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| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
| e533ceff5f | |||
| b9bc226ae1 |
447
README.md
447
README.md
@@ -107,12 +107,13 @@ unavailable). The suite lives in `tests/e2e/` and is driven by
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`playwright-core`, whose version must stay matched to the container's Playwright
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version — the browsers ship inside the image.
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It covers popup load, wallet creation through the UI, the Add Token screen and
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the transaction detail screen for an ERC-20 transfer. All outbound network is
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intercepted at the browser level and served from fixtures in
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`tests/e2e/network.js`, so the run is deterministic and fully offline;
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unrecognised outbound requests are reported as failures rather than silently
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allowed.
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It covers popup load, WebAssembly compilation under the shipped CSP (see
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[Content Security Policy](#content-security-policy)), wallet creation through
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the UI, the Add Token screen and the transaction detail screen for an ERC-20
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transfer. All outbound network is intercepted at the browser level and served
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from fixtures in `tests/e2e/network.js`, so the run is deterministic and fully
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offline; unrecognised outbound requests are reported as failures rather than
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silently allowed.
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That reporting has one bound worth knowing. Observation ends when the browser
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context is torn down, and nothing can watch traffic after that, so the run keeps
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@@ -271,10 +272,10 @@ on a different table knows exactly tf I am talking about.
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Every interactive element must visually indicate that it is clickable. Buttons
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use a visible border, padding, and a hover state (invert to white-on-black).
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Text that triggers an action (e.g. "Import private key") uses an underline. No
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invisible hit targets, no bare text that happens to have a click handler. If it
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does something when you click it, it must look like it does something when you
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click it.
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Text that triggers an action (e.g. "Add additional wallet...") uses an
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underline. No invisible hit targets, no bare text that happens to have a click
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handler. If it does something when you click it, it must look like it does
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something when you click it.
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#### Display Consistency
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@@ -334,12 +335,18 @@ attack.
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The core hierarchy is **Wallets → Addresses**:
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- A **wallet** is either:
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- An **HD wallet** (recovery phrase): generates multiple addresses from a
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single 12/24 word recovery phrase using BIP-39/BIP-44 derivation. The user
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can add more addresses with a "+" button.
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- A **key wallet** (private key): a single address imported directly from a
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private key. No "+" button since there is only one address.
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- A **wallet** is one of three types:
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- An **HD wallet** (`type: "hd"`, recovery phrase): generates multiple
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addresses from a single 12/24 word recovery phrase using BIP-39/BIP-44
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derivation. The user can add more addresses with a "+" button.
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- A **key wallet** (`type: "key"`, private key): a single address imported
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directly from a private key. No "+" button since there is only one
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address.
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- An **xprv wallet** (`type: "xprv"`, extended private key): the same
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multi-address behavior as an HD wallet, including the "+" button and the
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address scan on import, but imported from an extended private key rather
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than a recovery phrase. It therefore has no recovery phrase to display or
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back up.
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- An **address** holds ETH and any user-added ERC-20 tokens.
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- The user can have multiple wallets, each with multiple addresses (HD) or a
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single address (key).
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@@ -354,95 +361,140 @@ menus.
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### Screen Map
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Navigation uses a stack model (like iOS): each action pushes a screen onto the
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stack, and "Back" pops it. The root screen is either Welcome (no wallets) or
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Home (has wallets). Screens are listed below with their elements and
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transitions.
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Navigation uses a stack model (like iOS): each forward action pushes the current
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screen onto `state.viewStack`, and "Back" pops it (`pushCurrentView()` and
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`goBack()` in `src/popup/views/helpers.js`). The root screen is either Welcome
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(no wallets) or Home (has wallets). Each screen below gives its view id in
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parentheses; the registry of view ids is the `VIEWS` array in
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`src/popup/views/helpers.js`, and the markup for a screen is the element with id
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`view-` plus that view id in `src/popup/index.html`.
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#### Welcome
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Three elements sit outside the screens and are present on all of them: the title
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bar ("AutistMask by @sneak" plus the Settings gear), the flash message line
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under it, and the red banner at the very top that appears on a debug build, when
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runtime debug mode is on, or when the active network is a testnet. They are not
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repeated in the element lists below.
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- **When**: No wallets exist yet.
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- **Elements**: "AutistMask" heading, brief intro text, "Add wallet" button.
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Closing and reopening the popup returns to the screen the user was last on only
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for the views listed in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS` (`src/popup/index.js`). Every other
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screen, including ExportPrivKey, falls back to Home.
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#### Welcome (`welcome`)
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- **When**: No wallets exist yet (`state.hasWallet` is false). This is the root
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screen in that case.
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- **Elements**:
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- "Welcome! To get started, add a wallet." text
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- "Add wallet" button
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- **Transitions**:
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- "Add wallet" → **AddWallet**
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#### Home
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#### Home (`main`)
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- **When**: At least one wallet exists. This is the root screen.
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- **Elements**:
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- Header: "AutistMask", Settings gear button
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- Active address ETH balance (large) + USD value (inline parentheses)
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- Total USD value across all tokens (small text)
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- Active address ETH balance (large) + USD value in parentheses
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- "Total:" USD value across ETH and all tracked tokens of the active address
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- Active address (color dot, full address, etherscan link, tap to copy)
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- Send / Receive quick-action buttons
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- Send / Receive quick-action buttons, both acting on the active address
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- ETH/USD price display
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- Wallet list: each wallet shows name (tap to rename), "+" button (HD only),
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and its addresses with color dots, balances, and `[info]` buttons
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- Recent transactions across all addresses (merged, deduplicated, filtered)
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- Wallet list: each wallet shows its name (tap to rename inline) and a "+"
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button for HD and xprv wallets, then one block per address with "Address
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N" (bold when active), the ENS name if resolved, the full address, an
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`[info]` button, the address USD total, and a balance line for ETH and for
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each tracked token
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- "Recent Transactions": up to 25 transactions merged across every address
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of every wallet, deduplicated by hash and filtered
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- "Add additional wallet..." link at bottom
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- **Transitions**:
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- Tap address row → sets active address (no screen change)
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- Tap address row → sets the active address and broadcasts
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`AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED` (no screen change)
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- Tap wallet name → inline rename field (no screen change)
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- "+" on wallet → derives the next address inline (no screen change)
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- `[info]` on address → **AddressDetail**
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- "Send" → **Send** (selects active address)
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- "Send" → **Send** (refuses with a flash message on a zero balance)
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- "Receive" → **Receive** (shows active address QR)
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- "+" on wallet → derives next address inline
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- Tap home tx row → **TransactionDetail**
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- "Add additional wallet..." → **AddWallet**
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- Settings gear → **Settings** (toggles; tap again to return)
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- Tap home tx row → **AddressDetail** (for the address involved)
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#### AddWallet
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#### AddWallet (`add-wallet`)
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- **When**: User wants to add a new wallet (from Home, Welcome, or Settings).
