fix: settle a site approval on the port that carries its teardown (closes #275 )

Approve and window.close() left the popup on the next line, and the decision and the disconnect the close caused travelled independent channels with nothing ordering them. The disconnect handler settled a pending site approval as a rejection, so whichever landed first decided the outcome. Driven in a tab the teardown won every time: the user allowed the connection and the dApp was told they had refused. The decision now goes out on the approval port the popup already opens, which is the same port the close disconnects. One channel is ordered -- a message posted on a port is delivered before that port's own disconnect -- so the approval is settled before the teardown is even seen, and the disconnect then finds nothing pending to reject. Nothing waits, nothing is timed, and the popup closes exactly as immediately as before. windows.onRemoved no longer decides a site approval whose port is connected either. In the fallback-window shape that event races the decision on a channel of its own, which is the same defect one level over; the port disconnect says the same thing in a defined order, so it is left to say it. A window that closes before its popup ever connected has nothing else to speak for it and is still rejected there, so no dApp is left waiting on a window that is gone. Rejecting reports a rejection, and so does closing without deciding, in both shapes. AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_RESPONSE is gone; the port name carries the approval id, so the popup no longer names one, and the sender check the message carried moved to the port. tests/backgroundApproval.test.js drives decide-then-disconnect with nothing awaited in between, in the toolbar-popup shape that production uses and in the fallback-window shape, and asserts every close-without-deciding path still rejects. tests/e2e/run.js drops the deferred-window.close() accommodation it carried for this bug, so the two site-prompt tests now drive the shipped decide-then-close in a real Chromium.
2026-08-17 07:16:24 +00:00
27 changed files with 232542 additions and 2278 deletions
--- a/9
+++ b/9
@@ -682,14 +682,7 @@ under their own licenses. They are NOT covered by the GPL-3.0 license above.
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 File: src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json
-Source: the eth-phishing-detect community blocklist (src/config.json).
+Source: https://github.com/AugurProject/eth-phishing-detect (config.json)
        The file here is derived from it, not a copy of it: only the
        blacklist is carried over, and each entry is stored as a truncated
        digest rather than a domain name. script/vendor-blocklist records
        the exact upstream URL, the commit it is pinned to and the hash of
        the bytes that commit serves, and is what regenerates this file.
        The URL previously cited here, under a different organisation,
        returns 404: that repository is gone.
 Copyright: Copyright (c) 2018 kumavis
 License: Don't Be a Dick Public License (DBAD), Version 1.2
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--- a/16
+++ b/16
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e test-e2e-firefox lint fmt fmt-check check check-censored docker hooks build build-debug verify-build vendor-blocklist clean dev
+.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e test-e2e-firefox lint fmt fmt-check check docker hooks build build-debug verify-build clean dev
 # Standard targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
 # per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
@@ -35,12 +35,6 @@ fmt-check:
 check:
 	@script/check
 # Assert that the competitor name appears nowhere but its documented
 # exceptions. Part of check, and re-run against dist/ at the end of a build;
 # separate target for re-running it alone.
 check-censored:
 	@script/check-censored
 docker:
 	@script/docker
@@ -51,7 +45,6 @@ build:
 	@echo "Building extension..."
 	@yarn run build 2>&1
 	@script/verify-build
 	@script/check-censored --require-dist
 # Development-only build: enables the red DEBUG / INSECURE banner and makes
 # the hardcoded test recovery phrase the output of wallet creation. Never
@@ -60,19 +53,12 @@ build-debug:
 	@echo "Building extension (DEBUG)..."
 	@AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 yarn run build 2>&1
 	@AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 script/verify-build
 	@script/check-censored --require-dist
 # Assert the compiled DEBUG state of the bundles already in dist/. Runs at
 # the end of build and build-debug; separate target for re-running it alone.
 verify-build:
 	@script/verify-build
 # Refresh src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json from its hash-pinned upstream.
 # Run deliberately, land the diff: the extension does no runtime fetching, so
 # the shipped list is as fresh as the last vendoring run that was released.
 vendor-blocklist:
 	@script/vendor-blocklist
 clean:
 	@rm -rf dist/
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -18,10 +18,9 @@ don't implement any crypto, and don't send user-specific data anywhere but a
 extension contacts three user-configurable services: the configured RPC node for
 blockchain interactions, a public CoinDesk API (no API key) for realtime price
 information, and a Blockscout block-explorer API for transaction history and
-token balances. It also performs best-effort Etherscan address label lookups
+token balances. It also fetches a community-maintained phishing domain blocklist
-during transaction confirmation. A community-maintained phishing domain
+periodically and performs best-effort Etherscan address label lookups during
-blocklist is built into the extension at build time and checked locally; nothing
+transaction confirmation.
 is fetched for it at runtime.
 In the extension is a hardcoded list of the top ERC20 contract addresses. You
 can add any ERC20 contract by contract address if you wish, but the hardcoded
@@ -99,21 +98,7 @@ provide:
  the same script lint in place instead of recursing.
 - `script/fmt` — format all files (writes)
 - `script/fmt-check` — check formatting (read-only)
- `script/check` — run test, test-verify-build, check-censored, lint, and
+- `script/check` — run test, test-verify-build, lint, and fmt-check
  fmt-check
 - `script/check-censored` — assert the competitor name RULES.md bars appears
  nowhere in the working tree or under `dist/` outside its documented
  exceptions: the pinned source reference in `script/vendor-blocklist`, the two
  provider-shim identifiers in `src/content/inpage.js`, and one ERC-20's
  on-chain name in `src/shared/tokenList.js`. Each is scoped to that path and
  fails anywhere else. Part of `make check`, which inspects `dist/` when there
  is one and says loudly when there is not; `make build` re-runs it with
  `--require-dist`, so a build artifact is always covered
 - `script/vendor-blocklist` — refresh `src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json` from
  its upstream, pinned to a commit and to the sha256 of the bytes that commit
  serves. Run deliberately, never as part of a build: the output is committed
  and there is no runtime fetch, so the shipped list is as fresh as the last
  vendoring run that was released
 - `script/verify-build` — assert the compiled `DEBUG` state of the bundles in
  `dist/`: every bundle containing `src/shared/constants.js` must have `DEBUG`
  off, or on when `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1`. Run automatically at the end of
@@ -180,23 +165,6 @@ fixtures in `tests/e2e/network.js`, so the run is deterministic and fully
 offline; unrecognised outbound requests are reported as failures rather than
 silently allowed.
 It also covers the **Settings screen**, which holds the densest run of element
 id lookups in the codebase and where one wrong id leaves the whole popup blank
 rather than only degrading Settings: that the screen renders populated — the
 About well and the wallet list are read back, so a `show()` that stopped early
 is caught rather than merely a view that failed to appear — that the four Token
 Spam Protection controls are real checkboxes defaulted on, and that the theme
 and network selectors offer exactly the choices `src/shared/networks.js` and
 `index.html` define. What the selectors persist is then driven through the UI to
 `dark` and `sepolia` and reasserted after a popup reopen before being restored
 the same way; neither value is its selector's first `<option>`, so neither can
 be read back from the markup with no JavaScript having run. One spam filter is
 likewise toggled off and back on across a reopen each way, which exercises the
 change handler, `saveState()`, `loadState()` and the assignment `init()` makes.
 Each group of these assertions records a coverage key and a final case demands
 the exact set, so a section that silently stopped running reddens the suite
 instead of quietly shrinking it.
 It also covers the confirmation screen, for both a native ETH send and an ERC-20
 send: Send disabled while the fee estimate is in flight, enabled once it lands,
 the fee block quoting the expected cost and the reserve separately, the distinct
@@ -253,16 +221,16 @@ That interception covers the MV3 background service worker as well as the popup
 page, which it does not by default — `script/test-e2e` sets
 `PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1` for it. Because that flag is
 experimental, the harness does not take it on trust. At launch it waits for the
-background worker to exist, asks it for one throwaway `fetch()` of its own, and
+background worker's **own** startup request — the phishing blocklist fetch that
-requires that request to arrive in the route handler within 30 seconds or aborts
+`src/background/index.js` issues on startup, which on the suite's throwaway
-the entire suite (`tests/e2e/harness.js`). The anchor used to be the worker's
+profile always happens because no previous fetch timestamp is persisted — to
-own startup traffic — the phishing blocklist fetch — and there is no longer any:
+arrive in the route handler, and aborts the entire suite if none does within 30
-the blocklist is vendored at build time and the extension contacts nobody when
+seconds (`tests/e2e/harness.js`). The check is passive on purpose: a synthetic
-it starts. An earlier synthetic probe was rejected because evaluating in an
+probe fetched from inside the worker via `worker.evaluate()` was tried first and
-extension service worker immediately after launch killed the worker outright;
+rejected, because evaluating in an extension service worker that early kills the
-waiting for the worker to be handed over first, and issuing a `fetch()` that is
+worker outright, destroying the thing being measured. Observing traffic the
-not awaited, does not. Failing the probe fails closed — the suite refuses to run
+extension already generates perturbs nothing. Losing the race fails closed — the
-rather than passing quietly.
+suite refuses to run rather than passing quietly.
 As defence in depth, Chrome is also started with
 `--host-resolver-rules=MAP * ~NOTFOUND`, so a request that ever did slip past
@@ -432,24 +400,6 @@ the one-time pull of the pinned ~800MB Playwright layer, and well under a minute
 once that layer is cached. `e2e-firefox` about 1m05s cold, and it caches its
 Firefox and geckodriver downloads the same way.
 ### Element id guard (part of `make check`)
 `tests/popupElementIds.test.js` asserts statically that every element id the
 popup looks up — `$("...")`, `document.getElementById("...")`,
 `showError()`/`hideError()`, and the `view-<name>` a literal `showView("...")`
 resolves to — exists in `src/popup/index.html`, and that `index.html` defines no
 id twice. A wrong id is valid JavaScript naming a defined function, so neither
 jest (node environment, no DOM) nor a linter objects to it; at runtime `$()`
 returns `null` and the next property access throws, which inside a view's
 `init()` aborts the rest of `src/popup/index.js` `init()` and leaves the popup
 blank.
 It runs with no browser, so unlike the e2e suites it fits inside `make check`,
 and it covers every view rather than the ones some test happens to open. It only
 sees literal arguments: a call like `$(containerId)` is invisible to it, and a
 lookup naming the wrong existing element is valid by construction. Both of those
 are the browser suites' job.
 ## Rationale
 Common popular EVM wallets have become bloated with swap UIs, portfolio
@@ -511,46 +461,60 @@ on the next event. Two consequences shape every recurring job in the background:
 - `setInterval` and `setTimeout` are useless. They are destroyed with the
  worker, so a job scheduled that way runs until the first idle period and never
-  again. The one recurring job — the 60-second balance refresh — is scheduled
+  again. Both recurring jobs — the 60-second balance refresh and the 24-hour
-  through the extension alarms API (`src/shared/alarms.js`) instead. The browser
+  phishing blocklist refresh — are scheduled through the extension alarms API
-  holds the schedule and wakes the worker to deliver it. Alarm periods are
+  (`src/shared/alarms.js`) instead. The browser holds the schedule and wakes the
-  clamped to a one-minute minimum, so the balance refresh is expressed as
+  worker to deliver it. Alarm periods are clamped to a one-minute minimum, so
-  exactly one minute and nothing is silently slowed down.
+  the balance refresh is expressed as exactly one minute and nothing is silently
  slowed down.
 - Module-level variables do not survive either. Anything that must be remembered
-  across a restart goes in extension storage. `localStorage` does not exist in a
+  across a restart goes in extension storage, including the timestamp of the
-  service worker at all — the one remaining user of it, `src/shared/ens.js`,
+  last phishing list fetch: without it a revived worker would either re-fetch on
-  runs only in the popup and is marked as such.
+  every wake or, with a naive in-memory guard, never notice that an update is
  due. `localStorage` does not exist in a service worker at all — the one
  remaining user of it, `src/shared/ens.js`, runs only in the popup and is
  marked as such.
-The job also carries a freshness guard, and a guard must never be timed to the
+Both jobs also carry a freshness guard, and a guard must never be timed to the
-alarm period it gates. The guard is measured from the moment the last run
+alarm period it gates. Each guard is measured from the moment the last run
 finished, which is one run-duration after the alarm that started it, so a guard
 of exactly one period vetoes the very next tick and the real cadence becomes two
-periods. The balance refresh guard exists to skip work an open popup has already
+periods. The two jobs solve this differently, because their guards exist for
-done — the popup refreshes every 10 seconds and stamps the same field — and that
+different reasons:
 has to keep applying on the scheduled tick, so the guard is shortened to half
 the alarm period rather than bypassed: comfortably above the popup's 10 seconds,
 so an open popup still suppresses the background job, and comfortably below the
 60-second period, so the schedule always wins.
-Retiring a job means clearing its alarm, not just deleting its handler. The
+- The phishing refresh has a 24-hour cache TTL whose job is to keep the worker
-browser keeps an alarm until something removes it, so an install that once ran
+  off the network on the wakes between scheduled refreshes — Chrome revives the
-the version which created it goes on being woken on that schedule forever. Names
+  worker every ~30 seconds while the browser is busy, and every revival runs the
-that are no longer handled are listed in `OBSOLETE_ALARMS` and cleared on every
+  startup path. The scheduled alarm tick is not one of those wakes, so it
-start; the 24-hour phishing blocklist refresh is there, retired when the runtime
+  bypasses the TTL and fetches unconditionally. Shortening the TTL instead would
-fetch was removed.
+  not work: the startup path re-checks it on every wake, so a shorter TTL simply
  becomes the real refresh rate.
 - The balance refresh guard exists to skip work an open popup has already done —
  the popup refreshes every 10 seconds and stamps the same field. That has to
  keep applying on the scheduled tick, so the guard is shortened to half the
  alarm period instead of bypassed: comfortably above the popup's 10 seconds, so
  an open popup still suppresses the background job, and comfortably below the
  60-second period, so the schedule always wins.
-The startup path (`ensureRecurringAlarms()`) runs on `onInstalled`, on
+Two timestamps are persisted for the phishing list, not one. `lastFetchTime`
-`onStartup`, and at the top level of the worker, so every way the background
+records a fetch that produced a usable delta and drives the TTL.
-context can start re-establishes the schedule. On a fresh install more than one
+`lastAttemptTime` records that the network was contacted at all, and is written
-of those fires, so they share a single in-flight run rather than racing. It is
+even when the result is unusable — a failed request, or a delta over the 256 KiB
-idempotent: an alarm that already exists with the period the code asks for is
+cap. Without it those cases leave no freshness mark and the worker re-downloads
-left alone, because re-creating one restarts its schedule and a busy extension
+the full blocklist on every wake, indefinitely; with it, unscheduled retries are
-would push the next fire out indefinitely. An alarm carrying a different period
+floored at one hour. Both are discarded on load if they are in the future, since
-— one created by an earlier version — is re-created once, or a period changed in
+a stamp from a skewed clock or a restored backup would otherwise suppress
-a new release would never reach an existing install.
+updates until that time arrives, permanently and with no way out.
-Nothing is fetched when the worker starts. A wake costs no network traffic at
+The startup path (`ensureRecurringAlarms()` plus the phishing list init) runs on
-all, which is what the phishing blocklist being vendored at build time bought.
+`onInstalled`, on `onStartup`, and at the top level of the worker, so every way
 the background context can start re-establishes the schedule. On a fresh install
 more than one of those fires, so they share a single in-flight run rather than
 racing. It is idempotent: an alarm that already exists with the period the code
 asks for is left alone, because re-creating one restarts its schedule and a busy
 extension would push the next fire out indefinitely. An alarm carrying a
 different period — one created by an earlier version — is re-created once, or a
 period changed in a new release would never reach an existing install.
 Firefox uses Manifest V2 with a persistent background page, where timers would
 survive. Both browsers are built from one bundle and both take the alarm path,
@@ -1413,6 +1377,17 @@ What the extension does NOT do:
 In addition to the three user-configurable services above (RPC endpoint,
 CoinDesk price API, and Blockscout API), AutistMask also contacts:
 - **Phishing domain blocklist**: A community-maintained phishing domain
  blocklist is vendored into the extension at build time. At runtime, the
  extension fetches the live list once every 24 hours to detect newly added
  domains, plus once on a start where the list is more than 24 hours old. Only
  the delta (domains not already in the vendored list) is kept in memory,
  keeping runtime memory usage small. The delta and the timestamp of the fetch
  that produced it are persisted to extension storage if the record is under 256
  KiB; an oversized delta is dropped along with its timestamp, so a later start
  fetches again rather than claiming freshness for data it no longer holds. A
  fetch that fails, or one whose delta was too large to store, is not retried
  more than once an hour outside the 24-hour schedule.
 - **Etherscan address labels**: When confirming a transaction, the extension
  performs a best-effort lookup of the recipient address on Etherscan to check
  for phishing/scam labels. This is a direct page fetch with no API key; the
@@ -1683,25 +1658,17 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
 AutistMask protects users from known phishing sites when they connect their
 wallet or approve transactions/signatures. A community-maintained domain
-blocklist is vendored into the extension at build time and checked entirely
+blocklist is vendored into the extension at build time, providing immediate
-locally: no network request is made for it, ever, so nobody learns which sites
+protection without any network requests. At runtime, the extension fetches the
-the user connects to and no third party decides what this wallet warns about.
+live list once every 24 hours and keeps only the delta (newly added domains not
 in the vendored list) in memory. This architecture keeps runtime memory usage
 small while ensuring fresh coverage of new phishing domains.
-The trade is freshness. The shipped list is exactly as current as the last
+The 24-hour cadence is an alarm, not a timer; the alarm tick fetches
-vendoring run that was released, so a domain added upstream reaches users in the
+unconditionally rather than re-checking the 24-hour cache TTL that gates the
-next release rather than within a day. Refreshing it is `make vendor-blocklist`,
+startup path; and the fetch timestamps live in extension storage rather than in
-which fetches a hash-pinned upstream commit, verifies the sha256 of the bytes it
+module variables — see [Background scheduling](#background-scheduling) for why
-was served, and rewrites `src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json`; the diff is
+all three are required.
 committed and ships with the next version.
 The artifact holds digests, not domain names: sha256 truncated to 64 bits, one
 entry per 16 hex characters, concatenated in sorted order into a single string
 (`src/shared/domainHash.js`). A lookup hashes the hostname and its parent
 domains and binary-searches that string, so nothing is built at module load —
 which matters on MV3, where the worker re-evaluates the module on every wake —
 and the file is 1.7 MB rather than 8.7 MB. Storing digests is also what makes a
 list assembled elsewhere shippable here at all: the extension carries no
 plaintext list of anyone's domain names.
