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harden: verify the signed transaction against what the popup displayed (closes #216) #269

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clawbot merged 1 commits from harden/issue-216-verify-displayed-values into next 2026-08-12 12:15:26 +02:00
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11 changed files with 1808 additions and 346 deletions
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16
README.md
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@@ -1041,7 +1041,12 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
- **When**: A connected website requests a transaction via
`eth_sendTransaction`. Always opened in a separate popup window by the
background script (`windows.create()`), because the request is triggered
programmatically rather than by a user gesture.
programmatically rather than by a user gesture. The background populates the
transaction (nonce, gas limit, fees, chain id) against the RPC node _before_
opening the window, so the screen shows a complete transaction and the signed
artifact can be compared with it field for field. A request that cannot be
populated — unreachable node, reverting gas estimate — opens no window and is
failed back to the site.
- **Elements**:
- "Transaction Request" heading
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
@@ -1053,13 +1058,16 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
- Contract: color dot + full address + etherscan link (or "contract
creation"), token symbol label if known
- Value: amount in ETH (4 decimal places, USD in parentheses)
- Network fee (max): gas limit × fee per gas in ETH (4 decimal places, USD
in parentheses), with the gas limit and the fee per gas in gwei below it
- Network and nonce
- Raw data: full calldata displayed inline (shown if present)
- Password input and an error line
- "Confirm" / "Reject" buttons
- **Transitions**:
- "Confirm" (correct password) → decrypts and signs in the popup, hands the
signed transaction to the background to broadcast, then → **WaitTx** in
the same popup window
- "Confirm" (correct password) → decrypts and signs the transaction it was
shown, exactly as shown, hands the signed transaction to the background to
broadcast, then → **WaitTx** in the same popup window
- "Confirm" (wrong password) → error line, no screen change
- "Reject" → closes popup (returns rejection to background)
- Popup window closed without answering → the request is rejected with

11
TODO.md
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@@ -44,6 +44,17 @@ undefined identifiers, which is how
# Completed Steps
- 2026-08-12: The transaction a dApp asks for is now populated in the background
before the approval window opens, so the object the user is shown is the
object the signed artifact is verified against — nonce, gas limit and every
fee field are compared exactly instead of being left to the ceilings, which
stay as a backstop against what a lying RPC node can talk the wallet into
displaying. The approval also pins the address it was raised for, so an
address switch between approval and signing refuses rather than signing from
an account the screen never named, and a request naming an address that is not
the active one is refused outright. The approval screen now shows the fee, gas
limit, network and nonce it vouches for
([#216](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/216)).
- 2026-08-12: The restored navigation stack is filtered against
`RESTORABLE_VIEWS` on load, truncated at the first entry the popup would not
render so that every surviving entry keeps the Back target it had. Back after

13
docs/README.md
View File

@@ -311,10 +311,15 @@ pages. When a site requests access to your wallet:
time.
When a connected site requests a transaction, a separate approval popup appears
showing the transaction details (from, to, value, data). You must enter your
password and click "Confirm" to authorize it. Message and typed-data signature
requests work the same way, with a "Sign" button, and also require your
password.
showing the transaction details (from, to, value, data, network fee, network and
nonce). Every one of those values is checked against the transaction that is
actually signed before anything is broadcast, so what you read on that screen is
what goes out or nothing does. The popup appears once the wallet has worked out
the fee and gas from the network, which takes a moment; if that fails, no popup
appears and the site is told the transaction could not be prepared. You must
enter your password and click "Confirm" to authorize it. Message and typed-data
signature requests work the same way, with a "Sign" button, and also require
your password.
If the requesting site's domain is on the phishing blocklist, all three approval
screens show a red phishing warning before you decide.

147
src/background/index.js
View File

@@ -18,11 +18,14 @@ const {
verifySignature,
failureIsRetryable,
describeTxFailure,
sameAddress,
ApprovalMismatchError,
TX_STAGE_SIGN,
TX_STAGE_VERIFY,
TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,
TX_STAGE_INFLIGHT,
} = require("../shared/approvalVerify");
const { prepareApprovalTx } = require("../shared/approvalTx");
const {
isPhishingDomain,
refreshPhishingListOnSchedule,
@@ -77,6 +80,14 @@ async function getActiveAddress() {
return null;
}
// Whether a request names a signing address other than the active one. Such a
// request is refused rather than quietly signed as whichever address happens
// to be active: the page asked for account A and would otherwise be handed
// something from account B.
function namesAnotherAddress(requested, activeAddress) {
return !!requested && !sameAddress(requested, activeAddress);
}
async function getRpcUrl() {
const s = await getState();
return s.rpcUrl || DEFAULT_RPC_URL;
@@ -225,13 +236,21 @@ function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
// Uses windows.create() directly because tx approvals are triggered programmatically
// (from a dApp RPC call), not from a user gesture, so action.openPopup() is
// unreliable in this context.
function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, txParams) {
//
// `approvedTx` is the fully populated transaction (see approvalTx.js): the
// object the popup displays, the object it signs, and the object the artifact
// is verified against. `approvedFrom` is the address that is active now, and
// it is pinned here rather than read again at signing time — an address switch
// between approval and signing must refuse, not sign from an account this
// screen never named.
function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
pendingApprovals[id] = {
origin,
hostname,
txParams,
approvedTx,
approvedFrom,
resolve,
type: "tx",
};
@@ -244,13 +263,14 @@ function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, txParams) {
// Uses windows.create() directly because sign approvals are triggered programmatically
// (from a dApp RPC call), not from a user gesture, so action.openPopup() is
// unreliable in this context.
function requestSignApproval(origin, hostname, signParams) {
function requestSignApproval(origin, hostname, signParams, approvedFrom) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
pendingApprovals[id] = {
origin,
hostname,
signParams,
approvedFrom,
resolve,
type: "sign",
};
@@ -502,6 +522,16 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
? { method, message: params[0], from: params[1] }
: { method, message: params[1], from: params[0] };
if (namesAnotherAddress(signParams.from, activeAddress)) {
return {
error: {
code: 4100,
message:
"This site asked to sign as an address that is not the active one.",
},
};
}
if (method === "eth_sign") {
signParams.dangerWarning =
"\u26a0\ufe0f DANGER: This site is requesting to sign a raw hash. " +
@@ -513,6 +543,7 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
origin,
hostname,
signParams,
activeAddress,
);
if (decision.error) return { error: decision.error };
return { result: decision.signature };
@@ -534,10 +565,20 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
}
const signParams = { method, typedData: params[1], from: params[0] };
if (namesAnotherAddress(signParams.from, activeAddress)) {
return {
error: {
code: 4100,
message:
"This site asked to sign as an address that is not the active one.",
},
};
}
const decision = await requestSignApproval(
origin,
hostname,
signParams,
activeAddress,
);
if (decision.error) return { error: decision.error };
return { result: decision.signature };
@@ -559,7 +600,51 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
}
const txParams = params?.[0] || {};
const decision = await requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, txParams);
if (namesAnotherAddress(txParams.from, activeAddress)) {
return {
error: {
code: 4100,
message:
"This site asked to send from an address that is not the active one.",
},
};
}
// Populate here, before any window opens, so that the transaction the
// user is shown is a complete one and is the same object the signed
// artifact is checked against. A failure raises no approval at all and
// is reported to the requesting page; see approvalTx.js.
let approvedTx;
try {
approvedTx = await prepareApprovalTx(
getProvider(await getRpcUrl()),
activeAddress,
txParams,
);
} catch (e) {
return { error: { message: e.message } };
}
// Population is a network round trip, and the user can switch address
// during it. Raising the approval anyway would put an account on the
// screen that the wallet is no longer on, and it could never be signed
// — the signing handler refuses exactly that. Refuse it here instead,
// while the page is still waiting and nothing has been displayed.
if (!sameAddress(await getActiveAddress(), activeAddress)) {
return {
error: {
message:
"The active address changed while this transaction was being prepared, so it was not sent.",
},
};
}
const decision = await requestTxApproval(
origin,
hostname,
approvedTx,
activeAddress,
);
if (decision.error) return { error: decision.error };
return { result: decision.txHash };
}
@@ -810,11 +895,16 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
};
if (approval.type === "tx") {
resp.type = "tx";
resp.txParams = approval.txParams;
// The populated transaction, and the address it was raised
// for. The popup displays and signs exactly this and does not
// populate or re-read anything itself.
resp.approvedTx = approval.approvedTx;
resp.approvedFrom = approval.approvedFrom;
}
if (approval.type === "sign") {
resp.type = "sign";
resp.signParams = approval.signParams;
resp.approvedFrom = approval.approvedFrom;
}
// Flag if the requesting domain is on the phishing blocklist.
resp.isPhishingDomain = isPhishingDomain(approval.hostname);
@@ -888,14 +978,27 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
try {
await loadState();
const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
// An address switch between approval and signing refuses. The
// approval named one account; signing from whichever account
// is active now would send funds from an account this screen
// never showed. A switch normally rejects every pending
// approval on its way through broadcastAccountsChanged(), so
// this is the case where that did not reach the approval —
// and it is a refusal, not a retry, because the transaction
// the user saw is no longer the transaction that would go out.
if (!sameAddress(activeAddress, approval.approvedFrom)) {
throw new ApprovalMismatchError(
"The active address changed after this transaction was approved, so it was not sent.",
);
}
// The popup holds the secret, but the background stays the
// authority on what is broadcast: the raw transaction must be
// the approved one, signed by the approved address, on the
// network that is selected.
// the transaction that was displayed, signed by the address
// the approval named, on the network that is selected.
verifySignedTx(
msg.rawSignedTx,
approval.txParams,
activeAddress,
approval.approvedTx,
approval.approvedFrom,
currentNetwork().chainId,
);
} catch (e) {
@@ -932,10 +1035,10 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
sendResponse({ txHash: tx.hash });
} catch (e) {
// Terminal, never retried: the node may have accepted the
// transaction and still failed to answer, and the popup's
// retry re-signs at a freshly fetched nonce rather than
// re-broadcasting these bytes. Retrying would send the
// approved transfer a second time.
// transaction and still failed to answer, so the wallet cannot
// tell a transaction that never left from one already in the
// mempool. The page has been given its outcome for this
// request; a second attempt would report a second one.
const outcome = describeTxFailure(TX_STAGE_BROADCAST, e);
settleApproval(
msg.id,
@@ -998,12 +1101,24 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
(async () => {
try {
const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
// Same as the transaction path: the address the approval named
// is the one that must have signed, and a switch since then is
// a refusal rather than a signature from another account.
if (!sameAddress(activeAddress, approval.approvedFrom)) {
throw new ApprovalMismatchError(
"The active address changed after this request was approved, so it was not signed.",
);
}
// The popup holds the secret, but the background stays the
// authority on what is handed back to the page: the signature
// must cover the approved payload and recover to the approved
// address.
// must cover the approved payload and recover to the address
// the approval named.
const signature = msg.signature;
verifySignature(approval.signParams, signature, activeAddress);
verifySignature(
approval.signParams,
signature,
approval.approvedFrom,
);
settleApproval(msg.id, { signature }, { holdsClaim: true });
sendResponse({ signature });
} catch (e) {

