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chore/toke
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
| f7a24374ae |
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# .git is deliberately NOT excluded: build.js shells out to `git rev-parse` for
|
||||
# build-info stamping and the Dockerfile runs `make build`, so excluding it
|
||||
# would make every built extension report commitHash "unknown".
|
||||
.git
|
||||
node_modules
|
||||
.DS_Store
|
||||
dist
|
||||
|
||||
22
Makefile
22
Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e lint fmt fmt-check check docker hooks build build-debug verify-build clean dev
|
||||
.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test lint fmt fmt-check check docker hooks build clean dev
|
||||
|
||||
# Standard targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
|
||||
# per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
|
||||
@@ -11,15 +11,11 @@ setup:
|
||||
@script/setup
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||||
|
||||
install:
|
||||
@yarn install --frozen-lockfile
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||||
@yarn install
|
||||
|
||||
test:
|
||||
@script/test
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||||
|
||||
# Browser end-to-end suite. Requires docker; not part of check.
|
||||
test-e2e:
|
||||
@script/test-e2e
|
||||
|
||||
lint:
|
||||
@script/lint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -41,20 +37,6 @@ hooks:
|
||||
build:
|
||||
@echo "Building extension..."
|
||||
@yarn run build 2>&1
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||||
@script/verify-build
|
||||
|
||||
# Development-only build: enables the red DEBUG / INSECURE banner and makes
|
||||
# the hardcoded test recovery phrase the output of wallet creation. Never
|
||||
# distribute the artifacts this produces.
|
||||
build-debug:
|
||||
@echo "Building extension (DEBUG)..."
|
||||
@AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 yarn run build 2>&1
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||||
@AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 script/verify-build
|
||||
|
||||
# Assert the compiled DEBUG state of the bundles already in dist/. Runs at
|
||||
# the end of build and build-debug; separate target for re-running it alone.
|
||||
verify-build:
|
||||
@script/verify-build
|
||||
|
||||
clean:
|
||||
@rm -rf dist/
|
||||
|
||||
670
README.md
670
README.md
@@ -31,13 +31,10 @@ list exists to detect symbol spoofing attacks and improve UX.
|
||||
```bash
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git clone https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/autistmask.git
|
||||
cd autistmask
|
||||
make setup
|
||||
make install
|
||||
make build
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`make setup` is the entrypoint for a fresh clone: it installs dependencies from
|
||||
the lockfile and installs the git pre-commit hook.
|
||||
|
||||
Load the extension:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Chrome**: Navigate to `chrome://extensions/`, enable "Developer mode", click
|
||||
@@ -45,30 +42,6 @@ Load the extension:
|
||||
- **Firefox**: Navigate to `about:debugging#/runtime/this-firefox`, click "Load
|
||||
Temporary Add-on", and select `dist/firefox/manifest.json`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Debug Builds
|
||||
|
||||
`make build` always produces a release build: the build-time `DEBUG` constant is
|
||||
`false`, so wallet creation uses real entropy and the red banner is off. To
|
||||
produce a debug build instead, set `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1` in the environment:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
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make build-debug # or: AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 make build
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Only the exact value `1` enables it; any other value (including unset, empty, or
|
||||
`true`) yields a release build, so a typo cannot accidentally ship the debug
|
||||
behavior. The build prints which mode it used. See the
|
||||
[DEBUG Mode Policy](#debug-mode-policy) for what the flag changes. **Never
|
||||
distribute a debug build** — every wallet it creates gets the same publicly
|
||||
known test recovery phrase.
|
||||
|
||||
Both builds end by running `script/verify-build`, which reads the compiled
|
||||
`DEBUG` state back out of the emitted bundles and fails the build if it is not
|
||||
the one that was asked for. The test suite cannot check this: it loads
|
||||
`src/shared/constants.js` outside a bundle, so it only ever sees the fallback
|
||||
value. The assertion is on the artifacts because that is where the property
|
||||
lives.
|
||||
|
||||
## Entrypoints
|
||||
|
||||
This repository adheres to the
|
||||
@@ -83,97 +56,15 @@ provide:
|
||||
git pre-commit hook
|
||||
- `script/projectname` — print the project name (used for the Docker image tag)
|
||||
- `script/test` — run the test suite (jest)
|
||||
- `script/test-e2e` — run the browser end-to-end suite (docker required; see
|
||||
[End-to-End Tests](#end-to-end-tests))
|
||||
- `script/lint` — run the linter
|
||||
- `script/fmt` — format all files (writes)
|
||||
- `script/fmt-check` — check formatting (read-only)
|
||||
- `script/check` — run test, lint, and fmt-check
|
||||
- `script/verify-build` — assert the compiled `DEBUG` state of the bundles in
|
||||
`dist/`: every bundle containing `src/shared/constants.js` must have `DEBUG`
|
||||
off, or on when `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1`. Run automatically at the end of
|
||||
`make build` and `make build-debug`; fails loudly rather than passing if it
|
||||
cannot determine a bundle's state. Not part of `make check`, which does not
|
||||
depend on build artifacts existing.
|
||||
- `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged via `script/projectname`
|
||||
- `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: plain `docker build .`
|
||||
- `script/precommit` — run by the git pre-commit hook; runs `script/check`
|
||||
- `script/install-precommit` — install the git pre-commit hook
|
||||
|
||||
The Makefile shims to those. It also carries a few targets that have no
|
||||
`script/` counterpart and are Makefile-only conveniences:
|
||||
|
||||
- `make install` — `yarn install --frozen-lockfile` on its own, without the rest
|
||||
of `script/bootstrap`. Frozen so a stale `yarn.lock` fails instead of being
|
||||
silently rewritten. Use `make setup` for a fresh clone.
|
||||
- `make hooks` — shims to `script/install-precommit`
|
||||
- `make build` — build the extension into `dist/chrome/` and `dist/firefox/`
|
||||
- `make build-debug` — the same build with `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1` (see
|
||||
[Debug Builds](#debug-builds))
|
||||
- `make clean` — remove `dist/`
|
||||
- `make dev` — build in watch mode
|
||||
|
||||
## End-to-End Tests
|
||||
|
||||
`make test-e2e` builds `dist/chrome/` and drives the **real popup in a real
|
||||
Chrome**, loaded as an unpacked MV3 extension inside a pinned
|
||||
`mcr.microsoft.com/playwright` container (pinned by digest in `script/test-e2e`;
|
||||
docker is required and the suite fails loudly rather than skipping if it is
|
||||
unavailable). The suite lives in `tests/e2e/` and is driven by
|
||||
`playwright-core`, whose version must stay matched to the container's Playwright
|
||||
version — the browsers ship inside the image.
|
||||
|
||||
It covers popup load, wallet creation through the UI, the Add Token screen and
|
||||
the transaction detail screen for an ERC-20 transfer. All outbound network is
|
||||
intercepted at the browser level and served from fixtures in
|
||||
`tests/e2e/network.js`, so the run is deterministic and fully offline;
|
||||
unrecognised outbound requests are reported as failures rather than silently
|
||||
allowed.
|
||||
|
||||
That reporting has one bound worth knowing. Observation ends when the browser
|
||||
context is torn down, and nothing can watch traffic after that, so the run keeps
|
||||
collecting for a fixed grace period after the last test returns
|
||||
(`TRAILING_WATCH_MS` in `tests/e2e/run.js`, currently 1500ms) and then closes
|
||||
the context. A request whose _first_ dispatch falls after that window is never
|
||||
seen at all and cannot fail the run. In practice a request a test fires without
|
||||
awaiting reaches the route handler about 10ms later, and anything on a repeating
|
||||
timer gets observed on an earlier tick during the ~20s suite — but a one-shot
|
||||
call deliberately deferred past the window will escape.
|
||||
|
||||
That interception covers the MV3 background service worker as well as the popup
|
||||
page, which it does not by default — `script/test-e2e` sets
|
||||
`PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1` for it. Because that flag is
|
||||
experimental, the harness does not take it on trust. At launch it waits for the
|
||||
background worker's **own** startup request — the phishing blocklist fetch that
|
||||
`src/background/index.js` issues on startup, which on the suite's throwaway
|
||||
profile always happens because no previous fetch timestamp is persisted — to
|
||||
arrive in the route handler, and aborts the entire suite if none does within 30
|
||||
seconds (`tests/e2e/harness.js`). The check is passive on purpose: a synthetic
|
||||
probe fetched from inside the worker via `worker.evaluate()` was tried first and
|
||||
rejected, because evaluating in an extension service worker that early kills the
|
||||
worker outright, destroying the thing being measured. Observing traffic the
|
||||
extension already generates perturbs nothing. Losing the race fails closed — the
|
||||
suite refuses to run rather than passing quietly.
|
||||
|
||||
As defence in depth, Chrome is also started with
|
||||
`--host-resolver-rules=MAP * ~NOTFOUND`, so a request that ever did slip past
|
||||
the route handler could not resolve a host at all. That only bounds the damage;
|
||||
detecting escaping traffic remains the canary's job. To see what is actually
|
||||
being intercepted, run with `E2E_TRACE_NETWORK=1` and every routed request is
|
||||
printed, tagged `[sw]` or `[page]`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Any uncaught page error or `console.error` fails the run.** That is the point:
|
||||
a `ReferenceError` from a used-but-not-imported identifier is invisible to
|
||||
`make check` (`script/lint` is only `prettier --check`) but fatal in a browser,
|
||||
and this suite exists because exactly that class of bug shipped twice.
|
||||
|
||||
`make test-e2e` is deliberately **not** part of `make check` or `make test`.
|
||||
`REPO_POLICIES.md` caps `make test` at 20 seconds and a browser suite does not
|
||||
fit; nothing in `tests/e2e/` is named `*.test.js`, so jest cannot pick it up
|
||||
either. It is also not wired into the Gitea workflow yet — docker-in-docker in
|
||||
CI is a separate question. Run it locally before changing anything under
|
||||
`src/popup/views/`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Rationale
|
||||
|
||||
Common popular EVM wallets have become bloated with swap UIs, portfolio
|
||||
@@ -209,10 +100,9 @@ src/
|
||||
styles/main.css — Tailwind source
|
||||
views/ — one JS module per screen (home, send, approval, etc.)
|
||||
shared/ — modules used by both popup and background
|
||||
alarms.js — recurring background jobs (extension alarms API)
|
||||
balances.js — ETH + ERC-20 balance fetching via RPC + Blockscout
|
||||
constants.js — chain IDs, default RPC endpoint, ERC-20 ABI
|
||||
ens.js — ENS forward/reverse resolution (popup only)
|
||||
ens.js — ENS forward/reverse resolution
|
||||
prices.js — ETH/USD and token/USD via CoinDesk API
|
||||
scamlist.js — known fraud contract addresses
|
||||
state.js — persisted state (extension storage)
|
||||
@@ -226,74 +116,6 @@ manifest/
|
||||
firefox.json — Manifest V2 for Firefox
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Background scheduling
|
||||
|
||||
Chrome runs `src/background/index.js` as a Manifest V3 service worker, which the
|
||||
browser terminates after roughly 30 seconds idle and re-evaluates from scratch
|
||||
on the next event. Two consequences shape every recurring job in the background:
|
||||
|
||||
- `setInterval` and `setTimeout` are useless. They are destroyed with the
|
||||
worker, so a job scheduled that way runs until the first idle period and never
|
||||
again. Both recurring jobs — the 60-second balance refresh and the 24-hour
|
||||
phishing blocklist refresh — are scheduled through the extension alarms API
|
||||
(`src/shared/alarms.js`) instead. The browser holds the schedule and wakes the
|
||||
worker to deliver it. Alarm periods are clamped to a one-minute minimum, so
|
||||
the balance refresh is expressed as exactly one minute and nothing is silently
|
||||
slowed down.
|
||||
- Module-level variables do not survive either. Anything that must be remembered
|
||||
across a restart goes in extension storage, including the timestamp of the
|
||||
last phishing list fetch: without it a revived worker would either re-fetch on
|
||||
every wake or, with a naive in-memory guard, never notice that an update is
|
||||
due. `localStorage` does not exist in a service worker at all — the one
|
||||
remaining user of it, `src/shared/ens.js`, runs only in the popup and is
|
||||
marked as such.
|
||||
|
||||
Both jobs also carry a freshness guard, and a guard must never be timed to the
|
||||
alarm period it gates. Each guard is measured from the moment the last run
|
||||
finished, which is one run-duration after the alarm that started it, so a guard
|
||||
of exactly one period vetoes the very next tick and the real cadence becomes two
|
||||
periods. The two jobs solve this differently, because their guards exist for
|
||||
different reasons:
|
||||
|
||||
- The phishing refresh has a 24-hour cache TTL whose job is to keep the worker
|
||||
off the network on the wakes between scheduled refreshes — Chrome revives the
|
||||
worker every ~30 seconds while the browser is busy, and every revival runs the
|
||||
startup path. The scheduled alarm tick is not one of those wakes, so it
|
||||
bypasses the TTL and fetches unconditionally. Shortening the TTL instead would
|
||||
not work: the startup path re-checks it on every wake, so a shorter TTL simply
|
||||
becomes the real refresh rate.
|
||||
- The balance refresh guard exists to skip work an open popup has already done —
|
||||
the popup refreshes every 10 seconds and stamps the same field. That has to
|
||||
keep applying on the scheduled tick, so the guard is shortened to half the
|
||||
alarm period instead of bypassed: comfortably above the popup's 10 seconds, so
|
||||
an open popup still suppresses the background job, and comfortably below the
|
||||
60-second period, so the schedule always wins.
|
||||
|
||||
Two timestamps are persisted for the phishing list, not one. `lastFetchTime`
|
||||
records a fetch that produced a usable delta and drives the TTL.
|
||||
`lastAttemptTime` records that the network was contacted at all, and is written
|
||||
even when the result is unusable — a failed request, or a delta over the 256 KiB
|
||||
cap. Without it those cases leave no freshness mark and the worker re-downloads
|
||||
the full blocklist on every wake, indefinitely; with it, unscheduled retries are
|
||||
floored at one hour. Both are discarded on load if they are in the future, since
|
||||
a stamp from a skewed clock or a restored backup would otherwise suppress
|
||||
updates until that time arrives, permanently and with no way out.
|
||||
|
||||
The startup path (`ensureRecurringAlarms()` plus the phishing list init) runs on
|
||||
`onInstalled`, on `onStartup`, and at the top level of the worker, so every way
|
||||
the background context can start re-establishes the schedule. On a fresh install
|
||||
more than one of those fires, so they share a single in-flight run rather than
|
||||
racing. It is idempotent: an alarm that already exists with the period the code
|
||||
asks for is left alone, because re-creating one restarts its schedule and a busy
|
||||
extension would push the next fire out indefinitely. An alarm carrying a
|
||||
different period — one created by an earlier version — is re-created once, or a
|
||||
period changed in a new release would never reach an existing install.
|
||||
|
||||
Firefox uses Manifest V2 with a persistent background page, where timers would
|
||||
survive. Both browsers are built from one bundle and both take the alarm path,
|
||||
so there is a single code path to reason about; `"alarms"` is declared in both
|
||||
`manifest/chrome.json` and `manifest/firefox.json`.
|
||||
|
||||
### UI Design Philosophy
|
||||
|
||||
The UI is inspired by _Universal Paperclips_. It's deliberately minimal,
|
||||
@@ -357,10 +179,10 @@ on a different table knows exactly tf I am talking about.
|
||||
|
||||
Every interactive element must visually indicate that it is clickable. Buttons
|
||||
use a visible border, padding, and a hover state (invert to white-on-black).
|
||||
Text that triggers an action (e.g. "Add additional wallet...") uses an
|
||||
underline. No invisible hit targets, no bare text that happens to have a click
|
||||
handler. If it does something when you click it, it must look like it does
|
||||
something when you click it.
|
||||
Text that triggers an action (e.g. "Import private key") uses an underline. No
|
||||
invisible hit targets, no bare text that happens to have a click handler. If it
|
||||
does something when you click it, it must look like it does something when you
|
||||
click it.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Display Consistency
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -420,181 +242,115 @@ attack.
|
||||
|
||||
The core hierarchy is **Wallets → Addresses**:
|
||||
|
||||
- A **wallet** is one of three types:
|
||||
- An **HD wallet** (`type: "hd"`, recovery phrase): generates multiple
|
||||
addresses from a single 12/24 word recovery phrase using BIP-39/BIP-44
|
||||
derivation. The user can add more addresses with a "+" button.
|
||||
- A **key wallet** (`type: "key"`, private key): a single address imported
|
||||
directly from a private key. No "+" button since there is only one
|
||||
address.
|
||||
- An **xprv wallet** (`type: "xprv"`, extended private key): the same
|
||||
multi-address behavior as an HD wallet, including the "+" button and the
|
||||
address scan on import, but imported from an extended private key rather
|
||||
than a recovery phrase. It therefore has no recovery phrase to display or
|
||||
back up.
|
||||
- An **address** holds ETH and ERC-20 tokens.
|
||||
- A **wallet** is either:
|
||||
- An **HD wallet** (recovery phrase): generates multiple addresses from a
|
||||
single 12/24 word recovery phrase using BIP-39/BIP-44 derivation. The user
|
||||
can add more addresses with a "+" button.
|
||||
- A **key wallet** (private key): a single address imported directly from a
|
||||
private key. No "+" button since there is only one address.
|
||||
- An **address** holds ETH and any user-added ERC-20 tokens.
|
||||
- The user can have multiple wallets, each with multiple addresses (HD) or a
|
||||
single address (key).
|
||||
|
||||
Which tokens an address shows is decided by `fetchTokenBalances()` in
|
||||
`src/shared/balances.js`, from the Blockscout `token-balances` response, so
|
||||
tokens do appear without the user adding them. An ERC-20 is shown when its
|
||||
balance is nonzero and it is in the bundled top-250 token list, is tracked by
|
||||
the user, or has 1,000 or more holders; a token claiming a symbol from the
|
||||
bundled list from any other contract address is always dropped. That filter is
|
||||
unconditional — the "Hide tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders" setting governs
|
||||
the transaction history and the send-screen token selector, not this list.
|
||||
Tracked tokens with a zero balance are listed as well while "Show tracked tokens
|
||||
with zero balance" is on.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Navigation
|
||||
|
||||
The main view shows all addresses grouped by wallet, with ETH balances inline.
|
||||
The user taps an address to see its detail view (full address, balance, tokens,
|
||||
send/receive). Navigation is a stack: each forward action pushes the current
|
||||
screen, and every view has a "Back" or "Cancel" button that pops back to it (see
|
||||
the Screen Map below). There is no hamburger menu and no persistent tab bar; the
|
||||
Settings gear in the title bar is the only global control. Two screens carry an
|
||||
in-screen control beyond that: AddWallet uses three tabs to select the import
|
||||
mode, and AddressDetail keeps its one rarely-used action ("Export Private Key")
|
||||
behind a "···" menu.
|
||||
send/receive). Navigation is flat — every view has a "Back" or "Cancel" button
|
||||
that returns to the previous context. No deep nesting, no tabs, no hamburger
|
||||
menus.
|
||||
|
||||
### Screen Map
|
||||
|
||||
Navigation uses a stack model (like iOS): each forward action pushes the current
|
||||
screen onto `state.viewStack`, and "Back" pops it (`pushCurrentView()` and
|
||||
`goBack()` in `src/popup/views/helpers.js`). The root screen is either Welcome
|
||||
(no wallets) or Home (has wallets). Each screen below gives its view id in
|
||||
parentheses; the registry of view ids is the `VIEWS` array in
|
||||
`src/popup/views/helpers.js`, and the markup for a screen is the element with id
|
||||
`view-` plus that view id in `src/popup/index.html`.
|
||||
Navigation uses a stack model (like iOS): each action pushes a screen onto the
|
||||
stack, and "Back" pops it. The root screen is either Welcome (no wallets) or
|
||||
Home (has wallets). Screens are listed below with their elements and
|
||||
transitions.
|
||||
|
||||
Three elements sit outside the screens and are present on all of them: the title
|
||||
bar ("AutistMask by @sneak" plus the Settings gear), the flash message line
|
||||
under it, and the red banner at the very top that appears on a debug build, when
|
||||
runtime debug mode is on, or when the active network is a testnet. They are not
|
||||
repeated in the element lists below.
|
||||
#### Welcome
|
||||
|
||||
Closing and reopening the popup returns to the screen the user was last on only
|
||||
for the views listed in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS` (`src/popup/index.js`). Every other
|
||||
screen, including ExportPrivKey, falls back to Home.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Welcome (`welcome`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: No wallets exist yet (`state.hasWallet` is false). This is the root
|
||||
screen in that case.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Welcome! To get started, add a wallet." text
|
||||
- "Add wallet" button
|
||||
- **When**: No wallets exist yet.
|
||||
- **Elements**: "AutistMask" heading, brief intro text, "Add wallet" button.
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Add wallet" → **AddWallet**
|
||||
|
||||
#### Home (`main`)
|
||||
#### Home
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: At least one wallet exists. This is the root screen.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- Active address ETH balance (large) + USD value in parentheses
|
||||
- "Total:" USD value across ETH and every token shown for the active address
|
||||
- Header: "AutistMask", Settings gear button
|
||||
- Active address ETH balance (large) + USD value (inline parentheses)
|
||||
- Total USD value across all tokens (small text)
|
||||
- Active address (color dot, full address, etherscan link, tap to copy)
|
||||
- Send / Receive quick-action buttons, both acting on the active address
|
||||
- Send / Receive quick-action buttons
|
||||
- ETH/USD price display
|
||||
- Wallet list: each wallet shows its name (tap to rename inline) and a "+"
|
||||
button for HD and xprv wallets, then one block per address with "Address
|
||||
N" (bold when active), the ENS name if resolved, the full address, an
|
||||
`[info]` button, the address USD total, and a balance line for ETH and for
|
||||
each token shown for that address
|
||||
- "Recent Transactions": up to 25 transactions merged across every address
|
||||
of every wallet, deduplicated by hash and filtered
|
||||
- Wallet list: each wallet shows name (tap to rename), "+" button (HD only),
|
||||
and its addresses with color dots, balances, and `[info]` buttons
|
||||
- Recent transactions across all addresses (merged, deduplicated, filtered)
|
||||
- "Add additional wallet..." link at bottom
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- Tap address row → sets the active address and broadcasts
|
||||
`AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED` (no screen change)
|
||||
- Tap wallet name → inline rename field (no screen change)
|
||||
- "+" on wallet → derives the next address inline (no screen change)
|
||||
- Tap address row → sets active address (no screen change)
|
||||
- `[info]` on address → **AddressDetail**
|
||||
- "Send" → **Send** (refuses with a flash message on a zero balance)
|
||||
- "Send" → **Send** (selects active address)
|
||||
- "Receive" → **Receive** (shows active address QR)
|
||||
- Tap home tx row → **TransactionDetail**
|
||||
- "+" on wallet → derives next address inline
|
||||
- "Add additional wallet..." → **AddWallet**
|
||||
- Settings gear → **Settings** (toggles; tap again to return)
|
||||
- Tap home tx row → **AddressDetail** (for the address involved)
|
||||
|
||||
#### AddWallet (`add-wallet`)
|
||||
#### AddWallet
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User wants to add a new wallet (from Welcome, Home, or Settings).
|
||||
This one screen covers all three import modes; there is no separate import
|
||||
screen.
|
||||
- **When**: User wants to add a new wallet (from Home, Welcome, or Settings).
