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Author SHA1 Message Date
0710de92f4 fix: show the true token amount on the approval screen, or none at all (closes #306)
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decodeCalldata resolved an ERC-20 amount's scale from the 512-entry bundled
token list alone and fell back to 18 decimals for everything else. Most tokens
are outside that list, including anything the user added by contract address, so
a transfer of 5000000000 units of a 6-decimal token - 5,000 tokens - was drawn as
"Amount 0.0000". A user who reads zero confirms, and loses the balance or grants
the allowance.

The new src/shared/approvalAmount.js resolves decimals from the bundled list,
then state.trackedTokens, then the decimals the block explorer already reported
in addr.tokenBalances, accepting only a real uint8 from any of them and refusing
a scale the explorer's own entries disagree about.

Where no source knows the scale the amount is not formatted at all: the line
reads "5000000000 base units (decimals unknown)". A formatted number computed
from a guessed scale is the defect itself, and for a token with fewer decimals
than the guess it is wrong in the direction that reads as zero. approve is
covered alongside transfer; an unbounded allowance still reads "Unlimited",
which needs no scale. The same string is carried to the status screens, so no
formatted figure reappears downstream.

Verified failing first: restoring only the old lookup fails 6 of the 15 new
tests, with the unknown-decimals transfer case receiving exactly "0.0000".
2026-08-20 10:49:08 +00:00
26 changed files with 103 additions and 1008 deletions

View File

@@ -1464,44 +1464,10 @@ policy, but as of now there are none.
### Content Security Policy ### Content Security Policy
Both manifests declare the same policy for extension pages, as an object under Both manifests declare the same policy for extension pages
`script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'` — as an object under
`content_security_policy.extension_pages` in `manifest/chrome.json` (MV3) and as `content_security_policy.extension_pages` in `manifest/chrome.json` (MV3) and as
a bare string in `manifest/firefox.json` (MV2): a bare string in `manifest/firefox.json` (MV2).
```
default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self';
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:;
connect-src 'self' https: http:; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'none';
base-uri 'none'
```
`default-src 'self'` is the floor. Without it the policy governed script and
plugins only, and everything else — frames above all — was unrestricted, which
is what let an unescaped token symbol paint a cross-origin iframe over the
wallet's own UI. Escaping is the primary fix for that (see
`src/shared/html.js`); this is the second line, so an escape that does slip
cannot reach the network.
Four directives are looser than `'self'`, each for a reason that does not
generalise:
- `style-src 'unsafe-inline'``src/popup/index.html` and the view helpers set
presentation through `style="..."` attributes, which CSP blocks without this.
Chrome enforces `style-src` on attributes, not only on `<style>` blocks, and
Firefox has never implemented `style-src-attr`, so there is no narrower
spelling that works on both targets. It permits inline **style**; script stays
under `script-src`, which does not allow `'unsafe-inline'`.
- `img-src data:` — identicons are generated in the popup by
`ethereum-blockies-base64` and assigned to `img.src` as `data:` PNGs.
- `connect-src https: http:` — the RPC endpoint is user-configurable and a local
node over `http://127.0.0.1` is a supported configuration, which the Firefox
end-to-end suite depends on. The wallet's outbound traffic is constrained by
what it is written to contact (see External Communication), not by this
directive.
- `frame-src 'none'`, `form-action 'none'`, `base-uri 'none'` — named rather
than inherited. `form-action` and `base-uri` do not fall back to `default-src`
at all, so they would have stayed unrestricted; `frame-src 'none'` is what
refuses the framed-overlay attack outright.
`'wasm-unsafe-eval'` is there for one reason: libsodium. It ships a WebAssembly `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` is there for one reason: libsodium. It ships a WebAssembly
build and a `wasm2js` translation of it in one file, tries WASM first, and build and a `wasm2js` translation of it in one file, tries WASM first, and
@@ -1519,10 +1485,9 @@ strings, not inline script, not remote script. Using it requires already
executing script in an extension page, which is complete compromise on its own. executing script in an extension page, which is complete compromise on its own.
`'unsafe-eval'` is a different proposition and is not granted. `'unsafe-eval'` is a different proposition and is not granted.
The policy is pinned in both directions. `tests/manifest.test.js` asserts the The grant is pinned in both directions. `tests/manifest.test.js` asserts the
exact directive set and the exact token set of each directive in both manifests, exact token set in both manifests, so dropping `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` (a silent
so dropping `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` (a silent 20x regression on the key 20x regression on the key derivation) and adding anything beyond it both fail
derivation), dropping `default-src`, and adding anything anywhere all fail
`make check`. `tests/vaultBackend.test.js` asserts the unit tests run the WASM `make check`. `tests/vaultBackend.test.js` asserts the unit tests run the WASM
backend, and `make test-e2e` compiles a WebAssembly module inside the real popup backend, and `make test-e2e` compiles a WebAssembly module inside the real popup
under the real manifest. under the real manifest.

40
TODO.md
View File

@@ -44,46 +44,6 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
# Completed Steps # Completed Steps
- 2026-08-20: A hostile ERC-20 symbol no longer renders as live HTML in the
popup ([#307](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/307)). A token
symbol is whatever the contract's `symbol()` returns, the block explorer
passes it through unfiltered, and `balanceLine()` interpolated it into an
`innerHTML` string — so a token with the 1,000 holders the spam filter asks
for, airdropped to the victim, could paint a full-viewport cross-origin iframe
over the wallet's own UI, on the screens where the user types their password.
`escapeHtml` moved to `src/shared/html.js` as a pure string replace over `&`,
`<`, `>`, `"` and `'`: the old implementation round-tripped through a detached
element's `textContent`, which does not escape quotes, and it was already
being used inside `data-copy="..."`. Every interpolation into an `innerHTML`
string across `src/popup/views/` was audited, not just the reported one — the
transaction lists' direction label, the wallet name and ENS name in the Home
list, the `href` in the explorer link, and the confirmation screen's warning
line were all unescaped as well. Both manifests now declare
`default-src 'self'` with `frame-src 'none'`; the four directives that had to
stay looser than `'self'` are named and justified in the Content Security
Policy section of README.md, and `tests/manifest.test.js` pins the whole set
exactly. A display cap of 12 characters bounds the symbol, matching the bound
`lookupTokenInfo()` already applied on the contract-read path. Not repurposed
for any of this: `isSpoofedSymbol()`, which answers a different question and
would have been the wrong control.
- 2026-08-20: A page asking which chain the wallet is on is told the chain the
user is actually on ([#317](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/317)).
`eth_chainId` and `net_version` answered from `currentNetwork()`, which reads
the module-level `state` singleton that nothing populates at module scope, so
a service worker revived by the page's own message answered out of
`DEFAULT_STATE` and reported mainnet `0x1`/`1` to a user on Sepolia — a dApp
building its interaction for the wrong chain. Both now answer from
`getState()`, the per-call detached storage read the other read handlers use,
rather than from the singleton: these two are reachable by any page on every
provider init, and mutating the shared singleton on that path would detach the
wallet objects an in-flight `backgroundRefresh()` is mutating. The read side
of the background was audited with it: the remaining singleton reads are the
chain switch, the transaction verification path and `backgroundRefresh`, which
each already load, and everything else answers from storage per call through
`getState()`. One stale read is left named but unfixed, outside this issue's
scope: `handleSendTransaction` builds its provider with no network name, so
`getProvider()` falls back to the same unloaded singleton for ethers' static
network hint.
- 2026-08-20: The dApp approval screen no longer shows a token transfer it - 2026-08-20: The dApp approval screen no longer shows a token transfer it
cannot scale as `0.0000` cannot scale as `0.0000`
([#306](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/306)). `decodeCalldata` ([#306](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/306)). `decodeCalldata`

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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
"permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms"], "permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms"],
"host_permissions": ["<all_urls>"], "host_permissions": ["<all_urls>"],
"content_security_policy": { "content_security_policy": {
"extension_pages": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https: http:; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'none'; base-uri 'none'" "extension_pages": "script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'"
}, },
"action": { "action": {
"default_popup": "src/popup/index.html" "default_popup": "src/popup/index.html"

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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
"version": "0.1.0", "version": "0.1.0",
"description": "Minimal Ethereum wallet for Firefox", "description": "Minimal Ethereum wallet for Firefox",
"permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms", "<all_urls>"], "permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms", "<all_urls>"],
"content_security_policy": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https: http:; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'none'; base-uri 'none'", "content_security_policy": "script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'",
"browser_action": { "browser_action": {
"default_popup": "src/popup/index.html" "default_popup": "src/popup/index.html"
}, },