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- **When**: User wants to add a new wallet (from Welcome, Home, or Settings).
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This one screen covers all three import modes; there is no separate import
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screen.
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- **Elements**:
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- "Add Wallet" heading, "Back" button
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- Instruction text
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- Die button `[die]` (generates random recovery phrase)
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- Recovery phrase textarea
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- Backup warning box (shown after die is clicked)
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- Password + confirm password inputs
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- "Add" button
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- "Have a private key instead?" link
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- **Transitions**:
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- "Add" (valid phrase + password) → **Home**
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- "Back" → previous screen (Home or Welcome)
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- "Have a private key instead?" → **ImportKey**
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#### ImportKey
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- **When**: User wants to import a single private key.
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- **Elements**:
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- "Import Private Key" heading, "Back" button
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- Instruction text
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- Private key input (password-masked)
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- Password + confirm password inputs
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- "Back" button, "Add Wallet" heading
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- Three tabs — "From Phrase" (`tab-mnemonic`), "From Key" (`tab-privkey`),
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"From xprv" (`tab-xprv`) — each showing its own form section:
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- **From Phrase**: instruction text, a die button that generates a
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random recovery phrase, a recovery phrase textarea, and a backup
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warning box that becomes visible once the die button has been used
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- **From Key**: instruction text and a masked private key input
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- **From xprv**: instruction text and a masked extended private key
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input
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- Password + confirm password inputs, with a hint line whose wording depends
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on the selected tab
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- "Import" button
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- **Transitions**:
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- "Import" (valid key + password) → **Home**
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- "Back" → **AddWallet**
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- "Import" with a valid entry and a matching password of at least 12
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characters → creates the wallet, clears the navigation stack, and →
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**Home**. The phrase and xprv modes then scan for further used addresses
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and report the count as a flash message.
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- "Import" with an invalid entry, a duplicate wallet or address, or a short
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or mismatched password → flash message, no screen change
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- "Back" → previous screen (Welcome, Home, or Settings)
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#### AddressDetail
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#### AddressDetail (`address`)
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- **When**: User tapped `[info]` on an address from Home.
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- **Elements**:
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- "Back" button
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- Blockie identicon (48px, centered)
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- Title: "Wallet Name — Address N"
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- ENS name (if resolved, bold with color dot)
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- ENS name (if resolved, bold above the address)
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- Full address (color dot, etherscan link, tap to copy)
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- USD total for address
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- Balance list: ETH + tracked ERC-20 tokens (4 decimal places, USD inline).
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Each balance row is clickable → **AddressToken**
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- Send / Receive / + Token buttons
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- Send / Receive / + Token buttons and a "···" menu button
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- "···" dropdown containing a single "Export Private Key" entry
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- Transaction list (with ENS resolution for counterparties)
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- **Transitions**:
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- Tap balance row → **AddressToken** (for that token)
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- "Send" → **Send**
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- "Send" → **Send** (refuses with a flash message on a zero balance)
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- "Receive" → **Receive**
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- "+ Token" → **AddToken**
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- "···" → "Export Private Key" → **ExportPrivKey**
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- Tap transaction row → **TransactionDetail**
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- "Back" → **Home**
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- "Back" → previous screen (Home)
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#### AddressToken
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#### ExportPrivKey (`export-privkey`)
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- **When**: User chose "Export Private Key" from the "···" menu on
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AddressDetail. This screen discloses secret material.
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- **Elements**:
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- "Back" button
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- Blockie identicon (48px, centered)
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- "Export Private Key" heading
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- "Wallet Name — Address N" and the full address (etherscan link, tap to
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copy)
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- Warning that anyone holding the private key can transfer all funds from
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the address
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- Error line
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- Password input and "Reveal" button, shown until the key is revealed
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- The private key on a highlighted background, tap to copy, shown only after
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the password has been accepted
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- **Transitions**:
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- "Reveal" (correct password) → decrypts the wallet secret, derives this
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address's key, hides the password input and shows the key (no screen
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change)
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- "Reveal" (wrong password) → "Wrong password." on the error line, nothing
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revealed
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- "Back" → clears the key and password from the DOM, then → previous screen
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(AddressDetail)
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#### AddressToken (`address-token`)
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- **When**: User clicked a specific token balance on AddressDetail.
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- **Elements**:
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@@ -453,49 +505,64 @@ transitions.
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- USD total for this token
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- Single token balance line (4 decimal places)
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- Send / Receive buttons
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- Token contract well (ERC-20 only): full contract address (tap to copy,
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etherscan link) plus name, symbol, decimals, holder count and project
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website where known
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- Token-filtered transaction list (only this token's transfers)
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- **Transitions**:
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- "Send" → **Send** (token pre-selected and locked in dropdown)
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- "Send" → **Send** (token locked: the dropdown is replaced by a static
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symbol and contract address)
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- "Receive" → **Receive** (ERC-20 warning shown for non-ETH tokens)
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- Tap transaction row → **TransactionDetail**
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- "Back" → **AddressDetail**
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- "Back" → previous screen (AddressDetail)
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#### Send
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#### Send (`send`)
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- **When**: User wants to send ETH or a token from this address.
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- **When**: User wants to send ETH or a token, from Home, AddressDetail, or
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AddressToken.
