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Author SHA1 Message Date
681f2bf83c fix: judge the symbol a user sees, not the bytes a contract returns (closes #260)
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A token whose symbol is " ETH " missed KNOWN_SYMBOLS on all three surfaces
while HTML collapsed the padding and painted it as ETH next to the user's
real ETH. isSpoofedSymbol() now normalizes before the lookup: NFKC, then
every character that paints nothing removed wherever it sits, then trimmed,
then uppercased. All three surfaces inherit it unchanged.

The strip is "renders as nothing", spelled as \p{Cf} plus
\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point} plus U+007F. The classes are the spelling
and not the rule, which is why U+007F is named on its own: it is a control
rather than a default-ignorable character, so no class reaches it, yet it
measures 32.00px in the repo's pinned e2e Chromium at 16px sans-serif --
exactly a plain ETH -- so it paints nothing and would otherwise be a live
bypass. The remaining C0/C1 controls measure 48.00px, a visible box, and are
left alone; both directions are pinned by tests, and widening the strip to
\p{Cc} fails the visible-controls test.

Covered: ASCII and Unicode whitespace padding, zero-width and other
invisible characters, and compatibility variants such as fullwidth letters.
Knowingly left open, and asserted as open in the suite: confusables that are
distinct letters (Cyrillic capital Ie), bidi reordering, the visible
controls, and interior whitespace, which renders differently and so is not
the confusion.

No symbol in KNOWN_SYMBOLS or the bundled token list contains whitespace or
a non-ASCII character, so nothing legitimate is newly filtered; a test walks
the whole table and asserts it.

The balance list's token-type gate is now case-insensitive. It compared
exactly, so an explorer writing "erc-20" would silently drop a real holding
before any filter ran. Which types are admitted is unchanged.
2026-08-12 10:22:45 +00:00
17 changed files with 159 additions and 2787 deletions

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@@ -169,34 +169,6 @@ reserve while sitting on the same side of the estimate, so swapping the two in
what [#154](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/154) was, and it was what [#154](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/154) was, and it was
previously correct by reading only. previously correct by reading only.
It also covers the **dApp approval round trips** — the one place where the
content script, the inpage provider, the background worker and the approval
popup all have to work together. A local test page is served by the route
handler on a reserved-TLD origin, gets `window.ethereum` from the shipped
`MAIN`-world content script like any other page, and drives
`eth_requestAccounts`, `personal_sign`, `eth_signTypedData_v4` and
`eth_sendTransaction` through the real prompts. Every signature is recovered in
the runner and compared against the active address, the transaction assertions
run against the raw signed transaction captured at `eth_sendRawTransaction`
rather than against anything the extension reported, rejecting each prompt is
required to return a rejection to the page rather than hang or resolve, and the
password is required to be absent from every message the approval window sends
to the background — with the message that would carry it required to be present,
so that check cannot pass by observing nothing. That last one is the standing
floor under [#157](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/157).
Three limits of that coverage, none of them papered over. The RPC is stubbed
throughout, so this is **not** a real dApp against a real network with real
funds; that remains a human pass before 1.0.0. The site-connection prompt is
raised through `chrome.action.openPopup()`, and headless Chromium's
browser-action popup is not a page Playwright can see or click, so that one
prompt is driven at the URL the extension itself puts on the action — the same
page and the same approval id, but whether a real toolbar click shows it is not
observable here. And the EIP-1193 error code does not survive the last hop: the
rejection that crosses the boundary carries code 4001 and is asserted to, but
`src/content/inpage.js` rebuilds it as `new Error(message)`, so the calling page
catches an error with no `code` property.
Any test that drives a failure path on purpose declares the `console.error` it Any test that drives a failure path on purpose declares the `console.error` it
is about to provoke, via `errors.expect()`. That is not a mute: the declaration is about to provoke, via `errors.expect()`. That is not a mute: the declaration
consumes exactly one matching record, and a declaration nothing matched fails consumes exactly one matching record, and a declaration nothing matched fails
@@ -638,21 +610,6 @@ ExportPrivKey and ShowRecoveryPhrase — are deliberately absent from that list,
so the popup can never reopen onto one of them with no password prompt in front so the popup can never reopen onto one of them with no password prompt in front
of it. of it.
A reopened popup renders the wallet list and the one screen it restores onto,
and nothing else, so every screen on the stack behind that one is still the
blank template from `index.html`. "Back" therefore renders its target rather
than only unhiding it, through the same dispatch and data guards as the restore
(`src/popup/viewRouter.js`), and falls back to Home when the state the target
would render is gone.
It renders only a screen this page load has not rendered yet. Forward navigation
renders as it goes, and `viewRouter.js` records every screen that reaches
`showView()`, so "Back" onto a screen already on the page unhides it and nothing
more — rendering it a second time would re-fetch and overwrite what it holds,
such as an edit typed into Settings and not yet saved. Home is the one screen
"Back" always re-renders, so the wallet list reflects anything that changed
while the user was away from it.
Every screen that holds secret material in the page registers a cleanup with Every screen that holds secret material in the page registers a cleanup with
`onViewLeave()` (`src/popup/views/helpers.js`), which `showView()` runs on every `onViewLeave()` (`src/popup/views/helpers.js`), which `showView()` runs on every
exit from that screen rather than only on its "Back" button, so nothing secret exit from that screen rather than only on its "Back" button, so nothing secret

68
TODO.md
View File

@@ -45,74 +45,6 @@ undefined identifiers, which is how
# Completed Steps # Completed Steps
- 2026-08-14: Approving a site connection is no longer a race against the popup
closing. The decision now rides the approval port the popup already holds,
which is the same channel the close disconnects, so it is delivered ahead of
that disconnect however fast the teardown is; `windows.onRemoved` no longer
decides a site approval whose port is connected, since that event is ordered
against nothing either. Rejecting and closing without deciding both still
report a rejection, and the popup delays its own close by nothing. The e2e
harness's deferred-`window.close()` accommodation is gone with it, so the two
site-prompt tests now drive the shipped decide-then-close in a real Chromium;
against the unfixed code the approval came back to the page as
`{"settled":"rejected","code":4001}`
([#275](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/275)).
- 2026-08-12: EIP-1193 error codes now reach the page. `src/content/inpage.js`
rebuilt every failure as `new Error(error.message)`, so the code the
background produced and the content script relayed intact was dropped in the
last hop and a dApp checking `err.code === 4001` saw `undefined` — a wallet
the user deliberately declined was indistinguishable from one that broke. The
provider now rejects with a `ProviderRpcError` carrying `code` and, where the
boundary sent one, `data`, passed through verbatim rather than matched against
a list, so 4001, 4100 and 4902 all arrive and a future code needs no edit
here. An error the background sent with no code stays a plain `Error` with no
`code` property, and `message` is unchanged in every case. All four request
entry points (`request`, `enable`, `send`, `sendAsync`) are covered by
`tests/inpageErrors.test.js`, and the e2e probe that printed the missing code
now requires it on the page's Error as well as on the wire, for all four
rejected flows ([#274](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/274)).
- 2026-08-12: "Back" now renders the screen it lands on instead of only unhiding
it. A reopened popup renders the wallet list and the one screen it restores
onto, so every screen further down the stack was still the blank template from
`index.html`, and Back walked straight onto it — an empty address, no
balances, no QR code. The Back path now goes through the same per-view
dispatch and data guards as the restore (`src/popup/viewRouter.js`, shared
with `restoreView()`), falling back to Home when the state the target would
render is gone. It renders only a view this page load has not rendered yet:
`viewRouter.js` records every view that reaches `showView()`, which is where
forward navigation and the restore both end, so Back onto a view already on
the page unhides it and nothing more. That is what keeps a second render from
re-fetching and overwriting what the view holds — an unsaved edit in Settings,
a transaction list already loaded. Home is the exception and is always
re-rendered, as it was before. Covered by unit tests on the real `goBack()`
and by three end-to-end cases against the real popup, each demonstrated
failing on the unfixed build
([#268](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/268)).
- 2026-08-12: `KNOWN_SYMBOLS` now maps a symbol to the set of contract addresses
that bear it, not to one of them. A ticker is not unique: seven of the 512
bundled tokens — `FRAX`, `REUSD`, `TON`, `EURE`, `MSUSD`, `MUSD` and `JPYC`
share a symbol with another bundled entry at a different real contract, and
the table, built from the list first-wins, kept only the earlier one. The
other seven were judged spoofs of their own symbol at their own address and
hidden from the balance list, the history and the send selector, so a holder
could not spend them. Both contracts of each pair come from the same CoinGecko
fetch of 2026-02-27, so neither was stale and neither was dropped.
`isSpoofedSymbol()` asks set membership instead of equality, which does not
loosen the rule — a contract outside the set is still a spoof — and a test now
walks `TOKENS` asserting no bundled token is filtered at its own address,
which is the walk the suite lacked
([#276](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/276)).
- 2026-08-12: The dApp approval round trips are driven end to end in the
browser. A test page served by the harness speaks EIP-1193 to the real inpage
provider through the real content script, background worker and approval popup
for `eth_requestAccounts`, `personal_sign`, `eth_signTypedData_v4` and
`eth_sendTransaction`. Every signature is recovered and compared against the
active address, the transaction is checked against the bytes handed to the
stubbed RPC, each rejection must reach the page as a rejection, and the
password must appear in no message the approval window sends — the assertion
that gives [#157](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/157) a permanent
floor. This does not discharge a real dApp with real funds against mainnet
([#183](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/183)).
- 2026-08-12: The known-symbol spoof rule now judges the symbol a user actually - 2026-08-12: The known-symbol spoof rule now judges the symbol a user actually
sees. `isSpoofedSymbol()` normalizes before the lookup — NFKC, then every sees. `isSpoofedSymbol()` normalizes before the lookup — NFKC, then every
character that paints nothing removed (the format and default-ignorable character that paints nothing removed (the format and default-ignorable