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Back" button, "Add Wallet" heading
|
||||
- Three tabs — "From Phrase" (`tab-mnemonic`), "From Key" (`tab-privkey`),
|
||||
"From xprv" (`tab-xprv`) — each showing its own form section:
|
||||
- **From Phrase**: instruction text, a die button that generates a
|
||||
random recovery phrase, a recovery phrase textarea, and a backup
|
||||
warning box that becomes visible once the die button has been used
|
||||
- **From Key**: instruction text and a masked private key input
|
||||
- **From xprv**: instruction text and a masked extended private key
|
||||
input
|
||||
- Password + confirm password inputs, with a hint line whose wording depends
|
||||
on the selected tab
|
||||
- "Add Wallet" heading, "Back" button
|
||||
- Instruction text
|
||||
- Die button `[die]` (generates random recovery phrase)
|
||||
- Recovery phrase textarea
|
||||
- Backup warning box (shown after die is clicked)
|
||||
- Password + confirm password inputs
|
||||
- "Add" button
|
||||
- "Have a private key instead?" link
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Add" (valid phrase + password) → **Home**
|
||||
- "Back" → previous screen (Home or Welcome)
|
||||
- "Have a private key instead?" → **ImportKey**
|
||||
|
||||
#### ImportKey
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User wants to import a single private key.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Import Private Key" heading, "Back" button
|
||||
- Instruction text
|
||||
- Private key input (password-masked)
|
||||
- Password + confirm password inputs
|
||||
- "Import" button
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Import" with a valid entry and a matching password of at least 12
|
||||
characters → creates the wallet, clears the navigation stack, and →
|
||||
**Home**. The phrase and xprv modes then scan for further used addresses
|
||||
and report the count as a flash message.
|
||||
- "Import" with an invalid entry, a duplicate wallet or address, or a short
|
||||
or mismatched password → flash message, no screen change
|
||||
- "Back" → previous screen (Welcome, Home, or Settings)
|
||||
- "Import" (valid key + password) → **Home**
|
||||
- "Back" → **AddWallet**
|
||||
|
||||
#### AddressDetail (`address`)
|
||||
#### AddressDetail
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User tapped `[info]` on an address from Home.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Back" button
|
||||
- Blockie identicon (48px, centered)
|
||||
- Title: "Wallet Name — Address N"
|
||||
- ENS name (if resolved, bold above the address)
|
||||
- ENS name (if resolved, bold with color dot)
|
||||
- Full address (color dot, etherscan link, tap to copy)
|
||||
- USD total for address
|
||||
- Balance list: ETH + the ERC-20 tokens shown for this address (4 decimal
|
||||
places, USD inline). Each balance row is clickable → **AddressToken**
|
||||
- Send / Receive / + Token buttons and a "···" menu button
|
||||
- "···" dropdown containing a single "Export Private Key" entry
|
||||
- Balance list: ETH + tracked ERC-20 tokens (4 decimal places, USD inline).
|
||||
Each balance row is clickable → **AddressToken**
|
||||
- Send / Receive / + Token buttons
|
||||
- Transaction list (with ENS resolution for counterparties)
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- Tap balance row → **AddressToken** (for that token)
|
||||
- "Send" → **Send** (refuses with a flash message on a zero balance)
|
||||
- "Send" → **Send**
|
||||
- "Receive" → **Receive**
|
||||
- "+ Token" → **AddToken**
|
||||
- "···" → "Export Private Key" → **ExportPrivKey**
|
||||
- Tap transaction row → **TransactionDetail**
|
||||
- "Back" → previous screen (Home)
|
||||
- "Back" → **Home**
|
||||
|
||||
#### ExportPrivKey (`export-privkey`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User chose "Export Private Key" from the "···" menu on
|
||||
AddressDetail. This screen discloses secret material.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Back" button
|
||||
- Blockie identicon (48px, centered)
|
||||
- "Export Private Key" heading
|
||||
- "Wallet Name — Address N" and the full address (etherscan link, tap to
|
||||
copy)
|
||||
- Warning that anyone holding the private key can transfer all funds from
|
||||
the address
|
||||
- Error line
|
||||
- Password input and "Reveal" button, shown until the key is revealed
|
||||
- The private key on a highlighted background, tap to copy, shown only after
|
||||
the password has been accepted
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Reveal" (correct password) → decrypts the wallet secret, derives this
|
||||
address's key, hides the password input and shows the key (no screen
|
||||
change)
|
||||
- "Reveal" (wrong password) → "Wrong password." on the error line, nothing
|
||||
revealed
|
||||
- "Back" → clears the key and password from the DOM, then → previous screen
|
||||
(AddressDetail)
|
||||
|
||||
#### AddressToken (`address-token`)
|
||||
#### AddressToken
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User clicked a specific token balance on AddressDetail.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
@@ -605,64 +361,49 @@ screen, including ExportPrivKey, falls back to Home.
|
||||
- USD total for this token
|
||||
- Single token balance line (4 decimal places)
|
||||
- Send / Receive buttons
|
||||
- Token contract well (ERC-20 only): full contract address (tap to copy,
|
||||
etherscan link) plus name, symbol, decimals, holder count and project
|
||||
website where known
|
||||
- Token-filtered transaction list (only this token's transfers)
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Send" → **Send** (token locked: the dropdown is replaced by a static
|
||||
symbol and contract address)
|
||||
- "Send" → **Send** (token pre-selected and locked in dropdown)
|
||||
- "Receive" → **Receive** (ERC-20 warning shown for non-ETH tokens)
|
||||
- Tap transaction row → **TransactionDetail**
|
||||
- "Back" → previous screen (AddressDetail)
|
||||
- "Back" → **AddressDetail**
|
||||
|
||||
#### Send (`send`)
|
||||
#### Send
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User wants to send ETH or a token, from Home, AddressDetail, or
|
||||
AddressToken.
|
||||
- **When**: User wants to send ETH or a token from this address.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Back" button, "Send" heading
|
||||
- "Send" heading, "Back" button
|
||||
- From: address with color dot + etherscan link
|
||||
- What to send: token dropdown (or static display with contract address when
|
||||
locked from AddressToken)
|
||||
- To: address or ENS name input, with an inline validation message
|
||||
- To: address or ENS name input
|
||||
- Amount input with current balance display
|
||||
- "Review" button, disabled until the recipient validates
|
||||
- "Review" button
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Review" (valid inputs, ENS resolved) → **ConfirmTx**
|
||||
- "Review" with an unresolvable ENS name or an invalid amount → flash
|
||||
message, no screen change
|
||||
- "Back" → previous screen (Home, AddressDetail, or AddressToken)
|
||||
- "Back" → **AddressToken** (if came from token view) or **AddressDetail**
|
||||
|
||||
#### ConfirmTx (`confirm-tx`)
|
||||
#### ConfirmTx
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User reviewed send details and is ready to authorize.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Back" button, "Confirm Transaction" heading
|
||||
- "Confirm Transaction" heading, "Back" button
|
||||
- Type: "Native ETH transfer" or "ERC-20 token transfer (SYMBOL)"
|
||||
- Token contract: full address + etherscan link (ERC-20 only)
|
||||
- From: blockie + color dot + full address + etherscan link + wallet title
|
||||
- To: blockie + color dot + full address + etherscan link + ENS name
|
||||
- Amount: value + symbol (USD in parentheses)
|
||||
- Your balance: value + symbol (USD in parentheses)
|
||||
- Estimated network fee: "Estimating..." then the ETH amount (USD in
|
||||
parentheses) or "Unable to estimate", fetched async
|
||||
- Warnings: inline warnings from the local checks (scam address, self-send)
|
||||
plus four reserved warning boxes made visible by the async checks —
|
||||
recipient with no transaction history, recipient is a contract, burn
|
||||
address, and an Etherscan phishing/scam label
|
||||
- Estimated network fee: ETH amount (USD in parentheses), fetched async
|
||||
- Warnings (scam address, self-send)
|
||||
- Errors (insufficient balance)
|
||||
- Password: an inline field on this screen, not a modal, with its own error
|
||||
line
|
||||
- "Sign & Send" button (disabled if errors)
|
||||
- "Send" button (disabled if errors)
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Sign & Send" (correct password) → broadcast tx → **WaitTx**
|
||||
- "Sign & Send" (correct password) → broadcast fails → **ErrorTx**
|
||||
- "Sign & Send" (wrong password) → "Wrong password." on the password error
|
||||
line, no screen change
|
||||
- "Send" → password modal → broadcast tx → **WaitTx**
|
||||
- "Send" → password modal → broadcast fails → **ErrorTx**
|
||||
- "Back" → **Send**
|
||||
|
||||
#### WaitTx (`wait-tx`)
|
||||
#### WaitTx
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: Transaction has been broadcast, waiting for on-chain confirmation.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
@@ -676,24 +417,20 @@ screen, including ExportPrivKey, falls back to Home.
|
||||
- Receipt found → **SuccessTx**
|
||||
- 60 seconds without confirmation → **ErrorTx** (timeout message)
|
||||
|
||||
#### SuccessTx (`success-tx`)
|
||||
#### SuccessTx
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: Transaction confirmed on-chain.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Transaction Confirmed" heading
|
||||
- Decoded action well (shown when the transaction carried recognized
|
||||
calldata; the top-level Amount and To are hidden in that case)
|
||||
- Amount + symbol
|
||||
- To: color dot + full address + etherscan link
|
||||
- Block number
|
||||
- Transaction hash: full hash (tap to copy) + etherscan link
|
||||
- "Done" button
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Done" in the approval popup → closes the popup window
|
||||
- "Done" otherwise → resets the navigation stack, then → **AddressToken**
|
||||
(if `selectedToken` set) or **AddressDetail**
|
||||
- "Done" → **AddressToken** (if `selectedToken` set) or **AddressDetail**
|
||||
|
||||
#### ErrorTx (`error-tx`)
|
||||
#### ErrorTx
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: Transaction broadcast failed, or timed out waiting for confirmation.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
@@ -705,28 +442,24 @@ screen, including ExportPrivKey, falls back to Home.
|
||||
full hash (tap to copy) + etherscan link
|
||||
- "Done" button
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Done" in the approval popup → closes the popup window
|
||||
- "Done" otherwise → resets the navigation stack, then → **AddressToken**
|
||||
(if `selectedToken` set) or **AddressDetail**
|
||||
- "Done" → **AddressToken** (if `selectedToken` set) or **AddressDetail**
|
||||
|
||||
#### Receive (`receive`)
|
||||
#### Receive
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User wants to receive funds at this address, from Home,
|
||||
AddressDetail, or AddressToken.
|
||||
- **When**: User wants to receive funds at this address.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Back" button, "Receive" heading
|
||||
- "Receive" heading, "Back" button
|
||||
- Instruction text
|
||||
- QR code encoding the address
|
||||
- Full address (color dot, selectable, etherscan link)
|
||||
- "Copy address" button
|
||||
- ERC-20 warning (shown when navigating from AddressToken for non-ETH token)
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Back" → previous screen (Home, AddressDetail, or AddressToken)
|
||||
- "Back" → **AddressToken** (if `selectedToken` set) or **AddressDetail**
|
||||
|
||||
#### TransactionDetail (`transaction`)
|
||||
#### TransactionDetail
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User tapped a transaction row on Home, AddressDetail, or
|
||||
AddressToken.
|
||||
- **When**: User tapped a transaction row from AddressDetail or AddressToken.
|
||||
- **Elements** (grouped into logical blocks using light well containers; field
|
||||
labels are self-explanatory so groups have no headings):
|
||||
- "Transaction" heading, "Back" button
|
||||
@@ -751,182 +484,91 @@ screen, including ExportPrivKey, falls back to Home.
|
||||
- Raw data (shown when calldata is present): full calldata in monospace
|
||||
dashed border
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Back" → previous screen (Home, AddressDetail, or AddressToken)
|
||||
- "Back" → **AddressToken** (if `selectedToken` set) or **AddressDetail**
|
||||
|
||||
#### AddToken (`add-token`)
|
||||
#### AddToken
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User wants to track an ERC-20 token, reached from "+ Token" on
|
||||
AddressDetail.
|
||||
- **When**: User wants to track an ERC-20 token on this address.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Back" button, "Add Token" heading
|
||||
- "Add Token" heading, "Back" button
|
||||
- Instruction text (find contract address on Etherscan)
|
||||
- Contract address input
|
||||
- Status line ("Looking up token...", cleared or replaced on failure)
|
||||
- Common token quick-pick buttons (top 25 by market cap), which fill the
|
||||
contract address input
|
||||
- Token info preview (name, symbol — fetched from contract)
|
||||
- Common token quick-pick buttons
|
||||
- "Add" button
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Add" (valid contract) → tracks the token, pops the stack, and re-renders
|
||||
**AddressDetail**
|
||||
- "Add" with a token already tracked, a scam-listed address, or a failed
|
||||
contract lookup → flash message, no screen change
|
||||
- "Back" → previous screen (AddressDetail)
|
||||
- "Add" (valid contract) → **AddressDetail**
|
||||
- "Back" → **AddressDetail**
|
||||
|
||||
#### Settings (`settings`)
|
||||
#### Settings
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User tapped the Settings gear.
|
||||
- **When**: User tapped Settings gear from Home.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Back" button, "Settings" heading
|
||||
- Wallets: one row per wallet with its name (tap to rename inline) and an
|
||||
`[x]` delete button, plus a "+ Add wallet" button
|
||||
- Tracked Tokens: one row per tracked token with an `[x]` remove button,
|
||||
plus a "+ Add token" button
|
||||
- Display: "Show tracked tokens with zero balance" checkbox and a Theme
|
||||
selector (System / Light / Dark)
|
||||
- Network: network selector (Ethereum Mainnet / Sepolia Testnet); switching
|
||||
resets the RPC and Blockscout endpoints to that network's defaults
|
||||
- Ethereum RPC: endpoint URL input + "Save" button (validated against
|
||||
`eth_chainId` before being saved)
|
||||
- Blockscout API: endpoint URL input + "Save" button (validated against
|
||||
`/stats` before being saved)
|
||||
- "Settings" heading, "Back" button
|
||||
- Wallets: "+ Add wallet" button
|
||||
- Display: "Show tracked tokens with zero balance" checkbox
|
||||
- Ethereum RPC: endpoint URL input + "Save" button
|
||||
- Blockscout API: endpoint URL input + "Save" button
|
||||
- Token Spam Protection:
|
||||
- "Hide tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders" checkbox
|
||||
- "Hide transactions from detected fraud contracts" checkbox
|
||||
- "Hide dust transactions below N gwei" checkbox + threshold input
|
||||
- "UTC Timestamps" checkbox
|
||||
- Allowed Sites: list with remove buttons
|
||||
- Denied Sites: list with remove buttons
|
||||
- About: project link, license, author, version, release date, and the
|
||||
commit, which links to the commit in the repository
|
||||
- Debug: hidden until revealed, then an "Enable debug mode" checkbox that
|
||||
turns on the red banner and verbose logging
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "+ Add wallet" → **AddWallet**
|
||||
- "+ Add token" → **SettingsAddToken**
|
||||
- `[x]` on a wallet → **DeleteWallet**
|
||||
- Tap wallet name → inline rename field (no screen change)
|
||||
- `[x]` on a tracked token or a site → removes it in place (no screen
|
||||
change)
|
||||
- Ten clicks on the version → reveals the Debug well (no screen change)
|
||||
- "Back" (or Settings gear again) → previous screen (Home)
|
||||
- "Back" (or Settings gear again) → **Home**
|
||||
|
||||
#### DeleteWallet (`delete-wallet-confirm`)
|
||||
#### SiteApproval
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User tapped the `[x]` next to a wallet in Settings.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Back" button, "Delete Wallet" heading
|
||||
- Warning naming the wallet and stating that deletion is permanent and any
|
||||
funds are unrecoverable without the recovery phrase
|
||||
- Error line
|
||||
- Password input
|
||||
- "Confirm Delete" button
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Confirm Delete" (correct password, other wallets remain) → deletes the
|
||||
wallet and its site permissions, then → **Settings** with a "Wallet
|
||||
deleted." flash message
|
||||
- "Confirm Delete" (correct password, last wallet) → deletes the wallet,
|
||||
clears the selection and the navigation stack, then → **Welcome**
|
||||
- Either way, the active address moves only if it belonged to the deleted
|
||||
wallet, and `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED` is broadcast when it does
|
||||
(`src/shared/walletDelete.js`)
|
||||
- "Confirm Delete" (wrong password) → "Wrong password." on the error line,
|
||||
nothing deleted
|
||||
- "Back" → previous screen (Settings)
|
||||
|
||||
#### SettingsAddToken (`settings-addtoken`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: User tapped "+ Add token" in Settings. Tokens added here are tracked
|
||||
across every address, unlike AddToken which is reached from one address.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Back" button, "Add Token" heading
|
||||
- Instruction text
|
||||
- "Top tokens:" quick-pick buttons (top 10 by market cap; already-tracked
|
||||
tokens are disabled)
|
||||
- "Or pick from top 100:" dropdown (already-tracked tokens are disabled) +
|
||||
"Add selected" button
|
||||
- "Or enter contract address:" input, a status line, and an "Add" button
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- Any of the three add paths, on success → adds the token and shows an
|
||||
"Added SYMBOL" flash message (no screen change)
|
||||
- A duplicate, a scam-listed address, or a failed contract lookup → flash
|
||||
message, no screen change
|
||||
- "Back" → previous screen (Settings)
|
||||
|
||||
#### SiteApproval (`approve-site`)
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: A website requests wallet access via `eth_requestAccounts` or
|
||||
`wallet_requestPermissions` and is on neither the allowed nor the denied list.
|
||||
The background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`) and
|
||||
falls back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
|
||||
`requestApproval()`).
|
||||
- **When**: A website requests wallet access via `eth_requestAccounts`. Opened
|
||||
in a separate popup by the background script.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Connection Request" heading
|
||||
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
|
||||
blocklist)
|
||||
- Site hostname (bold) + "wants to connect to your wallet"
|
||||
- Site hostname (bold)
|
||||
- Address that will be shared (color dot + full address + etherscan link)
|
||||
- "Remember my choice for this site" checkbox
|
||||
- "Allow" / "Deny" buttons
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Allow" / "Deny" → closes popup (returns result to background script; the
|
||||
choice is persisted to the allowed or denied list when "Remember" is
|
||||
checked)
|
||||
- Popup closed without answering → treated as a denial
|
||||
- "Allow" / "Deny" → closes popup (returns result to background script)
|
||||
|
||||
#### TxApproval (`approve-tx`)
|
||||
#### TxApproval
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: A connected website requests a transaction via
|
||||
`eth_sendTransaction`. Always opened in a separate popup window by the
|
||||
background script (`windows.create()`), because the request is triggered
|
||||
programmatically rather than by a user gesture.
|
||||
`eth_sendTransaction`. Opened via the toolbar popup by the background script.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Transaction Request" heading
|
||||
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
|
||||
blocklist)
|
||||
- Site hostname (bold) + "wants to send a transaction"
|
||||
- Decoded action (if calldata is recognized): action name, token details,
|
||||
amounts, steps, deadline (see Transaction Decoding)
|
||||
- From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
|
||||
- Contract: color dot + full address + etherscan link (or "contract
|
||||
- To/Contract: color dot + full address + etherscan link (or "contract
|
||||
creation"), token symbol label if known
|
||||
- Value: amount in ETH (4 decimal places, USD in parentheses)
|
||||
- Value: amount in ETH (4 decimal places)
|
||||
- Raw data: full calldata displayed inline (shown if present)
|
||||
- Password input and an error line
|
||||
- Password input
|
||||
- "Confirm" / "Reject" buttons
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Confirm" (correct password) → decrypts and signs in the popup, hands the
|
||||
signed transaction to the background to broadcast, then → **WaitTx** in
|
||||
the same popup window
|
||||
- "Confirm" (wrong password) → error line, no screen change
|
||||
- "Confirm" (with password) → closes popup (returns result to background)
|
||||
- "Reject" → closes popup (returns rejection to background)
|
||||
- Popup window closed without answering → the request is rejected with
|
||||
EIP-1193 code 4001
|
||||
|
||||
#### SignApproval (`approve-sign`)
|
||||
#### SignApproval
|
||||
|
||||
- **When**: A connected website requests a message signature via
|
||||
`personal_sign`, `eth_sign`, or `eth_signTypedData_v4`. Opened the same way as
|
||||
TxApproval, in a separate popup window.
|
||||
`personal_sign`, `eth_sign`, or `eth_signTypedData_v4`. Opened via the toolbar
|
||||
popup by the background script.
|
||||
- **Elements**:
|
||||
- "Signature Request" heading
|
||||
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
|
||||
blocklist)
|
||||
- Site hostname (bold) + "wants you to sign a message"
|
||||
- Danger warning box (shown for `eth_sign`, which signs a raw hash)
|
||||
- Type: "Personal message" or "Typed data (EIP-712)"
|
||||
- From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
|
||||
- Message: decoded UTF-8 text (personal_sign) or formatted domain/type/
|
||||
message fields (EIP-712 typed data)
|
||||
- Password input and an error line
|
||||
- Password input
|
||||
- "Sign" / "Reject" buttons
|
||||
- **Transitions**:
|
||||
- "Sign" (correct password) → signs locally → closes popup (returns
|
||||
signature)
|
||||
- "Sign" (wrong password, or a signing failure) → error line, no screen
|
||||
change
|
||||
- "Sign" (with password) → signs locally → closes popup (returns signature)
|
||||
- "Reject" → closes popup (returns rejection to background)
|
||||
- Popup window closed without answering → the request is rejected with
|
||||
EIP-1193 code 4001
|
||||
|
||||
### External Services
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -962,7 +604,7 @@ communicates with three external services to function as a wallet:
|
||||
What the extension does NOT do:
|
||||
|
||||
- No analytics or telemetry services
|
||||
- No token list APIs (the top-250 token list is bundled at build time)
|
||||
- No token list APIs (user adds tokens manually by contract address)
|
||||
- No Infura/Alchemy dependency (any JSON-RPC endpoint works)
|
||||
- No backend servers operated by the developer
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -972,14 +614,9 @@ CoinDesk price API, and Blockscout API), AutistMask also contacts:
|
||||
- **Phishing domain blocklist**: A community-maintained phishing domain
|
||||
blocklist is vendored into the extension at build time. At runtime, the
|
||||
extension fetches the live list once every 24 hours to detect newly added
|
||||
domains, plus once on a start where the list is more than 24 hours old. Only
|
||||
the delta (domains not already in the vendored list) is kept in memory,
|
||||
keeping runtime memory usage small. The delta and the timestamp of the fetch
|
||||
that produced it are persisted to extension storage if the record is under 256
|
||||
KiB; an oversized delta is dropped along with its timestamp, so a later start
|
||||
fetches again rather than claiming freshness for data it no longer holds. A
|
||||
fetch that fails, or one whose delta was too large to store, is not retried
|
||||
more than once an hour outside the 24-hour schedule.
|
||||
domains. Only the delta (domains not already in the vendored list) is kept in
|
||||
memory, keeping runtime memory usage small. The delta is persisted to
|
||||
localStorage if it is under 256 KiB.
|
||||
- **Etherscan address labels**: When confirming a transaction, the extension
|
||||
performs a best-effort lookup of the recipient address on Etherscan to check
|
||||
for phishing/scam labels. This is a direct page fetch with no API key; the
|
||||
@@ -1031,19 +668,6 @@ flows, or alter program behavior beyond the banner and the hardcoded mnemonic.
|
||||
Adding new DEBUG-conditional branches requires explicit approval from the
|
||||
project owner.
|
||||
|
||||
`DEBUG` is a build-time constant, not a runtime setting. `build.js` injects it
|
||||
into the bundle as the `__BUILD_DEBUG__` define — `false` unless the build was
|
||||
run with `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1` (see [Debug Builds](#debug-builds)) — and
|
||||
`src/shared/constants.js` reads it. It cannot be changed after the bundle is
|
||||
produced.
|
||||
|
||||
The debug-mode toggle in settings is a separate, runtime-only flag. It raises
|
||||
the log level and turns the banner on, and that is all it may ever do: it feeds
|
||||
`isDebug()` in `src/shared/log.js`, which is deliberately not what
|
||||
`generateMnemonic()` consults. Mnemonic generation reads the build-time `DEBUG`
|
||||
constant directly, so no runtime toggle in a release build can reach the
|
||||
hardcoded test phrase.
|
||||
|
||||
### Key Decisions
|
||||
|
||||
- **No framework**: The popup UI is vanilla JS and HTML. The extension is small
|
||||
@@ -1086,12 +710,10 @@ hardcoded test phrase.
|
||||
- Create new HD wallet (generates 12-word recovery phrase)
|
||||
- Import HD wallet from existing 12 or 24 word recovery phrase
|
||||
- Import single-address wallet from private key
|
||||
- Import multi-address wallet from an extended private key (`xprv`)
|
||||
- Add multiple addresses within an HD wallet
|
||||
- Manage multiple wallets simultaneously
|
||||
- View ETH balance per address
|
||||
- View ERC-20 token balances (bundled top-250 tokens, tokens with 1,000 or more
|
||||
holders, and tokens the user adds by contract address)
|
||||
- View ERC-20 token balances (user adds token by contract address)
|
||||
- Send ETH to an address
|
||||
- Send ERC-20 tokens to an address
|
||||
- Receive ETH/tokens (display address, copy to clipboard, QR code)
|
||||
@@ -1183,8 +805,7 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
|
||||
it. AutistMask hides transactions below a configurable dust threshold
|
||||
(default: 100,000 gwei / 0.0001 ETH). This is high enough to filter poisoning
|
||||
dust while low enough to preserve any transfer a user would plausibly care
|
||||
about. The threshold is user-configurable in Settings; a threshold of `0`
|
||||
hides nothing, exactly as clearing the checkbox does.
|
||||
about. The threshold is user-configurable in Settings.
|
||||
|
||||
- **User-configurable**: All of the above filters (known symbol verification,
|
||||
low-holder threshold, fraud contract blocklist, dust threshold) are settings
|
||||
@@ -1202,12 +823,6 @@ live list once every 24 hours and keeps only the delta (newly added domains not
|
||||
in the vendored list) in memory. This architecture keeps runtime memory usage
|
||||
small while ensuring fresh coverage of new phishing domains.
|
||||
|
||||
The 24-hour cadence is an alarm, not a timer; the alarm tick fetches
|
||||
unconditionally rather than re-checking the 24-hour cache TTL that gates the
|
||||
startup path; and the fetch timestamps live in extension storage rather than in
|
||||
module variables — see [Background scheduling](#background-scheduling) for why
|
||||
all three are required.
|
||||
|
||||
When a dApp on a blocklisted domain requests a wallet connection, transaction
|
||||
approval, or signature, the approval popup displays a prominent red warning
|
||||
banner alerting the user. The domain checker matches exact hostnames and all
|
||||
@@ -1244,8 +859,7 @@ Currently supported:
|
||||
- Built in token swaps (use a DEX in the browser)
|
||||
- Analytics, telemetry, or tracking of any kind
|
||||
- Advertisements or promotions
|
||||
- Obscure token list auto-discovery — nothing outside the bundled list, the
|
||||
1,000-holder floor, and the tokens the user added by contract address
|
||||
- Obscure token list auto-discovery (user adds tokens manually)
|
||||
- We detect common/popular ERC20s in the basic case
|
||||
- Fiat on/off ramps
|
||||
- Extensive transaction decoding/parsing
|
||||
@@ -1261,18 +875,18 @@ Currently supported:
|
||||
|
||||
### Wallet Management
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Delete wallet (with confirmation)
|
||||
- [ ] Delete wallet (with confirmation)
|
||||
- [ ] Delete address from HD wallet (with confirmation)
|
||||
- [ ] Show wallet's recovery phrase (requires password)
|
||||
|
||||
### Transactions
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Gas estimation and fee display before confirming
|
||||
- [ ] Gas estimation and fee display before confirming
|
||||
|
||||
### Testing
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Tests for mnemonic generation and address derivation
|
||||
- [x] Tests for xpub derivation and child address generation
|
||||
- [ ] Tests for mnemonic generation and address derivation
|
||||
- [ ] Tests for xpub derivation and child address generation
|
||||
- [ ] Test on Firefox (Manifest V2)
|
||||
|
||||
### Scam List
|
||||
@@ -1303,17 +917,13 @@ covered by the GPL-3.0 license above. These files, their copyright holders, and
|
||||
their licenses are:
|
||||
|
||||
| File | Source | Copyright | License |
|
||||
| ---------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json` | `eth-phishing-detect` community-maintained phishing domain blocklist, vendored from its `src/config.json` | Copyright (c) 2018 kumavis | [DBAD (Don't Be a Dick)](https://github.com/philsturgeon/dbad) |
|
||||
| ---------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json` | [eth-phishing-detect](https://github.com/AugurProject/eth-phishing-detect) community-maintained phishing domain blocklist | Copyright (c) 2018 kumavis | [DBAD (Don't Be a Dick)](https://github.com/philsturgeon/dbad) |
|
||||
| `src/shared/scamlist.js` (address data from MyEtherWallet) | [ethereum-lists](https://github.com/MyEtherWallet/ethereum-lists) `addresses-darklist.json` | Copyright (c) 2020 MyEtherWallet | MIT |
|
||||
| `src/shared/scamlist.js` (address data from EtherScamDB) | [EtherScamDB](https://github.com/MrLuit/EtherScamDB) `scams.yaml` | Copyright (c) 2018 Luit Hollander | MIT |
|
||||
|
||||
The full license texts for these third-party files are included in the
|
||||
[LICENSE](LICENSE) file. The `eth-phishing-detect` row carries no repository
|
||||
link because the upstream is hosted under a competitor's organization name,
|
||||
which project policy keeps out of code and documentation; the vendored copy and
|
||||
the runtime refresh both come from that upstream, whose URL is the
|
||||
`BLOCKLIST_URL` constant in `src/shared/phishingDomains.js`.