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- **Elements**:
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- "Send" heading, "Back" button
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- "Back" button, "Send" heading
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- From: address with color dot + etherscan link
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- What to send: token dropdown (or static display with contract address when
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locked from AddressToken)
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- To: address or ENS name input
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- To: address or ENS name input, with an inline validation message
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- Amount input with current balance display
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- "Review" button
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- "Review" button, disabled until the recipient validates
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- **Transitions**:
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- "Review" (valid inputs, ENS resolved) → **ConfirmTx**
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- "Back" → **AddressToken** (if came from token view) or **AddressDetail**
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- "Review" with an unresolvable ENS name or an invalid amount → flash
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message, no screen change
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- "Back" → previous screen (Home, AddressDetail, or AddressToken)
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#### ConfirmTx
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#### ConfirmTx (`confirm-tx`)
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- **When**: User reviewed send details and is ready to authorize.
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- **Elements**:
|
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- "Confirm Transaction" heading, "Back" button
|
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- "Back" button, "Confirm Transaction" heading
|
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- Type: "Native ETH transfer" or "ERC-20 token transfer (SYMBOL)"
|
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- Token contract: full address + etherscan link (ERC-20 only)
|
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- From: blockie + color dot + full address + etherscan link + wallet title
|
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- To: blockie + color dot + full address + etherscan link + ENS name
|
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- Amount: value + symbol (USD in parentheses)
|
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- Your balance: value + symbol (USD in parentheses)
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- Estimated network fee: ETH amount (USD in parentheses), fetched async
|
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- Warnings (scam address, self-send)
|
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- Estimated network fee: "Estimating..." then the ETH amount (USD in
|
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parentheses) or "Unable to estimate", fetched async
|
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- Warnings: inline warnings from the local checks (scam address, self-send)
|
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plus four reserved warning boxes made visible by the async checks —
|
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recipient with no transaction history, recipient is a contract, burn
|
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address, and an Etherscan phishing/scam label
|
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- Errors (insufficient balance)
|
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- "Send" button (disabled if errors)
|
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- Password: an inline field on this screen, not a modal, with its own error
|
||||
line
|
||||
- "Sign & Send" button (disabled if errors)
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Send" → password modal → broadcast tx → **WaitTx**
|
||||
- "Send" → password modal → broadcast fails → **ErrorTx**
|
||||
- "Sign & Send" (correct password) → broadcast tx → **WaitTx**
|
||||
- "Sign & Send" (correct password) → broadcast fails → **ErrorTx**
|
||||
- "Sign & Send" (wrong password) → "Wrong password." on the password error
|
||||
line, no screen change
|
||||
- "Back" → **Send**
|
||||
|
||||
#### WaitTx
|
||||
#### WaitTx (`wait-tx`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: Transaction has been broadcast, waiting for on-chain confirmation.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
@@ -509,20 +576,24 @@ transitions.
|
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- Receipt found → **SuccessTx**
|
||||
- 60 seconds without confirmation → **ErrorTx** (timeout message)
|
||||
|
||||
#### SuccessTx
|
||||
#### SuccessTx (`success-tx`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: Transaction confirmed on-chain.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Transaction Confirmed" heading
|
||||
- Decoded action well (shown when the transaction carried recognized
|
||||
calldata; the top-level Amount and To are hidden in that case)
|
||||
- Amount + symbol
|
||||
- To: color dot + full address + etherscan link
|
||||
- Block number
|
||||
- Transaction hash: full hash (tap to copy) + etherscan link
|
||||
- "Done" button
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Done" → **AddressToken** (if `selectedToken` set) or **AddressDetail**
|
||||
- "Done" in the approval popup → closes the popup window
|
||||
- "Done" otherwise → resets the navigation stack, then → **AddressToken**
|
||||
(if `selectedToken` set) or **AddressDetail**
|
||||
|
||||
#### ErrorTx
|
||||
#### ErrorTx (`error-tx`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: Transaction broadcast failed, or timed out waiting for confirmation.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
@@ -534,24 +605,28 @@ transitions.
|
||||
full hash (tap to copy) + etherscan link
|
||||
- "Done" button
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Done" → **AddressToken** (if `selectedToken` set) or **AddressDetail**
|
||||
- "Done" in the approval popup → closes the popup window
|
||||
- "Done" otherwise → resets the navigation stack, then → **AddressToken**
|
||||
(if `selectedToken` set) or **AddressDetail**
|
||||
|
||||
#### Receive
|
||||
#### Receive (`receive`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User wants to receive funds at this address.
|
||||
- **When**: User wants to receive funds at this address, from Home,
|
||||
AddressDetail, or AddressToken.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Receive" heading, "Back" button
|
||||
- "Back" button, "Receive" heading
|
||||
- Instruction text
|
||||
- QR code encoding the address
|
||||
- Full address (color dot, selectable, etherscan link)
|
||||
- "Copy address" button
|
||||
- ERC-20 warning (shown when navigating from AddressToken for non-ETH token)
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Back" → **AddressToken** (if `selectedToken` set) or **AddressDetail**
|
||||
- "Back" → previous screen (Home, AddressDetail, or AddressToken)
|
||||
|
||||
#### TransactionDetail
|
||||
#### TransactionDetail (`transaction`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User tapped a transaction row from AddressDetail or AddressToken.
|
||||
- **When**: User tapped a transaction row on Home, AddressDetail, or
|
||||
AddressToken.
|
||||
- **Elements** (grouped into logical blocks using light well containers; field
|
||||
labels are self-explanatory so groups have no headings):
|
||||
- "Transaction" heading, "Back" button
|
||||
@@ -576,91 +651,182 @@ transitions.
|
||||
- Raw data (shown when calldata is present): full calldata in monospace
|
||||
dashed border
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Back" → **AddressToken** (if `selectedToken` set) or **AddressDetail**
|
||||
- "Back" → previous screen (Home, AddressDetail, or AddressToken)
|
||||
|
||||
#### AddToken
|
||||
#### AddToken (`add-token`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User wants to track an ERC-20 token on this address.