View File

@@ -279,50 +279,13 @@ function requestSignApproval(origin, hostname, signParams, approvedFrom) {
}); });
} }
// Anything only the extension's own pages may say. A content script speaks // Detect when an approval popup (browser-action) closes without a response.
// with the page's URL, so this is what separates the popup from the site the // TX and sign approvals now use windows.create() and are handled by the
// popup is being asked about. // windowsApi.onRemoved listener below, but we still handle site-connection
function isExtensionSender(sender) { // approval disconnects here.
const extUrl = runtime.getURL("");
return !!(sender && sender.url && sender.url.startsWith(extUrl));
}
// The approval popup's port: it carries the user's decision on a
// site-connection approval, and its disconnect is how that approval learns the
// popup closed without one.
//
// The decision travels this port rather than a one-off runtime.sendMessage()
// for exactly one reason: the port is also what the popup's window.close()
// disconnects. A message posted on a port is delivered before that port's
// disconnect, so approve-then-close settles as an approval no matter how fast
// the teardown is. Sent as a one-off message the two crossed on independent
// channels with nothing ordering them, and the teardown won every time when
// the prompt was driven in a tab: the user approved and the dApp was told they
// had refused.
//
// TX and sign approvals do not decide here. They stay pending across a
// disconnect — the user can reopen the toolbar popup — and are rejected by the
// windowsApi.onRemoved listener below.
runtime.onConnect.addListener((port) => { runtime.onConnect.addListener((port) => {
if (port.name.startsWith("approval:")) { if (port.name.startsWith("approval:")) {
const id = port.name.split(":")[1]; const id = port.name.split(":")[1];
if (pendingApprovals[id]) {
// This approval has a popup that can speak for it, so its
// disconnect is a trustworthy "closed"; see onRemoved below.
pendingApprovals[id].portConnected = true;
}
port.onMessage.addListener((msg) => {
if (!msg || msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_DECISION") return;
if (!isExtensionSender(port.sender)) return;
const approval = pendingApprovals[id];
if (!approval || approval.type === "tx" || approval.type === "sign")
return;
settleApproval(id, {
approved: !!msg.approved,
remember: !!msg.remember,
});
resetPopupUrl();
});
port.onDisconnect.addListener(() => { port.onDisconnect.addListener(() => {
const approval = pendingApprovals[id]; const approval = pendingApprovals[id];
if (approval) { if (approval) {
@@ -869,32 +832,20 @@ startBackgroundJobs();
// window is an ordinary event with an attempt already in flight behind it. // window is an ordinary event with an attempt already in flight behind it.
// settleApproval() refuses those, which leaves the attempt to report its real // settleApproval() refuses those, which leaves the attempt to report its real
// outcome to the page. // outcome to the page.
//
// A site-connection approval whose popup connected its port is not decided
// here. That popup approves and closes in the same breath, and this event
// races the decision on a channel of its own — the same race the port exists
// to end. Its port disconnect says the same thing this event does, in an order
// that is defined, so the disconnect is left to say it. The window closing
// before any port connected is the one case with nothing else to speak for it,
// and is rejected here so the dApp is not left waiting on a window that is
// gone.
if (windowsApi && windowsApi.onRemoved) { if (windowsApi && windowsApi.onRemoved) {
windowsApi.onRemoved.addListener((windowId) => { windowsApi.onRemoved.addListener((windowId) => {
for (const [id, approval] of Object.entries(pendingApprovals)) { for (const [id, approval] of Object.entries(pendingApprovals)) {
if (approval.windowId !== windowId) continue; if (approval.windowId !== windowId) continue;
const isSite = approval.type !== "tx" && approval.type !== "sign"; const rejection =
if (isSite && approval.portConnected) continue; approval.type === "tx" || approval.type === "sign"
settleApproval( ? {
id,
isSite
? { approved: false, remember: false }
: {
error: { error: {
code: 4001, code: 4001,
message: "User rejected the request.", message: "User rejected the request.",
}, },
}, }
); : { approved: false, remember: false };
settleApproval(id, rejection);
} }
}); });
} }
@@ -921,16 +872,18 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
} }
// Validate that popup-only messages originate from the extension itself. // Validate that popup-only messages originate from the extension itself.
// The site-connection decision is not here: it is a port message, and it
// is checked the same way where the port is served.
const POPUP_ONLY_TYPES = [ const POPUP_ONLY_TYPES = [
"AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL",
"AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_RESPONSE",
"AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE", "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
"AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE", "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
]; ];
if (POPUP_ONLY_TYPES.includes(msg.type) && !isExtensionSender(sender)) { if (POPUP_ONLY_TYPES.includes(msg.type)) {
sendResponse({ error: "Unauthorized sender" }); const extUrl = runtime.getURL("");
return false; if (!sender.url || !sender.url.startsWith(extUrl)) {
sendResponse({ error: "Unauthorized sender" });
return false;
}
} }
if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") { if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") {
@@ -962,6 +915,15 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
return false; return false;
} }
if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_RESPONSE") {
settleApproval(msg.id, {
approved: msg.approved,
remember: msg.remember,
});
resetPopupUrl();
return false;
}
if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE") { if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE") {
const approval = pendingApprovals[msg.id]; const approval = pendingApprovals[msg.id];
if (!approval) return false; if (!approval) return false;

View File

@@ -11,39 +11,6 @@
let nextId = 1; let nextId = 1;
const pending = {}; const pending = {};
// EIP-1193 ProviderRpcError: `code`, `message`, optional `data`. A class
// rather than properties bolted onto an Error because this object crosses
// no boundary after construction — it is built in the page's own realm and
// handed straight to the caller's catch — so the prototype survives and
// `error.name` is a stable thing for a dApp to see.
class ProviderRpcError extends Error {
constructor(code, message, data) {
super(message);
this.name = "ProviderRpcError";
this.code = code;
if (data !== undefined) this.data = data;
}
}
// Rebuild a boundary error as the error the page catches, carrying the
// code (and data) the extension reported. Without this a dApp cannot tell
// a user's refusal (4001) from a wallet that broke, and retries or shows
// an error instead of accepting the refusal.
//
// Whatever code arrived is passed through verbatim rather than being
// matched against a list: the extension emits 4001, 4100 and 4902 today,
// and a code this file has never heard of is still the truth about what
// happened. An error reported with no code at all stays a plain Error —
// a ProviderRpcError whose `code` is undefined would advertise a
// conformance it does not have. `message` is untouched in every case.
function toPageError(error) {
const message = (error && error.message) || "Request failed";
if (error && error.code !== undefined && error.code !== null) {
return new ProviderRpcError(error.code, message, error.data);
}
return new Error(message);
}
// Listen for responses from the content script // Listen for responses from the content script
window.addEventListener("message", function onUuid(event) { window.addEventListener("message", function onUuid(event) {
if (event.source !== window) return; if (event.source !== window) return;
@@ -53,7 +20,7 @@
if (!p) return; if (!p) return;
delete pending[id]; delete pending[id];
if (error) { if (error) {
p.reject(toPageError(error)); p.reject(new Error(error.message || "Request failed"));
} else { } else {
p.resolve(result); p.resolve(result);
} }