|
||||
[LICENSE](LICENSE) file.
|
||||
|
||||
## Author
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
149
TODO.md
149
TODO.md
@@ -1,127 +1,33 @@
|
||||
# Workflow
|
||||
|
||||
- `git pull` `next` and cut a branch from it — one branch per issue, named
|
||||
`issue-<N>-<slug>`. Never branch from `main`.
|
||||
- Do the work as one commit whose title ends with ` (closes #N)`, with the
|
||||
`TODO.md` update in that same commit.
|
||||
- Move Next Step to the top of Completed Steps; move the top item of Future
|
||||
Steps into Next Step.
|
||||
- Run `make fmt`, then `make check`. A feature branch may be red; `next` and
|
||||
`main` may not.
|
||||
- Rebase onto current `next` immediately before pushing — other branches land on
|
||||
`next` continuously — and re-run `make check` after resolving, because a clean
|
||||
textual merge can still break the build.
|
||||
- Push the branch and open one PR per issue with base `next`. Never base `main`.
|
||||
- An independent reviewer who did not write the change gates the merge. On a
|
||||
passed review the PR is squash-merged into `next`.
|
||||
- `next` is the branch for the next milestone. It is kept green and mergeable to
|
||||
`main` at any moment, without notice.
|
||||
- `main` receives exactly one PR per milestone, from `next`. Releases are tagged
|
||||
from `main`.
|
||||
- branch (from `main`)
|
||||
- do the work in Next Step
|
||||
- move Next Step to the top of Completed Steps
|
||||
- move the top item of Future Steps into Next Step
|
||||
- commit (`TODO.md` changes in the same commit as the work)
|
||||
- merge to `main` if the branch is not protected, otherwise open a PR
|
||||
- push
|
||||
|
||||
# Status
|
||||
|
||||
pre-1.0, working towards the 1.0.0 milestone. Tagged v0.1.0 on 2026-02-27. The
|
||||
milestone is in flight on `next`; its `next` -> `main` PR is
|
||||
[#190](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/pulls/190). `make check` verified
|
||||
green on `next` at `e9fa8be` on 2026-08-10, and `make build` produces
|
||||
`dist/chrome/` and `dist/firefox/` with every bundle verified to have `DEBUG`
|
||||
compiled off.
|
||||
|
||||
The backlog lives on the
|
||||
[Gitea tracker](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues), which is
|
||||
authoritative; this file does not duplicate it. Full policy file set present. A
|
||||
real-browser end-to-end suite (`make test-e2e`) now sits alongside `make check`,
|
||||
which cannot see a runtime `ReferenceError` in a popup view.
|
||||
pre-1.0. Tagged v0.1.0 on 2026-02-27. Active development on branch
|
||||
feat/issue-144-settings-about (another agent working as of 2026-07-06). Full
|
||||
policy file set present; make check on main not verified.
|
||||
|
||||
# Next Step
|
||||
|
||||
Land [#152](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/152): add ESLint to
|
||||
`script/lint`. `make check` is `prettier --check` only today and cannot catch
|
||||
undefined identifiers, which is how
|
||||
[#150](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/150) and
|
||||
[#151](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/151) shipped.
|
||||
Land feat/issue-144-settings-about: finish the settings About well (build info,
|
||||
app name and repo link, release date, version click easter egg, git info derived
|
||||
inside Docker), resolve the untracked scripts/ directory (commit or gitignore),
|
||||
get review, merge to main.
|
||||
|
||||
# Completed Steps
|
||||
|
||||
- 2026-08-11: A dust threshold of `0` now means "hide nothing" instead of
|
||||
falling back to the 100,000 gwei default, and every address comparison in
|
||||
`src/shared/transactions.js` goes through one case-normalising helper so a
|
||||
checksummed genuine contract is no longer read as a spoof
|
||||
([#179](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/179)).
|
||||
- 2026-08-11: the balance refresh and the 24-hour phishing list refresh moved
|
||||
from `setInterval` to the extension alarms API, with the phishing delta and
|
||||
its fetch timestamps persisted to extension storage, so neither job dies with
|
||||
the MV3 service worker. Each job's freshness guard was decoupled from its
|
||||
alarm period at the same time — timed to the period, a guard vetoes its own
|
||||
scheduled tick and halves the real refresh rate
|
||||
([#158](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/158)).
|
||||
- 2026-08-11: Policy compliance sweep — conditional verbose test rerun, local
|
||||
Tailwind binary instead of `npx`, `--frozen-lockfile` on `make install`, and
|
||||
the Makefile-only targets documented in the README
|
||||
([#166](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/166)).
|
||||
- 2026-08-11: `script/verify-build` diagnostics corrected: the both-markers
|
||||
message now states what is and is not proven, an unreadable bundle is
|
||||
diagnosed as an I/O fault rather than as changed output, the `*.js` assumption
|
||||
lives only in `build.js`, and the unlisted-bundle scan hard-fails when it
|
||||
cannot enumerate `dist/`
|
||||
([#180](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/180)).
|
||||
- 2026-08-11: Known-answer test coverage for the crypto core — BIP-39/BIP-32
|
||||
derivation in `wallet.js` and the Argon2id vault in `vault.js`
|
||||
([#159](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/159)).
|
||||
- 2026-08-11: Three `README.md` claims corrected against the code — blocklist
|
||||
attribution, token-display rule, navigation model
|
||||
([#213](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/213)).
|
||||
- 2026-08-11: README Screen Map rebuilt from the code — every screen, element
|
||||
and transition re-verified against `src/popup/`
|
||||
([#164](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/164)).
|
||||
- 2026-08-11: `docs/README.md` rewritten against the code: no competitor names,
|
||||
all five network destinations documented, password/Settings/Add Wallet
|
||||
sections corrected ([#163](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/163)).
|
||||
- 2026-08-11: `loadState()` now derives `hasWallet` from the wallet list instead
|
||||
of trusting the persisted flag, so a profile already saved inconsistent no
|
||||
longer stays broken on every load
|
||||
([#195](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/195)).
|
||||
- 2026-08-11: Wallet deletion repairs its own state — `hasWallet` follows the
|
||||
remaining wallets, the selection only moves when it was deleted, and the
|
||||
active-address change is broadcast to connected sites
|
||||
([#156](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/156)).
|
||||
- 2026-08-11: One row per on-chain value movement in transaction history: the
|
||||
merge moved into the pure `mergeTransactions` and the zero-ETH native side of
|
||||
a plain ERC-20 transfer absorbed into its token row
|
||||
([#177](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/177)).
|
||||
- 2026-08-11: `TODO.md` Workflow rewritten to the branch-and-PR-per-issue model
|
||||
on `next`, with Status and Next Step refreshed
|
||||
([#191](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/191)).
|
||||
- 2026-08-09: `DEBUG` became a build-time constant defaulting to off, injected
|
||||
as the `__BUILD_DEBUG__` esbuild define and turned on with
|
||||
`AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1`, so a plain `make build` no longer hands every newly
|
||||
created wallet the publicly committed test recovery phrase
|
||||
([#149](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/149)).
|
||||
- 2026-08-09: dApp approval signing moved into the popup — the password no
|
||||
longer crosses the extension messaging boundary; the background broadcasts and
|
||||
resolves approvals only, and verifies the signed artifact against the approval
|
||||
it holds (#157).
|
||||
- 2026-08-09: Post-build assertion that every emitted bundle containing
|
||||
`constants.js` has `DEBUG` compiled off, via `script/verify-build` on the
|
||||
`make build` path (#170).
|
||||
- 2026-08-09: Containerized Chrome end-to-end harness (`make test-e2e` /
|
||||
`script/test-e2e`) driving the real popup with all network intercepted, plus
|
||||
the two used-but-not-imported crashes it caught: AddToken unreachable (#150)
|
||||
and TransactionDetail broken for every ERC-20 transfer (#151). Harness
|
||||
demonstrated failing before the fixes and passing after (#181). Interception
|
||||
covers the MV3 background service worker, not just the popup page, and a
|
||||
launch-time canary aborts the suite if worker traffic starts escaping.
|
||||
- 2026-08-09: Reviewed the repo end to end and filed the 1.0.0 backlog
|
||||
(#149-#168).
|
||||
- 2026-08-09: Test coverage for the address-poisoning defense in
|
||||
`src/shared/transactions.js` (#160)
|
||||
- 2026-07-26: About well in settings with build info, repo link and the version
|
||||
click easter egg (#145); proper view navigation stack (#146).
|
||||
- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints, Makefile
|
||||
shims, README Entrypoints section (#148)
|
||||
- 2026-03-01: USD display suppressed on testnets (#142); estimated USD for ETH
|
||||
in approve-tx view (#141).
|
||||
shims, README Entrypoints section
|
||||
- 2026-03-01: About well in settings with build info and easter egg (in flight
|
||||
on feature branch); USD display suppressed on testnets (#142); estimated USD
|
||||
for ETH in approve-tx view (#141).
|
||||
- Sepolia testnet support (#137); etherscan links go to token-specific URLs
|
||||
(#136).
|
||||
- Transaction detail improvements: Type field and on-chain details (#130),
|
||||
@@ -139,15 +45,12 @@ undefined identifiers, which is how
|
||||
|
||||
# Future Steps
|
||||
|
||||
Only work that has no issue of its own belongs here; everything else is on the
|
||||
tracker.
|
||||
|
||||
- Verify main passes make check after the feature branch merges (not verified
|
||||
2026-07-06 because an agent was active in the tree); fix anything red. main
|
||||
must always be green.
|
||||
- Prune stale branches: dozens of merged local and remote feature branches
|
||||
remain (fix/_, feature/_, tx-\*); delete merged ones locally and on origin.
|
||||
- Continue the issue backlog toward a feature-complete wallet, then cut further
|
||||
tags as milestones land.
|
||||
- Pre-1.0 security review of the extension (key handling, DEBUG mode policy, RPC
|
||||
input validation) before any 1.0rc tag. Individual filed issues are parts of
|
||||
it, but the review is broader than any of them.
|
||||
- Decide whether docker-in-docker makes `make test-e2e` runnable in the Gitea
|
||||
workflow. Extending the suite itself is tracked as
|
||||
[#183](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/183) and
|
||||
[#184](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/184).
|
||||
- Cut 1.0.0 once the milestone is empty, then continue tagging as milestones
|
||||
land.
|
||||
input validation) before any 1.0rc tag.
|
||||
|
||||
200
build.js
200
build.js
@@ -3,183 +3,75 @@ const path = require("path");
|
||||
const { execSync } = require("child_process");
|
||||
const esbuild = require("esbuild");
|
||||
|
||||
const DIST = path.join(__dirname, "dist");
|
||||
const DIST_CHROME = path.join(DIST, "chrome");
|
||||
const DIST_FIREFOX = path.join(DIST, "firefox");
|
||||
const DIST_CHROME = path.join(__dirname, "dist", "chrome");
|
||||
const DIST_FIREFOX = path.join(__dirname, "dist", "firefox");
|
||||
const SRC = path.join(__dirname, "src");
|
||||
|
||||
// The module whose compiled DEBUG state script/verify-build asserts, and the
|
||||
// manifest naming every emitted bundle that ends up containing it. The
|
||||
// manifest is derived from esbuild's own dependency graph rather than from a
|
||||
// hardcoded list, so it tracks the bundle layout instead of rotting with it.
|
||||
const AUDITED_MODULE = "src/shared/constants.js";
|
||||
const BUNDLE_MANIFEST = path.join(DIST, "constants-bundles.txt");
|
||||
|
||||
function ensureDir(dir) {
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Repo-relative, forward-slashed, so the manifest reads the same on every
|
||||
// platform and can be consumed by a POSIX shell script without further work.
|
||||
function repoRelative(p) {
|
||||
return path.relative(__dirname, p).split(path.sep).join("/");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Collect the outputs of one esbuild run that bundle AUDITED_MODULE. esbuild
|
||||
// reports every input that contributed to an output in the metafile, which is
|
||||
// the authoritative answer to "is constants.js in this bundle" — unlike
|
||||
// searching the minified text, it does not depend on what survived minification.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The ".js" filter below is the only place that assumption lives:
|
||||
// script/verify-build searches every file and symlink under dist/ for a
|
||||
// marker, without filtering by extension, and hard-fails if it cannot walk the
|
||||
// whole tree, so a bundle emitted under some other extension fails there as
|
||||
// unlisted rather than escaping both checks at once.
|
||||
function outputsContainingAuditedModule(metafile) {
|
||||
return Object.entries(metafile.outputs)
|
||||
.filter(([outFile, info]) => {
|
||||
if (!outFile.endsWith(".js")) return false;
|
||||
return Object.keys(info.inputs).some(
|
||||
(input) => repoRelative(input) === AUDITED_MODULE,
|
||||
);
|
||||
})
|
||||
.map(([outFile]) => repoRelative(outFile));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DEBUG is a build-time flag, off unless explicitly requested. It is the only
|
||||
// thing that makes the hardcoded test mnemonic reachable, so the opt-in must be
|
||||
// exact: anything other than the literal "1" (unset, empty, "true", a typo)
|
||||
// produces a release build. Failing towards the safe mode is deliberate.
|
||||
function isDebugBuild() {
|
||||
return process.env.AUTISTMASK_DEBUG === "1";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function getBuildInfo() {
|
||||
const pkg = JSON.parse(
|
||||
fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, "package.json"), "utf8"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
let commitHash = "unknown";
|
||||
try {
|
||||
commitHash = execSync("git rev-parse --short HEAD", {
|
||||
encoding: "utf8",
|
||||
}).trim();
|
||||
} catch (_) {
|
||||
// not a git repo or git not available
|
||||
}
|
||||
let commitHashFull = "unknown";
|
||||
try {
|
||||
commitHashFull = execSync("git rev-parse HEAD", {
|
||||
encoding: "utf8",
|
||||
}).trim();
|
||||
} catch (_) {
|
||||
// not a git repo or git not available
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
version: pkg.version,
|
||||
license: pkg.license,
|
||||
author: pkg.author,
|
||||
commitHash,
|
||||
commitHashFull,
|
||||
buildDate: new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10),
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function build() {
|
||||
console.log("Building AutistMask extension...");
|
||||
|
||||
const buildInfo = getBuildInfo();
|
||||
console.log("Build info:", buildInfo);
|
||||
|
||||
const debugBuild = isDebugBuild();
|
||||
console.log(
|
||||
debugBuild
|
||||
? "Build mode: DEBUG (INSECURE - hardcoded test mnemonic, do not ship)"
|
||||
: "Build mode: release (DEBUG off)",
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const define = {
|
||||
__BUILD_DEBUG__: JSON.stringify(debugBuild),
|
||||
__BUILD_VERSION__: JSON.stringify(buildInfo.version),
|
||||
__BUILD_LICENSE__: JSON.stringify(buildInfo.license),
|
||||
__BUILD_AUTHOR__: JSON.stringify(buildInfo.author),
|
||||
__BUILD_COMMIT__: JSON.stringify(buildInfo.commitHash),
|
||||
__BUILD_COMMIT_FULL__: JSON.stringify(buildInfo.commitHashFull),
|
||||
__BUILD_DATE__: JSON.stringify(buildInfo.buildDate),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Emitted bundles that contain constants.js, accumulated across every
|
||||
// esbuild run below and written out for script/verify-build.
|
||||
const auditedBundles = [];
|
||||
|
||||
// compile tailwind CSS
|
||||
console.log("Compiling Tailwind CSS...");
|
||||
const tailwindInput = path.join(SRC, "popup", "styles", "main.css");
|
||||
const tailwindOutput = path.join(DIST, "styles.css");
|
||||
ensureDir(DIST);
|
||||
|
||||
// Drop any manifest from a previous build before emitting anything, so a
|
||||
// build that never gets around to writing one cannot be verified against
|
||||
// a stale list.
|
||||
fs.rmSync(BUNDLE_MANIFEST, { force: true });
|
||||
// The locally installed binary, not `npx` — npx silently fetches from the
|
||||
// registry when the binary is absent, which is an unpinned network fetch
|
||||
// in the middle of a build.
|
||||
const tailwindBin = path.join(
|
||||
__dirname,
|
||||
"node_modules",
|
||||
".bin",
|
||||
"tailwindcss",
|
||||
);
|
||||
const tailwindOutput = path.join(__dirname, "dist", "styles.css");
|
||||
ensureDir(path.join(__dirname, "dist"));
|
||||
execSync(
|
||||
`"${tailwindBin}" -i "${tailwindInput}" -o "${tailwindOutput}" --minify`,
|
||||
`npx @tailwindcss/cli -i ${tailwindInput} -o ${tailwindOutput} --minify`,
|
||||
{ stdio: "inherit" },
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Every bundle goes through here, so metafile collection cannot be
|
||||
// forgotten when a new entry point is added.
|
||||
async function bundle(entryPoint, outfile) {
|
||||
const result = await esbuild.build({
|
||||
entryPoints: [entryPoint],
|
||||
bundle: true,
|
||||
format: "iife",
|
||||
outfile,
|
||||
platform: "browser",
|
||||
target: ["chrome110", "firefox110"],
|
||||
minify: true,
|
||||
metafile: true,
|
||||
define,
|
||||
});
|
||||
auditedBundles.push(...outputsContainingAuditedModule(result.metafile));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (const distDir of [DIST_CHROME, DIST_FIREFOX]) {
|
||||
ensureDir(path.join(distDir, "src", "popup"));
|
||||
ensureDir(path.join(distDir, "src", "background"));
|
||||
ensureDir(path.join(distDir, "src", "content"));
|
||||
|
||||
// bundle popup JS with esbuild (inlines ethers, libsodium, etc.)
|
||||
await bundle(
|
||||
path.join(SRC, "popup", "index.js"),
|
||||
path.join(distDir, "src", "popup", "index.js"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
await esbuild.build({
|
||||
entryPoints: [path.join(SRC, "popup", "index.js")],
|
||||
bundle: true,
|
||||
format: "iife",
|
||||
outfile: path.join(distDir, "src", "popup", "index.js"),
|
||||
platform: "browser",
|
||||
target: ["chrome110", "firefox110"],
|
||||
minify: true,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// bundle background script
|
||||
await bundle(
|
||||
path.join(SRC, "background", "index.js"),
|
||||
path.join(distDir, "src", "background", "index.js"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
await esbuild.build({
|
||||
entryPoints: [path.join(SRC, "background", "index.js")],
|
||||
bundle: true,
|
||||
format: "iife",
|
||||
outfile: path.join(distDir, "src", "background", "index.js"),
|
||||
platform: "browser",
|
||||
target: ["chrome110", "firefox110"],
|
||||
minify: true,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// bundle content script
|
||||
await bundle(
|
||||
path.join(SRC, "content", "index.js"),
|
||||
path.join(distDir, "src", "content", "index.js"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
await esbuild.build({
|
||||
entryPoints: [path.join(SRC, "content", "index.js")],
|
||||
bundle: true,
|
||||
format: "iife",
|
||||
outfile: path.join(distDir, "src", "content", "index.js"),
|
||||
platform: "browser",
|
||||
target: ["chrome110", "firefox110"],
|
||||
minify: true,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// bundle inpage script (injected into page context, separate file)
|
||||
await bundle(
|
||||
path.join(SRC, "content", "inpage.js"),
|
||||
path.join(distDir, "src", "content", "inpage.js"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
await esbuild.build({
|
||||
entryPoints: [path.join(SRC, "content", "inpage.js")],
|
||||
bundle: true,
|
||||
format: "iife",
|
||||
outfile: path.join(distDir, "src", "content", "inpage.js"),
|
||||
platform: "browser",
|
||||
target: ["chrome110", "firefox110"],
|
||||
minify: true,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// copy popup HTML
|
||||
fs.copyFileSync(
|
||||
@@ -204,16 +96,6 @@ async function build() {
|
||||
path.join(DIST_FIREFOX, "manifest.json"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Written last so a build that died partway through leaves no manifest
|
||||
// at all, which script/verify-build treats as a hard failure rather than
|
||||
// as "nothing to check".
|
||||
const manifest = [...new Set(auditedBundles)].sort();
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(BUNDLE_MANIFEST, manifest.map((p) => `${p}\n`).join(""));
|
||||
console.log(
|
||||
`Bundles containing ${AUDITED_MODULE}: ${manifest.length} ` +
|
||||
`(listed in ${repoRelative(BUNDLE_MANIFEST)})`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
console.log("Build complete: dist/chrome/ and dist/firefox/");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
241
docs/README.md
241
docs/README.md
@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ and ERC-20 tokens, and connects to web3 sites. Nothing else.
|
||||
|
||||
## Why AutistMask Exists
|
||||
|
||||
The most popular browser-based EVM wallet has become bloated with swap UIs,
|
||||
portfolio dashboards, analytics, tracking, and advertisements. It is no longer a
|
||||
simple wallet. The common alternatives only support Chromium browsers, leaving
|
||||
Firefox users without a usable option.
|
||||
MetaMask has become bloated with swap UIs, portfolio dashboards, analytics,
|
||||
tracking, and advertisements. It is no longer a simple wallet. Most alternatives
|
||||
(Rabby, Rainbow, etc.) only support Chromium browsers, leaving Firefox users
|
||||
without a usable option.
|
||||
|
||||
AutistMask exists because a wallet should be a wallet. You should be able to see
|
||||
your balances, send tokens, receive tokens, and connect to sites. That is all a
|
||||
@@ -27,10 +27,9 @@ analytics, use a portfolio tracker. The wallet is not the place for any of that.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Encrypt your recovery phrase and private keys at rest.** Your secrets are
|
||||
encrypted on disk using Argon2id key derivation and XSalsa20-Poly1305
|
||||
authenticated encryption (via libsodium). Your password is required whenever a
|
||||
secret has to be decrypted: signing a transaction, signing a message or typed
|
||||
data, exporting a private key, and deleting a wallet. Viewing balances and
|
||||
addresses never requires a password.
|
||||
authenticated encryption (via libsodium). Your password is required only when
|
||||
signing a transaction. Viewing balances and addresses never requires a
|
||||
password.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Let you choose your own RPC endpoint.** The default is a public Ethereum
|
||||
RPC, but you can point it at your own node or any provider you trust. No
|
||||
@@ -57,25 +56,23 @@ analytics, use a portfolio tracker. The wallet is not the place for any of that.
|
||||
|
||||
- **No NFT galleries or portfolio views.** This is a wallet, not a dashboard.
|
||||
|
||||
- **No third-party token list APIs.** Token balances come from the same block
|
||||
explorer you configure for transaction history, and the extension ships its
|
||||
own hardcoded list of top ERC-20 contract addresses for symbol-spoofing
|
||||
detection. Any token you want tracked across all your addresses, you add
|
||||
yourself by contract address.
|
||||
- **No token auto-discovery.** AutistMask does not scan the blockchain for
|
||||
tokens you might hold. You add tokens manually by contract address. This
|
||||
prevents scam tokens from appearing in your wallet uninvited.
|
||||
|
||||
- **No backend servers operated by the developer.** Nothing is sent to any
|
||||
server run by AutistMask. Every network destination is listed below.
|
||||
- **No phishing blocklists from third parties.** AutistMask does not phone home
|
||||
to check URLs against a remote blocklist. It does maintain a local list of
|
||||
known scam addresses, but this is shipped with the extension, not fetched from
|
||||
a server.
|
||||
|
||||
## How It Works
|
||||
|
||||
AutistMask is a browser extension that runs entirely in your browser. It does
|
||||
not have a backend server. It communicates with five external destinations:
|
||||
three you configure yourself, and two fixed ones used for scam detection.
|
||||
not have a backend server. It communicates with three external services:
|
||||
|
||||
### External Services
|
||||
|
||||
**Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint** (default: `ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com`;
|
||||
`ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com` on Sepolia)
|
||||
**Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint** (default: `ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com`)
|
||||
|
||||
This is how AutistMask talks to the Ethereum network. Every wallet needs an
|
||||
Ethereum node to check balances, estimate gas, broadcast transactions, and
|
||||
@@ -83,77 +80,27 @@ verify confirmations. The default is a free public RPC endpoint. You can change
|
||||
this in Settings to any Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint, including your own local
|
||||
node.
|
||||
|
||||
When it is contacted: on every balance refresh (every 10 seconds while the popup
|
||||
is open, every 60 seconds in the background), when you type an ENS name into the
|
||||
Send screen, when a send is prepared and broadcast, while a pending transaction
|
||||
is polled for its receipt, and for the reverse ENS lookups used to label
|
||||
addresses (cached for 12 hours).
|
||||
|
||||
What gets sent: standard Ethereum JSON-RPC requests (balance queries,
|
||||
transaction broadcasts, gas estimates, ENS lookups, contract-code checks). Your
|
||||
addresses are necessarily visible to the RPC provider when querying balances.
|
||||
transaction broadcasts, gas estimates, ENS lookups). Your addresses are
|
||||
necessarily visible to the RPC provider when querying balances.
|
||||
|
||||
**Blockscout API** (default: `eth.blockscout.com/api/v2`;
|
||||
`eth-sepolia.blockscout.com/api/v2` on Sepolia)
|
||||
**Blockscout API** (default: `eth.blockscout.com/api/v2`)
|
||||
|
||||
Used to fetch token balances and transaction history. Blockscout is an
|
||||
open-source blockchain explorer. AutistMask queries it for your ERC-20 token
|
||||
balances (including the holder counts used for spam filtering) and your recent
|
||||
transactions and token transfers. You can change this in Settings to a
|
||||
balances and recent transactions. You can change this in Settings to a
|
||||
self-hosted Blockscout instance.
|
||||
|
||||
When it is contacted: on every balance refresh, and whenever a screen showing
|
||||
transaction history is opened.
|
||||
|
||||
What gets sent: your Ethereum addresses (to look up balances and transactions).
|
||||
|
||||
**CoinDesk CADLI price API** (`data-api.coindesk.com`)
|
||||
|
||||
Used to fetch current USD prices for ETH and the top 25 tokens. Prices are
|
||||
cached for 5 minutes. No API key is required. This endpoint is not
|
||||
user-configurable, and it is not contacted at all while you are on a testnet,
|
||||
where no USD values are shown.
|
||||
Used to fetch current USD prices for ETH and ERC-20 tokens. Prices are cached
|
||||
for 5 minutes. No API key is required. No user data is sent -- only a list of
|
||||
token symbols (e.g. "ETH", "USDC") to get their prices.