|
||||
- **When**: User wants to track an ERC-20 token, reached from "+ Token" on
|
||||
AddressDetail.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Add Token" heading, "Back" button
|
||||
- "Back" button, "Add Token" heading
|
||||
- Instruction text (find contract address on Etherscan)
|
||||
- Contract address input
|
||||
- Token info preview (name, symbol — fetched from contract)
|
||||
- Common token quick-pick buttons
|
||||
- Status line ("Looking up token...", cleared or replaced on failure)
|
||||
- Common token quick-pick buttons (top 25 by market cap), which fill the
|
||||
contract address input
|
||||
- "Add" button
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Add" (valid contract) → **AddressDetail**
|
||||
- "Back" → **AddressDetail**
|
||||
- "Add" (valid contract) → tracks the token, pops the stack, and re-renders
|
||||
**AddressDetail**
|
||||
- "Add" with a token already tracked, a scam-listed address, or a failed
|
||||
contract lookup → flash message, no screen change
|
||||
- "Back" → previous screen (AddressDetail)
|
||||
|
||||
#### Settings
|
||||
#### Settings (`settings`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User tapped Settings gear from Home.
|
||||
- **When**: User tapped the Settings gear.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Settings" heading, "Back" button
|
||||
- Wallets: "+ Add wallet" button
|
||||
- Display: "Show tracked tokens with zero balance" checkbox
|
||||
- Ethereum RPC: endpoint URL input + "Save" button
|
||||
- Blockscout API: endpoint URL input + "Save" button
|
||||
- "Back" button, "Settings" heading
|
||||
- Wallets: one row per wallet with its name (tap to rename inline) and an
|
||||
`[x]` delete button, plus a "+ Add wallet" button
|
||||
- Tracked Tokens: one row per tracked token with an `[x]` remove button,
|
||||
plus a "+ Add token" button
|
||||
- Display: "Show tracked tokens with zero balance" checkbox and a Theme
|
||||
selector (System / Light / Dark)
|
||||
- Network: network selector (Ethereum Mainnet / Sepolia Testnet); switching
|
||||
resets the RPC and Blockscout endpoints to that network's defaults
|
||||
- Ethereum RPC: endpoint URL input + "Save" button (validated against
|
||||
`eth_chainId` before being saved)
|
||||
- Blockscout API: endpoint URL input + "Save" button (validated against
|
||||
`/stats` before being saved)
|
||||
- Token Spam Protection:
|
||||
- "Hide tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders" checkbox
|
||||
- "Hide transactions from detected fraud contracts" checkbox
|
||||
- "Hide dust transactions below N gwei" checkbox + threshold input
|
||||
- "UTC Timestamps" checkbox
|
||||
- Allowed Sites: list with remove buttons
|
||||
- Denied Sites: list with remove buttons
|
||||
- About: project link, license, author, version, release date, and the
|
||||
commit, which links to the commit in the repository
|
||||
- Debug: hidden until revealed, then an "Enable debug mode" checkbox that
|
||||
turns on the red banner and verbose logging
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "+ Add wallet" → **AddWallet**
|
||||
- "Back" (or Settings gear again) → **Home**
|
||||
- "+ Add token" → **SettingsAddToken**
|
||||
- `[x]` on a wallet → **DeleteWallet**
|
||||
- Tap wallet name → inline rename field (no screen change)
|
||||
- `[x]` on a tracked token or a site → removes it in place (no screen
|
||||
change)
|
||||
- Ten clicks on the version → reveals the Debug well (no screen change)
|
||||
- "Back" (or Settings gear again) → previous screen (Home)
|
||||
|
||||
#### SiteApproval
|
||||
#### DeleteWallet (`delete-wallet-confirm`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: A website requests wallet access via `eth_requestAccounts`. Opened
|
||||
in a separate popup by the background script.
|
||||
- **When**: User tapped the `[x]` next to a wallet in Settings.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Back" button, "Delete Wallet" heading
|
||||
- Warning naming the wallet and stating that deletion is permanent and any
|
||||
funds are unrecoverable without the recovery phrase
|
||||
- Error line
|
||||
- Password input
|
||||
- "Confirm Delete" button
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Confirm Delete" (correct password, other wallets remain) → deletes the
|
||||
wallet and its site permissions, then → **Settings** with a "Wallet
|
||||
deleted." flash message
|
||||
- "Confirm Delete" (correct password, last wallet) → deletes the wallet,
|
||||
clears the selection and the navigation stack, then → **Welcome**
|
||||
- Either way, the active address moves only if it belonged to the deleted
|
||||
wallet, and `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED` is broadcast when it does
|
||||
(`src/shared/walletDelete.js`)
|
||||
- "Confirm Delete" (wrong password) → "Wrong password." on the error line,
|
||||
nothing deleted
|
||||
- "Back" → previous screen (Settings)
|
||||
|
||||
#### SettingsAddToken (`settings-addtoken`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User tapped "+ Add token" in Settings. Tokens added here are tracked
|
||||
across every address, unlike AddToken which is reached from one address.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Back" button, "Add Token" heading
|
||||
- Instruction text
|
||||
- "Top tokens:" quick-pick buttons (top 10 by market cap; already-tracked
|
||||
tokens are disabled)
|
||||
- "Or pick from top 100:" dropdown (already-tracked tokens are disabled) +
|
||||
"Add selected" button
|
||||
- "Or enter contract address:" input, a status line, and an "Add" button
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- Any of the three add paths, on success → adds the token and shows an
|
||||
"Added SYMBOL" flash message (no screen change)
|
||||
- A duplicate, a scam-listed address, or a failed contract lookup → flash
|
||||
message, no screen change
|
||||
- "Back" → previous screen (Settings)
|
||||
|
||||
#### SiteApproval (`approve-site`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: A website requests wallet access via `eth_requestAccounts` or
|
||||
`wallet_requestPermissions` and is on neither the allowed nor the denied list.
|
||||
The background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`) and
|
||||
falls back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
|
||||
`requestApproval()`).
