test: containerized Firefox end-to-end harness (closes #184)

Drives the real popup in a real Firefox with dist/firefox/ installed as an
unpacked MV2 temporary add-on, via geckodriver. Covers popup load, wallet
creation through the UI, and the Add Token screen. Outside make check, like
the Chrome suite.

Zero npm dependencies: tests/e2e/firefox/driver.js is a WebDriver client
over global fetch and child_process against geckodriver's HTTP API. The
Dockerfile pins the node base image, the Firefox 153.0.3 tarball and
geckodriver 0.36.0 by digest.

Errors are read from the privileged nsIConsoleService in Marionette's chrome
context, filtered to non-warning entries whose sourceName is the extension
origin. BiDi log.entryAdded delivers nothing at all for extension pages, so
a Playwright-BiDi or Puppeteer-BiDi harness would see nothing and report
success; the code says so where someone would be tempted to simplify it.
Errors logged during add-on install and background startup are drained and
folded into step 1, never discarded: a throw at the top of
src/background/index.js kills the background page and fails the run.
Content-script capture is left as unverified, because --network none leaves
no http:// page for a content script to be injected into.

Each drain reads the console and clears it in ONE chrome script. Splitting
the read from Services.console.reset() left a window between the two round
trips in which an error was logged into a buffer about to be discarded, and
destroyed unread rather than deferred to the next drain; a probe of 100
sequenced throws at 20ms spacing lost one. With the drain atomic the same
probe accounts for every throw that falls inside the observed window, on two
consecutive runs.

No driver layer is shared with the Chrome suite and the three UI steps are
written twice deliberately: the two backends have no common substrate, and
three steps do not pay for a shim.

Two limits are documented rather than papered over, with measurements rather
than absolutes. Error capture is poll-based, so an error is attributed to a
step and not to a moment within it; the drained window ends ~1.5s after the
last step returns (a 500ms settle, a 1000ms sleep and two drain round trips),
and that cut-off jitters run to run — three runs of throws at fixed offsets
reported everything up to +1.5s and one of the three also reported +1.6s.
Inside the window the atomic drain leaves no race, but nsIConsoleService
keeps a ring buffer of only 250 messages, so more than 250 console messages
between two drains evicts unread errors: 400 throws inside one step report
as exactly the newest 250, on three runs, while occupancy in a clean run
peaks at 4 of 250 at the install drain and 0 at every later drain. Nothing is
stubbed; the container runs with --network none instead, which proves no
request escaped, cannot report which were attempted, and runs only the
failure branches of network-dependent code.

README.md

@@ -169,34 +169,6 @@ reserve while sitting on the same side of the estimate, so swapping the two in
 what [#154](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/154) was, and it was
 previously correct by reading only.
 
-It also covers the **dApp approval round trips** — the one place where the
-content script, the inpage provider, the background worker and the approval
-popup all have to work together. A local test page is served by the route
-handler on a reserved-TLD origin, gets `window.ethereum` from the shipped
-`MAIN`-world content script like any other page, and drives
-`eth_requestAccounts`, `personal_sign`, `eth_signTypedData_v4` and
-`eth_sendTransaction` through the real prompts. Every signature is recovered in
-the runner and compared against the active address, the transaction assertions
-run against the raw signed transaction captured at `eth_sendRawTransaction`
-rather than against anything the extension reported, rejecting each prompt is
-required to return a rejection to the page rather than hang or resolve, and the
-password is required to be absent from every message the approval window sends
-to the background — with the message that would carry it required to be present,
-so that check cannot pass by observing nothing. That last one is the standing
-floor under [#157](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/157).
-
-Three limits of that coverage, none of them papered over. The RPC is stubbed
-throughout, so this is **not** a real dApp against a real network with real
-funds; that remains a human pass before 1.0.0. The site-connection prompt is
-raised through `chrome.action.openPopup()`, and headless Chromium's
-browser-action popup is not a page Playwright can see or click, so that one
-prompt is driven at the URL the extension itself puts on the action — the same
-page and the same approval id, but whether a real toolbar click shows it is not
-observable here. And the EIP-1193 error code does not survive the last hop: the
-rejection that crosses the boundary carries code 4001 and is asserted to, but
-`src/content/inpage.js` rebuilds it as `new Error(message)`, so the calling page
-catches an error with no `code` property.
-
 Any test that drives a failure path on purpose declares the `console.error` it
 is about to provoke, via `errors.expect()`. That is not a mute: the declaration
 consumes exactly one matching record, and a declaration nothing matched fails
@@ -1158,16 +1130,7 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
 - **When**: A connected website requests a transaction via
   `eth_sendTransaction`. Always opened in a separate popup window by the
   background script (`windows.create()`), because the request is triggered
-  programmatically rather than by a user gesture. The background populates the
-  transaction (nonce, gas limit, fees, chain id) against the RPC node _before_
-  opening the window, so the screen shows a complete transaction and the signed
-  artifact can be compared with it field for field. A request that cannot be
-  populated — unreachable node, reverting gas estimate — opens no window and is
-  failed back to the site. Only one transaction approval exists at a time:
-  populating fixes the nonce, so a second `eth_sendTransaction` arriving while
-  one is unanswered is refused with EIP-1193 code `-32002` rather than being
-  populated at the same nonce. It opens no window and takes no nonce, and the
-  site can send it again once the pending one is answered.
+  programmatically rather than by a user gesture.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Transaction Request" heading
     - Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
@@ -1179,16 +1142,13 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
     - Contract: color dot + full address + etherscan link (or "contract
       creation"), token symbol label if known
     - Value: amount in ETH (4 decimal places, USD in parentheses)
-    - Network fee (max): gas limit × fee per gas in ETH (4 decimal places, USD
-      in parentheses), with the gas limit and the fee per gas in gwei below it
-    - Network and nonce
     - Raw data: full calldata displayed inline (shown if present)
     - Password input and an error line
     - "Confirm" / "Reject" buttons
 - **Transitions**:
-    - "Confirm" (correct password) → decrypts and signs the transaction it was
-      shown, exactly as shown, hands the signed transaction to the background to
-      broadcast, then → **WaitTx** in the same popup window
+    - "Confirm" (correct password) → decrypts and signs in the popup, hands the
+      signed transaction to the background to broadcast, then → **WaitTx** in
+      the same popup window
     - "Confirm" (wrong password) → error line, no screen change
     - "Reject" → closes popup (returns rejection to background)
     - Popup window closed without answering → the request is rejected with

TODO.md

@@ -45,76 +45,6 @@ undefined identifiers, which is how
 
 # Completed Steps
 
-- 2026-08-14: One transaction approval at a time. Populating in the background
-  before the window opens is what makes the displayed object the verified
-  object, and it also fixes the nonce: two `eth_sendTransaction` calls populated
-  concurrently took the same nonce from a node that had seen neither broadcast,
-  and the second could then never be sent, because the only way to give it a
-  fresh nonce is to populate it again after the user has read the old one off
-  the screen. A second request is now refused with EIP-1193 `-32002` while one
-  is unanswered — before anything is populated, so no second nonce is allocated
-  and no second window opens — and the slot is freed when the page has its
-  answer. Signature approvals are not gated, consuming no nonce. A collision
-  that does happen is also reported accurately now: a broadcast the node refused
-  for the nonce, and an approval carrying a nonce this worker has already
-  broadcast (caught before the node is asked at all), both say the transaction
-  did not reach the network and to send it again, instead of warning that it may
-  have sent. `already known` deliberately keeps the ambiguous wording, because a
-  node that says it has the transaction has it
-  ([#271](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/271)).
-- 2026-08-12: EIP-1193 error codes now reach the page. `src/content/inpage.js`
-  rebuilt every failure as `new Error(error.message)`, so the code the
-  background produced and the content script relayed intact was dropped in the
-  last hop and a dApp checking `err.code === 4001` saw `undefined` — a wallet
-  the user deliberately declined was indistinguishable from one that broke. The
-  provider now rejects with a `ProviderRpcError` carrying `code` and, where the
-  boundary sent one, `data`, passed through verbatim rather than matched against
-  a list, so 4001, 4100 and 4902 all arrive and a future code needs no edit
-  here. An error the background sent with no code stays a plain `Error` with no
-  `code` property, and `message` is unchanged in every case. All four request
-  entry points (`request`, `enable`, `send`, `sendAsync`) are covered by
-  `tests/inpageErrors.test.js`, and the e2e probe that printed the missing code
-  now requires it on the page's Error as well as on the wire, for all four
-  rejected flows ([#274](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/274)).
-- 2026-08-12: `KNOWN_SYMBOLS` now maps a symbol to the set of contract addresses
-  that bear it, not to one of them. A ticker is not unique: seven of the 512
-  bundled tokens — `FRAX`, `REUSD`, `TON`, `EURE`, `MSUSD`, `MUSD` and `JPYC` —
-  share a symbol with another bundled entry at a different real contract, and
-  the table, built from the list first-wins, kept only the earlier one. The
-  other seven were judged spoofs of their own symbol at their own address and
-  hidden from the balance list, the history and the send selector, so a holder
-  could not spend them. Both contracts of each pair come from the same CoinGecko
-  fetch of 2026-02-27, so neither was stale and neither was dropped.
-  `isSpoofedSymbol()` asks set membership instead of equality, which does not
-  loosen the rule — a contract outside the set is still a spoof — and a test now
-  walks `TOKENS` asserting no bundled token is filtered at its own address,
-  which is the walk the suite lacked
-  ([#276](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/276)).
-- 2026-08-12: The dApp approval round trips are driven end to end in the
-  browser. A test page served by the harness speaks EIP-1193 to the real inpage
-  provider through the real content script, background worker and approval popup
-  for `eth_requestAccounts`, `personal_sign`, `eth_signTypedData_v4` and
-  `eth_sendTransaction`. Every signature is recovered and compared against the
-  active address, the transaction is checked against the bytes handed to the
-  stubbed RPC, each rejection must reach the page as a rejection, and the
-  password must appear in no message the approval window sends — the assertion
-  that gives [#157](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/157) a permanent
-  floor. This does not discharge a real dApp with real funds against mainnet
-  ([#183](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/183)).
-- 2026-08-12: The known-symbol spoof rule now judges the symbol a user actually
-  sees. `isSpoofedSymbol()` normalizes before the lookup — NFKC, then every
-  character that paints nothing removed (the format and default-ignorable
-  characters, plus U+007F), then trimmed — so `" ETH "`, a no-break space, a
-  zero-width space, a Hangul filler, a variation selector, a DELETE and a
-  fullwidth `ＥＴＨ` are all caught on the balance list, the history and the
-  send selector at once. Confusables that are distinct letters (Cyrillic `Е`),
-  bidi reordering and the visible C0/C1 controls — which measure 48.00px, a box,
-  in the pinned e2e Chromium where an invisible prefix measures 32.00px — stay
-  knowingly open and are asserted as open in the suite. No bundled symbol
-  contains whitespace or a non-ASCII character, so nothing legitimate is newly
-  filtered; the balance list's token-type gate also became case-insensitive,
-  which no longer drops a real holding if an explorer writes `erc-20`
-  ([#260](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/260)).
 - 2026-08-12: A containerized Firefox end-to-end harness
   (`make test-e2e-firefox`) drives the real popup in a real Firefox with the MV2
   build installed as a temporary add-on. Zero npm dependencies — a WebDriver
@@ -133,17 +63,6 @@ undefined identifiers, which is how
   unhandled `Promise.reject` and on an undefined identifier in `home.js`, and 0
   on the branch as it stands
   ([#184](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/184)).
-- 2026-08-12: The transaction a dApp asks for is now populated in the background
-  before the approval window opens, so the object the user is shown is the
-  object the signed artifact is verified against — nonce, gas limit and every
-  fee field are compared exactly instead of being left to the ceilings, which
-  stay as a backstop against what a lying RPC node can talk the wallet into
-  displaying. The approval also pins the address it was raised for, so an
-  address switch between approval and signing refuses rather than signing from
-  an account the screen never named, and a request naming an address that is not
-  the active one is refused outright. The approval screen now shows the fee, gas
-  limit, network and nonce it vouches for
-  ([#216](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/216)).
 - 2026-08-12: The restored navigation stack is filtered against
   `RESTORABLE_VIEWS` on load, truncated at the first entry the popup would not
   render so that every surviving entry keeps the Back target it had. Back after

docs/README.md

@@ -311,15 +311,10 @@ pages. When a site requests access to your wallet:
    time.
 
 When a connected site requests a transaction, a separate approval popup appears
-showing the transaction details (from, to, value, data, network fee, network and
-nonce). Every one of those values is checked against the transaction that is
-actually signed before anything is broadcast, so what you read on that screen is
-what goes out or nothing does. The popup appears once the wallet has worked out
-the fee and gas from the network, which takes a moment; if that fails, no popup
-appears and the site is told the transaction could not be prepared. You must
-enter your password and click "Confirm" to authorize it. Message and typed-data
-signature requests work the same way, with a "Sign" button, and also require
-your password.
+showing the transaction details (from, to, value, data). You must enter your
+password and click "Confirm" to authorize it. Message and typed-data signature
+requests work the same way, with a "Sign" button, and also require your
+password.
 
 If the requesting site's domain is on the phishing blocklist, all three approval
 screens show a red phishing warning before you decide.

src/background/index.js

@@ -18,15 +18,11 @@ const {
     verifySignature,
     failureIsRetryable,
     describeTxFailure,
-    sameAddress,
-    ApprovalMismatchError,
     TX_STAGE_SIGN,
     TX_STAGE_VERIFY,
     TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,
     TX_STAGE_INFLIGHT,
-    TX_STAGE_NONCE,
 } = require("../shared/approvalVerify");
-const { prepareApprovalTx } = require("../shared/approvalTx");
 const {
     isPhishingDomain,
     refreshPhishingListOnSchedule,
@@ -58,81 +54,6 @@ const connectedSites = {};
 // Pending approval requests: { id: { origin, hostname, resolve } }
 const pendingApprovals = {};
 
-// One transaction approval at a time, wallet-wide.
-//
-// The transaction a site asks for is populated before its approval window
-// opens, so that the object the user is shown is the object the signed
-// artifact is verified against. Populating fixes the nonce. Two requests
-// populated concurrently therefore take the SAME nonce — the node reports the
-// same pending count to both, neither having been broadcast — and whichever is
-// broadcast second is refused by the network for a nonce it can never be
-// re-signed at, because re-signing it would mean signing something other than
-// what was displayed.
-//
-// So the second request is refused while the first is unanswered. It is
-// refused before anything is populated, so no second nonce is allocated at
-// all, and while the page is still waiting with nothing on screen. The
-// alternatives were considered and rejected in
-// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/271: populating again at Confirm
-// puts a nonce on screen that is not the nonce that gets signed, and
-// allocating around in-flight approvals makes the wallet's own bookkeeping the
-// authority on a nonce the network has not accepted, which an abandoned
-// approval then leaves a hole in.
-//
-// Sign approvals are not gated: a signature consumes no nonce.
-let txApprovalSlotHeld = false;
-
-// EIP-1474 "resource unavailable": the standard code for a request that is
-// refused because another one is already pending.
-const TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE = -32002;
-
-const TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE =
-    "Another transaction is already waiting to be approved in AutistMask," +
-    " so this one was not sent. Please answer that request, then send this" +
-    " one again.";
-
-// Take the slot, or refuse. Called before the first await of the
-// eth_sendTransaction handler, so two requests arriving in the same tick
-// cannot both pass it.
-function reserveTxApprovalSlot() {
-    if (txApprovalSlotHeld) return false;
-    txApprovalSlotHeld = true;
-    return true;
-}
-
-function releaseTxApprovalSlot() {
-    txApprovalSlotHeld = false;
-}
-
-// Nonces this worker has already handed to the node, per address. This is the
-// wallet's own knowledge that a nonce is spent, and it is checked before a
-// broadcast rather than after: a node's pending count can lag a transaction it
-// has itself just accepted, and a request populated inside that window would
-// otherwise be signed and sent at a nonce this wallet has already used.
-//
-// The record dies with the worker, which is correct rather than merely
-// convenient: after a restart the node's count is the only answer available,
-// and a transaction of this wallet's that the node has forgotten is one the
-// user does want to be able to send again.
-const broadcastNonces = {};
-
-function broadcastNoncesFor(address) {
-    const key = String(address || "").toLowerCase();
-    if (!broadcastNonces[key]) broadcastNonces[key] = new Set();
-    return broadcastNonces[key];
-}
-
-// An approved transaction's nonce as a decimal string, or null if it cannot be
-// read as a number. Verification refuses an unreadable nonce before this is
-// ever reached; null here only keeps the record from holding junk.
-function approvedNonce(approvedTx) {
-    try {
-        return BigInt(approvedTx.nonce).toString();
-    } catch {
-        return null;
-    }
-}
-
 async function getState() {
     const result = await storageApi.get("autistmask");
     return (
@@ -156,14 +77,6 @@ async function getActiveAddress() {
     return null;
 }
 