 When a dApp on a blocklisted domain requests a wallet connection, transaction
 approval, or signature, the approval popup displays a prominent red warning
@@ -1797,24 +1764,18 @@ This repository includes data files from third-party projects that are not
 covered by the GPL-3.0 license above. These files, their copyright holders, and
 their licenses are:
-| File                                                       | Source                                                                                                   | Copyright                         | License                                                        |
+| File                                                       | Source                                                                                                    | Copyright                         | License                                                        |
-| ---------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| ---------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json`                        | `eth-phishing-detect` community-maintained phishing domain blocklist, derived from its `src/config.json` | Copyright (c) 2018 kumavis        | [DBAD (Don't Be a Dick)](https://github.com/philsturgeon/dbad) |
+| `src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json`                        | `eth-phishing-detect` community-maintained phishing domain blocklist, vendored from its `src/config.json` | Copyright (c) 2018 kumavis        | [DBAD (Don't Be a Dick)](https://github.com/philsturgeon/dbad) |
-| `src/shared/scamlist.js` (address data from MyEtherWallet) | [ethereum-lists](https://github.com/MyEtherWallet/ethereum-lists) `addresses-darklist.json`              | Copyright (c) 2020 MyEtherWallet  | MIT                                                            |
+| `src/shared/scamlist.js` (address data from MyEtherWallet) | [ethereum-lists](https://github.com/MyEtherWallet/ethereum-lists) `addresses-darklist.json`               | Copyright (c) 2020 MyEtherWallet  | MIT                                                            |
-| `src/shared/scamlist.js` (address data from EtherScamDB)   | [EtherScamDB](https://github.com/MrLuit/EtherScamDB) `scams.yaml`                                        | Copyright (c) 2018 Luit Hollander | MIT                                                            |
+| `src/shared/scamlist.js` (address data from EtherScamDB)   | [EtherScamDB](https://github.com/MrLuit/EtherScamDB) `scams.yaml`                                         | Copyright (c) 2018 Luit Hollander | MIT                                                            |
 The full license texts for these third-party files are included in the
 [LICENSE](LICENSE) file. The `eth-phishing-detect` row carries no repository
 link because the upstream is hosted under a competitor's organization name,
-which project policy keeps out of code and documentation.
+which project policy keeps out of code and documentation; the vendored copy and
-`script/vendor-blocklist` is the single definition and the only file that spells
+the runtime refresh both come from that upstream, whose URL is the
-the name in prose: it is build-time tooling, never shipped, and it records the
+`BLOCKLIST_URL` constant in `src/shared/phishingDomains.js`.
 exact URL, the commit it is pinned to and the sha256 of the bytes that commit
 serves, because a source reference nobody can verify is not a source reference.
 `script/check-censored` reads the name back out of that one file and fails the
 build wherever else it appears, save for three shipped-code literals it cannot
 avoid — each permitted only at the one path that carries it, and listed in that
 script's header.
 ## Author
--- a/TODO.md
+++ b/TODO.md
@@ -44,57 +44,6 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
 # Completed Steps
 - 2026-08-17: The Settings screen is driven in a browser, and every element id
  the popup looks up is checked statically. Nothing exercised Settings in the
  e2e suite, and jest runs with no DOM, so the densest run of `$("...")` lookups
  in the codebase was unverified at runtime. Seven new cases in
  `tests/e2e/run.js` reach Settings, assert the About well and the wallet list
  were actually written, assert the four Token Spam Protection checkboxes are
  real checkboxes defaulted on, and assert the theme and network selectors offer
  the choices `src/shared/networks.js` and `index.html` define. The selectors
  are then driven to `dark` and `sepolia` — neither is the first `<option>`, so
  neither can be read back from the markup with no JavaScript involved — and
  reasserted after a popup reopen before being restored the same way, and one
  spam filter is toggled off and back on across a reopen each way. Those round
  trips run the change handler, `saveState()`, `loadState()` and the
  `init()`/`show()` assignments rather than just looking at the screen. `show()`
  no longer guards its `settings-network` lookup with `if (networkSelect)`: a
  missing element must fail loudly, which is the whole failure mode this unit
  exists to catch. Each group records a coverage key and a final case demands
  the exact set, so a shortened or skipped section reddens the run instead of
  shrinking it. `tests/popupElementIds.test.js` is the general half and runs in
  `make check` with no browser: every literal id reached through `$()`,
  `document.getElementById()`, `showError()`/`hideError()` and `showView()` must
  exist in `src/popup/index.html`, which no id in `index.html` may define twice.
  Demonstrated on four deliberate breaks — a typo'd id (both halves red), a
  handler bound to the wrong but existing element (only the functional e2e case
  red), a typo in a view no browser suite opens (only the static guard red), and
  the deletion of both persisted-value assignments in `settings.js` (only the
  selector round-trip case red)
  ([#229](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/229)).
 - 2026-08-17: The phishing blocklist is vendored at build time and censored, and
  the runtime fetch is gone
  ([#219](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/219)).
  `script/vendor-blocklist` fetches upstream at a pinned commit, verifies the
  sha256 of the bytes it was served, and writes
  `src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json` as truncated sha256 digests rather than
  domain names — which is what removes the competitor's name from a list that
  carried it 6,475 times, without dropping a single one of those domains.
  `script/check-censored` runs in `make check` and again against `dist/` at the
  end of every build, each permitted occurrence scoped to the one path allowed
  to carry it; the name now appears only in the vendoring script, which defines
  it once, in the provider-shim identifiers in `src/content/inpage.js`, and in
  one ERC-20's on-chain name in `src/shared/tokenList.js`. Removing the fetch
  retired the delta, the persistence and the 24-hour alarm from
  [#158](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/158), and retired alarms
  are now cleared rather than left running on existing installs. Two
  consequences, both deliberate: the list no longer self-updates, so it is as
  fresh as the last vendoring run that was released; and re-vendoring from
  current upstream took it from 231,357 stale entries to 105,721 current ones,
  because upstream prunes and the vendored snapshot never did. `dist/` fell from
  18.9 MB to 8.9 MB. The e2e suite now drives the warning end to end from a real
  blocklisted origin, and its service-worker interception canary has a new
  anchor, because the startup fetch it used to watch for no longer exists.
 - 2026-08-17: One wording for an empty password field on every screen that asks
  for one. The private key export screen said "Password is required." where the
  other five say "Please enter your password.", the same one-condition-two-
@@ -123,10 +72,9 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
  and coverage change, not a repair of a broken target. `storageGet()` and
  `storageSet()` **reject** where `storage.local` is absent rather than
  resolving `{}` and a no-op write — they carry the wallet, and defaulting would
-  read an existing wallet back as none. The one caller that genuinely degraded,
+  read an existing wallet back as none. The one caller that genuinely degrades,
-  [`src/shared/phishingDomains.js`](src/shared/phishingDomains.js), took
+  [`src/shared/phishingDomains.js`](src/shared/phishingDomains.js), takes
-  `storageLocal()` directly and kept its own null check; it stores nothing at
+  `storageLocal()` directly and keeps its own null check.
  all as of [#219](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/219) above.
 - 2026-08-17: An address total no longer reports `$0.00` for holdings it cannot
  price. Prices exist for the top 25 tokens only, so the priced-only sum was
  printed as the total and an address holding nothing but unpriced ERC-20s was
@@ -228,27 +176,6 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
  under load, filed as [#287](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/287)
  rather than papered over
  ([#259](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/259)).
 - 2026-08-14: A background message handler that throws now rejects the page
  instead of hanging it. `handleRpc(...).then(sendResponse)` had no `.catch()`,
  and `sendResponse` is the only thing that settles the dApp's
  `window.ethereum.request()` promise — so any throw inside `handleRpc` left
  that promise pending forever, with no error and no timeout, indistinguishable
  from a slow wallet. It now answers `{ code: -32603, message }` (the JSON-RPC
  internal error EIP-1474 defines and EIP-1193 defers to; no EIP-1193 4xxx code
  describes "the wallet broke" and none was invented) and logs the method and
  the throw to the background console rather than swallowing them. The two async
  IIFEs behind `AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE` and `AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE` were the
  same shape one level down — every statement inside a `try`, but a throw out of
  a `catch` block escaping unhandled — and each got a last-resort `.catch()`
  settling the approval through `settleApproval()` and answering the popup. The
  transaction one tracks which phase it escaped from and reports that, so an
  escape before `broadcastTransaction()` says the request is gone rather than
  that it may still have reached the network. Every other handler on the path is
  synchronous. All four are driven by real failures — a rejecting storage read,
  and a failure classifier that throws while classifying a genuine verification
  or broadcast failure — and were demonstrated failing first, the RPC one with
  `sendResponse` at zero calls
  ([#280](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/280)).
 - 2026-08-14: Approving a site connection is no longer a race against the popup
  closing. The decision now rides the approval port the popup already holds,
  which is the same channel the close disconnects, so it is delivered ahead of
--- a/docs/README.md
+++ b/docs/README.md
@@ -120,6 +120,25 @@ What gets sent: token symbol names (e.g. "ETH", "USDC"). No addresses, no
 balances, no identifying information. As with any request, CoinDesk sees your IP
 address.
 **Phishing domain blocklist** (`raw.githubusercontent.com`)
 A community-maintained list of phishing domains, used to warn you when a site
 that asks to connect, or to have a transaction or signature approved, is a known
 scam. A copy is bundled into the extension at build time, so the protection
 works before any network request happens. At runtime the extension fetches the
 live list to pick up newly added domains, keeping only the entries not already
 in the bundled copy (persisted locally if under 256 KiB). This endpoint is not
 user-configurable.
 When it is contacted: when the background script starts, if the last fetch was
 more than 24 hours ago, and every 24 hours after that. The time of the last
 fetch is remembered across browser and background restarts, so restarting does
 not cause a re-download. If a fetch fails, or the list is too large to keep, the
 extension waits an hour before trying again outside that 24-hour schedule rather
 than retrying on every restart. It is a plain download of a public file —
 nothing about you is sent, but the host sees your IP address. If the fetch
 fails, the bundled copy is still used.
 **Etherscan address labels** (`etherscan.io`; `sepolia.etherscan.io` on Sepolia)
 When you review a send, AutistMask fetches the recipient's public Etherscan
@@ -348,12 +367,8 @@ confirmation screen. It contains only addresses involved in fraud -- it is not a
 sanctions list.
 **Phishing domain warnings.** Sites asking to connect or to have something
-approved are checked against a community-maintained list of known phishing
+approved are checked against the phishing domain blocklist described under
-domains, and flagged with a red banner if they match. The list is built into the
+External Services, and flagged with a red banner if they match.
 extension: the check is entirely local, so nobody is told which sites you visit,
 and it works offline. It is also only as current as the release you are running
 — a domain added to the list upstream reaches you in the next version of the
 extension, not the same day.
 The first four filters can be individually disabled in Settings if you prefer to
 see everything unfiltered.
--- a/eslint.config.js
+++ b/eslint.config.js
@@ -125,16 +125,6 @@ module.exports = [
        },
    },
    // The helpers the script/ entrypoints call: plain node programs too, run
    // from a shell script rather than from yarn, and never bundled.
    {
        files: ["script/lib/**/*.js"],
        languageOptions: {
            ...commonjs,
            globals: { ...globals.node },
        },
    },
    // The e2e harnesses are node programs that also carry, inline, the
    // callbacks they ship into the browser via page.evaluate — so both
    // contexts really are present in the same file and both sets of globals
--- a/script/check
+++ b/script/check
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
 main() {
    "$SCRIPT_DIR/test"
    "$SCRIPT_DIR/test-verify-build"
    "$SCRIPT_DIR/check-censored"
    "$SCRIPT_DIR/lint"
    "$SCRIPT_DIR/fmt-check"
 }
--- a/script/check-censored
+++ b/script/check-censored
@@ -1,301 +0,0 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # script/check-censored: assert that the competitor name RULES.md bars appears
 # nowhere in this repo, and nowhere in the built extension, except where it is
 # deliberate. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run from
 # script/check and from make build.
 #
 # Where the name is allowed, and why each one is not negotiable away:
 #
 #   - script/vendor-blocklist. Build-time tooling, never shipped. A pinned
 #     source reference that does not say what the source is cannot be verified
 #     by anyone, so it names it. Whole-file exemption.
 #   - the two provider-shim identifiers in src/content/inpage.js. Protocol
 #     identifiers dApps feature-detect on; renaming them does not rename them in
 #     their code, it only stops this wallet working on their sites.
 #   - the on-chain name of the MUSD ERC-20 in src/shared/tokenList.js. It is not
 #     what backs symbol-spoof detection — that reads symbol and address — but
 #     the wallet already surfaces the on-chain name of any token the user holds
 #     (src/shared/balances.js), and this contract's on-chain name is that
 #     string, so censoring the repo cannot stop the wallet displaying it.
 #     Dropping the entry instead would cost the user MUSD spoof detection.
 #
 # Everything else fails, in the working tree and under dist/. The last two are
 # literals rather than whole files, so they are enforced by counting, and each
 # literal is scoped to the path allowed to carry it: a file may contain the name
 # only as many times as it contains the literals permitted *there*, and zero
 # times anywhere else. The emitted bundles carry them too, so a plain "the name
 # must not appear in dist/" could never have passed.
 #
 # The name itself is not written in this file. script/vendor-blocklist is the
 # one place in this repo that defines it, and this reads it back out of there —
 # so the repo-wide grep this check exists to enforce keeps returning exactly the
 # files named above, and this file is not one of them.
 set -eu
 ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
 # Absolute path to this script, resolved before anything cd's anywhere: the
 # scan half runs in a re-invocation through xargs, so that the paths it works on
 # arrive as arguments and cannot be reshaped by field splitting on the way in.
 SELF="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)/$(basename "$0")"
 # Internal re-entry flag. Not part of the command-line interface.
 SCAN_FLAG="--scan-paths"
 VENDOR_SCRIPT="$ROOT/script/vendor-blocklist"
 # Set by extract_name / make_literals_file.
 NAME=""
 ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE=""
 FAILED=0
 cleanup() {
    [ -z "$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE" ] || rm -f "$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE"
 }
 trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
 fail() {
    echo "check-censored: FAIL: $*" >&2
    exit 1
 }
 # The name, taken from the single place that defines it. A check scanning for a
 # pattern it failed to read would pass against anything, so this refuses to
 # continue unless it got something that looks like the definition.
 extract_name() {
    [ -f "$VENDOR_SCRIPT" ] ||
        fail "$VENDOR_SCRIPT is missing, and it is where the name being
    checked for is defined. Nothing was scanned."
    NAME="$(grep -m1 '^UPSTREAM_ORG=' "$VENDOR_SCRIPT" | cut -d'"' -f2)" ||
        fail "could not read UPSTREAM_ORG from $VENDOR_SCRIPT. Nothing was
    scanned."
    case "$NAME" in
    "" | *[!A-Za-z0-9]*)
        fail "UPSTREAM_ORG in $VENDOR_SCRIPT did not yield a plain name
    (got: '$NAME'). Scanning for that would prove nothing. Nothing was
    scanned."
        ;;
    esac
 }
 make_literals_file() {
    ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE="$(mktemp \
        "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-censored.XXXXXX")" ||
        fail "could not create a temporary file, so nothing was scanned."
 }
 # The literals $1 may carry, and nothing else may. Each contains the name
 # exactly once, which is what makes counting them sound; each is scoped to its
 # path, so a file with no business carrying the name fails even when it spells
 # it the way shipped code has to. Scoping is the point: permitting these
 # literals in any file is what once let this check pass its own prose.
 #
 # The emitted paths are listed next to the sources they come from. If the
 # bundler moves one, this goes red and the new path gets added deliberately,
 # rather than a wildcard over dist/ covering whatever lands there.
 allowed_literals_for() {
    : >"$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE"
    case "$1" in
    src/content/inpage.js | dist/*/src/content/inpage.js)
        printf 'is%s\n_%s\n' "$NAME" "$NAME" >"$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE"
        ;;
    src/shared/tokenList.js | dist/*/src/background/index.js | \
        dist/*/src/popup/index.js)
        printf '%s USD\n' "$NAME" >"$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE"
        ;;
    esac
 }
 # How many times does $1 contain the name (TOTAL), and how many of those are one
 # of the allowed literals (ALLOWED)? Same discipline the rest of this repo's
 # shell checks apply to grep: exit 0 and 1 are answers about the file, anything
 # else means the file was not searched and is not an answer at all.
 count_matches() {
    _cm_status=0
    _cm_out="$(grep -a -o -i -F -e "$NAME" -- "$1")" || _cm_status=$?
    case "$_cm_status" in
    0) TOTAL="$(printf '%s\n' "$_cm_out" | grep -c .)" ;;
    1) TOTAL=0 ;;
    *)
        fail "grep exited $_cm_status reading $1, so the file was never
    searched and nothing was established about it. That is a permissions or I/O
    fault, not a clean file. Refusing to report success."
        ;;
    esac
    if [ "$TOTAL" -eq 0 ]; then
        ALLOWED=0
        return 0
    fi
    # No literal is permitted at this path, so every occurrence is a violation.
    # Handled here rather than by grep, which is not required to say anything
    # useful about an empty pattern file.
    if [ ! -s "$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE" ]; then
        ALLOWED=0
        return 0
    fi
    _cm_status=0
    _cm_out="$(grep -a -o -i -F -f "$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE" -- "$1")" ||
        _cm_status=$?
    case "$_cm_status" in
    0) ALLOWED="$(printf '%s\n' "$_cm_out" | grep -c .)" ;;
    1) ALLOWED=0 ;;
    *)
        fail "grep exited $_cm_status matching the allowed literals in $1.
    Refusing to report success."
        ;;
    esac
 }
 # The per-path half, run in a re-invocation of this script so it uses the same
 # counting as everything else rather than a second copy of it.
 scan_paths() {
    for _file in "$@"; do
        # dist/ arrives absolute (find) and the worktree relative (git
        # ls-files). The allowlist is keyed on repo-relative paths, so both
        # forms are reduced to one before anything is decided about them.
        _rel="$_file"
        case "$_rel" in
        "$ROOT"/*) _rel="${_rel#"$ROOT"/}" ;;
        esac
        case "$_rel" in
        script/vendor-blocklist) continue ;;
        esac
        [ -f "$_file" ] || continue
        allowed_literals_for "$_rel"
        count_matches "$_file"
        [ "$TOTAL" -gt "$ALLOWED" ] || continue
        FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
        echo "check-censored: $_rel: $TOTAL occurrence(s) of the name," \
            "$ALLOWED of them allowed at this path" >&2
        grep -a -n -i -F -e "$NAME" -- "$_file" | cut -c1-140 | head -5 >&2
    done
    [ "$FAILED" -eq 0 ]
 }
 # Hand a NUL-delimited listing to the scan half. Returns non-zero if any path
 # failed, or if the scan could not be run at all.
 scan_listing() {
    xargs -0 "$SELF" "$SCAN_FLAG" <"$1"
 }
 # Every file git tracks, plus everything untracked and not ignored: the working
 # tree as a reviewer would see it, and never node_modules or dist/ (both are
 # ignored; dist/ is walked separately below).
 check_worktree() {
    _list="$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-censored-tree.XXXXXX")" ||
        fail "could not create a temporary file, so nothing was scanned."
    _status=0
    git ls-files -z --cached --others --exclude-standard >"$_list" ||
        _status=$?
    [ "$_status" -eq 0 ] || {
        rm -f "$_list"
        fail "git ls-files exited $_status, so the working tree was never
    enumerated and nothing was established about it."
    }
    # Repo-relative paths. The scan half cd's to the repo root before it opens
    # anything, so they reach it intact and unjoined.
    WORKTREE_COUNT="$(tr -dc '\0' <"$_list" | wc -c | tr -d ' ')"
    _status=0
    scan_listing "$_list" || _status=$?
    rm -f "$_list"
    return "$_status"
 }
 check_dist() {
    _list="$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-censored-dist.XXXXXX")" ||
        fail "could not create a temporary file, so dist/ was not scanned."
    _status=0
    find "$ROOT/dist" -type f -print0 >"$_list" || _status=$?