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Connection Request" heading
|
||||
- Site hostname (bold)
|
||||
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
|
||||
blocklist)
|
||||
- Site hostname (bold) + "wants to connect to your wallet"
|
||||
- Address that will be shared (color dot + full address + etherscan link)
|
||||
- "Remember my choice for this site" checkbox
|
||||
- "Allow" / "Deny" buttons
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Allow" / "Deny" → closes popup (returns result to background script)
|
||||
- "Allow" / "Deny" → closes popup (returns result to background script; the
|
||||
choice is persisted to the allowed or denied list when "Remember" is
|
||||
checked)
|
||||
- Popup closed without answering → treated as a denial
|
||||
|
||||
#### TxApproval
|
||||
#### TxApproval (`approve-tx`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: A connected website requests a transaction via
|
||||
`eth_sendTransaction`. Opened via the toolbar popup by the background script.
|
||||
`eth_sendTransaction`. Always opened in a separate popup window by the
|
||||
background script (`windows.create()`), because the request is triggered
|
||||
programmatically rather than by a user gesture.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Transaction Request" heading
|
||||
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
|
||||
blocklist)
|
||||
- Site hostname (bold) + "wants to send a transaction"
|
||||
- Decoded action (if calldata is recognized): action name, token details,
|
||||
amounts, steps, deadline (see Transaction Decoding)
|
||||
- From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
|
||||
- To/Contract: color dot + full address + etherscan link (or "contract
|
||||
- Contract: color dot + full address + etherscan link (or "contract
|
||||
creation"), token symbol label if known
|
||||
- Value: amount in ETH (4 decimal places)
|
||||
- Value: amount in ETH (4 decimal places, USD in parentheses)
|
||||
- Raw data: full calldata displayed inline (shown if present)
|
||||
- Password input
|
||||
- Password input and an error line
|
||||
- "Confirm" / "Reject" buttons
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Confirm" (with password) → closes popup (returns result to background)
|
||||
- "Confirm" (correct password) → decrypts and signs in the popup, hands the
|
||||
signed transaction to the background to broadcast, then → **WaitTx** in
|
||||
the same popup window
|
||||
- "Confirm" (wrong password) → error line, no screen change
|
||||
- "Reject" → closes popup (returns rejection to background)
|
||||
- Popup window closed without answering → the request is rejected with
|
||||
EIP-1193 code 4001
|
||||
|
||||
#### SignApproval
|
||||
#### SignApproval (`approve-sign`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: A connected website requests a message signature via
|
||||
`personal_sign`, `eth_sign`, or `eth_signTypedData_v4`. Opened via the toolbar
|
||||
popup by the background script.
|
||||
`personal_sign`, `eth_sign`, or `eth_signTypedData_v4`. Opened the same way as
|
||||
TxApproval, in a separate popup window.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Signature Request" heading
|
||||
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
|
||||
blocklist)
|
||||
- Site hostname (bold) + "wants you to sign a message"
|
||||
- Danger warning box (shown for `eth_sign`, which signs a raw hash)
|
||||
- Type: "Personal message" or "Typed data (EIP-712)"
|
||||
- From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
|
||||
- Message: decoded UTF-8 text (personal_sign) or formatted domain/type/
|
||||
message fields (EIP-712 typed data)
|
||||
- Password input
|
||||
- Password input and an error line
|
||||
- "Sign" / "Reject" buttons
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Sign" (with password) → signs locally → closes popup (returns signature)
|
||||
- "Sign" (correct password) → signs locally → closes popup (returns
|
||||
signature)
|
||||
- "Sign" (wrong password, or a signing failure) → error line, no screen
|
||||
change
|
||||
- "Reject" → closes popup (returns rejection to background)
|
||||
- Popup window closed without answering → the request is rejected with
|
||||
EIP-1193 code 4001
|
||||
|
||||
### External Services
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -751,6 +917,36 @@ battle-tested.
|
||||
Exceptions require explicit authorization in a code comment referencing this
|
||||
policy, but as of now there are none.
|
||||
|
||||
### Content Security Policy
|
||||
|
||||
Both manifests declare the same policy for extension pages —
|
||||
`script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'` — as an object under
|
||||
`content_security_policy.extension_pages` in `manifest/chrome.json` (MV3) and as
|
||||
a bare string in `manifest/firefox.json` (MV2).
|
||||
|
||||
`'wasm-unsafe-eval'` is there for one reason: libsodium. It ships a WebAssembly
|
||||
build and a `wasm2js` translation of it in one file, tries WASM first, and
|
||||
silently falls back to the translation if instantiation throws. Under a plain
|
||||
`script-src 'self'` the fallback was taken on every popup load, announced by
|
||||
nothing but an uncaught `CompileError`. Measured on the same Argon2id parameters
|
||||
the vault uses (`OPSLIMIT_INTERACTIVE`, `MEMLIMIT_INTERACTIVE`), WASM derives a
|
||||
key in 141-198ms and `wasm2js` in 3204-3660ms. The work factor is identical — it
|
||||
is set by the ops and memory parameters, not by wall time — so the fallback
|
||||
bought nothing and cost about three and a half seconds on every operation that
|
||||
asks for the password, which is every signature.
|
||||
|
||||
The keyword permits compiling WebAssembly and nothing else: not `eval()` of
|
||||
strings, not inline script, not remote script. Using it requires already
|
||||
executing script in an extension page, which is complete compromise on its own.
|
||||
`'unsafe-eval'` is a different proposition and is not granted.
|
||||
|
||||
The grant is pinned in both directions. `tests/manifest.test.js` asserts the
|
||||
exact token set in both manifests, so dropping `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` (a silent
|
||||
20x regression on the key derivation) and adding anything beyond it both fail
|
||||
`make check`. `tests/vaultBackend.test.js` asserts the unit tests run the WASM
|
||||
backend, and `make test-e2e` compiles a WebAssembly module inside the real popup
|
||||
under the real manifest.
|
||||
|
||||
### DEBUG Mode Policy
|
||||
|
||||
The `DEBUG` constant in the popup JS enables a red "DEBUG / INSECURE" banner and
|
||||
@@ -815,6 +1011,7 @@ hardcoded test phrase.