27
src/popup/index.html
View File

@@ -1496,6 +1496,33 @@
<div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Value</div>
<div id="approve-tx-value" class="text-xs font-bold"></div>
</div>
<div class="mb-3">
<div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Network fee (max)</div>
<div
id="approve-tx-fee"
class="text-xs font-bold min-h-[1rem]"
></div>
<div
id="approve-tx-fee-detail"
class="text-xs text-muted min-h-[1rem]"
></div>
</div>
<div class="mb-3 flex justify-between">
<div>
<div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Network</div>
<div
id="approve-tx-network"
class="text-xs min-h-[1rem]"
></div>
</div>
<div>
<div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Nonce</div>
<div
id="approve-tx-nonce"
class="text-xs min-h-[1rem]"
></div>
</div>
</div>
<div id="approve-tx-data-section" class="mb-3 hidden">
<div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Raw data</div>
<div id="approve-tx-data" class="text-xs break-all"></div>

139
src/popup/views/approval.js
View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ const {
onViewLeave,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { networkByChainId } = require("../../shared/networks");
const {
formatEther,
formatUnits,
@@ -23,7 +24,6 @@ const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
const { describeSigningFailure } = require("../../shared/approvalVerify");
const txStatus = require("./txStatus");
const uniswap = require("../../shared/uniswap");
@@ -159,21 +159,61 @@ function showPhishingWarning(elementId, isPhishing) {
}
}
// The fields of the approved transaction the value and recipient lines do not
// already carry: network, gas limit, fee per gas, the most the fee can come to,
// and the nonce. The background compares every one of them against the signed
// artifact, so every one of them has to be on the screen — a number that is
// verified but never displayed is verified against nothing the user agreed to.
function showTxFee(approvedTx, ethPrice) {
const network = networkByChainId(approvedTx.chainId);
$("approve-tx-network").textContent = network
? network.name
: "Unknown network (chain id " + BigInt(approvedTx.chainId) + ")";
const gasLimit = BigInt(approvedTx.gasLimit);
const feePerGas = BigInt(approvedTx.maxFeePerGas || approvedTx.gasPrice);
const maxFeeEth = formatTxValue(formatEther(gasLimit * feePerGas));
const usdStr = formatUsd(
ethPrice ? parseFloat(maxFeeEth) * ethPrice : null,
);
$("approve-tx-fee").textContent =
maxFeeEth + " ETH" + (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
let detail =
gasLimit.toString() +
" gas at up to " +
formatUnits(feePerGas, 9) +
" gwei";
if (approvedTx.maxPriorityFeePerGas) {
detail +=
", " +
formatUnits(approvedTx.maxPriorityFeePerGas, 9) +
" gwei priority";
}
$("approve-tx-fee-detail").textContent = detail;
$("approve-tx-nonce").textContent = BigInt(approvedTx.nonce).toString();
}
function showTxApproval(details) {
showPhishingWarning(
"approve-tx-phishing-warning",
details.isPhishingDomain,
);
pendingTxParams = details.txParams;
// The transaction the background populated. It is displayed as it stands,
// signed as it stands, and verified against as it stands — the popup fills
// nothing in, so there is no number on this screen that the background
// cannot compare with the artifact it gets back.
pendingTxParams = details.approvedTx;
const approvedTx = details.approvedTx;
const toAddr = details.txParams.to;
const toAddr = approvedTx.to;
const token = toAddr ? TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(toAddr.toLowerCase()) : null;
const ethValue = formatEther(details.txParams.value || "0");
const ethValue = formatEther(approvedTx.value || "0");
// Build txInfo for status screens
pendingTxDetails = {
from: state.activeAddress,
from: details.approvedFrom,
to: toAddr || "",
amount: formatTxValue(ethValue),
token: "ETH",
@@ -181,7 +221,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
};
// If this is an ERC-20 call, try to extract the real recipient and amount
const decoded = decodeCalldata(details.txParams.data, toAddr || "");
const decoded = decodeCalldata(approvedTx.data, toAddr || "");
if (decoded && decoded.details) {
let decodedTokenAddr = null;
let decodedTokenSymbol = null;
@@ -219,7 +259,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
}
$("approve-tx-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
$("approve-tx-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(state.activeAddress);
$("approve-tx-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(details.approvedFrom);
// Show token symbol next to contract address if known
const symbol = toAddr ? tokenLabel(toAddr) : null;
@@ -235,7 +275,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
}
const ethValueFormatted = formatTxValue(
formatEther(details.txParams.value || "0"),
formatEther(approvedTx.value || "0"),
);
const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
const ethUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(ethValueFormatted) * ethPrice : null;
@@ -243,6 +283,8 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
$("approve-tx-value").textContent =
ethValueFormatted + " ETH" + (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
showTxFee(approvedTx, ethPrice);
// Decode calldata (reuse decoded from above)
const decodedEl = $("approve-tx-decoded");
if (decoded) {
@@ -271,8 +313,8 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
}
// Always show raw data when present
if (details.txParams.data && details.txParams.data !== "0x") {
$("approve-tx-data").textContent = details.txParams.data;
if (approvedTx.data && approvedTx.data !== "0x") {
$("approve-tx-data").textContent = approvedTx.data;
$("approve-tx-data-section").classList.remove("hidden");
} else {
$("approve-tx-data-section").classList.add("hidden");
@@ -283,7 +325,11 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
showView("approve-tx");
attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-tx");
gateOnWalletDefect("approve-tx-error", "btn-approve-tx");
gateOnWalletDefect(
"approve-tx-error",
"btn-approve-tx",
details.approvedFrom,
);
}
function decodeHexMessage(hex) {
@@ -342,9 +388,12 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
const sp = details.signParams;
pendingSignParams = sp;
pendingSignFrom = details.approvedFrom;
$("approve-sign-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
$("approve-sign-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(sp.from);
$("approve-sign-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(
details.approvedFrom,
);
const isTyped =
sp.method === "eth_signTypedData_v4" ||
@@ -383,7 +432,11 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
showView("approve-sign");
attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-sign");
gateOnWalletDefect("approve-sign-error", "btn-approve-sign");
gateOnWalletDefect(
"approve-sign-error",
"btn-approve-sign",
details.approvedFrom,
);
}
function show(id) {
@@ -418,11 +471,15 @@ function show(id) {
let approvalId = null;
let pendingTxDetails = null;
// The exact parameters shown to the user, kept so the popup signs what it
// displayed rather than re-fetching anything at approval time. Both are
// repopulated by show() when the popup is closed and reopened.
// The exact objects shown to the user, kept so the popup signs what it
// displayed rather than re-fetching or re-populating anything at approval
// time. All are repopulated by show() when the popup is closed and reopened.
let pendingTxParams = null;
let pendingSignParams = null;
// The address the approval was raised for. Signing uses this rather than the
// active address, so that an address switch since the approval fails here
// instead of producing a signature from an account the screen never named.
let pendingSignFrom = null;
// Approve buttons stay disabled and muted while the popup derives the key and
// signs, which is slow enough (Argon2id) that a double click is likely.
@@ -437,12 +494,13 @@ function setSignButtonBusy(busy) {
}
// Say so on the approval screen itself, and disable the approve button, when
// the active address belongs to a wallet whose keys cannot be derived. Without
// this the screen would take a password and fail after deriving it. Reject
// stays available; the wallet is not touched. Returns true when it gated.
function gateOnWalletDefect(errorId, buttonId) {
const active = findActiveWallet();
const defect = active ? walletDefect(active.wallet) : null;
// the address the approval was raised for belongs to a wallet whose keys
// cannot be derived. Without this the screen would take a password and fail
// after deriving it. Reject stays available; the wallet is not touched.
// Returns true when it gated.
function gateOnWalletDefect(errorId, buttonId, address) {
const owner = findWalletFor(address);
const defect = owner ? walletDefect(owner.wallet) : null;
if (!defect) return false;
showError(errorId, defect.shortMessage);
$(buttonId).disabled = true;
@@ -450,12 +508,14 @@ function gateOnWalletDefect(errorId, buttonId) {
return true;
}
// Locate the wallet and the address index owning the currently active
// address. Returns null when no wallet holds it.
function findActiveWallet() {
// Locate the wallet and the address index owning an address. Returns null when
// no wallet holds it. Approvals look up the address they were raised for, not
// whichever address is active now: the approval named one account, and signing
// with another is what verification refuses.
function findWalletFor(address) {
for (const wallet of state.wallets) {
for (let i = 0; i < wallet.addresses.length; i++) {
if (wallet.addresses[i].address === state.activeAddress) {
if (wallet.addresses[i].address === address) {
return { wallet, addrIndex: i };
}
}
@@ -517,12 +577,12 @@ function init(ctx) {
hideError("approve-tx-error");
setTxButtonBusy(true);
const active = findActiveWallet();
const active = findWalletFor(pendingTxParams.from);
if (!active) {
password = null;
showError(
"approve-tx-error",
"No wallet was found for the active address.",
"No wallet was found for the address this transaction was approved for.",
);
setTxButtonBusy(false);
return;
@@ -569,15 +629,16 @@ function init(ctx) {
active.addrIndex,
decryptedSecret,
);
const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
const connected = signer.connect(provider);
// This is the sequence ethers' own sendTransaction() runs
// internally, so nonce, gas, fee and chain id population are
// identical to when the background did the signing.
const populated =
await connected.populateTransaction(pendingTxParams);
delete populated.from;
payload.rawSignedTx = await connected.signTransaction(populated);
// Sign the approved transaction exactly as it was displayed. The
// background populated it before this screen was drawn and checks
// the artifact against it field for field, so there is nothing to
// fill in here and no provider to fill it in from. The copy is
// because ethers may strip `from` off what it is handed, and the
// approval has to survive a retry intact; keeping `from` on it
// makes ethers refuse a key that is not the approved address.
payload.rawSignedTx = await signer.signTransaction({
...pendingTxParams,
});
} catch (e) {
payload.error =
e.shortMessage || e.message || "Transaction signing failed.";
@@ -626,12 +687,12 @@ function init(ctx) {
hideError("approve-sign-error");
setSignButtonBusy(true);
const active = findActiveWallet();
const active = findWalletFor(pendingSignFrom);
if (!active) {
password = null;
showError(
"approve-sign-error",
"No wallet was found for the active address.",
"No wallet was found for the address this request was approved for.",
);
setSignButtonBusy(false);
return;