    [ "$_status" -eq 0 ] || {
        rm -f "$_list"
        fail "find exited $_status enumerating dist/, so part of the emitted
    tree was never walked and an unchecked file there went unchecked. Refusing
    to report success."
    }
    DIST_COUNT="$(tr -dc '\0' <"$_list" | wc -c | tr -d ' ')"
    _status=0
    scan_listing "$_list" || _status=$?
    rm -f "$_list"
    return "$_status"
 }
 usage() {
    echo "usage: script/check-censored [--require-dist]" >&2
    exit 2
 }
 main() {
    cd "$ROOT"
    # Internal re-entry from scan_listing's xargs.
    if [ "${1-}" = "$SCAN_FLAG" ]; then
        shift
        extract_name
        make_literals_file
        scan_paths "$@"
        return $?
    fi
    require_dist=no
    case "${1-}" in
    "") ;;
    --require-dist) require_dist=yes ;;
    *) usage ;;
    esac
    extract_name
    make_literals_file
    echo "Checking for censored names..."
    tree_status=0
    check_worktree || tree_status=$?
    dist_status=0
    dist_inspected=no
    DIST_COUNT=0
    if [ -d "$ROOT/dist" ]; then
        dist_inspected=yes
        check_dist || dist_status=$?
    fi
    if [ "$tree_status" -ne 0 ] || [ "$dist_status" -ne 0 ]; then
        fail "the name appears outside the deliberate exceptions (reported
    above). See the header of script/check-censored for what is allowed and
    why."
    fi
    if [ "$dist_inspected" = no ]; then
        if [ "$require_dist" = yes ]; then
            fail "there is no dist/ to inspect and this run was asked to
    require one. Run make build."
        fi
        cat <<EOF
 ################################################################################
 ## WARNING: dist/ WAS NOT INSPECTED BY THIS RUN AND IS NOT PROVEN CLEAN BY IT.
 ## There is no dist/ in this tree. The working tree is clean, but a build can
 ## carry text no source file does — a dependency's, or a bundler's. Every
 ## make build runs this check again with dist/ required, so a release artifact
 ## is always covered; this run simply had none to look at.
 ################################################################################
 EOF
    fi
    echo "check-censored: $WORKTREE_COUNT tracked file(s) inspected," \
        "$DIST_COUNT file(s) under dist/"
 }
 main "$@"
--- a/script/lib/build-blocklist.js
+++ b/script/lib/build-blocklist.js
@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
 // The transform half of script/vendor-blocklist: upstream's config.json in,
 // src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json out. Build-time repo tooling; nothing here
 // is shipped to users.
 //
 // Usage: node script/lib/build-blocklist.js <source.json> <output.json>
 //
 // What it does, and why each step is here:
 //
 //   - only the blacklist is carried over. The extension matches a hostname and
 //     its parent domains against that one list; upstream's whitelist, fuzzylist
 //     and version metadata are read by nothing here, so shipping them would add
 //     megabytes of dead weight to every install.
 //   - entries are lowercased and de-duplicated, because that is the form
 //     isPhishingDomain() compares against.
 //   - entries that cannot be a hostname are dropped and counted. Upstream
 //     carries the odd URL-shaped entry (a path, a scheme); hostname matching can
 //     never match one, and once the artifact is hashes nobody can see that it is
 //     in there, so it is reported at vendoring time instead.
 //   - entries are hashed (see src/shared/domainHash.js) and sorted, and the
 //     digests are concatenated into one fixed-width string. Sorted is what makes
 //     the runtime lookup a binary search over that string, with no set to build
 //     on every service-worker wake; one string rather than an array of 100k+ is
 //     what keeps the file, the bundle and the JSON parse small.
 //
 // Deterministic by construction: same input bytes, same output bytes.
 "use strict";
 const fs = require("fs");
 const {
    HASH_ALGORITHM,
    HASH_HEX_CHARS,
    hashDomain,
 } = require("../../src/shared/domainHash");
 // A blocklist that has collapsed to a handful of entries is a broken fetch or a
 // changed upstream shape, not a quiet day in phishing. Vendoring it would
 // disarm the feature, so it fails instead and a human decides.
 const MIN_ENTRIES = 10000;
 function fail(message) {
    process.stderr.write("build-blocklist: " + message + "\n");
    process.exit(1);
 }
 // A hostname, as the matcher understands one: dot-separated labels of letters,
 // digits, hyphens and underscores. Anything else — a path, a scheme, a space,
 // an empty string, a non-ASCII label a browser would have punycoded before it
 // ever reached isPhishingDomain() — cannot be produced by the hostname variants
 // the extension looks up, so it could only ever sit in the artifact unused.
 //
 // Underscores are deliberate. They are not legal in a hostname per RFC 1123,
 // but DNS carries them and browsers resolve them, and upstream lists 141 entries
 // that use one — real phishing sites on shared subdomain hosts. A stricter
 // pattern silently drops every one of them.
 const HOSTNAME_RE =
    /^[a-z0-9_]([a-z0-9_-]*[a-z0-9_])?(\.[a-z0-9_]([a-z0-9_-]*[a-z0-9_])?)+$/;
 function main(argv) {
    const [source, output] = argv;
    if (!source || !output) {
        fail("usage: build-blocklist.js <source.json> <output.json>");
    }
    let config;
    try {
        config = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(source, "utf8"));
    } catch (e) {
        fail("could not read " + source + " as JSON: " + e.message);
    }
    if (!Array.isArray(config.blacklist)) {
        fail(
            "the source has no blacklist array, so its shape is not the one " +
                "this transform understands. Refusing to write an artifact.",
        );
    }
    const seen = new Set();
    let dropped = 0;
    for (const raw of config.blacklist) {
        if (typeof raw !== "string") {
            dropped++;
            continue;
        }
        const domain = raw.trim().toLowerCase();
        if (!HOSTNAME_RE.test(domain)) {
            dropped++;
            continue;
        }
        seen.add(domain);
    }
    if (seen.size < MIN_ENTRIES) {
        fail(
            "the source yielded " +
                seen.size +
                " usable entries, below the " +
                MIN_ENTRIES +
                " floor. That is a broken source or a changed upstream " +
                "shape, and vendoring it would disarm phishing detection. " +
                "Refusing to write an artifact.",
        );
    }
    const hashes = [];
    for (const domain of seen) hashes.push(hashDomain(domain));
    hashes.sort();
    // Truncation makes collisions possible; they are harmless (both entries are
    // blocked either way) but they must not inflate the count the artifact
    // claims, which the runtime cross-checks against the string length.
    const unique = [];
    for (const hash of hashes) {
        if (unique.length === 0 || unique[unique.length - 1] !== hash) {
            unique.push(hash);
        }
    }
    const artifact = {
        algorithm: HASH_ALGORITHM,
        hashHexChars: HASH_HEX_CHARS,
        count: unique.length,
        hashes: unique.join(""),
    };
    // Four-space JSON with a trailing newline: what prettier emits for this
    // shape, so a vendored artifact passes make fmt-check untouched.
    fs.writeFileSync(output, JSON.stringify(artifact, null, 4) + "\n");
    process.stdout.write(
        "build-blocklist: " +
            config.blacklist.length +
            " source entries -> " +
            seen.size +
            " usable domains -> " +
            unique.length +
            " digests (" +
            dropped +
            " not hostnames, " +
            (seen.size - unique.length) +
            " digest collisions)\n",
    );
 }
 main(process.argv.slice(2));
--- a/script/test-e2e
+++ b/script/test-e2e
@@ -59,12 +59,12 @@ main() {
    #   browser profile.
    # PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1: without it,
    #   ctx.route() intercepts page requests only, and every fetch made by
-    #   the MV3 background service worker — the JSON-RPC calls behind
+    #   the MV3 background service worker — including the phishing
-    #   every approval the suite drives among them — goes to the real
+    #   blocklist fetch that src/background/index.js issues at worker
-    #   internet. The flag is experimental and Playwright may drop or
+    #   startup — goes to the real internet. The flag is experimental and
-    #   rename it. It cannot break silently: the harness asks the worker
+    #   Playwright may drop or rename it. It cannot break silently: the
-    #   for one request of its own at launch and aborts the whole suite
+    #   harness probes service-worker interception at launch and aborts
-    #   if it does not reach the route handler (see the interception
+    #   the whole suite if it is not in effect (see the interception
    #   canary in tests/e2e/harness.js). If a future Playwright removes
    #   the flag, that probe is what will fail, and the fix is either a
    #   replacement mechanism or an honest downgrade of the isolation
--- a/script/vendor-blocklist
+++ b/script/vendor-blocklist
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # script/vendor-blocklist: refresh the vendored phishing blocklist at
 # src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json from its upstream source. Our own extension
 # to scripts-to-rule-them-all.
 #
 # This is build-time repo tooling and is not shipped. It is the one place in
 # this repo that names the upstream project, because a source reference that
 # does not say what the source is cannot be verified by anyone; the artifact it
 # writes carries no names at all (see src/shared/domainHash.js).
 # script/check-censored reads the name back out of this file rather than
 # repeating it, so it stays defined exactly once.
 #
 # Run it deliberately, not on every build: the output is committed, and the
 # extension does no runtime fetching, so the shipped list is exactly as fresh as
 # the last time someone ran this and landed the result. Re-run it, land the
 # diff, cut a release; that is the whole refresh path.
 #
 # Pinned by content hash, twice over, as REPO_POLICIES.md requires. The commit
 # below is an immutable ref — the upstream default branch moves several times a
 # day and cannot be pinned — and UPSTREAM_SHA256 is the sha256 of the bytes that
 # commit serves. A mismatch is a hard failure: a vendoring step that accepts
 # whatever it is handed is a supply-chain hole, and this one feeds a security
 # warning shown to users.
 #
 # To move the pin: pick the new commit, run this with the new UPSTREAM_COMMIT
 # and an UPSTREAM_SHA256 you have not yet updated, and it will print the hash it
 # actually got. Verify that hash against the source independently before
 # recording it. Never copy the "actual" line in on trust.
 set -eu
 ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
 # Upstream, pinned 2026-08-17.
 UPSTREAM_ORG="MetaMask"
 UPSTREAM_REPO="eth-phishing-detect"
 UPSTREAM_COMMIT="6dddf74a87da3e1a0841f7ae0d1cb31aaf2c05db"
 UPSTREAM_FILE="src/config.json"
 UPSTREAM_SHA256="166d5b3504e8f4ed52eae37d3dd20c1a56efa0502bfb3dc957044ff8b5f1283f"
 OUTPUT="src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json"
 WORK=""
 cleanup() {
    [ -z "$WORK" ] || rm -rf "$WORK"
 }
 trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
 fail() {
    echo "vendor-blocklist: $*" >&2
    exit 1
 }
 sha256_of() {
    if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
        sha256sum "$1" | cut -d' ' -f1
    elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
        shasum -a 256 "$1" | cut -d' ' -f1
    else
        fail "neither sha256sum nor shasum is available, so the fetched
    source cannot be verified. Refusing to vendor unverified content."
    fi
 }
 main() {
    cd "$ROOT"
    command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
        fail "curl is required to fetch the upstream list"
    command -v node >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
        fail "node is required to build the artifact; run script/bootstrap"
    WORK="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-vendor-blocklist.XXXXXX")" ||
        fail "could not create a working directory"
    url="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/$UPSTREAM_ORG/$UPSTREAM_REPO/$UPSTREAM_COMMIT/$UPSTREAM_FILE"
    echo "Fetching $url"
    curl -fsSL --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -o "$WORK/source.json" "$url" ||
        fail "the fetch failed, so nothing was vendored"
    actual="$(sha256_of "$WORK/source.json")"
    if [ "$actual" != "$UPSTREAM_SHA256" ]; then
        fail "sha256 mismatch on the fetched source.
    expected: $UPSTREAM_SHA256
    actual:   $actual
    The pinned commit is immutable, so the same commit serving different bytes
    means the content was substituted somewhere between upstream and here.
    Nothing was written. Do not update the expectation to match unless you have
    verified the new bytes independently."
    fi
    echo "Verified sha256 $actual"
    node script/lib/build-blocklist.js "$WORK/source.json" "$WORK/out.json" ||
        fail "the transform failed, so nothing was written"
    if [ -f "$OUTPUT" ] && cmp -s "$WORK/out.json" "$OUTPUT"; then
        echo "vendor-blocklist: $OUTPUT is already up to date"
        return 0
    fi
    cp "$WORK/out.json" "$OUTPUT"
    echo "vendor-blocklist: wrote $OUTPUT (sha256 $(sha256_of "$OUTPUT"))"
 }
 main "$@"
--- a/src/background/index.js
+++ b/src/background/index.js
@@ -27,9 +27,14 @@ const {
    TX_STAGE_NONCE,
 } = require("../shared/approvalVerify");
 const { prepareApprovalTx } = require("../shared/approvalTx");
-const { isPhishingDomain } = require("../shared/phishingDomains");
+const {
    isPhishingDomain,
    refreshPhishingListOnSchedule,
    initPhishingList,
 } = require("../shared/phishingDomains");
 const {
    BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM,
    PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM,
    BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES,
    ensureRecurringAlarms,
    registerAlarmHandlers,
@@ -165,16 +170,6 @@ function approvedNonce(approvedTx) {
    }
 }
 // What the page is told when a request failed in a way the wallet has no
 // specific answer for. -32603 is the JSON-RPC internal error EIP-1474 defines
 // and EIP-1193 defers to for RPC-layer failures; no EIP-1193 4xxx code
 // describes "the wallet broke", and one is not invented here. The cause is
 // logged rather than put in the message: the page gets a stable sentence, the
 // background console gets the throw.
 const INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE = -32603;
 const INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE =
    "AutistMask could not complete this request because of an internal error.";
 async function getState() {
    const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
    return (
@@ -1047,20 +1042,26 @@ async function backgroundRefresh() {
    await saveState();
 }
-// The recurring job runs off an alarm, not a timer. On Chrome MV3 this file is
+// Both recurring jobs run off alarms, not timers. On Chrome MV3 this file is
 // a service worker that the browser terminates after about 30 seconds idle,
 // so a setInterval would only ever survive until the first idle period and
 // module-level state does not outlive it. Alarms are held by the browser and
 // wake the worker to deliver them.
 registerAlarmHandlers({
    [BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM]: backgroundRefresh,
    // The scheduled refresh, which restores persisted state on a freshly
    // revived worker and then fetches unconditionally. The freshness guards
    // belong to the startup path; applying them here would make the tick skip
    // itself.
    [PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM]: refreshPhishingListOnSchedule,
 });
 // Everything the background context needs re-established on start. This runs
 // on a fresh install, on browser startup, and on every revival of a
 // terminated worker, so it must be idempotent: ensureRecurringAlarms() only
-// creates alarms that are missing or carrying a stale period, and only clears
+// creates alarms that are missing or carrying a stale period, and
-// retired ones that are still registered.
+// initPhishingList() fetches only when the persisted timestamps say the list
 // is stale.
 //
 // On a fresh install the top-level call and the onInstalled listener both run,
 // close enough together that both could see an alarm missing and create it.
@@ -1071,7 +1072,10 @@ let backgroundJobsRun = null;
 function startBackgroundJobs() {
    if (backgroundJobsRun) return backgroundJobsRun;
-    backgroundJobsRun = ensureRecurringAlarms()
+    backgroundJobsRun = Promise.all([
        ensureRecurringAlarms(),
        initPhishingList(),
    ])
        .catch((err) => {
            // An alarm that failed to schedule means a recurring job silently
            // never runs again; it must not be an unhandled rejection.
@@ -1139,26 +1143,9 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
                // keep fallback
            }
        }
-        handleRpc(msg.method, msg.params, trustedOrigin)
+        handleRpc(msg.method, msg.params, trustedOrigin).then((response) => {
-            .then((response) => {
+            sendResponse(response);
-                sendResponse(response);
+        });
            })
            .catch((err) => {
                // Without this the page's window.ethereum.request() promise
                // stays pending forever: no response is sent, the content
                // script posts nothing back, and the dApp cannot tell the
                // failure from a slow wallet. handleRpc does real work —
                // state loads, provider calls, transaction population — so
                // "it does not throw today" is not a property anyone is
                // maintaining.
                log.errorf("RPC request failed:", msg.method, err);
                sendResponse({
                    error: {
                        code: INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE,
                        message: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
                    },
                });
            });
        return true;
    }
@@ -1254,10 +1241,6 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
            return false;
        }
        // Which phase the last-resort .catch() below reports. Everything up to
        // the broadcastTransaction() call provably never reached the network,
        // so an escape from there must not tell the user it might have.
        let lastResortStage = TX_STAGE_VERIFY;
        (async () => {
            // The chain this attempt is on, read once. Verification below
            // refuses an artifact signed for any other chain, and the nonce
@@ -1341,7 +1324,6 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
            try {
                const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
                lastResortStage = TX_STAGE_BROADCAST;
                const tx = await provider.broadcastTransaction(msg.rawSignedTx);
                if (nonce !== null) spent.add(nonce);
                settleApproval(
@@ -1373,28 +1355,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
                    stage: outcome.stage,
                });
            }
-        })().catch((e) => {
+        })();
            // Every statement above is inside a try, but a throw from one of
            // the catch blocks escapes as an unhandled rejection and neither
            // the popup nor the page is ever answered. Settle both, through
            // the same chokepoint as every other retirement.
            log.errorf("transaction approval response failed:", e);
            settleApproval(
                msg.id,
                {
                    error: {
                        code: INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE,
                        message: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
                    },
                },
                { holdsClaim: true },
            );
            sendResponse({
                error: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
                retryable: false,
                stage: lastResortStage,
            });
        });
        return true;
    }
@@ -1478,25 +1439,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
                }
                sendResponse({ error: errMsg, retryable });
            }
-        })().catch((e) => {
+        })();
            // Same shape as the transaction path: a throw out of the catch
            // block above would leave the popup and the page both waiting.
            log.errorf("sign approval response failed:", e);
            settleApproval(
                msg.id,
                {
                    error: {
                        code: INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE,
                        message: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
                    },
                },
                { holdsClaim: true },
            );
            sendResponse({
                error: INTERNAL_ERROR_MESSAGE,
                retryable: false,
            });
        });
        return true;
    }
--- a/src/content/inpage.js
+++ b/src/content/inpage.js
@@ -179,8 +179,7 @@
            return this;
        },
-        // Some dApps (wagmi) probe this object to decide whether the provider
+        // Some dApps (wagmi) check this to confirm MetaMask-like behavior
        // supports the de-facto standard extras. The name is theirs, not ours.
        _metamask: {
            isUnlocked() {
                return Promise.resolve(provider.selectedAddress !== null);
--- a/src/popup/views/settings.js
+++ b/src/popup/views/settings.js
@@ -167,7 +167,10 @@ function renderWalletListSettings() {
 function show() {
    $("settings-rpc").value = state.rpcUrl;
    $("settings-blockscout").value = state.blockscoutUrl;
-    $("settings-network").value = state.networkId;
+    const networkSelect = $("settings-network");
    if (networkSelect) {
        networkSelect.value = state.networkId;
    }
    renderTrackedTokens();
    renderSiteLists();
    renderWalletListSettings();
@@ -279,13 +282,15 @@ function init(ctx) {
    });
    const networkSelect = $("settings-network");
-    networkSelect.addEventListener("change", async () => {
+    if (networkSelect) {
-        const newId = networkSelect.value;
+        networkSelect.addEventListener("change", async () => {
-        const net = await onChainSwitch(newId);
+            const newId = networkSelect.value;
-        $("settings-rpc").value = state.rpcUrl;
+            const net = await onChainSwitch(newId);
-        $("settings-blockscout").value = state.blockscoutUrl;
+            $("settings-rpc").value = state.rpcUrl;
-        showFlash("Switched to " + net.name + ".");
+            $("settings-blockscout").value = state.blockscoutUrl;
-    });
+            showFlash("Switched to " + net.name + ".");
        });
    }
    $("settings-show-zero-balances").checked = state.showZeroBalanceTokens;
    $("settings-show-zero-balances").addEventListener("change", async () => {
--- a/src/shared/alarms.js
+++ b/src/shared/alarms.js
@@ -17,26 +17,16 @@
 // run finished and the alarm fires one run-duration earlier than that. Every
 // guard must therefore either be strictly shorter than the period it gates or
 // be bypassed on the scheduled tick — see backgroundRefresh() in
-// src/background/index.js.