|
||||
- Create new HD wallet (generates 12-word recovery phrase)
|
||||
- Import HD wallet from existing 12 or 24 word recovery phrase
|
||||
- Import single-address wallet from private key
|
||||
- Import multi-address wallet from an extended private key (`xprv`)
|
||||
- Add multiple addresses within an HD wallet
|
||||
- Manage multiple wallets simultaneously
|
||||
- View ETH balance per address
|
||||
@@ -986,7 +1183,7 @@ Currently supported:
|
||||
|
||||
### Transactions
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Gas estimation and fee display before confirming
|
||||
- [x] Gas estimation and fee display before confirming
|
||||
|
||||
### Testing
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
8
TODO.md
8
TODO.md
@@ -44,6 +44,14 @@ undefined identifiers, which is how
|
||||
|
||||
# Completed Steps
|
||||
|
||||
- 2026-08-11: libsodium runs on WebAssembly in the shipped builds —
|
||||
`'wasm-unsafe-eval'` added to both manifest CSPs after measuring the wasm2js
|
||||
fallback at 20x the Argon2id cost, pinned in both directions by
|
||||
`tests/manifest.test.js` and observed in the real popup by the e2e suite
|
||||
([#182](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/182)).
|
||||
- 2026-08-11: README Screen Map rebuilt from the code — every screen, element
|
||||
and transition re-verified against `src/popup/`
|
||||
([#164](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/164)).
|
||||
- 2026-08-11: `docs/README.md` rewritten against the code: no competitor names,
|
||||
all five network destinations documented, password/Settings/Add Wallet
|
||||
sections corrected ([#163](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/163)).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@
|
||||
"description": "Minimal Ethereum wallet for Chrome",
|
||||
"permissions": ["storage", "activeTab"],
|
||||
"host_permissions": ["<all_urls>"],
|
||||
"content_security_policy": {
|
||||
"extension_pages": "script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"action": {
|
||||
"default_popup": "src/popup/index.html"
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
|
||||
"version": "0.1.0",
|
||||
"description": "Minimal Ethereum wallet for Firefox",
|
||||
"permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "<all_urls>"],
|
||||
"content_security_policy": "script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'",
|
||||
"browser_action": {
|
||||
"default_popup": "src/popup/index.html"
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,14 +1,80 @@
|
||||
// Vault: password-based encryption of secrets using libsodium.
|
||||
// Uses Argon2id for key derivation and XSalsa20-Poly1305 for encryption.
|
||||
// All crypto operations are delegated to libsodium — no raw primitives.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Backend: WebAssembly, deliberately (#182).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// libsodium ships one file containing both a WebAssembly build and a
|
||||
// wasm2js ("asm.js") translation of it. It tries WASM first and, if
|
||||
// instantiation throws, silently swaps in the translation. An extension
|
||||
// CSP of plain script-src 'self' refuses WASM, so every popup load used
|
||||
// to take that fallback — announced by nothing but an uncaught
|
||||
// CompileError in the console.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Measured here, same Argon2id parameters (OPSLIMIT_INTERACTIVE,
|
||||
// MEMLIMIT_INTERACTIVE = 2 passes over 64MiB), node 22 on this machine:
|
||||
// WASM 141-198ms per derivation, wasm2js 3204-3660ms. The work factor is
|
||||
// identical either way — it is set by the ops/mem parameters, not by wall
|
||||
// time — so the fallback bought no security, it only made every password
|
||||
// operation take three and a half seconds, and the wallet asks for the
|
||||
// password on every signature.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// So both manifests declare 'wasm-unsafe-eval' for extension pages. That
|
||||
// keyword permits compiling WebAssembly and nothing else: not eval() of
|
||||
// strings, not inline script, not remote script. Reaching it requires
|
||||
// already executing script in the extension page, which is total
|
||||
// compromise on its own. 'unsafe-eval' would be a different matter and is
|
||||
// not granted. tests/manifest.test.js pins both policies to exactly
|
||||
// "'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'" so neither the grant nor the surrounding
|
||||
// strictness can drift unnoticed.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The fallback still exists, and a wallet that refuses to decrypt is
|
||||
// worse than a slow one, so it is not disabled — it is made loud:
|
||||
// cryptoBackend() reports which backend this realm can run, ensureReady()
|
||||
// logs an error if it is not WASM, tests/vaultBackend.test.js asserts the
|
||||
// unit tests exercise the WASM backend, and the end-to-end suite asserts
|
||||
// it in the real popup under the real manifest.
|
||||
|
||||
const sodium = require("libsodium-wrappers-sumo");
|
||||
const { log } = require("./log");
|
||||
|
||||
// An empty WebAssembly module: the 8-byte magic number and version header,
|
||||
// no sections. Compiling it asks the cheapest possible form of the only
|
||||
// question that matters here — may this realm compile WebAssembly at all —
|
||||
// which is exactly what a CSP without 'wasm-unsafe-eval' refuses, and
|
||||
// exactly what decides which backend libsodium ends up on.
|
||||
const EMPTY_WASM_MODULE = new Uint8Array([
|
||||
0x00, 0x61, 0x73, 0x6d, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
// "wasm" or "asmjs": whether this realm may compile WebAssembly, which is
|
||||
// what decides libsodium's backend when the CSP is the reason it cannot —
|
||||
// the case this codebase guards. It probes the realm, not libsodium, so a
|
||||
// fallback taken for some other reason (allocation failure, corrupt module)
|
||||
// would not be caught here; tests/vaultBackend.test.js checks libsodium's
|
||||
// own marker directly.
|
||||
async function cryptoBackend() {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await WebAssembly.compile(EMPTY_WASM_MODULE);
|
||||
return "wasm";
|
||||
} catch (_) {
|
||||
return "asmjs";
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let ready = false;
|
||||
|
||||
async function ensureReady() {
|
||||
if (!ready) {
|
||||
await sodium.ready;
|
||||
if ((await cryptoBackend()) !== "wasm") {
|
||||
log.errorf(
|
||||
"libsodium is running on the wasm2js fallback: this realm " +
|
||||
"refuses to compile WebAssembly, so every password " +
|
||||
"derivation costs roughly 20x what it should. See the " +
|
||||
"backend note in src/shared/vault.js.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
ready = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -59,4 +125,4 @@ async function decryptWithPassword(encrypted, password) {
|
||||
return sodium.to_string(plaintext);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
module.exports = { encryptWithPassword, decryptWithPassword };
|
||||
module.exports = { cryptoBackend, decryptWithPassword, encryptWithPassword };
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,18 +22,12 @@ const EXT_PATH = path.join(REPO_ROOT, "dist", "chrome");
|
||||
// entry must name the issue that will remove it. This list is the one
|
||||
// concession in an otherwise zero-tolerance policy: an uncaught error is
|
||||
// how this harness caught issue #150 in the first place.