213
src/shared/approvalTx.js Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
// Preparation of the transaction an approval screen displays.
//
// A dApp's eth_sendTransaction normally fixes only `to`, `value` and `data`.
// The nonce, the gas limit and the fees have to be filled in from the network
// before anything can be signed, and whoever fills them in decides what the
// user is shown. That work used to happen in the popup, after the user had
// already approved: the numbers on the approval screen came from the popup and
// were compared against nothing, so a compromised popup could display one fee
// and sign another, and the ceilings in approvalVerify.js were all that stood
// between the user and a fee that hands the validator the balance.
//
// So it happens here instead, in the background, before the approval window is
// opened. The background populates the transaction, shows that object, and
// verifies the signed artifact against that same object — the popup is handed
// a finished transaction and signs it as given. Every field the user reads is
// then a field that is compared.
//
// The cost is an RPC round trip before the approval window exists. Nothing is
// displayed while it is in flight, and a failure — an unreachable node, a
// reverting gas estimate, a transaction type this wallet does not sign, a fee
// past the ceilings — means no approval and no window at all: the error goes
// back to the requesting page, which is where the user's click came from. That
// is deliberate. The alternative, opening the window first and populating
// behind a spinner, needs a pending approval that exists before it can be
// displayed or signed, and a half-initialised approval is exactly the state
// the settle interlock in the background exists to keep out of that record.
// The failure also lands earlier than it used to rather than later: the same
// estimate previously failed after the user had typed their password.
const {
VoidSigner,
accessListify,
getAddress,
getBytes,
hexlify,
toQuantity,
} = require("ethers");
const {
ALLOWED_TX_TYPES,
SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
assertWithinCeilings,
} = require("./approvalVerify");
// How long the population may take before the request is failed back to the
// page. Without a bound a hung RPC endpoint leaves the dApp's promise pending
// forever with nothing on screen to explain it; ethers' own request timeout is
// minutes long, which is not a wait anyone will sit through.
const POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS = 20000;
// The request fields taken from the page. Anything else is dropped rather than
// passed to ethers: the object is page-controlled, and a future ethers that
// learns to carry a new transaction field must not start picking one up out of
// it without this module knowing.
const REQUEST_FIELDS = [
"to",
"value",
"data",
"nonce",
"gasLimit",
"gasPrice",
"maxFeePerGas",
"maxPriorityFeePerGas",
"chainId",
"accessList",
"type",
];
class ApprovalPrepareError extends Error {
constructor(message) {
super(message);
this.name = "ApprovalPrepareError";
}
}
function fail(message) {
return new ApprovalPrepareError(message);
}
function present(v) {
return v !== null && v !== undefined && v !== "";
}
// These strings reach the user through the requesting page, so they are full
// sentences even when the tail of one came from ethers or from the node.
function sentence(text) {
return /[.!?]$/.test(text) ? text : text + ".";
}
// Reject a promise that has taken too long, and never leave the timer behind.
async function withTimeout(promise, ms, message) {
let timer = null;
try {
return await Promise.race([
promise,
new Promise((_resolve, reject) => {
timer = setTimeout(() => reject(fail(message)), ms);
}),
]);
} finally {
if (timer !== null) clearTimeout(timer);
}
}
// The page's request, reduced to the fields this wallet acts on.
function requestFrom(txParams, from) {
const request = { from: getAddress(from) };
for (const key of REQUEST_FIELDS) {
if (present(txParams[key])) request[key] = txParams[key];
}
if (
present(request.type) &&
!ALLOWED_TX_TYPES.includes(Number(request.type))
) {
throw fail(
"The site asked for a transaction of a type this wallet does not sign.",
);
}
return request;
}
// Turn a populated transaction into the object that crosses to the popup, is
// displayed, and is compared with the signed artifact. It carries exactly the
// fields its type serializes, plus the address it is to be signed by, and
// every quantity as a hex string: extension messaging is JSON, which has no
// bigint, and a field that did not survive the trip would be a field the user
// was shown and nothing compared.
function serializeApprovedTx(populated, from) {
const type = Number(populated.type);
if (!ALLOWED_TX_TYPES.includes(type)) {
throw fail(
"This transaction would have to be sent as a type this wallet does not sign.",
);
}
const approved = { type, from: getAddress(from) };
for (const key of SERIALIZED_FIELDS[type]) {
if (key === "to") {
approved.to = present(populated.to)
? getAddress(populated.to)
: null;
} else if (key === "data") {
approved.data = present(populated.data)
? hexlify(getBytes(populated.data))
: "0x";
} else if (key === "accessList") {
approved.accessList = accessListify(populated.accessList || []);
} else if (key === "value") {
approved.value = toQuantity(populated.value || 0);
} else if (!present(populated[key])) {
// Unreachable while populateTransaction() fills every quantity of
// the type it produced. If it ever does not, the approval must not
// be raised: an unfixed quantity is one the artifact cannot be
// checked against.
throw fail(
"The transaction could not be prepared: the network did not supply a " +
key +
".",
);
} else {
approved[key] = toQuantity(populated[key]);
}
}
return approved;
}
// Populate the transaction a site asked for, as the address it will be signed
// by, and return the object to display, sign and verify against. Throws with a
// full sentence when no approval can be raised.
async function prepareApprovalTx(provider, from, txParams) {
if (!present(from)) {
throw fail("There is no active address to send this transaction from.");
}
const request = requestFrom(txParams || {}, from);
let populated;
try {
// The sequence ethers' own sendTransaction() runs internally, so the
// nonce, gas, fee and chain id are populated exactly as they were when
// the popup did this. VoidSigner cannot sign, which is the point: the
// background prepares, the popup signs.
populated = await withTimeout(
new VoidSigner(getAddress(from), provider).populateTransaction(
request,
),
POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS,
"The transaction could not be prepared: the network did not answer in time.",
);
} catch (e) {
if (e instanceof ApprovalPrepareError) throw e;
throw fail(
sentence(
"The transaction could not be prepared: " +
(e.shortMessage ||
e.message ||
"the network did not answer"),
),
);
}
const approved = serializeApprovedTx(populated, from);
// The backstop, applied before the user is shown anything rather than
// after they have approved it: what is displayed here is what gets signed,
// so an RPC node reporting an absurd fee has to be refused here.
assertWithinCeilings(approved);
return approved;
}
module.exports = {
prepareApprovalTx,
serializeApprovedTx,
ApprovalPrepareError,
POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS,
REQUEST_FIELDS,
};