+// src/background/index.js and updatePhishingList() in shared/phishingDomains.js.
 const { alarmsApi } = require("./browserApi");
 const BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM = "autistmask-balance-refresh";
-
+const PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM = "autistmask-phishing-refresh";
 // Alarms this extension used to create and no longer has a handler for. A
 // browser keeps an alarm until something clears it, so a job that is deleted
 // from the code goes on waking the service worker on its old schedule forever,
 // on every install that ever ran the version which created it. Removing the job
 // means removing the alarm, so retired names are listed here and cleared on
 // every start until the installs that carry them are long gone.
 const OBSOLETE_ALARMS = [
    // The 24-hour phishing blocklist refresh, retired when the runtime fetch
    // was removed and the list became purely build-time vendored.
    "autistmask-phishing-refresh",
 ];
 const MIN_ALARM_PERIOD_MINUTES = 1;
 const BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES = 1;
 const PHISHING_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES = 24 * 60;
 // alarmsApi() resolves on use rather than at module load: the worker is torn
 // down and re-evaluated repeatedly, and tests install a stub after requiring
@@ -75,34 +65,22 @@ async function ensureAlarm(name, periodInMinutes) {
 }
 /**
- * Clear every alarm this extension no longer handles.
+ * Ensure both recurring background jobs are scheduled. Safe to call on every
 * worker start, on onInstalled and on onStartup.
 *
- * @returns {Promise<string[]>} the retired alarms this call actually cleared.
+ * @returns {Promise<{balance: boolean, phishing: boolean}>} which alarms this
- */
+ * call had to create.
 async function clearObsoleteAlarms() {
    const api = alarmsApi();
    if (!api || !api.clear) return [];
    const cleared = [];
    for (const name of OBSOLETE_ALARMS) {
        if (await api.clear(name)) cleared.push(name);
    }
    return cleared;
 }
 /**
 * Ensure the recurring background jobs are scheduled, and that retired ones are
 * not. Safe to call on every worker start, on onInstalled and on onStartup.
 *
 * @returns {Promise<{balance: boolean, cleared: string[]}>} which alarms this
 * call had to create, and which retired ones it removed.
 */
 async function ensureRecurringAlarms() {
    const balance = await ensureAlarm(
        BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM,
        BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES,
    );
-    const cleared = await clearObsoleteAlarms();
+    const phishing = await ensureAlarm(
-    return { balance, cleared };
+        PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM,
        PHISHING_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES,
    );
    return { balance, phishing };
 }
 /**
@@ -124,10 +102,10 @@ function registerAlarmHandlers(handlers) {
 module.exports = {
    BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM,
-    OBSOLETE_ALARMS,
+    PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM,
    MIN_ALARM_PERIOD_MINUTES,
    BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES,
-    clearObsoleteAlarms,
+    PHISHING_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES,
    ensureAlarm,
    ensureRecurringAlarms,
    registerAlarmHandlers,
--- a/src/shared/domainHash.js
+++ b/src/shared/domainHash.js
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
 // The one definition of how a domain becomes a blocklist entry.
 //
 // The vendored phishing blocklist ships digests, not domain names: see
 // phishingDomains.js for why, and script/vendor-blocklist for how the artifact
 // is produced. Both sides have to agree exactly — a mismatch would silently
 // match nothing, which is a blocklist that quietly protects no one — so the
 // rule lives here and is required by both rather than written down twice.
 //
 // sha256 truncated to 64 bits. Truncation is what keeps the artifact small
 // enough to bundle (16 hex characters per entry rather than 64), and 64 bits is
 // far past what this has to withstand: over ~10^5 entries the chance that any
 // hostname a user visits collides with an entry it is not is about 10^-14 per
 // lookup, and a deliberate collision buys an attacker a false phishing warning
 // on a site they do not control, not a missed one. For scale, Safe Browsing
 // distributes 32-bit prefixes and resolves the rest against a server; this is
 // 32 bits more, with no server involved.
 const { sha256, toUtf8Bytes } = require("ethers");
 const HASH_ALGORITHM = "sha256";
 const HASH_HEX_CHARS = 16;
 /**
 * The blocklist entry for a domain: lowercased, hashed, truncated.
 *
 * @param {string} domain
 * @returns {string} HASH_HEX_CHARS lowercase hex characters, no 0x prefix.
 */
 function hashDomain(domain) {
    // ethers returns "0x" + 64 hex characters.
    return sha256(toUtf8Bytes(domain.toLowerCase())).slice(
        2,
        2 + HASH_HEX_CHARS,
    );
 }
 module.exports = {
    HASH_ALGORITHM,
    HASH_HEX_CHARS,
    hashDomain,
 };
--- a/src/shared/ens.js
+++ b/src/shared/ens.js
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
 //
 // POPUP ONLY. localStorage does not exist in the Chrome MV3 service worker,
 // so this module must not be pulled into src/background/. Anything the
-// background context needs to cache goes in extension storage instead.
+// background context needs to cache goes in extension storage instead (see
 // shared/phishingDomains.js).
 const { getProvider } = require("./balances");
 const { log } = require("./log");
--- a/src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json
+++ b/src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json
--- a/src/shared/phishingDomains.js
+++ b/src/shared/phishingDomains.js
@@ -1,109 +1,158 @@
-// Domain-based phishing detection against a blocklist vendored at build time.
+// Domain-based phishing detection using a vendored blocklist with delta updates.
 //
-// The list is produced by script/vendor-blocklist from a hash-pinned upstream
+// A community-maintained phishing domain blocklist is vendored in
-// commit, committed as phishingBlocklist.json, and bundled. There is no runtime
+// phishingBlocklist.json and bundled at build time. At runtime, we fetch
-// fetch: the extension asks nobody anything to answer this question, so no third
+// the live list periodically and keep only the delta (new entries not in
-// party learns which sites a user connects to, and no third party decides what
+// the vendored list) in memory. This keeps runtime memory usage small.
 // this wallet warns about. The cost is staleness — the shipped list is exactly
 // as fresh as the last vendoring run that was released — and the refresh path is
 // re-running that script and shipping the diff.
 //
-// The artifact holds digests, not domains: sha256 truncated to 64 bits, one
+// The domain-checker checks the in-memory delta first (fresh/recent scam
-// entry per 16 hex characters, concatenated in sorted order into a single
+// sites), then falls back to the vendored list.
 // string (see domainHash.js). Three things follow from that shape, and all
 // three are the reason for it:
 //
-//   - the extension ships no plaintext list of anyone's domain names, which is
+// If the delta and its fetch timestamp fit in 256 KiB they are persisted to
-//     what makes a blocklist assembled elsewhere shippable here at all.
+// extension storage, so they survive termination of the MV3 service worker.
-//   - a lookup is a binary search over that string. Nothing is built at module
+// Extension storage, not localStorage: localStorage does not exist in a
-//     load, which matters because the MV3 service worker is torn down when idle
+// service worker, so the previous persistence never ran on Chrome at all.
-//     and re-evaluates this file on every wake.
+// The stored timestamps are what keep a restarted worker from re-fetching on
-//   - the file is 1.7 MB rather than 8.7 MB.
+// every wake while still noticing an overdue update. Those guards apply to the
-//
+// startup path only; the 24-hour alarm tick bypasses them, or it would veto
-// Nothing here is async: callers answer an approval prompt with the result.
+// its own refresh — see updatePhishingList().
-const vendored = require("./phishingBlocklist.json");
+const vendoredConfig = require("./phishingBlocklist.json");
-const { HASH_ALGORITHM, HASH_HEX_CHARS, hashDomain } = require("./domainHash");
+const { storageLocal } = require("./browserApi");
-// The artifact is generated, so a shape it does not have is a build fault, not
+const BLOCKLIST_URL =
-// a runtime condition. It is checked anyway, and loudly, because every way of
+    "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MetaMask/eth-phishing-detect/main/src/config.json";
 // getting it wrong — a stale format, a truncated file, a different digest —
 // produces a blocklist that matches nothing at all while looking perfectly
 // healthy. A phishing check that silently answers "no" to everything is the one
 // failure this module must not have.
 function checkArtifact(a) {
    const bad = (why) =>
        new Error(
            "phishingBlocklist.json " +
                why +
                ". It is generated by script/vendor-blocklist; re-run that " +
                "rather than editing it.",
        );
-    if (!a || typeof a !== "object") throw bad("is not an object");
+const CACHE_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 24 hours
-    if (a.algorithm !== HASH_ALGORITHM) {
+
-        throw bad(
+// Floor on how often an unscheduled path may hit the network. The worker is
-            "declares algorithm " +
+// revived every ~30 seconds while the browser is busy, and every revival runs
-                JSON.stringify(a.algorithm) +
+// the startup path; without a persisted record of the last attempt, any state
-                ", but this build hashes with " +
+// that leaves lastFetchTime unset — a fetch that failed, or a delta too large
-                HASH_ALGORITHM,
+// to store — would download the full list on every single wake.
-        );
+const MIN_FETCH_ATTEMPT_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour
-    }
+
-    if (a.hashHexChars !== HASH_HEX_CHARS) {
+const DELTA_STORAGE_KEY = "phishing-delta";
-        throw bad(
+const MAX_DELTA_BYTES = 256 * 1024; // 256 KiB
-            "declares " +
+
-                JSON.stringify(a.hashHexChars) +
+// Vendored set — built once from the bundled JSON.
-                " hex characters per entry, but this build produces " +
+const vendoredBlacklist = new Set(
-                HASH_HEX_CHARS,
+    (vendoredConfig.blacklist || []).map((d) => d.toLowerCase()),
-        );
+);
-    }
+
-    if (typeof a.hashes !== "string") throw bad("has no hashes string");
+// Delta set — only entries from live list that are NOT in vendored.
-    if (!Number.isInteger(a.count) || a.count < 1) {
+let deltaBlacklist = new Set();
-        throw bad("declares no usable entry count");
+let lastFetchTime = 0;
-    }
+let lastAttemptTime = 0;
-    if (a.hashes.length !== a.count * HASH_HEX_CHARS) {
+let fetchPromise = null;
-        throw bad(
+let loadPromise = null;
-            "holds " +
+
-                a.hashes.length +
+// storageLocal() resolves on use rather than at module load, so a test can
-                " hex characters, which is not the " +
+// install a stub after requiring this module, and it returns null where the
-                a.count * HASH_HEX_CHARS +
+// API is absent — which is why the popup, with no reason to touch the delta,
-                " its count of " +
+// loads fine without it.
-                a.count +
+
-                " entries requires",
+/**
-        );
+ * Sanitise a timestamp read back from storage.
 *
 * A value in the future is permanent poison: every guard here measures elapsed
 * time as `Date.now() - stamp` and tests only the lower bound, so a stamp a
 * year ahead suppresses updates for a year with no path that ever clears it.
 * Clock skew and a restored profile backup both produce one. Since these
 * timestamps only ever gate work, discarding an impossible one is safe: it
 * costs at most a single extra fetch and restores a sane value immediately.
 *
 * @param {unknown} value
 * @returns {number} the timestamp, or 0 if it is unusable.
 */
 function sanitizeTimestamp(value) {
    if (typeof value !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(value)) return 0;
    if (value <= 0 || value > Date.now()) return 0;
    return value;
 }
 /**
 * Load the persisted delta and its timestamps from extension storage.
 * Runs once per worker lifetime; every entry point funnels through
 * ensureDeltaLoaded() so a wake from termination restores state exactly once.
 *
 * @returns {Promise<void>}
 */
 async function loadDeltaFromStorage() {
    const storage = storageLocal();
    if (!storage) return;
    try {
        const result = await storage.get(DELTA_STORAGE_KEY);
        const data = result && result[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY];
        if (!data) return;
        if (Array.isArray(data.blacklist)) {
            deltaBlacklist = new Set(
                data.blacklist.map((d) => d.toLowerCase()),
            );
        }
        lastFetchTime = sanitizeTimestamp(data.lastFetchTime);
        lastAttemptTime = sanitizeTimestamp(data.lastAttemptTime);
    } catch {
        // Storage unavailable or corrupt — start empty and re-fetch.
    }
 }
-checkArtifact(vendored);
+function ensureDeltaLoaded() {
-
+    if (!loadPromise) loadPromise = loadDeltaFromStorage();
-const HASHES = vendored.hashes;
+    return loadPromise;
-const COUNT = vendored.count;
+}
 /**
- * Is this digest one of the vendored entries?
+ * Persist the delta and its timestamps if they fit within MAX_DELTA_BYTES.
 *
- * Binary search over fixed-width records. The digests are lowercase hex of one
+ * The 256 KiB cap covers the delta and its freshness claim: when the delta is
- * width, so lexicographic order is numeric order and the artifact is written
+ * too large to keep, lastFetchTime goes with it, so the next start re-fetches
- * sorted; tests assert that ordering against the committed file, because an
+ * rather than trusting a freshness claim for a delta it no longer holds.
- * unsorted artifact would fail lookups silently rather than loudly.
+ * lastAttemptTime is written either way — it records that the network was
 * contacted, which stays true whatever became of the response, and it is what
 * stops a permanently oversized list from downloading on every worker wake.
 *
- * @param {string} hash
+ * @returns {Promise<void>}
 * @returns {boolean}
 */
-function hashListed(hash) {
+async function saveDeltaToStorage() {
-    let lo = 0;
+    const storage = storageLocal();
-    let hi = COUNT - 1;
+    if (!storage) return;
-    while (lo <= hi) {
+    try {
-        const mid = (lo + hi) >> 1;
+        const data = {
-        const at = HASHES.slice(
+            blacklist: Array.from(deltaBlacklist),
-            mid * HASH_HEX_CHARS,
+            lastFetchTime,
-            (mid + 1) * HASH_HEX_CHARS,
+            lastAttemptTime,
-        );
+        };
-        if (at === hash) return true;
+        const json = JSON.stringify(data);
-        if (at < hash) lo = mid + 1;
+        if (json.length < MAX_DELTA_BYTES) {
-        else hi = mid - 1;
+            await storage.set({ [DELTA_STORAGE_KEY]: data });
        } else if (lastAttemptTime > 0) {
            await storage.set({ [DELTA_STORAGE_KEY]: { lastAttemptTime } });
        } else {
            await storage.remove(DELTA_STORAGE_KEY);
        }
    } catch {
        // Storage unavailable — skip silently
    }
-    return false;
+}
 /**
 * Load a pre-parsed config and compute the delta against the vendored list.
 * Used for both live fetches and testing.
 *
 * @param {{ blacklist?: string[] }} config
 * @returns {Promise<void>} resolves once the delta has been persisted.
 */
 function loadConfig(config) {
    const liveBlacklist = (config.blacklist || []).map((d) => d.toLowerCase());
    // Delta = entries in the live list that are NOT in the vendored list
    deltaBlacklist = new Set(
        liveBlacklist.filter((d) => !vendoredBlacklist.has(d)),
    );
    lastFetchTime = Date.now();
    return saveDeltaToStorage();
 }
 /**
@@ -126,33 +175,161 @@ function hostnameVariants(hostname) {
 /**
 * Check if a hostname is on the phishing blocklist.
 * Checks delta first (fresh/recent scam sites), then vendored list.
 *
 * Synchronous by design — callers answer an approval prompt with it. On a
 * worker that has just woken, the persisted delta may still be loading; the
 * vendored list, which is bundled and always present, carries the check until
 * it lands.
 *
 * @param {string} hostname - The hostname to check.
 * @returns {boolean}
 */
 function isPhishingDomain(hostname) {
    if (!hostname) return false;
-    for (const variant of hostnameVariants(hostname)) {
+    const variants = hostnameVariants(hostname);
-        if (hashListed(hashDomain(variant))) return true;
+
    // Check delta blacklist first (fresh/recent scam sites), then vendored
    for (const v of variants) {
        if (deltaBlacklist.has(v) || vendoredBlacklist.has(v)) return true;
    }
    return false;
 }
 /**
- * Return the blocklist size for diagnostics.
+ * Fetch the latest blocklist and compute delta against vendored data.
 * De-duplicates concurrent fetches. Results are cached for CACHE_TTL_MS,
 * counted from the persisted timestamp so the cache outlives the worker.
 *
 * `force` is what makes the 24-hour alarm actually refresh every 24 hours.
 * The alarm fires one period after the previous alarm, but lastFetchTime is
 * stamped when that fetch *completed*, so an unforced tick lands one fetch
 * latency inside its own TTL, skips, and turns the real cadence into 48 hours.
 * Shortening the TTL instead would not fix it: the worker wakes every ~30
 * seconds and the startup path re-checks the TTL each time, so a shortened TTL
 * simply becomes the real cadence. The TTL is there to stop redundant fetches
 * on wake, and the scheduled tick is not redundant, so it bypasses it.
 *
 * @param {{force?: boolean}} [opts] force: fetch unless one is already in
 * flight, ignoring both the freshness and the retry guard. For the scheduled
 * alarm tick only.
 * @returns {Promise<void>}
 */
 async function updatePhishingList({ force = false } = {}) {
    // A worker that has just been revived knows nothing until the persisted
    // record is back in memory; without this the freshness check below would
    // always see 0 and re-fetch on every wake.
    await ensureDeltaLoaded();
    if (!force) {
        const now = Date.now();
        // Skip if recently fetched.
        if (lastFetchTime > 0 && now - lastFetchTime < CACHE_TTL_MS) return;
        // Skip if the network was contacted recently and the result was not
        // usable — a failed fetch or an oversized delta leaves lastFetchTime
        // unset, and without this every wake would retry.
        if (
            lastAttemptTime > 0 &&
            now - lastAttemptTime < MIN_FETCH_ATTEMPT_INTERVAL_MS
        ) {
            return;
        }
    }
    // De-duplicate concurrent calls
    if (fetchPromise) return fetchPromise;
    fetchPromise = (async () => {
        lastAttemptTime = Date.now();
        try {
            const resp = await fetch(BLOCKLIST_URL);
            if (!resp.ok) throw new Error("HTTP " + resp.status);
            const config = await resp.json();
            await loadConfig(config);
        } catch {
            // Silently fail — vendored list still provides coverage. Persist
            // the attempt so a persistently failing fetch is retried on the
            // schedule rather than on every wake.
            await saveDeltaToStorage();
        } finally {
            fetchPromise = null;
        }
    })();
    return fetchPromise;
 }
 /**
 * Restore persisted state and fetch if the list is overdue.
 *
 * Called from the background script every time it starts — a fresh install,
 * a browser start, and every revival of a terminated service worker all land
 * here. The recurring 24-hour schedule itself is an alarm (see
 * shared/alarms.js), not a timer, because timers die with the worker.