|
||||
const ALLOWED_ERRORS = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
// libsodium ships a WASM build and an asm.js fallback. The
|
||||
// extension CSP (script-src 'self', with no wasm-unsafe-eval)
|
||||
// refuses the WASM module on every popup load; libsodium catches
|
||||
// it and falls back to asm.js, so the wallet works. Deciding
|
||||
// which backend actually ships is issue #182, and this entry gets
|
||||
// deleted when that lands.
|
||||
issue: "#182",
|
||||
pattern: /Refused to compile or instantiate WebAssembly module/,
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Empty, and worth keeping that way. Its only entry was the WASM
|
||||
// CompileError libsodium provoked on every popup load, deleted with #182
|
||||
// when both manifests started allowing WASM; the run that used to need it
|
||||
// is now the run that proves the fix.
|
||||
const ALLOWED_ERRORS = [];
|
||||
|
||||
function isAllowed(text) {
|
||||
return ALLOWED_ERRORS.some((a) => a.pattern.test(text));
|
||||
@@ -247,6 +241,26 @@ async function visible(page, selector, timeout = 15000) {
|
||||
await page.waitForSelector(selector, { state: "visible", timeout });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// An empty WebAssembly module: magic number and version header, no
|
||||
// sections. Compiling it in the popup asks the one question that decides
|
||||
// libsodium's backend — may this realm compile WebAssembly — of the real
|
||||
// page under the real shipped manifest, which is the only place the
|
||||
// answer can be observed. Kept independent of src/shared/vault.js on
|
||||
// purpose: a bundle asked to grade itself proves less than an outside
|
||||
// observation of the same realm.
|
||||
const EMPTY_WASM_MODULE = [0x00, 0x61, 0x73, 0x6d, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00];
|
||||
|
||||
async function pageCompilesWasm(page) {
|
||||
return page.evaluate(async (bytes) => {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await WebAssembly.compile(new Uint8Array(bytes));
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
} catch (_) {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}, EMPTY_WASM_MODULE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function openPopup(ctx, popupUrl) {
|
||||
const page = await ctx.newPage();
|
||||
await page.goto(popupUrl);
|
||||
@@ -285,5 +299,6 @@ module.exports = {
|
||||
launch,
|
||||
openAddressDetail,
|
||||
openPopup,
|
||||
pageCompilesWasm,
|
||||
visible,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ const {
|
||||
launch,
|
||||
openAddressDetail,
|
||||
openPopup,
|
||||
pageCompilesWasm,
|
||||
visible,
|
||||
} = require("./harness");
|
||||
const { STUB_TOKEN, STUB_TX_HASH } = require("./network");
|
||||
@@ -55,6 +56,27 @@ test("popup loads and reaches the welcome view", async (env) => {
|
||||
assert(title === "AutistMask", "unexpected popup title: " + title);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The empirical half of #182. The manifest change is only a claim about
|
||||
// what the CSP permits; this is the observation. Two things have to hold
|
||||
// together, and the run covers both: the popup realm compiles WASM (here),
|
||||
// and no WASM refusal or abort is recorded anywhere in the run — the
|
||||
// harness allowlist that used to excuse exactly that error is now empty,
|
||||
// so a recurrence fails whichever test it lands in rather than being
|
||||
// tolerated. Since libsodium's WASM module is embedded in the bundle and
|
||||
// needs no fetch, a realm that compiles WASM is a realm where libsodium
|
||||
// takes the WASM path, and the next test drives a real vault encryption
|
||||
// through it.
|
||||
test("the popup compiles WebAssembly under the shipped CSP (#182)", async (env) => {
|
||||
const ok = await pageCompilesWasm(env.page);
|
||||
assert(
|
||||
ok,
|
||||
"the popup refused to compile WebAssembly. The shipped manifest CSP " +
|
||||
"has lost 'wasm-unsafe-eval', so libsodium is back on its wasm2js " +
|
||||
"fallback and every password derivation costs roughly 20x what it " +
|
||||
"should — see the backend note in src/shared/vault.js",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("wallet creation through the UI reaches the main view", async (env) => {
|
||||
await createWallet(env.page);
|
||||
const addrCount = await env.page
|
||||
|
||||
108
tests/manifest.test.js
Normal file
108
tests/manifest.test.js
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
|
||||
// The shipped Content Security Policy, pinned in both directions.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This is the anti-regression check for #182. libsodium decides its
|
||||
// backend by trying to compile WebAssembly and catching the failure, so a
|
||||
// CSP that refuses WASM demotes the vault to the wasm2js translation —
|
||||
// roughly 20x slower per Argon2id derivation — and says so only in a
|
||||
// console message nobody reads. Dropping 'wasm-unsafe-eval' from either
|
||||
// manifest therefore has to fail a check, not a log line.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It is equally a check against loosening. 'wasm-unsafe-eval' is granted
|
||||
// deliberately and narrowly (see the backend note in src/shared/vault.js);
|
||||
// 'unsafe-eval', 'unsafe-inline' and any remote script source are not, and
|
||||
// an exact match on the token set is what keeps the next edit from
|
||||
// smuggling one in alongside.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// build.js copies these files to dist/<target>/manifest.json verbatim, so
|
||||
// what is asserted here is what ships.