View File

@@ -9,17 +9,16 @@ const {
$, $,
showView, showView,
updateDebugBanner, updateDebugBanner,
setBackRenderer, setRenderMain,
pushCurrentView, pushCurrentView,
goBack, goBack,
clearViewStack, clearViewStack,
} = require("./views/helpers"); } = require("./views/helpers");
const { applyTheme } = require("./theme"); const { applyTheme } = require("./theme");
// Renders a view the popup lands on without having navigated to it forward: // Views that can be fully re-rendered from persisted state. All others fall
// on restore here, and on Back. Only the views that can be fully re-rendered // back to the nearest restorable parent; see the module for why the
// from persisted state (RESTORABLE_VIEWS, src/popup/restorableViews.js) go // secret-bearing views are absent.
// through it; anything else falls back to the nearest restorable parent. const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("./restorableViews");
const { renderView, makeBackRenderer } = require("./viewRouter");
const home = require("./views/home"); const home = require("./views/home");
const welcome = require("./views/welcome"); const welcome = require("./views/welcome");
@@ -109,22 +108,91 @@ const ctx = {
}, },
}; };
// The view modules the router renders through, keyed as it expects them. function needsAddress(view) {
const viewModules = { return (
main: { show: () => fallbackView() }, view === "address" ||
addressDetail, view === "address-token" ||
addressToken, view === "receive" ||
receive, view === "transaction"
settings, );
settingsAddToken, }
confirmTx,
transactionDetail, function hasValidAddress() {
txStatus, return (
}; state.selectedWallet !== null &&
state.selectedAddress !== null &&
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet] &&
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet].addresses[state.selectedAddress]
);
}
function restoreView() { function restoreView() {
if (!renderView(state.currentView, state, viewModules)) { const view = state.currentView;
fallbackView(); if (!view || !RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view)) {
return fallbackView();
}
if (needsAddress(view) && !hasValidAddress()) {
return fallbackView();
}
if (view === "address-token" && !state.selectedToken) {
return fallbackView();
}
switch (view) {
case "address":
addressDetail.show();
break;
case "address-token":
addressToken.show();
break;
case "receive":
receive.show();
break;
case "settings":
settings.show();
break;
case "settings-addtoken":
settingsAddToken.show();
break;
case "confirm-tx":
if (state.viewData && state.viewData.pendingTx) {
confirmTx.restore();
} else {
fallbackView();
}
break;
case "transaction":
if (state.viewData && state.viewData.tx) {
transactionDetail.render();
} else {
fallbackView();
}
break;
case "wait-tx":
// Resumes the receipt poll from the persisted broadcast time.
if (!txStatus.restoreWait()) {
fallbackView();
}
break;
case "success-tx":
if (state.viewData && state.viewData.hash) {
txStatus.renderSuccess();
} else {
fallbackView();
}
break;
case "error-tx":
if (state.viewData && state.viewData.message) {
txStatus.renderError();
} else {
fallbackView();
}
break;
default:
fallbackView();
break;
} }
} }
@@ -179,7 +247,7 @@ async function init() {
settings.show(); settings.show();
}); });
setBackRenderer(makeBackRenderer(state, viewModules)); setRenderMain(renderWalletList);
welcome.init(ctx); welcome.init(ctx);
addWallet.init(ctx); addWallet.init(ctx);

View File

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
// Rendering a view the popup lands on without having navigated to it
// forward: on restore, and on Back. In both cases the view may never have
// been rendered in this page load — a reopened popup renders only the
// wallet list and the view it restores onto, so every other view is still
// the blank static template from index.html — so unhiding it is not enough.
//
// Forward navigation renders as it goes and must NOT come through here:
// rendering a second time would re-fetch and clobber whatever the view has
// in flight.
//
// The view modules are injected and nothing here touches the DOM, so the
// dispatch and its data guards can be tested directly; src/popup/index.js
// cannot be required outside a browser.
const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("./restorableViews");
// The views this page load has rendered.
//
// The Back path cannot otherwise tell its two cases apart. A view the popup
// never rendered is still the blank template from index.html and has to be
// rendered; a view already on the page must NOT be rendered again, because
// a second render re-fetches and overwrites whatever the user has typed
// into it and not yet saved.
//
// Registration is showView() in views/helpers.js, which is the last thing
// every render path runs — restoreView()'s, the Back path's, and every
// forward show(). That is the point of putting it there rather than in the
// individual views: a view added later registers itself with no one having
// to remember it, so this cannot decay.
//
// Module scope is page-load scope: the popup loads this module once per
// page load, and a reopened popup gets a fresh, empty set — which is
// exactly the state that makes the Back path render.
const renderedViews = new Set();
function markViewRendered(view) {
if (view) renderedViews.add(view);
}
// Begin a fresh page-load scope. The popup gets one by being loaded; the
// unit tests, which simulate several page loads against one module
// instance, ask for one.
function resetRenderedViews() {
renderedViews.clear();
}
// Home is the exception: Back re-renders it every time, which is what the
// popup did before this router existed (index.js registered
// renderWalletList() as setRenderMain(), and goBack() called it on every
// Back onto "main"). It must stay that way — the wallet list has to reflect
// what changed while the user was away from it, such as a wallet renamed or
// an address removed in Settings — and Home holds no unsaved input to lose.
const ALWAYS_RENDER_ON_BACK = new Set(["main"]);
// Views that render an address the user picked and cannot be rendered
// without one.
const ADDRESS_VIEWS = new Set([
"address",
"address-token",
"receive",
"transaction",
]);
function needsAddress(view) {
return ADDRESS_VIEWS.has(view);
}
function hasValidAddress(state) {
return Boolean(
state.selectedWallet !== null &&
state.selectedAddress !== null &&
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet] &&
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet].addresses[state.selectedAddress],
);
}
// Render `view` from persisted state. Each view module shows itself, so a
// true return means the view is both rendered and on screen.
//
// Returns false when the view is not one the popup renders from state, or
// when the state it would render is gone — a token no longer selected, a
// transaction no longer persisted. The caller falls back rather than
// putting an empty template on screen.
function renderView(view, state, views) {
if (!view || !RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view)) return false;
if (needsAddress(view) && !hasValidAddress(state)) return false;
if (view === "address-token" && !state.selectedToken) return false;
const data = state.viewData || {};
switch (view) {
case "main":
views.main.show();
return true;
case "address":
views.addressDetail.show();
return true;
case "address-token":
views.addressToken.show();
return true;
case "receive":
views.receive.show();
return true;
case "settings":
views.settings.show();
return true;
case "settings-addtoken":
views.settingsAddToken.show();
return true;
case "confirm-tx":
if (!data.pendingTx) return false;
views.confirmTx.restore();
return true;
case "transaction":
if (!data.tx) return false;
views.transactionDetail.render();
return true;
case "wait-tx":
// Resumes the receipt poll from the persisted broadcast time,
// and answers false when there is nothing resumable left.
return Boolean(views.txStatus.restoreWait());
case "success-tx":
if (!data.hash) return false;
views.txStatus.renderSuccess();
return true;
case "error-tx":
if (!data.message) return false;
views.txStatus.renderError();
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
// The Back-path renderer, registered with setBackRenderer() in
// views/helpers.js.
//
// Returns false — leaving goBack() to unhide the view, as it always did —
// in the two cases where the view is known to be on the page already:
//
// - It is not one the popup renders from persisted state. The restored
// stack is filtered against RESTORABLE_VIEWS, so such a view can only
// be on the stack from this page load, where forward navigation
// rendered it on the way in.
// - This page load has rendered it. Re-rendering would re-fetch and
// clobber what it holds; Home is rendered anyway, see above.
//
// What is left is the case the router exists for: a view on the stack that
// this page load has never rendered, whose template is still blank.
function makeBackRenderer(state, views) {
return function renderBack(view) {
if (!RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view)) return false;
if (renderedViews.has(view) && !ALWAYS_RENDER_ON_BACK.has(view)) {
return false;
}
if (!renderView(view, state, views)) {
views.main.show();
}
return true;
};
}
module.exports = {
renderView,
makeBackRenderer,
markViewRendered,
resetRenderedViews,
};

View File

@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
function show(id) { function show(id) {
approvalId = id; approvalId = id;
approvalPort = runtime.connect({ name: "approval:" + id }); runtime.connect({ name: "approval:" + id });
runtime.sendMessage({ type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id }, (details) => { runtime.sendMessage({ type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id }, (details) => {
if (!details) { if (!details) {
window.close(); window.close();
@@ -470,14 +470,6 @@ function show(id) {
} }
let approvalId = null; let approvalId = null;
// The port this approval was opened on. Closing this window disconnects it,
// and the background treats that disconnect as "closed without deciding" for a
// site connection — so the decision goes out on this same port and not as a
// one-off message. One channel is ordered: a message posted on it is delivered
// before its own disconnect, however immediately the close follows. Two
// channels were not, and the close won, reporting a user who approved as
// having refused.
let approvalPort = null;
let pendingTxDetails = null; let pendingTxDetails = null;
// The exact objects shown to the user, kept so the popup signs what it // The exact objects shown to the user, kept so the popup signs what it
// displayed rather than re-fetching or re-populating anything at approval // displayed rather than re-fetching or re-populating anything at approval
@@ -545,20 +537,6 @@ function clearSignPassword() {
hideError("approve-sign-error"); hideError("approve-sign-error");
} }
// Answer a site-connection approval and close. The decision goes out on the
// approval port — see approvalPort above for why — and carries no approval id,
// because the port name already names the approval the background will settle.
function decideSite(approved) {
if (approvalPort) {
approvalPort.postMessage({
type: "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_DECISION",
approved,
remember: $("approve-remember").checked,
});
}
window.close();
}
function init(ctx) { function init(ctx) {
onViewLeave("approve-tx", clearTxPassword); onViewLeave("approve-tx", clearTxPassword);
onViewLeave("approve-sign", clearSignPassword); onViewLeave("approve-sign", clearSignPassword);
@@ -569,11 +547,25 @@ function init(ctx) {
}); });
$("btn-approve").addEventListener("click", () => { $("btn-approve").addEventListener("click", () => {
decideSite(true); const remember = $("approve-remember").checked;
runtime.sendMessage({
type: "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_RESPONSE",
id: approvalId,
approved: true,
remember,
});
window.close();
}); });
$("btn-reject").addEventListener("click", () => { $("btn-reject").addEventListener("click", () => {
decideSite(false); const remember = $("approve-remember").checked;
runtime.sendMessage({
type: "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_RESPONSE",
id: approvalId,
approved: false,
remember,
});
window.close();
}); });
$("btn-approve-tx").addEventListener("click", async () => { $("btn-approve-tx").addEventListener("click", async () => {

