOnly: [[42], [null], [{}], [[TOKEN_ADDRESS]]],
        holds: (v) => everyEntry(v, isText),
    },
    {
        field: "viewStack",
        kind: KIND.ENTRIES,
        hostile: [42, "notalist", ["main", "show-phrase", "settings"]],
        floorOnly: [[1, 2], [null], [{}], ["export-privkey"]],
        // Truncated at the first entry the popup will not reopen onto, rather
        // than filtered: every surviving entry's Back target has to stay the
        // one it had. restorableStack() may also substitute ["main"] under a
        // view restored below the root, so this is the one ENTRIES field whose
        // result is not always a subset of what was stored.
        holds: (v) => everyEntry(v, (e) => RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(e)),
    },
    {
        field: "networkEndpoints",
        kind: KIND.ENTRIES,
        hostile: [42, "notarecord", { mainnet: "notapair" }],
        floorOnly: [
            [1, 2],
            { mainnet: { rpcUrl: 42, blockscoutUrl: {} } },
            { mainnet: { rpcUrl: "", blockscoutUrl: [] } },
            { sepolia: 42 },
        ],
        // Entries are coerced rather than dropped: an unknown network id is
        // KEPT, so a profile that has been on a build with more networks does
        // not lose their endpoints here. What is floored is the two URL fields
        // inside the pair, which applyChainSwitchFields() assigns straight onto
        // s.rpcUrl / s.blockscoutUrl on the next switch.
        holds: (v) =>
            isRecord(v) &&
            Object.keys(v).every((id) => {
                const pair = v[id];
                return (
                    isRecord(pair) &&
                    (pair.rpcUrl === undefined ||
                        (isText(pair.rpcUrl) && pair.rpcUrl !== "")) &&
                    (pair.blockscoutUrl === undefined ||
                        (isText(pair.blockscoutUrl) &&
                            pair.blockscoutUrl !== ""))
                );
            }),
    },
    {
        field: "rpcUrl",
        kind: KIND.SCALAR,
        hostile: [42, true, { a: 1 }],
        floorOnly: [[], "", null],
        holds: (v) => isText(v) && v !== "",
        // The claim this row replaced said a bad value "fails the request on a
        // path that already catches". It does not: getProvider() hands rpcUrl
        // to `new JsonRpcProvider()`, which throws SYNCHRONOUSLY, from two call
        // sites outside any try — and a stored `currentView: "wait-tx"` reaches
        // one of them through restoreView(). So the row proves the claim
        // against the real constructor rather than describing it.
        alsoProven: (normalized, hostile) => {
            // requireActual: bootPopup() mocks this module out for the boots
            // above, and a mocked getProvider() would prove nothing at all
            // about the constructor this row is a claim about.
            const { getProvider } = jest.requireActual(
                "../src/shared/balances",
            );
            expect(() => getProvider(hostile, "mainnet")).toThrow();
            const provider = getProvider(normalized, "mainnet");
            expect(provider).toBeTruthy();
            provider.destroy();
        },
    },
    {
        field: "blockscoutUrl",
        kind: KIND.SCALAR,
        hostile: [42, true, { a: 1 }],
        floorOnly: [[], "", null],
        holds: (v) => isText(v) && v !== "",
    },
    {
        field: "activeAddress",
        kind: KIND.SCALAR,
        hostile: [42, true, { a: 1 }],
        floorOnly: [[ADDRESS], ""],
        holds: isTextOrNull,
    },
    {
        field: "selectedToken",
        kind: KIND.SCALAR,
        hostile: [42, true, { a: 1 }],
        floorOnly: [[TOKEN_ADDRESS], ""],
        holds: isTextOrNull,
    },
    {
        field: "selectedWallet",
        kind: KIND.SCALAR,
        // The prototype members are the whole point: `wallets["map"]` is
        // TRUTHY, so hasValidAddress()'s `&&` does not short-circuit and
        // `.addresses[…]` throws. A stale INTEGER is the safe case.
        hostile: ["map", "__proto__", { a: 1 }],
        floorOnly: ["length", "constructor", "toString", "0", -1, 1.5, true],
        holds: isIndexOrNull,
        // SCALAR, and swept anyway: the restore path is precisely why this
        // field gained a floor, so the sweep is the regression guard on it.
        alsoSweep: true,
        routes: true,
        // A stale INTEGER index, which reaches the restore path by a different
        // route from the prototype members above — falsy or out of range
        // rather than truthy — and has to keep being the safe case.
        hostileRestore: [{ value: "length" }, { value: 5 }],
    },
    {
        field: "selectedAddress",
        kind: KIND.SCALAR,
        hostile: ["map", "__proto__", { a: 1 }],
        floorOnly: ["length", "constructor", "toString", "0", -1, 1.5, true],
        holds: isIndexOrNull,
        alsoSweep: true,
        routes: true,
        hostileRestore: [{ value: 5 }],
    },
    {
        field: "currentView",
        kind: KIND.LOOSE,
        routes: true,
        // Compared, and concatenated into the debug banner's textContent