-// Whether a request names a signing address other than the active one. Such a
-// request is refused rather than quietly signed as whichever address happens
-// to be active: the page asked for account A and would otherwise be handed
-// something from account B.
-function namesAnotherAddress(requested, activeAddress) {
-    return !!requested && !sameAddress(requested, activeAddress);
-}
-
 async function getRpcUrl() {
     const s = await getState();
     return s.rpcUrl || DEFAULT_RPC_URL;
@@ -312,21 +225,13 @@ function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
 // Uses windows.create() directly because tx approvals are triggered programmatically
 // (from a dApp RPC call), not from a user gesture, so action.openPopup() is
 // unreliable in this context.
-//
-// `approvedTx` is the fully populated transaction (see approvalTx.js): the
-// object the popup displays, the object it signs, and the object the artifact
-// is verified against. `approvedFrom` is the address that is active now, and
-// it is pinned here rather than read again at signing time — an address switch
-// between approval and signing must refuse, not sign from an account this
-// screen never named.
-function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom) {
+function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, txParams) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
         pendingApprovals[id] = {
             origin,
             hostname,
-            approvedTx,
-            approvedFrom,
+            txParams,
             resolve,
             type: "tx",
         };
@@ -339,14 +244,13 @@ function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom) {
 // Uses windows.create() directly because sign approvals are triggered programmatically
 // (from a dApp RPC call), not from a user gesture, so action.openPopup() is
 // unreliable in this context.
-function requestSignApproval(origin, hostname, signParams, approvedFrom) {
+function requestSignApproval(origin, hostname, signParams) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
         pendingApprovals[id] = {
             origin,
             hostname,
             signParams,
-            approvedFrom,
             resolve,
             type: "sign",
         };
@@ -598,16 +502,6 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
                 ? { method, message: params[0], from: params[1] }
                 : { method, message: params[1], from: params[0] };
 
-        if (namesAnotherAddress(signParams.from, activeAddress)) {
-            return {
-                error: {
-                    code: 4100,
-                    message:
-                        "This site asked to sign as an address that is not the active one.",
-                },
-            };
-        }
-
         if (method === "eth_sign") {
             signParams.dangerWarning =
                 "\u26a0\ufe0f DANGER: This site is requesting to sign a raw hash. " +
@@ -619,7 +513,6 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
             origin,
             hostname,
             signParams,
-            activeAddress,
         );
         if (decision.error) return { error: decision.error };
         return { result: decision.signature };
@@ -641,44 +534,34 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         }
 
         const signParams = { method, typedData: params[1], from: params[0] };
-        if (namesAnotherAddress(signParams.from, activeAddress)) {
-            return {
-                error: {
-                    code: 4100,
-                    message:
-                        "This site asked to sign as an address that is not the active one.",
-                },
-            };
-        }
         const decision = await requestSignApproval(
             origin,
             hostname,
             signParams,
-            activeAddress,
         );
         if (decision.error) return { error: decision.error };
         return { result: decision.signature };
     }
 
     if (method === "eth_sendTransaction") {
-        // Synchronous, before any await: two requests delivered in the same
-        // tick must not both get past this.
-        if (!reserveTxApprovalSlot()) {
-            return {
-                error: {
-                    code: TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
-                    message: TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
-                },
-            };
-        }
-        try {
-            return await handleSendTransaction(params, origin);
-        } finally {
-            // Held until the page has its answer — the approval was broadcast,
-            // rejected, or retired by a closed window — because until then its
-            // nonce is allocated and unspent.
-            releaseTxApprovalSlot();
+        const s = await getState();
+        const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+        if (!activeAddress)
+            return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
+
+        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
+        const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
+        if (
+            !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+            !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
+        ) {
+            return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
         }
+
+        const txParams = params?.[0] || {};
+        const decision = await requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, txParams);
+        if (decision.error) return { error: decision.error };
+        return { result: decision.txHash };
     }
 
     // Proxy safe read-only methods to the RPC node
@@ -694,73 +577,6 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
     return { error: { message: "Unsupported method: " + method } };
 }
 
-// The body of eth_sendTransaction, from the connection check through to the
-// user's decision. Its caller holds the single transaction-approval slot for
-// as long as this runs.
-async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
-    const s = await getState();
-    const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
-    if (!activeAddress) return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
-
-    const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
-    const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
-    if (
-        !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
-        !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
-    ) {
-        return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
-    }
-
-    const txParams = params?.[0] || {};
-    if (namesAnotherAddress(txParams.from, activeAddress)) {
-        return {
-            error: {
-                code: 4100,
-                message:
-                    "This site asked to send from an address that is not the active one.",
-            },
-        };
-    }
-
-    // Populate here, before any window opens, so that the transaction the
-    // user is shown is a complete one and is the same object the signed
-    // artifact is checked against. A failure raises no approval at all and
-    // is reported to the requesting page; see approvalTx.js.
-    let approvedTx;
-    try {
-        approvedTx = await prepareApprovalTx(
-            getProvider(await getRpcUrl()),
-            activeAddress,
-            txParams,
-        );
-    } catch (e) {
-        return { error: { message: e.message } };
-    }
-
-    // Population is a network round trip, and the user can switch address
-    // during it. Raising the approval anyway would put an account on the
-    // screen that the wallet is no longer on, and it could never be signed
-    // — the signing handler refuses exactly that. Refuse it here instead,
-    // while the page is still waiting and nothing has been displayed.
-    if (!sameAddress(await getActiveAddress(), activeAddress)) {
-        return {
-            error: {
-                message:
-                    "The active address changed while this transaction was being prepared, so it was not sent.",
-            },
-        };
-    }
-
-    const decision = await requestTxApproval(
-        origin,
-        hostname,
-        approvedTx,
-        activeAddress,
-    );
-    if (decision.error) return { error: decision.error };
-    return { result: decision.txHash };
-}
-
 // Broadcast chainChanged to all tabs when the network is switched.
 function broadcastChainChanged(chainId) {
     tabsApi.query({}, (tabs) => {
@@ -994,16 +810,11 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
             };
             if (approval.type === "tx") {
                 resp.type = "tx";
-                // The populated transaction, and the address it was raised
-                // for. The popup displays and signs exactly this and does not
-                // populate or re-read anything itself.
-                resp.approvedTx = approval.approvedTx;
-                resp.approvedFrom = approval.approvedFrom;
+                resp.txParams = approval.txParams;
             }
             if (approval.type === "sign") {
                 resp.type = "sign";
                 resp.signParams = approval.signParams;
-                resp.approvedFrom = approval.approvedFrom;
             }
             // Flag if the requesting domain is on the phishing blocklist.
             resp.isPhishingDomain = isPhishingDomain(approval.hostname);
@@ -1058,7 +869,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
             sendResponse({
                 error: outcome.error,
                 retryable: outcome.retryable,
-                stage: outcome.stage,
+                stage: TX_STAGE_SIGN,
             });
             return false;
         }
@@ -1077,27 +888,14 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
             try {
                 await loadState();
                 const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
-                // An address switch between approval and signing refuses. The
-                // approval named one account; signing from whichever account
-                // is active now would send funds from an account this screen
-                // never showed. A switch normally rejects every pending
-                // approval on its way through broadcastAccountsChanged(), so
-                // this is the case where that did not reach the approval —
-                // and it is a refusal, not a retry, because the transaction
-                // the user saw is no longer the transaction that would go out.
-                if (!sameAddress(activeAddress, approval.approvedFrom)) {
-                    throw new ApprovalMismatchError(
-                        "The active address changed after this transaction was approved, so it was not sent.",
-                    );
-                }
                 // The popup holds the secret, but the background stays the
                 // authority on what is broadcast: the raw transaction must be
-                // the transaction that was displayed, signed by the address
-                // the approval named, on the network that is selected.
+                // the approved one, signed by the approved address, on the
+                // network that is selected.
                 verifySignedTx(
                     msg.rawSignedTx,
-                    approval.approvedTx,
-                    approval.approvedFrom,
+                    approval.txParams,
+                    activeAddress,
                     currentNetwork().chainId,
                 );
             } catch (e) {
@@ -1118,28 +916,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
                 sendResponse({
                     error: outcome.error,
                     retryable: outcome.retryable,
-                    stage: outcome.stage,
-                });
-                return;
-            }
-
-            // A nonce this worker has already broadcast for this address. The
-            // node is not asked: it has answered once already, and the wallet
-            // holding the receipt of that answer is what makes this failure
-            // one the user can be told did not reach the network.
-            const nonce = approvedNonce(approval.approvedTx);
-            const spent = broadcastNoncesFor(approval.approvedFrom);
-            if (nonce !== null && spent.has(nonce)) {
-                const outcome = describeTxFailure(TX_STAGE_NONCE, null);
-                settleApproval(
-                    msg.id,
-                    { error: { message: outcome.error } },
-                    { holdsClaim: true },
-                );
-                sendResponse({
-                    error: outcome.error,
-                    retryable: outcome.retryable,
-                    stage: outcome.stage,
+                    stage: TX_STAGE_VERIFY,
                 });
                 return;
             }
@@ -1147,7 +924,6 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
             try {
                 const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
                 const tx = await provider.broadcastTransaction(msg.rawSignedTx);
-                if (nonce !== null) spent.add(nonce);
                 settleApproval(
                     msg.id,
                     { txHash: tx.hash },
@@ -1156,15 +932,10 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
                 sendResponse({ txHash: tx.hash });
             } catch (e) {
                 // Terminal, never retried: the node may have accepted the
-                // transaction and still failed to answer, so the wallet cannot
-                // tell a transaction that never left from one already in the
-                // mempool. The page has been given its outcome for this
-                // request; a second attempt would report a second one.
-                //
-                // Unless the node blamed the nonce, which is the one answer
-                // that says plainly it did not take the transaction:
-                // describeTxFailure() reclassifies that, and the stage it
-                // returns is the one reported.
+                // transaction and still failed to answer, and the popup's
+                // retry re-signs at a freshly fetched nonce rather than
+                // re-broadcasting these bytes. Retrying would send the
+                // approved transfer a second time.
                 const outcome = describeTxFailure(TX_STAGE_BROADCAST, e);
                 settleApproval(
                     msg.id,
@@ -1174,7 +945,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
                 sendResponse({
                     error: outcome.error,
                     retryable: outcome.retryable,
-                    stage: outcome.stage,
+                    stage: TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,
                 });
             }
         })();
@@ -1227,24 +998,12 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
         (async () => {
             try {
                 const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
-                // Same as the transaction path: the address the approval named
-                // is the one that must have signed, and a switch since then is
-                // a refusal rather than a signature from another account.
-                if (!sameAddress(activeAddress, approval.approvedFrom)) {
-                    throw new ApprovalMismatchError(
-                        "The active address changed after this request was approved, so it was not signed.",
-                    );
-                }
                 // The popup holds the secret, but the background stays the
                 // authority on what is handed back to the page: the signature
-                // must cover the approved payload and recover to the address
-                // the approval named.
+                // must cover the approved payload and recover to the approved
+                // address.
                 const signature = msg.signature;
-                verifySignature(
-                    approval.signParams,
-                    signature,
-                    approval.approvedFrom,
-                );
+                verifySignature(approval.signParams, signature, activeAddress);
                 settleApproval(msg.id, { signature }, { holdsClaim: true });
                 sendResponse({ signature });
             } catch (e) {

src/content/inpage.js

@@ -11,39 +11,6 @@
     let nextId = 1;
     const pending = {};
 
-    // EIP-1193 ProviderRpcError: `code`, `message`, optional `data`. A class
-    // rather than properties bolted onto an Error because this object crosses
-    // no boundary after construction — it is built in the page's own realm and
-    // handed straight to the caller's catch — so the prototype survives and
-    // `error.name` is a stable thing for a dApp to see.
-    class ProviderRpcError extends Error {
-        constructor(code, message, data) {
-            super(message);
-            this.name = "ProviderRpcError";
-            this.code = code;
-            if (data !== undefined) this.data = data;
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Rebuild a boundary error as the error the page catches, carrying the
-    // code (and data) the extension reported. Without this a dApp cannot tell
-    // a user's refusal (4001) from a wallet that broke, and retries or shows
-    // an error instead of accepting the refusal.
-    //
-    // Whatever code arrived is passed through verbatim rather than being
-    // matched against a list: the extension emits 4001, 4100 and 4902 today,
-    // and a code this file has never heard of is still the truth about what
-    // happened. An error reported with no code at all stays a plain Error —
-    // a ProviderRpcError whose `code` is undefined would advertise a
-    // conformance it does not have. `message` is untouched in every case.
-    function toPageError(error) {
-        const message = (error && error.message) || "Request failed";
-        if (error && error.code !== undefined && error.code !== null) {
-            return new ProviderRpcError(error.code, message, error.data);
-        }
-        return new Error(message);
-    }
-
     // Listen for responses from the content script
     window.addEventListener("message", function onUuid(event) {
         if (event.source !== window) return;
@@ -53,7 +20,7 @@
         if (!p) return;
         delete pending[id];
         if (error) {
-            p.reject(toPageError(error));
+            p.reject(new Error(error.message || "Request failed"));
         } else {
             p.resolve(result);
         }

src/popup/index.html

@@ -1496,33 +1496,6 @@
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Value</div>
                     <div id="approve-tx-value" class="text-xs font-bold"></div>
                 </div>
-                <div class="mb-3">
-                    <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Network fee (max)</div>
-                    <div
-                        id="approve-tx-fee"
-                        class="text-xs font-bold min-h-[1rem]"
-                    ></div>
-                    <div
-                        id="approve-tx-fee-detail"
-                        class="text-xs text-muted min-h-[1rem]"
-                    ></div>
-                </div>
-                <div class="mb-3 flex justify-between">
-                    <div>
-                        <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Network</div>
-                        <div
-                            id="approve-tx-network"
-                            class="text-xs min-h-[1rem]"
-                        ></div>
-                    </div>
-                    <div>
-                        <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Nonce</div>
-                        <div
-                            id="approve-tx-nonce"
-                            class="text-xs min-h-[1rem]"
-                        ></div>
-                    </div>
-                </div>
                 <div id="approve-tx-data-section" class="mb-3 hidden">
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Raw data</div>
                     <div id="approve-tx-data" class="text-xs break-all"></div>

src/popup/views/approval.js

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ const {
     onViewLeave,
 } = require("./helpers");
 const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
-const { networkByChainId } = require("../../shared/networks");
 const {
     formatEther,
     formatUnits,
@@ -24,6 +23,7 @@ const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
 const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
 const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
 const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
+const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
 const { describeSigningFailure } = require("../../shared/approvalVerify");
 const txStatus = require("./txStatus");
 const uniswap = require("../../shared/uniswap");
@@ -159,61 +159,21 @@ function showPhishingWarning(elementId, isPhishing) {
     }
 }
 
-// The fields of the approved transaction the value and recipient lines do not
-// already carry: network, gas limit, fee per gas, the most the fee can come to,
-// and the nonce. The background compares every one of them against the signed
-// artifact, so every one of them has to be on the screen — a number that is
-// verified but never displayed is verified against nothing the user agreed to.
-function showTxFee(approvedTx, ethPrice) {
-    const network = networkByChainId(approvedTx.chainId);
-    $("approve-tx-network").textContent = network
-        ? network.name
-        : "Unknown network (chain id " + BigInt(approvedTx.chainId) + ")";
-
-    const gasLimit = BigInt(approvedTx.gasLimit);
-    const feePerGas = BigInt(approvedTx.maxFeePerGas || approvedTx.gasPrice);
-    const maxFeeEth = formatTxValue(formatEther(gasLimit * feePerGas));
-    const usdStr = formatUsd(
-        ethPrice ? parseFloat(maxFeeEth) * ethPrice : null,
-    );
-    $("approve-tx-fee").textContent =
-        maxFeeEth + " ETH" + (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
-
-    let detail =
-        gasLimit.toString() +
-        " gas at up to " +
-        formatUnits(feePerGas, 9) +
-        " gwei";
-    if (approvedTx.maxPriorityFeePerGas) {
-        detail +=
-            ", " +
-            formatUnits(approvedTx.maxPriorityFeePerGas, 9) +
-            " gwei priority";
-    }
-    $("approve-tx-fee-detail").textContent = detail;
-    $("approve-tx-nonce").textContent = BigInt(approvedTx.nonce).toString();
-}
-
 function showTxApproval(details) {
     showPhishingWarning(
         "approve-tx-phishing-warning",
         details.isPhishingDomain,
     );
 
-    // The transaction the background populated. It is displayed as it stands,
-    // signed as it stands, and verified against as it stands — the popup fills
-    // nothing in, so there is no number on this screen that the background
-    // cannot compare with the artifact it gets back.
-    pendingTxParams = details.approvedTx;
-    const approvedTx = details.approvedTx;
+    pendingTxParams = details.txParams;
 
-    const toAddr = approvedTx.to;
+    const toAddr = details.txParams.to;
     const token = toAddr ? TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(toAddr.toLowerCase()) : null;
-    const ethValue = formatEther(approvedTx.value || "0");
+    const ethValue = formatEther(details.txParams.value || "0");
 
     // Build txInfo for status screens
     pendingTxDetails = {
-        from: details.approvedFrom,
+        from: state.activeAddress,
         to: toAddr || "",
         amount: formatTxValue(ethValue),
         token: "ETH",
@@ -221,7 +181,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     };
 
     // If this is an ERC-20 call, try to extract the real recipient and amount
-    const decoded = decodeCalldata(approvedTx.data, toAddr || "");
+    const decoded = decodeCalldata(details.txParams.data, toAddr || "");
     if (decoded && decoded.details) {
         let decodedTokenAddr = null;
         let decodedTokenSymbol = null;
@@ -259,7 +219,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     }
 