287
src/shared/approvalVerify.js
View File

@@ -7,6 +7,13 @@
// the signer from the artifact and checks it against the approval it is
// holding before acting on it. All recovery is delegated to ethers.
//
// What the artifact is checked against is the transaction the background
// populated and the popup displayed (see approvalTx.js), not the request the
// dApp made. The two differ in every field a dApp normally leaves out — nonce,
// gas limit, fees — and those are the fields the user reads off the approval
// screen, so comparing against the request would leave the numbers on screen
// vouched for by nothing.
//
// The check is an allowlist, in both directions, because a denylist cannot be
// correct against a transaction format that keeps gaining fields:
//
@@ -31,14 +38,12 @@
// never a warning: what the user approved is what gets broadcast, or nothing
// does.
//
// Fields the approval does not carry are not treated as zero. The popup
// populates nonce, gas limit, fee and chain id through populateTransaction()
// when the requesting page did not fix them, so there is no approved value to
// compare against; treating absent as zero would refuse every legitimate
// transaction. Those fields are instead held to the absolute ceilings below,
// and the chain id is always checked against the selected network rather than
// against the approval alone, which is what makes a cross-chain replay
// impossible.
// The approved transaction is required to fix every field its type serializes,
// so there is no "the approval did not say" branch to fall through: a quantity
// the approval does not carry is a refusal, because an artifact that cannot be
// compared with what was displayed has not been checked. The chain id is
// checked against the selected network as well as against the approval, which
// is what makes a cross-chain replay impossible.
//
// Every failure message is a full sentence, because these strings are shown to
// the user and returned to the dApp.
@@ -113,6 +118,17 @@ const FORBIDDEN_FIELDS = [
},
];
// Absolute ceilings — a BACKSTOP, not the primary control.
//
// The primary control is equality: every field of the artifact is compared
// with the populated transaction the user was shown, so nothing the popup
// signs can differ from the screen. What equality cannot bound is the
// populated transaction itself, which is built from what the configured RPC
// node answered — a node that reports an absurd fee gets that fee displayed,
// and a user who does not read the fee line would approve it. These ceilings
// bound that, and they are therefore applied where the transaction is
// populated (approvalTx.js) as well as here.
//
// Above the block gas limit of every supported network (see networks.js), so
// no transaction that could ever be included is refused by it.
const MAX_GAS_LIMIT = 100000000n;
@@ -224,40 +240,151 @@ function normalizeData(v) {
return String(v).toLowerCase();
}
// Quantity fields the requesting page may fix in the approval. Each is
// compared exactly when the approval carries it, and left to the ceilings
// above when it does not.
const APPROVED_QUANTITIES = [
{
key: "nonce",
// How each field of an approved transaction is compared with the artifact.
// There is an entry here for every field any allowed type serializes — a test
// pins that against SERIALIZED_FIELDS — so the comparison loop covers the
// whole of what gets signed and cannot silently skip a field for want of a
// comparator.
//
// `kind` decides how the two sides are made comparable. A `quantity` must be
// fixed by the approval: it is one of the numbers on the approval screen, and
// an absent one means the artifact cannot be checked against what was
// displayed. `to`, `value`, `data` and `accessList` have canonical absent
// forms — contract creation, zero, "0x" and the empty list — so they are
// normalized on both sides instead.
const APPROVED_FIELDS = {
chainId: {
kind: "quantity",
label: "network",
message:
"The signed transaction is for a different network than the one that was approved.",
},
nonce: {
kind: "quantity",
label: "nonce",
message: "The signed transaction does not carry the approved nonce.",
},
{
key: "gasLimit",
gasLimit: {
kind: "quantity",
label: "gas limit",
message:
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved gas limit.",
},
{
key: "gasPrice",
gasPrice: {
kind: "quantity",
label: "gas price",
message:
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved gas price.",
},
{
key: "maxFeePerGas",
maxFeePerGas: {
kind: "quantity",
label: "maximum fee per gas",
message:
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved maximum fee per gas.",
},
{
key: "maxPriorityFeePerGas",
maxPriorityFeePerGas: {
kind: "quantity",
label: "maximum priority fee per gas",
message:
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved maximum priority fee per gas.",
},
];
to: {
kind: "address",
label: "recipient",
message:
"The signed transaction does not go to the approved recipient.",
},
value: {
kind: "value",
label: "value",
message: "The signed transaction does not carry the approved value.",
},
data: {
kind: "data",
label: "call data",
message:
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved call data.",
},
accessList: {
kind: "accessList",
label: "access list",
message:
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved access list.",
},
};
// Compare one field of the artifact with the approved transaction. A field
// with no entry in the table above is refused rather than skipped: the loop
// below runs over the fields the type serializes, so an unmatched key means
// something that gets signed has no comparator at all.
function assertFieldMatches(key, parsed, approvedTx) {
const field = APPROVED_FIELDS[key];
if (!field) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction carries a field this wallet cannot compare with the approval.",
);
}
switch (field.kind) {
case "quantity": {
if (!present(approvedTx[key])) {
throw refuse(
"The approved transaction fixes no " +
field.label +
", so the signed transaction cannot be checked" +
" against what was shown.",
);
}
const approved = normalizeQuantity(approvedTx[key], field.label);
if (normalizeQuantity(parsed[key], field.label) !== approved) {
throw refuse(field.message);
}
return;
}
case "address":
if (!sameAddress(parsed[key], approvedTx[key])) {
throw refuse(field.message);
}
return;
case "value":
if (normalizeValue(parsed[key]) !== normalizeValue(approvedTx[key]))
throw refuse(field.message);
return;
case "data":
if (normalizeData(parsed[key]) !== normalizeData(approvedTx[key]))
throw refuse(field.message);
return;
default:
if (
normalizeAccessList(parsed[key]) !==
normalizeAccessList(approvedTx[key])
) {
throw refuse(field.message);
}
}
}
// The ceilings, applied to a transaction that is either about to be displayed
// or about to be broadcast. See MAX_GAS_LIMIT above for what they are for:
// they bound what the RPC node can talk this wallet into showing the user,
// which is the one thing comparing the artifact with the screen cannot do.
function assertWithinCeilings(tx) {
if (
present(tx.gasLimit) &&
normalizeQuantity(tx.gasLimit, "gas limit") > MAX_GAS_LIMIT
) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction sets a gas limit no network this wallet supports can accept.",
);
}
for (const key of ["gasPrice", "maxFeePerGas", "maxPriorityFeePerGas"]) {
if (!present(tx[key])) continue;
if (normalizeQuantity(tx[key], "fee per gas") > MAX_FEE_PER_GAS) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction sets a fee per gas far above any plausible value.",
);
}
}
}
// Refuse a field only a transaction type this wallet does not sign can carry.
// The type allowlist keeps these unreachable in production, which is exactly
@@ -317,10 +444,28 @@ function assertCanonicalBytes(parsed, rawSignedTx) {
// signed by the address the approval was raised for, on the network that is
// selected. Returns the parsed ethers Transaction on success, throws
// otherwise.
function verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, txParams, expectedFrom, selectedChainId) {
//
// `approvedTx` is the populated transaction the approval screen displayed, and
// `expectedFrom` is the address that was active when the approval was raised —
// not whichever address is active now. An address switch between approval and
// signing therefore refuses here rather than producing a transaction from an
// account the approval did not name.
function verifySignedTx(
rawSignedTx,
approvedTx,
expectedFrom,
selectedChainId,
) {
if (typeof rawSignedTx !== "string" || !rawSignedTx.startsWith("0x")) {
throw refuse("The signed transaction is missing or malformed.");
}
// Nothing to compare against is a refusal like any other: an approval that
// does not carry the transaction it displayed cannot vouch for one.
if (!approvedTx || typeof approvedTx !== "object") {
throw refuse(
"There is no approved transaction to check the signed transaction against.",
);
}
let parsed;
try {
@@ -360,46 +505,15 @@ function verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, txParams, expectedFrom, selectedChainId) {
"The signed transaction is for a different network than the one that is selected.",
);
}
if (
present(txParams.chainId) &&
parsed.chainId !== normalizeQuantity(txParams.chainId, "network")
) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction is for a different network than the one that was approved.",
);
}
if (!sameAddress(parsed.to, txParams.to)) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction does not go to the approved recipient.",
);
}
if (normalizeValue(parsed.value) !== normalizeValue(txParams.value)) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved value.",
);
}
if (normalizeData(parsed.data) !== normalizeData(txParams.data)) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved call data.",
);
}
if (
normalizeAccessList(parsed.accessList) !==
normalizeAccessList(txParams.accessList)
) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved access list.",
);
}
// An approval that fixed EIP-1559 fees must not be signed as a legacy
// transaction, and vice versa: the fee the user agreed to is only
// meaningful under the mechanism it was quoted in.
// The approved fee mechanism, named before the type comparison below
// subsumes it: the fee the user agreed to is only meaningful under the
// mechanism it was quoted in, and saying so is more use than "a different
// transaction type".
const approvedEip1559 =
present(txParams.maxFeePerGas) ||
present(txParams.maxPriorityFeePerGas);
const approvedLegacy = present(txParams.gasPrice);
present(approvedTx.maxFeePerGas) ||
present(approvedTx.maxPriorityFeePerGas);
const approvedLegacy = present(approvedTx.gasPrice);
const signedEip1559 = parsed.type === 2;
if (
(approvedEip1559 && !signedEip1559) ||
@@ -410,28 +524,33 @@ function verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, txParams, expectedFrom, selectedChainId) {
);
}
for (const field of APPROVED_QUANTITIES) {
if (!present(txParams[field.key])) continue;
const approved = normalizeQuantity(txParams[field.key], field.label);
if (normalizeQuantity(parsed[field.key], field.label) !== approved) {
throw refuse(field.message);
}
}
if (parsed.gasLimit > MAX_GAS_LIMIT) {
// The type decides which fields are compared, so it is compared first and
// against the approval, not merely checked for membership of the
// allowlist above.
if (!present(approvedTx.type)) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction sets a gas limit no network this wallet supports can accept.",
"The approved transaction fixes no transaction type, so the signed transaction cannot be checked against what was shown.",
);
}
for (const key of ["gasPrice", "maxFeePerGas", "maxPriorityFeePerGas"]) {
const fee = parsed[key];
if (fee !== null && fee !== undefined && fee > MAX_FEE_PER_GAS) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction sets a fee per gas far above any plausible value.",
);
}
if (
BigInt(parsed.type) !==
normalizeQuantity(approvedTx.type, "transaction type")
) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction does not use the approved transaction type.",
);
}
// Every field this type serializes, compared with the transaction the user
// was shown. Driving the loop off SERIALIZED_FIELDS is what keeps this
// exhaustive: the same table decides what assertNothingUnchecked() rebuilds
// from, so a field that gets signed and is not compared here cannot exist.
for (const key of SERIALIZED_FIELDS[parsed.type]) {
assertFieldMatches(key, parsed, approvedTx);
}
assertWithinCeilings(parsed);
assertNothingUnchecked(parsed);
assertCanonicalBytes(parsed, rawSignedTx);
@@ -504,10 +623,10 @@ function errorText(err) {
// approval. Anything else failed before the check ran and is retryable.
// - broadcast: always terminal. A broadcast that throws after the node
// accepted the transaction is routine (a timeout, a dropped response, a
// node answering "already known"), and the popup's retry does not
// re-broadcast these bytes — it re-runs populateTransaction() and signs
// again at a freshly fetched pending-tag nonce. Retrying would therefore
// put a second transaction on the chain for one approval.
// node answering "already known"), so the wallet cannot tell a transaction
// that never left from one that is already in the mempool. The approval is
// spent and the requesting page has been given its outcome; a second
// attempt against it would report a second outcome for one request.
function describeTxFailure(stage, err) {
const error = errorText(err);
const retryable =
@@ -553,6 +672,7 @@ module.exports = {
assertNoForbiddenFields,
assertNothingUnchecked,
assertCanonicalBytes,
assertWithinCeilings,
sameAddress,
failureIsRetryable,
describeTxFailure,
@@ -561,6 +681,7 @@ module.exports = {
ALLOWED_TX_TYPES,
SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
FORBIDDEN_FIELDS,
APPROVED_FIELDS,
TX_STAGE_SIGN,
TX_STAGE_VERIFY,
TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,