|
||||
|
||||
When it is contacted: while the popup is open, at most once every 5 minutes.
|
||||
|
||||
What gets sent: token symbol names (e.g. "ETH", "USDC"). No addresses, no
|
||||
balances, no identifying information. As with any request, CoinDesk sees your IP
|
||||
address.
|
||||
|
||||
**Phishing domain blocklist** (`raw.githubusercontent.com`)
|
||||
|
||||
A community-maintained list of phishing domains, used to warn you when a site
|
||||
that asks to connect, or to have a transaction or signature approved, is a known
|
||||
scam. A copy is bundled into the extension at build time, so the protection
|
||||
works before any network request happens. At runtime the extension fetches the
|
||||
live list to pick up newly added domains, keeping only the entries not already
|
||||
in the bundled copy (persisted locally if under 256 KiB). This endpoint is not
|
||||
user-configurable.
|
||||
|
||||
When it is contacted: when the background script starts, if the last fetch was
|
||||
more than 24 hours ago, and every 24 hours after that. The time of the last
|
||||
fetch is remembered across browser and background restarts, so restarting does
|
||||
not cause a re-download. If a fetch fails, or the list is too large to keep, the
|
||||
extension waits an hour before trying again outside that 24-hour schedule rather
|
||||
than retrying on every restart. It is a plain download of a public file —
|
||||
nothing about you is sent, but the host sees your IP address. If the fetch
|
||||
fails, the bundled copy is still used.
|
||||
|
||||
**Etherscan address labels** (`etherscan.io`; `sepolia.etherscan.io` on Sepolia)
|
||||
|
||||
When you review a send, AutistMask fetches the recipient's public Etherscan
|
||||
address page and looks for a "Fake_Phishing"/"Phish/Hack" label or a scam
|
||||
warning, and shows a red warning if it finds one. This is a plain page fetch
|
||||
with no API key, made by your browser. It is best-effort: if it fails, it is
|
||||
silently ignored. This endpoint is not user-configurable.
|
||||
|
||||
When it is contacted: each time you reach the send confirmation screen.
|
||||
|
||||
What gets sent: the recipient address you are about to send to, and your IP
|
||||
address. Your own addresses are not sent.
|
||||
|
||||
Etherscan links shown elsewhere in the UI (on addresses, transactions, and token
|
||||
contracts) are ordinary links. They contact nothing until you click them.
|
||||
What gets sent: token symbol names. No addresses, no balances, no identifying
|
||||
information.
|
||||
|
||||
### What Stays Local
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -176,11 +123,8 @@ word recovery phrase can restore your wallet on any device without your
|
||||
password. The password only protects the copy stored in this browser. If you
|
||||
lose your recovery phrase, your password cannot help you recover it.
|
||||
|
||||
Your password is requested whenever an encrypted secret must be decrypted: when
|
||||
you send a transaction, when a site asks you to sign a message or typed data,
|
||||
when you export an address's private key, and when you delete a wallet. Viewing
|
||||
balances, receiving funds, and browsing transaction history never require your
|
||||
password.
|
||||
Your password is only requested when you send a transaction. Viewing balances,
|
||||
receiving funds, and browsing transaction history never require your password.
|
||||
|
||||
## Installation
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -203,46 +147,34 @@ password.
|
||||
### Creating a New Wallet
|
||||
|
||||
1. Click the AutistMask icon in your browser toolbar.
|
||||
2. Click "Add wallet" (on first use), or open Settings and click "+ Add wallet".
|
||||
3. On the "From Phrase" tab, click the die button to generate a random 12-word
|
||||
recovery phrase.
|
||||
2. Click "Add wallet".
|
||||
3. Click the die button to generate a random 12-word recovery phrase.
|
||||
4. **Write down the recovery phrase and store it safely.** Anyone with these
|
||||
words can take your funds. If you lose them, your wallet is gone. AutistMask
|
||||
cannot recover them for you.
|
||||
5. Choose a password and confirm it. This encrypts your recovery phrase on this
|
||||
device.
|
||||
6. Click "Import".
|
||||
5. Choose a password. This encrypts your recovery phrase on this device.
|
||||
6. Click "Add".
|
||||
|
||||
### Importing an Existing Wallet
|
||||
|
||||
The Add Wallet screen has three tabs:
|
||||
**From a recovery phrase:** Follow the same steps as creating a wallet, but
|
||||
paste your existing 12 or 24 word recovery phrase instead of generating a new
|
||||
one. AutistMask uses the same derivation path as MetaMask (`m/44'/60'/0'/0`), so
|
||||
your addresses will match.
|
||||
|
||||
**From Phrase:** Paste your existing 12 or 24 word recovery phrase instead of
|
||||
generating a new one. AutistMask uses the standard BIP-44 Ethereum derivation
|
||||
path (`m/44'/60'/0'/0`), which is what other wallets use by default, so your
|
||||
addresses will match and your phrase stays portable in both directions.
|
||||
|
||||
**From Key:** Paste a single private key. This creates a single-address wallet.
|
||||
|
||||
**From xprv:** Paste an extended private key. This imports the HD wallet and
|
||||
scans for used addresses.
|
||||
|
||||
All three tabs ask for the same password fields, and the "Import" button
|
||||
finishes the job.
|
||||
**From a private key:** On the Add Wallet screen, click "Have a private key
|
||||
instead?" and paste your private key. This creates a single-address wallet.
|
||||
|
||||
### Adding More Addresses
|
||||
|
||||
HD wallets (created from a recovery phrase or an xprv) can derive multiple
|
||||
addresses. On the home screen, click the "+" button next to a wallet name to add
|
||||
the next address. These are deterministic -- the same recovery phrase will
|
||||
always produce the same sequence of addresses.
|
||||
HD wallets (created from a recovery phrase) can derive multiple addresses. On
|
||||
the home screen, click the "+" button next to a wallet name to add the next
|
||||
address. These are deterministic -- the same recovery phrase will always produce
|
||||
the same sequence of addresses.
|
||||
|
||||
### Adding ERC-20 Tokens
|
||||
|
||||
Tokens you hold show up automatically only if they are in the extension's
|
||||
bundled list of well-known tokens or have at least 1,000 holders; everything
|
||||
else is treated as spam and hidden. To track a token explicitly (which also
|
||||
shows it at zero balance), add it by contract address:
|
||||
AutistMask does not auto-discover tokens. To track a token:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Go to an address detail view (click `[info]` on any address).
|
||||
2. Click "+ Token".
|
||||
@@ -251,13 +183,12 @@ shows it at zero balance), add it by contract address:
|
||||
4. Click "Add".
|
||||
|
||||
The token balance will appear on the address detail screen and on the home
|
||||
screen. Tokens can also be added from Settings, under "Tracked Tokens".
|
||||
screen.
|
||||
|
||||
## Sending
|
||||
|
||||
1. Click "Send" from the home screen or an address detail view.
|
||||
2. Select what to send (ETH, or any ERC-20 token with a balance on this address
|
||||
that survives the spam filters).
|
||||
2. Select what to send (ETH or any tracked ERC-20 token).
|
||||
3. Enter the recipient address or ENS name (e.g. `vitalik.eth`).
|
||||
4. Enter the amount.
|
||||
5. Click "Review" to see the confirmation screen.
|
||||
@@ -270,14 +201,11 @@ The confirmation screen shows:
|
||||
- **Amount** with USD estimate
|
||||
- **Your current balance** with USD estimate
|
||||
- **Estimated network fee** in ETH with USD estimate
|
||||
- **Warnings** if the recipient is a contract, a burn address, one of your own
|
||||
addresses, on the bundled scam-address list, or labelled as a phisher on
|
||||
Etherscan
|
||||
|
||||
After reviewing, enter your password and click "Sign & Send". The transaction
|
||||
will be broadcast to the network and you will see a waiting screen with a timer.
|
||||
Once confirmed (or after 60 seconds), you will see either a success or error
|
||||
screen with the transaction hash and an Etherscan link.
|
||||
After reviewing, click "Send" and enter your password. The transaction will be
|
||||
broadcast to the network and you will see a waiting screen with a timer. Once
|
||||
confirmed (or after 60 seconds), you will see either a success or error screen
|
||||
with the transaction hash and an Etherscan link.
|
||||
|
||||
### Sending a Specific Token
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -291,10 +219,10 @@ cannot accidentally switch to a different one.
|
||||
1. Click "Receive" from the home screen or an address detail view.
|
||||
2. Share the QR code or copy the address using the "Copy address" button.
|
||||
|
||||
When receiving ERC-20 tokens, make sure the sender is sending on the network you
|
||||
are using. AutistMask supports Ethereum mainnet and the Sepolia testnet. Tokens
|
||||
sent on other networks (Polygon, Arbitrum, BSC, etc.) to the same address will
|
||||
not appear and may be permanently lost.
|
||||
When receiving ERC-20 tokens, make sure the sender is sending on the Ethereum
|
||||
network. AutistMask is an Ethereum mainnet wallet. Tokens sent on other networks
|
||||
(Polygon, Arbitrum, BSC, etc.) to the same address will not appear and may be
|
||||
permanently lost.
|
||||
|
||||
## Connecting to Web3 Sites
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -309,12 +237,7 @@ pages. When a site requests access to your wallet:
|
||||
|
||||
When a connected site requests a transaction, a separate approval popup appears
|
||||
showing the transaction details (from, to, value, data). You must enter your
|
||||
password and click "Confirm" to authorize it. Message and typed-data signature
|
||||
requests work the same way, with a "Sign" button, and also require your
|
||||
password.
|
||||
|
||||
If the requesting site's domain is on the phishing blocklist, all three approval
|
||||
screens show a red phishing warning before you decide.
|
||||
password and click "Confirm" to authorize it.
|
||||
|
||||
You can manage site permissions in Settings. Allowed and denied sites can be
|
||||
individually removed to reset their permissions.
|
||||
@@ -324,16 +247,15 @@ individually removed to reset their permissions.
|
||||
AutistMask includes several defenses against common Ethereum scams, all enabled
|
||||
by default:
|
||||
|
||||
**Known token symbol verification.** AutistMask ships a list of roughly 500
|
||||
legitimate ERC-20 tokens with their contract addresses. If a transaction or
|
||||
balance claims to involve a known symbol (like "ETH" or "USDT") but comes from
|
||||
an unrecognized contract, it is identified as a spoof and hidden.
|
||||
**Known token symbol verification.** AutistMask ships a list of ~250 legitimate
|
||||
ERC-20 tokens with their contract addresses. If a transaction claims to involve
|
||||
a known symbol (like "ETH" or "USDT") but comes from an unrecognized contract,
|
||||
it is identified as a spoof and hidden.
|
||||
|
||||
**Low-holder token filtering.** Tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders are hidden
|
||||
from transaction history and the send token list, and are left out of your
|
||||
balances unless they are on the bundled known-token list or you added them
|
||||
yourself. Legitimate tokens have substantial holder counts; scam tokens deployed
|
||||
for address poisoning typically have zero.
|
||||
from transaction history and the send token list. Legitimate tokens have
|
||||
substantial holder counts; scam tokens deployed for address poisoning typically
|
||||
have zero.
|
||||
|
||||
**Fraud contract blocklist.** When AutistMask detects a fraudulent transfer, it
|
||||
adds the contract address to a local blocklist. Future transactions from that
|
||||
@@ -344,47 +266,31 @@ ETH by default) are hidden. Scammers send dust from look-alike addresses to
|
||||
plant them in your transaction history. The threshold is configurable in
|
||||
Settings.
|
||||
|
||||
**Scam address list.** A list of known fraud, drainer, and phishing addresses is
|
||||
shipped with the extension. Sending to one of them raises a warning on the
|
||||
confirmation screen. It contains only addresses involved in fraud -- it is not a
|
||||
sanctions list.
|
||||
|
||||
**Phishing domain warnings.** Sites asking to connect or to have something
|
||||
approved are checked against the phishing domain blocklist described under
|
||||
External Services, and flagged with a red banner if they match.
|
||||
|
||||
The first four filters can be individually disabled in Settings if you prefer to
|
||||
All of these filters can be individually disabled in Settings if you prefer to
|
||||
see everything unfiltered.
|
||||
|
||||
## Settings
|
||||
|
||||
Click the gear icon on the home screen to access settings:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Wallets**: Your wallets, and "+ Add wallet".
|
||||
- **Tracked Tokens**: The ERC-20 tokens tracked across all addresses, and "+ Add
|
||||
token".
|
||||
- **Display**: Toggle whether tracked tokens with zero balance are shown, and
|
||||
choose the theme (System, Light, or Dark).
|
||||
- **Network**: Switch between Ethereum Mainnet and Sepolia Testnet. Switching
|
||||
resets the RPC and Blockscout endpoints to that network's defaults.
|
||||
- **Wallets**: Add a new wallet.
|
||||
- **Display**: Toggle whether tracked tokens with zero balance are shown.
|
||||
- **Ethereum RPC**: Change the Ethereum node endpoint. Default is a public RPC.
|
||||
You can use your own node for maximum privacy.
|
||||
- **Blockscout API**: Change the Blockscout instance used for token balances and
|
||||
transaction history. You can use a self-hosted instance.
|
||||
- **Token Spam Protection**: Toggle individual scam filters, set the dust
|
||||
transaction threshold, and switch timestamps to UTC.
|
||||
- **Token Spam Protection**: Toggle individual scam filters and set the dust
|
||||
transaction threshold.
|
||||
- **Allowed Sites / Denied Sites**: View and manage web3 site permissions.
|
||||
- **About**: License, author, version, release date, and a link to the commit
|
||||
this build came from.
|
||||
|
||||
## Frequently Asked Questions
|
||||
|
||||
**Can I use AutistMask alongside another wallet?**
|
||||
**Is AutistMask compatible with MetaMask?**
|
||||
|
||||
Yes. AutistMask uses the standard `m/44'/60'/0'/0` derivation path, so importing
|
||||
the same recovery phrase gives you the same addresses as any other wallet using
|
||||
that path. Two wallet extensions can be installed side by side, though only one
|
||||
can be the active `window.ethereum` provider at a time.
|
||||
Yes. AutistMask uses the same derivation path (`m/44'/60'/0'/0`) as MetaMask. If
|
||||
you import the same recovery phrase, you will get the same addresses. You can
|
||||
use both wallets side by side, though only one can be the active
|
||||
`window.ethereum` provider at a time.
|
||||
|
||||
**Can I use AutistMask with a hardware wallet?**
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -392,9 +298,8 @@ Not yet. Hardware wallet support may be added in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
**Does AutistMask support networks other than Ethereum mainnet?**
|
||||
|
||||
Ethereum mainnet and the Sepolia testnet, selectable in Settings. No other
|
||||
networks are supported today. On Sepolia, USD values are not shown, because
|
||||
testnet tokens have no market value.
|
||||
Not currently. AutistMask is Ethereum mainnet only. Multi-chain support may be
|
||||
added in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
**Where is my data stored?**
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -407,7 +312,7 @@ to any server operated by AutistMask.
|
||||
|
||||
Your data is deleted. Make sure you have your recovery phrase backed up before
|
||||
uninstalling. With your recovery phrase, you can restore your wallet in
|
||||
AutistMask or any other wallet that uses the standard derivation path.
|
||||
AutistMask or any other compatible wallet (MetaMask, etc.) at any time.
|
||||
|
||||
**What happens if a transaction times out?**
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
"name": "AutistMask",
|
||||
"version": "0.1.0",
|
||||
"description": "Minimal Ethereum wallet for Chrome",
|
||||
"permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms"],
|
||||
"permissions": ["storage", "activeTab"],
|
||||
"host_permissions": ["<all_urls>"],
|
||||
"action": {
|
||||
"default_popup": "src/popup/index.html"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
"name": "AutistMask",
|
||||
"version": "0.1.0",
|
||||
"description": "Minimal Ethereum wallet for Firefox",
|
||||
"permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms", "<all_urls>"],
|
||||
"permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "<all_urls>"],
|
||||
"browser_action": {
|
||||
"default_popup": "src/popup/index.html"
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
|
||||
"private": true,
|
||||
"scripts": {
|
||||
"test": "jest --forceExit",
|
||||
"test:verbose": "jest --forceExit --verbose",
|
||||
"build": "node build.js",
|
||||
"lint": "prettier --check .",
|
||||
"fmt": "prettier --write .",
|
||||
@@ -17,7 +16,6 @@
|
||||
"@tailwindcss/cli": "^4.2.1",
|
||||
"esbuild": "^0.27.3",
|
||||
"jest": "^30.2.0",
|
||||
"playwright-core": "1.56.0",
|
||||
"prettier": "^3.8.1",
|
||||
"tailwindcss": "^4.2.1"
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,13 +7,7 @@ ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
|
||||
main() {
|
||||
cd "$ROOT"
|
||||
echo "Running tests..."
|
||||
timeout 30 yarn run test 2>&1 || {
|
||||
echo "--- Rerunning with --verbose for details ---"
|
||||
timeout 30 yarn run test:verbose 2>&1 || true
|
||||
# Always fail: the first run already proved the tests are broken, so a
|
||||
# flaky pass on the rerun must not turn the build green.
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
timeout 30 yarn run test 2>&1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
main "$@"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
# script/test-e2e: build the extension and drive the real popup in a real
|
||||
# Chromium inside a pinned container. Our own extension to
|
||||
# scripts-to-rule-them-all.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Deliberately NOT called by script/check or script/test: REPO_POLICIES.md
|
||||
# caps make test at 20 seconds and a browser suite does not fit. Run it
|
||||
# yourself before touching popup views; it is the only check that can see
|
||||
# a used-but-not-imported identifier blow up at runtime.
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
|
||||
|
||||
# mcr.microsoft.com/playwright:v1.56.0-noble, 2026-08-09
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The playwright-core devDependency is pinned to the matching Playwright
|
||||
# version (1.56.0) and the two must be bumped together: the browsers ship
|
||||
# inside this image, and playwright-core looks for the exact browser
|
||||
# revision its own version expects. A mismatch fails at launch.
|
||||
IMAGE="mcr.microsoft.com/playwright@sha256:35246d87a7c88ea9b771c65d33171b2611b02a8253b4b12ce6f94376c55f99f2"
|
||||
|
||||
main() {
|
||||
cd "$ROOT"
|
||||
|
||||
if ! command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
echo "test-e2e: docker is required to run the e2e suite" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "Building extension for e2e..."
|
||||
yarn run build 2>&1
|
||||
|
||||
echo "Running e2e suite in the pinned Playwright container..."
|
||||
# --ipc=host: Chromium's shared-memory needs more than the default
|
||||
# 64MB /dev/shm or renderers crash.
|
||||
# --user: keep files the suite touches owned by the caller, not root.
|
||||
# HOME=/tmp: the mapped uid has no home directory in the image.
|
||||
# PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1: without it,
|
||||
# ctx.route() intercepts page requests only, and every fetch made by
|
||||
# the MV3 background service worker — including the phishing
|
||||
# blocklist fetch that src/background/index.js issues at worker
|
||||
# startup — goes to the real internet. The flag is experimental and
|
||||
# Playwright may drop or rename it. It cannot break silently: the
|
||||
# harness probes service-worker interception at launch and aborts
|
||||
# the whole suite if it is not in effect (see the interception
|
||||
# canary in tests/e2e/harness.js). If a future Playwright removes
|
||||
# the flag, that probe is what will fail, and the fix is either a
|
||||
# replacement mechanism or an honest downgrade of the isolation
|
||||
# claim in tests/e2e/network.js and README.md — not deleting the
|
||||
# probe. The image is pinned by digest, so this can only ever bite
|
||||
# on a deliberate bump.
|
||||
docker run --rm \
|
||||
--ipc=host \
|
||||
--user "$(id -u):$(id -g)" \
|
||||
-e HOME=/tmp \
|
||||
-e PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1 \
|
||||
-e "E2E_TRACE_NETWORK=${E2E_TRACE_NETWORK:-0}" \
|
||||
-v "$ROOT:/work" \
|
||||
-w /work \
|
||||
"$IMAGE" \
|
||||
node tests/e2e/run.js
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
main "$@"
|
||||
@@ -1,212 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
# script/verify-build: assert the compiled DEBUG state of the emitted
|
||||
# bundles. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run at the end of
|
||||
# make build / make build-debug.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Why this exists: DEBUG makes the publicly committed test recovery phrase the
|
||||
# output of wallet creation, so a release artifact built with it live hands
|
||||
# every new wallet to anyone who reads the repo. The test suite cannot see
|
||||
# this, because it loads src/shared/constants.js outside a bundle and takes
|
||||
# the fallback branch; the property only exists in the emitted output, so it
|
||||
# has to be asserted against the emitted output.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# What it reads: dist/constants-bundles.txt, written by build.js from
|
||||
# esbuild's metafile, naming every emitted bundle that contains
|
||||
# src/shared/constants.js. Each of those must carry exactly one of the two
|
||||
# BUILD_DEBUG_MARKER literals that constants.js folds down to.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# It fails rather than passes whenever it cannot determine a bundle's state.
|
||||
# Minified output is not a stable contract, so "matched neither form" is not
|
||||
# evidence of anything and must never read as green.
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
|
||||
|
||||
MANIFEST="dist/constants-bundles.txt"
|
||||
MARKER_ON="autistmask-build-debug=on"
|
||||
MARKER_OFF="autistmask-build-debug=off"
|
||||
|
||||
# Set by read_marker.
|
||||
MARKER=""
|
||||
|
||||
fail() {
|
||||
echo "verify-build: FAIL: $*" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Is the literal $1 present in the file $2? Match (grep exit 0) and no-match
|
||||
# (exit 1) are answers about the emitted output. Anything else (exit 2: the
|
||||
# file could not be read) is not an answer at all, and must not be reported as
|
||||
# "no marker" — that would blame the bundle for a permissions or I/O fault.
|
||||
has_marker() {
|
||||
_hm_status=0
|
||||
grep -q -F -e "$1" -- "$2" || _hm_status=$?
|
||||
case "$_hm_status" in
|
||||
0) return 0 ;;
|
||||
1) return 1 ;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
fail "grep exited $_hm_status reading $2, so the file could not be
|
||||
searched and its DEBUG state was not checked at all. That is a permissions
|
||||
or I/O fault on the artifact, not a change in the emitted output. Refusing
|
||||
to report success."
|
||||
;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Does the manifest list the path $1, as a whole line? Same discipline as
|
||||
# has_marker: exit 0 and 1 are answers about the manifest, exit 2 means the
|
||||
# manifest could not be read and is not an answer at all. Without this, an
|
||||
# unreadable manifest reads as "this file is not listed" and every emitted
|
||||
# bundle gets reported as an unlisted one.
|
||||
is_listed() {
|
||||
_il_status=0
|
||||
grep -q -x -F -e "$1" -- "$MANIFEST" || _il_status=$?
|
||||
case "$_il_status" in
|
||||
0) return 0 ;;
|
||||
1) return 1 ;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
fail "grep exited $_il_status reading $MANIFEST, so it could not be
|
||||
searched and nothing was established about which bundles it lists. That is
|
||||
a permissions or I/O fault on the manifest, not a stale manifest. Refusing
|
||||
to report success."
|
||||
;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Read one bundle's DEBUG state into MARKER. Exactly one marker must be
|
||||
# present. Both means the ternary in constants.js was never folded, which is
|
||||
# what happens when the __BUILD_DEBUG__ define goes missing from build.js:
|
||||
# DEBUG stops being known at build time. Neither means we are reading output
|
||||
# we do not understand. Both are hard failures; neither is ever treated as
|
||||
# absence of a problem.
|
||||
read_marker() {
|
||||
_file="$1"
|
||||
_on=no
|
||||
_off=no
|
||||
if has_marker "$MARKER_ON" "$_file"; then _on=yes; fi
|
||||
if has_marker "$MARKER_OFF" "$_file"; then _off=yes; fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$_on" = yes ] && [ "$_off" = yes ]; then
|
||||
fail "$_file carries both debug markers, so DEBUG was not resolved at
|
||||
build time: the ternary in src/shared/constants.js survived into the
|
||||
emitted output. This does not mean the debug branch is live in this
|
||||
artifact: an unresolved __BUILD_DEBUG__ is undeclared in extension
|
||||
context, so DEBUG evaluates to false at runtime. It does mean the
|
||||
release/debug distinction is no longer enforced at build time, and which
|
||||
way that fallback happens to evaluate is then an accident a refactor can
|
||||
flip. Check that build.js still defines __BUILD_DEBUG__."
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$_on" = no ] && [ "$_off" = no ]; then
|
||||
fail "$_file carries no debug marker, so its DEBUG state cannot be
|
||||
determined. Either BUILD_DEBUG_MARKER is gone from src/shared/constants.js
|
||||
or the emitted output changed shape. Refusing to report success."
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$_on" = yes ]; then
|
||||
MARKER="$MARKER_ON"
|
||||
else
|
||||
MARKER="$MARKER_OFF"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# The manifest says which bundles must carry a marker. This says no other
|
||||
# emitted file may carry one, which catches a manifest that has gone stale
|
||||
# or short rather than trusting whatever it happens to list.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Deliberately unfiltered by extension. build.js selects manifest entries with
|
||||
# an endsWith(".js") test; repeating that literal here would mean a bundle
|
||||
# emitted under some other extension escaped the manifest AND this check at
|
||||
# once, which is the correlated blind spot the two-source design exists to
|
||||
# avoid. Every file under dist/ is searched, so build.js's filter is the only
|
||||
# place the assumption lives and this check is what catches it being wrong.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# That claim only holds if the walk is exhaustive, so two things are enforced
|
||||
# here rather than assumed:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - find's exit status is checked. A subtree it cannot descend is reported on
|
||||
# stderr and then simply missing from the listing, so an unchecked status
|
||||
# turns "could not look" into "nothing was there" — the same conflation
|
||||
# has_marker exists to prevent. The status cannot be read off a pipeline
|
||||
# ending in sort, so the sort is a separate step.
|
||||
# - symlinks are walked too (-type l), not skipped. A marker-carrying bundle
|
||||
# reachable under an unlisted path in dist/ is a stale manifest whether the
|
||||
# path is a link or a file, and grep reads through the link. A link that
|
||||
# cannot be read through — dangling, or pointing at a directory — fails
|
||||
# hard via has_marker's exit-2 path, which is the fail-closed answer: the
|
||||
# build emits neither, so their DEBUG state is unproven, not fine.
|
||||
check_unlisted_bundles() {
|
||||
_find_status=0
|
||||
_listing="$(find dist \( -type f -o -type l \) -print)" || _find_status=$?
|
||||
[ "$_find_status" -eq 0 ] ||
|
||||
fail "find exited $_find_status enumerating dist/, so part of the tree
|
||||
was never walked and nothing was established about the files in it. Any
|
||||
unlisted bundle there went unchecked. That is a permissions or I/O fault on
|
||||
the artifact, not a stale manifest. Refusing to report success."
|
||||
_listing="$(printf '%s\n' "$_listing" | sort)"
|
||||
|
||||
while read -r _file; do
|
||||
[ -n "$_file" ] || continue
|
||||
if is_listed "$_file"; then
|
||||
continue
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if has_marker "$MARKER_ON" "$_file" ||
|
||||
has_marker "$MARKER_OFF" "$_file"; then
|
||||
fail "$_file carries a debug marker but is absent from $MANIFEST,
|
||||
so the manifest no longer describes the emitted bundles."