View File

@@ -3,11 +3,7 @@
// non-sensitive calls to the configured Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint. // non-sensitive calls to the configured Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint.
const { DEFAULT_RPC_URL } = require("../shared/constants"); const { DEFAULT_RPC_URL } = require("../shared/constants");
const { const { SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS, networkByChainId } = require("../shared/networks");
SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS,
networkById,
networkByChainId,
} = require("../shared/networks");
const { onChainSwitch } = require("../shared/chainSwitch"); const { onChainSwitch } = require("../shared/chainSwitch");
const { const {
state, state,
@@ -667,28 +663,12 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
return { result: [] }; return { result: [] };
} }
// Both answered from currentNetwork(), which reads the module-level state if (method === "eth_chainId") {
// singleton, and nothing populates that at module scope. A worker revived return { result: currentNetwork().chainId };
// by the page's own message therefore held DEFAULT_STATE and told a page }
// it was on mainnet while the user was on Sepolia
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/317). if (method === "net_version") {
// return { result: currentNetwork().networkVersion };
// Answered from getState() rather than by loading the singleton. Any page
// reaches these two — neither is gated on a connection, and the injected
// provider sends eth_chainId on every page load — and loadState() replaces
// state.wallets wholesale, which would detach the address objects an
// in-flight backgroundRefresh() is mutating across its network round trip,
// so its saveState() would persist the pre-refresh balances while still
// stamping lastBalanceRefresh. getState() is the detached per-call storage
// read the other read handlers here already use.
// networkById(undefined) falls back to mainnet, matching the default for a
// profile with no stored networkId.
if (method === "eth_chainId" || method === "net_version") {
const s = await getState();
const net = networkById(s.networkId);
return {
result: method === "eth_chainId" ? net.chainId : net.networkVersion,
};
} }
if (method === "wallet_switchEthereumChain") { if (method === "wallet_switchEthereumChain") {

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
const { $, showView, showFlash, escapeHtml, goBack } = require("./helpers"); const { $, showView, showFlash, goBack } = require("./helpers");
const { getTopTokens } = require("../../shared/tokenList"); const { getTopTokens } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state"); const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { lookupTokenInfo } = require("../../shared/balances"); const { lookupTokenInfo } = require("../../shared/balances");
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ function show() {
list.innerHTML = getTopTokens(25) list.innerHTML = getTopTokens(25)
.map( .map(
(t) => (t) =>
`<button class="common-token border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer text-xs" data-address="${escapeHtml(t.address)}" data-symbol="${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}" data-decimals="${escapeHtml(t.decimals)}">${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}</button>`, `<button class="common-token border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer text-xs" data-address="${t.address}" data-symbol="${t.symbol}" data-decimals="${t.decimals}">${t.symbol}</button>`,
) )
.join(""); .join("");
list.querySelectorAll(".common-token").forEach((btn) => { list.querySelectorAll(".common-token").forEach((btn) => {

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ const {
addressDotHtml, addressDotHtml,
addressTitle, addressTitle,
escapeHtml, escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
truncateMiddle, truncateMiddle,
renderAddressHtml, renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers, attachCopyHandlers,
@@ -222,12 +221,10 @@ function renderTransactions(txs) {
: tx.from; : tx.from;
const ensName = ensNameMap.get(counterparty) || null; const ensName = ensNameMap.get(counterparty) || null;
const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets); const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets);
// The explorer's method name for a contract call, title-cased. const dirLabel = tx.directionLabel;
const dirLabel = escapeHtml(tx.directionLabel);
const sym = displaySymbol(tx.symbol);
const amountStr = tx.value const amountStr = tx.value
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + sym) ? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + tx.symbol)
: escapeHtml(sym); : escapeHtml(tx.symbol);
const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10)); const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10));
const displayAddr = const displayAddr =
title || ensName || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr); title || ensName || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr);

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ const {
addressDotHtml, addressDotHtml,
addressTitle, addressTitle,
escapeHtml, escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
truncateMiddle, truncateMiddle,
balanceLine, balanceLine,
renderAddressHtml, renderAddressHtml,
@@ -125,11 +124,7 @@ function show() {
currentSymbol = symbol; currentSymbol = symbol;
$("address-token-title").textContent = $("address-token-title").textContent =
wallet.name + wallet.name + " \u2014 Address " + (ai + 1) + " \u2014 " + symbol;
" \u2014 Address " +
(ai + 1) +
" \u2014 " +
displaySymbol(symbol);
// Blockie // Blockie
const blockieEl = $("address-token-jazzicon"); const blockieEl = $("address-token-jazzicon");
@@ -179,9 +174,7 @@ function show() {
(knownToken && knownToken.symbol) || (knownToken && knownToken.symbol) ||
null; null;
const tokenName = rawName ? escapeHtml(rawName) : null; const tokenName = rawName ? escapeHtml(rawName) : null;
const tokenSymbol = rawSymbol const tokenSymbol = rawSymbol ? escapeHtml(rawSymbol) : null;
? escapeHtml(displaySymbol(rawSymbol))
: null;
const tokenDecimals = const tokenDecimals =
tb && tb.decimals != null tb && tb.decimals != null
? tb.decimals ? tb.decimals
@@ -295,12 +288,10 @@ function renderTransactions(txs) {
const counterparty = tx.direction === "sent" ? tx.to : tx.from; const counterparty = tx.direction === "sent" ? tx.to : tx.from;
const ensName = ensNameMap.get(counterparty) || null; const ensName = ensNameMap.get(counterparty) || null;
const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets); const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets);
// The explorer's method name for a contract call, title-cased. const dirLabel = tx.directionLabel;
const dirLabel = escapeHtml(tx.directionLabel);
const sym = displaySymbol(tx.symbol);
const amountStr = tx.value const amountStr = tx.value
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + sym) ? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + tx.symbol)
: escapeHtml(sym); : escapeHtml(tx.symbol);
const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10)); const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10));
const displayAddr = const displayAddr =
title || ensName || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr); title || ensName || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr);
@@ -370,7 +361,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
} }
// Hide dropdown, show static token display // Hide dropdown, show static token display
$("send-token").classList.add("hidden"); $("send-token").classList.add("hidden");
let staticHtml = `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(displaySymbol(currentSymbol))}</div>`; let staticHtml = `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(currentSymbol)}</div>`;
if (tokenId !== "ETH") { if (tokenId !== "ETH") {
staticHtml += `<div class="text-xs">${renderAddressHtml(tokenId)}</div>`; staticHtml += `<div class="text-xs">${renderAddressHtml(tokenId)}</div>`;
} }

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ const {
showView, showView,
addressTitle, addressTitle,
escapeHtml, escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
renderAddressHtml, renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers, attachCopyHandlers,
goBack, goBack,
@@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ function restore() {
function blockieHtml(address) { function blockieHtml(address) {
const src = makeBlockie(address); const src = makeBlockie(address);
return `<img src="${escapeHtml(src)}" width="48" height="48" style="image-rendering:pixelated;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block">`; return `<img src="${src}" width="48" height="48" style="image-rendering:pixelated;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block">`;
} }
function confirmAddressHtml(address, ensName, title) { function confirmAddressHtml(address, ensName, title) {
@@ -82,11 +81,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
feeWei = null; feeWei = null;
const isErc20 = txInfo.token !== "ETH"; const isErc20 = txInfo.token !== "ETH";
// The raw symbol is the price-table key; the capped one is what the const symbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : "ETH";
// screen says. Truncating before the lookup would silently drop the
// price of any token whose symbol is long enough to be capped.
const rawSymbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : "ETH";
const symbol = displaySymbol(rawSymbol);
// Transaction type // Transaction type
if (isErc20) { if (isErc20) {
@@ -128,7 +123,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
// Amount (with inline USD) // Amount (with inline USD)
const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH"); const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
const tokenPrice = getPrice(rawSymbol); const tokenPrice = getPrice(symbol);
const amountNum = parseFloat(txInfo.amount); const amountNum = parseFloat(txInfo.amount);
const price = isErc20 ? tokenPrice : ethPrice; const price = isErc20 ? tokenPrice : ethPrice;
const amountUsd = price ? amountNum * price : null; const amountUsd = price ? amountNum * price : null;
@@ -161,12 +156,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
warningsEl.innerHTML = localWarnings warningsEl.innerHTML = localWarnings
.map( .map(
(w) => (w) =>
// Only the three hardcoded strings in `<div class="border border-border border-dashed p-2 mb-1 text-xs font-bold">WARNING: ${w.message}</div>`,
// src/shared/addressWarnings.js reach this today, but
// src/shared/etherscanLabels.js already builds a
// `warning` out of scraped explorer markup, so this is
// one wiring change away from carrying remote text.
`<div class="border border-border border-dashed p-2 mb-1 text-xs font-bold">WARNING: ${escapeHtml(w.message)}</div>`,
) )
.join(""); .join("");
warningsEl.style.visibility = "visible"; warningsEl.style.visibility = "visible";
@@ -216,7 +206,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
// touches already occupies its space, so re-running it never moves anything. // touches already occupies its space, so re-running it never moves anything.
function renderValidation(txInfo) { function renderValidation(txInfo) {
const isErc20 = txInfo.token !== "ETH"; const isErc20 = txInfo.token !== "ETH";
const symbol = isErc20 ? displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?") : "ETH"; const symbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : "ETH";
const { canSend, codes } = validateTransfer({ const { canSend, codes } = validateTransfer({
isErc20, isErc20,

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ const {
$, $,
showView, showView,
showFlash, showFlash,
escapeHtml,
goBack, goBack,
renderAddressHtml, renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers, attachCopyHandlers,
@@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ function balanceWarningHtml(addr) {
if (!addressHoldsFunds(addr)) return "&nbsp;"; if (!addressHoldsFunds(addr)) return "&nbsp;";
const line = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr)); const line = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));
const total = line const total = line
? `<div class="text-xs text-muted mt-1">${escapeHtml(line)}</div>` ? `<div class="text-xs text-muted mt-1">${line}</div>`
: ""; : "";
return ( return (
`<p class="mb-1">This address holds a balance. Removing it does not ` + `<p class="mb-1">This address holds a balance. Removing it does not ` +