309
tests/approvalTx.test.js Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
// Preparation of the transaction the approval screen displays.
//
// This is the half of the fix that makes the verification in
// approvalVerify.test.js mean anything: the numbers the user reads have to be
// produced before the screen is drawn and be the numbers that get signed. What
// is asserted here is that the object leaving this module is complete (nothing
// is left for the popup to fill in), that it survives the messaging boundary
// (extension messaging is JSON, which has no bigint), and that nothing the
// requesting page or the RPC node can say turns it into an approval that
// should never have been raised.
const { Network, Wallet } = require("ethers");
const {
prepareApprovalTx,
serializeApprovedTx,
POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS,
} = require("../src/shared/approvalTx");
const {
SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
MAX_GAS_LIMIT,
} = require("../src/shared/approvalVerify");
const SIGNER_KEY =
"0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
// The ordinary dApp request: recipient, value, call data, and nothing else.
const TX_PARAMS = {
from: signer.address,
to: RECIPIENT,
value: "0x2386f26fc10000",
data: "0xdeadbeef",
};
function providerWith(overrides) {
return {
getNetwork: async () => Network.from(1),
getTransactionCount: async () => 7,
estimateGas: async () => 21000n,
getFeeData: async () => ({
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
}),
...(overrides || {}),
};
}
// A node that only quotes a flat gas price, so populateTransaction produces a
// legacy transaction rather than an EIP-1559 one.
const legacyProvider = providerWith({
getFeeData: async () => ({
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
maxFeePerGas: null,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
}),
});
describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
test("fills in everything the request left out", async () => {
const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
providerWith(),
signer.address,
TX_PARAMS,
);
expect(approved).toEqual({
type: 2,
from: signer.address,
chainId: "0x1",
nonce: "0x7",
gasLimit: "0x5208",
maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
to: RECIPIENT,
value: TX_PARAMS.value,
data: TX_PARAMS.data,
accessList: [],
});
});
// The object is displayed, signed and verified against on the far side of
// chrome.runtime.sendMessage, which is JSON: a bigint would throw on the
// way out and a field that did not survive the trip would be a field the
// user was shown and nothing compared.
test("survives the messaging boundary unchanged", async () => {
const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
providerWith(),
signer.address,
TX_PARAMS,
);
expect(JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(approved))).toEqual(approved);
for (const value of Object.values(approved)) {
expect(typeof value).not.toBe("bigint");
}
});
test("carries exactly the fields its type serializes, and the signer", async () => {
const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
providerWith(),
signer.address,
TX_PARAMS,
);
expect(Object.keys(approved).sort()).toEqual(
["type", "from", ...SERIALIZED_FIELDS[2]].sort(),
);
});
test("produces a legacy transaction when that is all the node quotes", async () => {
const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
legacyProvider,
signer.address,
TX_PARAMS,
);
expect(approved.type).toBe(0);
expect(approved.gasPrice).toBe("0x77359400");
expect(approved.maxFeePerGas).toBeUndefined();
expect(Object.keys(approved).sort()).toEqual(
["type", "from", ...SERIALIZED_FIELDS[0]].sort(),
);
});
test("keeps a nonce, gas limit and fee the request did fix", async () => {
const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
providerWith(),
signer.address,
{
...TX_PARAMS,
nonce: "0x2",
gasLimit: "0x30d40",
maxFeePerGas: "0x12a05f200",
maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
},
);
expect(approved.nonce).toBe("0x2");
expect(approved.gasLimit).toBe("0x30d40");
expect(approved.maxFeePerGas).toBe("0x12a05f200");
});
test("carries an access list the request asked for", async () => {
const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
providerWith(),
signer.address,
{
...TX_PARAMS,
accessList: [{ address: RECIPIENT, storageKeys: [] }],
},
);
expect(approved.accessList).toEqual([
{ address: RECIPIENT, storageKeys: [] },
]);
});
// The request is page-controlled. Anything this wallet does not act on is
// dropped before ethers sees it, so a field a future ethers learns to
// carry cannot be picked up out of it without this module knowing.
test("drops request fields this wallet does not act on", async () => {
const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
providerWith(),
signer.address,
{
...TX_PARAMS,
authorizationList: [{ address: RECIPIENT }],
blobVersionedHashes: ["0x01" + "ab".repeat(31)],
customData: { anything: true },
},
);
expect(approved.authorizationList).toBeUndefined();
expect(approved.blobVersionedHashes).toBeUndefined();
expect(approved.customData).toBeUndefined();
expect(approved.type).toBe(2);
});
test("refuses a transaction type this wallet does not sign", async () => {
await expect(
prepareApprovalTx(providerWith(), signer.address, {
...TX_PARAMS,
type: 4,
}),
).rejects.toThrow(/type this wallet does not sign/);
});
test("refuses to raise an approval with no active address", async () => {
await expect(
prepareApprovalTx(providerWith(), null, TX_PARAMS),
).rejects.toThrow(/no active address/);
});
// The ceilings as a backstop: equality with the screen cannot bound what
// the node talks the wallet into putting on the screen, so it is refused
// before the user is shown anything.
test("refuses a fee the node quoted above the ceiling", async () => {
const gouging = providerWith({
getFeeData: async () => ({
gasPrice: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS + 1n,
maxFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS + 1n,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
}),
});
await expect(
prepareApprovalTx(gouging, signer.address, TX_PARAMS),
).rejects.toThrow(/fee per gas far above any plausible value/);
});
test("refuses a gas limit the node estimated above the ceiling", async () => {
const absurd = providerWith({
estimateGas: async () => MAX_GAS_LIMIT + 1n,
});
await expect(
prepareApprovalTx(absurd, signer.address, TX_PARAMS),
).rejects.toThrow(/gas limit no network this wallet supports/);
});
// No approval and no window: the failure goes back to the page the click
// came from, in a sentence.
test("reports a failed estimate as a full sentence", async () => {
const reverting = providerWith({
estimateGas: async () => {
throw new Error("execution reverted: ERC20: transfer amount");
},
});
let thrown;
try {
await prepareApprovalTx(reverting, signer.address, TX_PARAMS);
} catch (e) {
thrown = e;
}
expect(thrown.message).toMatch(
/^The transaction could not be prepared/,
);
expect(thrown.message).toMatch(/execution reverted/);
expect(thrown.message).toMatch(/^[A-Z].*\.$/);
});
// Without a bound, an unreachable node leaves the page's promise pending
// with nothing on screen to explain it.
test("gives up on a node that never answers", async () => {
jest.useFakeTimers();
try {
const hanging = providerWith({
estimateGas: () => new Promise(() => {}),
});
const pending = prepareApprovalTx(
hanging,
signer.address,
TX_PARAMS,
);
const settled = expect(pending).rejects.toThrow(
/did not answer in time/,
);
await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS + 1);
await settled;
} finally {
jest.useRealTimers();
}
});
});
describe("serializeApprovedTx", () => {
// Unreachable through prepareApprovalTx while the request type is checked
// first, which is what it is for: a node or an ethers upgrade that
// populates a type this wallet does not sign must not produce an approval.
test("refuses a populated transaction of a type this wallet does not sign", () => {
expect(() =>
serializeApprovedTx(
{ type: 3, to: RECIPIENT, nonce: 7 },
signer.address,
),
).toThrow(/type this wallet does not sign/);
});
test("refuses a populated transaction missing a quantity", () => {
expect(() =>
serializeApprovedTx(
{
type: 2,
chainId: 1n,
nonce: 7,
gasLimit: 21000n,
maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
to: RECIPIENT,
value: 0n,
data: "0x",
},
signer.address,
),
).toThrow(/did not supply a maxPriorityFeePerGas/);
});
test("keeps a contract creation's absent recipient absent", () => {
const approved = serializeApprovedTx(
{
type: 0,
chainId: 1n,
nonce: 7,
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
gasLimit: 21000n,
to: null,
value: 0n,
data: "0x600160005500",
},
signer.address,
);
expect(approved.to).toBeNull();
expect(approved.value).toBe("0x0");
expect(approved.data).toBe("0x600160005500");
});
});