        // (src/popup/views/helpers.js) with no gate in front of it, which
        // coerces. Nothing renders FROM it without RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has()
        // first, and Set.has() answers false for any value.
        hostile: [42, "no-such-view", { a: 1 }],
    },
    {
        field: "viewData",
        kind: KIND.LOOSE,
        routes: true,
        // The container is taken verbatim; what makes its ENTRIES safe is the
        // per-branch guard in src/popup/viewRouter.js. The sweep drives the
        // container shapes below onto every restorable view; hostileRestore
        // adds the records that PASS a branch's gate and then hand its
        // renderer something it dereferences, which is where the entries are
        // actually decided.
        hostile: [42, "notarecord", { a: 1 }, [1, 2]],
        hostileRestore: [
            // success-tx passes on `data.hash`, and renderSuccess() then calls
            // toAddressHtml(d.to) -> addressTitle() -> address.toLowerCase().
            { value: { hash: "0x1" }, views: ["success-tx"] },
            { value: { hash: "0x1", to: 42 }, views: ["success-tx"] },
            {
                value: { hash: "0x1", to: ADDRESS, decoded: { details: 7 } },
                views: ["success-tx"],
            },
            {
                value: {
                    hash: "0x1",
                    to: ADDRESS,
                    decoded: { details: [{ address: 42 }] },
                },
                views: ["success-tx"],
            },
            // error-tx passes on `data.message`, same dereference.
            { value: { message: "boom" }, views: ["error-tx"] },
            { value: { message: "boom", to: 42 }, views: ["error-tx"] },
            // transaction passes on `data.tx`.
            { value: { tx: { hash: "0x1" } }, views: ["transaction"] },
            {
                value: {
                    tx: {
                        hash: "0x1",
                        from: ADDRESS,
                        to: ADDRESS,
                        contractAddress: 42,
                    },
                },
                views: ["transaction"],
            },
            // confirm-tx passes on `data.pendingTx`.
            { value: { pendingTx: { amount: "1" } }, views: ["confirm-tx"] },
            {
                value: {
                    pendingTx: {
                        token: 42,
                        from: ADDRESS,
                        to: ADDRESS,
                        amount: "1",
                    },
                },
                views: ["confirm-tx"],
            },
            // wait-tx passes on `pendingWait.hash`; restoreWait() has checked
            // the fields below it since it was written, and this is the
            // regression guard.
            {
                value: {
                    pendingWait: {
                        hash: "0x1",
                        txInfo: { to: 42, amount: "1" },
                    },
                },
                views: ["wait-tx"],
            },
            // A record that passes EVERY branch's gate at once, driven onto
            // every restorable view: a branch a view does not read must stay
            // one it does not read, and each renderer must survive the fields
            // another branch left behind.
            {
                value: {
                    hash: "0x1",
                    message: "boom",
                    tx: { hash: "0x1" },
                    pendingTx: { amount: "1" },
                    pendingWait: { hash: "0x1" },
                },
            },
        ],
    },
    {
        field: "lastBalanceRefresh",
        kind: KIND.LOOSE,
        // Arithmetic only: `now - (s.lastBalanceRefresh || 0)` compares false
        // for a non-number and forces a refresh.
        hostile: [true, "notatime", { a: 1 }],
    },
    {
        field: "tokenHolderCache",
        kind: KIND.LOOSE,
        // Nothing DEREFERENCES it structurally. It is read by the
        // field-agnostic snapshotPersisted()/deepEqual() in
        // src/shared/state.js, which are safe for any value, and otherwise
        // only reset wholesale in src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js.
        hostile: [42, "notarecord", [1, 2]],
    },
    {
        field: "theme",
        kind: KIND.LOOSE,
        // Compared against "dark"/"light" in applyTheme() and otherwise falls
        // to the system branch; assigned into an input .value, which coerces.
        hostile: [42, "chartreuse", { a: 1 }],
    },
    {
        field: "dustThresholdGwei",
        kind: KIND.LOOSE,
        hostile: ["notanumber", true, { a: 1 }],
    },
    ...[
        "rememberSiteChoice",
        "showZeroBalanceTokens",
        "hideSpoofedSymbols",
        "hideLowHolderTokens",
        "hideFraudContracts",
        "hideDustTransactions",
        "utcTimestamps",
        "debugMode",
    ].map((field) => ({
        field,
        kind: KIND.LOOSE,
        // A flag: only ever tested for truthiness, and written back verbatim.
        hostile: [42, "notabool", { a: 1 }],
    })),
];