View File

@@ -1,22 +1,8 @@
// Shared DOM helpers used by all views. // Shared DOM helpers used by all views.
//
// Escaping rule for every view in this directory, since they all build
// markup by concatenation: any VALUE interpolated into an innerHTML string
// goes through escapeHtml(), whatever its provenance looks like today. The
// only interpolations left bare are markup FRAGMENTS this code just built
// (a rendered dot, an icon, a composed row), which escaping would turn into
// visible angle brackets, and locally computed numbers and loop indices.
// The distinction is meant to be greppable: an unescaped `${` next to a
// name that reads like data is a defect.
// escapeHtml lives in src/shared/html.js, where the escape and the
// reasoning behind it are; it is re-exported below so views keep importing
// it from here.
const { escapeHtml } = require("../../shared/html");
const { isDebug } = require("../../shared/log"); const { isDebug } = require("../../shared/log");
const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices"); const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state"); const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { displaySymbol } = require("../../shared/symbolDisplay");
const { markViewRendered } = require("../viewRouter"); const { markViewRendered } = require("../viewRouter");
// When views are added, removed, or transitions between them change, // When views are added, removed, or transitions between them change,
@@ -191,26 +177,17 @@ function showFlash(msg, duration = 2000) {
}, duration); }, duration);
} }
// One row of the balance list: symbol, quantity, fiat value.
//
// `symbol` is the ERC-20's own symbol() as the block explorer reported it,
// so it is attacker-chosen markup until it has been through escapeHtml, and
// attacker-chosen length until it has been through displaySymbol. This is
// the row that issue #307 was reported against: every screen that lists a
// holding renders through here.
function balanceLine(symbol, amount, price, tokenId) { function balanceLine(symbol, amount, price, tokenId) {
const qty = amount.toFixed(4); const qty = amount.toFixed(4);
const usd = price ? formatUsd(amount * price) || "&nbsp;" : "&nbsp;"; const usd = price ? formatUsd(amount * price) || "&nbsp;" : "&nbsp;";
// tokenId is a contract address out of the same explorer JSON, and it const tokenAttr = tokenId ? ` data-token="${tokenId}"` : "";
// lands inside a quoted attribute.
const tokenAttr = tokenId ? ` data-token="${escapeHtml(tokenId)}"` : "";
const clickClass = tokenId const clickClass = tokenId
? " cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover balance-row" ? " cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover balance-row"
: ""; : "";
return ( return (
`<div class="flex text-xs${clickClass}"${tokenAttr}>` + `<div class="flex text-xs${clickClass}"${tokenAttr}>` +
`<span class="flex justify-between" style="width:42ch;max-width:100%">` + `<span class="flex justify-between" style="width:42ch;max-width:100%">` +
`<span>${escapeHtml(displaySymbol(symbol))}</span>` + `<span>${symbol}</span>` +
`<span>${qty}</span>` + `<span>${qty}</span>` +
`</span>` + `</span>` +
`<span class="text-right text-muted flex-1">${usd}</span>` + `<span class="text-right text-muted flex-1">${usd}</span>` +
@@ -312,6 +289,12 @@ function addressDotHtml(address) {
return `<span style="width:8px;height:8px;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block;background:${color};margin-right:4px;vertical-align:middle;flex-shrink:0;"></span>`; return `<span style="width:8px;height:8px;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block;background:${color};margin-right:4px;vertical-align:middle;flex-shrink:0;"></span>`;
} }
function escapeHtml(s) {
const div = document.createElement("div");
div.textContent = s;
return div.innerHTML;
}
// Look up an address across all wallets and return its title // Look up an address across all wallets and return its title
// (e.g. "Address 1.2") or null if it's not one of ours. // (e.g. "Address 1.2") or null if it's not one of ours.
function addressTitle(address, wallets) { function addressTitle(address, wallets) {
@@ -399,26 +382,13 @@ const EXT_ICON =
`<path d="M7 1.5h3.5V5M7 5.5L10.5 1.5"/>` + `<path d="M7 1.5h3.5V5M7 5.5L10.5 1.5"/>` +
`</svg></span>`; `</svg></span>`;
// Block-explorer URLs. The origin is a per-network constant from
// src/shared/networks.js; only the path segment is data, and it comes out
// of explorer JSON (a transaction's from/to, a token's address_hash), which
// nothing upstream validates as hex. percent-encoding it keeps a segment
// that contains a slash, a query or a fragment from re-pointing the link
// somewhere else in the explorer.
function explorerUrl(kind, value) {
return `${currentNetwork().explorerUrl}/${kind}/${encodeURIComponent(value)}`;
}
function etherscanAddressUrl(address) { function etherscanAddressUrl(address) {
return explorerUrl("address", address); return `${currentNetwork().explorerUrl}/address/${address}`;
} }
// The URL still has to be escaped on the way into href="...": encoding
// governs what the URL means, escaping governs whether it stays inside the
// attribute.
function etherscanLinkHtml(url) { function etherscanLinkHtml(url) {
return ( return (
`<a href="${escapeHtml(url)}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" ` + `<a href="${url}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" ` +
`class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>` `class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>`
); );
} }
@@ -522,7 +492,6 @@ module.exports = {
addressColor, addressColor,
addressDotHtml, addressDotHtml,
escapeHtml, escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
addressTitle, addressTitle,
formatAddressHtml, formatAddressHtml,
renderAddressHtml, renderAddressHtml,
@@ -530,7 +499,6 @@ module.exports = {
attachCopyHandlers, attachCopyHandlers,
etherscanAddressUrl, etherscanAddressUrl,
etherscanLinkHtml, etherscanLinkHtml,
explorerUrl,
EXT_ICON, EXT_ICON,
truncateMiddle, truncateMiddle,
isoDate, isoDate,

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ const {
addressDotHtml, addressDotHtml,
addressTitle, addressTitle,
escapeHtml, escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
truncateMiddle, truncateMiddle,
renderAddressHtml, renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers, attachCopyHandlers,
@@ -110,13 +109,10 @@ function renderHomeTxList(ctx) {
: tx.direction === "sent" || tx.direction === "contract" : tx.direction === "sent" || tx.direction === "contract"
? tx.to ? tx.to
: tx.from; : tx.from;
// directionLabel is the explorer's own method name for a contract const dirLabel = tx.directionLabel;
// call, title-cased — attacker-chosen for an attacker's contract.
const dirLabel = escapeHtml(tx.directionLabel);
const sym = displaySymbol(tx.symbol);
const amountStr = tx.value const amountStr = tx.value
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + sym) ? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + tx.symbol)
: escapeHtml(sym); : escapeHtml(tx.symbol);
const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets); const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets);
const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10)); const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10));
const displayAddr = title || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr); const displayAddr = title || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr);
@@ -230,7 +226,7 @@ function walletListHtml() {
const defect = walletDefect(wallet); const defect = walletDefect(wallet);
html += `<div>`; html += `<div>`;
html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center bg-section py-1 px-2" style="margin:0 -0.5rem">`; html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center bg-section py-1 px-2" style="margin:0 -0.5rem">`;
html += `<span class="font-bold cursor-pointer wallet-name underline decoration-dashed" data-wallet="${wi}">${escapeHtml(wallet.name)}</span>`; html += `<span class="font-bold cursor-pointer wallet-name underline decoration-dashed" data-wallet="${wi}">${wallet.name}</span>`;
// No "+" on a defective wallet: deriving another address from that // No "+" on a defective wallet: deriving another address from that
// xpub would only add one more address the key does not produce // xpub would only add one more address the key does not produce
// under the standard path. // under the standard path.
@@ -254,13 +250,10 @@ function walletListHtml() {
const titleBold = isActive ? "font-bold" : ""; const titleBold = isActive ? "font-bold" : "";
html += `<div class="text-xs ${titleBold}">Address ${ai + 1}</div>`; html += `<div class="text-xs ${titleBold}">Address ${ai + 1}</div>`;
if (addr.ensName) { if (addr.ensName) {
// An ENS reverse record is whatever the name owner set it html += `<div class="text-xs font-bold flex items-center">${dot}${addr.ensName}</div>`;
// to; renderAddressHtml() escapes its own copy of this and
// this list was the one that did not.
html += `<div class="text-xs font-bold flex items-center">${dot}${escapeHtml(addr.ensName)}</div>`;
} }
html += `<div class="flex text-xs items-center justify-between">`; html += `<div class="flex text-xs items-center justify-between">`;
html += `<span class="flex items-center break-all">${addr.ensName ? "" : dot}${escapeHtml(addr.address)}</span>`; html += `<span class="flex items-center break-all">${addr.ensName ? "" : dot}${addr.address}</span>`;
html += `<span class="flex-shrink-0 ml-1">${infoBtn}${removeBtn}</span>`; html += `<span class="flex-shrink-0 ml-1">${infoBtn}${removeBtn}</span>`;
html += `</div>`; html += `</div>`;
const addrTotal = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr)); const addrTotal = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ const {
flashCopyFeedback, flashCopyFeedback,
formatAddressHtml, formatAddressHtml,
addressTitle, addressTitle,
displaySymbol,
attachCopyHandlers, attachCopyHandlers,
goBack, goBack,
} = require("./helpers"); } = require("./helpers");
@@ -45,7 +44,7 @@ function show() {
} }
warningEl.textContent = warningEl.textContent =
"This is an ERC-20 token. Only send " + "This is an ERC-20 token. Only send " +
displaySymbol(symbol) + symbol +
" on " + " on " +
currentNetwork().name + currentNetwork().name +
" to this address. Sending tokens on other networks will result in permanent loss."; " to this address. Sending tokens on other networks will result in permanent loss.";