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ const {
getAddressValueUsd, getAddressValueUsd,
} = require("../../shared/prices"); } = require("../../shared/prices");
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state"); const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { markViewRendered } = require("../viewRouter");
// When views are added, removed, or transitions between them change, // When views are added, removed, or transitions between them change,
// update the view-navigation documentation in README.md to match. // update the view-navigation documentation in README.md to match.
@@ -77,10 +76,6 @@ function showView(name) {
} }
clearFlash(); clearFlash();
state.currentView = name; state.currentView = name;
// A view's show() ends here, so this is where the Back path learns the
// view is no longer the blank template from index.html and must not be
// rendered a second time. See viewRouter.js.
markViewRendered(name);
saveState(); saveState();
updateDebugBanner(name); updateDebugBanner(name);
} }
@@ -116,19 +111,12 @@ function updateDebugBanner(viewName) {
} }
} }
// Callback that renders a view being navigated BACK onto. Set once by // Callback to re-render the main/home view when navigating back to it.
// index.js via setBackRenderer(), which routes the view through the same // Set once by index.js via setRenderMain().
// per-view render and data guards restoreView() uses. let _renderMain = null;
//
// It answers true when it took the navigation — the view is rendered and
// shown, or its backing data was gone and it fell back — and false for a
// view the popup does not render from persisted state. Those can only be
// on the stack from this page load, because the stack is filtered on load,
// so they have already been rendered and only need unhiding.
let _renderBack = null;
function setBackRenderer(fn) { function setRenderMain(fn) {
_renderBack = fn; _renderMain = fn;
} }
// Push the current view onto the navigation stack so goBack() can // Push the current view onto the navigation stack so goBack() can
@@ -148,11 +136,9 @@ function goBack() {
} else { } else {
target = "main"; target = "main";
} }
// A popped view is landed on, not navigated to. If the popup has been if (target === "main" && _renderMain) {
// closed and reopened since the view was pushed, nothing has ever _renderMain();
// rendered it in this page load and its template is still blank, so it }
// has to be rendered here rather than merely unhidden.
if (_renderBack && _renderBack(target)) return;
showView(target); showView(target);
} }
@@ -484,7 +470,7 @@ module.exports = {
showView, showView,
onViewLeave, onViewLeave,
updateDebugBanner, updateDebugBanner,
setBackRenderer, setRenderMain,
pushCurrentView, pushCurrentView,
goBack, goBack,
clearViewStack, clearViewStack,

View File

@@ -8,19 +8,12 @@
// either verdict alone, because the balance list is where the user forms // either verdict alone, because the balance list is where the user forms
// their belief about what they own (issue #235). // their belief about what they own (issue #235).
// //
// KNOWN_SYMBOLS maps a symbol to the set of lowercased contract addresses // KNOWN_SYMBOLS maps a symbol to the lowercased contract address that may
// that may bear it, or to null. Null means the symbol belongs to the native // bear it, or to null. Null means the symbol belongs to the native asset,
// asset, which has no contract at all, so no contract may bear it and every // which has no contract at all, so no contract may bear it and every one
// one that does is a spoof. "ETH" is the only such entry today; the rule is // that does is a spoof. "ETH" is the only such entry today; the rule is
// written so that a second one needs no change here or at any call site. // written so that a second one needs no change here or at any call site.
// //
// The value is a set because a ticker is not unique: seven symbols in the
// bundled list belong to two real contracts each, and answering with one of
// them hid the other one's holders' money (issue #276). Membership, not
// equality, is therefore the question — but it is the same question, asked of
// a table that can now state the truth. Every address in a set is one the
// wallet ships as a real token; a contract outside the set is still a spoof.
//
// The symbol is attacker-controlled — it is whatever the ERC-20 contract // The symbol is attacker-controlled — it is whatever the ERC-20 contract
// returns — so the lookup is done on a normalized form (issue #260): the // returns — so the lookup is done on a normalized form (issue #260): the
// question is whether the symbol reaches the user's eye as a known one, // question is whether the symbol reaches the user's eye as a known one,
@@ -100,7 +93,7 @@ function isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, contractAddress) {
if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(sym)) return false; if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(sym)) return false;
const legit = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(sym); const legit = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(sym);
if (legit === null) return true; if (legit === null) return true;
return !legit.has(contract); return contract !== normalizeAddress(legit);
} }
module.exports = { module.exports = {