575
tests/approvalVerify.test.js
View File

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ const {
assertNoForbiddenFields,
assertNothingUnchecked,
assertCanonicalBytes,
assertWithinCeilings,
sameAddress,
failureIsRetryable,
describeTxFailure,
@@ -18,12 +19,14 @@ const {
ALLOWED_TX_TYPES,
SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
FORBIDDEN_FIELDS,
APPROVED_FIELDS,
TX_STAGE_SIGN,
TX_STAGE_VERIFY,
TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,
MAX_GAS_LIMIT,
MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
} = require("../src/shared/approvalVerify");
const { prepareApprovalTx } = require("../src/shared/approvalTx");
const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../src/shared/wallet");
// Fixed test keys — never used for anything but these tests.
@@ -42,7 +45,10 @@ const OTHER_RECIPIENT = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
const SELECTED = "0x1";
const SEPOLIA = "0xaa36a7";
// Approved parameters as a dApp would supply them over eth_sendTransaction.
// Parameters as a dApp would supply them over eth_sendTransaction. Note what
// is missing: nonce, gas limit and fees. The background fills those in before
// the approval screen is drawn, which is why the approval below and not this
// object is what every comparison runs against.
const TX_PARAMS = {
from: signer.address,
to: RECIPIENT,
@@ -61,8 +67,8 @@ const POPULATED = {
type: 2,
};
// Build a signable transaction from approved params. The popup does the same
// thing through populateTransaction(); here the fields are fixed so the test
// Build a signable transaction from a request. The background populates the
// same fields through populateTransaction(); here they are fixed so the test
// needs no provider. `overrides` stands in for what a tampered or misbuilt
// popup would put on the wire.
function txFor(params, overrides) {
@@ -75,6 +81,21 @@ function txFor(params, overrides) {
};
}
// The populated transaction the approval screen displayed, which is the object
// the artifact is verified against. Built from the same fields as the signable
// transaction above, because that is the point: displayed and verified are one
// object.
function approvedFor(params, overrides) {
return {
from: signer.address,
accessList: [],
...txFor(params, overrides),
};
}
// The ordinary case: the dApp's request, populated.
const APPROVED = approvedFor(TX_PARAMS);
async function signedFor(params, withWallet, overrides) {
return (withWallet || signer).signTransaction(txFor(params, overrides));
}
@@ -108,7 +129,7 @@ describe("sameAddress", () => {
describe("verifySignedTx", () => {
test("accepts the approved transaction signed by the approved address", async () => {
const raw = await signedFor(TX_PARAMS);
const parsed = verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED);
const parsed = verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED);
expect(parsed.from).toBe(signer.address);
expect(parsed.hash).toBe(Transaction.from(raw).hash);
});
@@ -117,23 +138,23 @@ describe("verifySignedTx", () => {
const params = { to: undefined, value: "0x0", data: "0x600160005500" };
const raw = await signedFor(params);
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, params, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(raw, approvedFor(params), signer.address, SELECTED),
).not.toThrow();
});
test("accepts an absent value as zero", async () => {
const approved = { to: RECIPIENT, data: "0x" };
const raw = await signedFor(approved);
const params = { to: RECIPIENT, data: "0x" };
const raw = await signedFor(params);
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(raw, approvedFor(params), signer.address, SELECTED),
).not.toThrow();
});
test("accepts call data whose case differs from the approval", async () => {
const approved = { to: RECIPIENT, value: "0x0", data: "0xDEADBEEF" };
const raw = await signedFor(approved);
const params = { to: RECIPIENT, value: "0x0", data: "0xDEADBEEF" };
const raw = await signedFor(params);
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(raw, approvedFor(params), signer.address, SELECTED),
).not.toThrow();
});
@@ -143,7 +164,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx", () => {
to: OTHER_RECIPIENT,
});
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved recipient/);
});
@@ -153,47 +174,64 @@ describe("verifySignedTx", () => {
value: "0x4563918244f40000",
});
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved value/);
});
test("rejects substituted call data", async () => {
const raw = await signedFor({ ...TX_PARAMS, data: "0xc0ffee" });
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved call data/);
});
test("rejects a transaction signed by a different address", async () => {
const raw = await signedFor(TX_PARAMS, other);
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/different address/);
});
// The address the approval named, not whichever address is active when the
// artifact comes back: an approval raised for one account cannot be
// satisfied by a signature from another, whatever the wallet switched to
// in between.
test("rejects a signature from the address that is active now", async () => {
const raw = await signedFor(TX_PARAMS, other);
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/different address than the one that was approved/);
// The same artifact against the same approval, verified for the other
// address, is what would have happened had expectedFrom been read from
// the wallet's current state.
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, other.address, SELECTED),
).not.toThrow();
});
test("rejects an unsigned transaction", () => {
const unsigned = Transaction.from(txFor(TX_PARAMS)).unsignedSerialized;
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(unsigned, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(unsigned, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/no valid signature/);
});
test("rejects a missing or malformed payload", () => {
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(undefined, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(undefined, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/missing or malformed/);
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx("nope", TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx("nope", APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/missing or malformed/);
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx("0xc0ffee", TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx("0xc0ffee", APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/could not be decoded/);
});
test("every rejection message is a full sentence", async () => {
const raw = await signedFor({ ...TX_PARAMS, to: OTHER_RECIPIENT });
try {
verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED);
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED);
throw new Error("expected a rejection");
} catch (e) {
expect(e.message).toMatch(/^[A-Z].*\.$/);
@@ -201,20 +239,113 @@ describe("verifySignedTx", () => {
});
});
// The defect this file's approvals now stand against: for every field the dApp
// left out, the old comparison had nothing to compare and skipped the field,
// so the fee and the nonce the user read off the screen were checked by the
// ceilings alone. A populated approval fixes all of them, and an approval that
// does not fix one is a refusal rather than a pass.
describe("verifySignedTx against what was displayed", () => {
test("a fee differing from the displayed one is refused", async () => {
// Ten times the fee the screen showed, and far below the ceiling: the
// artifact the old comparison would have accepted.
const inflated = 20000000000n;
expect(inflated).toBeLessThan(MAX_FEE_PER_GAS);
const raw = await signedWith({ maxFeePerGas: inflated });
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved maximum fee per gas/);
});
test("a nonce differing from the displayed one is refused", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({ nonce: 8 });
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved nonce/);
});
test("a gas limit differing from the displayed one is refused", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({ gasLimit: 250000n });
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved gas limit/);
});
test("an approval fixing no quantity is refused, not waved through", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({});
for (const key of [
"chainId",
"nonce",
"gasLimit",
"maxFeePerGas",
"maxPriorityFeePerGas",
]) {
const incomplete = { ...APPROVED };
delete incomplete[key];
let thrown;
try {
verifySignedTx(raw, incomplete, signer.address, SELECTED);
throw new Error("expected a rejection for " + key);
} catch (e) {
thrown = e;
}
expect(thrown.message).toMatch(/fixes no /);
expect(thrown.approvalMismatch).toBe(true);
}
});
test("no approved transaction at all is refused", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({});
for (const approved of [undefined, null, "0xdeadbeef"]) {
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/no approved transaction/);
}
});
test("an approval fixing no transaction type is refused", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({});
const incomplete = { ...APPROVED };
delete incomplete.type;
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, incomplete, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/fixes no transaction type/);
});
test("an artifact of a type other than the approved one is refused", async () => {
// Same fee mechanism on both sides, so only the type differs: a type 1
// artifact against a type 2 approval.
const approved = approvedFor(TX_PARAMS, {
type: 1,
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
maxFeePerGas: null,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
});
const raw = await signedWith({
type: 0,
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
maxFeePerGas: null,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
});
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved transaction type/);
});
});
// One case per consequential field: the field alone differs from what was
// approved, and that alone must refuse the signature.
describe("verifySignedTx field comparison", () => {
test("rejects a chain id that is not the selected network", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({ chainId: 11155111 });
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/different network than the one that is selected/);
});
test("rejects a chain id that is not the approved one", async () => {
// Selected network and signed chain id agree; the dApp asked for a
// different chain, so the artifact is not what was approved.
const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, chainId: SEPOLIA };
// Selected network and signed chain id agree; the approval was raised
// for a different chain, so the artifact is not what was approved.
const approved = { ...APPROVED, chainId: SEPOLIA };
const raw = await signedWith({});
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
@@ -224,58 +355,59 @@ describe("verifySignedTx field comparison", () => {
test("refuses when the selected network is unknown", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({});
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, undefined),
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, undefined),
).toThrow(/selected network is unknown/);
});
test("rejects a substituted nonce", async () => {
const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, nonce: 7 };
const raw = await signedWith({ nonce: 8 });
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved nonce/);
});
test("rejects a substituted gas limit", async () => {
const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, gasLimit: "0x186a0" };
const raw = await signedWith({ gasLimit: 250000n });
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved gas limit/);
});
test("rejects a substituted maximum fee per gas", async () => {
const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400" };
const raw = await signedWith({ maxFeePerGas: 900000000000n });
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved maximum fee per gas/);
});
test("rejects a substituted maximum priority fee per gas", async () => {
const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00" };
const raw = await signedWith({ maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1500000000n });
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved maximum priority fee per gas/);
});
test("rejects a substituted legacy gas price", async () => {
const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, gasPrice: "0x77359400" };
const legacy = {
type: 0,
gasPrice: 9000000000n,
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
maxFeePerGas: null,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
};
const raw = await signedWith(legacy);
const approved = approvedFor(TX_PARAMS, legacy);
const raw = await signedWith({ ...legacy, gasPrice: 9000000000n });
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved gas price/);
});
test("rejects an approved legacy fee signed as an EIP-1559 fee", async () => {
const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, gasPrice: "0x77359400" };
const approved = approvedFor(TX_PARAMS, {
type: 0,
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
maxFeePerGas: null,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
});
const raw = await signedWith({});
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
@@ -283,7 +415,6 @@ describe("verifySignedTx field comparison", () => {
});
test("rejects an approved EIP-1559 fee signed as a legacy fee", async () => {
const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400" };
const raw = await signedWith({
type: 0,
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
@@ -291,36 +422,72 @@ describe("verifySignedTx field comparison", () => {
maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
});
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved fee mechanism/);
});
// The ceilings are a backstop against what the RPC node can talk the
// wallet into populating and displaying, so they are checked against an
// approval that carries the absurd value too — equality alone would accept
// it, which is exactly what the ceiling is there for.
test("rejects a gas limit above anything a supported network accepts", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({ gasLimit: MAX_GAS_LIMIT + 1n });
const overrides = { gasLimit: MAX_GAS_LIMIT + 1n };
const raw = await signedWith(overrides);
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(
raw,
approvedFor(TX_PARAMS, overrides),
signer.address,
SELECTED,
),
).toThrow(/gas limit no network this wallet supports/);
});
test("rejects an absurd fee per gas the approval never fixed", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({
test("rejects an absurd fee per gas even when it was displayed", async () => {
const overrides = {
maxFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS + 1n,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS + 1n,
});
};
const raw = await signedWith(overrides);
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(
raw,
approvedFor(TX_PARAMS, overrides),
signer.address,
SELECTED,
),
).toThrow(/fee per gas far above any plausible value/);
});
test("assertWithinCeilings is the same check on either side of the screen", () => {
expect(() =>
assertWithinCeilings({ gasLimit: MAX_GAS_LIMIT + 1n }),
).toThrow(/gas limit no network this wallet supports/);
for (const key of [
"gasPrice",
"maxFeePerGas",
"maxPriorityFeePerGas",
]) {
expect(() =>
assertWithinCeilings({ [key]: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS + 1n }),
).toThrow(/fee per gas far above any plausible value/);
}
expect(() =>
assertWithinCeilings({
gasLimit: MAX_GAS_LIMIT,
maxFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
}),
).not.toThrow();
// Nothing to bound is not a failure: a type 2 approval carries no gas
// price, and a bare object must not be refused for lacking one.
expect(() => assertWithinCeilings({})).not.toThrow();
});
test("every field mismatch is a refusal, not a warning", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({ nonce: 8 });
try {
verifySignedTx(
raw,
{ ...TX_PARAMS, nonce: 7 },
signer.address,
SELECTED,
);
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED);
throw new Error("expected a rejection");
} catch (e) {
expect(e.approvalMismatch).toBe(true);
@@ -331,17 +498,17 @@ describe("verifySignedTx field comparison", () => {
// The transaction type decides which fields exist, so an artifact of a type
// this wallet does not sign carries consequences the approval cannot describe
// and none of the field comparisons can see. The approval used here is the
// ordinary dApp shape with no fee fields — the common case, since
// populateTransaction() fills them — which is exactly the case the
// fee-mechanism check cannot catch by accident.
// and none of the field comparisons can see. The refusal has to come from the
// type allowlist rather than from a field comparison, so these run against an
// approval whose every other field matches the artifact exactly.
describe("verifySignedTx transaction type", () => {
const BARE_APPROVAL = {
const BARE_REQUEST = {
from: signer.address,
to: RECIPIENT,
value: "0x2386f26fc10000",
data: "0x",
};
const BARE_APPROVAL = approvedFor(BARE_REQUEST);
// An EIP-7702 artifact that pays the approved amount to the approved