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ const {
$, $,
showFlash, showFlash,
addressTitle, addressTitle,
displaySymbol,
renderAddressHtml, renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers, attachCopyHandlers,
goBack, goBack,
@@ -132,7 +131,7 @@ function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
if (state.hideLowHolderTokens && isLowHolderCount(t.holders)) continue; if (state.hideLowHolderTokens && isLowHolderCount(t.holders)) continue;
const opt = document.createElement("option"); const opt = document.createElement("option");
opt.value = t.address; opt.value = t.address;
opt.textContent = displaySymbol(t.symbol); opt.textContent = t.symbol;
sel.appendChild(opt); sel.appendChild(opt);
} }
} }

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ const {
updateDebugBanner, updateDebugBanner,
showFlash, showFlash,
escapeHtml, escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
flashCopyFeedback, flashCopyFeedback,
goBack, goBack,
pushCurrentView, pushCurrentView,
@@ -44,11 +43,8 @@ function renderSiteList(containerId, siteMap, stateKey) {
let html = ""; let html = "";
hostnames.forEach((hostname) => { hostnames.forEach((hostname) => {
html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center text-xs py-1 border-b border-border-light">`; html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center text-xs py-1 border-b border-border-light">`;
// A hostname the URL parser produced cannot carry a delimiter, so html += `<span>${hostname}</span>`;
// this is escaped for the rule rather than for a known hole — the html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-key="${stateKey}" data-hostname="${hostname}">[x]</button>`;
// rule being that nothing reaches innerHTML unescaped.
html += `<span>${escapeHtml(hostname)}</span>`;
html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-key="${escapeHtml(stateKey)}" data-hostname="${escapeHtml(hostname)}">[x]</button>`;
html += `</div>`; html += `</div>`;
}); });
container.innerHTML = html; container.innerHTML = html;
@@ -77,10 +73,9 @@ function renderTrackedTokens() {
} }
let html = ""; let html = "";
state.trackedTokens.forEach((token, idx) => { state.trackedTokens.forEach((token, idx) => {
const sym = escapeHtml(displaySymbol(token.symbol));
const label = token.name const label = token.name
? escapeHtml(token.name) + " (" + sym + ")" ? escapeHtml(token.name) + " (" + escapeHtml(token.symbol) + ")"
: sym; : escapeHtml(token.symbol);
html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center text-xs py-1 border-b border-border-light">`; html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center text-xs py-1 border-b border-border-light">`;
html += `<span>${label}</span>`; html += `<span>${label}</span>`;
html += `<button class="btn-remove-token border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-idx="${idx}">[x]</button>`; html += `<button class="btn-remove-token border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-idx="${idx}">[x]</button>`;

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
const { $, showView, showFlash, escapeHtml, goBack } = require("./helpers"); const { $, showView, showFlash, goBack } = require("./helpers");
const { getTopTokens } = require("../../shared/tokenList"); const { getTopTokens } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state"); const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { lookupTokenInfo } = require("../../shared/balances"); const { lookupTokenInfo } = require("../../shared/balances");
@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ function renderTop10() {
: "border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer text-xs"; : "border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer text-xs";
return ( return (
`<button class="settings-addtoken-quick ${cls}"` + `<button class="settings-addtoken-quick ${cls}"` +
` data-address="${escapeHtml(t.address)}"` + ` data-address="${t.address}"` +
` data-symbol="${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}"` + ` data-symbol="${t.symbol}"` +
` data-decimals="${escapeHtml(t.decimals)}"` + ` data-decimals="${t.decimals}"` +
` data-name="${escapeHtml(t.name || "")}"` + ` data-name="${(t.name || "").replace(/"/g, "&quot;")}"` +
`${tracked ? " disabled" : ""}>${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}</button>` `${tracked ? " disabled" : ""}>${t.symbol}</button>`
); );
}) })
.join(""); .join("");
@@ -62,11 +62,11 @@ function renderDropdown() {
const tracked = isTracked(t.address); const tracked = isTracked(t.address);
const label = tokenLabel(t) + (tracked ? " (tracked)" : ""); const label = tokenLabel(t) + (tracked ? " (tracked)" : "");
html += html +=
`<option value="${escapeHtml(t.address)}"` + `<option value="${t.address}"` +
` data-symbol="${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}"` + ` data-symbol="${t.symbol}"` +
` data-decimals="${escapeHtml(t.decimals)}"` + ` data-decimals="${t.decimals}"` +
` data-name="${escapeHtml(t.name || "")}"` + ` data-name="${(t.name || "").replace(/"/g, "&quot;")}"` +
`${tracked ? " disabled" : ""}>${escapeHtml(label)}</option>`; `${tracked ? " disabled" : ""}>${label}</option>`;
} }
sel.innerHTML = html; sel.innerHTML = html;
} }

View File

@@ -15,11 +15,9 @@ const {
attachCopyHandlers, attachCopyHandlers,
copyableHtml, copyableHtml,
etherscanLinkHtml, etherscanLinkHtml,
explorerUrl,
displaySymbol,
goBack, goBack,
} = require("./helpers"); } = require("./helpers");
const { state } = require("../../shared/state"); const { state, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { formatEther, formatUnits } = require("ethers"); const { formatEther, formatUnits } = require("ethers");
const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64"); const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
const { log, debugFetch } = require("../../shared/log"); const { log, debugFetch } = require("../../shared/log");
@@ -46,7 +44,7 @@ function getTransactionType(tx) {
function blockieHtml(address) { function blockieHtml(address) {
const src = makeBlockie(address); const src = makeBlockie(address);
return `<img src="${escapeHtml(src)}" width="48" height="48" style="image-rendering:pixelated;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block">`; return `<img src="${src}" width="48" height="48" style="image-rendering:pixelated;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block">`;
} }
function txAddressHtml(address, ensName, title) { function txAddressHtml(address, ensName, title) {
@@ -58,7 +56,7 @@ function txAddressHtml(address, ensName, title) {
} }
function txHashHtml(hash) { function txHashHtml(hash) {
const link = explorerUrl("tx", hash); const link = `${currentNetwork().explorerUrl}/tx/${hash}`;
const extLink = etherscanLinkHtml(link); const extLink = etherscanLinkHtml(link);
return copyableHtml(hash, "break-all") + extLink; return copyableHtml(hash, "break-all") + extLink;
} }
@@ -103,10 +101,9 @@ function render() {
$("tx-detail-to").innerHTML = txAddressHtml(tx.to, tx.toEns, toTitle); $("tx-detail-to").innerHTML = txAddressHtml(tx.to, tx.toEns, toTitle);
// Exact amount (full precision, copyable) // Exact amount (full precision, copyable)
const detailSym = displaySymbol(tx.symbol);
const exactStr = tx.exactValue const exactStr = tx.exactValue
? tx.exactValue + " " + detailSym ? tx.exactValue + " " + tx.symbol
: tx.directionLabel + " " + detailSym; : tx.directionLabel + " " + tx.symbol;
$("tx-detail-value").innerHTML = copyableHtml(exactStr, "font-bold"); $("tx-detail-value").innerHTML = copyableHtml(exactStr, "font-bold");
// Native quantity (raw integer, copyable) // Native quantity (raw integer, copyable)
@@ -136,7 +133,7 @@ function render() {
if (tokenContractSection && tokenContractEl) { if (tokenContractSection && tokenContractEl) {
if (tx.contractAddress) { if (tx.contractAddress) {
const dot = addressDotHtml(tx.contractAddress); const dot = addressDotHtml(tx.contractAddress);
const link = explorerUrl("token", tx.contractAddress); const link = `${currentNetwork().explorerUrl}/token/${tx.contractAddress}`;
tokenContractEl.innerHTML = tokenContractEl.innerHTML =
`<div class="flex items-center">${dot}` + `<div class="flex items-center">${dot}` +
copyableHtml(tx.contractAddress, "break-all") + copyableHtml(tx.contractAddress, "break-all") +
@@ -188,7 +185,7 @@ function showDetailField(sectionId, contentId, value) {
function populateOnChainDetails(txData) { function populateOnChainDetails(txData) {
// Block number // Block number
if (txData.block_number != null) { if (txData.block_number != null) {
const blockLink = explorerUrl("block", String(txData.block_number)); const blockLink = `${currentNetwork().explorerUrl}/block/${txData.block_number}`;
const blockSection = $("tx-detail-block-section"); const blockSection = $("tx-detail-block-section");
const blockEl = $("tx-detail-block"); const blockEl = $("tx-detail-block");
if (blockSection && blockEl) { if (blockSection && blockEl) {
@@ -312,7 +309,7 @@ async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress) {
// Token entry: show symbol on its own line, then address via shared renderer // Token entry: show symbol on its own line, then address via shared renderer
const tokenSymbol = d.value.match(/^(\S+)\s*\(/)?.[1]; const tokenSymbol = d.value.match(/^(\S+)\s*\(/)?.[1];
if (tokenSymbol) { if (tokenSymbol) {
detailsHtml += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(displaySymbol(tokenSymbol))}</div>`; detailsHtml += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(tokenSymbol)}</div>`;
} }
detailsHtml += renderAddressHtml(d.address); detailsHtml += renderAddressHtml(d.address);
} else if (d.address) { } else if (d.address) {