     $("approve-tx-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
-    $("approve-tx-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(details.approvedFrom);
+    $("approve-tx-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(state.activeAddress);
 
     // Show token symbol next to contract address if known
     const symbol = toAddr ? tokenLabel(toAddr) : null;
@@ -275,7 +235,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     }
 
     const ethValueFormatted = formatTxValue(
-        formatEther(approvedTx.value || "0"),
+        formatEther(details.txParams.value || "0"),
     );
     const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
     const ethUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(ethValueFormatted) * ethPrice : null;
@@ -283,8 +243,6 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     $("approve-tx-value").textContent =
         ethValueFormatted + " ETH" + (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
 
-    showTxFee(approvedTx, ethPrice);
-
     // Decode calldata (reuse decoded from above)
     const decodedEl = $("approve-tx-decoded");
     if (decoded) {
@@ -313,8 +271,8 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     }
 
     // Always show raw data when present
-    if (approvedTx.data && approvedTx.data !== "0x") {
-        $("approve-tx-data").textContent = approvedTx.data;
+    if (details.txParams.data && details.txParams.data !== "0x") {
+        $("approve-tx-data").textContent = details.txParams.data;
         $("approve-tx-data-section").classList.remove("hidden");
     } else {
         $("approve-tx-data-section").classList.add("hidden");
@@ -325,11 +283,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
 
     showView("approve-tx");
     attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-tx");
-    gateOnWalletDefect(
-        "approve-tx-error",
-        "btn-approve-tx",
-        details.approvedFrom,
-    );
+    gateOnWalletDefect("approve-tx-error", "btn-approve-tx");
 }
 
 function decodeHexMessage(hex) {
@@ -388,12 +342,9 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
 
     const sp = details.signParams;
     pendingSignParams = sp;
-    pendingSignFrom = details.approvedFrom;
 
     $("approve-sign-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
-    $("approve-sign-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(
-        details.approvedFrom,
-    );
+    $("approve-sign-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(sp.from);
 
     const isTyped =
         sp.method === "eth_signTypedData_v4" ||
@@ -432,11 +383,7 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
 
     showView("approve-sign");
     attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-sign");
-    gateOnWalletDefect(
-        "approve-sign-error",
-        "btn-approve-sign",
-        details.approvedFrom,
-    );
+    gateOnWalletDefect("approve-sign-error", "btn-approve-sign");
 }
 
 function show(id) {
@@ -471,15 +418,11 @@ function show(id) {
 
 let approvalId = null;
 let pendingTxDetails = null;
-// The exact objects shown to the user, kept so the popup signs what it
-// displayed rather than re-fetching or re-populating anything at approval
-// time. All are repopulated by show() when the popup is closed and reopened.
+// The exact parameters shown to the user, kept so the popup signs what it
+// displayed rather than re-fetching anything at approval time. Both are
+// repopulated by show() when the popup is closed and reopened.
 let pendingTxParams = null;
 let pendingSignParams = null;
-// The address the approval was raised for. Signing uses this rather than the
-// active address, so that an address switch since the approval fails here
-// instead of producing a signature from an account the screen never named.
-let pendingSignFrom = null;
 
 // Approve buttons stay disabled and muted while the popup derives the key and
 // signs, which is slow enough (Argon2id) that a double click is likely.
@@ -494,13 +437,12 @@ function setSignButtonBusy(busy) {
 }
 
 // Say so on the approval screen itself, and disable the approve button, when
-// the address the approval was raised for belongs to a wallet whose keys
-// cannot be derived. Without this the screen would take a password and fail
-// after deriving it. Reject stays available; the wallet is not touched.
-// Returns true when it gated.
-function gateOnWalletDefect(errorId, buttonId, address) {
-    const owner = findWalletFor(address);
-    const defect = owner ? walletDefect(owner.wallet) : null;
+// the active address belongs to a wallet whose keys cannot be derived. Without
+// this the screen would take a password and fail after deriving it. Reject
+// stays available; the wallet is not touched. Returns true when it gated.
+function gateOnWalletDefect(errorId, buttonId) {
+    const active = findActiveWallet();
+    const defect = active ? walletDefect(active.wallet) : null;
     if (!defect) return false;
     showError(errorId, defect.shortMessage);
     $(buttonId).disabled = true;
@@ -508,14 +450,12 @@ function gateOnWalletDefect(errorId, buttonId, address) {
     return true;
 }
 
-// Locate the wallet and the address index owning an address. Returns null when
-// no wallet holds it. Approvals look up the address they were raised for, not
-// whichever address is active now: the approval named one account, and signing
-// with another is what verification refuses.
-function findWalletFor(address) {
+// Locate the wallet and the address index owning the currently active
+// address. Returns null when no wallet holds it.
+function findActiveWallet() {
     for (const wallet of state.wallets) {
         for (let i = 0; i < wallet.addresses.length; i++) {
-            if (wallet.addresses[i].address === address) {
+            if (wallet.addresses[i].address === state.activeAddress) {
                 return { wallet, addrIndex: i };
             }
         }
@@ -577,12 +517,12 @@ function init(ctx) {
         hideError("approve-tx-error");
         setTxButtonBusy(true);
 
-        const active = findWalletFor(pendingTxParams.from);
+        const active = findActiveWallet();
         if (!active) {
             password = null;
             showError(
                 "approve-tx-error",
-                "No wallet was found for the address this transaction was approved for.",
+                "No wallet was found for the active address.",
             );
             setTxButtonBusy(false);
             return;
@@ -629,16 +569,15 @@ function init(ctx) {
                 active.addrIndex,
                 decryptedSecret,
             );
-            // Sign the approved transaction exactly as it was displayed. The
-            // background populated it before this screen was drawn and checks
-            // the artifact against it field for field, so there is nothing to
-            // fill in here and no provider to fill it in from. The copy is
-            // because ethers may strip `from` off what it is handed, and the
-            // approval has to survive a retry intact; keeping `from` on it
-            // makes ethers refuse a key that is not the approved address.
-            payload.rawSignedTx = await signer.signTransaction({
-                ...pendingTxParams,
-            });
+            const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
+            const connected = signer.connect(provider);
+            // This is the sequence ethers' own sendTransaction() runs
+            // internally, so nonce, gas, fee and chain id population are
+            // identical to when the background did the signing.
+            const populated =
+                await connected.populateTransaction(pendingTxParams);
+            delete populated.from;
+            payload.rawSignedTx = await connected.signTransaction(populated);
         } catch (e) {
             payload.error =
                 e.shortMessage || e.message || "Transaction signing failed.";
@@ -687,12 +626,12 @@ function init(ctx) {
         hideError("approve-sign-error");
         setSignButtonBusy(true);
 
-        const active = findWalletFor(pendingSignFrom);
+        const active = findActiveWallet();
         if (!active) {
             password = null;
             showError(
                 "approve-sign-error",
-                "No wallet was found for the address this request was approved for.",
+                "No wallet was found for the active address.",
             );
             setSignButtonBusy(false);
             return;

src/shared/approvalTx.js

@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
-// Preparation of the transaction an approval screen displays.
-//
-// A dApp's eth_sendTransaction normally fixes only `to`, `value` and `data`.
-// The nonce, the gas limit and the fees have to be filled in from the network
-// before anything can be signed, and whoever fills them in decides what the
-// user is shown. That work used to happen in the popup, after the user had
-// already approved: the numbers on the approval screen came from the popup and
-// were compared against nothing, so a compromised popup could display one fee
-// and sign another, and the ceilings in approvalVerify.js were all that stood
-// between the user and a fee that hands the validator the balance.
-//
-// So it happens here instead, in the background, before the approval window is
-// opened. The background populates the transaction, shows that object, and
-// verifies the signed artifact against that same object — the popup is handed
-// a finished transaction and signs it as given. Every field the user reads is
-// then a field that is compared.
-//
-// The cost is an RPC round trip before the approval window exists. Nothing is
-// displayed while it is in flight, and a failure — an unreachable node, a
-// reverting gas estimate, a transaction type this wallet does not sign, a fee
-// past the ceilings — means no approval and no window at all: the error goes
-// back to the requesting page, which is where the user's click came from. That
-// is deliberate. The alternative, opening the window first and populating
-// behind a spinner, needs a pending approval that exists before it can be
-// displayed or signed, and a half-initialised approval is exactly the state
-// the settle interlock in the background exists to keep out of that record.
-// The failure also lands earlier than it used to rather than later: the same
-// estimate previously failed after the user had typed their password.
-
-const {
-    VoidSigner,
-    accessListify,
-    getAddress,
-    getBytes,
-    hexlify,
-    toQuantity,
-} = require("ethers");
-const {
-    ALLOWED_TX_TYPES,
-    SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
-    assertWithinCeilings,
-} = require("./approvalVerify");
-
-// How long the population may take before the request is failed back to the
-// page. Without a bound a hung RPC endpoint leaves the dApp's promise pending
-// forever with nothing on screen to explain it; ethers' own request timeout is
-// minutes long, which is not a wait anyone will sit through.
-const POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS = 20000;
-
-// The request fields taken from the page. Anything else is dropped rather than
-// passed to ethers: the object is page-controlled, and a future ethers that
-// learns to carry a new transaction field must not start picking one up out of
-// it without this module knowing.
-const REQUEST_FIELDS = [
-    "to",
-    "value",
-    "data",
-    "nonce",
-    "gasLimit",
-    "gasPrice",
-    "maxFeePerGas",
-    "maxPriorityFeePerGas",
-    "chainId",
-    "accessList",
-    "type",
-];
-
-class ApprovalPrepareError extends Error {
-    constructor(message) {
-        super(message);
-        this.name = "ApprovalPrepareError";
-    }
-}
-
-function fail(message) {
-    return new ApprovalPrepareError(message);
-}
-
-function present(v) {
-    return v !== null && v !== undefined && v !== "";
-}
-
-// These strings reach the user through the requesting page, so they are full
-// sentences even when the tail of one came from ethers or from the node.
-function sentence(text) {
-    return /[.!?]$/.test(text) ? text : text + ".";
-}
-
-// Reject a promise that has taken too long, and never leave the timer behind.
-async function withTimeout(promise, ms, message) {
-    let timer = null;
-    try {
-        return await Promise.race([
-            promise,
-            new Promise((_resolve, reject) => {
-                timer = setTimeout(() => reject(fail(message)), ms);
-            }),
-        ]);
-    } finally {
-        if (timer !== null) clearTimeout(timer);
-    }
-}
-
-// The page's request, reduced to the fields this wallet acts on.
-function requestFrom(txParams, from) {
-    const request = { from: getAddress(from) };
-    for (const key of REQUEST_FIELDS) {
-        if (present(txParams[key])) request[key] = txParams[key];
-    }
-    if (
-        present(request.type) &&
-        !ALLOWED_TX_TYPES.includes(Number(request.type))
-    ) {
-        throw fail(
-            "The site asked for a transaction of a type this wallet does not sign.",
-        );
-    }
-    return request;
-}
-
-// Turn a populated transaction into the object that crosses to the popup, is
-// displayed, and is compared with the signed artifact. It carries exactly the
-// fields its type serializes, plus the address it is to be signed by, and
-// every quantity as a hex string: extension messaging is JSON, which has no
-// bigint, and a field that did not survive the trip would be a field the user
-// was shown and nothing compared.
-function serializeApprovedTx(populated, from) {
-    const type = Number(populated.type);
-    if (!ALLOWED_TX_TYPES.includes(type)) {
-        throw fail(
-            "This transaction would have to be sent as a type this wallet does not sign.",
-        );
-    }
-    const approved = { type, from: getAddress(from) };
-    for (const key of SERIALIZED_FIELDS[type]) {
-        if (key === "to") {
-            approved.to = present(populated.to)
-                ? getAddress(populated.to)
-                : null;
-        } else if (key === "data") {
-            approved.data = present(populated.data)
-                ? hexlify(getBytes(populated.data))
-                : "0x";
-        } else if (key === "accessList") {
-            approved.accessList = accessListify(populated.accessList || []);
-        } else if (key === "value") {
-            approved.value = toQuantity(populated.value || 0);
-        } else if (!present(populated[key])) {
-            // Unreachable while populateTransaction() fills every quantity of
-            // the type it produced. If it ever does not, the approval must not
-            // be raised: an unfixed quantity is one the artifact cannot be
-            // checked against.
-            throw fail(
-                "The transaction could not be prepared: the network did not supply a " +
-                    key +
-                    ".",
-            );
-        } else {
-            approved[key] = toQuantity(populated[key]);
-        }
-    }
-    return approved;
-}
-
-// Populate the transaction a site asked for, as the address it will be signed
-// by, and return the object to display, sign and verify against. Throws with a
-// full sentence when no approval can be raised.
-async function prepareApprovalTx(provider, from, txParams) {
-    if (!present(from)) {
-        throw fail("There is no active address to send this transaction from.");
-    }
-    const request = requestFrom(txParams || {}, from);
-
-    let populated;
-    try {
-        // The sequence ethers' own sendTransaction() runs internally, so the
-        // nonce, gas, fee and chain id are populated exactly as they were when
-        // the popup did this. VoidSigner cannot sign, which is the point: the
-        // background prepares, the popup signs.
-        populated = await withTimeout(
-            new VoidSigner(getAddress(from), provider).populateTransaction(
-                request,
-            ),
-            POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS,
-            "The transaction could not be prepared: the network did not answer in time.",
-        );
-    } catch (e) {
-        if (e instanceof ApprovalPrepareError) throw e;
-        throw fail(
-            sentence(
-                "The transaction could not be prepared: " +
-                    (e.shortMessage ||
-                        e.message ||
-                        "the network did not answer"),
-            ),
-        );
-    }
-
-    const approved = serializeApprovedTx(populated, from);
-    // The backstop, applied before the user is shown anything rather than
-    // after they have approved it: what is displayed here is what gets signed,
-    // so an RPC node reporting an absurd fee has to be refused here.
-    assertWithinCeilings(approved);
-    return approved;
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-    prepareApprovalTx,
-    serializeApprovedTx,
-    ApprovalPrepareError,
-    POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS,
-    REQUEST_FIELDS,
-};

src/shared/approvalVerify.js

@@ -7,13 +7,6 @@
 // the signer from the artifact and checks it against the approval it is
 // holding before acting on it. All recovery is delegated to ethers.
 //
-// What the artifact is checked against is the transaction the background
-// populated and the popup displayed (see approvalTx.js), not the request the
-// dApp made. The two differ in every field a dApp normally leaves out — nonce,
-// gas limit, fees — and those are the fields the user reads off the approval
-// screen, so comparing against the request would leave the numbers on screen
-// vouched for by nothing.
-//
 // The check is an allowlist, in both directions, because a denylist cannot be
 // correct against a transaction format that keeps gaining fields:
 //
@@ -38,12 +31,14 @@
 // never a warning: what the user approved is what gets broadcast, or nothing
 // does.
 //
-// The approved transaction is required to fix every field its type serializes,
-// so there is no "the approval did not say" branch to fall through: a quantity
-// the approval does not carry is a refusal, because an artifact that cannot be
-// compared with what was displayed has not been checked. The chain id is
-// checked against the selected network as well as against the approval, which
-// is what makes a cross-chain replay impossible.
+// Fields the approval does not carry are not treated as zero. The popup
+// populates nonce, gas limit, fee and chain id through populateTransaction()
+// when the requesting page did not fix them, so there is no approved value to
+// compare against; treating absent as zero would refuse every legitimate
+// transaction. Those fields are instead held to the absolute ceilings below,
+// and the chain id is always checked against the selected network rather than
+// against the approval alone, which is what makes a cross-chain replay
+// impossible.
 //
 // Every failure message is a full sentence, because these strings are shown to
 // the user and returned to the dApp.
@@ -118,17 +113,6 @@ const FORBIDDEN_FIELDS = [
     },
 ];
 
-// Absolute ceilings — a BACKSTOP, not the primary control.
-//
-// The primary control is equality: every field of the artifact is compared
-// with the populated transaction the user was shown, so nothing the popup
-// signs can differ from the screen. What equality cannot bound is the
-// populated transaction itself, which is built from what the configured RPC
-// node answered — a node that reports an absurd fee gets that fee displayed,
-// and a user who does not read the fee line would approve it. These ceilings
-// bound that, and they are therefore applied where the transaction is
-// populated (approvalTx.js) as well as here.
-//
 // Above the block gas limit of every supported network (see networks.js), so
 // no transaction that could ever be included is refused by it.
 const MAX_GAS_LIMIT = 100000000n;
@@ -240,151 +224,40 @@ function normalizeData(v) {
     return String(v).toLowerCase();
 }
 