 *
 * @returns {Promise<void>}
 */
 async function initPhishingList() {
    await ensureDeltaLoaded();
    return updatePhishingList();
 }
 /**
 * The 24-hour alarm tick. Separate from initPhishingList() because this is the
 * scheduled refresh and must not be vetoed by the guards that exist to keep
 * the unscheduled startup path off the network.
 *
 * @returns {Promise<void>}
 */
 async function refreshPhishingListOnSchedule() {
    return updatePhishingList({ force: true });
 }
 /**
 * Return the total blocklist size (vendored + delta) for diagnostics.
 *
 * @returns {number}
 */
 function getBlocklistSize() {
-    return COUNT;
+    return vendoredBlacklist.size + deltaBlacklist.size;
 }
 /**
 * Return the delta blocklist size for diagnostics.
 *
 * @returns {number}
 */
 function getDeltaSize() {
    return deltaBlacklist.size;
 }
 /**
 * Reset internal state (for testing).
 */
 function _reset() {
    deltaBlacklist = new Set();
    lastFetchTime = 0;
    lastAttemptTime = 0;
    fetchPromise = null;
    loadPromise = null;
 }
 module.exports = {
    isPhishingDomain,
    updatePhishingList,
    refreshPhishingListOnSchedule,
    initPhishingList,
    loadDeltaFromStorage,
    loadConfig,
    CACHE_TTL_MS,
    MIN_FETCH_ATTEMPT_INTERVAL_MS,
    DELTA_STORAGE_KEY,
    MAX_DELTA_BYTES,
    getBlocklistSize,
    getDeltaSize,
    hostnameVariants,
-    // Exposed for testing only: the ends of the search range are where an
+    _reset,
-    // off-by-one hides, and reaching them through isPhishingDomain() would mean
+    // Exposed for testing only
-    // knowing which domain hashes to the first or last entry.
+    _getVendoredBlacklistSize: () => vendoredBlacklist.size,
-    _hashListed: hashListed,
+    _getDeltaBlacklist: () => deltaBlacklist,
 };
--- a/tests/alarms.test.js
+++ b/tests/alarms.test.js
@@ -80,12 +80,17 @@ describe("alarms module", () => {
        delete global.chrome;
    });
-    test("ensureRecurringAlarms schedules the recurring job", async () => {
+    test("ensureRecurringAlarms schedules both recurring jobs", async () => {
        const created = await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
-        expect(created).toEqual({ balance: true, cleared: [] });
+        expect(created).toEqual({ balance: true, phishing: true });
-        const names = alarmsStub.created.map((c) => c.name);
+        const names = alarmsStub.created.map((c) => c.name).sort();
-        expect(names).toEqual([alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM]);
+        expect(names).toEqual(
            [
                alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM,
                alarmsMod.PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM,
            ].sort(),
        );
    });
    test("the balance refresh keeps its 60-second cadence", async () => {
@@ -94,35 +99,12 @@ describe("alarms module", () => {
        expect(balance.periodInMinutes).toBe(1);
    });
-    test("a retired job's alarm is cleared, not left running", async () => {
+    test("the phishing refresh keeps its 24-hour cadence", async () => {
        // The browser holds an alarm until something clears it. Deleting the
        // job from the code is not enough: on every install that ever ran the
        // version which created it, the alarm goes on waking the service
        // worker on its old schedule with nothing to deliver it to.
        for (const name of alarmsMod.OBSOLETE_ALARMS) {
            alarmsStub.create(name, { periodInMinutes: 24 * 60 });
        }
        expect(alarmsMod.OBSOLETE_ALARMS.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
        const result = await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
        expect(result.cleared).toEqual(alarmsMod.OBSOLETE_ALARMS);
        for (const name of alarmsMod.OBSOLETE_ALARMS) {
            expect(alarmsStub.alarms.get(name)).toBeUndefined();
        }
    });
    test("clearing a retired alarm is not re-reported once it is gone", async () => {
        await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
-        const again = await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
+        const phishing = alarmsStub.alarms.get(
-        expect(again.cleared).toEqual([]);
+            alarmsMod.PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM,
    });
    test("no retired name is also a live one", async () => {
        // A name in both lists would be created and then cleared on every
        // start, so the job it schedules would never fire.
        expect(alarmsMod.OBSOLETE_ALARMS).not.toContain(
            alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM,
        );
        expect(phishing.periodInMinutes).toBe(24 * 60);
    });
    test("no period is below the browser-enforced minimum", async () => {
@@ -140,14 +122,14 @@ describe("alarms module", () => {
    test("a revived worker does not reset an existing alarm's schedule", async () => {
        await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
-        expect(alarmsStub.create).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(alarmsStub.create).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
        // Every wake re-runs the startup path. Re-creating an alarm restarts
        // its period, so a busy extension would push the next fire out
        // forever and the job would never run.
        const again = await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
-        expect(again).toEqual({ balance: false, cleared: [] });
+        expect(again).toEqual({ balance: false, phishing: false });
-        expect(alarmsStub.create).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(alarmsStub.create).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
    });
    test("a missing alarm is re-created on the next start", async () => {
@@ -155,7 +137,7 @@ describe("alarms module", () => {
        await alarmsStub.clear(alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM);
        const again = await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
-        expect(again).toEqual({ balance: true, cleared: [] });
+        expect(again).toEqual({ balance: true, phishing: false });
        expect(
            alarmsStub.alarms.get(alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM),
        ).toBeDefined();
@@ -165,17 +147,17 @@ describe("alarms module", () => {
        // An install carries its alarms across an extension update, so a
        // period changed in a new release only ever reaches users if the
        // stale one is reconciled.
-        alarmsStub.create(alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM, {
+        alarmsStub.create(alarmsMod.PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM, {
            periodInMinutes: 7 * 24 * 60,
        });
        alarmsStub.create.mockClear();
        const created = await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
-        expect(created.balance).toBe(true);
+        expect(created.phishing).toBe(true);
        expect(
-            alarmsStub.alarms.get(alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM)
+            alarmsStub.alarms.get(alarmsMod.PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM)
                .periodInMinutes,
-        ).toBe(alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES);
+        ).toBe(alarmsMod.PHISHING_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES);
    });
    test("reconciling a period settles instead of re-creating forever", async () => {
@@ -186,31 +168,31 @@ describe("alarms module", () => {
        alarmsStub.create.mockClear();
        const again = await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
-        expect(again).toEqual({ balance: false, cleared: [] });
+        expect(again).toEqual({ balance: false, phishing: false });
        expect(alarmsStub.create).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
    });
    test("handlers are dispatched by alarm name from one listener", () => {
        const balance = jest.fn();
-        const other = jest.fn();
+        const phishing = jest.fn();
        expect(
            alarmsMod.registerAlarmHandlers({
                [alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM]: balance,
-                "autistmask-some-other-job": other,
+                [alarmsMod.PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM]: phishing,
            }),
        ).toBe(true);
        expect(alarmsStub.listenerCount()).toBe(1);
        alarmsStub.fire(alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM);
        expect(balance).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-        expect(other).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(phishing).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-        alarmsStub.fire("autistmask-some-other-job");
+        alarmsStub.fire(alarmsMod.PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM);
-        expect(other).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(phishing).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-        alarmsStub.fire("an-alarm-with-no-handler");
+        alarmsStub.fire("some-other-extension-alarm");
        expect(balance).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-        expect(other).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(phishing).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
    });
    test("Firefox MV2 gets the same treatment via browser.alarms", async () => {
@@ -223,8 +205,8 @@ describe("alarms module", () => {
        try {
            const mod = require("../src/shared/alarms");
            const created = await mod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
-            expect(created).toEqual({ balance: true, cleared: [] });
+            expect(created).toEqual({ balance: true, phishing: true });
-            expect(firefoxAlarms.created).toHaveLength(1);
+            expect(firefoxAlarms.created).toHaveLength(2);
            // The Chrome stub must not have been touched.
            expect(alarmsStub.create).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
        } finally {
@@ -238,7 +220,7 @@ describe("alarms module", () => {
        const mod = require("../src/shared/alarms");
        await expect(mod.ensureRecurringAlarms()).resolves.toEqual({
            balance: false,
-            cleared: [],
+            phishing: false,
        });
        expect(mod.registerAlarmHandlers({})).toBe(false);
    });
@@ -292,12 +274,9 @@ function loadBackground(initialStore = {}) {
        tabs: { query: jest.fn(), sendMessage: jest.fn() },
        action: { setPopup: jest.fn() },
    };
    // Present so that a startup path which went to the network would be
    // recorded rather than throwing, which is what makes "no request was made"
    // an observation instead of an assumption.
    global.fetch = jest.fn(async () => ({
        ok: true,
-        json: async () => ({}),
+        json: async () => ({ blacklist: [] }),
    }));
    jest.resetModules();
    require("../src/background/index");
@@ -339,21 +318,17 @@ describe("background worker scheduling", () => {
        // Let the startup path's promises settle.
        await settle();
-        const names = alarmsStub.created.map((c) => c.name);
+        const names = alarmsStub.created.map((c) => c.name).sort();
-        const { BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM } = require("../src/shared/alarms");
+        const {
-        expect(names).toEqual([BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM]);
+            BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM,
            PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM,
        } = require("../src/shared/alarms");
        expect(names).toEqual(
            [BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM, PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM].sort(),
        );
        expect(mockSetIntervalCalls).toBe(0);
    });
    test("startup contacts nothing", async () => {
        // The phishing blocklist is vendored at build time and there is no
        // other startup fetch, so a worker coming up asks nobody anything.
        // Every wake used to be a candidate for a blocklist download.
        loadBackground();
        await settle();
        expect(global.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
    });
    test("an onAlarm listener is installed on startup", async () => {
        alarmsStub = loadBackground().alarmsStub;
        await settle();
@@ -373,7 +348,7 @@ describe("background worker scheduling", () => {
        alarmsStub.created.length = 0;
        loaded.listeners.onStartup[0]();
        await settle();
-        expect(alarmsStub.created).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(alarmsStub.created).toHaveLength(2);
    });
    test("the install-time listener and the top-level call share one run", async () => {
@@ -385,10 +360,13 @@ describe("background worker scheduling", () => {
        loaded.listeners.onInstalled[0]();
        await settle();
-        expect(alarmsStub.created).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(alarmsStub.created).toHaveLength(2);
-        expect(alarmsStub.created.map((c) => c.name)).toEqual([
+        expect(alarmsStub.created.map((c) => c.name).sort()).toEqual(
-            "autistmask-balance-refresh",
+            [
-        ]);
+                "autistmask-balance-refresh",
                "autistmask-phishing-refresh",
            ].sort(),
        );
    });
 });
--- a/tests/backgroundApproval.test.js
+++ b/tests/backgroundApproval.test.js
@@ -20,11 +20,6 @@
 const { Network, Wallet } = require("ethers");
 // The real formatter the approval screen renders failures through. Bound here,
 // before any jest.doMock() of the module, so the copy assertions below check
 // what the user is actually shown.
 const { describeSigningFailure } = require("../src/shared/approvalVerify");
 const SIGNER_KEY =
    "0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
 const OTHER_KEY =
@@ -157,21 +152,16 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
    }));
    jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
        isPhishingDomain: () => false,
        refreshPhishingListOnSchedule: jest.fn(async () => {}),
        initPhishingList: jest.fn(async () => {}),
    }));
    jest.doMock("../src/shared/alarms", () => ({
        BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM: "balance",
        PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM: "phishing",
        BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES: 1,
        ensureRecurringAlarms: jest.fn(async () => {}),
        registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn(),
    }));
    // The real verification module, except where a test replaces one export
    // with a throw to drive the handler's own error handling into failing.
    if (opts.approvalVerify) {
        jest.doMock("../src/shared/approvalVerify", () => ({
            ...jest.requireActual("../src/shared/approvalVerify"),
            ...opts.approvalVerify,
        }));
    }
    const persisted = {
        wallets: [
@@ -196,10 +186,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
    global.chrome = {
        storage: {
            local: {
-                get: jest.fn(
+                get: jest.fn(async () => ({ autistmask: persisted })),
                    opts.storageGet ||
                        (async () => ({ autistmask: persisted })),
                ),
                set: jest.fn(async () => {}),
            },
        },
@@ -425,15 +412,6 @@ async function settle() {
    for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
 }
 // settle() only drains microtasks. A handler whose last-resort .catch() has to
 // run after a macrotask boundary needs those turns too, so the assertion that
 // the page WAS answered is what reports a regression rather than a timeout.
 async function settleIncludingRejections() {
    await settle();
    await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
    await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
 }
 afterEach(() => {
    delete global.chrome;
    jest.resetModules();
@@ -1500,200 +1478,6 @@ describe("a claimed approval outlives every other retirement path", () => {
    });
 });
 // A handler that throws must still answer. `sendResponse` is the only thing
 // that settles the page's window.ethereum.request() promise, so a throw that
 // escapes a handler leaves that promise pending forever — no error, no
 // timeout, indistinguishable from a slow wallet. Each case below drives a real
 // throw out of a handler rather than asserting the catch block exists.
 describe("a handler that throws still settles the page", () => {
    const INTERNAL_ERROR = {
        code: -32603,
        message:
            "AutistMask could not complete this request because of an internal error.",
    };
    let errorLog;
    beforeEach(() => {
        errorLog = jest.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => {});
    });
    afterEach(() => {
        errorLog.mockRestore();
    });
    // getState() awaits extension storage unguarded, and every read path in
    // handleRpc goes through it. A storage read that rejects is the whole
    // failure — no hook in the handler itself.
    test("a rejected handleRpc rejects the page instead of hanging it", async () => {
        const bg = loadBackground({
            storageGet: async () => {
                throw new Error("storage unavailable");
            },
        });
        const answer = bg.send(
            { type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC", method: "eth_accounts", params: [] },
            { origin: ORIGIN },
        );
        await settleIncludingRejections();
        // The channel is held open for the async answer, and the answer
        // arrives.
        expect(answer.kept).toBe(true);
        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
            error: INTERNAL_ERROR,
        });
        // Not swallowed: the throw is on the background console, which is how
        // this class gets caught in future.
        expect(errorLog).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
            "[AutistMask]",
            "RPC request failed:",
            "eth_accounts",
            expect.objectContaining({ message: "storage unavailable" }),
        );
    });
    // The transaction response handler wraps every statement in a try, so what
    // escapes it is a throw from inside one of its catch blocks. Here the
    // failure classifier itself throws while classifying a real verification
    // failure — the approval is left claimed, so nothing else can settle it.
    // The escape happens before broadcastTransaction() is reached, so the
    // reported stage must be the one that says the transaction is gone.
    test("a throw while verifying a transaction settles both the page and the popup", async () => {
        const bg = loadBackground({
            approvalVerify: {
                describeTxFailure: () => {
                    throw new Error("classifier broke");
                },
            },
        });
        const pending = bg.requestTx();
        await settle();
        const id = pending.id();
        // A real verification failure: the artifact is signed at a nonce the
        // approval never displayed.
        const answer = bg.send(
            {
                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
                id,
                approved: true,
                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE + 1),
            },
            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
        );
        await settleIncludingRejections();
        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ error: INTERNAL_ERROR });
        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
            error: INTERNAL_ERROR.message,
            retryable: false,
            // Nothing was broadcast, so the popup must say the request is gone
            // rather than that it may still have reached the network.
            stage: "verify",
        });
        expect(errorLog).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
            "[AutistMask]",
            "transaction approval response failed:",
            expect.objectContaining({ message: "classifier broke" }),
        );
        // The copy the user actually reads, from the popup's own formatter.
        expect(
            describeSigningFailure(answer.sendResponse.mock.calls[0][0], "")
                .message,
        ).toBe(
            INTERNAL_ERROR.message +
                " This request can no longer be signed." +
                " Please start it again from the site.",
        );
    });
    // The other side of the same local: once broadcastTransaction() has been
    // entered the wallet genuinely cannot tell whether the node took the
    // transaction, and the copy that warns about a second send is correct.
    test("a throw while handling a failed broadcast reports the broadcast stage", async () => {
        const bg = loadBackground({
            approvalVerify: {
                describeTxFailure: () => {
                    throw new Error("classifier broke");
                },
            },
        });
        bg.broadcastTransaction.mockRejectedValue(new Error("node refused"));
        const pending = bg.requestTx();
        await settle();
        const id = pending.id();
        // The approved artifact, so verification passes and the failure
        // happens at the broadcast.
        const answer = bg.send(
            {
                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
                id,
                approved: true,
                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
            },
            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
        );
        await settleIncludingRejections();
        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).toHaveBeenCalled();
        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ error: INTERNAL_ERROR });
        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
            error: INTERNAL_ERROR.message,
            retryable: false,
            stage: "broadcast",
        });
        expect(
            describeSigningFailure(answer.sendResponse.mock.calls[0][0], "")
                .message,
        ).toBe(
            INTERNAL_ERROR.message +
                " The transaction may still have reached the network." +
                " Check the account before sending it again.",
        );
    });
    test("a throw while handling a failed signature settles both the page and the popup", async () => {
        const bg = loadBackground({
            approvalVerify: {
                failureIsRetryable: () => {
                    throw new Error("classifier broke");
                },
            },
        });
        const pending = bg.requestSign();
        await settle();
        // A real verification failure: the active address moved after the
        // approval was raised.
        bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
        const answer = bg.send(
            {
                type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
                id: pending.id(),
                approved: true,
                signature: await signer.signMessage(
                    Buffer.from(MESSAGE.slice(2), "hex"),
                ),
            },
            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
        );
        await settleIncludingRejections();
        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ error: INTERNAL_ERROR });
        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
            error: INTERNAL_ERROR.message,
            retryable: false,
        });
        expect(errorLog).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
            "[AutistMask]",
            "sign approval response failed:",
            expect.objectContaining({ message: "classifier broke" }),
        );
    });
 });
 describe("popup-only messages", () => {
    test("a page sender cannot answer an approval", async () => {
        const bg = loadBackground();
--- a/tests/e2e/harness.js
+++ b/tests/e2e/harness.js
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ const os = require("os");
 const path = require("path");
 const { chromium } = require("playwright-core");
-const { installNetworkStubs, WORKER_PROBE_URL } = require("./network");
+const { installNetworkStubs } = require("./network");
 const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "..");
 const EXT_PATH = path.join(REPO_ROOT, "dist", "chrome");
@@ -129,109 +129,42 @@ function attachErrorListeners(ctx, errors) {
    // if it ever stops being.
 }
 function sleep(ms) {
    return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
 }
 // The most recently seen background worker, waiting for one if none has
 // appeared yet. Most recent rather than first: Chrome stops an idle MV3
 // worker and starts a fresh one on the next event, and a handle to a
 // stopped worker cannot be evaluated in.
 async function serviceWorker(ctx) {
-    const workers = ctx.serviceWorkers();
+    const [existing] = ctx.serviceWorkers();
-    const latest = workers[workers.length - 1];
+    if (existing) return existing;
    if (latest) return latest;
    return ctx.waitForEvent("serviceworker", { timeout: 30000 });
 }
-// How long to wait for the probe request the worker is asked to make.
+// How long to wait for the background worker's first outbound request.