View File

@@ -9,12 +9,10 @@ const {
attachCopyHandlers, attachCopyHandlers,
copyableHtml, copyableHtml,
etherscanLinkHtml, etherscanLinkHtml,
explorerUrl,
displaySymbol,
clearViewStack, clearViewStack,
} = require("./helpers"); } = require("./helpers");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("../../shared/tokenList"); const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { state } = require("../../shared/state"); const { state, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances"); const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
const { log } = require("../../shared/log"); const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
@@ -64,13 +62,13 @@ function toAddressHtml(address) {
} }
function txHashHtml(hash) { function txHashHtml(hash) {
const link = explorerUrl("tx", hash); const link = `${currentNetwork().explorerUrl}/tx/${hash}`;
return copyableHtml(hash, "break-all") + etherscanLinkHtml(link); return copyableHtml(hash, "break-all") + etherscanLinkHtml(link);
} }
function blockNumberHtml(blockNumber) { function blockNumberHtml(blockNumber) {
const num = String(blockNumber); const num = String(blockNumber);
const link = explorerUrl("block", num); const link = `${currentNetwork().explorerUrl}/block/${num}`;
return copyableHtml(num) + etherscanLinkHtml(link); return copyableHtml(num) + etherscanLinkHtml(link);
} }
@@ -82,10 +80,7 @@ function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
endWait(); endWait();
const id = waitId; const id = waitId;
const symbol = const symbol = txInfo.token === "ETH" ? "ETH" : txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?";
txInfo.token === "ETH"
? "ETH"
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
$("wait-tx-summary").textContent = txInfo.amount + " " + symbol; $("wait-tx-summary").textContent = txInfo.amount + " " + symbol;
$("wait-tx-to").innerHTML = toAddressHtml(txInfo.to); $("wait-tx-to").innerHTML = toAddressHtml(txInfo.to);
$("wait-tx-hash").innerHTML = txHashHtml(txHash); $("wait-tx-hash").innerHTML = txHashHtml(txHash);
@@ -216,10 +211,7 @@ function restoreWait() {
function showSuccess(txInfo, txHash, blockNumber) { function showSuccess(txInfo, txHash, blockNumber) {
endWait(); endWait();
const symbol = const symbol = txInfo.token === "ETH" ? "ETH" : txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?";
txInfo.token === "ETH"
? "ETH"
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
state.viewData = { state.viewData = {
amount: txInfo.amount, amount: txInfo.amount,
symbol: symbol, symbol: symbol,
@@ -307,10 +299,7 @@ function renderSuccess() {
function showError(txInfo, txHash, message) { function showError(txInfo, txHash, message) {
endWait(); endWait();
const symbol = const symbol = txInfo.token === "ETH" ? "ETH" : txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?";
txInfo.token === "ETH"
? "ETH"
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
state.viewData = { state.viewData = {
amount: txInfo.amount, amount: txInfo.amount,
symbol: symbol, symbol: symbol,

View File

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
// HTML escaping for values interpolated into an innerHTML string.
//
// Every view in src/popup/views/ builds markup by string concatenation, so
// this is the only thing standing between a value the wallet did not author
// and the extension's own DOM. The values that reach it are attacker
// controlled by design: an ERC-20's symbol() and name() are whatever the
// contract chooses to return, an ENS name is whatever the resolver returns,
// and both arrive through the block explorer with no schema.
//
// It escapes both quote characters as well as the tag delimiters, because
// the popup interpolates into attribute values as well as into element
// text — copyableHtml() writes data-copy="..." and etherscanLinkHtml()
// writes href="...". A `<`/`>`-only escape leaves an unquoted-attribute
// break-out intact, and the round trip through a detached element's
// textContent that used to implement this was exactly that escape: the
// HTML serializer only escapes `&`, `<`, `>` and U+00A0 in a text node,
// since a text node has no idea it is about to be pasted inside quotes.
//
// Deliberately a pure string function with no DOM dependency: it is called
// on every rendered row, it is unit-testable without a document, and it
// cannot be affected by the state of a document that an attacker-supplied
// string has already been written into.
const HTML_ESCAPES = {
"&": "&amp;",
"<": "&lt;",
">": "&gt;",
'"': "&quot;",
"'": "&#39;",
};
// `&` is escaped first by virtue of being in the same pass: a sequential
// replace would re-escape the ampersands it had just introduced.
function escapeHtml(s) {
if (s === null || s === undefined) return "";
return String(s).replace(/[&<>"']/g, (c) => HTML_ESCAPES[c]);
}
module.exports = {
escapeHtml,
};

View File

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
// The length bound on a token symbol as displayed.
//
// A symbol is whatever an ERC-20's symbol() returns and the wallet fetches
// it from the block explorer, which imposes no length: src/shared/balances.js
// takes `item.token.symbol` as given. A kilobyte-long symbol is a real
// return value, and rendering it pushes every amount off the row, scrolls
// the balance list past the screen, and hides the figures the user is there
// to read.
//
// This is a layout bound, not a security control. Escaping is what makes a
// hostile symbol inert (see src/shared/html.js), and isSpoofedSymbol() is
// what catches one impersonating a known ticker; neither job belongs here
// and neither is done here. Truncating an unescaped symbol would still be
// an injection, just a shorter one.
//
// 12 characters, which is the bound lookupTokenInfo() in
// src/shared/balances.js already applies when it stores a symbol read
// straight off a contract; the explorer path was the one with no bound at
// all. The longest symbol across the 512 entries of the bundled list is 10
// (MSYRUPUSDP), so nothing the wallet ships as a real token is ever
// truncated. The ellipsis is what tells the user the name they are looking
// at is not the whole name — worth knowing before they send to it.
const MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH = 12;
// The placeholder for a token whose symbol the explorer did not report.
// balances.js already substitutes this; repeated here so a symbol that
// arrives empty from anywhere else displays the same way rather than as a
// blank gap in the row.
const UNKNOWN_SYMBOL = "???";
function displaySymbol(symbol) {
const s = symbol === null || symbol === undefined ? "" : String(symbol);
if (s.length === 0) return UNKNOWN_SYMBOL;
if (s.length <= MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH) return s;
return s.slice(0, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH - 1) + "…";
}
module.exports = {
displaySymbol,
MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH,
UNKNOWN_SYMBOL,
};

View File

@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
// balanceLine() is the row that issue #307 was reported against: every
// screen that lists a holding renders through it, and the symbol it renders
// is whatever an ERC-20's symbol() returned. This asserts against the
// string it emits, which is what gets assigned to innerHTML.
//
// The browser half of the same claim — that a real Chrome renders that
// string as text and puts no iframe in the popup DOM — is in
// tests/e2e/run.js. This half runs inside the 20-second make test cap.
"use strict";
// helpers.js reaches for both at module scope through the modules it pulls
// in. Neither is exercised by anything asserted here.
global.chrome = {
storage: {
local: {
get: () => Promise.resolve({}),
set: () => Promise.resolve(),
},
},
runtime: { sendMessage: () => {} },
};
global.document = {
getElementById: () => null,
createElement: () => ({ style: {}, classList: { toggle() {} } }),
body: { prepend: () => {} },
addEventListener: () => {},
};
const { balanceLine } = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
const { MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH } = require("../src/shared/symbolDisplay");
// The payload from the issue's reproduction, verbatim.
const HOSTILE_SYMBOL =
'<iframe id="pwn" src="https://dapp.e2e.test/" ' +
'style="position:fixed;left:0;top:0;width:360px;height:600px;z-index:99999"></iframe>';
describe("balanceLine", () => {
test("emits a hostile symbol as text, not as an element", () => {
// Deliberately asserted on the escaping alone. The cap truncates
// this payload before its id attribute, so an assertion about the
// rest of the payload would pass on the cap and say nothing about
// the escape.
const html = balanceLine(HOSTILE_SYMBOL, 1, null, null);
expect(html).not.toContain("<iframe");
expect(html).toContain("&lt;iframe");
});
test("caps the symbol before rendering it", () => {
const html = balanceLine("A".repeat(4096), 1, null, null);
expect(html).toContain("A".repeat(MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH - 1) + "…");
expect(html).not.toContain("A".repeat(MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH + 1));
});
// The token id lands inside data-token="...", so a quote in it is a
// way out of the attribute and into a new one.
test("keeps a quote-bearing token id inside its attribute", () => {
const html = balanceLine("TKN", 1, null, '" onclick="alert(1)');
expect(html).not.toContain('onclick="');
expect(html).toContain('data-token="&quot; onclick=&quot;alert(1)"');
});
test("renders an ordinary holding unchanged", () => {
const html = balanceLine("USDC", 1.5, null, "0xabc");
expect(html).toContain("<span>USDC</span>");
expect(html).toContain("<span>1.5000</span>");
expect(html).toContain('data-token="0xabc"');
});
});