-// How each field of an approved transaction is compared with the artifact.
-// There is an entry here for every field any allowed type serializes — a test
-// pins that against SERIALIZED_FIELDS — so the comparison loop covers the
-// whole of what gets signed and cannot silently skip a field for want of a
-// comparator.
-//
-// `kind` decides how the two sides are made comparable. A `quantity` must be
-// fixed by the approval: it is one of the numbers on the approval screen, and
-// an absent one means the artifact cannot be checked against what was
-// displayed. `to`, `value`, `data` and `accessList` have canonical absent
-// forms — contract creation, zero, "0x" and the empty list — so they are
-// normalized on both sides instead.
-const APPROVED_FIELDS = {
-    chainId: {
-        kind: "quantity",
-        label: "network",
-        message:
-            "The signed transaction is for a different network than the one that was approved.",
-    },
-    nonce: {
-        kind: "quantity",
+// Quantity fields the requesting page may fix in the approval. Each is
+// compared exactly when the approval carries it, and left to the ceilings
+// above when it does not.
+const APPROVED_QUANTITIES = [
+    {
+        key: "nonce",
         label: "nonce",
         message: "The signed transaction does not carry the approved nonce.",
     },
-    gasLimit: {
-        kind: "quantity",
+    {
+        key: "gasLimit",
         label: "gas limit",
         message:
             "The signed transaction does not carry the approved gas limit.",
     },
-    gasPrice: {
-        kind: "quantity",
+    {
+        key: "gasPrice",
         label: "gas price",
         message:
             "The signed transaction does not carry the approved gas price.",
     },
-    maxFeePerGas: {
-        kind: "quantity",
+    {
+        key: "maxFeePerGas",
         label: "maximum fee per gas",
         message:
             "The signed transaction does not carry the approved maximum fee per gas.",
     },
-    maxPriorityFeePerGas: {
-        kind: "quantity",
+    {
+        key: "maxPriorityFeePerGas",
         label: "maximum priority fee per gas",
         message:
             "The signed transaction does not carry the approved maximum priority fee per gas.",
     },
-    to: {
-        kind: "address",
-        label: "recipient",
-        message:
-            "The signed transaction does not go to the approved recipient.",
-    },
-    value: {
-        kind: "value",
-        label: "value",
-        message: "The signed transaction does not carry the approved value.",
-    },
-    data: {
-        kind: "data",
-        label: "call data",
-        message:
-            "The signed transaction does not carry the approved call data.",
-    },
-    accessList: {
-        kind: "accessList",
-        label: "access list",
-        message:
-            "The signed transaction does not carry the approved access list.",
-    },
-};
-
-// Compare one field of the artifact with the approved transaction. A field
-// with no entry in the table above is refused rather than skipped: the loop
-// below runs over the fields the type serializes, so an unmatched key means
-// something that gets signed has no comparator at all.
-function assertFieldMatches(key, parsed, approvedTx) {
-    const field = APPROVED_FIELDS[key];
-    if (!field) {
-        throw refuse(
-            "The signed transaction carries a field this wallet cannot compare with the approval.",
-        );
-    }
-    switch (field.kind) {
-        case "quantity": {
-            if (!present(approvedTx[key])) {
-                throw refuse(
-                    "The approved transaction fixes no " +
-                        field.label +
-                        ", so the signed transaction cannot be checked" +
-                        " against what was shown.",
-                );
-            }
-            const approved = normalizeQuantity(approvedTx[key], field.label);
-            if (normalizeQuantity(parsed[key], field.label) !== approved) {
-                throw refuse(field.message);
-            }
-            return;
-        }
-        case "address":
-            if (!sameAddress(parsed[key], approvedTx[key])) {
-                throw refuse(field.message);
-            }
-            return;
-        case "value":
-            if (normalizeValue(parsed[key]) !== normalizeValue(approvedTx[key]))
-                throw refuse(field.message);
-            return;
-        case "data":
-            if (normalizeData(parsed[key]) !== normalizeData(approvedTx[key]))
-                throw refuse(field.message);
-            return;
-        default:
-            if (
-                normalizeAccessList(parsed[key]) !==
-                normalizeAccessList(approvedTx[key])
-            ) {
-                throw refuse(field.message);
-            }
-    }
-}
-
-// The ceilings, applied to a transaction that is either about to be displayed
-// or about to be broadcast. See MAX_GAS_LIMIT above for what they are for:
-// they bound what the RPC node can talk this wallet into showing the user,
-// which is the one thing comparing the artifact with the screen cannot do.
-function assertWithinCeilings(tx) {
-    if (
-        present(tx.gasLimit) &&
-        normalizeQuantity(tx.gasLimit, "gas limit") > MAX_GAS_LIMIT
-    ) {
-        throw refuse(
-            "The signed transaction sets a gas limit no network this wallet supports can accept.",
-        );
-    }
-    for (const key of ["gasPrice", "maxFeePerGas", "maxPriorityFeePerGas"]) {
-        if (!present(tx[key])) continue;
-        if (normalizeQuantity(tx[key], "fee per gas") > MAX_FEE_PER_GAS) {
-            throw refuse(
-                "The signed transaction sets a fee per gas far above any plausible value.",
-            );
-        }
-    }
-}
+];
 
 // Refuse a field only a transaction type this wallet does not sign can carry.
 // The type allowlist keeps these unreachable in production, which is exactly
@@ -444,28 +317,10 @@ function assertCanonicalBytes(parsed, rawSignedTx) {
 // signed by the address the approval was raised for, on the network that is
 // selected. Returns the parsed ethers Transaction on success, throws
 // otherwise.
-//
-// `approvedTx` is the populated transaction the approval screen displayed, and
-// `expectedFrom` is the address that was active when the approval was raised —
-// not whichever address is active now. An address switch between approval and
-// signing therefore refuses here rather than producing a transaction from an
-// account the approval did not name.
-function verifySignedTx(
-    rawSignedTx,
-    approvedTx,
-    expectedFrom,
-    selectedChainId,
-) {
+function verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, txParams, expectedFrom, selectedChainId) {
     if (typeof rawSignedTx !== "string" || !rawSignedTx.startsWith("0x")) {
         throw refuse("The signed transaction is missing or malformed.");
     }
-    // Nothing to compare against is a refusal like any other: an approval that
-    // does not carry the transaction it displayed cannot vouch for one.
-    if (!approvedTx || typeof approvedTx !== "object") {
-        throw refuse(
-            "There is no approved transaction to check the signed transaction against.",
-        );
-    }
 
     let parsed;
     try {
@@ -505,15 +360,46 @@ function verifySignedTx(
             "The signed transaction is for a different network than the one that is selected.",
         );
     }
+    if (
+        present(txParams.chainId) &&
+        parsed.chainId !== normalizeQuantity(txParams.chainId, "network")
+    ) {
+        throw refuse(
+            "The signed transaction is for a different network than the one that was approved.",
+        );
+    }
 
-    // The approved fee mechanism, named before the type comparison below
-    // subsumes it: the fee the user agreed to is only meaningful under the
-    // mechanism it was quoted in, and saying so is more use than "a different
-    // transaction type".
+    if (!sameAddress(parsed.to, txParams.to)) {
+        throw refuse(
+            "The signed transaction does not go to the approved recipient.",
+        );
+    }
+    if (normalizeValue(parsed.value) !== normalizeValue(txParams.value)) {
+        throw refuse(
+            "The signed transaction does not carry the approved value.",
+        );
+    }
+    if (normalizeData(parsed.data) !== normalizeData(txParams.data)) {
+        throw refuse(
+            "The signed transaction does not carry the approved call data.",
+        );
+    }
+    if (
+        normalizeAccessList(parsed.accessList) !==
+        normalizeAccessList(txParams.accessList)
+    ) {
+        throw refuse(
+            "The signed transaction does not carry the approved access list.",
+        );
+    }
+
+    // An approval that fixed EIP-1559 fees must not be signed as a legacy
+    // transaction, and vice versa: the fee the user agreed to is only
+    // meaningful under the mechanism it was quoted in.
     const approvedEip1559 =
-        present(approvedTx.maxFeePerGas) ||
-        present(approvedTx.maxPriorityFeePerGas);
-    const approvedLegacy = present(approvedTx.gasPrice);
+        present(txParams.maxFeePerGas) ||
+        present(txParams.maxPriorityFeePerGas);
+    const approvedLegacy = present(txParams.gasPrice);
     const signedEip1559 = parsed.type === 2;
     if (
         (approvedEip1559 && !signedEip1559) ||
@@ -524,32 +410,27 @@ function verifySignedTx(
         );
     }
 
-    // The type decides which fields are compared, so it is compared first and
-    // against the approval, not merely checked for membership of the
-    // allowlist above.
-    if (!present(approvedTx.type)) {
-        throw refuse(
-            "The approved transaction fixes no transaction type, so the signed transaction cannot be checked against what was shown.",
-        );
+    for (const field of APPROVED_QUANTITIES) {
+        if (!present(txParams[field.key])) continue;
+        const approved = normalizeQuantity(txParams[field.key], field.label);
+        if (normalizeQuantity(parsed[field.key], field.label) !== approved) {
+            throw refuse(field.message);
         }
-    if (
-        BigInt(parsed.type) !==
-        normalizeQuantity(approvedTx.type, "transaction type")
-    ) {
-        throw refuse(
-            "The signed transaction does not use the approved transaction type.",
-        );
     }
 
-    // Every field this type serializes, compared with the transaction the user
-    // was shown. Driving the loop off SERIALIZED_FIELDS is what keeps this
-    // exhaustive: the same table decides what assertNothingUnchecked() rebuilds
-    // from, so a field that gets signed and is not compared here cannot exist.
-    for (const key of SERIALIZED_FIELDS[parsed.type]) {
-        assertFieldMatches(key, parsed, approvedTx);
+    if (parsed.gasLimit > MAX_GAS_LIMIT) {
+        throw refuse(
+            "The signed transaction sets a gas limit no network this wallet supports can accept.",
+        );
+    }
+    for (const key of ["gasPrice", "maxFeePerGas", "maxPriorityFeePerGas"]) {
+        const fee = parsed[key];
+        if (fee !== null && fee !== undefined && fee > MAX_FEE_PER_GAS) {
+            throw refuse(
+                "The signed transaction sets a fee per gas far above any plausible value.",
+            );
+        }
     }
-
-    assertWithinCeilings(parsed);
 
     assertNothingUnchecked(parsed);
     assertCanonicalBytes(parsed, rawSignedTx);
@@ -602,12 +483,6 @@ const TX_STAGE_BROADCAST = "broadcast";
 // may yet succeed, so the one thing the popup must not say is "start again
 // from the site".
 const TX_STAGE_INFLIGHT = "inflight";
-// A transaction refused for a nonce that is already spoken for, either by the
-// node's own answer or by this wallet's record of what it has broadcast. It is
-// the one broadcast-stage failure that is not ambiguous: the transaction was
-// not taken, so the user is told it did not reach the network and to send it
-// again, rather than being warned that it might already be out there.
-const TX_STAGE_NONCE = "nonce";
 
 function errorText(err) {
     if (typeof err === "string" && err !== "") return err;
@@ -617,59 +492,6 @@ function errorText(err) {
     return "The transaction could not be sent.";
 }
 
-// Every string a failure might carry its reason in. ethers reports the node's
-// own words in `shortMessage`, but a JSON-RPC error it could not classify is
-// nested under `error` or `info.error` with the node's message intact, and the
-// classification below has to see that too.
-function failureTexts(err) {
-    if (typeof err === "string") return [err];
-    if (!err || typeof err !== "object") return [];
-    const texts = [];
-    for (const text of [err.shortMessage, err.message, err.reason]) {
-        if (text) texts.push(String(text));
-    }
-    const nested = err.error || (err.info && err.info.error);
-    if (nested && nested.message) texts.push(String(nested.message));
-    return texts;
-}
-
-// What the Ethereum clients say when a transaction's nonce is already spoken
-// for: either it is below the account's next nonce, or another transaction is
-// sitting in the pool at that nonce and this one did not outbid it. Either way
-// the node answered, and its answer was that it did not take this transaction.
-//
-// "already known" is deliberately absent. A node that says it knows the
-// transaction has it, so that transaction did reach the network and the
-// ambiguous broadcast wording is the correct one for it.
-const NONCE_COLLISION_PATTERNS = [
-    /nonce too low/i,
-    /nonce has already been used/i,
-    /invalid nonce/i,
-    /oldnonce/i,
-    /replacement transaction underpriced/i,
-    /replacement fee too low/i,
-];
-
-// ethers' own classification of the same two conditions.
-const NONCE_COLLISION_CODES = ["NONCE_EXPIRED", "REPLACEMENT_UNDERPRICED"];
-
-// Whether a failed send is a nonce collision.
-function isNonceCollision(err) {
-    if (!err) return false;
-    if (err.code && NONCE_COLLISION_CODES.includes(err.code)) return true;
-    return failureTexts(err).some((text) =>
-        NONCE_COLLISION_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(text)),
-    );
-}
-
-// What both the requesting page and the popup are told about a nonce
-// collision. The node's own words ("nonce too low") are a fragment and are
-// replaced rather than passed through: they are not a sentence, and they say
-// less than the wallet knows.
-const NONCE_COLLISION_MESSAGE =
-    "The transaction was not sent, because its nonce had already been used" +
-    " by another transaction.";
-
 // What the background does with a pending transaction approval after a failed
 // attempt: what it tells the popup, and whether the approval is spent
 // (resolved to the requesting page as an error and deleted) or left standing
@@ -682,35 +504,16 @@ const NONCE_COLLISION_MESSAGE =
 //    approval. Anything else failed before the check ran and is retryable.
 //  - broadcast: always terminal. A broadcast that throws after the node
 //    accepted the transaction is routine (a timeout, a dropped response, a
-//    node answering "already known"), so the wallet cannot tell a transaction
-//    that never left from one that is already in the mempool. The approval is
-//    spent and the requesting page has been given its outcome; a second
-//    attempt against it would report a second outcome for one request.
-//  - nonce: terminal too, and the one case where the wallet does know the
-//    transaction never left. The approval carries a nonce that is spent, so
-//    the artifact signed against it can never be accepted and the user is told
-//    to send it again from the site.
-//
-// The stage comes back out because a broadcast failure the node blamed on the
-// nonce is reclassified here; the caller reports the stage this returns rather
-// than the one it passed in.
+//    node answering "already known"), and the popup's retry does not
+//    re-broadcast these bytes — it re-runs populateTransaction() and signs
+//    again at a freshly fetched pending-tag nonce. Retrying would therefore
+//    put a second transaction on the chain for one approval.
 function describeTxFailure(stage, err) {
-    if (
-        stage === TX_STAGE_NONCE ||
-        (stage === TX_STAGE_BROADCAST && isNonceCollision(err))
-    ) {
-        return {
-            error: NONCE_COLLISION_MESSAGE,
-            retryable: false,
-            spendApproval: true,
-            stage: TX_STAGE_NONCE,
-        };
-    }
     const error = errorText(err);
     const retryable =
         stage === TX_STAGE_SIGN ||
         (stage === TX_STAGE_VERIFY && failureIsRetryable(err));
-    return { error, retryable, spendApproval: !retryable, stage };
+    return { error, retryable, spendApproval: !retryable };
 }
 
 // What the popup shows and does after the background reports a failed signing
@@ -720,20 +523,14 @@ function describeTxFailure(stage, err) {
 //
 // A failed broadcast gets its own wording: the transaction may already be on
 // the network, so telling the user to start again from the site is exactly the
-// wrong instruction. A nonce collision is the exception to that exception —
-// the transaction demonstrably did not go out, and saying it might have would
-// send the user hunting for a transaction that does not exist.
+// wrong instruction.
 function describeSigningFailure(response, fallbackMessage) {
     let message = (response && response.error) || fallbackMessage;
     if (!/[.!?]$/.test(message)) message += ".";
     const retryable = !!(response && response.retryable);
     const stage = response && response.stage;
     if (!retryable) {
-        if (stage === TX_STAGE_NONCE) {
-            message +=
-                " The transaction did not reach the network." +
-                " Please send it again from the site.";
-        } else if (stage === TX_STAGE_BROADCAST) {
+        if (stage === TX_STAGE_BROADCAST) {
             message +=
                 " The transaction may still have reached the network." +
                 " Check the account before sending it again.";
@@ -756,23 +553,18 @@ module.exports = {
     assertNoForbiddenFields,
     assertNothingUnchecked,
     assertCanonicalBytes,
-    assertWithinCeilings,
     sameAddress,
     failureIsRetryable,
-    isNonceCollision,
     describeTxFailure,
     describeSigningFailure,
     ApprovalMismatchError,
-    NONCE_COLLISION_MESSAGE,
     ALLOWED_TX_TYPES,
     SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
     FORBIDDEN_FIELDS,
-    APPROVED_FIELDS,
     TX_STAGE_SIGN,
     TX_STAGE_VERIFY,
     TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,
     TX_STAGE_INFLIGHT,
-    TX_STAGE_NONCE,
     MAX_GAS_LIMIT,
     MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
 };

src/shared/balances.js

@@ -66,12 +66,7 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
 
         const balances = [];
         for (const item of items) {
-            // Case-insensitive: the token type is an explorer's label, not a
-            // protocol value, and an exact comparison silently drops a real
-            // holding if one ever writes "erc-20".  Which types are admitted
-            // is unchanged.
-            const type = String(item.token?.type || "").toUpperCase();
-            if (type !== "ERC-20") continue;
+            if (item.token?.type !== "ERC-20") continue;
             const decimals = parseInt(item.token.decimals || "18", 10);
             const bal = formatTokenBalance(item.value || "0", decimals);
             if (bal === "0.0") continue;

src/shared/symbolSpoof.js

@@ -8,23 +8,11 @@
 // either verdict alone, because the balance list is where the user forms
 // their belief about what they own (issue #235).
 //
-// KNOWN_SYMBOLS maps a symbol to the set of lowercased contract addresses
-// that may bear it, or to null.  Null means the symbol belongs to the native
-// asset, which has no contract at all, so no contract may bear it and every
-// one that does is a spoof.  "ETH" is the only such entry today; the rule is
+// KNOWN_SYMBOLS maps a symbol to the lowercased contract address that may
+// bear it, or to null.  Null means the symbol belongs to the native asset,
+// which has no contract at all, so no contract may bear it and every one
+// that does is a spoof.  "ETH" is the only such entry today; the rule is
 // written so that a second one needs no change here or at any call site.
-//
-// The value is a set because a ticker is not unique: seven symbols in the
-// bundled list belong to two real contracts each, and answering with one of
-// them hid the other one's holders' money (issue #276).  Membership, not
-// equality, is therefore the question — but it is the same question, asked of
-// a table that can now state the truth.  Every address in a set is one the
-// wallet ships as a real token; a contract outside the set is still a spoof.
-//
-// The symbol is attacker-controlled — it is whatever the ERC-20 contract
-// returns — so the lookup is done on a normalized form (issue #260): the
-// question is whether the symbol reaches the user's eye as a known one,
-// since that is what the user acts on.
 