 //
 // The margin that actually decides whether this check is sound is not
 // this timeout — it is whether the route handler is installed before the
 // worker fetches. Measured over several runs: route installation
 // completes 11-23ms after the context comes up, and the worker's
 // blocklist fetch arrives 525-883ms after that, so the route wins by
 // roughly 25-50x. This 30s figure is only slack for a loaded machine on
 // top of that; losing the race fails the run rather than passing it
 // quietly, which was verified by forcing a 3s delay before route
 // installation.
 const WORKER_TRAFFIC_TIMEOUT_MS = 30000;
 // ctx.route() only sees service-worker requests when Playwright runs with
 // PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1, which script/test-e2e
-// sets. Without it every fetch the background worker makes goes to the
+// sets. Without it the worker's traffic — notably the phishing blocklist
-// real internet and nothing says so. A harness whose isolation can lapse
+// fetch src/background/index.js issues at startup — goes to the real
-// in silence is worthless, so this does not take the flag on trust: a
+// internet, and nothing says so, because src/shared/phishingDomains.js
-// request the worker itself issues has to show up in the route handler,
+// swallows fetch failures. A harness whose isolation can lapse in silence
-// or the suite refuses to run.
+// is worthless, so this does not take the flag on trust: the background
 // worker's own startup fetch has to show up in the route handler, or the
 // suite refuses to run.
 //
-// The anchor is a probe the harness asks the worker for, not traffic the
+// Deliberately NOT a synthetic probe fetched through worker.evaluate():
-// extension generates on its own. It used to be the phishing blocklist
+// evaluating in an extension worker this early kills it (the call fails
-// fetch src/background/index.js issued at startup; that fetch is gone —
+// with "Target page, context or browser has been closed" and the worker
-// the blocklist is vendored at build time and the extension contacts
+// disappears), which would break the very thing being measured. Observing
-// nobody when it starts — so there is no longer any startup traffic to
+// traffic the extension already generates costs nothing and cannot
-// observe and the check generates its own.
+// perturb it.
-//
+async function assertWorkerTrafficIntercepted(stubs) {
 // Evaluating in the worker straight after launch does not work, and that
 // is not a stale observation: it was tried again here and failed with
 // "Target page, context or browser has been closed" on the first run.
 // Chrome stops the freshly registered worker as soon as it has nothing to
 // do, and the extension no longer gives it anything to do — which is the
 // same change that removed the old anchor. So the probe wakes the worker
 // before it evaluates in it, by sending it a message from an extension
 // page and waiting for the reply: delivering a message is what starts a
 // stopped worker, and a worker that has just answered one is alive.
 // The evaluated fetch is not awaited, so nothing in the worker is held
 // open by the probe either.
 async function wakeWorker(ctx) {
    const sw = await serviceWorker(ctx);
    const extensionId = new URL(sw.url()).host;
    const page = await ctx.newPage();
    try {
        await page.goto(
            "chrome-extension://" + extensionId + "/src/popup/index.html",
        );
        // eth_chainId is answered from local state: it wakes the worker
        // and changes nothing.
        await page.evaluate(
            () =>
                new Promise((resolve) => {
                    chrome.runtime.sendMessage(
                        {
                            type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
                            method: "eth_chainId",
                            params: [],
                        },
                        () => resolve(null),
                    );
                }),
        );
    } finally {
        await page.close();
    }
 }
 async function probeFromWorker(ctx, url) {
    let lastError = null;
    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 5; attempt++) {
        try {
            await wakeWorker(ctx);
            const sw = await serviceWorker(ctx);
            await sw.evaluate((u) => {
                // Deliberately not awaited and never rejected: what is
                // being observed is that the request reaches the route
                // handler, and an unhandled rejection in the worker would
                // be collected as a suite error if it did not.
                fetch(u).catch(() => {});
            }, url);
            return;
        } catch (e) {
            lastError = e;
            await sleep(500);
        }
    }
    throw new Error(
        "could not ask the background worker to fetch " +
            url +
            ", so service-worker interception was never tested. Last " +
            "error: " +
            (lastError && lastError.message),
    );
 }
 async function assertWorkerTrafficIntercepted(ctx, stubs) {
    await probeFromWorker(ctx, WORKER_PROBE_URL);
    const seen = await stubs.waitForServiceWorkerTraffic(
        WORKER_TRAFFIC_TIMEOUT_MS,
    );
@@ -244,16 +177,19 @@ async function assertWorkerTrafficIntercepted(ctx, stubs) {
    throw new Error(
        "observed no service-worker request in the route handler within " +
            WORKER_TRAFFIC_TIMEOUT_MS +
-            "ms, although the background worker was asked to fetch " +
+            "ms. Under working interception the background worker's " +
-            WORKER_PROBE_URL +
+            "startup blocklist fetch (src/background/index.js) reaches the " +
-            ". Two causes are plausible and this check cannot distinguish " +
+            "handler about half a second after the route is installed. " +
            "Two causes are plausible and this check cannot distinguish " +
            "them: (1) service-worker interception is not in effect, so " +
-            "that request went to the real internet unobserved — the suite " +
+            "that traffic went to the real internet unobserved — the suite " +
            "must be run through script/test-e2e, which sets " +
            "PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1, and a " +
            "Playwright upgrade may have dropped or renamed that flag; " +
-            "(2) the probe never ran, because the worker was torn down " +
+            "(2) no worker request was made in the first place — the route " +
-            "between being handed over and being evaluated in. Either way " +
+            "lost the startup race, or the worker no longer fetches at " +
            "startup, in which case this check needs a new anchor because " +
            "there is no longer any worker traffic to observe. Either way " +
            "the fix is a replacement mechanism or an honest downgrade of " +
            "the isolation claims in tests/e2e/network.js and README.md — " +
            "not deleting this check",
@@ -305,7 +241,7 @@ async function launch(routeOpts) {
        routeOpts.report = (text) => errors.record("network", text);
        const stubs = await installNetworkStubs(ctx, routeOpts);
-        await assertWorkerTrafficIntercepted(ctx, stubs);
+        await assertWorkerTrafficIntercepted(stubs);
        // The extension id is derived from the unpacked path, so it
        // changes and must never be hardcoded. It is the host part of the
--- a/tests/e2e/network.js
+++ b/tests/e2e/network.js
@@ -9,12 +9,13 @@
 //
 // Service-worker coverage is not free: ctx.route() only sees worker
 // traffic when PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1 is set in
-// the environment, which script/test-e2e does. Without it every fetch the
+// the environment, which script/test-e2e does. Without it the phishing
-// MV3 background worker makes — the JSON-RPC calls behind every approval
+// blocklist fetch that src/background/index.js issues at worker startup
-// in this suite among them — goes to the real internet unobserved. That is
+// silently reaches raw.githubusercontent.com on the open internet, and
-// not left to trust: waitForServiceWorkerTraffic() below backs the
+// src/shared/phishingDomains.js swallows the failure so nothing surfaces
-// launch-time canary in harness.js, which fails the entire suite if worker
+// it. That is not left to trust: waitForServiceWorkerTraffic() below
-// requests stop being visible here.
+// backs the launch-time canary in harness.js, which fails the entire
 // suite if worker requests stop being visible here.
 //
 // Anything not explicitly stubbed here is aborted AND reported to the
 // error collector, so a newly added outbound call shows up as a test
@@ -102,22 +103,6 @@ function word(value) {
 const DAPP_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.e2e.test";
 const DAPP_URL = DAPP_ORIGIN + "/";
 // The same page, served from a hostname that is on the vendored phishing
 // blocklist, so the phishing warning can be driven end to end against the real
 // list rather than a stub of it. It is a live entry at the pinned upstream
 // commit; upstream prunes, so a re-vendoring run that retires it turns the
 // phishing test red, and the fix is a current entry, not a weaker assertion.
 const PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN = "https://myetheywallet.com";
 const PHISHING_DAPP_URL = PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN + "/";
 // A request the harness asks the background service worker to make, purely so
 // that worker interception can be proved before any test runs. Nothing in the
 // extension fetches at startup any more — the blocklist is vendored at build
 // time — so the canary in harness.js has no product traffic to anchor on and
 // generates its own. See assertWorkerTrafficIntercepted().
 const WORKER_PROBE_ORIGIN = "https://worker-probe.e2e.test";
 const WORKER_PROBE_URL = WORKER_PROBE_ORIGIN + "/canary";
 // Requests are parked rather than awaited. An approval prompt only exists
 // while its call is in flight, so a test that awaited the promise could
 // never drive the popup that has to settle it; start() files the promise
@@ -570,9 +555,10 @@ async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
    // E2E_TRACE_NETWORK=1 prints every request that reaches this handler,
    // tagged [sw] when it originated in the background service worker.
    // It exists so the isolation claim above can be re-checked by anyone
-    // in one command, without editing files: the canary probe and then
+    // in one command, without editing files: the phishing blocklist fetch
-    // every JSON-RPC call behind an approval showing up with an [sw] tag
+    // showing up with an [sw] tag is the proof that the worker really is
-    // is the proof that the worker really is intercepted.
+    // intercepted and that the raw.githubusercontent.com stub below is
    // live code rather than decoration.
    const trace = traceEnabled(process.env.E2E_TRACE_NETWORK);
    // Regex rather than a glob so chrome-extension:// resource loads are
@@ -603,11 +589,7 @@ async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
        // trips run against a real http(s) origin — which is what makes the
        // shipped content scripts inject at all — without any remote origin
        // being involved.
-        if (
+        if (url.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN && p === "/") {
            (url.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN ||
                url.origin === PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN) &&
            p === "/"
        ) {
            return route.fulfill({
                status: 200,
                contentType: "text/html; charset=utf-8",
@@ -653,10 +635,18 @@ async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
            return jsonResponse(route, { Data: {} });
        }
-        // The interception canary's own request. Answered with nothing: what
+        // MetaMask phishing blocklist
-        // is being observed is that it arrived here at all.
+        if (
-        if (url.href === WORKER_PROBE_URL) {
+            url.hostname === "raw.githubusercontent.com" ||
-            return route.fulfill({ status: 204, body: "" });
+            p.endsWith("/eth-phishing-detect/main/src/config.json")
        ) {
            return jsonResponse(route, {
                version: 2,
                tolerance: 2,
                fuzzylist: [],
                whitelist: [],
                blacklist: [],
            });
        }
        // Best-effort Etherscan address labels: served as an empty page.
@@ -677,12 +667,12 @@ async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
         * Resolve with the first service-worker-originated request this
         * handler saw, or null if none arrives within `ms`.
         *
-         * The caller asks the worker for one request of its own (see
+         * The background worker fetches the phishing blocklist at
-         * WORKER_PROBE_URL) and then waits here, so under working
+         * startup, unconditionally, within about a second of the context
-         * interception this resolves almost immediately. Nothing arriving
+         * coming up — so under working interception this resolves almost
-         * means worker traffic is bypassing the handler entirely and going
+         * immediately. Nothing arriving means worker traffic is bypassing
-         * to the real internet, which the caller turns into a hard failure
+         * the handler entirely and going to the real internet, which the
-         * of the whole suite.
+         * caller turns into a hard failure of the whole suite.
         */
        waitForServiceWorkerTraffic(ms) {
            if (firstWorkerRequest) return Promise.resolve(firstWorkerRequest);
@@ -706,9 +696,6 @@ module.exports = {
    DAPP_HTML,
    DAPP_ORIGIN,
    DAPP_URL,
    PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN,
    PHISHING_DAPP_URL,
    WORKER_PROBE_URL,
    FEE_ESTIMATE_WEI,
    FEE_RESERVE_WEI,
    STUB_COUNTERPARTY,
--- a/tests/e2e/run.js
+++ b/tests/e2e/run.js
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ const {
 const {
    DAPP_ORIGIN,
    DAPP_URL,
    PHISHING_DAPP_URL,
    FEE_ESTIMATE_WEI,
    FEE_RESERVE_WEI,
    STUB_COUNTERPARTY,
@@ -43,7 +42,6 @@ const {
    STUB_TX_HASH,
 } = require("./network");
 const { DUST_THRESHOLD_MESSAGE } = require("../../src/popup/dustThreshold");
 const { NETWORKS } = require("../../src/shared/networks");
 const TEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 120000;
@@ -946,328 +944,6 @@ test("confirming removes the address and returns Home (#162)", async (env) => {
    );
 });
 // ------------------------------------------------- Settings screen (#229)
 // Settings holds the densest run of $("...") lookups in the codebase, and
 // until this section nothing drove it in a browser. One wrong id makes
 // settings.init() throw, which aborts the rest of index.js init() before it
 // renders anything at all — so a broken id does not degrade Settings, it
 // leaves the whole popup blank. These tests assert the controls are there
 // AND that they work, because "the view is visible" would still pass
 // against a screen whose handlers were never wired.
 // The four Token Spam Protection checkboxes, in markup order, with the
 // src/shared/state.js key each one is bound to. All four default true.
 const SPAM_FILTER_CHECKBOXES = [
    { id: "settings-hide-spoofed-symbols", key: "hideSpoofedSymbols" },
    { id: "settings-hide-low-holders", key: "hideLowHolderTokens" },
    { id: "settings-hide-fraud-contracts", key: "hideFraudContracts" },
    { id: "settings-hide-dust", key: "hideDustTransactions" },
 ];
 // The one toggled through a reopen. Chosen because nothing later in this
 // suite depends on it: the other three filter token and transaction lists
 // that the ConfirmTx and dApp sections go on to drive.
 const TOGGLED_FILTER = "settings-hide-dust";
 // Everything the Settings assertions below must observe, recorded as each
 // group of them completes. The final test demands the exact set.
 //
 // The point is that a green run cannot mean the assertions were skipped.
 // Navigation that silently fails already fails a test — visible() throws
 // on a timeout — but an early return, a deleted test, or a body that
 // stopped being reached would otherwise shrink this section quietly
 // instead of reddening the run.
 const SETTINGS_COVERAGE = [
    "about-well",
    "spam-checkbox-defaults",
    "theme-select",
    "network-select",
    "selector-round-trip",
    "selector-restore",
    "toggle-off-survives-reopen",
    "toggle-on-survives-reopen",
    "wallet-list",
 ];
 // A control read as the DOM has it, not as a selector claims: tag name and
 // type distinguish a real <input type="checkbox"> from a <div> that merely
 // carries the id, and `checked` is the live property rather than the
 // attribute, so it reflects what init() assigned.
 function controlState(page, id) {
    return page.evaluate((elementId) => {
        const el = document.getElementById(elementId);
        if (!el) return null;
        return {
            tag: el.tagName.toLowerCase(),
            type: el.type || "",
            checked: el.checked,
            value: el.value,
            options: Array.from(el.options || []).map((o) => o.value),
        };
    }, id);
 }
 async function checkboxStates(page) {
    const out = {};
    for (const { id } of SPAM_FILTER_CHECKBOXES) {
        out[id] = await controlState(page, id);
    }
    return out;
 }
 function assertSpamCheckbox(st, id, expected, where) {
    assert(st !== null, "no element with id " + id + " on Settings " + where);
    assert(
        st.tag === "input" && st.type === "checkbox",
        id + " is a <" + st.tag + " type=" + st.type + ">, not a checkbox",
    );
    assert(
        st.checked === expected,
        id +
            " reads " +
            st.checked +
            " " +
            where +
            ", expected " +
            expected +
            " — the checkbox is on screen but not carrying the persisted value",
    );
 }
 test("Settings renders with the whole screen populated (#229)", async (env) => {
    await visible(env.page, "#view-main");
    await openSettings(env.page);
    // show() writes the About well near its end — only the debug well and
    // the debug-mode checkbox follow it — and showView() is the last thing
    // of all, so an id show() cannot find aborts before Settings is ever
    // displayed. Reading these values back proves show() ran through to
    // there, not just far enough to unhide the section. They are filled
    // from build-time constants that always have a value, so empty means
    // the write did not happen.
    const about = await env.page.evaluate(() => {
        const out = {};
        for (const id of [
            "about-license",
            "about-author",
            "about-version",
            "about-release-date",
            "about-commit-link",
        ]) {
            const el = document.getElementById(id);
            out[id] = el === null ? null : el.textContent.trim();
        }
        return out;
    });
    for (const [id, text] of Object.entries(about)) {
        assert(
            text !== null && text.length > 0,
            "the About well left #" +
                id +
                " unwritten: " +
                JSON.stringify(about),
        );
    }
    env.settingsCoverage.add("about-well");
    // The wallet list is rendered by settings.js rather than authored in
    // index.html, so an empty container means renderWalletListSettings()
    // did not run even though the screen came up.
    const wallets = await env.page
        .locator("#settings-wallet-list .settings-wallet-name")
        .count();
    assert(
        wallets >= 2,
        "Settings lists " +
            wallets +
            " wallets; the suite created two by this point",
    );
    env.settingsCoverage.add("wallet-list");
 });
 test("the four Token Spam Protection checkboxes render, defaulted on (#229)", async (env) => {
    await openSettings(env.page);
    const states = await checkboxStates(env.page);
    for (const { id } of SPAM_FILTER_CHECKBOXES) {
        assertSpamCheckbox(states[id], id, true, "on first render");
    }
    env.settingsCoverage.add("spam-checkbox-defaults");
 });
 test("the theme and network selectors render their real choices (#229)", async (env) => {
    await openSettings(env.page);
    const theme = await controlState(env.page, "settings-theme");
    assert(theme !== null, "no #settings-theme element on Settings");
    assert(
        theme.tag === "select",
        "#settings-theme is a <" + theme.tag + ">, not a <select>",
    );
    assert(
        theme.options.join(",") === "system,light,dark",
        "the theme selector offers " + JSON.stringify(theme.options),
    );
    env.settingsCoverage.add("theme-select");
    const network = await controlState(env.page, "settings-network");
    assert(network !== null, "no #settings-network element on Settings");
    assert(
        network.tag === "select",
        "#settings-network is a <" + network.tag + ">, not a <select>",
    );
    const wantNetworks = Object.keys(NETWORKS).sort().join(",");
    assert(
        network.options.slice().sort().join(",") === wantNetworks,
        "the network selector offers " +
            JSON.stringify(network.options) +
            ", expected the networks in src/shared/networks.js: " +
            wantNetworks,
    );
    env.settingsCoverage.add("network-select");
 });
 // Reads both selectors in one page task, so a round trip cannot observe
 // them at two different moments.
 async function selectorValues(page) {
    const theme = await controlState(page, "settings-theme");
    const network = await controlState(page, "settings-network");
    assert(theme !== null, "no #settings-theme element on Settings");
    assert(network !== null, "no #settings-network element on Settings");
    return { theme: theme.value, network: network.value };
 }
 function assertSelectors(got, wantTheme, wantNetwork, where) {
    assert(
        got.theme === wantTheme,
        "the theme selector shows " +
            JSON.stringify(got.theme) +
            " " +
            where +
            ", expected " +
            JSON.stringify(wantTheme),
    );
    assert(
        got.network === wantNetwork,
        "the network selector shows " +
            JSON.stringify(got.network) +
            " " +
            where +
            ", expected " +
            JSON.stringify(wantNetwork),
    );
 }
 // The two values the selectors are driven to. NEITHER is the first
 // <option> of its <select> (`system` and `mainnet` are), and that is the
 // entire point: the first option is what the DOM reports with no
 // JavaScript involved at all, so asserting it would pass just as happily
 // against a Settings screen that never assigned anything. Only a value
 // that went out through the change handler and saveState(), and came back
 // through loadState() and the assignment show()/init() makes, can be read
 // here.
 const NONDEFAULT_THEME = "dark";
 const NONDEFAULT_NETWORK = "sepolia";
 test("the theme and network selectors carry a non-default persisted value (#229)", async (env) => {
    await openSettings(env.page);
    // selectOption() fires "change", which is what the handlers bind.