// recipient and, in the same transaction, installs the attacker's code at
@@ -353,7 +520,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx transaction type", () => {
chainId: 1,
nonce: 8,
});
const raw = await signedFor(BARE_APPROVAL, signer, {
const raw = await signedFor(BARE_REQUEST, signer, {
type: 4,
authorizationList: [authorization],
});
@@ -366,7 +533,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx transaction type", () => {
});
test("refuses a type 3 blob artifact", async () => {
const raw = await signedFor(BARE_APPROVAL, signer, {
const raw = await signedFor(BARE_REQUEST, signer, {
type: 3,
maxFeePerBlobGas: 1000000000n,
blobVersionedHashes: ["0x01" + "ab".repeat(31)],
@@ -390,7 +557,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx transaction type", () => {
chainId: 1,
nonce: 8,
});
const raw = await signedFor(BARE_APPROVAL, signer, {
const raw = await signedFor(BARE_REQUEST, signer, {
type: 4,
authorizationList: [authorization],
});
@@ -404,40 +571,45 @@ describe("verifySignedTx transaction type", () => {
});
test("accepts a legacy type 0 transaction", async () => {
const approved = { ...BARE_APPROVAL, gasPrice: "0x77359400" };
const raw = await signedFor(approved, signer, {
const legacy = {
type: 0,
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
maxFeePerGas: null,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
});
};
const raw = await signedFor(BARE_REQUEST, signer, legacy);
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(
raw,
approvedFor(BARE_REQUEST, legacy),
signer.address,
SELECTED,
),
).not.toThrow();
});
test("accepts a type 1 transaction whose access list is the approved one", async () => {
const accessList = [{ address: OTHER_RECIPIENT, storageKeys: [] }];
const approved = {
...BARE_APPROVAL,
gasPrice: "0x77359400",
accessList,
};
const raw = await signedFor(approved, signer, {
const overrides = {
type: 1,
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
maxFeePerGas: null,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
accessList,
});
accessList: [{ address: OTHER_RECIPIENT, storageKeys: [] }],
};
const raw = await signedFor(BARE_REQUEST, signer, overrides);
expect(Transaction.from(raw).type).toBe(1);
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(
raw,
approvedFor(BARE_REQUEST, overrides),
signer.address,
SELECTED,
),
).not.toThrow();
});
test("refuses an access list the approval never carried", async () => {
const raw = await signedFor(BARE_APPROVAL, signer, {
const raw = await signedFor(BARE_REQUEST, signer, {
accessList: [{ address: OTHER_RECIPIENT, storageKeys: [] }],
});
expect(() =>
@@ -446,8 +618,11 @@ describe("verifySignedTx transaction type", () => {
});
test("treats an absent access list and an empty one as the same thing", async () => {
const approved = { ...BARE_APPROVAL, accessList: [] };
const raw = await signedFor(BARE_APPROVAL, signer, {});
const approved = { ...BARE_APPROVAL };
delete approved.accessList;
expect(approved.accessList).toBeUndefined();
const raw = await signedFor(BARE_REQUEST, signer, {});
expect(Transaction.from(raw).accessList).toEqual([]);
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
).not.toThrow();
@@ -498,6 +673,25 @@ describe("verifySignedTx exhaustiveness", () => {
expect(exposed.filter((name) => !accounted.has(name))).toEqual([]);
});
// The comparison loop runs over the fields a type serializes and refuses a
// field it has no comparator for. That refusal is unreachable only while
// the table covers the whole of SERIALIZED_FIELDS, so the coverage is
// pinned here rather than assumed: adding a field to a type without a
// comparator would otherwise turn every transaction of that type into a
// refusal, and adding a comparator without the field would be a check that
// never runs.
test("every field a type serializes has a comparator", () => {
const serialized = new Set(
Object.values(SERIALIZED_FIELDS).flat().sort(),
);
expect([...serialized].filter((key) => !APPROVED_FIELDS[key])).toEqual(
[],
);
expect(
Object.keys(APPROVED_FIELDS).filter((key) => !serialized.has(key)),
).toEqual([]);
});
// The two layers behind the type allowlist. Nothing reachable through
// verifySignedTx can trip either of them while the allowlist holds — that
// is what they are for — so they are exercised directly rather than taken
@@ -553,49 +747,30 @@ describe("verifySignedTx exhaustiveness", () => {
test("an accepted artifact of each allowed type rebuilds byte for byte", async () => {
const shapes = [
{
approved: { ...TX_PARAMS, gasPrice: "0x77359400" },
overrides: {
type: 0,
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
maxFeePerGas: null,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
},
type: 0,
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
maxFeePerGas: null,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
},
{
approved: {
...TX_PARAMS,
gasPrice: "0x77359400",
accessList: [
{
address: RECIPIENT,
storageKeys: ["0x" + "11".repeat(32)],
},
],
},
overrides: {
type: 1,
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
maxFeePerGas: null,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
accessList: [
{
address: RECIPIENT,
storageKeys: ["0x" + "11".repeat(32)],
},
],
},
type: 1,
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
maxFeePerGas: null,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
accessList: [
{
address: RECIPIENT,
storageKeys: ["0x" + "11".repeat(32)],
},
],
},
{ approved: TX_PARAMS, overrides: {} },
{},
];
for (const shape of shapes) {
const raw = await signedFor(
shape.approved,
signer,
shape.overrides,
);
for (const overrides of shapes) {
const raw = await signedFor(TX_PARAMS, signer, overrides);
const parsed = verifySignedTx(
raw,
shape.approved,
approvedFor(TX_PARAMS, overrides),
signer.address,
SELECTED,
);
@@ -644,7 +819,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx canonical encoding", () => {
test("refuses an artifact that is not its own canonical encoding", async () => {
const mutated = await nonCanonical();
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(mutated, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(mutated, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/not encoded canonically/);
});
@@ -659,7 +834,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx canonical encoding", () => {
const raw = await signedWith({});
const upper = "0x" + raw.slice(2).toUpperCase();
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(upper, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(upper, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
).not.toThrow();
});
});
@@ -670,46 +845,33 @@ describe("verifySignedTx normalization", () => {
test("accepts a decimal chain id against a hex selected network", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({});
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, 1),
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, 1),
).not.toThrow();
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, "1"),
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, "1"),
).not.toThrow();
});
test("accepts an approved chain id written in hex", async () => {
// The approved transaction crosses to the popup as JSON, so it comes back
// spelled in hex quantities rather than in the bigints it was populated
// with. None of that is tampering.
test("accepts an approval spelled as the wire spells it", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({});
const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, chainId: "0x1" };
const wire = {
...APPROVED,
chainId: "0x1",
nonce: "0x7",
gasLimit: "0x186a0",
maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
value: "0x2386f26fc10000",
};
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(raw, wire, signer.address, SELECTED),
).not.toThrow();
});
test("accepts a hex nonce against a numeric one", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({ nonce: 7 });
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(
raw,
{ ...TX_PARAMS, nonce: "0x7" },
signer.address,
SELECTED,
),
).not.toThrow();
});
test("accepts a decimal gas limit against a hex one", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({ gasLimit: 100000n });
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(
raw,
{ ...TX_PARAMS, gasLimit: "100000" },
signer.address,
SELECTED,
),
).not.toThrow();
});
test("accepts fee fields spelled as hex, decimal, number and bigint", async () => {
test("accepts quantities spelled as hex, decimal, number and bigint", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({});
for (const maxFee of [
"0x77359400",
@@ -720,7 +882,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx normalization", () => {
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(
raw,
{ ...TX_PARAMS, maxFeePerGas: maxFee },
{ ...APPROVED, maxFeePerGas: maxFee },
signer.address,
SELECTED,
),
@@ -728,24 +890,19 @@ describe("verifySignedTx normalization", () => {
}
});
test("accepts an approval that fixes no nonce, gas or fee at all", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({});
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
).not.toThrow();
});
test("accepts an approval whose recipient case differs", async () => {
const raw = await signedWith({});
const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, to: RECIPIENT.toLowerCase() };
const approved = { ...APPROVED, to: RECIPIENT.toLowerCase() };
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
).not.toThrow();
});
test("accepts absent call data against 0x", async () => {
const approved = { to: RECIPIENT, value: "0x0" };
const raw = await signedFor({ ...approved, data: "0x" });
const params = { to: RECIPIENT, value: "0x0" };
const approved = approvedFor(params);
delete approved.data;
const raw = await signedFor({ ...params, data: "0x" });
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
).not.toThrow();
@@ -756,7 +913,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx normalization", () => {
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(
raw,
{ ...TX_PARAMS, maxFeePerGas: "cheap" },
{ ...APPROVED, maxFeePerGas: "cheap" },
signer.address,
SELECTED,
),
@@ -774,7 +931,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx normalization", () => {
try {
verifySignedTx(
raw,
{ ...TX_PARAMS, value },
{ ...APPROVED, value },
signer.address,
SELECTED,
);
@@ -793,7 +950,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx normalization", () => {
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(
raw,
{ ...TX_PARAMS, accessList: ["nope"] },
{ ...APPROVED, accessList: ["nope"] },
signer.address,
SELECTED,
),
@@ -934,7 +1091,7 @@ describe("signing failure and retry", () => {
test("a mismatch spends the approval", async () => {
const raw = await signedFor({ ...TX_PARAMS, to: OTHER_RECIPIENT });
try {
verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED);
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED);
throw new Error("expected a rejection");
} catch (e) {
expect(failureIsRetryable(e)).toBe(false);
@@ -1007,7 +1164,7 @@ describe("signing failure and retry", () => {
const raw = await signedFor({ ...TX_PARAMS, to: OTHER_RECIPIENT });
let outcome;
try {
verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED);
verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED);
} catch (e) {
outcome = describeTxFailure(TX_STAGE_VERIFY, e);
}
@@ -1061,12 +1218,13 @@ describe("signing failure and retry", () => {
});
});
// End-to-end over the messaging boundary, without a browser: run the exact
// sequence the approval popup runs, then hand the artifact to the exact check
// the background runs before it broadcasts or resolves. Only what the popup
// puts on the wire is passed along, so this also pins down that the wire
// payload is sufficient on its own.
describe("popup signing sequence to background verification", () => {
// End-to-end over the messaging boundary, without a browser: the background
// populates the transaction, the object that produces crosses to the popup as
// JSON and is signed there, and the artifact goes back to the exact check the
// background runs before it broadcasts. Only what each side puts on the wire is
// passed along, so this also pins down that the wire payloads are sufficient on
// their own.
describe("background population to popup signing to verification", () => {
// Stand-in for the JSON-RPC provider. populateTransaction only needs the
// nonce, the gas estimate, the network and the fee data.
const fakeProvider = {
@@ -1084,33 +1242,52 @@ describe("popup signing sequence to background verification", () => {
// through getSignerForAddress() the way the popup does.
const walletData = { type: "privkey" };
async function popupSignsTx(txParams) {
const localSigner = getSignerForAddress(walletData, 0, SIGNER_KEY);
const connected = localSigner.connect(fakeProvider);
const populated = await connected.populateTransaction(txParams);
delete populated.from;
return connected.signTransaction(populated);
// What the background does before the approval window opens.
async function backgroundPrepares(txParams) {
const approvedTx = await prepareApprovalTx(
fakeProvider,
signer.address,
txParams,
);
// Extension messaging is JSON; the popup sees the other side of it.
return JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(approvedTx));
}
test("a populated, signed transaction is accepted and broadcastable", async () => {
const rawSignedTx = await popupSignsTx(TX_PARAMS);
// What the popup does with it: signs it as given, populating nothing.
async function popupSigns(approvedTx) {
const localSigner = getSignerForAddress(walletData, 0, SIGNER_KEY);
return localSigner.signTransaction({ ...approvedTx });
}
test("the populated transaction is what gets signed and what gets checked", async () => {
const approvedTx = await backgroundPrepares(TX_PARAMS);
const rawSignedTx = await popupSigns(approvedTx);
const parsed = verifySignedTx(
rawSignedTx,
TX_PARAMS,
approvedTx,
signer.address,
SELECTED,
);
expect(parsed.nonce).toBe(7);
expect(parsed.chainId).toBe(1n);
expect(parsed.gasLimit).toBe(21000n);
expect(parsed.maxFeePerGas).toBe(2000000000n);
expect(parsed.to).toBe(RECIPIENT);
expect(parsed.value).toBe(BigInt(TX_PARAMS.value));
expect(parsed.data).toBe(TX_PARAMS.data);
expect(parsed.signature).not.toBeNull();
// Every field the screen shows, and the artifact, are the same numbers.
expect(BigInt(approvedTx.nonce)).toBe(BigInt(parsed.nonce));
expect(BigInt(approvedTx.gasLimit)).toBe(parsed.gasLimit);
expect(BigInt(approvedTx.maxFeePerGas)).toBe(parsed.maxFeePerGas);
expect(BigInt(approvedTx.maxPriorityFeePerGas)).toBe(
parsed.maxPriorityFeePerGas,
);
});
test("the wire payload carries no password and no secret", async () => {
const rawSignedTx = await popupSignsTx(TX_PARAMS);
const approvedTx = await backgroundPrepares(TX_PARAMS);
const rawSignedTx = await popupSigns(approvedTx);
const payload = {
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
id: "test-approval-id",
@@ -1128,20 +1305,54 @@ describe("popup signing sequence to background verification", () => {
expect(wire).not.toContain(SIGNER_KEY.slice(2).toLowerCase());
});
// The popup is the component whose compromise this check exists to detect,
// so it is given the approved transaction and signs something else.
test("a popup that signs a different fee than it was given is refused", async () => {
const approvedTx = await backgroundPrepares(TX_PARAMS);
const rawSignedTx = await popupSigns({
...approvedTx,
maxFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca000",
});
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, approvedTx, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved maximum fee per gas/);
});
test("a popup that signs a different nonce than it was given is refused", async () => {
const approvedTx = await backgroundPrepares(TX_PARAMS);
const rawSignedTx = await popupSigns({ ...approvedTx, nonce: "0x8" });
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, approvedTx, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved nonce/);
});
test("the background rejects a transaction the popup did not approve", async () => {
const rawSignedTx = await popupSignsTx({
...TX_PARAMS,
const approvedTx = await backgroundPrepares(TX_PARAMS);
const rawSignedTx = await popupSigns({
...approvedTx,
to: OTHER_RECIPIENT,
});
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, approvedTx, signer.address, SELECTED),
).toThrow(/approved recipient/);
});
test("the background rejects a transaction populated on another network", async () => {
const rawSignedTx = await popupSignsTx(TX_PARAMS);
const approvedTx = await backgroundPrepares(TX_PARAMS);
const rawSignedTx = await popupSigns(approvedTx);
expect(() =>
verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SEPOLIA),
verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, approvedTx, signer.address, SEPOLIA),
).toThrow(/different network than the one that is selected/);
});
// ethers refuses to sign for an address that is not the key's own, so a
// popup working from the approved object cannot quietly sign as whichever
// address the user has switched to.
test("the approved from stops the popup signing with another key", async () => {
const approvedTx = await backgroundPrepares(TX_PARAMS);
const otherSigner = getSignerForAddress(walletData, 0, OTHER_KEY);
await expect(
otherSigner.signTransaction({ ...approvedTx }),
).rejects.toThrow(/from address mismatch/);
});
});