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done <<EOF
|
||||
$_listing
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# The requested mode, read from our own environment using build.js's exact
|
||||
# rule: only the literal 1 opts in. Deliberately not taken from anything
|
||||
# build.js records about itself, so build.js cannot vouch for build.js.
|
||||
expected_marker() {
|
||||
if [ "${AUTISTMASK_DEBUG-}" = "1" ]; then
|
||||
echo "$MARKER_ON"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "$MARKER_OFF"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
main() {
|
||||
cd "$ROOT"
|
||||
|
||||
expected="$(expected_marker)"
|
||||
echo "Verifying emitted bundles (expecting $expected)..."
|
||||
|
||||
[ -f "$MANIFEST" ] ||
|
||||
fail "$MANIFEST is missing. build.js writes it at the end of a
|
||||
successful build; run make build first."
|
||||
[ -s "$MANIFEST" ] ||
|
||||
fail "$MANIFEST is empty, so no emitted bundle was found to contain
|
||||
src/shared/constants.js. That is never correct, so it is a failure and not
|
||||
a pass."
|
||||
[ -r "$MANIFEST" ] ||
|
||||
fail "$MANIFEST is not readable, so nothing was inspected. That is a
|
||||
permissions or I/O fault, not a pass."
|
||||
|
||||
count=0
|
||||
while read -r file; do
|
||||
[ -n "$file" ] || continue
|
||||
[ -f "$file" ] ||
|
||||
fail "$MANIFEST lists $file, which does not exist."
|
||||
[ -s "$file" ] ||
|
||||
fail "$MANIFEST lists $file, which is empty. An empty bundle
|
||||
carries no marker and proves nothing, so this is a failure and not a pass."
|
||||
read_marker "$file"
|
||||
[ "$MARKER" = "$expected" ] ||
|
||||
fail "$file is $MARKER but this build expects $expected."
|
||||
echo " ok: $file ($MARKER)"
|
||||
count=$((count + 1))
|
||||
done <"$MANIFEST"
|
||||
|
||||
[ "$count" -gt 0 ] || fail "no bundles were inspected."
|
||||
|
||||
check_unlisted_bundles
|
||||
|
||||
echo "verify-build: $count bundle(s) verified $expected"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
main "$@"
|
||||
161
scripts/apply-enrichment.mjs
Normal file
161
scripts/apply-enrichment.mjs
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env node
|
||||
// Apply enrichment data to tokenList.js: add name + url fields to each token.
|
||||
|
||||
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "fs";
|
||||
|
||||
const enrichment = JSON.parse(
|
||||
readFileSync("scripts/token-enrichment.json", "utf8"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Well-known URLs for major tokens not in ethereum-lists.
|
||||
// These are official project websites verified from public sources.
|
||||
const EXTRA_URLS = {
|
||||
"0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2": "https://weth.io",
|
||||
"0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7": "https://tether.to",
|
||||
"0xB8c77482e45F1F44dE1745F52C74426C631bDD52": "https://www.bnbchain.org",
|
||||
"0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48": "https://www.circle.com/usdc",
|
||||
"0xdC035D45d973E3EC169d2276DDab16f1e407384F": "https://sky.money",
|
||||
"0x2AF5D2aD76741191D15Dfe7bF6aC92d4Bd912Ca3": "https://www.bitfinex.com",
|
||||
"0x514910771AF9Ca656af840dff83E8264EcF986CA": "https://chain.link",
|
||||
"0x4c9EDD5852cd905f086C759E8383e09bff1E68B3": "https://ethena.fi",
|
||||
"0x8d0D000Ee44948FC98c9B98A4FA4921476f08B0d":
|
||||
"https://www.worldlibertyfinancial.com",
|
||||
"0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F": "https://makerdao.com",
|
||||
"0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8":
|
||||
"https://www.paypal.com/us/digital-wallet/manage-money/crypto/pyusd",
|
||||
"0x95aD61b0a150d79219dCF64E1E6Cc01f0B64C4cE": "https://shibatoken.com",
|
||||
"0xdA5e1988097297dCdc1f90D4dFE7909e847CBeF6":
|
||||
"https://www.worldlibertyfinancial.com",
|
||||
"0xA0b73E1Ff0B80914AB6fe0444E65848C4C34450b": "https://crypto.com",
|
||||
"0x582d872A1B094FC48F5DE31D3B73F2D9bE47def1": "https://ton.org",
|
||||
"0x68749665FF8D2d112Fa859AA293F07A622782F38": "https://gold.tether.to",
|
||||
"0x196C20DA81Fbc324EcdF55501e95Ce9f0bD84d14": "https://polkadot.network",
|
||||
"0x1f9840a85d5aF5bf1D1762F925BDADdC4201F984": "https://uniswap.org",
|
||||
"0x45804880De22913dAFE09f4980848ECE6EcbAf78":
|
||||
"https://www.paxos.com/paxgold",
|
||||
"0x3c3a81e81dc49A522A592e7622A7E711c06bf354": "https://www.mantle.xyz",
|
||||
"0x7Fc66500c84A76Ad7e9c93437bFc5Ac33E2DDaE9": "https://aave.com",
|
||||
"0x75231F58b43240C9718Dd58B4967c5114342a86c": "https://www.okx.com",
|
||||
"0x6982508145454Ce325dDbE47a25d4ec3d2311933": "https://www.pepe.vip",
|
||||
"0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599": "https://wbtc.network",
|
||||
"0xae7ab96520DE3A18E5e111B5EaAb095312D7fE84": "https://lido.fi",
|
||||
"0x5A98FcBEA516Cf06857215779Fd812CA3beF1B32": "https://lido.fi",
|
||||
"0xC18360217D8F7Ab5e7c516566761Ea12Ce7F9D72": "https://ens.domains",
|
||||
"0x7D1AfA7B718fb893dB30A3aBc0Cfc608AaCfeBB0": "https://polygon.technology",
|
||||
"0x9f8F72aA9304c8B593d555F12eF6589cC3A579A2": "https://makerdao.com",
|
||||
"0xD533a949740bb3306d119CC777fa900bA034cd52": "https://curve.fi",
|
||||
"0x111111111117dC0aa78b770fA6A738034120C302": "https://1inch.io",
|
||||
"0x163f8C2467924be0ae7B5347228CABF260318753": "https://worldcoin.org",
|
||||
"0xba100000625a3754423978a60c9317c58a424e3D": "https://balancer.fi",
|
||||
"0xC011a73ee8576Fb46F5E1c5751cA3B9Fe0af2a6F": "https://synthetix.io",
|
||||
"0x1a7e4e63778B4f12a199C062f3eFdD288afCBce8": "https://www.euler.finance",
|
||||
"0xBBbbCA6A901c926F240b89EacB641d8Aec7AEafD": "https://loopring.org",
|
||||
"0xC669928185DbCE49d2230CC9B0979BE6DC797957": "https://bitstable.finance",
|
||||
"0x7f39C581F595B53c5cb19bD0b3f8dA6c935E2Ca0": "https://lido.fi",
|
||||
"0xBe9895146f7AF43049ca1c1AE358B0541Ea49704":
|
||||
"https://www.coinbase.com/cbeth",
|
||||
"0xfAbA6f8e4a5E8Ab82F62fe7C39859FA577269BE3": "https://ondo.finance",
|
||||
"0x0C10bF8FcB7Bf5412187A595ab97a3609160b5c6": "https://decentraland.org",
|
||||
"0x6De037ef9aD2725EB40118Bb1702EBb27e4Aeb24": "https://www.render.com",
|
||||
"0x4a220E6096B25EADb88358cb44068A3248254675": "https://www.quant.network",
|
||||
"0xba5BDe662c17e2aDFF1075610382B9B691296350": "https://superrare.com",
|
||||
"0x15D4c048F83bd7e37d49eA4C83a07267Ec4203dA": "https://galxe.com",
|
||||
"0xc00e94Cb662C3520282E6f5717214004A7f26888": "https://compound.finance",
|
||||
"0xE41d2489571d322189246DaFA5ebDe1F4699F498": "https://0x.org",
|
||||
"0x0bc529c00C6401aEF6D220BE8C6Ea1667F6Ad93e": "https://yearn.fi",
|
||||
"0x6fB3e0A217407EFFf7Ca062D46c26E5d60a14d69": "https://iotex.io",
|
||||
"0xD31a59c85aE9D8edEFec411D448f90841571b89c": "https://solana.com",
|
||||
"0xa1faa113cbE53436Df28FF0aEe54275c13B40975": "https://alphafinance.io",
|
||||
"0xF57e7e7C23978C3cAEC3C3548E3D615c346e79fF": "https://immutable.com",
|
||||
"0x0f5D2fB29fb7d3CFeE444a200298f468908cC942": "https://decentraland.org",
|
||||
"0x3845badAde8e6dFF049820680d1F14bD3903a5d0": "https://www.sandbox.game",
|
||||
"0x4d224452801ACEd8B2F0aebE155379bb5D594381": "https://apecoin.com",
|
||||
"0x6810e776880C02933D47DB1b9fc05908e5386b96": "https://gnosis.io",
|
||||
"0x5f98805A4E8be255a32880FDeC7F6728C6568bA0": "https://www.liquity.org",
|
||||
"0xd26114cd6EE289AccF82350c8d8487fedB8A0C07": "https://omg.network",
|
||||
"0x0D8775F648430679A709E98d2b0Cb6250d2887EF":
|
||||
"https://basicattentiontoken.org",
|
||||
"0xc944E90C64B2c07662A292be6244BDf05Cda44a7": "https://thegraph.com",
|
||||
"0x1985365e9f78359a9B6AD760e32412f4a445E862": "https://augur.net",
|
||||
"0x4E15361FD6b4BB609Fa63C81A2be19d873717870": "https://fantom.foundation",
|
||||
"0x853d955aCEf822Db058eb8505911ED77F175b99e": "https://frax.finance",
|
||||
"0x0000000000085d4780B73119b644AE5ecd22b376": "https://www.trueusd.com",
|
||||
"0x0cEC1A9154Ff802e7934Fc916Ed7Ca50bDE6844e": "https://polymesh.network",
|
||||
"0x956F47F50A910163D8BF957Cf5846D573E7f87CA": "https://fei.money",
|
||||
"0x3432B6A60D23Ca0dFCa7761B7ab56459D9C964D0": "https://frax.finance",
|
||||
"0xf939E0A03FB07F59A73314E73794Be0E57ac1b4E": "https://curve.fi",
|
||||
"0x0100546F2cD4C9D97f798fFC9755E47865FF7Ee6": "https://alchemix.fi",
|
||||
"0x808507121B80c02388fAd14726482e061B8da827": "https://pendle.finance",
|
||||
"0xCa14007Eff0dB1f8135f4C25B34De49AB0d42766": "https://starknet.io",
|
||||
"0x8457CA5040ad67fdebbCC8EdCE889A335Bc0fbFB": "https://alt.layer",
|
||||
"0x4C19596f5aAfF459fA38B0f7eD92F11AE6543784": "https://www.truflation.com",
|
||||
"0xB50721BCf8d664c30412Cfbc6cf7a15145234ad1": "https://arbitrum.io",
|
||||
"0x912CE59144191C1204E64559FE8253a0e49E6548": "https://arbitrum.io",
|
||||
"0x6985884C4392D348587B19cb9eAAf157F13271cd": "https://layerzero.network",
|
||||
"0xFe0c30065B384F05761f15d0CC899D4F9F9Cc0eB": "https://ethfi.org",
|
||||
"0x18084fbA666a33d37592fA2633fD49a74DD93a88": "https://tbtc.network",
|
||||
"0x9D39A5DE30e57443BfF2A8307A4256c8797A3497": "https://suilend.fi",
|
||||
"0x5283D291DBCF85356A21bA090E6db59121208b44": "https://blur.io",
|
||||
"0x43Dfc4159D86F3A37A5A4B3D4580b888ad7d4DDd": "https://dydx.exchange",
|
||||
"0xCf0C122c6b73ff809C693DB761e7BaeBe62b6a2E": "https://floki.com",
|
||||
"0xe53EC727dbDEB9E2d5456c3be40cFF031AB40A55": "https://superfarm.com",
|
||||
"0x32353A6C91143bfd6C7d363B546e62a9A2489A20": "https://www.agora.finance",
|
||||
"0x1aBaEA1f7C830bD89Acc67eC4af516284b1bC33c": "https://www.euro-coin.com",
|
||||
"0x1a03eF3d1a80b5f214e468ACD97F55714E049393": "https://gemspad.io",
|
||||
"0x7122985656e38BDC0302Db86685bb972b145bD3C": "https://stone.fi",
|
||||
"0xa35923162C49cF95e6BF26623385eb431ad920D3": "https://www.turbo-eth.com",
|
||||
"0xdBdb4d16EdA451D0503b854CF79D55697F90c8DF": "https://alchemix.fi",
|
||||
"0x08c32b0726C5684024ea6e141C50aDe9690bBdcc": "https://stratis.io",
|
||||
"0x65Ef703f5594D2573eb71Aaf55BC0CB548492df4": "https://multichain.org",
|
||||
"0x1151CB3d861920e07a38e03eEAd12C32178567F6": "https://bonk.com",
|
||||
"0x090185f2135308BaD17527004364eBcC2D37e5F6": "https://spell.club",
|
||||
"0xAf5191B0De278C7286d6C7CC6ab6BB8A73bA2Cd6": "https://stargate.finance",
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Apply extra URLs where enrichment has none
|
||||
for (const [addr, url] of Object.entries(EXTRA_URLS)) {
|
||||
const e = enrichment[addr];
|
||||
if (e && !e.url) {
|
||||
e.url = url;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Read original tokenList.js
|
||||
const original = readFileSync("src/shared/tokenList.js", "utf8");
|
||||
|
||||
// Replace each token block: add name and url after decimals
|
||||
let result = original;
|
||||
let replacements = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for (const [addr, data] of Object.entries(enrichment)) {
|
||||
// Escape special regex characters in the address
|
||||
const escaped = addr.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&");
|
||||
|
||||
// Match the token block: { address: "...", symbol: "...", decimals: N, }
|
||||
// The closing }, may have trailing whitespace
|
||||
const blockRe = new RegExp(
|
||||
`(\\{\\s*address:\\s*"${escaped}",\\s*symbol:\\s*"[^"]+",\\s*decimals:\\s*\\d+),?(\\s*\\})`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const match = result.match(blockRe);
|
||||
if (!match) {
|
||||
console.error(`WARNING: Could not find block for ${addr}`);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Build replacement: original fields + name + url
|
||||
const nameEscaped = data.name.replace(/\\/g, "\\\\").replace(/"/g, '\\"');
|
||||
const urlEscaped = data.url.replace(/\\/g, "\\\\").replace(/"/g, '\\"');
|
||||
const replacement =
|
||||
match[1] +
|
||||
`,\n name: "${nameEscaped}",` +
|
||||
`\n url: "${urlEscaped}",` +
|
||||
match[2];
|
||||
|
||||
result = result.replace(blockRe, replacement);
|
||||
replacements++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
console.error(`Applied ${replacements} enrichments to tokenList.js`);
|
||||
writeFileSync("src/shared/tokenList.js", result);
|
||||
console.error("Done!");
|
||||
87
scripts/enrich-tokens.mjs
Normal file
87
scripts/enrich-tokens.mjs
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env node
|
||||
// Temporary script: fetch name + homepage URL for every token in tokenList.js
|
||||
// Phase 1: CoinGecko /coins/list (1 bulk call) for names — gets 100%
|
||||
// Phase 2: ethereum-lists GitHub repo for project URLs — gets ~15%
|
||||
|
||||
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "fs";
|
||||
|
||||
const src = readFileSync("src/shared/tokenList.js", "utf8");
|
||||
|
||||
const tokens = [];
|
||||
const re =
|
||||
/\{\s*address:\s*"(0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40})",\s*symbol:\s*"([^"]+)",\s*decimals:\s*(\d+)/g;
|
||||
let m;
|
||||
while ((m = re.exec(src)) !== null) {
|
||||
tokens.push({ address: m[1], symbol: m[2], decimals: parseInt(m[3]) });
|
||||
}
|
||||
console.error(`Parsed ${tokens.length} tokens`);
|
||||
|
||||
const sleep = (ms) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
|
||||
|
||||
// --- Phase 1: bulk names from CoinGecko ---
|
||||
console.error("Fetching CoinGecko coins list...");
|
||||
const listResp = await fetch(
|
||||
"https://api.coingecko.com/api/v3/coins/list?include_platform=true",
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (!listResp.ok) throw new Error(`CoinGecko list HTTP ${listResp.status}`);
|
||||
const coins = await listResp.json();
|
||||
|
||||
const addrMap = new Map();
|
||||
for (const coin of coins) {
|
||||
const eth = (coin.platforms?.ethereum || "").toLowerCase().trim();
|
||||
if (eth && eth.startsWith("0x")) {
|
||||
addrMap.set(eth, { name: coin.name, id: coin.id });
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
console.error(`CoinGecko map: ${addrMap.size} Ethereum tokens`);
|
||||
|
||||
const enriched = new Map();
|
||||
for (const t of tokens) {
|
||||
const info = addrMap.get(t.address.toLowerCase());
|
||||
enriched.set(t.address, { name: info?.name || t.symbol, url: "" });
|
||||
}
|
||||
console.error(
|
||||
`Matched ${[...enriched.values()].filter((e) => e.name).length}/${tokens.length} names`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// --- Phase 2: ethereum-lists GitHub for URLs ---
|
||||
console.error("Fetching URLs from ethereum-lists GitHub...");
|
||||
const CONCURRENT = 10;
|
||||
let urlsFound = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < tokens.length; i += CONCURRENT) {
|
||||
const batch = tokens.slice(i, i + CONCURRENT);
|
||||
await Promise.allSettled(
|
||||
batch.map(async (t) => {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const r = await fetch(
|
||||
`https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum-lists/tokens/master/tokens/eth/${t.address}.json`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (!r.ok) return;
|
||||
const data = await r.json();
|
||||
const website = (data.website || "").trim();
|
||||
if (website && website !== "https://") {
|
||||
enriched.get(t.address).url = website;
|
||||
urlsFound++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
// ignore
|
||||
}
|
||||
}),
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (i % 100 === 0) {
|
||||
console.error(
|
||||
` GitHub: ${Math.min(i + CONCURRENT, tokens.length)}/${tokens.length}, ${urlsFound} URLs`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
await sleep(200);
|
||||
}
|
||||
console.error(`Phase 2 done: ${urlsFound} URLs from ethereum-lists`);
|
||||
|
||||
// --- Output ---
|
||||
const output = {};
|
||||
for (const [addr, e] of enriched) {
|
||||
output[addr] = { name: e.name, url: e.url };
|
||||
}
|
||||
writeFileSync("scripts/token-enrichment.json", JSON.stringify(output, null, 2));
|
||||
console.error(`Done! ${tokens.length} names, ${urlsFound} URLs.`);
|
||||
2050
scripts/token-enrichment.json
Normal file
2050
scripts/token-enrichment.json
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
|
||||
const { DEFAULT_RPC_URL } = require("../shared/constants");
|
||||
const { SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS, networkByChainId } = require("../shared/networks");
|
||||
const { onChainSwitch } = require("../shared/chainSwitch");
|
||||
const { getBytes } = require("ethers");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
state,
|
||||
loadState,
|
||||
@@ -12,20 +13,14 @@ const {
|
||||
currentNetwork,
|
||||
} = require("../shared/state");
|
||||
const { refreshBalances, getProvider } = require("../shared/balances");
|
||||
const { debugFetch, log } = require("../shared/log");
|
||||
const { verifySignedTx, verifySignature } = require("../shared/approvalVerify");
|
||||
const { debugFetch } = require("../shared/log");
|
||||
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../shared/vault");
|
||||
const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../shared/wallet");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
isPhishingDomain,
|
||||
refreshPhishingListOnSchedule,
|
||||
initPhishingList,
|
||||
updatePhishingList,
|
||||
startPeriodicRefresh,
|
||||
} = require("../shared/phishingDomains");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM,
|
||||
PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM,
|
||||
BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES,
|
||||
ensureRecurringAlarms,
|
||||
registerAlarmHandlers,
|
||||
} = require("../shared/alarms");
|
||||
|
||||
const storageApi =
|
||||
typeof browser !== "undefined"
|
||||
@@ -598,22 +593,12 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
|
||||
// Background balance refresh: every 60 seconds when the popup isn't open.
|
||||
// When the popup IS open, its 10-second interval keeps lastBalanceRefresh
|
||||
// fresh, so this naturally skips.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The alarm period alone sets the cadence; this guard only suppresses a
|
||||
// refresh something else has just done, so it must stay strictly shorter than
|
||||
// the period. Timed to the period it would veto every tick it gates —
|
||||
// lastBalanceRefresh is stamped after the refresh runs, so a tick one period
|
||||
// after the last one always lands inside a guard of equal length and the real
|
||||
// cadence becomes two periods. Half the period keeps it comfortably above the
|
||||
// popup's 10-second refresh, so an open popup still suppresses the background
|
||||
// job, and comfortably below the alarm period, so the schedule always wins.
|
||||
const BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MS = BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES * 60 * 1000;
|
||||
const RECENT_BALANCE_REFRESH_MS = Math.floor(BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MS / 2);
|
||||
const BACKGROUND_REFRESH_INTERVAL = 60000;
|
||||
|
||||
async function backgroundRefresh() {
|
||||
await loadState();
|
||||
const now = Date.now();
|
||||
if (now - (state.lastBalanceRefresh || 0) < RECENT_BALANCE_REFRESH_MS)
|
||||
if (now - (state.lastBalanceRefresh || 0) < BACKGROUND_REFRESH_INTERVAL)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
if (state.wallets.length === 0) return;
|
||||
await refreshBalances(
|
||||
@@ -626,58 +611,12 @@ async function backgroundRefresh() {
|
||||
await saveState();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Both recurring jobs run off alarms, not timers. On Chrome MV3 this file is
|
||||
// a service worker that the browser terminates after about 30 seconds idle,
|
||||
// so a setInterval would only ever survive until the first idle period and
|
||||
// module-level state does not outlive it. Alarms are held by the browser and
|
||||
// wake the worker to deliver them.
|
||||
registerAlarmHandlers({
|
||||
[BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM]: backgroundRefresh,
|
||||
// The scheduled refresh, which restores persisted state on a freshly
|
||||
// revived worker and then fetches unconditionally. The freshness guards
|
||||
// belong to the startup path; applying them here would make the tick skip
|
||||
// itself.
|
||||
[PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM]: refreshPhishingListOnSchedule,
|
||||
});
|
||||
setInterval(backgroundRefresh, BACKGROUND_REFRESH_INTERVAL);
|
||||
|
||||
// Everything the background context needs re-established on start. This runs
|
||||
// on a fresh install, on browser startup, and on every revival of a
|
||||
// terminated worker, so it must be idempotent: ensureRecurringAlarms() only
|
||||
// creates alarms that are missing or carrying a stale period, and
|
||||
// initPhishingList() fetches only when the persisted timestamps say the list
|
||||
// is stale.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// On a fresh install the top-level call and the onInstalled listener both run,
|
||||
// close enough together that both could see an alarm missing and create it.
|
||||
// Sharing one in-flight run makes the "create only when missing" check
|
||||
// race-free; the memo is dropped once it settles so a later onStartup runs
|
||||
// again.
|
||||
let backgroundJobsRun = null;
|
||||
|
||||
function startBackgroundJobs() {
|
||||
if (backgroundJobsRun) return backgroundJobsRun;
|
||||
backgroundJobsRun = Promise.all([
|
||||
ensureRecurringAlarms(),
|
||||
initPhishingList(),
|
||||
])
|
||||
.catch((err) => {
|
||||
// An alarm that failed to schedule means a recurring job silently
|
||||
// never runs again; it must not be an unhandled rejection.
|
||||
log.errorf("background job startup failed:", err);
|
||||
})
|
||||
.finally(() => {
|
||||
backgroundJobsRun = null;
|
||||
});
|
||||
return backgroundJobsRun;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (runtime.onInstalled) {
|
||||
runtime.onInstalled.addListener(startBackgroundJobs);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (runtime.onStartup) {
|
||||
runtime.onStartup.addListener(startBackgroundJobs);
|
||||
}
|
||||
startBackgroundJobs();
|
||||
// Fetch the phishing domain blocklist delta on startup and refresh every 24h.
|
||||
// The vendored blocklist is bundled at build time; this fetches only new entries.
|
||||
updatePhishingList();
|
||||
startPeriodicRefresh();
|
||||
|
||||
// When approval window is closed without a response, treat as rejection
|
||||
if (windowsApi && windowsApi.onRemoved) {
|
||||
@@ -786,28 +725,39 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The popup signs; it reports back here when it could not. Fail the
|
||||
// request the same way this handler used to when it did the signing.
|
||||
if (msg.error) {
|
||||
approval.resolve({ error: { message: msg.error } });
|
||||
sendResponse({ error: msg.error });
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
(async () => {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await loadState();
|
||||
const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
|
||||
// The popup holds the secret, but the background stays the
|
||||
// authority on what is broadcast: the raw transaction must be
|
||||
// the approved one, signed by the approved address.
|
||||
verifySignedTx(
|
||||
msg.rawSignedTx,
|
||||
approval.txParams,
|
||||
activeAddress,
|
||||
let wallet, addrIndex;
|
||||
for (const w of state.wallets) {
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < w.addresses.length; i++) {
|
||||
if (w.addresses[i].address === activeAddress) {
|
||||
wallet = w;
|
||||
addrIndex = i;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (wallet) break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!wallet) throw new Error("Wallet not found");
|
||||
// TODO(security): Move decryption to popup to avoid sending password via runtime.sendMessage
|
||||
let decrypted = await decryptWithPassword(
|
||||
wallet.encryptedSecret,
|
||||
msg.password,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const signer = getSignerForAddress(
|
||||
wallet,
|
||||
addrIndex,
|
||||
decrypted,
|
||||
);
|
||||
// Best-effort: clear decrypted secret after use.
|
||||
// Note: JS strings are immutable; this nulls the reference but
|
||||
// the original string may persist in memory until GC.
|
||||
decrypted = null;
|
||||
const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
|
||||
const tx = await provider.broadcastTransaction(msg.rawSignedTx);
|
||||
const connected = signer.connect(provider);
|
||||
const tx = await connected.sendTransaction(approval.txParams);
|
||||
approval.resolve({ txHash: tx.hash });
|
||||
sendResponse({ txHash: tx.hash });
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
@@ -834,23 +784,55 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The popup signs; it reports back here when it could not. Fail the
|
||||
// request the same way this handler used to when it did the signing.
|
||||
if (msg.error) {
|
||||
approval.resolve({ error: { message: msg.error } });
|
||||
sendResponse({ error: msg.error });
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
(async () => {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await loadState();
|
||||
const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
|
||||
// The popup holds the secret, but the background stays the
|
||||
// authority on what is handed back to the page: the signature
|
||||
// must cover the approved payload and recover to the approved
|
||||
// address.
|
||||
const signature = msg.signature;
|
||||
verifySignature(approval.signParams, signature, activeAddress);
|
||||
let wallet, addrIndex;
|
||||
for (const w of state.wallets) {
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < w.addresses.length; i++) {
|
||||
if (w.addresses[i].address === activeAddress) {
|
||||
wallet = w;
|
||||
addrIndex = i;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (wallet) break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!wallet) throw new Error("Wallet not found");
|
||||
// TODO(security): Move decryption to popup to avoid sending password via runtime.sendMessage
|
||||
let decrypted = await decryptWithPassword(
|
||||
wallet.encryptedSecret,
|
||||
msg.password,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const signer = getSignerForAddress(
|
||||
wallet,
|
||||
addrIndex,
|
||||
decrypted,
|
||||
);
|
||||
// Best-effort: clear decrypted secret after use.
|
||||
// Note: JS strings are immutable; this nulls the reference but
|
||||
// the original string may persist in memory until GC.
|
||||
decrypted = null;
|
||||
|
||||
const sp = approval.signParams;
|
||||
let signature;
|
||||
|
||||
if (sp.method === "personal_sign" || sp.method === "eth_sign") {
|
||||
signature = await signer.signMessage(getBytes(sp.message));
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// eth_signTypedData_v4 / eth_signTypedData
|
||||
const typedData = JSON.parse(sp.typedData);
|
||||
const { domain, types, message } = typedData;
|
||||
// ethers handles EIP712Domain internally
|
||||
delete types.EIP712Domain;
|
||||
signature = await signer.signTypedData(
|
||||
domain,
|
||||
types,
|
||||
message,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
approval.resolve({ signature });
|
||||
sendResponse({ signature });
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1002,64 +1002,6 @@
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
<div id="settings-denied-sites"></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="bg-well p-3 mx-1 mb-3">
|
||||
<h3 class="font-bold mb-1">About</h3>
|
||||
<p class="text-xs mb-2">
|
||||
<a
|
||||
href="https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask"
|
||||
class="underline decoration-dashed"
|
||||
target="_blank"
|
||||
rel="noopener noreferrer"
|
||||
>AutistMask</a
|
||||
>
|
||||
— Minimal Ethereum wallet browser extension.