View File

@@ -1,258 +0,0 @@
// What eth_chainId and net_version answer on a worker that has not loaded
// state yet.
//
// The MV3 service worker is terminated when idle and revived by the next
// message, and nothing loads state at module scope. Both methods answered from
// currentNetwork(), which reads the module-level `state` singleton, so a
// worker revived by the page's own message answered out of DEFAULT_STATE and
// told a page it was on mainnet while the user was on Sepolia
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/317).
//
// This file therefore uses the REAL state module and never calls loadState()
// itself: the handler has to answer from storage on its own. Same shape as
// tests/coldWorkerChainSwitch.test.js, which covers the write side.
const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
const UNKNOWN_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
const REFRESHED_BALANCE = "1.5";
function storedProfile(networkId) {
return {
hasWallet: true,
wallets: [
{
name: "Wallet 1",
type: "hd",
addresses: [
{ address: ADDRESS, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] },
],
},
],
activeAddress: ADDRESS,
networkId,
rpcUrl: networkById(networkId).defaultRpcUrl,
blockscoutUrl: networkById(networkId).defaultBlockscoutUrl,
allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
deniedSites: {},
trackedTokens: [],
};
}
async function settle() {
for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
}
afterEach(() => {
delete global.chrome;
});
// Load the background worker with the real state module behind it, over a
// storage stub that keeps what is written.
//
// The stub structured-clones in both directions, as the real
// chrome.storage.local does. A stub that handed back the live stored object
// would alias it into whatever read it, so an in-place mutation of a detached
// copy would appear to have reached storage and this whole class of defect
// would be invisible here.
//
// opts.refreshBalances replaces the balances stub, so a test can hold a
// refresh open across a message.
function loadColdWorker(networkId, opts) {
jest.resetModules();
const options = opts || {};
jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
getProvider: () => ({}),
refreshBalances: options.refreshBalances || jest.fn(async () => {}),
}));
jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
isPhishingDomain: () => false,
}));
let alarmHandlers = {};
jest.doMock("../src/shared/alarms", () => ({
BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM: "balance",
BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES: 1,
ensureRecurringAlarms: jest.fn(async () => {}),
registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn((handlers) => {
alarmHandlers = handlers;
}),
}));
const store = { autistmask: storedProfile(networkId) };
let messageListener = null;
const set = jest.fn(async (items) => {
store.autistmask = structuredClone(items.autistmask);
});
global.chrome = {
storage: {
local: {
get: jest.fn(async () => structuredClone(store)),
set,
},
},
runtime: {
getURL: (path) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + path,
onMessage: {
addListener: (fn) => {
messageListener = fn;
},
},
onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
lastError: null,
},
windows: {
getLastFocused: (cb) => cb(null),
create: (options, cb) => cb({ id: 1 }),
remove: (id, cb) => {
if (cb) cb();
},
onRemoved: { addListener: () => {} },
},
tabs: {
query: (queryInfo, cb) => cb([{ id: 1 }]),
sendMessage: (tabId, message, cb) => {
if (cb) cb();
},
},
action: { setPopup: () => {} },
};
require("../src/background/index");
async function rpc(method, origin) {
let result = null;
messageListener(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC", method, params: [] },
{ origin: origin || CONNECTED_ORIGIN },
(r) => {
result = r;
},
);
await settle();
return result;
}
return {
rpc,
persisted: () => store.autistmask,
storageSet: set,
fireBalanceAlarm: () => alarmHandlers.balance(),
};
}
describe("chain identity read by a worker that never loaded state", () => {
test("eth_chainId answers the stored chain, not the default", async () => {
// The first message this worker ever sees. Reading the unloaded
// singleton answers mainnet's 0x1 to a user who is on Sepolia.
const bg = loadColdWorker("sepolia");
expect(await bg.rpc("eth_chainId")).toEqual({
result: SEPOLIA.chainId,
});
});
test("net_version answers the stored chain, not the default", async () => {
const bg = loadColdWorker("sepolia");
expect(await bg.rpc("net_version")).toEqual({
result: SEPOLIA.networkVersion,
});
});
test("answers the stored chain to an origin that never connected", async () => {
// Neither method is gated on a connection, so the stale answer reached
// any page at all; the fixed answer has to as well.
const bg = loadColdWorker("sepolia");
expect(await bg.rpc("eth_chainId", UNKNOWN_ORIGIN)).toEqual({
result: SEPOLIA.chainId,
});
expect(await bg.rpc("net_version", UNKNOWN_ORIGIN)).toEqual({
result: SEPOLIA.networkVersion,
});
});
test("answers mainnet for a profile stored on mainnet", async () => {
// The default and the stored value agree here, so this case cannot
// catch the defect; it is what keeps the fix from being a swap.
const bg = loadColdWorker("mainnet");
expect(await bg.rpc("eth_chainId")).toEqual({
result: MAINNET.chainId,
});
expect(await bg.rpc("net_version")).toEqual({
result: MAINNET.networkVersion,
});
});
test("persists nothing: these are reads", async () => {
// The load must not turn a read into a write. saveState() persists
// every field of the singleton, and a read path that reached it would
// be the wipe https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/316 fixed.
const bg = loadColdWorker("sepolia");
await bg.rpc("eth_chainId");
await bg.rpc("net_version");
expect(bg.storageSet).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(bg.persisted()).toEqual(storedProfile("sepolia"));
});
test("a chain read arriving mid-refresh does not discard the refresh", async () => {
// Any page reaches these two methods, and the injected provider sends
// eth_chainId on every page load, so this overlap is ordinary traffic
// rather than a contrived race.
//
// backgroundRefresh() hands the singleton's wallets to
// refreshBalances(), which mutates those address objects in place once
// the network round trip resolves, and only then saves. Answering the
// page by calling loadState() would replace state.wallets mid-flight,
// so the refreshed balances would land on detached objects and the
// save that follows would persist the pre-refresh values — while still
// stamping lastBalanceRefresh, suppressing the redo.
let releaseRoundTrip;
const roundTrip = new Promise((resolve) => {
releaseRoundTrip = resolve;
});
let refreshReachedNetwork;
const inFlight = new Promise((resolve) => {
refreshReachedNetwork = resolve;
});
const bg = loadColdWorker("sepolia", {
refreshBalances: async (wallets) => {
refreshReachedNetwork();
await roundTrip;
// In place, on the objects handed in — as balances.js does.
wallets[0].addresses[0].balance = REFRESHED_BALANCE;
},
});
const refresh = bg.fireBalanceAlarm();
await inFlight;
expect(await bg.rpc("eth_chainId", UNKNOWN_ORIGIN)).toEqual({
result: SEPOLIA.chainId,
});
releaseRoundTrip();
await refresh;
expect(bg.persisted().wallets[0].addresses[0].balance).toBe(
REFRESHED_BALANCE,
);
});
});

View File

@@ -268,15 +268,11 @@ function ethCallResult(req, opts) {
return ZERO_WORD; return ZERO_WORD;
} }
// opts.tokenSymbolOverride is the hostile contract: set it and the explorer function tokenObject() {
// reports that string as the token's symbol, exactly as it would for a token
// whose symbol() returns markup. Read at request time, like every other
// fixture switch, so a test can flip it and reopen the popup.
function tokenObject(opts) {
return { return {
address_hash: STUB_TOKEN.address, address_hash: STUB_TOKEN.address,
address: STUB_TOKEN.address, address: STUB_TOKEN.address,
symbol: (opts && opts.tokenSymbolOverride) || STUB_TOKEN.symbol, symbol: STUB_TOKEN.symbol,
name: STUB_TOKEN.name, name: STUB_TOKEN.name,
decimals: STUB_TOKEN.decimals, decimals: STUB_TOKEN.decimals,
holders_count: STUB_TOKEN.holders, holders_count: STUB_TOKEN.holders,
@@ -285,7 +281,7 @@ function tokenObject(opts) {
} }
// One received ERC-20 transfer of 1.5 E2E to the address under test. // One received ERC-20 transfer of 1.5 E2E to the address under test.
function tokenTransferItems(address, opts) { function tokenTransferItems(address) {
return [ return [
{ {
transaction_hash: STUB_TX_HASH, transaction_hash: STUB_TX_HASH,
@@ -294,7 +290,7 @@ function tokenTransferItems(address, opts) {
from: { hash: STUB_COUNTERPARTY }, from: { hash: STUB_COUNTERPARTY },
to: { hash: address }, to: { hash: address },
total: { decimals: STUB_TOKEN.decimals, value: "1500000" }, total: { decimals: STUB_TOKEN.decimals, value: "1500000" },
token: tokenObject(opts), token: tokenObject(),
}, },
]; ];
} }
@@ -321,11 +317,11 @@ function nativeTransactionItems(address) {
// A holding of 1.5 E2E, in the shape src/shared/balances.js parses. Serving // A holding of 1.5 E2E, in the shape src/shared/balances.js parses. Serving
// this is what puts an ERC-20 in the send screen's token dropdown, which is // this is what puts an ERC-20 in the send screen's token dropdown, which is
// the only way the confirmation screen's ERC-20 path can be reached. // the only way the confirmation screen's ERC-20 path can be reached.
function tokenBalanceItems(opts) { function tokenBalanceItems() {
return [ return [
{ {
value: "1500000", value: "1500000",
token: tokenObject(opts), token: tokenObject(),
}, },
]; ];
} }
@@ -600,9 +596,6 @@ function traceEnabled(raw) {
* @param {string} [opts.tokenDecimalsOverride] what decimals() answers for * @param {string} [opts.tokenDecimalsOverride] what decimals() answers for
* the stub token, in place of the value Blockscout reports for it. This is * the stub token, in place of the value Blockscout reports for it. This is
* the token that lies about its scale; read at request time. * the token that lies about its scale; read at request time.
* @param {string} [opts.tokenSymbolOverride] what the explorer reports as
* the stub token's symbol, in place of "E2E". This is the token whose
* symbol is markup; read at request time.
* @param {boolean} [opts.seedReceipt] answer eth_getTransactionReceipt with a * @param {boolean} [opts.seedReceipt] answer eth_getTransactionReceipt with a
* confirmed receipt instead of null, so a wait screen resolves. * confirmed receipt instead of null, so a wait screen resolves.
* @returns {Promise<{waitForServiceWorkerTraffic: (ms: number) => * @returns {Promise<{waitForServiceWorkerTraffic: (ms: number) =>
@@ -681,14 +674,14 @@ async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
return jsonResponse(route, { return jsonResponse(route, {
items: items:
opts.seedTokenTransfer && addr opts.seedTokenTransfer && addr
? tokenTransferItems(addr, opts) ? tokenTransferItems(addr)
: [], : [],
}); });
} }
if (/\/addresses\/0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\/token-balances$/.test(p)) { if (/\/addresses\/0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\/token-balances$/.test(p)) {
return jsonResponse( return jsonResponse(
route, route,
opts.seedTokenBalance ? tokenBalanceItems(opts) : [], opts.seedTokenBalance ? tokenBalanceItems() : [],
); );
} }
for (const hash of [STUB_TX_HASH, STUB_NATIVE_TX_HASH]) { for (const hash of [STUB_TX_HASH, STUB_NATIVE_TX_HASH]) {