 const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS } = require("./tokenList");
 
@@ -34,59 +22,6 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
     return (addr || "").toLowerCase();
 }
 
-// Fold a symbol onto what a user actually sees, and no further:
-//
-//   NFKC        collapses compatibility variants that render as the ASCII
-//               letters they imitate — fullwidth ETH, styled mathematical
-//               letters — and maps the non-ASCII spaces onto U+0020.
-//   strip       drops what paints nothing: \p{Cf} plus
-//               \p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point} plus U+007F.  That covers
-//               the format characters (zero-width space, joiner and
-//               non-joiner, word joiner, soft hyphen, byte-order mark, bidi
-//               marks and overrides), the variation selectors, the Hangul
-//               fillers, and DELETE.  Removed everywhere, not merely at the
-//               ends.
-//   trim        removes surrounding whitespace, which HTML collapses:
-//               `" ETH "` is painted next to the user's real ETH as `ETH`.
-//   toUpperCase makes the comparison case-insensitive, as before.
-//
-// The rule is "strip what paints nothing".  The Unicode classes are how
-// that is spelled, not what it means, which is why U+007F is named on its
-// own: it is a control rather than a default-ignorable character, so no
-// class here reaches it, yet it paints nothing all the same.  Measured in
-// the repo's pinned e2e Chromium (16px sans-serif, plain `ETH` = 32.00px,
-// so an invisible prefix leaves 32.00px):
-//
-//   U+007F, U+3164, U+115F, U+FE0F, U+FE00   32.00px — invisible
-//   U+FFA0                                   40.00px — a box
-//   U+1160                                   48.00px — a box
-//   U+0001, U+0085, U+0090                   48.00px — a box
-//
-// U+1160 and U+FFA0 are `Default_Ignorable_Code_Point` members that font
-// fallback nonetheless draws, and they are stripped anyway: erring toward
-// hiding a token that does not look like `ETH` is the harmless direction of
-// the two.  The other controls are left alone for the same reason read the
-// other way — a symbol carrying a visible box does not reach the eye as
-// `ETH`, so filtering it would hide a token the user could not have
-// confused with the native asset.
-//
-// Deliberately not folded, and asserted as open in tests/symbolSpoof.test.js:
-// interior whitespace (`E T H` renders as `E T H`, so folding it would filter
-// a token nobody could confuse with the native asset), confusables that are
-// distinct letters rather than compatibility variants (Cyrillic capital Ie,
-// U+0415; Greek capital Epsilon, U+0395), bidi reordering, which needs the
-// bidi algorithm rather than a character filter, and the visible controls.
-//
-// This decides only how the question is asked.  Nothing here changes what a
-// surface displays; a token still shows the symbol it reports.
-function normalizeSymbol(symbol) {
-    return String(symbol || "")
-        .normalize("NFKC")
-        .replace(/[\p{Cf}\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}\x7F]/gu, "")
-        .trim()
-        .toUpperCase();
-}
-
 // True when a token bearing `symbol` from contract `contractAddress` is
 // impersonating a known symbol.
 //
@@ -96,11 +31,11 @@ function normalizeSymbol(symbol) {
 function isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, contractAddress) {
     const contract = normalizeAddress(contractAddress);
     if (!contract) return false;
-    const sym = normalizeSymbol(symbol);
+    const sym = (symbol || "").toUpperCase();
     if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(sym)) return false;
     const legit = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(sym);
     if (legit === null) return true;
-    return !legit.has(contract);
+    return contract !== normalizeAddress(legit);
 }
 
 module.exports = {

src/shared/tokenList.js

@@ -3607,33 +3607,14 @@ for (const t of TOKENS) {
     TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.set(t.address.toLowerCase(), t);
 }
 
-// Build a map of symbol (uppercased) -> the set of contract addresses
-// (lowercased) that legitimately bear it.  Used for spoofed-symbol detection.
-// "ETH" maps to null: the native asset has no contract, so no contract may
-// bear its symbol.
-//
-// The value is a set and not a single address because tickers are not unique
-// and the list above proves it: seven of these 512 tokens share a symbol with
-// another entry — FRAX, REUSD, TON, EURE, MSUSD, MUSD and JPYC — at two
-// different real contracts each, all of them from the same source fetch.  A
-// one-address-per-symbol table can only answer that by picking a winner, and
-// the loser is then a token in our own bundled list that the spoof filter
-// hides from the balance list, the history and the send selector at its own
-// address, so the user cannot spend it (issue #276).  Naming every address
-// that bears the symbol is the only shape that says what is true; it does not
-// loosen the rule, because a contract outside the set is still a spoof.
+// Build a map of symbol (uppercased) -> legitimate contract address (lowercased).
+// Used for spoofed-symbol detection. "ETH" maps to null (native token).
 const KNOWN_SYMBOLS = new Map();
 KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set("ETH", null);
 for (const t of TOKENS) {
     const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
     if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(upper)) {
-        KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set(upper, new Set());
-    }
-    const addresses = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(upper);
-    // A null entry is the native asset and stays null: an ERC-20 that reports
-    // the native symbol does not thereby become entitled to it.
-    if (addresses !== null) {
-        addresses.add(t.address.toLowerCase());
+        KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set(upper, t.address.toLowerCase());
     }
 }
 

tests/approvalTx.test.js

@@ -1,309 +0,0 @@
-// Preparation of the transaction the approval screen displays.
-//
-// This is the half of the fix that makes the verification in
-// approvalVerify.test.js mean anything: the numbers the user reads have to be
-// produced before the screen is drawn and be the numbers that get signed. What
-// is asserted here is that the object leaving this module is complete (nothing
-// is left for the popup to fill in), that it survives the messaging boundary
-// (extension messaging is JSON, which has no bigint), and that nothing the
-// requesting page or the RPC node can say turns it into an approval that
-// should never have been raised.
-
-const { Network, Wallet } = require("ethers");
-const {
-    prepareApprovalTx,
-    serializeApprovedTx,
-    POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS,
-} = require("../src/shared/approvalTx");
-const {
-    SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
-    MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
-    MAX_GAS_LIMIT,
-} = require("../src/shared/approvalVerify");
-
-const SIGNER_KEY =
-    "0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
-const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
-const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
-
-// The ordinary dApp request: recipient, value, call data, and nothing else.
-const TX_PARAMS = {
-    from: signer.address,
-    to: RECIPIENT,
-    value: "0x2386f26fc10000",
-    data: "0xdeadbeef",
-};
-
-function providerWith(overrides) {
-    return {
-        getNetwork: async () => Network.from(1),
-        getTransactionCount: async () => 7,
-        estimateGas: async () => 21000n,
-        getFeeData: async () => ({
-            gasPrice: 2000000000n,
-            maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
-            maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
-        }),
-        ...(overrides || {}),
-    };
-}
-
-// A node that only quotes a flat gas price, so populateTransaction produces a
-// legacy transaction rather than an EIP-1559 one.
-const legacyProvider = providerWith({
-    getFeeData: async () => ({
-        gasPrice: 2000000000n,
-        maxFeePerGas: null,
-        maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
-    }),
-});
-
-describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
-    test("fills in everything the request left out", async () => {
-        const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
-            providerWith(),
-            signer.address,
-            TX_PARAMS,
-        );
-        expect(approved).toEqual({
-            type: 2,
-            from: signer.address,
-            chainId: "0x1",
-            nonce: "0x7",
-            gasLimit: "0x5208",
-            maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
-            maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
-            to: RECIPIENT,
-            value: TX_PARAMS.value,
-            data: TX_PARAMS.data,
-            accessList: [],
-        });
-    });
-
-    // The object is displayed, signed and verified against on the far side of
-    // chrome.runtime.sendMessage, which is JSON: a bigint would throw on the
-    // way out and a field that did not survive the trip would be a field the
-    // user was shown and nothing compared.
-    test("survives the messaging boundary unchanged", async () => {
-        const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
-            providerWith(),
-            signer.address,
-            TX_PARAMS,
-        );
-        expect(JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(approved))).toEqual(approved);
-        for (const value of Object.values(approved)) {
-            expect(typeof value).not.toBe("bigint");
-        }
-    });
-
-    test("carries exactly the fields its type serializes, and the signer", async () => {
-        const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
-            providerWith(),
-            signer.address,
-            TX_PARAMS,
-        );
-        expect(Object.keys(approved).sort()).toEqual(
-            ["type", "from", ...SERIALIZED_FIELDS[2]].sort(),
-        );
-    });
-
-    test("produces a legacy transaction when that is all the node quotes", async () => {
-        const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
-            legacyProvider,
-            signer.address,
-            TX_PARAMS,
-        );
-        expect(approved.type).toBe(0);
-        expect(approved.gasPrice).toBe("0x77359400");
-        expect(approved.maxFeePerGas).toBeUndefined();
-        expect(Object.keys(approved).sort()).toEqual(
-            ["type", "from", ...SERIALIZED_FIELDS[0]].sort(),
-        );
-    });
-
-    test("keeps a nonce, gas limit and fee the request did fix", async () => {
-        const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
-            providerWith(),
-            signer.address,
-            {
-                ...TX_PARAMS,
-                nonce: "0x2",
-                gasLimit: "0x30d40",
-                maxFeePerGas: "0x12a05f200",
-                maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
-            },
-        );
-        expect(approved.nonce).toBe("0x2");
-        expect(approved.gasLimit).toBe("0x30d40");
-        expect(approved.maxFeePerGas).toBe("0x12a05f200");
-    });
-
-    test("carries an access list the request asked for", async () => {
-        const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
-            providerWith(),
-            signer.address,
-            {
-                ...TX_PARAMS,
-                accessList: [{ address: RECIPIENT, storageKeys: [] }],
-            },
-        );
-        expect(approved.accessList).toEqual([
-            { address: RECIPIENT, storageKeys: [] },
-        ]);
-    });
-
-    // The request is page-controlled. Anything this wallet does not act on is
-    // dropped before ethers sees it, so a field a future ethers learns to
-    // carry cannot be picked up out of it without this module knowing.
-    test("drops request fields this wallet does not act on", async () => {
-        const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
-            providerWith(),
-            signer.address,
-            {
-                ...TX_PARAMS,
-                authorizationList: [{ address: RECIPIENT }],
-                blobVersionedHashes: ["0x01" + "ab".repeat(31)],
-                customData: { anything: true },
-            },
-        );
-        expect(approved.authorizationList).toBeUndefined();
-        expect(approved.blobVersionedHashes).toBeUndefined();
-        expect(approved.customData).toBeUndefined();
-        expect(approved.type).toBe(2);
-    });
-
-    test("refuses a transaction type this wallet does not sign", async () => {
-        await expect(
-            prepareApprovalTx(providerWith(), signer.address, {
-                ...TX_PARAMS,
-                type: 4,
-            }),
-        ).rejects.toThrow(/type this wallet does not sign/);
-    });
-
-    test("refuses to raise an approval with no active address", async () => {
-        await expect(
-            prepareApprovalTx(providerWith(), null, TX_PARAMS),
-        ).rejects.toThrow(/no active address/);
-    });
-
-    // The ceilings as a backstop: equality with the screen cannot bound what
-    // the node talks the wallet into putting on the screen, so it is refused
-    // before the user is shown anything.
-    test("refuses a fee the node quoted above the ceiling", async () => {
-        const gouging = providerWith({
-            getFeeData: async () => ({
-                gasPrice: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS + 1n,
-                maxFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS + 1n,
-                maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
-            }),
-        });
-        await expect(
-            prepareApprovalTx(gouging, signer.address, TX_PARAMS),
-        ).rejects.toThrow(/fee per gas far above any plausible value/);
-    });
-
-    test("refuses a gas limit the node estimated above the ceiling", async () => {
-        const absurd = providerWith({
-            estimateGas: async () => MAX_GAS_LIMIT + 1n,
-        });
-        await expect(
-            prepareApprovalTx(absurd, signer.address, TX_PARAMS),
-        ).rejects.toThrow(/gas limit no network this wallet supports/);
-    });
-
-    // No approval and no window: the failure goes back to the page the click
-    // came from, in a sentence.
-    test("reports a failed estimate as a full sentence", async () => {
-        const reverting = providerWith({
-            estimateGas: async () => {
-                throw new Error("execution reverted: ERC20: transfer amount");
-            },
-        });
-        let thrown;
-        try {
-            await prepareApprovalTx(reverting, signer.address, TX_PARAMS);
-        } catch (e) {
-            thrown = e;
-        }
-        expect(thrown.message).toMatch(
-            /^The transaction could not be prepared/,
-        );
-        expect(thrown.message).toMatch(/execution reverted/);
-        expect(thrown.message).toMatch(/^[A-Z].*\.$/);
-    });
-
-    // Without a bound, an unreachable node leaves the page's promise pending
-    // with nothing on screen to explain it.
-    test("gives up on a node that never answers", async () => {
-        jest.useFakeTimers();
-        try {
-            const hanging = providerWith({
-                estimateGas: () => new Promise(() => {}),
-            });
-            const pending = prepareApprovalTx(
-                hanging,
-                signer.address,
-                TX_PARAMS,
-            );
-            const settled = expect(pending).rejects.toThrow(
-                /did not answer in time/,
-            );
-            await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS + 1);
-            await settled;
-        } finally {
-            jest.useRealTimers();
-        }
-    });
-});
-
-describe("serializeApprovedTx", () => {
-    // Unreachable through prepareApprovalTx while the request type is checked
-    // first, which is what it is for: a node or an ethers upgrade that
-    // populates a type this wallet does not sign must not produce an approval.
-    test("refuses a populated transaction of a type this wallet does not sign", () => {
-        expect(() =>
-            serializeApprovedTx(
-                { type: 3, to: RECIPIENT, nonce: 7 },
-                signer.address,
-            ),
-        ).toThrow(/type this wallet does not sign/);
-    });
-
-    test("refuses a populated transaction missing a quantity", () => {
-        expect(() =>
-            serializeApprovedTx(
-                {
-                    type: 2,
-                    chainId: 1n,
-                    nonce: 7,
-                    gasLimit: 21000n,
-                    maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
-                    to: RECIPIENT,
-                    value: 0n,
-                    data: "0x",
-                },
-                signer.address,
-            ),
-        ).toThrow(/did not supply a maxPriorityFeePerGas/);
-    });
-
-    test("keeps a contract creation's absent recipient absent", () => {
-        const approved = serializeApprovedTx(
-            {
-                type: 0,
-                chainId: 1n,
-                nonce: 7,
-                gasPrice: 2000000000n,
-                gasLimit: 21000n,
-                to: null,
-                value: 0n,
-                data: "0x600160005500",
-            },
-            signer.address,
-        );
-        expect(approved.to).toBeNull();
-        expect(approved.value).toBe("0x0");
-        expect(approved.data).toBe("0x600160005500");
-    });
-});

tests/backgroundApproval.test.js

@@ -8,24 +8,16 @@
 // already saw — which means the entry being present is not by itself proof
 // that no attempt is running. A second response carrying the same id (a
 // reloaded approval window re-rendering a live Approve button, a popup that
-// emits the message twice) must not start a second verify and broadcast: the
-// same approved transaction signed twice verifies twice, and the transfer
-// would go out twice.
-//
-// It also covers what the approval is verified against. The approval now
-// carries the transaction the background populated and the screen displayed,
-// and the address that was active when it was raised — so a fee, a nonce or an
-// address that moved between approval and signing is refused rather than
-// signed.
+// emits the message twice) must not start a second verify and broadcast: with
+// the ordinary dApp approval shape the page fixes no nonce, so two artifacts
+// signed at different nonces both verify, and the approved transfer would go
+// out twice.
 