function siteMapHolds(v) {
    return (
        isRecord(v) &&
        Object.getPrototypeOf(v) === Object.prototype &&
        !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(v, "__proto__") &&
        Object.keys(v).every((key) => everyEntry(v[key], isText))
    );
}

afterEach(() => {
    cleanupPopup();
});

// -------------------------------------------------------------- exhaustive

describe("the contract covers the record", () => {
    test("every persisted field has exactly one row, and no row invents one", () => {
        const rows = CONTRACT.map((row) => row.field);

        expect([...rows].sort()).toEqual([...PERSISTED_FIELDS].sort());
    });

    test("every row declares a kind this file knows how to prove", () => {
        const kinds = Object.values(KIND);
        for (const row of CONTRACT) {
            expect(kinds).toContain(row.kind);
            expect(row.hostile.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
        }
    });
});

// ------------------------------------------------------------- the floors

function profileWith(field, value) {
    return unversionedValidProfile({ [field]: value });
}

describe("the floor each row claims", () => {
    for (const row of CONTRACT) {
        const values = [...row.hostile, ...(row.floorOnly || [])];

        if (row.kind === KIND.REFUSED) {
            test(`${row.field}: the gate refuses it`, () => {
                for (const value of values) {
                    expect(
                        typeof stateProblem(profileWith(row.field, value)),
                    ).toBe("string");
                }
            });
            continue;
        }

        test(`${row.field}: ${row.kind}`, () => {
            for (const value of values) {
                const out = normalizePersisted(profileWith(row.field, value));
                if (row.kind === KIND.LOOSE) {
                    // The claim IS that there is no floor. A field that grows
                    // one has to move to another kind rather than keep a row
                    // saying its readers are what make it safe.
                    continue;
                }
                expect({
                    value: value,
                    holds: row.holds(out[row.field]),
                }).toEqual({ value: value, holds: true });
            }
        });

        if (row.kind === KIND.LOOSE) {
            test(`${row.field}: is genuinely unfloored`, () => {
                // EVERY value, not some: a PARTIAL floor is still a floor, and
                // a row that keeps saying LOOSE because one hostile value out
                // of three still survives is exactly the stale claim this file
                // exists to stop.
                for (const value of values) {
                    const out = normalizePersisted(
                        profileWith(row.field, value),
                    );
                    expect({
                        value: value,
                        survived: JSON.stringify(out[row.field]),
                    }).toEqual({
                        value: value,
                        survived: JSON.stringify(value),
                    });
                }
            });
        }
    }
});