View File

@@ -2169,156 +2169,6 @@ test("a token that lies about decimals() at signing time broadcasts nothing (#30
await visible(env.page, "#view-address"); await visible(env.page, "#view-address");
}); });
// ------------------------------------------- hostile token symbol (#307)
//
// The reproduction from the issue, in the real browser against the real
// shipped manifest. A token symbol is whatever the contract's symbol()
// returns, the explorer passes it through, and the popup interpolated it
// into an innerHTML string — so a token with 1,000 holders airdropped to
// the victim could paint a full-viewport cross-origin iframe over the
// wallet's own UI, on the screens where the user types their password.
//
// The iframe count and the rendered text are asserted separately on
// purpose, and neither substitutes for the other. `frame-src 'none'` stops
// an injected frame LOADING; it does not stop the element existing, so a
// zero iframe count is a claim about the escaping and about nothing else.
// The literal capped text is the claim that the symbol was treated as a
// string all the way down.
//
// The iframe count is taken on the address screen before anything is
// clicked. That is where the injected frame lands first, and it covers the
// viewport: with the escaping removed, every later step fails as a click
// timeout ("<iframe id=\"pwn\"> intercepts pointer events") rather than as
// anything that names the defect.
// Verbatim from the issue's reproduction.
const HOSTILE_SYMBOL =
'<iframe id="pwn" src="https://dapp.e2e.test/" ' +
'style="position:fixed;left:0;top:0;width:360px;height:600px;z-index:99999"></iframe>';
// What a correctly escaped and capped render of it reads as: the first
// MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH-1 characters and an ellipsis. Spelled out rather than
// imported, so a change to the cap has to be restated here deliberately
// instead of being absorbed by a shared constant.
const HOSTILE_SYMBOL_DISPLAYED = "<iframe id=" + "…";
// Everything the popup can say about an injected symbol, read out of the
// live DOM in one pass.
function hostileSymbolState(page, tokenAddress) {
return page.evaluate((addr) => {
const row = document.querySelector(
'#wallet-list [data-token="' + addr + '"]',
);
// balanceLine() emits <div data-token><span><span>SYMBOL</span>…
// so this is the span the symbol itself was written into.
const symbolEl = row && row.firstElementChild.firstElementChild;
return {
rowFound: !!row,
rowText: row ? row.innerText.trim() : "",
symbolText: symbolEl ? symbolEl.textContent : "",
// The symbol's own span must hold text and nothing else. An
// element child here is the injection, whether or not it
// happens to be an iframe.
symbolElementChildren: symbolEl
? symbolEl.querySelectorAll("*").length
: -1,
// The whole popup document, not just the row: an injected
// element positioned fixed can be anywhere in the tree.
iframes: document.querySelectorAll("iframe").length,
pwnPresent: !!document.getElementById("pwn"),
};
}, tokenAddress);
}
test("a token whose symbol() returns markup renders as text (#307)", async (env) => {
env.routeOpts.ethBalanceWei = toHexWei(FUNDED_ETH_WEI);
env.routeOpts.seedTokenBalance = true;
env.routeOpts.tokenSymbolOverride = HOSTILE_SYMBOL;
console.log(
"# stub token symbol() now returns: " + JSON.stringify(HOSTILE_SYMBOL),
);
// Close and reopen so the refresh that runs on open fetches balances
// with the hostile symbol in them.
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-address");
await env.page.waitForFunction(
(addr) =>
!!document.querySelector(
'#address-balances [data-token="' + addr + '"]',
),
STUB_TOKEN.address,
{ timeout: 60000 },
);
const onAddress = await env.page.evaluate(() => ({
iframes: document.querySelectorAll("iframe").length,
pwnPresent: !!document.getElementById("pwn"),
}));
console.log("# address-detail iframes = " + onAddress.iframes);
assert(
onAddress.iframes === 0 && !onAddress.pwnPresent,
"the address screen contains " +
onAddress.iframes +
" iframe(s) after a hostile symbol rendered (#307)",
);
await env.page.click("#btn-address-back");
await visible(env.page, "#view-main");
await visible(
env.page,
'#wallet-list [data-token="' + STUB_TOKEN.address + '"]',
60000,
);
const st = await hostileSymbolState(env.page, STUB_TOKEN.address);
console.log(
"# iframes in the popup DOM = " +
st.iframes +
" | #pwn present = " +
st.pwnPresent +
" | symbol = " +
JSON.stringify(st.symbolText),
);
assert(st.rowFound, "the hostile token never rendered a row at all");
assert(
st.iframes === 0,
"the popup DOM contains " + st.iframes + " iframe(s) (#307)",
);
assert(!st.pwnPresent, "the injected #pwn element is in the popup DOM");
assert(
st.symbolElementChildren === 0,
"the symbol span grew " +
st.symbolElementChildren +
" element children out of a token symbol (#307)",
);
assert(
st.symbolText === HOSTILE_SYMBOL_DISPLAYED,
"the symbol did not render as the literal capped text " +
JSON.stringify(HOSTILE_SYMBOL_DISPLAYED) +
": " +
JSON.stringify(st.symbolText),
);
assert(
!st.rowText.includes("z-index"),
"the uncapped symbol reached the screen: " + JSON.stringify(st.rowText),
);
// Put the fixture back before the next test reads it, and let the
// stored balances be rewritten with the honest symbol.
env.routeOpts.tokenSymbolOverride = null;
await reopenPopup(env, "#view-main");
await env.page.waitForFunction(
(addr) => {
const row = document.querySelector(
'#wallet-list [data-token="' + addr + '"]',
);
return !!row && row.innerText.includes("E2E");
},
STUB_TOKEN.address,
{ timeout: 60000 },
);
});
// ------------------------------------------- dApp round trips (#183) // ------------------------------------------- dApp round trips (#183)
// //
// The seam. Everything above drives the popup on its own; this section is // The seam. Everything above drives the popup on its own; this section is
@@ -3453,9 +3303,6 @@ async function main() {
// something other than the value the same fixture reports through // something other than the value the same fixture reports through
// Blockscout. The token that lies about its scale (#305). // Blockscout. The token that lies about its scale (#305).
tokenDecimalsOverride: null, tokenDecimalsOverride: null,
// What the explorer reports as the stub token's symbol. The token
// whose symbol() returns markup (#307).
tokenSymbolOverride: null,
// Whether eth_getTransactionReceipt confirms a transaction rather than // Whether eth_getTransactionReceipt confirms a transaction rather than
// answering "not mined yet". // answering "not mined yet".
seedReceipt: false, seedReceipt: false,