-const { Network, Wallet } = require("ethers");
+const { Wallet } = require("ethers");
 
 const SIGNER_KEY =
     "0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
-const OTHER_KEY =
-    "0x5de4111afa1a4b94908f83103eb1f1706367c2e68ca870fc3fb9a804cdab365a";
 const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
-const other = new Wallet(OTHER_KEY);
 const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
@@ -41,16 +33,9 @@ const TX_PARAMS = {
     data: "0x",
 };
 
-// The nonce the stubbed node reports, and so the nonce the background
-// populates the approval with.
-const NONCE = 7;
-
-// "Hello AutistMask" as the hex string a dApp passes to personal_sign.
-const MESSAGE = "0x48656c6c6f204175746973744d61736b";
-
-// The transaction the background populates and the approval screen displays.
-// The nonce is a parameter because the duplicate case turns on two artifacts
-// differing in a field the dApp fixed nothing for.
+// The fields the popup's populateTransaction() would fill in. The nonce is a
+// parameter because the duplicate case turns on the two artifacts differing
+// in exactly the field nothing constrains.
 function populated(nonce) {
     return {
         type: 2,
@@ -65,26 +50,8 @@ function populated(nonce) {
     };
 }
 
-function signedAtNonce(nonce, withWallet) {
-    return (withWallet || signer).signTransaction(populated(nonce));
-}
-
-// The node the background populates against. Its answers are the numbers the
-// approval screen shows, so they are also the numbers every artifact below is
-// signed at.
-function fakeProvider(broadcastTransaction, overrides) {
-    return {
-        broadcastTransaction,
-        getNetwork: async () => Network.from(1),
-        getTransactionCount: async () => NONCE,
-        estimateGas: async () => 100000n,
-        getFeeData: async () => ({
-            gasPrice: 2000000000n,
-            maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
-            maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
-        }),
-        ...(overrides || {}),
-    };
+function signedAtNonce(nonce) {
+    return signer.signTransaction(populated(nonce));
 }
 
 // A promise whose settlement the test controls, so a broadcast can be held in
@@ -118,7 +85,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
         currentNetwork: () => ({ chainId: "0x1" }),
     }));
     jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
-        getProvider: () => fakeProvider(broadcastTransaction, opts.provider),
+        getProvider: () => ({ broadcastTransaction }),
         refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
     }));
     jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
@@ -204,12 +171,8 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
 
     // Raise a pending transaction approval the way a dApp does, and dig the
     // approval id back out of the popup URL the background opened.
-    function requestTx(txParams) {
+    function requestTx() {
         let rpcResult = null;
-        // The window this request opens, if it opens one. A request refused
-        // before an approval is raised opens none, and the window belonging to
-        // some other request must not be handed back as this one's.
-        const windowIndex = created.length;
         const sendResponse = jest.fn((r) => {
             rpcResult = r;
         });
@@ -217,42 +180,13 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
             {
                 type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
                 method: "eth_sendTransaction",
-                params: [txParams || TX_PARAMS],
+                params: [TX_PARAMS],
             },
             { origin: ORIGIN },
             sendResponse,
         );
         return {
-            id: () =>
-                created.length > windowIndex
-                    ? new URL(created[windowIndex].url).searchParams.get(
-                          "approval",
-                      )
-                    : null,
-            result: () => rpcResult,
-        };
-    }
-
-    // The same for a message-signing approval, which pins the signing address
-    // at approval time in exactly the same way.
-    function requestSign(from) {
-        let rpcResult = null;
-        messageListener(
-            {
-                type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
-                method: "personal_sign",
-                params: [MESSAGE, from || signer.address],
-            },
-            { origin: ORIGIN },
-            (r) => {
-                rpcResult = r;
-            },
-        );
-        return {
-            id: () =>
-                new URL(created[created.length - 1].url).searchParams.get(
-                    "approval",
-                ),
+            id: () => new URL(created[0].url).searchParams.get("approval"),
             result: () => rpcResult,
         };
     }
@@ -266,27 +200,18 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
     return {
         send,
         requestTx,
-        requestSign,
         closeWindow,
         broadcastTransaction,
         loadState,
         created,
         removed,
-        // The user switching account in the toolbar popup, as the background
-        // sees it: the persisted active address changes underneath a pending
-        // approval.
-        setActiveAddress: (address) => {
-            persisted.activeAddress = address;
-        },
         fromPopup: { url: EXT_URL + "src/popup/index.html" },
     };
 }
 
-// Let the handler's promise chain run to the next suspension point. Raising a
-// transaction approval now populates it against the node first, which is
-// several awaits deep before the window is opened.
+// Let the handler's promise chain run to the next suspension point.
 async function settle() {
-    for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+    for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) await Promise.resolve();
 }
 
 afterEach(() => {
@@ -319,11 +244,9 @@ describe("one approval, one broadcast", () => {
         await settle();
         expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
 
-        // A reloaded approval window signs the same approval again, at another
-        // nonce. The claim is taken before anything is verified, so what this
-        // asserts is the interlock and not the nonce comparison: the refusal
-        // below is the claim's own message, which a verification failure does
-        // not produce.
+        // A reloaded approval window signs the same approval again. Nothing
+        // in the approval fixes a nonce, so this artifact verifies just as
+        // well as the first one.
         const second = bg.send(
             {
                 type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
@@ -453,489 +376,6 @@ describe("one approval, one broadcast", () => {
     });
 });
 
-// Populating the transaction before the approval window opens is what makes
-// the displayed object the verified object. It also fixes the nonce before the
-// user has answered anything: two requests populated concurrently take the
-// same nonce from a node that has seen neither of them broadcast, and the
-// second can then never be sent, because the only way to give it a fresh nonce
-// is to populate it again after the user has read the old one off the screen.
-// So the second request is refused while the first is unanswered.
-describe("one transaction approval at a time", () => {
-    test("a second eth_sendTransaction while one is pending is refused before it takes a nonce", async () => {
-        const getTransactionCount = jest.fn(async () => NONCE);
-        const bg = loadBackground({ provider: { getTransactionCount } });
-
-        const first = bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-        expect(first.id()).toBeTruthy();
-        expect(getTransactionCount).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-
-        const second = bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-
-        expect(second.result()).toEqual({
-            error: {
-                code: -32002,
-                message: expect.stringMatching(
-                    /already waiting to be approved/,
-                ),
-            },
-        });
-        // Where the refusal happened matters as much as that it happened: no
-        // second window, and the node was never asked for a second nonce.
-        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
-        expect(getTransactionCount).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-
-        // The refusal leaves the pending approval untouched, and it still
-        // sends.
-        bg.broadcastTransaction.mockResolvedValue({ hash: "0xfeed" });
-        bg.send(
-            {
-                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
-                id: first.id(),
-                approved: true,
-                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
-            },
-            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
-        );
-        await settle();
-        expect(first.result()).toEqual({ result: "0xfeed" });
-    });
-
-    test("an answered approval frees the next request", async () => {
-        const bg = loadBackground();
-        const first = bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-
-        // The user closes the approval window, which rejects it.
-        bg.closeWindow(1);
-        await settle();
-        expect(first.result()).toEqual({
-            error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
-        });
-
-        const second = bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-        expect(second.id()).toBeTruthy();
-        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
-    });
-
-    test("a signature request is not held up by a pending transaction", async () => {
-        const bg = loadBackground();
-        bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-
-        // A signature consumes no nonce, so it has nothing to collide with.
-        const signing = bg.requestSign();
-        await settle();
-        expect(signing.id()).toBeTruthy();
-        expect(signing.result()).toBeNull();
-        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
-    });
-});
-
-// A nonce collision found before the transaction reaches the network is the
-// one send failure the wallet can speak about with certainty. The user is told
-// it did not go out and to send it again, rather than being warned it might
-// already be on the chain — which would send them looking for a transaction
-// that does not exist, and stop them retrying the one that never went.
-describe("a nonce collision is reported as a transaction that did not go out", () => {
-    test("a broadcast the node refused for the nonce is not reported as possibly sent", async () => {
-        const bg = loadBackground();
-        const pending = bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-
-        bg.broadcastTransaction.mockRejectedValue(
-            Object.assign(new Error("nonce too low"), {
-                code: "NONCE_EXPIRED",
-            }),
-        );
-        const answer = bg.send(
-            {
-                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
-                id: pending.id(),
-                approved: true,
-                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
-            },
-            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
-        );
-        await settle();
-
-        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
-            error: expect.stringMatching(/nonce had already been used/),
-            retryable: false,
-            stage: "nonce",
-        });
-        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
-            error: {
-                message: expect.stringMatching(
-                    /transaction was not sent, because its nonce/,
-                ),
-            },
-        });
-    });
-
-    test("a nonce this wallet already broadcast is refused without asking the node again", async () => {
-        const bg = loadBackground();
-        const first = bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-
-        bg.broadcastTransaction.mockResolvedValue({ hash: "0xfeed" });
-        bg.send(
-            {
-                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
-                id: first.id(),
-                approved: true,
-                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
-            },
-            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
-        );
-        await settle();
-        expect(first.result()).toEqual({ result: "0xfeed" });
-
-        // The stubbed node still reports NONCE as the next nonce — a pending
-        // count that lags a broadcast the node has already taken — so this
-        // second approval is populated at a nonce this worker has spent.
-        const second = bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-        const answer = bg.send(
-            {
-                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
-                id: second.id(),
-                approved: true,
-                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
-            },
-            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
-        );
-        await settle();
-
-        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
-            error: expect.stringMatching(/nonce had already been used/),
-            retryable: false,
-            stage: "nonce",
-        });
-        expect(second.result()).toEqual({
-            error: {
-                message: expect.stringMatching(/nonce had already been used/),
-            },
-        });
-    });
-});
-
-// The approval carries the transaction the user was shown and the address it
-// was raised for, and the artifact is checked against both. Every case here is
-// one the old comparison — against the dApp's request, for the address that is
-// active now — would have broadcast.
-describe("what the approval is verified against", () => {
-    // The approval screen showed the populated fee. An artifact at ten times
-    // that fee, still far below the ceilings, is what the ceilings alone could
-    // not catch.
-    test("a fee differing from the displayed one is refused, not sent", async () => {
-        const bg = loadBackground();
-        const pending = bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-        const id = pending.id();
-
-        const raw = await signer.signTransaction({
-            ...populated(NONCE),
-            maxFeePerGas: 20000000000n,
-        });
-        const answer = bg.send(
-            {
-                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
-                id,
-                approved: true,
-                rawSignedTx: raw,
-            },
-            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
-        );
-        await settle();
-
-        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-            expect.objectContaining({
-                error: expect.stringMatching(/approved maximum fee per gas/),
-                retryable: false,
-                stage: "verify",
-            }),
-        );
-        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
-            error: {
-                message: expect.stringMatching(/approved maximum fee per gas/),
-            },
-        });
-    });
-
-    test("a nonce differing from the displayed one is refused, not sent", async () => {
-        const bg = loadBackground();
-        const pending = bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-        const id = pending.id();
-
-        const answer = bg.send(
-            {
-                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
-                id,
-                approved: true,
-                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE + 1),
-            },
-            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
-        );
-        await settle();
-
-        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-            expect.objectContaining({
-                error: expect.stringMatching(/approved nonce/),
-                retryable: false,
-                stage: "verify",
-            }),
-        );
-    });
-
-    // The address switch. The approval named one account; the wallet is on
-    // another by the time the artifact arrives. Both halves are covered: the
-    // popup signing as the account that is active now, and the popup correctly
-    // signing as the approved account while the wallet has moved on.
-    test("an artifact signed by the address that is active now is refused", async () => {
-        const bg = loadBackground();
-        const pending = bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-        const id = pending.id();
-
-        bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
-        const answer = bg.send(
-            {
-                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
-                id,
-                approved: true,
-                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE, other),
-            },
-            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
-        );
-        await settle();
-
-        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-            expect.objectContaining({ retryable: false, stage: "verify" }),
-        );
-        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
-            error: { message: expect.stringMatching(/active address changed/) },
-        });
-    });
-
-    test("an address switch refuses even the correctly signed artifact", async () => {
-        const bg = loadBackground();
-        const pending = bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-        const id = pending.id();
-
-        bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
-        const answer = bg.send(
-            {
-                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
-                id,
-                approved: true,
-                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
-            },
-            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
-        );
-        await settle();
-
-        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-            expect.objectContaining({
-                error: expect.stringMatching(/active address changed/),
-                retryable: false,
-                stage: "verify",
-            }),
-        );
-        // A refusal, so the approval is spent: the same artifact offered again
-        // finds nothing to answer.
-        const retry = bg.send(
-            {
-                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
-                id,
-                approved: true,
-                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
-            },
-            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
-        );
-        await settle();
-        expect(retry.sendResponse).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    });
-
-    test("a switch back to the approved address still sends", async () => {
-        const bg = loadBackground();
-        const pending = bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-        const id = pending.id();
-
-        bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
-        bg.setActiveAddress(signer.address);
-        bg.broadcastTransaction.mockResolvedValue({ hash: "0xfeed" });
-        bg.send(
-            {
-                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
-                id,
-                approved: true,
-                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
-            },
-            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
-        );
-        await settle();
-
-        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: "0xfeed" });
-    });
-
-    // The popup is handed the populated transaction and the address it is for,
-    // and nothing else it would have to fetch or decide.
-    test("the popup is given the transaction it is to sign", async () => {
-        const bg = loadBackground();
-        const pending = bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-
-        const details = bg.send(
-            { type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id: pending.id() },
-            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
-        );
-        const shown = details.sendResponse.mock.calls[0][0];
-        expect(shown.type).toBe("tx");
-        expect(shown.approvedFrom).toBe(signer.address);
-        expect(shown.approvedTx).toEqual({
-            type: 2,
-            from: signer.address,
-            chainId: "0x1",
-            nonce: "0x7",
-            gasLimit: "0x186a0",
-            maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
-            maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
-            to: RECIPIENT,
-            value: TX_PARAMS.value,
-            data: "0x",
-            accessList: [],
-        });
-    });
-
-    // A request naming an account the wallet is not on is refused outright
-    // rather than signed as whichever account is active.
-    test("a request from another address raises no approval at all", async () => {
-        const bg = loadBackground();
-        const pending = bg.requestTx({ ...TX_PARAMS, from: other.address });
-        await settle();
-
-        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
-            error: {
-                code: 4100,
-                message: expect.stringMatching(/not the active one/),
-            },
-        });
-        expect(bg.created).toEqual([]);
-    });
-
-    // Message signing pins the address the same way, and refuses the same way.
-    // A signature is not a transaction, but a permit signed by an account the
-    // approval did not name spends that account's tokens all the same.
-    test("a sign approval refuses a signature after an address switch", async () => {
-        const bg = loadBackground();
-        const pending = bg.requestSign();
-        await settle();
-
-        bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
-        const answer = bg.send(
-            {
-                type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
-                id: pending.id(),
-                approved: true,
-                signature: await signer.signMessage(
-                    Buffer.from(MESSAGE.slice(2), "hex"),
-                ),
-            },
-            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
-        );
-        await settle();
-
-        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-            expect.objectContaining({
-                error: expect.stringMatching(/active address changed/),
-                retryable: false,
-            }),
-        );
-        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
-            error: { message: expect.stringMatching(/active address changed/) },
-        });
-    });
-
-    test("a sign request from another address raises no approval at all", async () => {
-        const bg = loadBackground();
-        const pending = bg.requestSign(other.address);
-        await settle();
-
-        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
-            error: {
-                code: 4100,
-                message: expect.stringMatching(/not the active one/),
-            },
-        });
-        expect(bg.created).toEqual([]);
-    });
-
-    // Population is a network round trip with the user's hands free. An
-    // approval raised for the address that was active when it started could
-    // never be signed once the wallet has moved off it, so it is never raised.
-    test("an address switch during population raises no approval", async () => {
-        let bg;
-        bg = loadBackground({
-            provider: {
-                // The user switches account in the toolbar popup while the
-                // node is being asked for a gas estimate.
-                estimateGas: async () => {
-                    bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
-                    return 100000n;
-                },
-            },
-        });
-        const pending = bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-
-        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
-            error: {
-                message: expect.stringMatching(
-                    /active address changed while this transaction was being prepared/,
-                ),
-            },
-        });
-        expect(bg.created).toEqual([]);
-    });
-
-    // Population happens before the window exists, so its failure is a failure
-    // of the request: no approval, no window, and the error goes back to the
-    // page the click came from.
-    test("a transaction that cannot be prepared opens no window", async () => {
-        const bg = loadBackground({
-            provider: {
-                estimateGas: async () => {
-                    throw new Error("execution reverted");
-                },
-            },
-        });
-        const pending = bg.requestTx();
-        await settle();
-
-        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
-            error: {
-                message: expect.stringMatching(
-                    /could not be prepared.*execution reverted/,
-                ),
-            },
-        });
-        expect(bg.created).toEqual([]);
-    });
-});
-
 // The interlock must not cost the retry the approval exists to allow.
 describe("the interlock releases a failed attempt", () => {
     test("a retryable failure before the broadcast leaves the approval usable", async () => {

tests/e2e/network.js

@@ -23,8 +23,6 @@
 
 "use strict";
 
-const { Transaction } = require("ethers");
-
 // Fictional ERC-20 used to seed the transaction-detail test. The symbol
 // must not collide with any entry in src/shared/tokenList.js, or
 // isSpoofedSymbol() in src/shared/transactions.js drops the transfer as a
@@ -64,87 +62,6 @@ function word(value) {
     return "0x" + BigInt(value).toString(16).padStart(64, "0");
 }
 