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
<div class="text-xs">
|
||||
<div class="mb-1">
|
||||
<span class="text-muted">License:</span>
|
||||
<span id="about-license"></span>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div class="mb-1">
|
||||
<span class="text-muted">Author:</span>
|
||||
<span id="about-author"></span>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div class="mb-1">
|
||||
<span class="text-muted">Version:</span>
|
||||
<span
|
||||
id="about-version"
|
||||
class="cursor-pointer select-none"
|
||||
></span>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div class="mb-1">
|
||||
<span class="text-muted">Release date:</span>
|
||||
<span id="about-release-date"></span>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div>
|
||||
<span class="text-muted">Commit:</span>
|
||||
<a
|
||||
id="about-commit-link"
|
||||
class="underline decoration-dashed"
|
||||
target="_blank"
|
||||
rel="noopener noreferrer"
|
||||
></a>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<div
|
||||
id="settings-debug-well"
|
||||
class="bg-well p-3 mx-1 mb-3"
|
||||
style="display: none"
|
||||
>
|
||||
<h3 class="font-bold mb-1">Debug</h3>
|
||||
<label
|
||||
class="text-xs flex items-center gap-1 cursor-pointer"
|
||||
>
|
||||
<input type="checkbox" id="settings-debug-mode" />
|
||||
Enable debug mode
|
||||
</label>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- ============ DELETE WALLET CONFIRM ============ -->
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,14 +1,18 @@
|
||||
// AutistMask popup entry point.
|
||||
// Loads state, initializes views, triggers first render.
|
||||
|
||||
const { state, saveState, loadState } = require("../shared/state");
|
||||
const { setRuntimeDebug } = require("../shared/log");
|
||||
const { DEBUG } = require("../shared/constants");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
state,
|
||||
saveState,
|
||||
loadState,
|
||||
currentNetwork,
|
||||
} = require("../shared/state");
|
||||
const { refreshPrices } = require("../shared/prices");
|
||||
const { refreshBalances } = require("../shared/balances");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
$,
|
||||
showView,
|
||||
updateDebugBanner,
|
||||
setRenderMain,
|
||||
pushCurrentView,
|
||||
goBack,
|
||||
@@ -205,11 +209,21 @@ async function init() {
|
||||
await loadState();
|
||||
applyTheme(state.theme);
|
||||
|
||||
// Sync runtime debug flag from persisted state before first render
|
||||
setRuntimeDebug(state.debugMode);
|
||||
|
||||
// Create the debug/testnet banner if needed (uses runtime debug state)
|
||||
updateDebugBanner();
|
||||
const net = currentNetwork();
|
||||
if (DEBUG || net.isTestnet) {
|
||||
const banner = document.createElement("div");
|
||||
banner.id = "debug-banner";
|
||||
if (DEBUG && net.isTestnet) {
|
||||
banner.textContent = "DEBUG / INSECURE [TESTNET]";
|
||||
} else if (net.isTestnet) {
|
||||
banner.textContent = "[TESTNET]";
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
banner.textContent = "DEBUG / INSECURE";
|
||||
}
|
||||
banner.style.cssText =
|
||||
"background:#c00;color:#fff;text-align:center;font-size:10px;padding:1px 0;font-family:monospace;position:sticky;top:0;z-index:9999;";
|
||||
document.body.prepend(banner);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Auto-default active address
|
||||
if (
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
|
||||
--color-border: #000000;
|
||||
--color-border-light: #cccccc;
|
||||
--color-hover: #eeeeee;
|
||||
--color-well: #e8e8e8;
|
||||
--color-well: #f5f5f5;
|
||||
--color-danger-well: #fef2f2;
|
||||
--color-section: #dddddd;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
const { $, showView, showFlash, goBack } = require("./helpers");
|
||||
const { $, showFlash, goBack } = require("./helpers");
|
||||
const { getTopTokens } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
|
||||
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { lookupTokenInfo } = require("../../shared/balances");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,19 +9,10 @@ const {
|
||||
attachCopyHandlers,
|
||||
} = require("./helpers");
|
||||
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
formatEther,
|
||||
formatUnits,
|
||||
getBytes,
|
||||
Interface,
|
||||
toUtf8String,
|
||||
} = require("ethers");
|
||||
const { formatEther, formatUnits, Interface, toUtf8String } = require("ethers");
|
||||
const { getPrice, formatUsd } = require("../../shared/prices");
|
||||
const { ERC20_ABI } = require("../../shared/constants");
|
||||
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
|
||||
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
|
||||
const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
|
||||
const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
|
||||
const txStatus = require("./txStatus");
|
||||
const uniswap = require("../../shared/uniswap");
|
||||
const runtime =
|
||||
@@ -162,8 +153,6 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
|
||||
details.isPhishingDomain,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
pendingTxParams = details.txParams;
|
||||
|
||||
const toAddr = details.txParams.to;
|
||||
const token = toAddr ? TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(toAddr.toLowerCase()) : null;
|
||||
const ethValue = formatEther(details.txParams.value || "0");
|
||||
@@ -337,7 +326,6 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const sp = details.signParams;
|
||||
pendingSignParams = sp;
|
||||
|
||||
$("approve-sign-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
|
||||
$("approve-sign-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(sp.from);
|
||||
@@ -413,36 +401,6 @@ function show(id) {
|
||||
|
||||
let approvalId = null;
|
||||
let pendingTxDetails = null;
|
||||
// The exact parameters shown to the user, kept so the popup signs what it
|
||||
// displayed rather than re-fetching anything at approval time. Both are
|
||||
// repopulated by show() when the popup is closed and reopened.
|
||||
let pendingTxParams = null;
|
||||
let pendingSignParams = null;
|
||||
|
||||
// Approve buttons stay disabled and muted while the popup derives the key and
|
||||
// signs, which is slow enough (Argon2id) that a double click is likely.
|
||||
function setTxButtonBusy(busy) {
|
||||
$("btn-approve-tx").disabled = busy;
|
||||
$("btn-approve-tx").classList.toggle("text-muted", busy);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function setSignButtonBusy(busy) {
|
||||
$("btn-approve-sign").disabled = busy;
|
||||
$("btn-approve-sign").classList.toggle("text-muted", busy);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Locate the wallet and the address index owning the currently active
|
||||
// address. Returns null when no wallet holds it.
|
||||
function findActiveWallet() {
|
||||
for (const wallet of state.wallets) {
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < wallet.addresses.length; i++) {
|
||||
if (wallet.addresses[i].address === state.activeAddress) {
|
||||
return { wallet, addrIndex: i };
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function init(ctx) {
|
||||
$("approve-remember").addEventListener("change", async () => {
|
||||
@@ -472,78 +430,25 @@ function init(ctx) {
|
||||
window.close();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
$("btn-approve-tx").addEventListener("click", async () => {
|
||||
let password = $("approve-tx-password").value;
|
||||
$("btn-approve-tx").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
const password = $("approve-tx-password").value;
|
||||
if (!password) {
|
||||
showError("approve-tx-error", "Please enter your password.");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
hideError("approve-tx-error");
|
||||
setTxButtonBusy(true);
|
||||
$("btn-approve-tx").disabled = true;
|
||||
$("btn-approve-tx").classList.add("text-muted");
|
||||
|
||||
const active = findActiveWallet();
|
||||
if (!active) {
|
||||
password = null;
|
||||
showError(
|
||||
"approve-tx-error",
|
||||
"No wallet was found for the active address.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
setTxButtonBusy(false);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Decrypt here, in the popup. The password must never cross the
|
||||
// extension messaging boundary; only the signed transaction does.
|
||||
let decryptedSecret;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
decryptedSecret = await decryptWithPassword(
|
||||
active.wallet.encryptedSecret,
|
||||
password,
|
||||
);
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
showError(
|
||||
"approve-tx-error",
|
||||
"That password is incorrect. Please try again.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
setTxButtonBusy(false);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
// Best-effort: drop the password as soon as the key derivation
|
||||
// is done. Note that JS strings are immutable; this clears the
|
||||
// reference but the original string may persist until GC.
|
||||
password = null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const payload = {
|
||||
runtime.sendMessage(
|
||||
{
|
||||
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
|
||||
id: approvalId,
|
||||
approved: true,
|
||||
};
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const signer = getSignerForAddress(
|
||||
active.wallet,
|
||||
active.addrIndex,
|
||||
decryptedSecret,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
|
||||
const connected = signer.connect(provider);
|
||||
// This is the sequence ethers' own sendTransaction() runs
|
||||
// internally, so nonce, gas, fee and chain id population are
|
||||
// identical to when the background did the signing.
|
||||
const populated =
|
||||
await connected.populateTransaction(pendingTxParams);
|
||||
delete populated.from;
|
||||
payload.rawSignedTx = await connected.signTransaction(populated);
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
payload.error =
|
||||
e.shortMessage || e.message || "Transaction signing failed.";
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
// Best-effort: clear the decrypted secret after use, with the
|
||||
// same immutability caveat as the password above.
|
||||
decryptedSecret = null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
runtime.sendMessage(payload, (response) => {
|
||||
// TODO(security): Move decryption to popup to avoid sending password via runtime.sendMessage
|
||||
password: password,
|
||||
},
|
||||
(response) => {
|
||||
if (response && response.txHash) {
|
||||
txStatus.showWait(pendingTxDetails, response.txHash);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
@@ -551,7 +456,8 @@ function init(ctx) {
|
||||
(response && response.error) || "Transaction failed.";
|
||||
txStatus.showError(pendingTxDetails, null, msg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
$("btn-reject-tx").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
@@ -563,93 +469,36 @@ function init(ctx) {
|
||||
window.close();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
$("btn-approve-sign").addEventListener("click", async () => {
|
||||
let password = $("approve-sign-password").value;
|
||||
$("btn-approve-sign").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
const password = $("approve-sign-password").value;
|
||||
if (!password) {
|
||||
showError("approve-sign-error", "Please enter your password.");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
hideError("approve-sign-error");
|
||||
setSignButtonBusy(true);
|
||||
$("btn-approve-sign").disabled = true;
|
||||
$("btn-approve-sign").classList.add("text-muted");
|
||||
|
||||
const active = findActiveWallet();
|
||||
if (!active) {
|
||||
password = null;
|
||||
showError(
|
||||
"approve-sign-error",
|
||||
"No wallet was found for the active address.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
setSignButtonBusy(false);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Decrypt here, in the popup. The password must never cross the
|
||||
// extension messaging boundary; only the signature does.
|
||||
let decryptedSecret;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
decryptedSecret = await decryptWithPassword(
|
||||
active.wallet.encryptedSecret,
|
||||
password,
|
||||
);
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
showError(
|
||||
"approve-sign-error",
|
||||
"That password is incorrect. Please try again.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
setSignButtonBusy(false);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
// Best-effort: drop the password as soon as the key derivation
|
||||
// is done. Note that JS strings are immutable; this clears the
|
||||
// reference but the original string may persist until GC.
|
||||
password = null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const payload = {
|
||||
runtime.sendMessage(
|
||||
{
|
||||
type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
|
||||
id: approvalId,
|
||||
approved: true,
|
||||
};
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const signer = getSignerForAddress(
|
||||
active.wallet,
|
||||
active.addrIndex,
|
||||
decryptedSecret,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const sp = pendingSignParams;
|
||||
if (sp.method === "personal_sign" || sp.method === "eth_sign") {
|
||||
payload.signature = await signer.signMessage(
|
||||
getBytes(sp.message),
|
||||
);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// eth_signTypedData_v4 / eth_signTypedData
|
||||
const typedData = JSON.parse(sp.typedData);
|
||||
const { domain, types, message } = typedData;
|
||||
// ethers handles EIP712Domain internally
|
||||
delete types.EIP712Domain;
|
||||
payload.signature = await signer.signTypedData(
|
||||
domain,
|
||||
types,
|
||||
message,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
payload.error = e.shortMessage || e.message || "Signing failed.";
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
// Best-effort: clear the decrypted secret after use, with the
|
||||
// same immutability caveat as the password above.
|
||||
decryptedSecret = null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
runtime.sendMessage(payload, (response) => {
|
||||
// TODO(security): Move decryption to popup to avoid sending password via runtime.sendMessage
|
||||
password: password,
|
||||
},
|
||||
(response) => {
|
||||
if (response && response.signature) {
|
||||
window.close();
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
const msg = (response && response.error) || "Signing failed.";
|
||||
const msg =
|
||||
(response && response.error) || "Signing failed.";
|
||||
showError("approve-sign-error", msg);
|
||||
setSignButtonBusy(false);
|
||||
$("btn-approve-sign").disabled = false;
|
||||
$("btn-approve-sign").classList.remove("text-muted");
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
$("btn-reject-sign").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,10 +1,6 @@
|
||||
const { $, showView, showFlash, goBack, clearViewStack } = require("./helpers");
|
||||
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
removeWalletFromState,
|
||||
broadcastActiveChanged,
|
||||
} = require("../../shared/walletDelete");
|
||||
|
||||
let deleteWalletIndex = null;
|
||||
let ctx = null;
|
||||
@@ -62,24 +58,35 @@ function init(_ctx) {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Remove the wallet and repair selection, permissions and hasWallet
|
||||
const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(
|
||||
state,
|
||||
walletIdx,
|
||||
);
|
||||
// Collect addresses to clean up from allowedSites/deniedSites
|
||||
const addresses = (wallet.addresses || []).map((a) => a.address);
|
||||
|
||||
// Remove wallet
|
||||
state.wallets.splice(walletIdx, 1);
|
||||
|
||||
// Clean up site permissions for deleted addresses
|
||||
for (const addr of addresses) {
|
||||
delete state.allowedSites[addr];
|
||||
delete state.deniedSites[addr];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
deleteWalletIndex = null;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!state.hasWallet) {
|
||||
if (state.wallets.length === 0) {
|
||||
// No wallets left — reset selection and show welcome
|
||||
state.selectedWallet = null;
|
||||
state.selectedAddress = null;
|
||||
state.activeAddress = null;
|
||||
clearViewStack();
|
||||
await saveState();
|
||||
// Save before broadcasting: the background reads the active
|
||||
// address back out of storage to build accountsChanged.
|
||||
if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
|
||||
showView("welcome");
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Switch to first wallet if deleted wallet was active
|
||||
state.selectedWallet = 0;
|
||||
state.selectedAddress = 0;
|
||||
state.activeAddress =
|
||||
state.wallets[0].addresses[0]?.address || null;
|
||||
await saveState();
|
||||
if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
|
||||
// Reset stack to [main] so Settings back goes home.
|
||||
// Use require() lazily to avoid circular dependency
|
||||
// (settings.js requires deleteWallet.js).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
// Shared DOM helpers used by all views.
|
||||
|
||||
const { isDebug } = require("../../shared/log");
|
||||
const { DEBUG } = require("../../shared/constants");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
formatUsd,
|
||||
getPrice,
|
||||
@@ -59,37 +59,19 @@ function showView(name) {
|
||||
clearFlash();
|
||||
state.currentView = name;
|
||||
saveState();
|
||||
updateDebugBanner(name);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Create or update the debug/insecure warning banner.
|
||||
// Called on every view switch and after the settings debug toggle changes.
|
||||
// The banner is shown when the compile-time DEBUG constant is true OR when
|
||||
// the user has enabled runtime debug mode via the settings easter egg, OR
|
||||
// when the active network is a testnet.
|
||||
function updateDebugBanner(viewName) {
|
||||
const debug = isDebug();
|
||||
const net = currentNetwork();
|
||||
const show = debug || net.isTestnet;
|
||||
let banner = document.getElementById("debug-banner");
|
||||
if (show) {
|
||||
if (!banner) {
|
||||
banner = document.createElement("div");
|
||||
banner.id = "debug-banner";
|
||||
banner.style.cssText =
|
||||
"background:#c00;color:#fff;text-align:center;font-size:10px;padding:1px 0;font-family:monospace;position:sticky;top:0;z-index:9999;";
|
||||
document.body.prepend(banner);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const suffix = viewName ? " (" + viewName + ")" : "";
|
||||
if (debug && net.isTestnet) {
|
||||
banner.textContent = "DEBUG / INSECURE [TESTNET]" + suffix;
|
||||
if (DEBUG || net.isTestnet) {
|
||||
const banner = document.getElementById("debug-banner");
|
||||
if (banner) {
|
||||
if (DEBUG && net.isTestnet) {
|
||||
banner.textContent =
|
||||
"DEBUG / INSECURE [TESTNET] (" + name + ")";
|
||||
} else if (net.isTestnet) {
|
||||
banner.textContent = "[TESTNET]" + suffix;
|
||||
banner.textContent = "[TESTNET]";
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
banner.textContent = "DEBUG / INSECURE" + suffix;
|
||||
banner.textContent = "DEBUG / INSECURE (" + name + ")";
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if (banner) {
|
||||
banner.remove();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -435,7 +417,6 @@ module.exports = {
|
||||
showError,
|
||||
hideError,
|
||||
showView,
|
||||
updateDebugBanner,
|
||||
setRenderMain,
|
||||
pushCurrentView,
|
||||
goBack,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
|
||||
const {
|
||||
$,
|
||||
showView,
|
||||
updateDebugBanner,
|
||||
showFlash,
|
||||
escapeHtml,
|
||||
flashCopyFeedback,
|
||||
goBack,
|
||||
pushCurrentView,
|
||||
} = require("./helpers");
|
||||
@@ -12,23 +10,12 @@ const { applyTheme } = require("../theme");
|
||||
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { NETWORKS, SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS } = require("../../shared/networks");
|
||||
const { onChainSwitch } = require("../../shared/chainSwitch");
|
||||
const { log, debugFetch, setRuntimeDebug } = require("../../shared/log");
|
||||
const { log, debugFetch } = require("../../shared/log");
|
||||
const deleteWallet = require("./deleteWallet");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
BUILD_VERSION,
|
||||
BUILD_LICENSE,
|
||||
BUILD_AUTHOR,
|
||||
BUILD_COMMIT,
|
||||
BUILD_DATE,
|
||||
GITEA_COMMIT_URL,
|
||||
} = require("../../shared/buildInfo");
|
||||
|
||||
const runtime =
|
||||
typeof browser !== "undefined" ? browser.runtime : chrome.runtime;
|
||||
|
||||
let versionClickCount = 0;
|
||||
let versionClickTimer = null;
|
||||
|
||||
function renderSiteList(containerId, siteMap, stateKey) {
|
||||
const container = $(containerId);
|
||||
const hostnames = [...new Set(Object.values(siteMap).flat())];
|
||||
@@ -155,28 +142,6 @@ function show() {
|
||||
renderSiteLists();
|
||||
renderWalletListSettings();
|
||||
|
||||
// Populate About well
|
||||
$("about-license").textContent = BUILD_LICENSE;
|
||||
// Show only the name part of the author field (strip email)
|
||||
const authorName = BUILD_AUTHOR.replace(/\s*<[^>]+>/, "");
|
||||
$("about-author").textContent = authorName;
|
||||
$("about-version").textContent = BUILD_VERSION;
|
||||
$("about-release-date").textContent = BUILD_DATE;
|
||||
$("about-commit-link").textContent = BUILD_COMMIT;
|
||||
$("about-commit-link").href = GITEA_COMMIT_URL;
|
||||
|
||||
// Reset version click counter each time settings opens
|
||||
versionClickCount = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
// Show debug well if debug mode is already enabled
|
||||
const debugWell = $("settings-debug-well");
|
||||
if (state.debugMode) {
|
||||
debugWell.style.display = "";
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
debugWell.style.display = "none";
|
||||
}
|
||||
$("settings-debug-mode").checked = state.debugMode;
|
||||
|
||||
showView("settings");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -304,17 +269,11 @@ function init(ctx) {
|
||||
|
||||
$("settings-dust-threshold").value = state.dustThresholdGwei;
|
||||
$("settings-dust-threshold").addEventListener("change", async () => {
|
||||
const raw = $("settings-dust-threshold").value.trim();
|
||||
const val = Number(raw);
|
||||
// 0 is accepted and means "hide nothing". Empty, negative,
|
||||
// fractional and non-numeric input is rejected outright rather than
|
||||
// coerced, and the field is put back to the stored threshold so it
|
||||
// never shows a value the wallet is not using.
|
||||
if (raw !== "" && Number.isInteger(val) && val >= 0) {
|
||||
const val = parseInt($("settings-dust-threshold").value, 10);
|
||||
if (!isNaN(val) && val >= 0) {
|
||||
state.dustThresholdGwei = val;
|
||||
await saveState();
|
||||
}
|
||||
$("settings-dust-threshold").value = state.dustThresholdGwei;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
$("settings-utc-timestamps").checked = state.utcTimestamps;
|
||||
@@ -330,66 +289,6 @@ function init(ctx) {
|
||||
ctx.showSettingsAddTokenView,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Bright saturated colors for easter egg flashes (clicks 6–10)
|
||||
const easterEggColors = [
|
||||
"#ff0055", // hot pink
|
||||
"#00cc44", // vivid green
|
||||
"#3366ff", // electric blue
|
||||
"#ff9900", // bright orange
|
||||
"#aa00ff", // vivid purple
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
// Easter egg: click version 10 times to reveal the debug well.
|
||||
// Each click does a copy-flash animation. After 5 clicks, each
|
||||
// additional click flashes a different bright saturated color.
|
||||
$("about-version").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
versionClickCount++;
|
||||
clearTimeout(versionClickTimer);
|
||||
// Reset counter if user stops clicking for 3 seconds
|
||||
versionClickTimer = setTimeout(() => {
|
||||
versionClickCount = 0;
|
||||
}, 3000);
|
||||
|
||||
const el = $("about-version");
|
||||
|
||||
if (versionClickCount > 5) {
|
||||
// Colored flash for clicks 6–10
|
||||
const colorIdx = versionClickCount - 6;
|
||||
const color = easterEggColors[colorIdx % easterEggColors.length];
|
||||
el.classList.remove("copy-flash-fade");
|
||||
el.style.backgroundColor = color;
|
||||
el.style.color = "#ffffff";
|
||||
setTimeout(() => {
|
||||
el.style.backgroundColor = "";
|
||||
el.style.color = "";
|
||||
el.classList.add("copy-flash-fade");
|
||||
setTimeout(() => {
|
||||
el.classList.remove("copy-flash-fade");
|
||||
}, 275);
|
||||
}, 75);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Standard copy-flash for clicks 1–5
|
||||
flashCopyFeedback(el);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (versionClickCount >= 10) {
|
||||
versionClickCount = 0;
|
||||
clearTimeout(versionClickTimer);
|
||||
$("settings-debug-well").style.display = "";
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Debug mode toggle — update runtime flag, persist, and re-render banner
|
||||
$("settings-debug-mode").addEventListener("change", async () => {
|
||||
state.debugMode = $("settings-debug-mode").checked;
|
||||
setRuntimeDebug(state.debugMode);
|
||||
await saveState();
|
||||
updateDebugBanner(state.currentView);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Sync runtime debug flag on init
|
||||
setRuntimeDebug(state.debugMode);
|
||||
|
||||
$("btn-settings-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
goBack();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ const {
|
||||
showFlash,
|
||||
flashCopyFeedback,
|
||||
addressTitle,
|
||||
addressDotHtml,
|
||||
escapeHtml,
|
||||
isoDate,
|
||||
timeAgo,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Periodic scheduling for the background context.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The Chrome MV3 service worker is terminated after roughly 30 seconds idle,
|
||||
// which takes every setInterval/setTimeout with it. The extension alarms API
|
||||
// is the mechanism that survives: the browser holds the schedule and wakes
|
||||
// the worker to deliver onAlarm. Firefox MV2 runs a persistent background
|
||||
// page where timers would survive, but alarms behave identically there, so
|
||||
// both targets share this path and both manifests declare the "alarms"
|
||||
// permission.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Periods are whole minutes at or above the browser-enforced one-minute
|
||||
// minimum, so nothing here is silently clamped to a slower cadence.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Trap for anyone changing a period: each job also carries a freshness guard
|
||||
// that can veto its own scheduled tick. A guard timed to the alarm period
|
||||
// halves the real cadence, because the guard is measured from when the last
|
||||
// run finished and the alarm fires one run-duration earlier than that. Every
|
||||
// guard must therefore either be strictly shorter than the period it gates or
|
||||
// be bypassed on the scheduled tick — see backgroundRefresh() in
|
||||
// src/background/index.js and updatePhishingList() in shared/phishingDomains.js.