// --------------------------------------------- driving the real popup boot

// A booted popup is healthy when nothing threw out of init() and something is
// on screen. A throw out of restoreView() is neither: init() does not guard it,
// so the rest of popup init never runs and the user gets a popup with no view,
// no message and no control on it.
async function bootHealth(profile) {
    const env = await bootPopup(profile);
    return {
        errors: env.pageErrors,
        blank: env.visibleViews().length === 0,
    };
}

const HEALTHY = { errors: [], blank: false };

// unversionedValidProfile() stores no currentView, so every boot in here lands
// on Home. That is the cheap half of the proof; the restore path below is the
// half that matters.
describe("a hostile value for one field, booting onto Home", () => {
    for (const row of CONTRACT) {
        for (const value of row.hostile) {
            test(`${row.field} = ${JSON.stringify(value)}`, async () => {
                await expect(
                    bootHealth(profileWith(row.field, value)),
                ).resolves.toEqual(HEALTHY);
            });
        }
    }
});

describe("a row's extra proof against the real reader", () => {
    for (const row of CONTRACT) {
        if (!row.alsoProven) continue;
        test(row.field, () => {
            for (const value of row.hostile) {
                const out = normalizePersisted(profileWith(row.field, value));
                row.alsoProven(out[row.field], value);
            }
        });
    }
});

// ------------------------------------------------ driving the restore path

// Everything above lands on Home. Home is not where this class of defect
// lives: all three of the false claims this file replaced were falsified by a
// RESTORE, through the unguarded restoreView() in src/popup/index.js. So a
// swept row's hostile values are driven onto EVERY restorable view, one boot
// each.
//
// This is what makes a LOOSE row falsifiable. A field that gains a structural
// dereference on any restorable view — `state.theme.toLowerCase()` in a view's
// show(), say — turns the row red here, instead of waiting for a reviewer to
// re-derive the claim by hand.

// restoreWait() resumes from this, so it has to be a finite number and recent
// enough that the resumed deadline has not already passed — a wait that has
// outlived its deadline resolves on the first poll instead of staying on
// screen. Read once at module load, so every boot in one run shares it.
const BROADCAST_TIME = Date.now();

// A viewData well formed for every restorable branch at once, so the only
// thing a swept boot can fail on is the field the row corrupts. "the base
// profile the sweep corrupts" below proves this really does render each view
// rather than falling back — without that, a sweep could pass by never
// reaching a renderer at all.
const WELL_FORMED_DATA = {
    hash: "0x1",
    message: "boom",
    to: ADDRESS,
    decoded: { details: [{ address: TOKEN_ADDRESS }] },
    tx: { hash: "0x1", from: ADDRESS, to: ADDRESS, contractAddress: null },
    pendingTx: {
        token: "ETH",
        from: ADDRESS,
        to: ADDRESS,
        amount: "1",
        balance: "2",
    },
    pendingWait: {
        hash: "0x1",
        txInfo: { to: ADDRESS, amount: "1" },
        broadcastTime: BROADCAST_TIME,
    },
};

function restoringOnto(view, extra) {
    return unversionedValidProfile({
        currentView: view,
        selectedWallet: 0,
        selectedAddress: 0,
        selectedToken: TOKEN_ADDRESS,
        viewStack: ["main"],
        viewData: WELL_FORMED_DATA,
        ...extra,
    });
}

// A boot that RESTORED is healthy and landed on the view it stored, rather
// than falling back to Home — which a healthy boot also does, and which would
// let a sweep pass by never running the renderer it is aimed at.
async function restoredHealth(profile, view) {
    const env = await bootPopup(profile);
    return {
        errors: env.pageErrors,
        restored: env.visibleViews().includes(view),
    };
}

const RESTORED = { errors: [], restored: true };

describe("the base profile the sweep corrupts", () => {
    for (const view of RESTORABLE_VIEWS) {
        test(`renders ${view} rather than falling back`, async () => {
            await expect(
                restoredHealth(restoringOnto(view), view),
            ).resolves.toEqual(RESTORED);
        });
    }
});