-// -------------------------------------------------------- dApp fixture
-//
-// The origin the EIP-1193 test page is served from, and the page itself.
-//
-// It is a fixture like every other one in this file: the route handler
-// fulfils the navigation from the string below, so the page never comes
-// from a remote origin and nothing about the dApp round trips leaves the
-// container. `.test` is reserved by RFC 6761 and has no owner to reach in
-// the first place; the launch arguments map every host to NOTFOUND anyway.
-//
-// What the page deliberately does NOT do is load a provider. window.ethereum
-// is put there by the shipped manifest's MAIN-world content script, exactly
-// as it is on any http(s) page a user visits, so what these tests speak to
-// is the real inpage provider and not a copy the harness wired up.
-const DAPP_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.e2e.test";
-const DAPP_URL = DAPP_ORIGIN + "/";
-
-// Requests are parked rather than awaited. An approval prompt only exists
-// while its call is in flight, so a test that awaited the promise could
-// never drive the popup that has to settle it; start() files the promise
-// under a key and settle() collects it once the prompt has been dealt with.
-//
-// The rejection branch records the whole observable shape of the error as it
-// arrives — name, message, and whether a `code` is present at all as distinct
-// from its value. EIP-1193 says a user rejection is a ProviderRpcError
-// carrying code 4001; what the page can actually see is recorded here rather
-// than assumed, and asserted in run.js.
-//
-// The message log is the page's half of the boundary observation: every
-// AUTISTMASK_* message that crosses between this page and the content
-// script, in both directions, verbatim.
-const DAPP_HTML = [
-    "<!doctype html>",
-    '<html lang="en">',
-    "<head>",
-    '<meta charset="utf-8">',
-    "<title>AutistMask e2e dApp</title>",
-    // Inline and empty: without it Chromium asks for /favicon.ico, which
-    // the unstubbed-request guard would report as escaping traffic.
-    '<link rel="icon" href="data:,">',
-    "</head>",
-    "<body>",
-    "<h1>AutistMask e2e dApp</h1>",
-    "<script>",
-    "window.__dapp = {",
-    "    messages: [],",
-    "    calls: {},",
-    "    start: function (key, method, params) {",
-    "        window.__dapp.calls[key] = window.ethereum",
-    "            .request({ method: method, params: params })",
-    "            .then(",
-    "                function (result) {",
-    "                    return { settled: 'resolved', result: result };",
-    "                },",
-    "                function (error) {",
-    "                    return {",
-    "                        settled: 'rejected',",
-    "                        message: String((error && error.message) || error),",
-    "                        name: error ? error.name : undefined,",
-    "                        hasCode: !!error && 'code' in Object(error),",
-    "                        code: error ? error.code : undefined,",
-    "                    };",
-    "                },",
-    "            );",
-    "    },",
-    "    settle: function (key) {",
-    "        return window.__dapp.calls[key];",
-    "    },",
-    "};",
-    "window.addEventListener('message', function (event) {",
-    "    if (event.source !== window) return;",
-    "    var d = event.data;",
-    "    if (!d || typeof d.type !== 'string') return;",
-    "    if (d.type.indexOf('AUTISTMASK') !== 0) return;",
-    "    window.__dapp.messages.push(d);",
-    "});",
-    "</script>",
-    "</body>",
-    "</html>",
-].join("\n");
-
 // ------------------------------------------------------------ fee fixture
 //
 // The confirmation screen carries two different numbers for the same
@@ -184,11 +101,6 @@ const RPC_RESULTS = {
     eth_estimateGas: hex(GAS_LIMIT),
     eth_getTransactionCount: "0x0",
     eth_maxPriorityFeePerGas: hex(PRIORITY_FEE_WEI),
-    // "not mined yet", which is what a node answers for a transaction it has
-    // only just accepted. The wait screen the dApp transaction approval hands
-    // off to polls this every 10 seconds; leaving it unstubbed would report
-    // the poll as escaping traffic the moment a test outlived one tick.
-    eth_getTransactionReceipt: null,
 };
 
 // The "latest" block, which ethers' getFeeData() reads baseFeePerGas from
@@ -352,31 +264,6 @@ function rpcReply(req, opts, report) {
     if (req.method === "eth_getBlockByNumber") {
         return Object.assign(envelope, { result: latestBlock() });
     }
-    // The end of the dApp transaction round trip: the raw signed transaction
-    // the background hands to the node. It is recorded verbatim so a test can
-    // recover the signer from the exact bytes that were broadcast, rather than
-    // from anything the extension reported about them.
-    //
-    // The reply must be the transaction's real hash. ethers compares the hash
-    // the node returns against the one it computes itself and throws on a
-    // mismatch, so a constant here would fail the broadcast for a reason that
-    // has nothing to do with what is being tested.
-    if (req.method === "eth_sendRawTransaction") {
-        const raw = Array.isArray(req.params) ? req.params[0] : null;
-        let parsed;
-        try {
-            parsed = Transaction.from(raw);
-        } catch {
-            report("eth_sendRawTransaction with an undecodable transaction");
-            return Object.assign(envelope, {
-                error: { code: -32000, message: "undecodable transaction" },
-            });
-        }
-        if (Array.isArray(opts.broadcastTransactions)) {
-            opts.broadcastTransactions.push(raw);
-        }
-        return Object.assign(envelope, { result: parsed.hash });
-    }
     if (req.method === "eth_estimateGas" && opts.failGasEstimate) {
         // A refusal the node itself would produce, not a transport error:
         // this is the shape the confirmation screen has to turn into
@@ -488,8 +375,6 @@ function traceEnabled(raw) {
  *   node-side refusal.
  * @param {boolean} [opts.holdGasEstimate]  hold every batch containing an
  *   eth_estimateGas until this is cleared again.
- * @param {string[]} [opts.broadcastTransactions]  every raw signed
- *   transaction handed to eth_sendRawTransaction, appended in order.
  * @returns {Promise<{waitForServiceWorkerTraffic: (ms: number) =>
  *   Promise<string|null>}>}
  */
@@ -535,18 +420,6 @@ async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
             return handleRpc(route, req.postData(), opts, report);
         }
 
-        // The local EIP-1193 test page. Served from here so the dApp round
-        // trips run against a real http(s) origin — which is what makes the
-        // shipped content scripts inject at all — without any remote origin
-        // being involved.
-        if (url.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN && p === "/") {
-            return route.fulfill({
-                status: 200,
-                contentType: "text/html; charset=utf-8",
-                body: DAPP_HTML,
-            });
-        }
-
         // Blockscout v2
         if (p.includes("/api/v2/")) {
             if (/\/addresses\/0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\/transactions$/.test(p)) {
@@ -635,8 +508,6 @@ async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
 
 module.exports = {
     installNetworkStubs,
-    DAPP_ORIGIN,
-    DAPP_URL,
     FEE_ESTIMATE_WEI,
     FEE_RESERVE_WEI,
     STUB_COUNTERPARTY,

tests/inpageErrors.test.js

@@ -1,310 +0,0 @@
-// The EIP-1193 error the page actually catches (src/content/inpage.js).
-//
-// The bug this pins down (issue #274): the provider rebuilt every failure as
-// `new Error(error.message)`, so the `code` the background produced and the
-// content script relayed intact was thrown away in the last hop. A dApp
-// checking `err.code === 4001` — the standard way to tell "the user said no"
-// from "the wallet broke" — saw undefined, and well-behaved sites showed an
-// error or retried instead of accepting the refusal.
-//
-// inpage.js is a bare IIFE injected into the page's JS context, not a module:
-// it takes no import and exports nothing, and reaches for `window` at load.
-// So it is evaluated here the way the browser evaluates it, against a stub
-// window, and the provider is collected from `window.ethereum`. The globals it
-// touches are passed in as function parameters rather than assigned to
-// globalThis: nothing leaks between tests, and the source is compiled in this
-// realm, so the errors it constructs are comparable against this file's own
-// `Error` — which a second realm's intrinsics would silently defeat.
-//
-// There is no jsdom in this repo; see tests/txStatus.test.js.
-
-const fs = require("fs");
-const path = require("path");
-const { webcrypto } = require("crypto");
-
-const SOURCE = fs.readFileSync(
-    path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "content", "inpage.js"),
-    "utf8",
-);
-
-const loadInto = new Function(
-    "window",
-    "self",
-    "crypto",
-    "Event",
-    "CustomEvent",
-    SOURCE,
-);
-
-class StubEvent {
-    constructor(type) {
-        this.type = type;
-    }
-}
-
-class StubCustomEvent extends StubEvent {
-    constructor(type, init) {
-        super(type);
-        this.detail = init && init.detail;
-    }
-}
-
-// Every code the background emits on the RPC path today, read out of
-// src/background/index.js. The provider must not know this list — it passes
-// through whatever arrived — but the cases below are the real ones.
-const REJECTED = 4001; // user rejected the request
-const UNAUTHORIZED = 4100; // site not connected / wrong address
-const UNRECOGNIZED_CHAIN = 4902; // switch/add to an unsupported chain
-
-// A stub window with the four things inpage.js touches: message listeners,
-// postMessage out to the content script, window.ethereum, and dispatchEvent
-// for the EIP-6963 announcement.
-function loadProvider() {
-    const messageListeners = [];
-    const posted = [];
-
-    const win = {
-        addEventListener(type, fn) {
-            if (type === "message") messageListeners.push(fn);
-        },
-        removeEventListener(type, fn) {
-            const i = messageListeners.indexOf(fn);
-            if (type === "message" && i !== -1) messageListeners.splice(i, 1);
-        },
-        postMessage(data) {
-            posted.push(data);
-        },
-        dispatchEvent() {
-            return true;
-        },
-    };
-    win.window = win;
-
-    loadInto(win, win, webcrypto, StubEvent, StubCustomEvent);
-
-    // Deliver the content script's answer to an outstanding request. The id is
-    // read back off the wire rather than assumed: inpage.js issues its own
-    // eth_chainId at load, so the first id a test sees is not 1.
-    function respond(response) {
-        const request = posted
-            .filter((m) => m.type === "AUTISTMASK_REQUEST")
-            .pop();
-        expect(request).toBeDefined();
-        const event = {
-            source: win,
-            data: { type: "AUTISTMASK_RESPONSE", id: request.id, ...response },
-        };
-        for (const fn of messageListeners.slice()) fn(event);
-    }
-
-    return { provider: win.ethereum, posted, respond };
-}
-
-// Start a request, answer it with `response`, and hand back the rejection.
-// Fails the test if the call resolves instead.
-async function rejectionFrom(start, response) {
-    const { provider, respond } = loadProvider();
-    const settled = start(provider).then(
-        (result) => ({ resolved: result }),
-        (error) => ({ error }),
-    );
-    // The provider posts synchronously, so the request is already on the wire.
-    respond(response);
-    const outcome = await settled;
-    expect(outcome).not.toHaveProperty("resolved");
-    return outcome.error;
-}
-
-describe("an EIP-1193 code reaches the page", () => {
-    test("a user rejection arrives as code 4001", async () => {
-        const err = await rejectionFrom(
-            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
-            {
-                error: {
-                    code: REJECTED,
-                    message: "User rejected the request.",
-                },
-            },
-        );
-        expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
-        expect(err.message).toBe("User rejected the request.");
-    });
-
-    test("it is a ProviderRpcError, and an Error", async () => {
-        const err = await rejectionFrom(
-            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
-            {
-                error: {
-                    code: REJECTED,
-                    message: "User rejected the request.",
-                },
-            },
-        );
-        expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
-        expect(err.name).toBe("ProviderRpcError");
-    });
-
-    test("4100 unauthorized arrives intact", async () => {
-        const err = await rejectionFrom(
-            (p) => p.request({ method: "personal_sign", params: ["0x00"] }),
-            { error: { code: UNAUTHORIZED, message: "Unauthorized" } },
-        );
-        expect(err.code).toBe(UNAUTHORIZED);
-        expect(err.message).toBe("Unauthorized");
-    });
-
-    test("4902 unrecognized chain arrives intact", async () => {
-        const message =
-            "AutistMask supports Ethereum Mainnet and Sepolia Testnet only.";
-        const err = await rejectionFrom(
-            (p) => p.request({ method: "wallet_switchEthereumChain" }),
-            { error: { code: UNRECOGNIZED_CHAIN, message } },
-        );
-        expect(err.code).toBe(UNRECOGNIZED_CHAIN);
-        expect(err.message).toBe(message);
-    });
-
-    // The provider is not allowed to know the list above: a code added to the
-    // background later must reach the page without this file being edited.
-    test("a code the provider has never heard of is passed through", async () => {
-        const err = await rejectionFrom(
-            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_accounts" }),
-            { error: { code: 4900, message: "Disconnected" } },
-        );
-        expect(err.code).toBe(4900);
-    });
-
-    test("data is carried when the boundary sent it", async () => {
-        const err = await rejectionFrom(
-            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_call" }),
-            {
-                error: {
-                    code: -32000,
-                    message: "execution reverted",
-                    data: "0x08c379a0",
-                },
-            },
-        );
-        expect(err.code).toBe(-32000);
-        expect(err.data).toBe("0x08c379a0");
-    });
-
-    test("no data property is invented when the boundary sent none", async () => {
-        const err = await rejectionFrom(
-            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
-            {
-                error: {
-                    code: REJECTED,
-                    message: "User rejected the request.",
-                },
-            },
-        );
-        expect("data" in err).toBe(false);
-    });
-});
-
-describe("the message is untouched", () => {
-    test("a coded error keeps the message byte for byte", async () => {
-        const message =
-            "This site asked to sign as an address that is not " +
-            "the active one.";
-        const err = await rejectionFrom(
-            (p) => p.request({ method: "personal_sign" }),
-            { error: { code: UNAUTHORIZED, message } },
-        );
-        expect(err.message).toBe(message);
-    });
-
-    test("an error the background sent with no code keeps its message", async () => {
-        const err = await rejectionFrom(
-            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_sendTransaction" }),
-            { error: { message: "No accounts available" } },
-        );
-        expect(err.message).toBe("No accounts available");
-    });
-
-    // A ProviderRpcError whose code is undefined would claim a conformance it
-    // does not have, and `'code' in err` is exactly what a careful dApp asks.
-    test("an error with no code gets no code property at all", async () => {
-        const err = await rejectionFrom(
-            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_sendTransaction" }),
-            { error: { message: "No accounts available" } },
-        );
-        expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
-        expect("code" in err).toBe(false);
-    });
-
-    test("an error with no message keeps the generic fallback", async () => {
-        const err = await rejectionFrom(
-            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_sendTransaction" }),
-            { error: { code: REJECTED } },
-        );
-        expect(err.message).toBe("Request failed");
-        expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
-    });
-});
-
-// Every entry point the provider exposes, not just eth_requestAccounts. They
-// all funnel through the same response listener, and this is what says so.
-describe("every request path carries the code", () => {
-    const rejection = {
-        error: { code: REJECTED, message: "User rejected the request." },
-    };
-
-    test("request()", async () => {
-        const err = await rejectionFrom(
-            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
-            rejection,
-        );
-        expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
-    });
-
-    test("enable()", async () => {
-        const err = await rejectionFrom((p) => p.enable(), rejection);
-        expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
-    });
-
-    test("send(method, params)", async () => {
-        const err = await rejectionFrom(
-            (p) => p.send("eth_requestAccounts", []),
-            rejection,
-        );
-        expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
-    });
-
-    test("send({ method, params })", async () => {
-        const err = await rejectionFrom(
-            (p) => p.send({ method: "personal_sign", params: ["0x00"] }),
-            rejection,
-        );
-        expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
-    });
-
-    test("sendAsync() hands the code to its callback", async () => {
-        const { provider, respond } = loadProvider();
-        const called = new Promise((resolve) => {
-            provider.sendAsync({ id: 1, method: "eth_requestAccounts" }, (e) =>
-                resolve(e),
-            );
-        });
-        respond(rejection);
-        const err = await called;
-        expect(err.name).toBe("ProviderRpcError");
-        expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
-        expect(err.message).toBe("User rejected the request.");
-    });
-});
-
-describe("the success path is unchanged", () => {
-    test("a result still resolves", async () => {
-        const { provider, respond } = loadProvider();
-        const settled = provider.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" });
-        respond({ result: ["0xb61264DEFB0c4B8afb3D73724be15310036743a5"] });
-        await expect(settled).resolves.toEqual([
-            "0xb61264DEFB0c4B8afb3D73724be15310036743a5",
-        ]);
-        expect(provider.selectedAddress).toBe(
-            "0xb61264DEFB0c4B8afb3D73724be15310036743a5",
-        );
-    });
-});

tests/symbolSpoof.test.js

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ global.chrome = {
 };
 
 const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("../src/shared/symbolSpoof");
-const { TOKENS, KNOWN_SYMBOLS } = require("../src/shared/tokenList");
+const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS } = require("../src/shared/tokenList");
 const { filterTransactions } = require("../src/shared/transactions");
 const {
     fetchTokenBalances,
@@ -124,301 +124,6 @@ describe("the shared rule", () => {
     });
 });
 