417
tests/backgroundApproval.test.js
View File

@@ -8,16 +8,24 @@
// already saw — which means the entry being present is not by itself proof
// that no attempt is running. A second response carrying the same id (a
// reloaded approval window re-rendering a live Approve button, a popup that
// emits the message twice) must not start a second verify and broadcast: with
// the ordinary dApp approval shape the page fixes no nonce, so two artifacts
// signed at different nonces both verify, and the approved transfer would go
// out twice.
// emits the message twice) must not start a second verify and broadcast: the
// same approved transaction signed twice verifies twice, and the transfer
// would go out twice.
//
// It also covers what the approval is verified against. The approval now
// carries the transaction the background populated and the screen displayed,
// and the address that was active when it was raised — so a fee, a nonce or an
// address that moved between approval and signing is refused rather than
// signed.
const { Wallet } = require("ethers");
const { Network, Wallet } = require("ethers");
const SIGNER_KEY =
"0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
const OTHER_KEY =
"0x5de4111afa1a4b94908f83103eb1f1706367c2e68ca870fc3fb9a804cdab365a";
const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
const other = new Wallet(OTHER_KEY);
const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
const ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
@@ -33,9 +41,16 @@ const TX_PARAMS = {
data: "0x",
};
// The fields the popup's populateTransaction() would fill in. The nonce is a
// parameter because the duplicate case turns on the two artifacts differing
// in exactly the field nothing constrains.
// The nonce the stubbed node reports, and so the nonce the background
// populates the approval with.
const NONCE = 7;
// "Hello AutistMask" as the hex string a dApp passes to personal_sign.
const MESSAGE = "0x48656c6c6f204175746973744d61736b";
// The transaction the background populates and the approval screen displays.
// The nonce is a parameter because the duplicate case turns on two artifacts
// differing in a field the dApp fixed nothing for.
function populated(nonce) {
return {
type: 2,
@@ -50,8 +65,26 @@ function populated(nonce) {
};
}
function signedAtNonce(nonce) {
return signer.signTransaction(populated(nonce));
function signedAtNonce(nonce, withWallet) {
return (withWallet || signer).signTransaction(populated(nonce));
}
// The node the background populates against. Its answers are the numbers the
// approval screen shows, so they are also the numbers every artifact below is
// signed at.
function fakeProvider(broadcastTransaction, overrides) {
return {
broadcastTransaction,
getNetwork: async () => Network.from(1),
getTransactionCount: async () => NONCE,
estimateGas: async () => 100000n,
getFeeData: async () => ({
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
}),
...(overrides || {}),
};
}
// A promise whose settlement the test controls, so a broadcast can be held in
@@ -85,7 +118,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
currentNetwork: () => ({ chainId: "0x1" }),
}));
jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
getProvider: () => ({ broadcastTransaction }),
getProvider: () => fakeProvider(broadcastTransaction, opts.provider),
refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
}));
jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
@@ -171,7 +204,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
// Raise a pending transaction approval the way a dApp does, and dig the
// approval id back out of the popup URL the background opened.
function requestTx() {
function requestTx(txParams) {
let rpcResult = null;
const sendResponse = jest.fn((r) => {
rpcResult = r;
@@ -180,7 +213,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
method: "eth_sendTransaction",
params: [TX_PARAMS],
params: [txParams || TX_PARAMS],
},
{ origin: ORIGIN },
sendResponse,
@@ -191,6 +224,30 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
};
}
// The same for a message-signing approval, which pins the signing address
// at approval time in exactly the same way.
function requestSign(from) {
let rpcResult = null;
messageListener(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
method: "personal_sign",
params: [MESSAGE, from || signer.address],
},
{ origin: ORIGIN },
(r) => {
rpcResult = r;
},
);
return {
id: () =>
new URL(created[created.length - 1].url).searchParams.get(
"approval",
),
result: () => rpcResult,
};
}
// The user closes the approval popup. `created` is index-aligned with the
// ids the window stub hands back, so window 1 is the first popup opened.
function closeWindow(windowId) {
@@ -200,18 +257,27 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
return {
send,
requestTx,
requestSign,
closeWindow,
broadcastTransaction,
loadState,
created,
removed,
// The user switching account in the toolbar popup, as the background
// sees it: the persisted active address changes underneath a pending
// approval.
setActiveAddress: (address) => {
persisted.activeAddress = address;
},
fromPopup: { url: EXT_URL + "src/popup/index.html" },
};
}
// Let the handler's promise chain run to the next suspension point.
// Let the handler's promise chain run to the next suspension point. Raising a
// transaction approval now populates it against the node first, which is
// several awaits deep before the window is opened.
async function settle() {
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) await Promise.resolve();
for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
}
afterEach(() => {
@@ -244,9 +310,11 @@ describe("one approval, one broadcast", () => {
await settle();
expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// A reloaded approval window signs the same approval again. Nothing
// in the approval fixes a nonce, so this artifact verifies just as
// well as the first one.
// A reloaded approval window signs the same approval again, at another
// nonce. The claim is taken before anything is verified, so what this
// asserts is the interlock and not the nonce comparison: the refusal
// below is the claim's own message, which a verification failure does
// not produce.
const second = bg.send(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
@@ -376,6 +444,319 @@ describe("one approval, one broadcast", () => {
});
});
// The approval carries the transaction the user was shown and the address it
// was raised for, and the artifact is checked against both. Every case here is
// one the old comparison — against the dApp's request, for the address that is
// active now — would have broadcast.
describe("what the approval is verified against", () => {
// The approval screen showed the populated fee. An artifact at ten times
// that fee, still far below the ceilings, is what the ceilings alone could
// not catch.
test("a fee differing from the displayed one is refused, not sent", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestTx();
await settle();
const id = pending.id();
const raw = await signer.signTransaction({
...populated(NONCE),
maxFeePerGas: 20000000000n,
});
const answer = bg.send(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
id,
approved: true,
rawSignedTx: raw,
},
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
);
await settle();
expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
error: expect.stringMatching(/approved maximum fee per gas/),
retryable: false,
stage: "verify",
}),
);
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
error: {
message: expect.stringMatching(/approved maximum fee per gas/),
},
});
});
test("a nonce differing from the displayed one is refused, not sent", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestTx();
await settle();
const id = pending.id();
const answer = bg.send(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
id,
approved: true,
rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE + 1),
},
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
);
await settle();
expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
error: expect.stringMatching(/approved nonce/),
retryable: false,
stage: "verify",
}),
);
});
// The address switch. The approval named one account; the wallet is on
// another by the time the artifact arrives. Both halves are covered: the
// popup signing as the account that is active now, and the popup correctly
// signing as the approved account while the wallet has moved on.
test("an artifact signed by the address that is active now is refused", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestTx();
await settle();
const id = pending.id();
bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
const answer = bg.send(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
id,
approved: true,
rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE, other),
},
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
);
await settle();
expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ retryable: false, stage: "verify" }),
);
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
error: { message: expect.stringMatching(/active address changed/) },
});
});
test("an address switch refuses even the correctly signed artifact", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestTx();
await settle();
const id = pending.id();
bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
const answer = bg.send(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
id,
approved: true,
rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
},
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
);
await settle();
expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
error: expect.stringMatching(/active address changed/),
retryable: false,
stage: "verify",
}),
);
// A refusal, so the approval is spent: the same artifact offered again
// finds nothing to answer.
const retry = bg.send(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
id,
approved: true,
rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
},
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
);
await settle();
expect(retry.sendResponse).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
test("a switch back to the approved address still sends", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestTx();
await settle();
const id = pending.id();
bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
bg.setActiveAddress(signer.address);
bg.broadcastTransaction.mockResolvedValue({ hash: "0xfeed" });
bg.send(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
id,
approved: true,
rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
},
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
);
await settle();
expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: "0xfeed" });
});
// The popup is handed the populated transaction and the address it is for,
// and nothing else it would have to fetch or decide.
test("the popup is given the transaction it is to sign", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestTx();
await settle();
const details = bg.send(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id: pending.id() },
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
);
const shown = details.sendResponse.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(shown.type).toBe("tx");
expect(shown.approvedFrom).toBe(signer.address);
expect(shown.approvedTx).toEqual({
type: 2,
from: signer.address,
chainId: "0x1",
nonce: "0x7",
gasLimit: "0x186a0",
maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
to: RECIPIENT,
value: TX_PARAMS.value,
data: "0x",
accessList: [],
});
});
// A request naming an account the wallet is not on is refused outright
// rather than signed as whichever account is active.
test("a request from another address raises no approval at all", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestTx({ ...TX_PARAMS, from: other.address });
await settle();
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
error: {
code: 4100,
message: expect.stringMatching(/not the active one/),
},
});
expect(bg.created).toEqual([]);
});
// Message signing pins the address the same way, and refuses the same way.
// A signature is not a transaction, but a permit signed by an account the
// approval did not name spends that account's tokens all the same.
test("a sign approval refuses a signature after an address switch", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestSign();
await settle();
bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
const answer = bg.send(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
id: pending.id(),
approved: true,
signature: await signer.signMessage(
Buffer.from(MESSAGE.slice(2), "hex"),
),
},
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
);
await settle();
expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
error: expect.stringMatching(/active address changed/),
retryable: false,
}),
);
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
error: { message: expect.stringMatching(/active address changed/) },
});
});
test("a sign request from another address raises no approval at all", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestSign(other.address);
await settle();
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
error: {
code: 4100,
message: expect.stringMatching(/not the active one/),
},
});
expect(bg.created).toEqual([]);
});
// Population is a network round trip with the user's hands free. An
// approval raised for the address that was active when it started could
// never be signed once the wallet has moved off it, so it is never raised.
test("an address switch during population raises no approval", async () => {
let bg;
bg = loadBackground({
provider: {
// The user switches account in the toolbar popup while the
// node is being asked for a gas estimate.
estimateGas: async () => {
bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
return 100000n;
},
},
});
const pending = bg.requestTx();
await settle();
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
error: {
message: expect.stringMatching(
/active address changed while this transaction was being prepared/,
),
},
});
expect(bg.created).toEqual([]);
});
// Population happens before the window exists, so its failure is a failure
// of the request: no approval, no window, and the error goes back to the
// page the click came from.
test("a transaction that cannot be prepared opens no window", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground({
provider: {
estimateGas: async () => {
throw new Error("execution reverted");
},
},
});
const pending = bg.requestTx();
await settle();
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
error: {
message: expect.stringMatching(
/could not be prepared.*execution reverted/,
),
},
});
expect(bg.created).toEqual([]);
});
});
// The interlock must not cost the retry the approval exists to allow.
describe("the interlock releases a failed attempt", () => {
test("a retryable failure before the broadcast leaves the approval usable", async () => {