View File

@@ -3607,33 +3607,14 @@ for (const t of TOKENS) {
TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.set(t.address.toLowerCase(), t); TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.set(t.address.toLowerCase(), t);
} }
// Build a map of symbol (uppercased) -> the set of contract addresses // Build a map of symbol (uppercased) -> legitimate contract address (lowercased).
// (lowercased) that legitimately bear it. Used for spoofed-symbol detection. // Used for spoofed-symbol detection. "ETH" maps to null (native token).
// "ETH" maps to null: the native asset has no contract, so no contract may
// bear its symbol.
//
// The value is a set and not a single address because tickers are not unique
// and the list above proves it: seven of these 512 tokens share a symbol with
// another entry — FRAX, REUSD, TON, EURE, MSUSD, MUSD and JPYC — at two
// different real contracts each, all of them from the same source fetch. A
// one-address-per-symbol table can only answer that by picking a winner, and
// the loser is then a token in our own bundled list that the spoof filter
// hides from the balance list, the history and the send selector at its own
// address, so the user cannot spend it (issue #276). Naming every address
// that bears the symbol is the only shape that says what is true; it does not
// loosen the rule, because a contract outside the set is still a spoof.
const KNOWN_SYMBOLS = new Map(); const KNOWN_SYMBOLS = new Map();
KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set("ETH", null); KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set("ETH", null);
for (const t of TOKENS) { for (const t of TOKENS) {
const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase(); const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(upper)) { if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(upper)) {
KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set(upper, new Set()); KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set(upper, t.address.toLowerCase());
}
const addresses = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(upper);
// A null entry is the native asset and stays null: an ERC-20 that reports
// the native symbol does not thereby become entitled to it.
if (addresses !== null) {
addresses.add(t.address.toLowerCase());
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,329 +0,0 @@
// Back after reopening the popup (#268).
//
// A reopened popup renders the wallet list and the one view it restores
// onto; every other view is still the blank static template from
// index.html. goBack() used to only unhide its target, so Back landed on
// that blank template for any view the popup had not rendered in this page
// load. These tests drive the real goBack() with the real router wired to
// recording view modules, so what is asserted is which view render ran —
// the thing that was missing.
//
// The rendering itself is asserted against the real popup in a real
// browser by tests/e2e/run.js; here the DOM is a stub, because goBack()
// only needs showView() to work.
const els = new Map();
function fakeEl() {
return {
textContent: "",
innerHTML: "",
classList: {
toggle() {},
add() {},
remove() {},
contains: () => false,
},
remove() {},
};
}
globalThis.document = {
getElementById(id) {
if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, fakeEl());
return els.get(id);
},
};
// helpers.js pulls in state.js, which reads chrome.storage.local at load.
globalThis.chrome = {
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
};
const {
showView,
goBack,
setBackRenderer,
pushCurrentView,
} = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
const {
makeBackRenderer,
markViewRendered,
resetRenderedViews,
} = require("../src/popup/viewRouter");
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const ADDRESS = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
const TOKEN = "0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48";
let calls;
// Stand-ins for the view modules. Each records itself and then shows its
// view, which is what every real view render ends with — so the assertions
// can tell "rendered and shown" apart from "merely unhidden".
function recorder(name, view) {
return () => {
calls.push(name);
showView(view);
};
}
function makeViews() {
return {
main: { show: recorder("main", "main") },
addressDetail: { show: recorder("addressDetail", "address") },
addressToken: { show: recorder("addressToken", "address-token") },
receive: { show: recorder("receive", "receive") },
settings: { show: recorder("settings", "settings") },
settingsAddToken: {
show: recorder("settingsAddToken", "settings-addtoken"),
},
confirmTx: { restore: recorder("confirmTx", "confirm-tx") },
transactionDetail: {
render: recorder("transactionDetail", "transaction"),
},
txStatus: {
restoreWait: () => {
calls.push("waitTx");
showView("wait-tx");
return true;
},
renderSuccess: recorder("successTx", "success-tx"),
renderError: recorder("errorTx", "error-tx"),
},
};
}
// The popup as it stands just after a reopen: one wallet with one address,
// the view the popup restored onto, and the stack behind it.
//
// A reopen is a fresh page load, so the record of what has been rendered
// starts empty — that emptiness is what makes the Back path render at all.
// Returns the view modules so a test can drive forward navigation through
// the same recorders the router renders through.
function reopenedOn(view, stack, extra) {
calls = [];
resetRenderedViews();
state.wallets = [
{
name: "Wallet 1",
addresses: [{ address: ADDRESS, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] }],
},
];
state.selectedWallet = 0;
state.selectedAddress = 0;
state.selectedToken = null;
state.viewData = null;
state.currentView = view;
state.viewStack = stack.slice();
Object.assign(state, extra || {});
// Restoring onto a view renders it, so the reopened popup has that one
// view on the page and nothing else.
markViewRendered(view);
const views = makeViews();
setBackRenderer(makeBackRenderer(state, views));
return views;
}
// The reproduction from the issue, step for step.
describe("Back onto a view the reopened popup never rendered", () => {
test("Back from settings renders the address detail underneath", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "address"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["addressDetail"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("address");
expect(state.viewStack).toEqual(["main"]);
});
test("Back onto the token detail renders it", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "address", "address-token"], {
selectedToken: TOKEN,
});
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["addressToken"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("address-token");
});
test("Back onto Receive renders it", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "address", "receive"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["receive"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("receive");
});
test("Back onto the transaction detail renders it", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "transaction"], {
viewData: { tx: { hash: "0xdead" } },
});
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["transactionDetail"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("transaction");
});
test("Back onto the transaction confirmation restores it", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "confirm-tx"], {
viewData: { pendingTx: { to: ADDRESS, amount: "1" } },
});
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["confirmTx"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("confirm-tx");
});
test("Back onto the success screen renders it", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "success-tx"], {
viewData: { hash: "0xdead" },
});
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["successTx"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("success-tx");
});
test("Back onto the failure screen renders it", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "error-tx"], {
viewData: { message: "execution reverted" },
});
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["errorTx"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("error-tx");
});
test("Back onto Home renders the wallet list", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
test("Back with an empty stack renders Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", []);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
});
// The guards are restoreView()'s, so a popped view whose backing data is
// gone lands on Home rather than on an empty template.
describe("Back onto a view whose backing data is gone", () => {
test("the token detail with no token selected falls back to Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "address-token"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
test("the transaction detail with no transaction falls back to Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "transaction"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
test("the confirmation with no pending transaction falls back to Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "confirm-tx"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
test("an address view with no address selected falls back to Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "receive"], {
selectedAddress: null,
});
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
test("the success screen with no transaction hash falls back to Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "success-tx"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
test("the failure screen with no message falls back to Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "error-tx"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
test("a wait that can no longer be resumed falls back to Home", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "wait-tx"]);
const views = makeViews();
views.txStatus.restoreWait = () => false;
setBackRenderer(makeBackRenderer(state, views));
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
});
// Forward navigation renders as it goes, and a second render would re-fetch
// and clobber whatever the view holds — an unsaved edit, a request in
// flight. So the Back path renders only a view this page load has never
// rendered, and merely unhides every other one: the views it does not
// render from persisted state, and the views already on the page.
describe("what the Back path leaves alone", () => {
test("forward navigation renders nothing by itself", () => {
reopenedOn("address", ["main"]);
pushCurrentView();
showView("send");
expect(calls).toEqual([]);
expect(state.viewStack).toEqual(["main", "address"]);
});
test("Back onto a live-session view only unhides it", () => {
reopenedOn("confirm-tx", ["main", "address", "send"]);
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual([]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("send");
});
test("Back renders its target exactly once", () => {
reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "address"]);
goBack();
expect(calls.filter((c) => c === "addressDetail")).toHaveLength(1);
});
test("Back onto a view this page load already rendered only unhides it", () => {
const views = reopenedOn("main", []);
pushCurrentView();
views.addressDetail.show();
pushCurrentView();
views.settings.show();
calls = [];
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual([]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("address");
});
// The unit mirror of the regression the browser suite pins: Settings
// reassigns its fields from persisted state on every render, so a
// re-render on the way back discards an edit the user has not saved.
test("Back onto Settings visited earlier in this page load does not re-render it", () => {
const views = reopenedOn("main", []);
pushCurrentView();
views.settings.show();
pushCurrentView();
views.settingsAddToken.show();
calls = [];
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual([]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("settings");
});
// Home is the deliberate exception, unchanged from the popup's
// behaviour before the router existed: it re-renders on every Back so
// the wallet list reflects what changed while the user was away.
test("Back onto Home renders it again even when it is already on the page", () => {
const views = reopenedOn("main", []);
pushCurrentView();
views.addressDetail.show();
calls = [];
goBack();
expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
});
});