-// Issue #260: the symbol is whatever the ERC-20 contract returns, and HTML
-// collapses leading and trailing whitespace, so a token calling itself
-// `" ETH "` reaches the user's eye as `ETH` while missing a raw
-// KNOWN_SYMBOLS lookup.  Normalizing inside the shared rule fixes all three
-// surfaces at once, which is what consolidating the rule bought.
-//
-// Every character under test here is built from its code point rather than
-// pasted in: most of them are invisible, and an invisible character in a
-// test file is unreviewable.
-const cp = (...codes) => String.fromCodePoint(...codes);
-const NBSP = cp(0x00a0); // no-break space
-const FIGURE_SPACE = cp(0x2007);
-const IDEOGRAPHIC_SPACE = cp(0x3000);
-const ZWSP = cp(0x200b); // zero-width space
-const BOM = cp(0xfeff); // zero-width no-break space
-const WORD_JOINER = cp(0x2060);
-const SOFT_HYPHEN = cp(0x00ad);
-const LRM = cp(0x200e); // left-to-right mark
-const RLO = cp(0x202e); // right-to-left override
-const HANGUL_FILLER = cp(0x3164);
-const CHOSEONG_FILLER = cp(0x115f);
-const VS16 = cp(0xfe0f); // variation selector-16
-const VS1 = cp(0xfe00); // variation selector-1
-const NEL = cp(0x0085); // next line, a C1 control
-const DEL = cp(0x007f);
-const FULLWIDTH_ETH = cp(0xff25, 0xff34, 0xff28);
-const FULLWIDTH_USDC = cp(0xff55, 0xff53, 0xff44, 0xff43); // lowercase
-const CYRILLIC_CAPITAL_IE = cp(0x0415);
-
-describe("the shared rule: symbols that render as a known symbol", () => {
-    test("ASCII padding does not buy a pass", () => {
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(" ETH ", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("\tETH\n", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("  usdc  ", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
-    });
-
-    test("non-breaking and other Unicode spaces do not either", () => {
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(NBSP + "ETH" + NBSP, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(
-            true,
-        );
-        expect(
-            isSpoofedSymbol(
-                FIGURE_SPACE + "ETH" + IDEOGRAPHIC_SPACE,
-                FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT,
-            ),
-        ).toBe(true);
-    });
-
-    // These render as nothing at all, in any position, so they are removed
-    // wherever they sit rather than only at the ends.
-    test("zero-width characters are stripped wherever they sit", () => {
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("E" + ZWSP + "TH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(
-            true,
-        );
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(BOM + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
-        expect(
-            isSpoofedSymbol("ET" + WORD_JOINER + "H", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT),
-        ).toBe(true);
-        expect(
-            isSpoofedSymbol("E" + SOFT_HYPHEN + "TH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT),
-        ).toBe(true);
-    });
-
-    // An LRM is invisible and, in all-Latin text, moves nothing: dropping it
-    // leaves exactly the string the user saw.
-    test("an invisible bidi mark does not hide a known symbol", () => {
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(LRM + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
-    });
-
-    // Invisibility is not confined to \p{Cf}.  A Hangul filler is Lo and a
-    // variation selector is Mn, yet each of these four measures 32.00px in
-    // the repo's pinned e2e Chromium at 16px sans-serif — exactly the width
-    // of a plain `ETH` — so each reaches the user's eye as `ETH`.  They are
-    // caught by \p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}, not by \p{Cf}.
-    test("invisible non-format characters are stripped too", () => {
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(HANGUL_FILLER + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(
-            true,
-        );
-        expect(
-            isSpoofedSymbol(CHOSEONG_FILLER + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT),
-        ).toBe(true);
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("ETH" + VS16, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("E" + VS1 + "TH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
-    });
-
-    // Nor is it confined to the Unicode classes.  U+007F is a control (Cc)
-    // and is not default-ignorable, so neither class reaches it, but it
-    // measures 32.00px in the same browser — it paints nothing, so a
-    // symbol carrying it reaches the eye as `ETH`.  It is named on its own
-    // in the strip for exactly that reason.
-    test("U+007F paints nothing and is stripped", () => {
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(DEL + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
-    });
-
-    // The other side of the boundary, which is not the class boundary but
-    // the visibility one: the remaining C0 and C1 controls render as a
-    // visible 48.00px box in the same browser, so a symbol carrying one
-    // does not look like `ETH` and must not be judged a spoof.  Widening
-    // the strip to \p{Cc} — the obvious over-correction once U+007F is in
-    // it — fails this test.
-    test("visible control characters do not make a symbol a spoof", () => {
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(NEL + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(cp(0x0001) + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(
-            false,
-        );
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(cp(0x0090) + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(
-            false,
-        );
-    });
-
-    test("compatibility forms fold onto the symbol they imitate", () => {
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(FULLWIDTH_ETH, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(FULLWIDTH_USDC, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
-    });
-
-    // The two knowingly open classes, asserted here so that the boundary is
-    // a fact in the suite and not a claim in a PR body.  A Cyrillic capital
-    // Ie is a distinct letter rather than a compatibility variant, so NFKC
-    // leaves it alone; and a right-to-left override reverses the rendering
-    // of what follows it, which dropping the control character does not
-    // undo.  Closing either needs a confusables table or a bidi resolver,
-    // and both are a separate change from this one.
-    test("a Cyrillic homoglyph is knowingly still not caught", () => {
-        expect(
-            isSpoofedSymbol(CYRILLIC_CAPITAL_IE + "TH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT),
-        ).toBe(false);
-    });
-
-    test("a bidi-reordered symbol is knowingly still not caught", () => {
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(RLO + "HTE", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
-    });
-
-    // Normalization does not reach the native-asset exemption, which turns
-    // on the absence of a contract address and never on the symbol.
-    test("a padded symbol with no contract is still not a spoof", () => {
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(" ETH ", null)).toBe(false);
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(NBSP + "ETH", "")).toBe(false);
-    });
-
-    test("a genuine contract still bears its own padded symbol", () => {
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(" USDC ", USDC_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(ZWSP + "WETH", WETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
-    });
-
-    // Normalization must not invent a match.  Interior ASCII whitespace is
-    // left alone: `E T H` renders as `E T H`, not as `ETH`, so folding it
-    // would filter a token no user could confuse with the native asset.
-    test("a symbol that renders differently is not judged a spoof", () => {
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("E T H", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("ETH2", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
-        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("MY ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
-    });
-
-    // The false-positive question, answered against the shipped data rather
-    // than by assertion: no bundled symbol carries whitespace or a
-    // non-ASCII character, so the normalization cannot newly filter one.
-    // The character class starts at `!` rather than at the space so that it
-    // asserts the claim it stands for — `[ -~]` would admit an interior
-    // space and let a whitespace-bearing entry through the guard.
-    test("no bundled symbol is touched by the normalization", () => {
-        for (const [symbol, addresses] of KNOWN_SYMBOLS) {
-            expect(symbol).toBe(symbol.trim());
-            expect(symbol).toMatch(/^[!-~]+$/);
-            if (addresses === null) continue;
-            for (const address of addresses) {
-                expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, address)).toBe(false);
-            }
-        }
-    });
-});
-
-// Issue #276: the guard that was missing.  The suite walked KNOWN_SYMBOLS,
-// which is built from TOKENS, so it could only ever assert that the table
-// agrees with itself.  Seven symbols appear twice in the bundled list at two
-// different real contracts, and the table kept whichever came first, so the
-// other seven contracts — tokens in our own shipped list, at their own
-// addresses — were judged spoofs and hidden from the balance list, the
-// history and the send selector.  That is the over-filtering direction: it
-// hides a holding the user cannot then spend.
-//
-// This walk is over TOKENS, the data the wallet actually ships, so it fails
-// whenever a bundled token would be filtered at its own address no matter
-// which side of the table the mistake is on.
-describe("the shipped token list", () => {
-    test("no bundled token is filtered at its own address", () => {
-        const filtered = TOKENS.filter((t) =>
-            isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address),
-        ).map((t) => t.symbol + " @ " + t.address);
-        expect(filtered).toEqual([]);
-    });
-
-    // The third failure mode the issue asks about: a symbol whose table entry
-    // names an address that is in neither the table nor the list would be a
-    // contract we vouch for and do not ship.  There is none, and the table is
-    // built from the list, so this asserts the derivation has not acquired a
-    // hand-written entry.
-    test("every address the table vouches for is a bundled token", () => {
-        const bundled = new Set(TOKENS.map((t) => t.address.toLowerCase()));
-        for (const [symbol, addresses] of KNOWN_SYMBOLS) {
-            if (addresses === null) continue;
-            expect(addresses.size).toBeGreaterThan(0);
-            for (const address of addresses) {
-                expect(address).toBe(address.toLowerCase());
-                expect(bundled.has(address)).toBe(true);
-                // And it is the token that actually reports that symbol.
-                const token = TOKENS.find(
-                    (t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === address,
-                );
-                expect(token.symbol.toUpperCase()).toBe(symbol);
-            }
-        }
-    });
-
-    // Both contracts behind a shared ticker must pass, from either side: a
-    // rule that admits only the one the table happens to visit first is the
-    // bug, not the fix.
-    test("both contracts behind a shared ticker are admitted", () => {
-        const bySymbol = new Map();
-        for (const t of TOKENS) {
-            const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
-            if (!bySymbol.has(upper)) bySymbol.set(upper, []);
-            bySymbol.get(upper).push(t);
-        }
-        const shared = [...bySymbol].filter(([, list]) => list.length > 1);
-        // The shared tickers are a fact about the shipped data; if a future
-        // list has none, this test would silently assert nothing.
-        expect(shared.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
-        for (const [, list] of shared) {
-            for (const t of list) {
-                expect(isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address)).toBe(false);
-            }
-        }
-    });
-
-    // The seven from issue #276, named so that the reconciliation is a fact
-    // in the suite: each is two real contracts from the same source fetch,
-    // and the table now holds both rather than the one that came first.
-    test("the seven shared tickers each name both bundled contracts", () => {
-        const expected = {
-            TON: [
-                "0x582d872a1b094fc48f5de31d3b73f2d9be47def1", // Toncoin
-                "0x2be5e8c109e2197d077d13a82daead6a9b3433c5", // Tokamak Network
-            ],
-            FRAX: [
-                "0x853d955acef822db058eb8505911ed77f175b99e", // Legacy Frax Dollar
-                "0x3432b6a60d23ca0dfca7761b7ab56459d9c964d0", // Frax (prev. FXS)
-            ],
-            REUSD: [
-                "0x5086bf358635b81d8c47c66d1c8b9e567db70c72", // Re Protocol reUSD
-                "0x57ab1e0003f623289cd798b1824be09a793e4bec", // Resupply USD
-            ],
-            EURE: [
-                "0x39b8b6385416f4ca36a20319f70d28621895279d", // Monerium EUR emoney
-                "0x3231cb76718cdef2155fc47b5286d82e6eda273f", // Monerium EUR emoney [OLD]
-            ],
-            MSUSD: [
-                "0x4ba01f22827018b4772cd326c7627fb4956a7c00", // Main Street USD
-                "0xab5eb14c09d416f0ac63661e57edb7aecdb9befa", // Metronome Synth USD
-            ],
-            MUSD: [
-                "0xaca92e438df0b2401ff60da7e4337b687a2435da", // MetaMask USD
-                "0xdd468a1ddc392dcdbef6db6e34e89aa338f9f186", // Mezo USD
-            ],
-            JPYC: [
-                "0x431d5dff03120afa4bdf332c61a6e1766ef37bdb", // JPY Coin
-                "0x2370f9d504c7a6e775bf6e14b3f12846b594cd53", // JPY Coin v1
-            ],
-        };
-        for (const [symbol, addresses] of Object.entries(expected)) {
-            expect([...KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(symbol)].sort()).toEqual(
-                [...addresses].sort(),
-            );
-            for (const address of addresses) {
-                expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, address)).toBe(false);
-            }
-        }
-    });
-
-    // The other direction, on the same symbols: widening the table to hold
-    // every bundled address for a ticker must not turn it into a pass for
-    // any other contract.
-    test("a shared ticker from a third contract is still a spoof", () => {
-        const bySymbol = new Map();
-        for (const t of TOKENS) {
-            const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
-            if (!bySymbol.has(upper)) bySymbol.set(upper, []);
-            bySymbol.get(upper).push(t);
-        }
-        for (const [symbol, list] of bySymbol) {
-            if (list.length < 2) continue;
-            expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
-        }
-    });
-});
-
 describe("surface 1: the transaction history", () => {
     function fakeEthTransfer() {
         return {
@@ -442,22 +147,6 @@ describe("surface 1: the transaction history", () => {
         expect(result.transactions).toEqual([]);
     });
 
-    // Issue #260 on this surface: the same transfer with a padded symbol.
-    test("a padded fake ETH token transfer is filtered too", () => {
-        const padded = { ...fakeEthTransfer(), symbol: " ETH " };
-        const result = filterTransactions([padded], {
-            hideSpoofedSymbols: true,
-            hideFraudContracts: true,
-            hideLowHolderTokens: true,
-            hideDustTransactions: true,
-            dustThresholdGwei: 100000,
-        });
-        expect(result.transactions).toEqual([]);
-        // The contract is learned as fraudulent, exactly as for the
-        // unpadded symbol: the padding must not cost the blocklist entry.
-        expect(result.newFraudContracts).toEqual([FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT]);
-    });
-
     test("a real native ETH transfer survives", () => {
         const native = {
             hash: "0x" + "2".repeat(64),
@@ -512,36 +201,6 @@ describe("surface 2: the Send token selector", () => {
         expect(select.children).toEqual([]);
     });
 
-    // Issue #260 on this surface: the option text is rendered into HTML,
-    // which collapses the padding, so an unfiltered padded token would sit
-    // in the selector reading exactly `ETH`.
-    test("a padded fake ETH token is not selectable either", () => {
-        render([
-            {
-                address: FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT,
-                symbol: " ETH ",
-                decimals: 18,
-                balance: "0.005",
-                holders: 900000,
-            },
-        ]);
-        expect(select.children).toEqual([]);
-    });
-
-    test("a genuine token with a padded symbol stays selectable", () => {
-        render([
-            {
-                address: USDC_CONTRACT,
-                symbol: " USDC ",
-                decimals: 6,
-                balance: "12.5",
-                holders: 900000,
-            },
-        ]);
-        expect(select.children).toHaveLength(1);
-        expect(select.children[0].value).toBe(USDC_CONTRACT);
-    });
-
     test("native ETH remains the always-present option", () => {
         render([]);
         expect(select.innerHTML).toBe('<option value="ETH">ETH</option>');
@@ -592,35 +251,6 @@ describe("surface 3: the balance list", () => {
         expect(balances).toEqual([]);
     });
 
-    // Issue #260 on this surface: the balance list is where the user forms
-    // their belief about what they own, and it renders the symbol into HTML.
-    test("a padded fake ETH token is filtered too", async () => {
-        respondWith([fakeEthItem({ symbol: " ETH " })]);
-        expect(await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [])).toEqual([]);
-    });
-
-    test("a fake ETH token padded with a no-break space is filtered", async () => {
-        respondWith([fakeEthItem({ symbol: NBSP + "ETH" + NBSP })]);
-        expect(await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [])).toEqual([]);
-    });
-
-    // The false-positive direction on the surface that matters most: a real
-    // holding whose symbol happens to carry padding is still listed, and the
-    // list still shows the symbol the token actually reports.
-    test("a genuine token with a padded symbol is not newly filtered", async () => {
-        respondWith([
-            fakeEthItem({
-                address_hash: USDC_CONTRACT,
-                symbol: " USDC ",
-                name: "USD Coin",
-                decimals: "6",
-            }),
-        ]);
-        const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, []);
-        expect(balances).toHaveLength(1);
-        expect(balances[0].symbol).toBe(" USDC ");
-    });
-
     test("a genuine token keeps its place in the list", async () => {
         respondWith([
             fakeEthItem({
@@ -644,33 +274,6 @@ describe("surface 3: the balance list", () => {
         expect(await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [])).toEqual([]);
     });
 
-    // The adjacent finding from the same review as issue #260: the type gate
-    // compared exactly, so an explorer that ever varied the casing would
-    // silently drop a real holding before any filter ran.  The comparison is
-    // now case-insensitive, which changes nothing about which types are
-    // admitted.
-    test("a differently-cased ERC-20 type still lists a real holding", async () => {
-        respondWith([
-            fakeEthItem({
-                type: "erc-20",
-                address_hash: USDC_CONTRACT,
-                symbol: "USDC",
-                name: "USD Coin",
-                decimals: "6",
-            }),
-        ]);
-        const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, []);
-        expect(balances).toHaveLength(1);
-        expect(balances[0].symbol).toBe("USDC");
-    });
-
-    test("case insensitivity does not admit another token type", async () => {
-        respondWith([fakeEthItem({ type: "erc-721" })]);
-        expect(await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [])).toEqual([]);
-        respondWith([fakeEthItem({ type: "ERC-20-EXTRA" })]);
-        expect(await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [])).toEqual([]);
-    });
-
     // The money test: the user holds real ETH and has been airdropped a fake
     // ETH ERC-20.  The fake is gone from the list of tokens; the real balance
     // is exactly what the node reported.

tests/transactions.test.js

@@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ describe("token list assumptions the fixtures rely on", () => {
     });
 
     test("USDC and WETH map to their genuine lowercased contracts", () => {
-        expect([...KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("USDC")]).toEqual([USDC_CONTRACT]);
-        expect([...KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("WETH")]).toEqual([WETH_CONTRACT]);
+        expect(KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("USDC")).toBe(USDC_CONTRACT);
+        expect(KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("WETH")).toBe(WETH_CONTRACT);
     });
 
     test("the spam fixture symbol is not in the known token list", () => {