|
||||
|
||||
const fs = require("fs");
|
||||
const path = require("path");
|
||||
|
||||
const MANIFEST_DIR = path.join(__dirname, "..", "manifest");
|
||||
|
||||
const EXPECTED_SCRIPT_SRC = ["'self'", "'wasm-unsafe-eval'"];
|
||||
const EXPECTED_OBJECT_SRC = ["'self'"];
|
||||
|
||||
const FORBIDDEN_SOURCES = [
|
||||
"'unsafe-eval'",
|
||||
"'unsafe-inline'",
|
||||
"http:",
|
||||
"https:",
|
||||
"data:",
|
||||
"blob:",
|
||||
"*",
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
function readManifest(name) {
|
||||
return JSON.parse(
|
||||
fs.readFileSync(path.join(MANIFEST_DIR, name + ".json"), "utf8"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// "script-src 'self'; object-src 'self'" -> { "script-src": ["'self'"], ... }
|
||||
function parseCsp(policy) {
|
||||
const directives = {};
|
||||
for (const part of policy.split(";")) {
|
||||
const tokens = part.trim().split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean);
|
||||
if (tokens.length === 0) continue;
|
||||
directives[tokens[0]] = tokens.slice(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return directives;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function assertPolicy(policy) {
|
||||
const directives = parseCsp(policy);
|
||||
expect(Object.keys(directives).sort()).toEqual([
|
||||
"object-src",
|
||||
"script-src",
|
||||
]);
|
||||
expect(directives["script-src"].slice().sort()).toEqual(
|
||||
EXPECTED_SCRIPT_SRC,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(directives["object-src"].slice().sort()).toEqual(
|
||||
EXPECTED_OBJECT_SRC,
|
||||
);
|
||||
for (const source of FORBIDDEN_SOURCES) {
|
||||
expect(directives["script-src"]).not.toContain(source);
|
||||
expect(directives["object-src"]).not.toContain(source);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe("shipped Content Security Policy", () => {
|
||||
// MV3 takes an object and applies extension_pages to the popup and the
|
||||
// background service worker, which is where libsodium runs.
|
||||
test("chrome MV3 allows WASM and nothing else beyond 'self'", () => {
|
||||
const csp = readManifest("chrome").content_security_policy;
|
||||
expect(typeof csp).toBe("object");
|
||||
expect(Object.keys(csp)).toEqual(["extension_pages"]);
|
||||
assertPolicy(csp.extension_pages);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// MV2 takes the policy as a bare string. Firefox does not require
|
||||
// 'wasm-unsafe-eval' for MV2 today — enforcement is report-only and
|
||||
// Bugzilla 1770909 is still open — so this is future-proofing, not a
|
||||
// mandate. It does not weaken anything under either baseline: Gecko's
|
||||
// real MV2 default (extensions.webextensions.default-content-security-
|
||||
// policy) is `script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval';` with no object-src
|
||||
// at all, so this string leaves script-src unchanged and ADDS
|
||||
// object-src 'self', constraining <object>/<embed> sources that were
|
||||
// previously unrestricted. Against MDN's documented MV2 default
|
||||
// (`script-src 'self'; object-src 'self';`) it is a one-token loosening,
|
||||
// identical to Chrome. Same policy, different manifest shape.
|
||||
test("firefox MV2 allows WASM and nothing else beyond 'self'", () => {
|
||||
const csp = readManifest("firefox").content_security_policy;
|
||||
expect(typeof csp).toBe("string");
|
||||
assertPolicy(csp);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The two targets share one codebase and one crypto path; a policy
|
||||
// that drifts apart between them means one of the two builds is
|
||||
// running a backend nothing tests.
|
||||
test("both targets ship the same policy", () => {
|
||||
const chrome =
|
||||
readManifest("chrome").content_security_policy.extension_pages;
|
||||
const firefox = readManifest("firefox").content_security_policy;
|
||||
expect(firefox).toBe(chrome);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
52
tests/vaultBackend.test.js
Normal file
52
tests/vaultBackend.test.js
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
|
||||
// The unit tests must exercise the libsodium backend that actually ships
|
||||
// (#182). Before this, they could not: node compiles WebAssembly happily,
|
||||
// the extension CSP refused it, and so the browser silently ran the
|
||||
// wasm2js translation while every test ran the WASM build.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// With 'wasm-unsafe-eval' in both manifests the two agree, and these tests
|
||||
// hold that agreement in place from the node side. tests/manifest.test.js
|
||||
// holds up the CSP end of it, and the end-to-end suite observes the real
|
||||
// popup.
|
||||
|
||||
const { cryptoBackend } = require("../src/shared/vault");
|
||||
|
||||
// The module libsodium-wrappers-sumo itself requires and drives. Not a new
|
||||
// dependency: it is inspected here, never used to perform crypto, because
|
||||
// it is the only thing that can say which backend is loaded.
|
||||
const SODIUM_CORE = "libsodium-sumo";
|
||||
|
||||
describe("libsodium backend", () => {
|
||||
test("this realm compiles WebAssembly, so the tests run the WASM build", async () => {
|
||||
await expect(cryptoBackend()).resolves.toBe("wasm");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("libsodium did not swap in the wasm2js fallback", async () => {
|
||||
const core = require(SODIUM_CORE);
|
||||
await require("libsodium-wrappers-sumo").ready;
|
||||
// useBackupModule is the entry point to the fallback; taking it
|
||||
// replaces the module's exports with the translation's, and the
|
||||
// entry point goes with them. Still present after ready means the
|
||||
// WASM module is the one in place. The test below is what keeps
|
||||
// that inference honest.
|
||||
expect(typeof core.useBackupModule).toBe("function");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Deliberately last, and deliberately destructive: it takes the
|
||||
// fallback, which replaces the loaded module for the rest of this
|
||||
// file. Jest gives each test file its own module registry, so nothing
|
||||
// outside sees it.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Without this, the check above would be a claim about libsodium's
|
||||
// internals with nothing holding it to account: if a future version
|
||||
// kept useBackupModule on the fallback module too, the marker would
|
||||
// quietly become true in both backends and the test would pass while
|
||||
// measuring nothing. Forcing the fallback and watching the marker
|
||||
// disappear is what makes its presence mean something.
|
||||
test("the fallback marker distinguishes the two backends", async () => {
|
||||
const core = require(SODIUM_CORE);
|
||||
await require("libsodium-wrappers-sumo").ready;
|
||||
expect(typeof core.useBackupModule).toBe("function");
|
||||
await core.useBackupModule();
|
||||
expect(typeof core.useBackupModule).toBe("undefined");
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user