View File

@@ -32,21 +32,6 @@ const ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
const HOSTNAME = "dapp.example"; const HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/"; const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
// An origin the persisted state has never allowed, so asking to connect from
// it raises a prompt rather than being answered from allowedSites.
const FRESH_ORIGIN = "https://fresh.example";
// The approval id in the most recent popup URL of a list, or null when none
// of them carries one. Takes both shapes: the absolute URL windows.create()
// is given and the extension-relative one action.setPopup() is given.
function approvalIdIn(urls) {
for (let i = urls.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (!urls[i] || !urls[i].includes("?approval=")) continue;
return new URL(urls[i], EXT_URL).searchParams.get("approval");
}
return null;
}
// What the dApp asks for: no nonce, no gas, no fees. This is the shape that // What the dApp asks for: no nonce, no gas, no fees. This is the shape that
// makes a duplicate broadcast possible at all. // makes a duplicate broadcast possible at all.
const TX_PARAMS = { const TX_PARAMS = {
@@ -161,13 +146,8 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
let messageListener = null; let messageListener = null;
let windowRemovedListener = null; let windowRemovedListener = null;
let connectListener = null;
const created = []; const created = [];
const removed = []; const removed = [];
// Every URL the background put on the browser action. A site approval
// raised through action.openPopup() opens no window at all, so this is
// the only place its id appears.
const actionPopups = [];
global.chrome = { global.chrome = {
storage: { storage: {
@@ -183,14 +163,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
messageListener = fn; messageListener = fn;
}, },
}, },
// Captured, not swallowed: the approval port is what carries a onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
// site connection's decision and the popup teardown that races
// it, so a no-op stub here hides the whole subject of #275.
onConnect: {
addListener: (fn) => {
connectListener = fn;
},
},
lastError: null, lastError: null,
}, },
windows: { windows: {
@@ -216,17 +189,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
query: (q, cb) => cb([]), query: (q, cb) => cb([]),
sendMessage: () => {}, sendMessage: () => {},
}, },
action: { action: { setPopup: () => {} },
setPopup: (o) => {
actionPopups.push(o.popup);
},
// The production route for a site connection. Present only when
// a test asks for it, because with it the prompt is the toolbar
// popup: no window is created, so windows.onRemoved can never
// fire for it and the port disconnect is the only close signal
// that exists.
...(opts.actionPopup ? { openPopup: () => Promise.resolve() } : {}),
},
}; };
require("../src/background/index"); require("../src/background/index");
@@ -285,70 +248,6 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
}; };
} }
// A dApp asking to connect. The origin defaults to one the persisted
// state has never allowed, so the request really does raise a prompt
// instead of being answered from allowedSites.
function requestSite(origin) {
let rpcResult = null;
messageListener(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
method: "eth_requestAccounts",
params: [],
},
{ origin: origin || FRESH_ORIGIN },
(r) => {
rpcResult = r;
},
);
return {
// Wherever the prompt went: the toolbar popup URL when
// action.openPopup() carried it, the created window otherwise.
id: () =>
approvalIdIn(actionPopups) ||
approvalIdIn(created.map((c) => c.url)),
result: () => rpcResult,
};
}
// The popup's approval port, as the browser delivers it. Messages posted
// on a port and that port's disconnect travel one channel in FIFO order,
// which is exactly the property the fix rests on, so this stub delivers
// them in the order the caller emits them and never reorders them.
function connectApproval(id, senderUrl) {
const onMessage = [];
const onDisconnect = [];
const port = {
name: "approval:" + id,
sender: {
url:
senderUrl === undefined
? EXT_URL + "src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id
: senderUrl,
},
onMessage: { addListener: (fn) => onMessage.push(fn) },
onDisconnect: { addListener: (fn) => onDisconnect.push(fn) },
};
connectListener(port);
return {
decide: (approved, remember) => {
for (const fn of onMessage) {
fn(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_DECISION",
approved,
remember: !!remember,
},
port,
);
}
},
disconnect: () => {
for (const fn of onDisconnect) fn(port);
},
};
}
// The user closes the approval popup. `created` is index-aligned with the // The user closes the approval popup. `created` is index-aligned with the
// ids the window stub hands back, so window 1 is the first popup opened. // ids the window stub hands back, so window 1 is the first popup opened.
function closeWindow(windowId) { function closeWindow(windowId) {
@@ -359,8 +258,6 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
send, send,
requestTx, requestTx,
requestSign, requestSign,
requestSite,
connectApproval,
closeWindow, closeWindow,
broadcastTransaction, broadcastTransaction,
loadState, loadState,
@@ -1161,136 +1058,3 @@ describe("popup-only messages", () => {
}); });
}); });
}); });
// A site connection decided in a popup that closes on the next line.
//
// The decision and the teardown are two events the popup emits back to back,
// and the background must not be able to reach different outcomes depending on
// which of them it processes first. It cannot, because they are now one
// channel: the decision is posted on the approval port that the close then
// disconnects, so it is delivered first. Every test here therefore emits the
// close IMMEDIATELY after the decision, with nothing awaited in between —
// which is what the popup does, and what used to report a user who approved as
// having refused (#275).
describe("a site connection decided as the popup closes", () => {
// The production route: chrome.action.openPopup() put the prompt in the
// toolbar popup, which is not a window, so nothing but the port
// disconnect can tell the background this prompt is gone.
test("approving in the toolbar popup connects the site", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
const pending = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
const id = pending.id();
expect(id).toBeTruthy();
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(0);
const port = bg.connectApproval(id);
port.decide(true, false);
port.disconnect();
await settle();
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
});
test("closing the toolbar popup without deciding is a rejection", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
const pending = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
const port = bg.connectApproval(pending.id());
port.disconnect();
await settle();
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
});
});
test("rejecting is a rejection, and the close that follows adds nothing", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
const pending = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
const port = bg.connectApproval(pending.id());
port.decide(false, false);
port.disconnect();
await settle();
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
});
});
// The port carries a decision now, so it carries the sender check the
// one-off message used to carry. A content script that guessed an
// approval id must not be able to connect the site it is running on.
test("a decision from a page sender is ignored, and the close rejects", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
const pending = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
const port = bg.connectApproval(pending.id(), FRESH_ORIGIN + "/x.html");
port.decide(true, true);
await settle();
expect(pending.result()).toBeNull();
port.disconnect();
await settle();
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
});
});
// The fallback shape, where openPopup() is unavailable and the prompt is
// a window the extension opened. Closing it fires windows.onRemoved as
// well, on a channel of its own that is ordered against nothing — so the
// window event must not be allowed to decide a site approval either.
test("approving in the fallback window survives the window event too", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
const port = bg.connectApproval(pending.id());
port.decide(true, false);
bg.closeWindow(1);
port.disconnect();
await settle();
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
});
// Same shape, and the same window event arriving before the popup has
// said anything at all — which is a user closing the window rather than
// deciding, and still has to reach the dApp as a rejection.
test("closing the fallback window without deciding is a rejection", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
const port = bg.connectApproval(pending.id());
bg.closeWindow(1);
port.disconnect();
await settle();
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
});
});
// The net under the paragraph above: a prompt whose page never got as far
// as connecting the port has no disconnect to reject it, so the window
// event has to. Otherwise the dApp waits forever on a window that is gone.
test("a window that closes before its popup ever connected still rejects", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestSite();
await settle();
bg.closeWindow(1);
await settle();
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
});
});
});

View File

@@ -23,8 +23,6 @@
"use strict"; "use strict";
const { Transaction } = require("ethers");
// Fictional ERC-20 used to seed the transaction-detail test. The symbol // Fictional ERC-20 used to seed the transaction-detail test. The symbol
// must not collide with any entry in src/shared/tokenList.js, or // must not collide with any entry in src/shared/tokenList.js, or
// isSpoofedSymbol() in src/shared/transactions.js drops the transfer as a // isSpoofedSymbol() in src/shared/transactions.js drops the transfer as a
@@ -64,87 +62,6 @@ function word(value) {
return "0x" + BigInt(value).toString(16).padStart(64, "0"); return "0x" + BigInt(value).toString(16).padStart(64, "0");
} }
// -------------------------------------------------------- dApp fixture
//
// The origin the EIP-1193 test page is served from, and the page itself.
//
// It is a fixture like every other one in this file: the route handler
// fulfils the navigation from the string below, so the page never comes
// from a remote origin and nothing about the dApp round trips leaves the
// container. `.test` is reserved by RFC 6761 and has no owner to reach in
// the first place; the launch arguments map every host to NOTFOUND anyway.
//
// What the page deliberately does NOT do is load a provider. window.ethereum
// is put there by the shipped manifest's MAIN-world content script, exactly
// as it is on any http(s) page a user visits, so what these tests speak to
// is the real inpage provider and not a copy the harness wired up.
const DAPP_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.e2e.test";
const DAPP_URL = DAPP_ORIGIN + "/";
// Requests are parked rather than awaited. An approval prompt only exists
// while its call is in flight, so a test that awaited the promise could
// never drive the popup that has to settle it; start() files the promise
// under a key and settle() collects it once the prompt has been dealt with.
//
// The rejection branch records the whole observable shape of the error as it
// arrives — name, message, and whether a `code` is present at all as distinct
// from its value. EIP-1193 says a user rejection is a ProviderRpcError
// carrying code 4001; what the page can actually see is recorded here rather
// than assumed, and asserted in run.js.
//
// The message log is the page's half of the boundary observation: every
// AUTISTMASK_* message that crosses between this page and the content
// script, in both directions, verbatim.
const DAPP_HTML = [
"<!doctype html>",
'<html lang="en">',
"<head>",
'<meta charset="utf-8">',
"<title>AutistMask e2e dApp</title>",
// Inline and empty: without it Chromium asks for /favicon.ico, which
// the unstubbed-request guard would report as escaping traffic.
'<link rel="icon" href="data:,">',
"</head>",
"<body>",
"<h1>AutistMask e2e dApp</h1>",
"<script>",
"window.__dapp = {",
" messages: [],",
" calls: {},",
" start: function (key, method, params) {",
" window.__dapp.calls[key] = window.ethereum",
" .request({ method: method, params: params })",
" .then(",
" function (result) {",
" return { settled: 'resolved', result: result };",
" },",
" function (error) {",
" return {",
" settled: 'rejected',",
" message: String((error && error.message) || error),",
" name: error ? error.name : undefined,",
" hasCode: !!error && 'code' in Object(error),",
" code: error ? error.code : undefined,",
" };",
" },",
" );",
" },",
" settle: function (key) {",
" return window.__dapp.calls[key];",
" },",
"};",
"window.addEventListener('message', function (event) {",
" if (event.source !== window) return;",
" var d = event.data;",
" if (!d || typeof d.type !== 'string') return;",
" if (d.type.indexOf('AUTISTMASK') !== 0) return;",
" window.__dapp.messages.push(d);",
"});",
"</script>",
"</body>",
"</html>",
].join("\n");
// ------------------------------------------------------------ fee fixture // ------------------------------------------------------------ fee fixture
// //
// The confirmation screen carries two different numbers for the same // The confirmation screen carries two different numbers for the same
@@ -184,11 +101,6 @@ const RPC_RESULTS = {
eth_estimateGas: hex(GAS_LIMIT), eth_estimateGas: hex(GAS_LIMIT),
eth_getTransactionCount: "0x0", eth_getTransactionCount: "0x0",
eth_maxPriorityFeePerGas: hex(PRIORITY_FEE_WEI), eth_maxPriorityFeePerGas: hex(PRIORITY_FEE_WEI),
// "not mined yet", which is what a node answers for a transaction it has
// only just accepted. The wait screen the dApp transaction approval hands
// off to polls this every 10 seconds; leaving it unstubbed would report
// the poll as escaping traffic the moment a test outlived one tick.
eth_getTransactionReceipt: null,
}; };
// The "latest" block, which ethers' getFeeData() reads baseFeePerGas from // The "latest" block, which ethers' getFeeData() reads baseFeePerGas from
@@ -352,31 +264,6 @@ function rpcReply(req, opts, report) {
if (req.method === "eth_getBlockByNumber") { if (req.method === "eth_getBlockByNumber") {
return Object.assign(envelope, { result: latestBlock() }); return Object.assign(envelope, { result: latestBlock() });
} }
// The end of the dApp transaction round trip: the raw signed transaction
// the background hands to the node. It is recorded verbatim so a test can
// recover the signer from the exact bytes that were broadcast, rather than
// from anything the extension reported about them.
//
// The reply must be the transaction's real hash. ethers compares the hash
// the node returns against the one it computes itself and throws on a
// mismatch, so a constant here would fail the broadcast for a reason that
// has nothing to do with what is being tested.
if (req.method === "eth_sendRawTransaction") {
const raw = Array.isArray(req.params) ? req.params[0] : null;
let parsed;
try {
parsed = Transaction.from(raw);
} catch {
report("eth_sendRawTransaction with an undecodable transaction");
return Object.assign(envelope, {
error: { code: -32000, message: "undecodable transaction" },
});
}
if (Array.isArray(opts.broadcastTransactions)) {
opts.broadcastTransactions.push(raw);
}
return Object.assign(envelope, { result: parsed.hash });
}
if (req.method === "eth_estimateGas" && opts.failGasEstimate) { if (req.method === "eth_estimateGas" && opts.failGasEstimate) {
// A refusal the node itself would produce, not a transport error: // A refusal the node itself would produce, not a transport error:
// this is the shape the confirmation screen has to turn into // this is the shape the confirmation screen has to turn into
@@ -488,8 +375,6 @@ function traceEnabled(raw) {
* node-side refusal. * node-side refusal.
* @param {boolean} [opts.holdGasEstimate] hold every batch containing an * @param {boolean} [opts.holdGasEstimate] hold every batch containing an
* eth_estimateGas until this is cleared again. * eth_estimateGas until this is cleared again.
* @param {string[]} [opts.broadcastTransactions] every raw signed
* transaction handed to eth_sendRawTransaction, appended in order.
* @returns {Promise<{waitForServiceWorkerTraffic: (ms: number) => * @returns {Promise<{waitForServiceWorkerTraffic: (ms: number) =>
* Promise<string|null>}>} * Promise<string|null>}>}
*/ */
@@ -535,18 +420,6 @@ async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
return handleRpc(route, req.postData(), opts, report); return handleRpc(route, req.postData(), opts, report);
} }
// The local EIP-1193 test page. Served from here so the dApp round
// trips run against a real http(s) origin — which is what makes the
// shipped content scripts inject at all — without any remote origin
// being involved.
if (url.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN && p === "/") {
return route.fulfill({
status: 200,
contentType: "text/html; charset=utf-8",
body: DAPP_HTML,
});
}
// Blockscout v2 // Blockscout v2
if (p.includes("/api/v2/")) { if (p.includes("/api/v2/")) {
if (/\/addresses\/0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\/transactions$/.test(p)) { if (/\/addresses\/0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\/transactions$/.test(p)) {
@@ -635,8 +508,6 @@ async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
module.exports = { module.exports = {
installNetworkStubs, installNetworkStubs,
DAPP_ORIGIN,
DAPP_URL,
FEE_ESTIMATE_WEI, FEE_ESTIMATE_WEI,
FEE_RESERVE_WEI, FEE_RESERVE_WEI,
STUB_COUNTERPARTY, STUB_COUNTERPARTY,