    await env.page.selectOption("#settings-theme", NONDEFAULT_THEME);
    await env.page.selectOption("#settings-network", NONDEFAULT_NETWORK);
    await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
    assertSelectors(
        await selectorValues(env.page),
        NONDEFAULT_THEME,
        NONDEFAULT_NETWORK,
        "after reopening the popup",
    );
    env.settingsCoverage.add("selector-round-trip");
    // Restore, the same way round, and assert the restore actually took
    // rather than trusting it: the later sections inherit this fixture,
    // and a selector stuck on `dark`/`sepolia` would otherwise be
    // indistinguishable here from one that persists correctly. Switching
    // the network back also returns state.rpcUrl and state.blockscoutUrl
    // to the mainnet defaults that onChainSwitch() overwrote, which are
    // the values src/shared/state.js starts with.
    await env.page.selectOption("#settings-theme", "system");
    await env.page.selectOption("#settings-network", "mainnet");
    await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
    assertSelectors(
        await selectorValues(env.page),
        "system",
        "mainnet",
        "after restoring and reopening the popup",
    );
    env.settingsCoverage.add("selector-restore");
 });
 // The functional half. A checkbox that renders but is not wired looks
 // identical on screen; only a value that survives being written to storage
 // and read back by a fresh page load tells the two apart. That round trip
 // runs through the change handler, saveState(), loadState() and the
 // assignment init() makes — every part of the wiring at once.
 test("a spam filter toggled in Settings survives a popup reopen (#229)", async (env) => {
    await openSettings(env.page);
    await env.page.click("#" + TOGGLED_FILTER);
    const immediately = await controlState(env.page, TOGGLED_FILTER);
    assert(
        immediately.checked === false,
        "clicking #" + TOGGLED_FILTER + " did not clear it",
    );
    await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
    const after = await checkboxStates(env.page);
    for (const { id } of SPAM_FILTER_CHECKBOXES) {
        assertSpamCheckbox(
            after[id],
            id,
            id !== TOGGLED_FILTER,
            "after reopening the popup",
        );
    }
    env.settingsCoverage.add("toggle-off-survives-reopen");
 });
 test("turning the same filter back on survives a reopen too (#229)", async (env) => {
    await openSettings(env.page);
    await env.page.click("#" + TOGGLED_FILTER);
    await reopenPopup(env, "#view-settings");
    // Restores the fixture the later sections inherit, and rules out a
    // checkbox that persists "off" only because it is stuck there.
    const after = await checkboxStates(env.page);
    for (const { id } of SPAM_FILTER_CHECKBOXES) {
        assertSpamCheckbox(after[id], id, true, "after toggling back on");
    }
    env.settingsCoverage.add("toggle-on-survives-reopen");
    await env.page.click("#btn-settings-back");
    await visible(env.page, "#view-main");
 });
 test("the Settings assertions above all ran (#229)", async (env) => {
    const seen = [...env.settingsCoverage].sort();
    const want = SETTINGS_COVERAGE.slice().sort();
    assert(
        seen.join(",") === want.join(","),
        "the Settings section covered " +
            JSON.stringify(seen) +
            " but must cover " +
            JSON.stringify(want) +
            " — a green run here would otherwise mean only that fewer " +
            "assertions ran, not that they passed",
    );
 });
 // ------------------------------------------------ dust threshold (#233)
 // The popup size README documents the UI as designed for. Pages in this
@@ -2070,9 +1746,9 @@ async function extensionActiveAddress(page) {
    return getAddress(address);
 }
-async function openDapp(ctx, url = DAPP_URL) {
+async function openDapp(ctx) {
    const page = await ctx.newPage();
-    await page.goto(url);
+    await page.goto(DAPP_URL);
    // window.ethereum is not the fixture's doing — it is the shipped
    // MAIN-world content script. Waiting for it is waiting for the real
    // provider to have injected itself into a real http(s) origin.
@@ -2544,15 +2220,6 @@ test("eth_requestAccounts rejected at the prompt returns a rejection (#183)", as
                JSON.stringify(hostname),
        );
        // The control for the phishing test below: this origin is not on the
        // blocklist, so the banner must be absent here. Without it a banner
        // that was simply always visible would satisfy that test.
        assert(
            await popup.locator("#approve-site-phishing-warning").isHidden(),
            "the phishing warning is showing for an origin that is not on " +
                "the blocklist, so its appearance proves nothing",
        );
        // Deliberately not remembered: a remembered rejection lands the
        // origin in deniedSites and every later test in this section is
        // auto-rejected with no prompt at all, which would look like a pass.
@@ -2616,53 +2283,6 @@ test("eth_requestAccounts approved returns the selected address (#183)", async (
    );
 });
 test("a connect request from a blocklisted site is flagged (#219)", async (env) => {
    // The vendored blocklist, end to end: a real entry from the shipped
    // artifact, served as a real http(s) origin, reaching the real background
    // check and the real approval screen. Nothing about the list is stubbed —
    // there is nothing left to stub, since the extension no longer fetches it.
    const phishingDapp = await openDapp(env.ctx, PHISHING_DAPP_URL);
    const hostname = new URL(PHISHING_DAPP_URL).hostname;
    try {
        await reserveApprovalTab(env);
        await startRequest(
            phishingDapp,
            "phishing-accounts",
            "eth_requestAccounts",
            [],
        );
        const popup = await openSiteApprovalPopup(env);
        try {
            await visible(popup, "#view-approve-site");
            const shown = await popup.locator("#approve-hostname").innerText();
            assert(
                shown === hostname,
                "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " +
                    JSON.stringify(shown),
            );
            await visible(popup, "#approve-site-phishing-warning");
            console.log("# phishing warning shown for " + hostname);
            // Not remembered: a remembered decision for this origin would
            // outlive the test.
            await popup.uncheck("#approve-remember");
            await popup.click("#btn-reject");
            await assertUserRejection(
                phishingDapp,
                "phishing-accounts",
                "the blocklisted site's eth_requestAccounts",
            );
        } finally {
            await closeApprovalPages(env.ctx);
        }
    } finally {
        await phishingDapp.close();
    }
 });
 test("personal_sign signs, and the signature recovers to the address (#183)", async (env) => {
    await startRequest(env.dapp, "sign", "personal_sign", [
        SIGN_HEX,
@@ -3126,11 +2746,6 @@ async function main() {
        // The recovery phrase of the wallet created in test 2, so later
        // tests can assert on the real secret rather than its shape.
        phrase: null,
        // What the Settings section (#229) actually observed. A guard test
        // at the end of that section demands the full set, so a skipped or
        // silently shortened assertion reddens the run instead of shrinking
        // it.
        settingsCoverage: new Set(),
        // Confirmation-screen heights, measured in the pending state and
        // compared against every later state of the same screen.
        ethPendingHeight: null,
--- a/tests/phishingDomains.test.js
+++ b/tests/phishingDomains.test.js
@@ -1,219 +1,573 @@
-// The phishing blocklist is vendored at build time and shipped as digests:
+// Extension storage stub for the Node test environment. The module resolves
-// script/vendor-blocklist writes src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json, and nothing
+// the storage API on use, so this only has to exist before the first call.
-// fetches anything at runtime. Two things therefore have to be proven here, and
+// Values round-trip through JSON the way structured cloning would, so a test
-// the second is the one that would otherwise fail silently:
+// cannot pass by holding a live reference to the module's own array.
-//
+const storageStore = {};
-//   - real domains from the vendored list are detected, and clean ones are not.
+global.chrome = {
-//   - a malformed artifact fails loudly. Every way of getting the artifact
+    storage: {
-//     wrong produces a blocklist that matches nothing while looking healthy,
+        local: {
-//     which is a phishing check that answers "no" to everything.
+            get: async (key) =>
                Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(storageStore, key)
                    ? { [key]: JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(storageStore[key])) }
                    : {},
            set: async (items) => {
                for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(items)) {
                    storageStore[key] = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(value));
                }
            },
            remove: async (key) => {
                delete storageStore[key];
            },
        },
    },
 };
 const {
    isPhishingDomain,
    loadConfig,
    getBlocklistSize,
    getDeltaSize,
    hostnameVariants,
    DELTA_STORAGE_KEY,
    _reset,
    _getVendoredBlacklistSize,
    _getDeltaBlacklist,
 } = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
 const { HASH_HEX_CHARS, hashDomain } = require("../src/shared/domainHash");
 const vendored = require("../src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json");
-// Domains present in the vendored list at the pinned upstream commit. Upstream
+function clearStorage() {
-// prunes as well as adds, so re-vendoring can retire one of these and turn this
+    for (const key of Object.keys(storageStore)) {
-// red; that is the intended prompt to pick a current entry, not a licence to
+        delete storageStore[key];
 // weaken the assertion into "some domain somewhere matches".
 const LISTED = [
    "0-google.ph",
    "myetheywallet.com",
    // An underscore is not legal in a hostname, but DNS carries one and
    // browsers resolve it, and upstream lists well over a hundred phishing
    // sites that use one. The vendoring transform keeps them.
    "phntum-wallett.godaddysites.com",
    "coinbase_prologin1.godaddysites.com",
 ];
 // Not on the list, and the kind of host a user actually visits.
 const CLEAN = ["etherscan.io", "example.com", "opensea.io", "sneak.berlin"];
 describe("vendored blocklist", () => {
    test("the artifact holds the whole list", () => {
        expect(getBlocklistSize()).toBeGreaterThan(100000);
        expect(vendored.hashes).toHaveLength(vendored.count * HASH_HEX_CHARS);
    });
    test("the digests are sorted and unique", () => {
        // The lookup is a binary search over the concatenated digests. An
        // unsorted or duplicated artifact would fail lookups quietly rather
        // than loudly, so the ordering the search depends on is asserted here
        // against the committed file rather than assumed of the generator.
        // One assertion at the end rather than one per entry: 100k+ expect()
        // calls cost seconds, and make test is capped at 30 for the whole
        // suite. The index of the first offender is reported, so a failure
        // still says where.
        let previous = "";
        let outOfOrderAt = -1;
        for (let i = 0; i < vendored.count; i++) {
            const at = vendored.hashes.slice(
                i * HASH_HEX_CHARS,
                (i + 1) * HASH_HEX_CHARS,
            );
            if (at <= previous) {
                outOfOrderAt = i;
                break;
            }
            previous = at;
        }
        expect(outOfOrderAt).toBe(-1);
    });
    test("every digest is lowercase hex of the declared width", () => {
        expect(vendored.hashes).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]*$/);
    });
    test("detects domains from the vendored list", () => {
        for (const domain of LISTED) {
            expect(isPhishingDomain(domain)).toBe(true);
        }
    });
    test("does not flag legitimate domains", () => {
        for (const domain of CLEAN) {
            expect(isPhishingDomain(domain)).toBe(false);
        }
    });
    test("detects a subdomain of a listed domain", () => {
        expect(isPhishingDomain("wallet." + LISTED[0])).toBe(true);
        expect(isPhishingDomain("a.b.c." + LISTED[0])).toBe(true);
    });
    test("matching is case-insensitive", () => {
        expect(isPhishingDomain(LISTED[0].toUpperCase())).toBe(true);
    });
    test("returns false for an empty or missing hostname", () => {
        expect(isPhishingDomain("")).toBe(false);
        expect(isPhishingDomain(null)).toBe(false);
        expect(isPhishingDomain(undefined)).toBe(false);
    });
    test("the first and last entries are both reachable", () => {
        // The ends are where an off-by-one in a binary search hides: a search
        // that never examines index 0 or index count-1 still finds everything
        // in between, and the real list is not searched exhaustively here.
        const first = vendored.hashes.slice(0, HASH_HEX_CHARS);
        const last = vendored.hashes.slice(-HASH_HEX_CHARS);
        const { _hashListed } = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
        expect(_hashListed(first)).toBe(true);
        expect(_hashListed(last)).toBe(true);
        expect(_hashListed("0".repeat(HASH_HEX_CHARS))).toBe(false);
        expect(_hashListed("f".repeat(HASH_HEX_CHARS))).toBe(false);
    });
 });
 describe("hostnameVariants", () => {
    test("returns exact hostname plus parent domains", () => {
        expect(hostnameVariants("sub.evil.com")).toEqual([
            "sub.evil.com",
            "evil.com",
        ]);
    });
    test("returns just the hostname for a bare domain", () => {
        expect(hostnameVariants("example.com")).toEqual(["example.com"]);
    });
    test("handles deep subdomain chains", () => {
        expect(hostnameVariants("a.b.c.d.com")).toEqual([
            "a.b.c.d.com",
            "b.c.d.com",
            "c.d.com",
            "d.com",
        ]);
    });
    test("lowercases hostnames", () => {
        expect(hostnameVariants("Evil.COM")).toEqual(["evil.com"]);
    });
 });
 describe("domain hashing", () => {
    test("a digest is the declared width of lowercase hex", () => {
        const hash = hashDomain("example.com");
        expect(hash).toHaveLength(HASH_HEX_CHARS);
        expect(hash).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]+$/);
    });
    test("hashing is case-insensitive, so lookups are too", () => {
        expect(hashDomain("Evil.COM")).toBe(hashDomain("evil.com"));
    });
    test("different domains get different digests", () => {
        expect(hashDomain("evil.com")).not.toBe(hashDomain("evil.org"));
    });
 });
 // A blocklist that silently matches nothing is the failure this module must not
 // have, so each way of breaking the artifact is required to throw at load. The
 // generator is the only thing that writes this file, but "the generator is
 // correct" is not something the shipped extension can check at runtime — this
 // is what makes a format drift a build failure rather than a silent one.
 describe("a malformed artifact fails loudly", () => {
    const GOOD = {
        algorithm: "sha256",
        hashHexChars: HASH_HEX_CHARS,
        count: 2,
        hashes: "0".repeat(HASH_HEX_CHARS) + "1".repeat(HASH_HEX_CHARS),
    };
    function loadWith(artifact) {
        let mod;
        jest.isolateModules(() => {
            jest.doMock(
                "../src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json",
                () => artifact,
                {
                    virtual: false,
                },
            );
            mod = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
        });
        return mod;
    }
 }
 // The MV3 service worker is torn down when idle and re-evaluated on the next
 // event, which wipes every module-level variable. Re-requiring the module with
 // the registry reset is exactly that: fresh in-memory state, same extension
 // storage underneath.
 function restartWorker() {
    jest.resetModules();
    return require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
 }
 // Reset delta state before each test to avoid cross-test contamination.
 // Note: vendored sets are immutable and always present.
 beforeEach(() => {
    _reset();
    clearStorage();
 });
 describe("phishingDomains", () => {
    describe("vendored blocklist", () => {
        test("vendored blacklist is loaded from bundled JSON", () => {
            // The vendored blocklist should have a large number of entries
            expect(_getVendoredBlacklistSize()).toBeGreaterThan(100000);
        });
        test("detects domains from vendored blacklist", () => {
            // These are well-known phishing domains in the vendored list
            expect(isPhishingDomain("hopprotocol.pro")).toBe(true);
            expect(isPhishingDomain("blast-pools.pages.dev")).toBe(true);
        });
        test("getBlocklistSize includes vendored entries", () => {
            expect(getBlocklistSize()).toBeGreaterThan(100000);
        });
    });
    describe("hostnameVariants", () => {
        test("returns exact hostname plus parent domains", () => {
            const variants = hostnameVariants("sub.evil.com");
            expect(variants).toEqual(["sub.evil.com", "evil.com"]);
        });
        test("returns just the hostname for a bare domain", () => {
            const variants = hostnameVariants("example.com");
            expect(variants).toEqual(["example.com"]);
        });
        test("handles deep subdomain chains", () => {
            const variants = hostnameVariants("a.b.c.d.com");
            expect(variants).toEqual([
                "a.b.c.d.com",
                "b.c.d.com",
                "c.d.com",
                "d.com",
            ]);
        });
        test("lowercases hostnames", () => {
            const variants = hostnameVariants("Evil.COM");
            expect(variants).toEqual(["evil.com"]);
        });
    });
    describe("delta computation via loadConfig", () => {
        test("loadConfig computes delta of new entries not in vendored list", () => {
            loadConfig({
                blacklist: [
                    "brand-new-scam-site-xyz123.com",
                    "hopprotocol.pro", // already in vendored
                ],
            });
            // Only the new domain should be in the delta
            expect(
                _getDeltaBlacklist().has("brand-new-scam-site-xyz123.com"),
            ).toBe(true);
            expect(_getDeltaBlacklist().has("hopprotocol.pro")).toBe(false);
            expect(getDeltaSize()).toBe(1);
        });
        test("re-loading config replaces previous delta", () => {
            loadConfig({
                blacklist: ["first-scam-xyz.com"],
            });
            expect(isPhishingDomain("first-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(true);
            loadConfig({
                blacklist: ["second-scam-xyz.com"],
            });
            expect(isPhishingDomain("first-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(false);
            expect(isPhishingDomain("second-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(true);
        });
        test("getBlocklistSize includes both vendored and delta", () => {
            const baseSize = getBlocklistSize();
            loadConfig({
                blacklist: ["delta-only-scam-xyz.com"],
            });
            expect(getBlocklistSize()).toBe(baseSize + 1);
        });
    });
    describe("isPhishingDomain with delta + vendored", () => {
        test("detects domain from delta blacklist", () => {
            loadConfig({
                blacklist: ["fresh-scam-xyz.com"],
            });
            expect(isPhishingDomain("fresh-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(true);
        });
        test("detects domain from vendored blacklist", () => {
            // No delta loaded — vendored still works
            expect(isPhishingDomain("hopprotocol.pro")).toBe(true);
        });
        test("returns false for clean domains", () => {
            expect(isPhishingDomain("etherscan.io")).toBe(false);
            expect(isPhishingDomain("example.com")).toBe(false);
        });
        test("detects subdomain of blacklisted domain (vendored)", () => {
            expect(isPhishingDomain("app.hopprotocol.pro")).toBe(true);
        });
        test("detects subdomain of blacklisted domain (delta)", () => {
            loadConfig({
                blacklist: ["delta-phish-xyz.com"],
            });
            expect(isPhishingDomain("sub.delta-phish-xyz.com")).toBe(true);
        });
        test("case-insensitive matching", () => {
            loadConfig({
                blacklist: ["Delta-Scam-XYZ.COM"],
            });
            expect(isPhishingDomain("delta-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(true);
            expect(isPhishingDomain("DELTA-SCAM-XYZ.COM")).toBe(true);
        });
        test("returns false for empty/null hostname", () => {
            expect(isPhishingDomain("")).toBe(false);
            expect(isPhishingDomain(null)).toBe(false);
        });
        test("handles config with no blacklist key", () => {
            loadConfig({});
            expect(getDeltaSize()).toBe(0);
            // Vendored list still works
            expect(isPhishingDomain("hopprotocol.pro")).toBe(true);
        });
    });
    describe("extension storage persistence", () => {
        test("delta is persisted to extension storage, not localStorage", async () => {
            await loadConfig({
                blacklist: ["persisted-scam-xyz.com"],
            });
            const stored = storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY];
            expect(stored).toBeDefined();
            expect(stored.blacklist).toContain("persisted-scam-xyz.com");
        });
        test("the fetch timestamp is persisted alongside the delta", async () => {
            const before = Date.now();
            await loadConfig({ blacklist: ["timestamped-scam-xyz.com"] });
            const stored = storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY];
            expect(typeof stored.lastFetchTime).toBe("number");
            expect(stored.lastFetchTime).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(before);
        });
        test("an oversized delta is dropped entirely, timestamp included", async () => {
            // A record above the 256 KiB cap is not worth keeping; the
            // timestamp goes with it so the next start re-fetches rather than
            // claiming freshness for a delta that was never stored.