// A field the ROUTER itself reads — the two it gates on and the two
// hasValidAddress() indexes with. A hostile value in one of these legitimately
// changes which view renders, so each gets its own boot per view and is held
// only to "healthy", not to "restored onto the view it stored".
const routes = (row) => Boolean(row.routes);

// Every routing row × every hostile value × every restorable view. Profiles
// are deduplicated because a hostile `currentView` REPLACES the view being
// restored onto, which would otherwise be the same boot eleven times.
describe("a hostile routing value restoring onto", () => {
    for (const row of CONTRACT) {
        if (!swept(row) || !routes(row)) continue;
        const seen = new Set();
        for (const value of row.hostile) {
            for (const view of RESTORABLE_VIEWS) {
                const profile = restoringOnto(view, { [row.field]: value });
                const key = JSON.stringify(profile);
                if (seen.has(key)) continue;
                seen.add(key);
                test(`${view}: ${row.field} = ${JSON.stringify(
                    value,
                )}`, async () => {
                    await expect(bootHealth(profile)).resolves.toEqual(HEALTHY);
                });
            }
        }
    }
});

// Every OTHER swept field, corrupted at once, one boot per view per hostile
// slot: twelve fields on one boot rather than twelve boots. A field is only in
// here because it is not one the router reads — and that is ASSERTED, not
// argued, because the boot has to land on `view`. A field that does move the
// routing turns this red and has to declare `routes` and take the individual
// sweep above.
//
// Nothing is masked by combining: a throw fails the boot whichever field threw,
// and the only other way a dereference could go unseen is the renderer not
// running at all, which is exactly what `restored` forbids. When it does go
// red, the same view is re-booted one field at a time so the failure names the
// fields rather than leaving a reader to bisect twelve of them.
const UNROUTED = CONTRACT.filter((row) => swept(row) && !routes(row));
const HOSTILE_SLOTS = Math.max(...UNROUTED.map((row) => row.hostile.length));

function unroutedValues(slot) {
    const fields = {};
    for (const row of UNROUTED) {
        fields[row.field] = row.hostile[slot % row.hostile.length];
    }
    return fields;
}

describe("every field the router does not read, corrupted at once, onto", () => {
    for (const view of RESTORABLE_VIEWS) {
        for (let slot = 0; slot < HOSTILE_SLOTS; slot++) {
            test(`${view}: hostile value ${slot + 1} in all ${
                UNROUTED.length
            } of them`, async () => {
                const fields = unroutedValues(slot);
                const together = await restoredHealth(
                    restoringOnto(view, fields),
                    view,
                );
                if (together.errors.length === 0 && together.restored) {
                    expect(together).toEqual(RESTORED);
                    return;
                }

                const named = [];
                for (const row of UNROUTED) {
                    const one = await restoredHealth(
                        restoringOnto(view, {
                            [row.field]: fields[row.field],
                        }),
                        view,
                    );
                    if (one.errors.length === 0 && one.restored) continue;
                    named.push(
                        `${row.field}=${JSON.stringify(fields[row.field])}: ` +
                            (one.errors.join("; ") || `fell off ${view}`),
                    );
                }
                expect({ view: view, fields: named }).toEqual({
                    view: view,
                    fields: [],
                });
            });
        }
    }
});

// The values that only mean something on the restore path: a viewData that
// PASSES a branch's gate and then hands its renderer something dereferenced,
// and the index values whose route through hasValidAddress() differs from the
// row's own hostile set.
describe("a restore-only hostile value onto", () => {
    for (const row of CONTRACT) {
        for (const entry of row.hostileRestore || []) {
            for (const view of entry.views || RESTORABLE_VIEWS) {
                test(`${view}: ${row.field} = ${JSON.stringify(
                    entry.value,
                )}`, async () => {
                    await expect(
                        bootHealth(
                            restoringOnto(view, { [row.field]: entry.value }),
                        ),
                    ).resolves.toEqual(HEALTHY);
                });
            }
        }
    }
});