|
||||
|
||||
const BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM = "autistmask-balance-refresh";
|
||||
const PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM = "autistmask-phishing-refresh";
|
||||
|
||||
const MIN_ALARM_PERIOD_MINUTES = 1;
|
||||
const BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES = 1;
|
||||
const PHISHING_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES = 24 * 60;
|
||||
|
||||
// Resolved on use rather than captured at module load: the worker is torn
|
||||
// down and re-evaluated repeatedly, and tests install a stub after requiring
|
||||
// the module.
|
||||
function alarmsApi() {
|
||||
if (typeof browser !== "undefined" && browser.alarms) return browser.alarms;
|
||||
if (typeof chrome !== "undefined" && chrome.alarms) return chrome.alarms;
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Create an alarm unless one with the requested period already exists.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The existence check is load-bearing: creating an alarm resets its schedule,
|
||||
* and this runs on every worker wake. Creating unconditionally would push the
|
||||
* next fire time out on every incoming message, so a busy extension would
|
||||
* never see the alarm fire at all.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The period comparison is equally load-bearing in the other direction: an
|
||||
* alarm created by an older version keeps its old period forever unless a
|
||||
* changed constant re-creates it, so a period edit would never reach an
|
||||
* existing install. Re-creating on a period change happens once and then
|
||||
* settles into the existence check above.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param {string} name
|
||||
* @param {number} periodInMinutes
|
||||
* @returns {Promise<boolean>} true if the alarm was created by this call.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function ensureAlarm(name, periodInMinutes) {
|
||||
const api = alarmsApi();
|
||||
if (!api) return false;
|
||||
const period = Math.max(periodInMinutes, MIN_ALARM_PERIOD_MINUTES);
|
||||
const existing = await api.get(name);
|
||||
if (existing && existing.periodInMinutes === period) return false;
|
||||
api.create(name, {
|
||||
periodInMinutes: period,
|
||||
delayInMinutes: period,
|
||||
});
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Ensure both recurring background jobs are scheduled. Safe to call on every
|
||||
* worker start, on onInstalled and on onStartup.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @returns {Promise<{balance: boolean, phishing: boolean}>} which alarms this
|
||||
* call had to create.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function ensureRecurringAlarms() {
|
||||
const balance = await ensureAlarm(
|
||||
BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM,
|
||||
BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const phishing = await ensureAlarm(
|
||||
PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM,
|
||||
PHISHING_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES,
|
||||
);
|
||||
return { balance, phishing };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Register per-alarm handlers. One listener dispatches by alarm name so the
|
||||
* worker only ever installs a single onAlarm listener.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param {Object<string, function>} handlers
|
||||
* @returns {boolean} true if the listener was installed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function registerAlarmHandlers(handlers) {
|
||||
const api = alarmsApi();
|
||||
if (!api || !api.onAlarm) return false;
|
||||
api.onAlarm.addListener((alarm) => {
|
||||
const handler = handlers[alarm && alarm.name];
|
||||
if (handler) handler();
|
||||
});
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
module.exports = {
|
||||
BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM,
|
||||
PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM,
|
||||
MIN_ALARM_PERIOD_MINUTES,
|
||||
BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES,
|
||||
PHISHING_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES,
|
||||
ensureAlarm,
|
||||
ensureRecurringAlarms,
|
||||
registerAlarmHandlers,
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Verification of the signed artifacts produced by the approval popup.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Signing happens in the popup, where the password is entered; the background
|
||||
// only broadcasts the raw transaction and resolves the pending approval back
|
||||
// to the requesting page. So that moving the signing out of the background
|
||||
// does not turn the background into a blind relay, the background re-derives
|
||||
// the signer from the artifact and checks it against the approval it is
|
||||
// holding before acting on it. All recovery is delegated to ethers.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Every failure message is a full sentence, because these strings are shown to
|
||||
// the user and returned to the dApp.
|
||||
|
||||
const {
|
||||
Transaction,
|
||||
getAddress,
|
||||
getBytes,
|
||||
verifyMessage,
|
||||
verifyTypedData,
|
||||
} = require("ethers");
|
||||
|
||||
// Case-insensitive address comparison that tolerates absent values on either
|
||||
// side. Two absent addresses compare equal (contract creation has no `to`).
|
||||
function sameAddress(a, b) {
|
||||
const aMissing = a === null || a === undefined || a === "";
|
||||
const bMissing = b === null || b === undefined || b === "";
|
||||
if (aMissing || bMissing) return aMissing && bMissing;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
return getAddress(a) === getAddress(b);
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
return String(a).toLowerCase() === String(b).toLowerCase();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Normalize a transaction value (hex string, decimal string, number or
|
||||
// bigint) to a bigint. An absent value is zero, matching ethers.
|
||||
function normalizeValue(v) {
|
||||
if (v === null || v === undefined || v === "") return 0n;
|
||||
return BigInt(v);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Normalize call data to a lowercase hex string. Absent data is "0x".
|
||||
function normalizeData(v) {
|
||||
if (v === null || v === undefined || v === "" || v === "0x") return "0x";
|
||||
return String(v).toLowerCase();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert that a raw signed transaction is the transaction the user approved,
|
||||
// signed by the address the approval was raised for. Returns the parsed
|
||||
// ethers Transaction on success, throws otherwise.
|
||||
function verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, txParams, expectedFrom) {
|
||||
if (typeof rawSignedTx !== "string" || !rawSignedTx.startsWith("0x")) {
|
||||
throw new Error("The signed transaction is missing or malformed.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let parsed;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
parsed = Transaction.from(rawSignedTx);
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
throw new Error("The signed transaction could not be decoded.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!parsed.from) {
|
||||
throw new Error("The signed transaction carries no valid signature.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!sameAddress(parsed.from, expectedFrom)) {
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
"The signed transaction was signed by a different address than the one that was approved.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!sameAddress(parsed.to, txParams.to)) {
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
"The signed transaction does not go to the approved recipient.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (normalizeValue(parsed.value) !== normalizeValue(txParams.value)) {
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved value.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (normalizeData(parsed.data) !== normalizeData(txParams.data)) {
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved call data.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return parsed;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert that a signature over the approved message or typed data was
|
||||
// produced by the address the approval was raised for. Returns the recovered
|
||||
// address on success, throws otherwise.
|
||||
function verifySignature(signParams, signature, expectedFrom) {
|
||||
if (typeof signature !== "string" || !signature.startsWith("0x")) {
|
||||
throw new Error("The signature is missing or malformed.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let recovered;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
if (
|
||||
signParams.method === "personal_sign" ||
|
||||
signParams.method === "eth_sign"
|
||||
) {
|
||||
recovered = verifyMessage(getBytes(signParams.message), signature);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
const typedData = JSON.parse(signParams.typedData);
|
||||
const { domain, types, message } = typedData;
|
||||
// ethers derives EIP712Domain itself and rejects it as an input.
|
||||
delete types.EIP712Domain;
|
||||
recovered = verifyTypedData(domain, types, message, signature);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
throw new Error("The signature could not be verified.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!sameAddress(recovered, expectedFrom)) {
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
"The signature was produced by a different address than the one that was approved.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return recovered;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
module.exports = { verifySignedTx, verifySignature, sameAddress };
|
||||
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Build-time constants injected by esbuild define in build.js.
|
||||
// These globals are replaced at bundle time with string literals.
|
||||
|
||||
/* global __BUILD_VERSION__, __BUILD_LICENSE__, __BUILD_AUTHOR__,
|
||||
__BUILD_COMMIT__, __BUILD_COMMIT_FULL__, __BUILD_DATE__ */
|
||||
|
||||
const BUILD_VERSION =
|
||||
typeof __BUILD_VERSION__ !== "undefined" ? __BUILD_VERSION__ : "dev";
|
||||
const BUILD_LICENSE =
|
||||
typeof __BUILD_LICENSE__ !== "undefined" ? __BUILD_LICENSE__ : "GPL-3.0";
|
||||
const BUILD_AUTHOR =
|
||||
typeof __BUILD_AUTHOR__ !== "undefined"
|
||||
? __BUILD_AUTHOR__
|
||||
: "sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>";
|
||||
const BUILD_COMMIT =
|
||||
typeof __BUILD_COMMIT__ !== "undefined" ? __BUILD_COMMIT__ : "unknown";
|
||||
const BUILD_COMMIT_FULL =
|
||||
typeof __BUILD_COMMIT_FULL__ !== "undefined"
|
||||
? __BUILD_COMMIT_FULL__
|
||||
: "unknown";
|
||||
const BUILD_DATE =
|
||||
typeof __BUILD_DATE__ !== "undefined" ? __BUILD_DATE__ : "unknown";
|
||||
|
||||
const GITEA_COMMIT_URL =
|
||||
"https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/commit/" + BUILD_COMMIT_FULL;
|
||||
|
||||
module.exports = {
|
||||
BUILD_VERSION,
|
||||
BUILD_LICENSE,
|
||||
BUILD_AUTHOR,
|
||||
BUILD_COMMIT,
|
||||
BUILD_COMMIT_FULL,
|
||||
BUILD_DATE,
|
||||
GITEA_COMMIT_URL,
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -1,27 +1,4 @@
|
||||
// DEBUG is a build-time constant injected by esbuild's define in build.js
|
||||
// (see src/shared/buildInfo.js for the same pattern). It is false unless the
|
||||
// bundle was produced with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1, and it is false whenever the
|
||||
// module is loaded outside a bundle (tests, plain require). It must never be
|
||||
// derived from anything the user can change at runtime: it is what gates the
|
||||
// hardcoded test mnemonic below.
|
||||
/* global __BUILD_DEBUG__ */
|
||||
const DEBUG = typeof __BUILD_DEBUG__ !== "undefined" ? __BUILD_DEBUG__ : false;
|
||||
|
||||
// Machine-readable record of the compiled DEBUG state, read out of the emitted
|
||||
// bundles by script/verify-build. It is derived from DEBUG itself so the two
|
||||
// cannot disagree, and it is a plain string literal rather than a minifier
|
||||
// artifact like `DEBUG:!1`, so the check does not depend on esbuild's output
|
||||
// staying byte-stable across versions.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The ambiguity is the point. When DEBUG is known at build time the bundler
|
||||
// folds this to exactly one of the two literals. When it is not — which is
|
||||
// exactly what happens if the __BUILD_DEBUG__ define goes missing from
|
||||
// build.js — the ternary survives, both literals appear in the bundle, and
|
||||
// verify-build fails rather than guessing.
|
||||
const BUILD_DEBUG_MARKER = DEBUG
|
||||
? "autistmask-build-debug=on"
|
||||
: "autistmask-build-debug=off";
|
||||
|
||||
const DEBUG = true;
|
||||
const DEBUG_MNEMONIC =
|
||||
"cube evolve unfold result inch risk jealous skill hotel bulb night wreck";
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -59,7 +36,6 @@ function isBurnAddress(address) {
|
||||
|
||||
module.exports = {
|
||||
DEBUG,
|
||||
BUILD_DEBUG_MARKER,
|
||||
DEBUG_MNEMONIC,
|
||||
ETHEREUM_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID,
|
||||
ETHEREUM_SEPOLIA_CHAIN_ID,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,11 +1,6 @@
|
||||
// Cached ENS reverse resolution.
|
||||
// Resolves addresses to ENS names via ethers provider.lookupAddress(),
|
||||
// caching results in localStorage with a 12-hour TTL.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// POPUP ONLY. localStorage does not exist in the Chrome MV3 service worker,
|
||||
// so this module must not be pulled into src/background/. Anything the
|
||||
// background context needs to cache goes in extension storage instead (see
|
||||
// shared/phishingDomains.js).
|
||||
|
||||
const { getProvider } = require("./balances");
|
||||
const { log } = require("./log");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,27 +1,12 @@
|
||||
// Leveled logger. Outputs to console with [AutistMask] prefix.
|
||||
// Level is DEBUG when the compile-time DEBUG constant is true or the runtime
|
||||
// debugMode state flag is enabled. The runtime flag is checked lazily so it
|
||||
// responds immediately when toggled in settings.
|
||||
// Level is DEBUG when the DEBUG constant is true, INFO otherwise.
|
||||
|
||||
const { DEBUG } = require("./constants");
|
||||
|
||||
const LEVELS = { debug: 0, info: 1, warn: 2, error: 3 };
|
||||
|
||||
// Runtime debug mode flag — set by settings.js when the user toggles debug
|
||||
// mode via the easter egg. Kept here as a simple mutable reference so it can
|
||||
// be updated without circular dependency issues with state.js.
|
||||
let _runtimeDebug = false;
|
||||
|
||||
function setRuntimeDebug(enabled) {
|
||||
_runtimeDebug = enabled;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function isDebug() {
|
||||
return DEBUG || _runtimeDebug;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const threshold = DEBUG ? LEVELS.debug : LEVELS.info;
|
||||
|
||||
function emit(level, method, args) {
|
||||
const threshold = isDebug() ? LEVELS.debug : LEVELS.info;
|
||||
if (LEVELS[level] >= threshold) {
|
||||
console[method]("[AutistMask]", ...args);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -52,4 +37,4 @@ async function debugFetch(url, opts) {
|
||||
return resp;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
module.exports = { log, debugFetch, setRuntimeDebug, isDebug };
|
||||
module.exports = { log, debugFetch };
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -8,14 +8,8 @@
|
||||
// The domain-checker checks the in-memory delta first (fresh/recent scam
|
||||
// sites), then falls back to the vendored list.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// If the delta and its fetch timestamp fit in 256 KiB they are persisted to
|
||||
// extension storage, so they survive termination of the MV3 service worker.
|
||||
// Extension storage, not localStorage: localStorage does not exist in a
|
||||
// service worker, so the previous persistence never ran on Chrome at all.
|
||||
// The stored timestamps are what keep a restarted worker from re-fetching on
|
||||
// every wake while still noticing an overdue update. Those guards apply to the
|
||||
// startup path only; the 24-hour alarm tick bypasses them, or it would veto
|
||||
// its own refresh — see updatePhishingList().
|
||||
// If the delta is under 256 KiB it is persisted to localStorage so it
|
||||
// survives extension/service-worker restarts.
|
||||
|
||||
const vendoredConfig = require("./phishingBlocklist.json");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,14 +17,7 @@ const BLOCKLIST_URL =
|
||||
"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MetaMask/eth-phishing-detect/main/src/config.json";
|
||||
|
||||
const CACHE_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 24 hours
|
||||
|
||||
// Floor on how often an unscheduled path may hit the network. The worker is
|
||||
// revived every ~30 seconds while the browser is busy, and every revival runs
|
||||
// the startup path; without a persisted record of the last attempt, any state
|
||||
// that leaves lastFetchTime unset — a fetch that failed, or a delta too large
|
||||
// to store — would download the full list on every single wake.
|
||||
const MIN_FETCH_ATTEMPT_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour
|
||||
|
||||
const REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 24 hours
|
||||
const DELTA_STORAGE_KEY = "phishing-delta";
|
||||
const MAX_DELTA_BYTES = 256 * 1024; // 256 KiB
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -42,104 +29,45 @@ const vendoredBlacklist = new Set(
|
||||
// Delta set — only entries from live list that are NOT in vendored.
|
||||
let deltaBlacklist = new Set();
|
||||
let lastFetchTime = 0;
|
||||
let lastAttemptTime = 0;
|
||||
let fetchPromise = null;
|
||||
let loadPromise = null;
|
||||
|
||||
// Resolved on use rather than captured at module load, so a test can install
|
||||
// a stub after requiring the module and so the popup — which has no reason to
|
||||
// touch the delta — does not fail to load where the API is absent.
|
||||
function storageApi() {
|
||||
if (typeof browser !== "undefined" && browser.storage) {
|
||||
return browser.storage.local;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (typeof chrome !== "undefined" && chrome.storage) {
|
||||
return chrome.storage.local;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let refreshTimer = null;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Sanitise a timestamp read back from storage.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A value in the future is permanent poison: every guard here measures elapsed
|
||||
* time as `Date.now() - stamp` and tests only the lower bound, so a stamp a
|
||||
* year ahead suppresses updates for a year with no path that ever clears it.
|
||||
* Clock skew and a restored profile backup both produce one. Since these
|
||||
* timestamps only ever gate work, discarding an impossible one is safe: it
|
||||
* costs at most a single extra fetch and restores a sane value immediately.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param {unknown} value
|
||||
* @returns {number} the timestamp, or 0 if it is unusable.
|
||||
* Load delta entries from localStorage on startup.
|
||||
* Called once during module initialization in the background script.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function sanitizeTimestamp(value) {
|
||||
if (typeof value !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(value)) return 0;
|
||||
if (value <= 0 || value > Date.now()) return 0;
|
||||
return value;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Load the persisted delta and its timestamps from extension storage.
|
||||
* Runs once per worker lifetime; every entry point funnels through
|
||||
* ensureDeltaLoaded() so a wake from termination restores state exactly once.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @returns {Promise<void>}
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function loadDeltaFromStorage() {
|
||||
const storage = storageApi();
|
||||
if (!storage) return;
|
||||
function loadDeltaFromStorage() {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const result = await storage.get(DELTA_STORAGE_KEY);
|
||||
const data = result && result[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY];
|
||||
if (!data) return;
|
||||
if (Array.isArray(data.blacklist)) {
|
||||
const raw = localStorage.getItem(DELTA_STORAGE_KEY);
|
||||
if (!raw) return;
|
||||
const data = JSON.parse(raw);
|
||||
if (data.blacklist && Array.isArray(data.blacklist)) {
|
||||
deltaBlacklist = new Set(
|
||||
data.blacklist.map((d) => d.toLowerCase()),
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
lastFetchTime = sanitizeTimestamp(data.lastFetchTime);
|
||||
lastAttemptTime = sanitizeTimestamp(data.lastAttemptTime);
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
// Storage unavailable or corrupt — start empty and re-fetch.
|
||||
// localStorage unavailable or corrupt — start empty
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function ensureDeltaLoaded() {
|
||||
if (!loadPromise) loadPromise = loadDeltaFromStorage();
|
||||
return loadPromise;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Persist the delta and its timestamps if they fit within MAX_DELTA_BYTES.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The 256 KiB cap covers the delta and its freshness claim: when the delta is
|
||||
* too large to keep, lastFetchTime goes with it, so the next start re-fetches
|
||||
* rather than trusting a freshness claim for a delta it no longer holds.
|
||||
* lastAttemptTime is written either way — it records that the network was
|
||||
* contacted, which stays true whatever became of the response, and it is what
|
||||
* stops a permanently oversized list from downloading on every worker wake.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @returns {Promise<void>}
|
||||
* Persist delta to localStorage if it fits within MAX_DELTA_BYTES.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function saveDeltaToStorage() {
|
||||
const storage = storageApi();
|
||||
if (!storage) return;
|
||||
function saveDeltaToStorage() {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const data = {
|
||||
blacklist: Array.from(deltaBlacklist),
|
||||
lastFetchTime,
|
||||
lastAttemptTime,
|
||||
};
|
||||
const json = JSON.stringify(data);
|
||||
if (json.length < MAX_DELTA_BYTES) {
|
||||
await storage.set({ [DELTA_STORAGE_KEY]: data });
|
||||
} else if (lastAttemptTime > 0) {
|
||||
await storage.set({ [DELTA_STORAGE_KEY]: { lastAttemptTime } });
|
||||
localStorage.setItem(DELTA_STORAGE_KEY, json);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
await storage.remove(DELTA_STORAGE_KEY);
|
||||
// Too large — remove stale key if present
|
||||
localStorage.removeItem(DELTA_STORAGE_KEY);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
// Storage unavailable — skip silently
|
||||
// localStorage unavailable — skip silently
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -148,7 +76,6 @@ async function saveDeltaToStorage() {
|
||||
* Used for both live fetches and testing.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param {{ blacklist?: string[] }} config
|
||||
* @returns {Promise<void>} resolves once the delta has been persisted.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function loadConfig(config) {
|
||||
const liveBlacklist = (config.blacklist || []).map((d) => d.toLowerCase());
|
||||
@@ -159,7 +86,7 @@ function loadConfig(config) {
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
lastFetchTime = Date.now();
|
||||
return saveDeltaToStorage();
|
||||
saveDeltaToStorage();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -184,11 +111,6 @@ function hostnameVariants(hostname) {
|
||||
* Check if a hostname is on the phishing blocklist.
|
||||
* Checks delta first (fresh/recent scam sites), then vendored list.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Synchronous by design — callers answer an approval prompt with it. On a
|
||||
* worker that has just woken, the persisted delta may still be loading; the
|
||||
* vendored list, which is bundled and always present, carries the check until
|
||||
* it lands.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param {string} hostname - The hostname to check.
|
||||
* @returns {boolean}
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@@ -205,59 +127,28 @@ function isPhishingDomain(hostname) {
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Fetch the latest blocklist and compute delta against vendored data.
|
||||
* De-duplicates concurrent fetches. Results are cached for CACHE_TTL_MS,
|
||||
* counted from the persisted timestamp so the cache outlives the worker.
|
||||
* De-duplicates concurrent fetches. Results are cached for CACHE_TTL_MS.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* `force` is what makes the 24-hour alarm actually refresh every 24 hours.
|
||||
* The alarm fires one period after the previous alarm, but lastFetchTime is
|
||||
* stamped when that fetch *completed*, so an unforced tick lands one fetch
|
||||
* latency inside its own TTL, skips, and turns the real cadence into 48 hours.
|
||||
* Shortening the TTL instead would not fix it: the worker wakes every ~30
|
||||
* seconds and the startup path re-checks the TTL each time, so a shortened TTL
|
||||
* simply becomes the real cadence. The TTL is there to stop redundant fetches
|
||||
* on wake, and the scheduled tick is not redundant, so it bypasses it.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param {{force?: boolean}} [opts] force: fetch unless one is already in
|
||||
* flight, ignoring both the freshness and the retry guard. For the scheduled
|
||||
* alarm tick only.
|
||||
* @returns {Promise<void>}
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function updatePhishingList({ force = false } = {}) {
|
||||
// A worker that has just been revived knows nothing until the persisted
|
||||
// record is back in memory; without this the freshness check below would
|
||||
// always see 0 and re-fetch on every wake.
|
||||
await ensureDeltaLoaded();
|
||||
|
||||
if (!force) {
|
||||
const now = Date.now();
|
||||
// Skip if recently fetched.
|
||||
if (lastFetchTime > 0 && now - lastFetchTime < CACHE_TTL_MS) return;
|
||||
// Skip if the network was contacted recently and the result was not
|
||||
// usable — a failed fetch or an oversized delta leaves lastFetchTime
|
||||
// unset, and without this every wake would retry.
|
||||
if (
|
||||
lastAttemptTime > 0 &&
|
||||
now - lastAttemptTime < MIN_FETCH_ATTEMPT_INTERVAL_MS
|
||||
) {
|
||||
async function updatePhishingList() {
|
||||
// Skip if recently fetched
|
||||
if (Date.now() - lastFetchTime < CACHE_TTL_MS && lastFetchTime > 0) {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// De-duplicate concurrent calls
|
||||
if (fetchPromise) return fetchPromise;
|
||||
|
||||
fetchPromise = (async () => {
|
||||
lastAttemptTime = Date.now();
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const resp = await fetch(BLOCKLIST_URL);
|
||||
if (!resp.ok) throw new Error("HTTP " + resp.status);
|
||||
const config = await resp.json();
|
||||
await loadConfig(config);
|
||||
loadConfig(config);
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
// Silently fail — vendored list still provides coverage. Persist
|
||||
// the attempt so a persistently failing fetch is retried on the
|
||||
// schedule rather than on every wake.
|
||||
await saveDeltaToStorage();
|
||||
// Silently fail — vendored list still provides coverage.
|
||||
// We'll retry next time.