            const huge = [];
            for (let i = 0; i < 20000; i++) {
                huge.push(`oversize-scam-${i}-xyzxyzxyzxyzxyz.com`);
            }
            await loadConfig({ blacklist: huge });
            expect(storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY]).toBeUndefined();
        });
        test("delta is cleared on _reset", () => {
            loadConfig({
                blacklist: ["temp-scam-xyz.com"],
            });
            expect(getDeltaSize()).toBe(1);
            _reset();
            expect(getDeltaSize()).toBe(0);
        });
    });
    describe("real-world blocklist patterns", () => {
        test("detects known phishing domains from vendored list", () => {
            expect(isPhishingDomain("uniswap-trade.web.app")).toBe(true);
            expect(isPhishingDomain("hopprotocol.pro")).toBe(true);
            expect(isPhishingDomain("blast-pools.pages.dev")).toBe(true);
        });
        test("does not flag legitimate domains", () => {
            expect(isPhishingDomain("opensea.io")).toBe(false);
            expect(isPhishingDomain("etherscan.io")).toBe(false);
        });
    });
 });
 describe("phishing list across a service worker restart", () => {
    beforeEach(() => {
        clearStorage();
        jest.resetModules();
    });
    afterEach(() => {
-        jest.dontMock("../src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json");
+        delete global.fetch;
    });
-    test("the control artifact loads", () => {
+    test("a revived worker restores the persisted delta without re-fetching", async () => {
-        expect(loadWith(GOOD).getBlocklistSize()).toBe(2);
+        const first = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
        await first.loadConfig({ blacklist: ["restart-scam-xyz.com"] });
        const revived = restartWorker();
        // Nothing in memory yet — this is a brand new module instance.
        expect(revived.getDeltaSize()).toBe(0);
        global.fetch = jest.fn();
        await revived.initPhishingList();
        expect(global.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
        expect(revived.getDeltaSize()).toBe(1);
        expect(revived.isPhishingDomain("restart-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(true);
    });
-    test("a different digest algorithm throws", () => {
+    test("repeated wakes inside the cache window never re-fetch", async () => {
-        expect(() => loadWith({ ...GOOD, algorithm: "md5" })).toThrow(
+        const first = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
-            /algorithm/,
+        await first.loadConfig({ blacklist: ["no-storm-scam-xyz.com"] });
-        );
+
        global.fetch = jest.fn();
        for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
            const revived = restartWorker();
            await revived.initPhishingList();
        }
        expect(global.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
    });
-    test("a different digest width throws", () => {
+    test("a persisted timestamp older than the TTL causes a fetch on startup", async () => {
-        expect(() => loadWith({ ...GOOD, hashHexChars: 8 })).toThrow(
+        const first = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
-            /hex characters per entry/,
+        await first.loadConfig({ blacklist: ["stale-scam-xyz.com"] });
-        );
+
        // Age the persisted record past the 24-hour TTL.
        storageStore[first.DELTA_STORAGE_KEY].lastFetchTime =
            Date.now() - first.CACHE_TTL_MS - 1000;
        const revived = restartWorker();
        global.fetch = jest.fn(async () => ({
            ok: true,
            json: async () => ({ blacklist: ["refreshed-scam-xyz.com"] }),
        }));
        await revived.initPhishingList();
        expect(global.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
        expect(revived.isPhishingDomain("refreshed-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(true);
        expect(revived.isPhishingDomain("stale-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(false);
    });
-    test("a count that does not match the string length throws", () => {
+    test("a first start with nothing persisted fetches immediately", async () => {
-        expect(() => loadWith({ ...GOOD, count: 3 })).toThrow(
+        const fresh = restartWorker();
-            /which is not the/,
+        global.fetch = jest.fn(async () => ({
-        );
+            ok: true,
            json: async () => ({ blacklist: ["first-run-scam-xyz.com"] }),
        }));
        await fresh.initPhishingList();
        expect(global.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
        expect(fresh.isPhishingDomain("first-run-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(true);
    });
-    test("a missing hashes string throws", () => {
+    test("updatePhishingList honours the persisted timestamp on its own", async () => {
-        expect(() => loadWith({ ...GOOD, hashes: undefined })).toThrow(
+        // The startup path calls updatePhishingList() directly, so it must
-            /no hashes string/,
+        // load persisted state itself rather than relying on anything else
-        );
+        // having finished first.
-    });
+        const first = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
        await first.loadConfig({ blacklist: ["alarm-tick-scam-xyz.com"] });
-    test("an empty artifact throws rather than matching nothing", () => {
+        const revived = restartWorker();
-        expect(() => loadWith({ ...GOOD, count: 0, hashes: "" })).toThrow(
+        global.fetch = jest.fn();
-            /entry count/,
+        await revived.updatePhishingList();
-        );
+
        expect(global.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
        expect(revived.isPhishingDomain("alarm-tick-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(true);
    });
 });
 // The alarm period alone must set the cadence. lastFetchTime is stamped when
 // the fetch completes, so it lands one fetch latency after the alarm that
 // caused it; a freshness guard timed to the alarm period therefore vetoes
 // every scheduled tick and halves the real refresh rate. These tests measure
 // the interval between fetches that actually happened.
 describe("phishing refresh steady-state cadence", () => {
    const { PHISHING_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES } = require("../src/shared/alarms");
    const PERIOD_MS = PHISHING_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES * 60 * 1000;
    let clockSpy;
    let now;
    beforeEach(() => {
        clearStorage();
        jest.resetModules();
        now = Date.UTC(2026, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0);
        clockSpy = jest.spyOn(Date, "now").mockImplementation(() => now);
    });
    afterEach(() => {
        clockSpy.mockRestore();
        delete global.fetch;
    });
    function fetchStub(latencyMs, seen) {
        return jest.fn(async () => {
            seen.push(now);
            // A network fetch takes time, and lastFetchTime is stamped after
            // it, not when the alarm fired.
            now += latencyMs;
            return { ok: true, json: async () => ({ blacklist: [] }) };
        });
    }
    test("ten alarm ticks produce ten fetches, one per period", async () => {
        const fetchedAt = [];
        global.fetch = fetchStub(5000, fetchedAt);
        const startup = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
        const T0 = now;
        await startup.initPhishingList();
        expect(fetchedAt).toEqual([T0]);
        const TICKS = 10;
        let tickAt = T0 + PERIOD_MS;
        for (let i = 0; i < TICKS; i++) {
            now = tickAt;
            tickAt += PERIOD_MS;
            // The browser wakes a terminated worker to deliver the alarm, so
            // every tick starts from cold memory and the persisted record.
            const revived = restartWorker();
            await revived.refreshPhishingListOnSchedule();
        }
        expect(fetchedAt).toHaveLength(TICKS + 1);
        const intervals = fetchedAt.slice(1).map((t, i) => t - fetchedAt[i]);
        expect(intervals).toEqual(new Array(TICKS).fill(PERIOD_MS));
    });
    test("the scheduled tick fetches whatever the last fetch's latency was", async () => {
        // The alarm fires one period after the previous alarm, which is
        // `latency` short of one period since the fetch it caused completed.
        for (const latency of [200, 1000, 5000]) {
            clearStorage();
            jest.resetModules();
            storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY] = {
                blacklist: [],
                lastFetchTime: now - PERIOD_MS + latency,
                lastAttemptTime: now - PERIOD_MS,
            };
            const mod = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
            const fetchedAt = [];
            global.fetch = fetchStub(latency, fetchedAt);
            await mod.refreshPhishingListOnSchedule();
            expect(fetchedAt).toHaveLength(1);
        }
    });
    test("a worker wake inside the cache window still does not fetch", async () => {
        // The TTL is not removed, only taken off the scheduled path. Chrome
        // revives the worker every ~30 seconds and every revival runs the
        // startup path, so the TTL still has to keep that off the network.
        storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY] = {
            blacklist: [],
            lastFetchTime: now - PERIOD_MS + 5000,
            lastAttemptTime: now - PERIOD_MS,
        };
        const mod = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
        global.fetch = jest.fn();
        await mod.initPhishingList();
        expect(global.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
    });
 });
 describe("phishing list timestamps that cannot be trusted", () => {
    let clockSpy;
    let now;
    beforeEach(() => {
        clearStorage();
        jest.resetModules();
        now = Date.UTC(2026, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0);
        clockSpy = jest.spyOn(Date, "now").mockImplementation(() => now);
    });
    afterEach(() => {
        clockSpy.mockRestore();
        delete global.fetch;
    });
    function okFetch() {
        return jest.fn(async () => ({
            ok: true,
            json: async () => ({ blacklist: ["recovered-scam-xyz.com"] }),
        }));
    }
    // jest.resetModules() clears the call record of a jest.fn, and simulating
    // a worker restart is exactly that call. Anything counted across restarts
    // has to be counted outside the mock.
    function countingFetch(counter, response) {
        return async () => {
            counter.calls++;
            return response();
        };
    }
    test("a lastFetchTime in the future is discarded rather than trusted", async () => {
        // Clock skew or a restored profile backup writes one. Every guard
        // measures `Date.now() - stamp` and only tests the lower bound, so a
        // stamp a year ahead would suppress updates for a year, and now that
        // the value is persisted it would outlive every worker.
        storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY] = {
            blacklist: ["poisoned-scam-xyz.com"],
            lastFetchTime: now + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
            lastAttemptTime: 0,
        };
        const mod = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
        global.fetch = okFetch();
        await mod.initPhishingList();
        expect(global.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
        expect(mod.isPhishingDomain("recovered-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(true);
        // And the record it leaves behind is sane, so recovery is permanent.
        expect(
            storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY].lastFetchTime,
        ).toBeLessThanOrEqual(now);
    });
    test("a lastAttemptTime in the future does not suppress the retry", async () => {
        storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY] = {
            lastAttemptTime: now + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
        };
        const mod = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
        global.fetch = okFetch();
        await mod.initPhishingList();
        expect(global.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
    });
    test("an oversized delta does not re-download on every worker wake", async () => {
        // The delta and its freshness claim are both dropped, which is right,
        // but nothing then says a fetch just happened. Chrome cycles the
        // worker roughly every 30 seconds idle, so without the attempt stamp
        // this is a full blocklist download per wake, forever.
        const huge = [];
        for (let i = 0; i < 20000; i++) {
            huge.push(`oversize-scam-${i}-xyzxyzxyzxyzxyz.com`);
        }
        const counter = { calls: 0 };
        global.fetch = countingFetch(counter, () => ({
            ok: true,
            json: async () => ({ blacklist: huge }),
        }));
        for (let wake = 0; wake < 4; wake++) {
            const revived = restartWorker();
            await revived.initPhishingList();
            now += 30 * 1000; // idle timeout, worker torn down and revived
        }
        expect(counter.calls).toBe(1);
        expect(storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY].blacklist).toBeUndefined();
        expect(typeof storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY].lastAttemptTime).toBe(
            "number",
        );
    });
    test("a failing fetch is not retried on every worker wake either", async () => {
        const counter = { calls: 0 };
        global.fetch = countingFetch(counter, () => ({
            ok: false,
            status: 503,
        }));
        for (let wake = 0; wake < 4; wake++) {
            const revived = restartWorker();
            await revived.initPhishingList();
            now += 30 * 1000;
        }
        expect(counter.calls).toBe(1);
    });
    test("the retry floor expires, so a failure is not permanent", async () => {
        const {
            MIN_FETCH_ATTEMPT_INTERVAL_MS,
        } = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
        const counter = { calls: 0 };
        global.fetch = countingFetch(counter, () => ({
            ok: false,
            status: 503,
        }));
        await restartWorker().initPhishingList();
        expect(counter.calls).toBe(1);
        // Still inside the floor: no retry.
        now += MIN_FETCH_ATTEMPT_INTERVAL_MS - 1000;
        await restartWorker().initPhishingList();
        expect(counter.calls).toBe(1);
        // Past it: the extension goes back to the network.
        now += 2000;
        await restartWorker().initPhishingList();
        expect(counter.calls).toBe(2);
    });
    test("the scheduled tick ignores the retry floor", async () => {
        // The alarm period is far above the floor, but the floor exists to
        // throttle wakes, not the schedule.
        storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY] = { lastAttemptTime: now - 1000 };
        const mod = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
        global.fetch = okFetch();
        await mod.refreshPhishingListOnSchedule();
        expect(global.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
    });
 });
--- a/tests/popupElementIds.test.js
+++ b/tests/popupElementIds.test.js
@@ -1,182 +0,0 @@
 // Every element id the popup views look up must exist in the markup they
 // look it up in.
 //
 // The failure this catches: `$("settings-hide-dsut")` is valid JavaScript
 // referring to a defined function, so neither jest (node environment, no
 // DOM) nor a linter has anything to object to. At runtime `$()` returns
 // null and the next property access throws, which in `init()` aborts the
 // rest of that view's wiring and takes the whole screen down. Settings is
 // the densest concentration of these lookups in the codebase.
 //
 // This is the cheap general half of the guard: it runs in `make check`
 // with no browser and covers every id in every view, not the ones some
 // test happens to click. The expensive specific half is the Settings
 // section of the end-to-end suite (tests/e2e/run.js), which proves the
 // screen actually comes up and its controls work.
 //
 // Scope and limits, stated rather than implied:
 //   - Only literal string arguments are resolvable statically. A call
 //     like `$(containerId)` is invisible here; those are covered by the
 //     e2e run instead.
 //   - `document.getElementById()` is checked too, minus the ids listed in
 //     RUNTIME_CREATED_IDS, which name nodes the code creates itself and
 //     which are legitimately absent from the static markup.
 "use strict";
 const fs = require("fs");
 const path = require("path");
 const POPUP_DIR = path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "popup");
 const POPUP_HTML_PATH = path.join(POPUP_DIR, "index.html");
 // Nodes built at runtime rather than authored in index.html. Each one must
 // be created unconditionally by the code before it is ever looked up.
 const RUNTIME_CREATED_IDS = new Set([
    // Created by updateDebugBanner() in src/popup/views/helpers.js.
    "debug-banner",
 ]);
 // Every id lookup the popup performs with a literal argument, as
 // {id, file, line, source} records.
 //
 // showView("x") is included because it resolves to the element id
 // "view-x": a view name with no matching section is the same defect one
 // indirection further out.
 const PATTERNS = [
    { re: /\$\(\s*"([^"\n]+)"\s*\)/g, id: (m) => m[1], source: "$()" },
    {
        re: /document\.getElementById\(\s*"([^"\n]+)"\s*\)/g,
        id: (m) => m[1],
        source: "getElementById()",
    },
    {
        re: /\b(?:showError|hideError)\(\s*"([^"\n]+)"/g,
        id: (m) => m[1],
        source: "showError()/hideError()",
    },
    {
        re: /\bshowView\(\s*"([^"\n]+)"\s*\)/g,
        id: (m) => "view-" + m[1],
        source: "showView()",
    },
 ];
 function jsFilesUnder(dir) {
    const out = [];
    for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
        const full = path.join(dir, entry.name);
        if (entry.isDirectory()) {
            out.push(...jsFilesUnder(full));
        } else if (entry.name.endsWith(".js")) {
            out.push(full);
        }
    }
    return out.sort();
 }
 function lineOf(text, index) {
    return text.slice(0, index).split("\n").length;
 }
 function collectReferences() {
    const refs = [];
    for (const file of jsFilesUnder(POPUP_DIR)) {
        const text = fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8");
        const rel = path.relative(path.join(__dirname, ".."), file);
        for (const { re, id, source } of PATTERNS) {
            re.lastIndex = 0;
            let m;
            while ((m = re.exec(text)) !== null) {
                refs.push({
                    id: id(m),
                    file: rel,
                    line: lineOf(text, m.index),
                    source,
                });
            }
        }
    }
    return refs;
 }
 function collectHtmlIds(html) {
    const ids = [];
    const re = /\bid="([^"]+)"/g;
    let m;
    while ((m = re.exec(html)) !== null) ids.push(m[1]);
    return ids;
 }
 const HTML = fs.readFileSync(POPUP_HTML_PATH, "utf8");
 const HTML_IDS = collectHtmlIds(HTML);
 const HTML_ID_SET = new Set(HTML_IDS);
 const REFERENCES = collectReferences();
 describe("every element id the popup looks up exists in its markup", () => {
    // A guard that found nothing to check would pass forever. If a
    // refactor renames the directory, changes the helper, or moves the
    // markup, this fails instead of quietly covering zero call sites.
    // The floors are far below the counts measured when this was written
    // (434 lookups across 20 of the 24 files under src/popup/, against 274
    // ids in the markup), so ordinary churn does not trip them.
    test("the scan actually found the code and the markup", () => {
        const files = new Set(REFERENCES.map((r) => r.file));
        expect(files.size).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(15);
        expect(REFERENCES.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(300);
        expect(HTML_IDS.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(200);
        // The densest screen, named explicitly: a scan that stopped
        // covering src/popup/views/settings.js is the exact regression
        // this file was written for.
        expect(
            files.has(path.join("src", "popup", "views", "settings.js")),
        ).toBe(true);
        expect(
            REFERENCES.some((r) => r.id === "settings-hide-spoofed-symbols"),
        ).toBe(true);
        expect(REFERENCES.some((r) => r.id === "view-settings")).toBe(true);
    });
    test("no lookup names an id that src/popup/index.html does not define", () => {
        const missing = REFERENCES.filter(
            (r) => !HTML_ID_SET.has(r.id) && !RUNTIME_CREATED_IDS.has(r.id),
        ).map(
            (r) =>
                r.file +
                ":" +
                r.line +
                " " +
                r.source +
                ' looks up id "' +
                r.id +
                '", which is not in src/popup/index.html',
        );
        expect(missing).toEqual([]);
    });
    test("every id excused as runtime-created is still looked up somewhere", () => {
        // Otherwise the exception list becomes a place stale names
        // accumulate, and the next real miss can be waved through by
        // adding one more.
        for (const id of RUNTIME_CREATED_IDS) {
            expect(REFERENCES.some((r) => r.id === id)).toBe(true);
            expect(HTML_ID_SET.has(id)).toBe(false);
        }
    });
    test("index.html defines no id twice", () => {
        // getElementById returns the first match, so a duplicate id means
        // one of the two elements can never be reached by the code that
        // thinks it owns it.
        const seen = new Set();
        const duplicated = [];
        for (const id of HTML_IDS) {
            if (seen.has(id)) duplicated.push(id);
            seen.add(id);
        }
        expect(duplicated).toEqual([]);
    });
 });
--- a/tests/symbolSpoof.test.js
+++ b/tests/symbolSpoof.test.js
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ describe("the shipped token list", () => {
                "0xab5eb14c09d416f0ac63661e57edb7aecdb9befa", // Metronome Synth USD
            ],
            MUSD: [
-                "0xaca92e438df0b2401ff60da7e4337b687a2435da",
+                "0xaca92e438df0b2401ff60da7e4337b687a2435da", // MetaMask USD
                "0xdd468a1ddc392dcdbef6db6e34e89aa338f9f186", // Mezo USD
            ],
            JPYC: [