View File

@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
// The escape every view depends on, and the length bound on a displayed
// token symbol. Both were added for #307, where a token whose symbol()
// returned an <iframe> tag rendered that iframe inside the popup.
const { escapeHtml } = require("../src/shared/html");
const {
displaySymbol,
MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH,
UNKNOWN_SYMBOL,
} = require("../src/shared/symbolDisplay");
// The payload from the issue's reproduction, verbatim.
const HOSTILE_SYMBOL =
'<iframe id="pwn" src="https://dapp.e2e.test/" ' +
'style="position:fixed;left:0;top:0;width:360px;height:600px;z-index:99999"></iframe>';
describe("escapeHtml", () => {
test("escapes all five characters, quotes included", () => {
expect(escapeHtml("&<>\"'")).toBe("&amp;&lt;&gt;&quot;&#39;");
});
// The regression this function was rewritten for. The previous
// implementation round-tripped through a detached div's textContent,
// and an HTML text node serializes a quote as itself — so a value with
// a quote in it broke straight out of data-copy="..." and href="...".
test("escapes quotes, which the textContent round trip did not", () => {
expect(escapeHtml('a"b')).toBe("a&quot;b");
expect(escapeHtml("a'b")).toBe("a&#39;b");
});
test("does not double-escape an ampersand it just introduced", () => {
expect(escapeHtml("&lt;")).toBe("&amp;lt;");
expect(escapeHtml("&amp;")).toBe("&amp;amp;");
});
test("leaves a string with nothing to escape untouched", () => {
expect(escapeHtml("USDC")).toBe("USDC");
expect(escapeHtml("")).toBe("");
});
test("renders the hostile symbol inert", () => {
const out = escapeHtml(HOSTILE_SYMBOL);
expect(out).not.toContain("<");
expect(out).not.toContain(">");
expect(out).not.toContain('"');
expect(out).toContain("&lt;iframe");
});
// A quoted attribute is broken out of by a quote, a bare one by a
// space; both are closed here. Asserted as a whole attribute rather
// than character by character, because it is the attribute that has to
// survive, not the escape table.
test("a value carrying a quote stays inside its attribute", () => {
const evil = '" onload="alert(1)';
const attr = `data-copy="${escapeHtml(evil)}"`;
expect(attr).toBe('data-copy="&quot; onload=&quot;alert(1)"');
expect(attr.split('"').length - 1).toBe(2);
});
test("null and undefined render as nothing rather than as words", () => {
expect(escapeHtml(null)).toBe("");
expect(escapeHtml(undefined)).toBe("");
});
test("coerces a non-string without losing the escape", () => {
expect(escapeHtml(42)).toBe("42");
expect(escapeHtml({ toString: () => "<b>" })).toBe("&lt;b&gt;");
});
});
describe("displaySymbol", () => {
test("passes every symbol in the bundled list through unchanged", () => {
const { TOKENS } = require("../src/shared/tokenList");
for (const t of TOKENS) {
expect([t.address, displaySymbol(t.symbol)]).toEqual([
t.address,
t.symbol,
]);
}
});
test("caps an over-long symbol and marks it as truncated", () => {
const long = "A".repeat(4096);
const out = displaySymbol(long);
expect(out.length).toBe(MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
expect(out.endsWith("…")).toBe(true);
});
test("keeps a symbol of exactly the cap intact", () => {
const exact = "A".repeat(MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
expect(displaySymbol(exact)).toBe(exact);
});
test("substitutes a placeholder for an absent symbol", () => {
expect(displaySymbol("")).toBe(UNKNOWN_SYMBOL);
expect(displaySymbol(null)).toBe(UNKNOWN_SYMBOL);
expect(displaySymbol(undefined)).toBe(UNKNOWN_SYMBOL);
});
// The cap is a layout bound and nothing more: it must not be mistaken
// for the thing that makes a symbol safe to render. A short hostile
// symbol passes through it untouched, and is inert only because the
// caller escapes it afterwards.
test("does not sanitize — a short markup symbol survives it verbatim", () => {
expect(displaySymbol("<img src=x>")).toBe("<img src=x>");
expect(escapeHtml(displaySymbol("<img src=x>"))).toBe(
"&lt;img src=x&gt;",
);
});
});

View File

@@ -13,33 +13,6 @@
// an exact match on the token set is what keeps the next edit from // an exact match on the token set is what keeps the next edit from
// smuggling one in alongside. // smuggling one in alongside.
// //
// It is also the anti-regression check for #307. The policy used to declare
// script-src and object-src and nothing else, which left every directive
// that does not fall back to them — and, absent default-src, every one that
// does — wide open: a hostile ERC-20 symbol that reached innerHTML could
// load a full-viewport cross-origin iframe over the wallet's own UI. The
// escaping in src/shared/html.js is the primary fix; default-src is what
// stops the next escape that slips from reaching the network.
//
// Every directive below is pinned exactly, because each of the four
// loosenings is load-bearing and none of them may grow:
//
// style-src 'unsafe-inline' src/popup/index.html and the view helpers
// use style="..." attributes throughout, which
// CSP blocks without it. Chrome enforces this
// on attributes, not just <style> blocks, and
// Firefox has never implemented style-src-attr,
// so there is no narrower spelling available.
// img-src data: blockies are data: PNGs assigned to img.src.
// connect-src https: http: the RPC endpoint is user-configurable, and a
// local node over http://127.0.0.1 is a
// supported configuration — the Firefox e2e
// suite runs on exactly that.
// frame-src/form-action/base-uri named rather than inherited: form-action
// and base-uri do not fall back to default-src
// at all, and frame-src 'none' is what kills
// the reported attack outright.
//
// build.js copies these files to dist/<target>/manifest.json verbatim, so // build.js copies these files to dist/<target>/manifest.json verbatim, so
// what is asserted here is what ships. // what is asserted here is what ships.
@@ -48,22 +21,8 @@ const path = require("path");
const MANIFEST_DIR = path.join(__dirname, "..", "manifest"); const MANIFEST_DIR = path.join(__dirname, "..", "manifest");
const EXPECTED_DIRECTIVES = { const EXPECTED_SCRIPT_SRC = ["'self'", "'wasm-unsafe-eval'"];
"default-src": ["'self'"], const EXPECTED_OBJECT_SRC = ["'self'"];
"script-src": ["'self'", "'wasm-unsafe-eval'"],
"object-src": ["'self'"],
"style-src": ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"],
"img-src": ["'self'", "data:"],
"connect-src": ["'self'", "http:", "https:"],
"frame-src": ["'none'"],
"form-action": ["'none'"],
"base-uri": ["'none'"],
};
// Directives that fetch script. Nothing that can execute code may name a
// remote source, an eval form, or an inline form; 'wasm-unsafe-eval' is the
// single deliberate exception and it is pinned above.
const SCRIPT_DIRECTIVES = ["default-src", "script-src", "object-src"];
const FORBIDDEN_SOURCES = [ const FORBIDDEN_SOURCES = [
"'unsafe-eval'", "'unsafe-eval'",
@@ -94,31 +53,26 @@ function parseCsp(policy) {
function assertPolicy(policy) { function assertPolicy(policy) {
const directives = parseCsp(policy); const directives = parseCsp(policy);
// Exact, in both directions: a directive that appears here and not in expect(Object.keys(directives).sort()).toEqual([
// EXPECTED_DIRECTIVES is an unreviewed addition, and one that "object-src",
// disappears silently reopens whatever it was closing. "script-src",
expect(Object.keys(directives).sort()).toEqual(
Object.keys(EXPECTED_DIRECTIVES).sort(),
);
for (const [name, sources] of Object.entries(EXPECTED_DIRECTIVES)) {
expect([name, directives[name].slice().sort()]).toEqual([
name,
sources.slice().sort(),
]); ]);
} expect(directives["script-src"].slice().sort()).toEqual(
for (const name of SCRIPT_DIRECTIVES) { EXPECTED_SCRIPT_SRC,
for (const source of FORBIDDEN_SOURCES) {
expect(name + " " + directives[name].join(" ")).not.toContain(
" " + source,
); );
} expect(directives["object-src"].slice().sort()).toEqual(
EXPECTED_OBJECT_SRC,
);
for (const source of FORBIDDEN_SOURCES) {
expect(directives["script-src"]).not.toContain(source);
expect(directives["object-src"]).not.toContain(source);
} }
} }
describe("shipped Content Security Policy", () => { describe("shipped Content Security Policy", () => {
// MV3 takes an object and applies extension_pages to the popup and the // MV3 takes an object and applies extension_pages to the popup and the
// background service worker, which is where libsodium runs. // background service worker, which is where libsodium runs.
test("chrome MV3 ships the pinned policy, default-src included", () => { test("chrome MV3 allows WASM and nothing else beyond 'self'", () => {
const csp = readManifest("chrome").content_security_policy; const csp = readManifest("chrome").content_security_policy;
expect(typeof csp).toBe("object"); expect(typeof csp).toBe("object");
expect(Object.keys(csp)).toEqual(["extension_pages"]); expect(Object.keys(csp)).toEqual(["extension_pages"]);
@@ -133,7 +87,7 @@ describe("shipped Content Security Policy", () => {
// Firefox before 106 rejects an MV2 policy string that omits // Firefox before 106 rejects an MV2 policy string that omits
// object-src and falls back to its own default, discarding everything // object-src and falls back to its own default, discarding everything
// declared here. Same policy as Chrome, different manifest shape. // declared here. Same policy as Chrome, different manifest shape.
test("firefox MV2 ships the pinned policy, default-src included", () => { test("firefox MV2 allows WASM and nothing else beyond 'self'", () => {
const csp = readManifest("firefox").content_security_policy; const csp = readManifest("firefox").content_security_policy;
expect(typeof csp).toBe("string"); expect(typeof csp).toBe("string");
assertPolicy(csp); assertPolicy(csp);