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,310 +0,0 @@
// The EIP-1193 error the page actually catches (src/content/inpage.js).
//
// The bug this pins down (issue #274): the provider rebuilt every failure as
// `new Error(error.message)`, so the `code` the background produced and the
// content script relayed intact was thrown away in the last hop. A dApp
// checking `err.code === 4001` — the standard way to tell "the user said no"
// from "the wallet broke" — saw undefined, and well-behaved sites showed an
// error or retried instead of accepting the refusal.
//
// inpage.js is a bare IIFE injected into the page's JS context, not a module:
// it takes no import and exports nothing, and reaches for `window` at load.
// So it is evaluated here the way the browser evaluates it, against a stub
// window, and the provider is collected from `window.ethereum`. The globals it
// touches are passed in as function parameters rather than assigned to
// globalThis: nothing leaks between tests, and the source is compiled in this
// realm, so the errors it constructs are comparable against this file's own
// `Error` — which a second realm's intrinsics would silently defeat.
//
// There is no jsdom in this repo; see tests/txStatus.test.js.
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const { webcrypto } = require("crypto");
const SOURCE = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "content", "inpage.js"),
"utf8",
);
const loadInto = new Function(
"window",
"self",
"crypto",
"Event",
"CustomEvent",
SOURCE,
);
class StubEvent {
constructor(type) {
this.type = type;
}
}
class StubCustomEvent extends StubEvent {
constructor(type, init) {
super(type);
this.detail = init && init.detail;
}
}
// Every code the background emits on the RPC path today, read out of
// src/background/index.js. The provider must not know this list — it passes
// through whatever arrived — but the cases below are the real ones.
const REJECTED = 4001; // user rejected the request
const UNAUTHORIZED = 4100; // site not connected / wrong address
const UNRECOGNIZED_CHAIN = 4902; // switch/add to an unsupported chain
// A stub window with the four things inpage.js touches: message listeners,
// postMessage out to the content script, window.ethereum, and dispatchEvent
// for the EIP-6963 announcement.
function loadProvider() {
const messageListeners = [];
const posted = [];
const win = {
addEventListener(type, fn) {
if (type === "message") messageListeners.push(fn);
},
removeEventListener(type, fn) {
const i = messageListeners.indexOf(fn);
if (type === "message" && i !== -1) messageListeners.splice(i, 1);
},
postMessage(data) {
posted.push(data);
},
dispatchEvent() {
return true;
},
};
win.window = win;
loadInto(win, win, webcrypto, StubEvent, StubCustomEvent);
// Deliver the content script's answer to an outstanding request. The id is
// read back off the wire rather than assumed: inpage.js issues its own
// eth_chainId at load, so the first id a test sees is not 1.
function respond(response) {
const request = posted
.filter((m) => m.type === "AUTISTMASK_REQUEST")
.pop();
expect(request).toBeDefined();
const event = {
source: win,
data: { type: "AUTISTMASK_RESPONSE", id: request.id, ...response },
};
for (const fn of messageListeners.slice()) fn(event);
}
return { provider: win.ethereum, posted, respond };
}
// Start a request, answer it with `response`, and hand back the rejection.
// Fails the test if the call resolves instead.
async function rejectionFrom(start, response) {
const { provider, respond } = loadProvider();
const settled = start(provider).then(
(result) => ({ resolved: result }),
(error) => ({ error }),
);
// The provider posts synchronously, so the request is already on the wire.
respond(response);
const outcome = await settled;
expect(outcome).not.toHaveProperty("resolved");
return outcome.error;
}
describe("an EIP-1193 code reaches the page", () => {
test("a user rejection arrives as code 4001", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
{
error: {
code: REJECTED,
message: "User rejected the request.",
},
},
);
expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
expect(err.message).toBe("User rejected the request.");
});
test("it is a ProviderRpcError, and an Error", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
{
error: {
code: REJECTED,
message: "User rejected the request.",
},
},
);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
expect(err.name).toBe("ProviderRpcError");
});
test("4100 unauthorized arrives intact", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "personal_sign", params: ["0x00"] }),
{ error: { code: UNAUTHORIZED, message: "Unauthorized" } },
);
expect(err.code).toBe(UNAUTHORIZED);
expect(err.message).toBe("Unauthorized");
});
test("4902 unrecognized chain arrives intact", async () => {
const message =
"AutistMask supports Ethereum Mainnet and Sepolia Testnet only.";
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "wallet_switchEthereumChain" }),
{ error: { code: UNRECOGNIZED_CHAIN, message } },
);
expect(err.code).toBe(UNRECOGNIZED_CHAIN);
expect(err.message).toBe(message);
});
// The provider is not allowed to know the list above: a code added to the
// background later must reach the page without this file being edited.
test("a code the provider has never heard of is passed through", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_accounts" }),
{ error: { code: 4900, message: "Disconnected" } },
);
expect(err.code).toBe(4900);
});
test("data is carried when the boundary sent it", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_call" }),
{
error: {
code: -32000,
message: "execution reverted",
data: "0x08c379a0",
},
},
);
expect(err.code).toBe(-32000);
expect(err.data).toBe("0x08c379a0");
});
test("no data property is invented when the boundary sent none", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
{
error: {
code: REJECTED,
message: "User rejected the request.",
},
},
);
expect("data" in err).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("the message is untouched", () => {
test("a coded error keeps the message byte for byte", async () => {
const message =
"This site asked to sign as an address that is not " +
"the active one.";
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "personal_sign" }),
{ error: { code: UNAUTHORIZED, message } },
);
expect(err.message).toBe(message);
});
test("an error the background sent with no code keeps its message", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_sendTransaction" }),
{ error: { message: "No accounts available" } },
);
expect(err.message).toBe("No accounts available");
});
// A ProviderRpcError whose code is undefined would claim a conformance it
// does not have, and `'code' in err` is exactly what a careful dApp asks.
test("an error with no code gets no code property at all", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_sendTransaction" }),
{ error: { message: "No accounts available" } },
);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
expect("code" in err).toBe(false);
});
test("an error with no message keeps the generic fallback", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_sendTransaction" }),
{ error: { code: REJECTED } },
);
expect(err.message).toBe("Request failed");
expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
});
});
// Every entry point the provider exposes, not just eth_requestAccounts. They
// all funnel through the same response listener, and this is what says so.
describe("every request path carries the code", () => {
const rejection = {
error: { code: REJECTED, message: "User rejected the request." },
};
test("request()", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
rejection,
);
expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
});
test("enable()", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom((p) => p.enable(), rejection);
expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
});
test("send(method, params)", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.send("eth_requestAccounts", []),
rejection,
);
expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
});
test("send({ method, params })", async () => {
const err = await rejectionFrom(
(p) => p.send({ method: "personal_sign", params: ["0x00"] }),
rejection,
);
expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
});
test("sendAsync() hands the code to its callback", async () => {
const { provider, respond } = loadProvider();
const called = new Promise((resolve) => {
provider.sendAsync({ id: 1, method: "eth_requestAccounts" }, (e) =>
resolve(e),
);
});
respond(rejection);
const err = await called;
expect(err.name).toBe("ProviderRpcError");
expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
expect(err.message).toBe("User rejected the request.");
});
});
describe("the success path is unchanged", () => {
test("a result still resolves", async () => {
const { provider, respond } = loadProvider();
const settled = provider.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" });
respond({ result: ["0xb61264DEFB0c4B8afb3D73724be15310036743a5"] });
await expect(settled).resolves.toEqual([
"0xb61264DEFB0c4B8afb3D73724be15310036743a5",
]);
expect(provider.selectedAddress).toBe(
"0xb61264DEFB0c4B8afb3D73724be15310036743a5",
);
});
});

View File

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ global.chrome = {
}; };
const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("../src/shared/symbolSpoof"); const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("../src/shared/symbolSpoof");
const { TOKENS, KNOWN_SYMBOLS } = require("../src/shared/tokenList"); const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS } = require("../src/shared/tokenList");
const { filterTransactions } = require("../src/shared/transactions"); const { filterTransactions } = require("../src/shared/transactions");
const { const {
fetchTokenBalances, fetchTokenBalances,
@@ -284,137 +284,11 @@ describe("the shared rule: symbols that render as a known symbol", () => {
// asserts the claim it stands for — `[ -~]` would admit an interior // asserts the claim it stands for — `[ -~]` would admit an interior
// space and let a whitespace-bearing entry through the guard. // space and let a whitespace-bearing entry through the guard.
test("no bundled symbol is touched by the normalization", () => { test("no bundled symbol is touched by the normalization", () => {
for (const [symbol, addresses] of KNOWN_SYMBOLS) { for (const [symbol, address] of KNOWN_SYMBOLS) {
expect(symbol).toBe(symbol.trim()); expect(symbol).toBe(symbol.trim());
expect(symbol).toMatch(/^[!-~]+$/); expect(symbol).toMatch(/^[!-~]+$/);
if (addresses === null) continue; if (address === null) continue;
for (const address of addresses) { expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, address)).toBe(false);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, address)).toBe(false);
}
}
});
});
// Issue #276: the guard that was missing. The suite walked KNOWN_SYMBOLS,
// which is built from TOKENS, so it could only ever assert that the table
// agrees with itself. Seven symbols appear twice in the bundled list at two
// different real contracts, and the table kept whichever came first, so the
// other seven contracts — tokens in our own shipped list, at their own
// addresses — were judged spoofs and hidden from the balance list, the
// history and the send selector. That is the over-filtering direction: it
// hides a holding the user cannot then spend.
//
// This walk is over TOKENS, the data the wallet actually ships, so it fails
// whenever a bundled token would be filtered at its own address no matter
// which side of the table the mistake is on.
describe("the shipped token list", () => {
test("no bundled token is filtered at its own address", () => {
const filtered = TOKENS.filter((t) =>
isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address),
).map((t) => t.symbol + " @ " + t.address);
expect(filtered).toEqual([]);
});
// The third failure mode the issue asks about: a symbol whose table entry
// names an address that is in neither the table nor the list would be a
// contract we vouch for and do not ship. There is none, and the table is
// built from the list, so this asserts the derivation has not acquired a
// hand-written entry.
test("every address the table vouches for is a bundled token", () => {
const bundled = new Set(TOKENS.map((t) => t.address.toLowerCase()));
for (const [symbol, addresses] of KNOWN_SYMBOLS) {
if (addresses === null) continue;
expect(addresses.size).toBeGreaterThan(0);
for (const address of addresses) {
expect(address).toBe(address.toLowerCase());
expect(bundled.has(address)).toBe(true);
// And it is the token that actually reports that symbol.
const token = TOKENS.find(
(t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === address,
);
expect(token.symbol.toUpperCase()).toBe(symbol);
}
}
});
// Both contracts behind a shared ticker must pass, from either side: a
// rule that admits only the one the table happens to visit first is the
// bug, not the fix.
test("both contracts behind a shared ticker are admitted", () => {
const bySymbol = new Map();
for (const t of TOKENS) {
const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
if (!bySymbol.has(upper)) bySymbol.set(upper, []);
bySymbol.get(upper).push(t);
}
const shared = [...bySymbol].filter(([, list]) => list.length > 1);
// The shared tickers are a fact about the shipped data; if a future
// list has none, this test would silently assert nothing.
expect(shared.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
for (const [, list] of shared) {
for (const t of list) {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address)).toBe(false);
}
}
});
// The seven from issue #276, named so that the reconciliation is a fact
// in the suite: each is two real contracts from the same source fetch,
// and the table now holds both rather than the one that came first.
test("the seven shared tickers each name both bundled contracts", () => {
const expected = {
TON: [
"0x582d872a1b094fc48f5de31d3b73f2d9be47def1", // Toncoin
"0x2be5e8c109e2197d077d13a82daead6a9b3433c5", // Tokamak Network
],
FRAX: [
"0x853d955acef822db058eb8505911ed77f175b99e", // Legacy Frax Dollar
"0x3432b6a60d23ca0dfca7761b7ab56459d9c964d0", // Frax (prev. FXS)
],
REUSD: [
"0x5086bf358635b81d8c47c66d1c8b9e567db70c72", // Re Protocol reUSD
"0x57ab1e0003f623289cd798b1824be09a793e4bec", // Resupply USD
],
EURE: [
"0x39b8b6385416f4ca36a20319f70d28621895279d", // Monerium EUR emoney
"0x3231cb76718cdef2155fc47b5286d82e6eda273f", // Monerium EUR emoney [OLD]
],
MSUSD: [
"0x4ba01f22827018b4772cd326c7627fb4956a7c00", // Main Street USD
"0xab5eb14c09d416f0ac63661e57edb7aecdb9befa", // Metronome Synth USD
],
MUSD: [
"0xaca92e438df0b2401ff60da7e4337b687a2435da", // MetaMask USD
"0xdd468a1ddc392dcdbef6db6e34e89aa338f9f186", // Mezo USD
],
JPYC: [
"0x431d5dff03120afa4bdf332c61a6e1766ef37bdb", // JPY Coin
"0x2370f9d504c7a6e775bf6e14b3f12846b594cd53", // JPY Coin v1
],
};
for (const [symbol, addresses] of Object.entries(expected)) {
expect([...KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(symbol)].sort()).toEqual(
[...addresses].sort(),
);
for (const address of addresses) {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, address)).toBe(false);
}
}
});
// The other direction, on the same symbols: widening the table to hold
// every bundled address for a ticker must not turn it into a pass for
// any other contract.
test("a shared ticker from a third contract is still a spoof", () => {
const bySymbol = new Map();
for (const t of TOKENS) {
const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
if (!bySymbol.has(upper)) bySymbol.set(upper, []);
bySymbol.get(upper).push(t);
}
for (const [symbol, list] of bySymbol) {
if (list.length < 2) continue;
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
} }
}); });
}); });

View File

@@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ describe("token list assumptions the fixtures rely on", () => {
}); });
test("USDC and WETH map to their genuine lowercased contracts", () => { test("USDC and WETH map to their genuine lowercased contracts", () => {
expect([...KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("USDC")]).toEqual([USDC_CONTRACT]); expect(KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("USDC")).toBe(USDC_CONTRACT);
expect([...KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("WETH")]).toEqual([WETH_CONTRACT]); expect(KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("WETH")).toBe(WETH_CONTRACT);
}); });
test("the spam fixture symbol is not in the known token list", () => { test("the spam fixture symbol is not in the known token list", () => {