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
fetchPromise = null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -267,29 +158,12 @@ async function updatePhishingList({ force = false } = {}) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Restore persisted state and fetch if the list is overdue.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Called from the background script every time it starts — a fresh install,
|
||||
* a browser start, and every revival of a terminated service worker all land
|
||||
* here. The recurring 24-hour schedule itself is an alarm (see
|
||||
* shared/alarms.js), not a timer, because timers die with the worker.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @returns {Promise<void>}
|
||||
* Start periodic refresh of the phishing list.
|
||||
* Should be called once from the background script on startup.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function initPhishingList() {
|
||||
await ensureDeltaLoaded();
|
||||
return updatePhishingList();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The 24-hour alarm tick. Separate from initPhishingList() because this is the
|
||||
* scheduled refresh and must not be vetoed by the guards that exist to keep
|
||||
* the unscheduled startup path off the network.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @returns {Promise<void>}
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function refreshPhishingListOnSchedule() {
|
||||
return updatePhishingList({ force: true });
|
||||
function startPeriodicRefresh() {
|
||||
if (refreshTimer) return;
|
||||
refreshTimer = setInterval(updatePhishingList, REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -316,22 +190,21 @@ function getDeltaSize() {
|
||||
function _reset() {
|
||||
deltaBlacklist = new Set();
|
||||
lastFetchTime = 0;
|
||||
lastAttemptTime = 0;
|
||||
fetchPromise = null;
|
||||
loadPromise = null;
|
||||
if (refreshTimer) {
|
||||
clearInterval(refreshTimer);
|
||||
refreshTimer = null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Load persisted delta on module initialization
|
||||
loadDeltaFromStorage();
|
||||
|
||||
module.exports = {
|
||||
isPhishingDomain,
|
||||
updatePhishingList,
|
||||
refreshPhishingListOnSchedule,
|
||||
initPhishingList,
|
||||
loadDeltaFromStorage,
|
||||
startPeriodicRefresh,
|
||||
loadConfig,
|
||||
CACHE_TTL_MS,
|
||||
MIN_FETCH_ATTEMPT_INTERVAL_MS,
|
||||
DELTA_STORAGE_KEY,
|
||||
MAX_DELTA_BYTES,
|
||||
getBlocklistSize,
|
||||
getDeltaSize,
|
||||
hostnameVariants,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ const DEFAULT_STATE = {
|
||||
fraudContracts: [],
|
||||
tokenHolderCache: {},
|
||||
theme: "system",
|
||||
debugMode: false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const state = {
|
||||
@@ -69,7 +68,6 @@ async function saveState() {
|
||||
fraudContracts: state.fraudContracts,
|
||||
tokenHolderCache: state.tokenHolderCache,
|
||||
theme: state.theme,
|
||||
debugMode: state.debugMode,
|
||||
currentView: state.currentView,
|
||||
selectedWallet: state.selectedWallet,
|
||||
selectedAddress: state.selectedAddress,
|
||||
@@ -84,11 +82,8 @@ async function loadState() {
|
||||
const result = await storageApi.get("autistmask");
|
||||
if (result.autistmask) {
|
||||
const saved = result.autistmask;
|
||||
state.hasWallet = saved.hasWallet;
|
||||
state.wallets = saved.wallets || [];
|
||||
// Derived, never read from storage: a profile persisted with the flag
|
||||
// out of step with the wallet list would otherwise stay broken on
|
||||
// every load. Nothing depends on the two disagreeing.
|
||||
state.hasWallet = state.wallets.length > 0;
|
||||
state.trackedTokens = saved.trackedTokens || [];
|
||||
state.networkId = saved.networkId || DEFAULT_STATE.networkId;
|
||||
state.rpcUrl = saved.rpcUrl || DEFAULT_STATE.rpcUrl;
|
||||
@@ -133,8 +128,6 @@ async function loadState() {
|
||||
state.fraudContracts = saved.fraudContracts || [];
|
||||
state.tokenHolderCache = saved.tokenHolderCache || {};
|
||||
state.theme = saved.theme || "system";
|
||||
state.debugMode =
|
||||
saved.debugMode !== undefined ? saved.debugMode : false;
|
||||
state.currentView = saved.currentView || null;
|
||||
state.selectedWallet =
|
||||
saved.selectedWallet !== undefined ? saved.selectedWallet : null;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,14 +10,6 @@ const { formatEther, formatUnits } = require("ethers");
|
||||
const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
|
||||
const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS, TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
|
||||
|
||||
// Ethereum addresses are case-insensitive: EIP-55 mixed case is a checksum
|
||||
// over the address, not part of its identity. Every address comparison in
|
||||
// this file goes through this helper, so an address arriving in checksummed
|
||||
// or upper-case form can never be read as a different address.
|
||||
function normalizeAddress(addr) {
|
||||
return (addr || "").toLowerCase();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function formatTxValue(val) {
|
||||
const parts = val.split(".");
|
||||
if (parts.length === 1) return val + ".0000";
|
||||
@@ -38,10 +30,10 @@ function parseTx(tx, addrLower) {
|
||||
let exactValue = formatEther(rawWei);
|
||||
let rawAmount = rawWei;
|
||||
let rawUnit = "wei";
|
||||
let direction = normalizeAddress(from) === addrLower ? "sent" : "received";
|
||||
let direction = from.toLowerCase() === addrLower ? "sent" : "received";
|
||||
let directionLabel = direction === "sent" ? "Sent" : "Received";
|
||||
if (toIsContract && method && method !== "transfer") {
|
||||
const token = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(normalizeAddress(to));
|
||||
const token = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(to.toLowerCase());
|
||||
if (token) {
|
||||
symbol = token.symbol;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -95,8 +87,7 @@ function parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower) {
|
||||
const to = tt.to?.hash || "";
|
||||
const decimals = parseInt(tt.total?.decimals || "18", 10);
|
||||
const rawVal = tt.total?.value || "0";
|
||||
const direction =
|
||||
normalizeAddress(from) === addrLower ? "sent" : "received";
|
||||
const direction = from.toLowerCase() === addrLower ? "sent" : "received";
|
||||
const sym = tt.token?.symbol || "?";
|
||||
return {
|
||||
hash: tt.transaction_hash,
|
||||
@@ -113,95 +104,18 @@ function parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower) {
|
||||
direction: direction,
|
||||
directionLabel: direction === "sent" ? "Sent" : "Received",
|
||||
isError: false,
|
||||
contractAddress: normalizeAddress(
|
||||
tt.token?.address_hash || tt.token?.address || "",
|
||||
),
|
||||
contractAddress: (
|
||||
tt.token?.address_hash ||
|
||||
tt.token?.address ||
|
||||
""
|
||||
).toLowerCase(),
|
||||
holders: parseInt(tt.token?.holders_count || "0", 10),
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// True when a parsed native entry moved no ETH. Contract-call entries have
|
||||
// their amount fields blanked by parseTx, so they are never judged here.
|
||||
function movedNoEther(tx) {
|
||||
if (tx.direction === "contract") return false;
|
||||
return BigInt(tx.rawAmount || "0") === BigInt(0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Merge parsed normal transactions with parsed ERC-20 token transfers into
|
||||
// one row per distinct value movement. Pure: it reads only its arguments
|
||||
// and returns a new list sorted newest block first.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The merge key is the transaction hash for the native entry and
|
||||
// hash + token contract for each token transfer, so:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - A display-level contract call (a swap and friends, direction
|
||||
// "contract") absorbs every token leg of its hash into the single
|
||||
// native entry, because the legs are hops of one operation rather
|
||||
// than separate movements the user made.
|
||||
// - Otherwise each distinct token contract in the transaction keeps its
|
||||
// own row, so a hash carrying several genuine transfers stays several
|
||||
// rows.
|
||||
// - The native entry of such a transaction is dropped when it moved no
|
||||
// ETH and at least one token transfer shares its hash: that entry is
|
||||
// the ERC-20 call itself, already represented by the token row. A
|
||||
// native entry that moved ETH survives alongside the token rows, since
|
||||
// the ETH and the tokens are two real movements, and a zero-value
|
||||
// native transaction with no token transfer on its hash survives too.
|
||||
function mergeTransactions(txs, tokenTransfers) {
|
||||
const byKey = new Map();
|
||||
|
||||
// Entries are copied so consolidation never writes through to the
|
||||
// caller's objects.
|
||||
for (const tx of txs) {
|
||||
byKey.set(tx.hash, { ...tx });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const absorbedHashes = new Set();
|
||||
|
||||
for (const parsed of tokenTransfers) {
|
||||
const existing = byKey.get(parsed.hash);
|
||||
if (existing && existing.direction === "contract") {
|
||||
// For contract calls (swaps), consolidate into the original
|
||||
// tx entry. Prefer the "received" transfer (swap output)
|
||||
// for the display amount. If no received transfer exists,
|
||||
// fall back to the first "sent" transfer (swap input).
|
||||
const isReceived = parsed.direction === "received";
|
||||
const needsAmount = !existing.exactValue;
|
||||
if (isReceived || needsAmount) {
|
||||
existing.value = parsed.value;
|
||||
existing.exactValue = parsed.exactValue;
|
||||
existing.rawAmount = parsed.rawAmount;
|
||||
existing.rawUnit = parsed.rawUnit;
|
||||
existing.symbol = parsed.symbol;
|
||||
existing.contractAddress = parsed.contractAddress;
|
||||
existing.holders = parsed.holders;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Keep the original tx's from/to (the user's address and the
|
||||
// contract they called), not the token transfer's from/to
|
||||
// which may be a router or Permit2 contract.
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (existing && movedNoEther(existing)) {
|
||||
absorbedHashes.add(parsed.hash);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Every other token transfer gets its own entry.
|
||||
byKey.set(parsed.hash + ":" + (parsed.contractAddress || ""), {
|
||||
...parsed,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (const hash of absorbedHashes) {
|
||||
byKey.delete(hash);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const merged = [...byKey.values()];
|
||||
merged.sort((a, b) => b.blockNumber - a.blockNumber);
|
||||
return merged;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function fetchRecentTransactions(address, blockscoutUrl, count = 25) {
|
||||
log.debugf("fetchRecentTransactions", address);
|
||||
const addrLower = normalizeAddress(address);
|
||||
const addrLower = address.toLowerCase();
|
||||
|
||||
const [txResp, ttResp] = await Promise.all([
|
||||
debugFetch(blockscoutUrl + "/addresses/" + address + "/transactions"),
|
||||
@@ -231,11 +145,53 @@ async function fetchRecentTransactions(address, blockscoutUrl, count = 25) {
|
||||
const txJson = txResp.ok ? await txResp.json() : {};
|
||||
const ttJson = ttResp.ok ? await ttResp.json() : {};
|
||||
|
||||
const txs = mergeTransactions(
|
||||
(txJson.items || []).map((tx) => parseTx(tx, addrLower)),
|
||||
(ttJson.items || []).map((tt) => parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower)),
|
||||
);
|
||||
const txsByHash = new Map();
|
||||
|
||||
for (const tx of txJson.items || []) {
|
||||
txsByHash.set(tx.hash, parseTx(tx, addrLower));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// When a token transfer shares a hash with a normal tx, the normal tx
|
||||
// is the contract call (0 ETH) and the token transfer has the real
|
||||
// amount and symbol. For contract calls (swaps), a single transaction
|
||||
// can produce multiple token transfers (input, intermediates, output).
|
||||
// We consolidate these into the original tx entry using the token
|
||||
// transfer where the user *receives* tokens (the swap output), so
|
||||
// the transaction list shows the final result rather than confusing
|
||||
// intermediate hops. We preserve the original tx's from/to so the
|
||||
// user sees their own address, not a router or Permit2 contract.
|
||||
for (const tt of ttJson.items || []) {
|
||||
const parsed = parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower);
|
||||
const existing = txsByHash.get(parsed.hash);
|
||||
if (existing && existing.direction === "contract") {
|
||||
// For contract calls (swaps), consolidate into the original
|
||||
// tx entry. Prefer the "received" transfer (swap output)
|
||||
// for the display amount. If no received transfer exists,
|
||||
// fall back to the first "sent" transfer (swap input).
|
||||
const isReceived = parsed.direction === "received";
|
||||
const needsAmount = !existing.exactValue;
|
||||
if (isReceived || needsAmount) {
|
||||
existing.value = parsed.value;
|
||||
existing.exactValue = parsed.exactValue;
|
||||
existing.rawAmount = parsed.rawAmount;
|
||||
existing.rawUnit = parsed.rawUnit;
|
||||
existing.symbol = parsed.symbol;
|
||||
existing.contractAddress = parsed.contractAddress;
|
||||
existing.holders = parsed.holders;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Keep the original tx's from/to (the user's address and the
|
||||
// contract they called), not the token transfer's from/to
|
||||
// which may be a router or Permit2 contract.
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Non-contract token transfers get their own entries.
|
||||
const ttKey = parsed.hash + ":" + (parsed.contractAddress || "");
|
||||
txsByHash.set(ttKey, parsed);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const txs = [...txsByHash.values()];
|
||||
|
||||
txs.sort((a, b) => b.blockNumber - a.blockNumber);
|
||||
const result = txs.slice(0, count);
|
||||
log.debugf("fetchRecentTransactions done, count:", result.length);
|
||||
return result;
|
||||
@@ -250,38 +206,34 @@ function isSpoofedSymbol(tx) {
|
||||
if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(symbol)) return false;
|
||||
const legit = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(symbol);
|
||||
if (legit === null) return true; // "ETH" as ERC-20 is always fake
|
||||
return normalizeAddress(tx.contractAddress) !== normalizeAddress(legit);
|
||||
return tx.contractAddress !== legit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Pure filter function. Takes raw transactions and filter settings,
|
||||
// returns { transactions, newFraudContracts }.
|
||||
function filterTransactions(txs, filters = {}) {
|
||||
const fraudSet = new Set(
|
||||
(filters.fraudContracts || []).map(normalizeAddress),
|
||||
(filters.fraudContracts || []).map((a) => a.toLowerCase()),
|
||||
);
|
||||
// The dust threshold defaults only when it is unset (nullish): a
|
||||
// threshold of 0 is a real value meaning "hide nothing", since no
|
||||
// transaction has a value below 0 gwei. It is therefore equivalent to
|
||||
// clearing the hide-dust checkbox, and the two controls cannot override
|
||||
// each other in either direction.
|
||||
const dustThresholdGwei = filters.dustThresholdGwei ?? 100000;
|
||||
const newFraud = [];
|
||||
const filtered = [];
|
||||
|
||||
for (const tx of txs) {
|
||||
const contract = normalizeAddress(tx.contractAddress);
|
||||
|
||||
// Always filter spoofed known symbols and record the fraud contract
|
||||
if (isSpoofedSymbol(tx)) {
|
||||
if (contract && !fraudSet.has(contract)) {
|
||||
fraudSet.add(contract);
|
||||
newFraud.push(contract);
|
||||
if (tx.contractAddress && !fraudSet.has(tx.contractAddress)) {
|
||||
fraudSet.add(tx.contractAddress);
|
||||
newFraud.push(tx.contractAddress);
|
||||
}
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Filter fraud contracts if setting is on
|
||||
if (filters.hideFraudContracts && contract && fraudSet.has(contract)) {
|
||||
if (
|
||||
filters.hideFraudContracts &&
|
||||
tx.contractAddress &&
|
||||
fraudSet.has(tx.contractAddress)
|
||||
) {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -302,7 +254,7 @@ function filterTransactions(txs, filters = {}) {
|
||||
filters.hideDustTransactions &&
|
||||
!tx.isContractCall &&
|
||||
tx.valueGwei !== null &&
|
||||
tx.valueGwei < dustThresholdGwei
|
||||
tx.valueGwei < (filters.dustThresholdGwei || 100000)
|
||||
) {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -313,8 +265,4 @@ function filterTransactions(txs, filters = {}) {
|
||||
return { transactions: filtered, newFraudContracts: newFraud };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
module.exports = {
|
||||
fetchRecentTransactions,
|
||||
filterTransactions,
|
||||
mergeTransactions,
|
||||
};
|
||||
module.exports = { fetchRecentTransactions, filterTransactions };
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,10 +5,6 @@ const { Mnemonic, HDNodeWallet, Wallet } = require("ethers");
|
||||
const { DEBUG, DEBUG_MNEMONIC, BIP44_ETH_PATH } = require("./constants");
|
||||
|
||||
function generateMnemonic() {
|
||||
// This must stay the compile-time DEBUG constant. Do NOT switch it to
|
||||
// isDebug() from log.js: that also ORs in the runtime debugMode flag the
|
||||
// settings toggle drives, which would let a user of a release build turn
|
||||
// the hardcoded, publicly known test phrase back on for real wallets.
|
||||
if (DEBUG) return DEBUG_MNEMONIC;
|
||||
const m = Mnemonic.fromEntropy(
|
||||
globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16)),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Wallet deletion state transition, kept out of the view so the selection
|
||||
// and broadcast rules are testable without a DOM.
|
||||
|
||||
// Remove wallet `walletIdx` from `state` and repair the derived state.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Rules:
|
||||
// - `hasWallet` tracks whether any wallet remains.
|
||||
// - Site permissions are dropped for every address of the deleted wallet.
|
||||
// - `selectedWallet` follows the splice: it is decremented when a wallet
|
||||
// before it was removed, and falls back to the first remaining wallet's
|
||||
// first address only when the selection itself was deleted.
|
||||
// - `activeAddress` is only moved when it belonged to the deleted wallet;
|
||||
// the fallback is the first remaining wallet's first address, or null
|
||||
// when no wallet remains.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Returns whether `activeAddress` changed, so the caller can broadcast it.
|
||||
function removeWalletFromState(state, walletIdx) {
|
||||
const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
|
||||
const addresses = (wallet.addresses || []).map((a) => a.address);
|
||||
const previousActive = state.activeAddress;
|
||||
const activeWasDeleted =
|
||||
previousActive !== null &&
|
||||
previousActive !== undefined &&
|
||||
addresses.some(
|
||||
(a) => a.toLowerCase() === String(previousActive).toLowerCase(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
state.wallets.splice(walletIdx, 1);
|
||||
|
||||
for (const addr of addresses) {
|
||||
delete state.allowedSites[addr];
|
||||
delete state.deniedSites[addr];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
state.hasWallet = state.wallets.length > 0;
|
||||
|
||||
const fallbackAddress = state.hasWallet
|
||||
? state.wallets[0].addresses[0]?.address || null
|
||||
: null;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!state.hasWallet) {
|
||||
state.selectedWallet = null;
|
||||
state.selectedAddress = null;
|
||||
} else if (state.selectedWallet === walletIdx) {
|
||||
state.selectedWallet = 0;
|
||||
state.selectedAddress = 0;
|
||||
} else if (
|
||||
typeof state.selectedWallet === "number" &&
|
||||
state.selectedWallet > walletIdx
|
||||
) {
|
||||
state.selectedWallet -= 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (activeWasDeleted || !state.hasWallet) {
|
||||
state.activeAddress = fallbackAddress;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return { activeAddressChanged: state.activeAddress !== previousActive };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tell the background the active address changed, so it re-emits
|
||||
// accountsChanged to connected sites. Same call shape as the address
|
||||
// switch in the home view.
|
||||
function broadcastActiveChanged() {
|
||||
const runtime =
|
||||
typeof browser !== "undefined" ? browser.runtime : chrome.runtime;
|
||||
runtime.sendMessage({ type: "AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED" });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
module.exports = { removeWalletFromState, broadcastActiveChanged };
|
||||
@@ -1,468 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Scheduling for the background context.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The Chrome MV3 service worker is terminated after roughly 30 seconds idle,
|
||||
// so anything scheduled with setInterval/setTimeout dies with it. These tests
|
||||
// pin the recurring jobs to the alarms API and to the re-registration path a
|
||||
// revived worker runs.
|
||||
|
||||
// A controllable clock plus a stubbed balance refresh, so a cadence test can
|
||||
// measure the interval between refreshes that actually happened rather than
|
||||
// asserting the interval someone intended.
|
||||
let mockNow = 0;
|
||||
const mockBalanceRefreshAt = [];
|
||||
|
||||
// jest.resetModules() clears the call record of every jest.fn, and loading the
|
||||
// worker is exactly that call — so anything that must be counted across a load
|
||||
// is counted here rather than read off a mock.
|
||||
let mockSetIntervalCalls = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
// Extension storage reads do not take a constant amount of time, and that is
|
||||
// what makes a guard timed to the alarm period bite: backgroundRefresh()
|
||||
// stamps its freshness marker after awaiting loadState(), so any read that is
|
||||
// quicker than the previous one puts the next tick inside a guard of exactly
|
||||
// one period and the tick is skipped. A simulation with a constant latency
|
||||
// would sit exactly on the boundary and hide the bug.
|
||||
const MOCK_STORAGE_LATENCIES_MS = [7, 3, 11, 2, 9, 4, 13, 1, 6, 5];
|
||||
const MOCK_MAX_STORAGE_LATENCY_MS = Math.max(...MOCK_STORAGE_LATENCIES_MS);
|
||||
let mockStorageJitter = false;
|
||||
let mockStorageOpCount = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
function mockStorageTick() {
|
||||
if (!mockStorageJitter) return;
|
||||
mockNow +=
|
||||
MOCK_STORAGE_LATENCIES_MS[
|
||||
mockStorageOpCount++ % MOCK_STORAGE_LATENCIES_MS.length
|
||||
];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
jest.mock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
|
||||
refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {
|
||||
mockBalanceRefreshAt.push(Date.now());
|
||||
}),
|
||||
getProvider: jest.fn(() => ({})),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
function makeAlarmsStub() {
|
||||
const alarms = new Map();
|
||||
const listeners = [];
|
||||
const stub = {
|
||||
created: [],
|
||||
alarms,
|
||||
create: jest.fn((name, info) => {
|
||||
stub.created.push({ name, info });
|
||||
alarms.set(name, { name, ...info });
|
||||
}),
|
||||
get: jest.fn(async (name) => alarms.get(name)),
|
||||
clear: jest.fn(async (name) => alarms.delete(name)),
|
||||
onAlarm: {
|
||||
addListener: jest.fn((fn) => listeners.push(fn)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
fire: (name) => {
|
||||
for (const fn of listeners) fn({ name });
|
||||
},
|
||||
listenerCount: () => listeners.length,
|
||||
};
|
||||
return stub;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe("alarms module", () => {
|
||||
let alarmsStub;
|
||||
let alarmsMod;
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
jest.resetModules();
|
||||
alarmsStub = makeAlarmsStub();
|
||||
global.chrome = { alarms: alarmsStub };
|
||||
alarmsMod = require("../src/shared/alarms");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
delete global.chrome;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("ensureRecurringAlarms schedules both recurring jobs", async () => {
|
||||
const created = await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
|
||||
expect(created).toEqual({ balance: true, phishing: true });
|
||||
|
||||
const names = alarmsStub.created.map((c) => c.name).sort();
|
||||
expect(names).toEqual(
|
||||
[
|
||||
alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM,
|
||||
alarmsMod.PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM,
|
||||
].sort(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the balance refresh keeps its 60-second cadence", async () => {
|
||||
await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
|
||||
const balance = alarmsStub.alarms.get(alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM);
|
||||
expect(balance.periodInMinutes).toBe(1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the phishing refresh keeps its 24-hour cadence", async () => {
|
||||
await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
|
||||
const phishing = alarmsStub.alarms.get(
|
||||
alarmsMod.PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(phishing.periodInMinutes).toBe(24 * 60);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("no period is below the browser-enforced minimum", async () => {
|
||||
// A period under one minute is silently clamped by the browser, so a
|
||||
// request for one would mean the documented cadence is not the real
|
||||
// one. Every period must be a whole minute at or above the minimum.
|
||||
await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
|
||||
for (const { info } of alarmsStub.created) {
|
||||
expect(info.periodInMinutes).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(
|
||||
alarmsMod.MIN_ALARM_PERIOD_MINUTES,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(Number.isInteger(info.periodInMinutes)).toBe(true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a revived worker does not reset an existing alarm's schedule", async () => {
|
||||
await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
|
||||
expect(alarmsStub.create).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
|
||||
|
||||
// Every wake re-runs the startup path. Re-creating an alarm restarts
|
||||
// its period, so a busy extension would push the next fire out
|
||||
// forever and the job would never run.
|
||||
const again = await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
|
||||
expect(again).toEqual({ balance: false, phishing: false });
|
||||
expect(alarmsStub.create).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a missing alarm is re-created on the next start", async () => {
|
||||
await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
|
||||
await alarmsStub.clear(alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM);
|
||||
|
||||
const again = await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
|
||||
expect(again).toEqual({ balance: true, phishing: false });
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
alarmsStub.alarms.get(alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM),
|
||||
).toBeDefined();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("an alarm left over with a stale period is re-created", async () => {
|
||||
// An install carries its alarms across an extension update, so a
|
||||
// period changed in a new release only ever reaches users if the
|
||||
// stale one is reconciled.
|
||||
alarmsStub.create(alarmsMod.PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM, {
|
||||
periodInMinutes: 7 * 24 * 60,
|
||||
});
|
||||
alarmsStub.create.mockClear();
|
||||
|
||||
const created = await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
|
||||
expect(created.phishing).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
alarmsStub.alarms.get(alarmsMod.PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM)
|
||||
.periodInMinutes,
|
||||
).toBe(alarmsMod.PHISHING_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("reconciling a period settles instead of re-creating forever", async () => {
|
||||
alarmsStub.create(alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM, {
|
||||
periodInMinutes: 30,
|
||||
});
|
||||
await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
|
||||
alarmsStub.create.mockClear();
|
||||
|
||||
const again = await alarmsMod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
|
||||
expect(again).toEqual({ balance: false, phishing: false });
|
||||
expect(alarmsStub.create).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("handlers are dispatched by alarm name from one listener", () => {
|
||||
const balance = jest.fn();
|
||||
const phishing = jest.fn();
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
alarmsMod.registerAlarmHandlers({
|
||||
[alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM]: balance,
|
||||
[alarmsMod.PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM]: phishing,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(alarmsStub.listenerCount()).toBe(1);
|
||||
|
||||
alarmsStub.fire(alarmsMod.BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM);
|
||||
expect(balance).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
expect(phishing).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
|
||||
alarmsStub.fire(alarmsMod.PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM);
|
||||
expect(phishing).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
|
||||
alarmsStub.fire("some-other-extension-alarm");
|
||||
expect(balance).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
expect(phishing).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("Firefox MV2 gets the same treatment via browser.alarms", async () => {
|
||||
// Both targets are built from one bundle. MV2 has a persistent
|
||||
// background page, but it takes the alarm path too, so the schedule
|
||||
// is the same code on both browsers.
|
||||
jest.resetModules();
|
||||
const firefoxAlarms = makeAlarmsStub();
|
||||
global.browser = { alarms: firefoxAlarms };
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const mod = require("../src/shared/alarms");
|
||||
const created = await mod.ensureRecurringAlarms();
|
||||
expect(created).toEqual({ balance: true, phishing: true });
|
||||
expect(firefoxAlarms.created).toHaveLength(2);
|
||||
// The Chrome stub must not have been touched.
|
||||
expect(alarmsStub.create).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
delete global.browser;
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a context without the alarms API degrades instead of throwing", async () => {
|
||||
jest.resetModules();
|
||||
delete global.chrome;
|
||||
const mod = require("../src/shared/alarms");
|
||||
await expect(mod.ensureRecurringAlarms()).resolves.toEqual({
|
||||
balance: false,
|
||||
phishing: false,
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(mod.registerAlarmHandlers({})).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Loads the background worker against stubbed browser APIs. The returned
|
||||
// store is the extension storage the worker sees, so a test can seed wallet
|
||||
// state and read back what the worker persisted.
|
||||
function loadBackground(initialStore = {}) {
|
||||
const storageStore = initialStore;
|
||||
const alarmsStub = makeAlarmsStub();
|
||||
const listeners = { onInstalled: [], onStartup: [] };
|
||||
global.chrome = {
|
||||
alarms: alarmsStub,
|
||||
storage: {
|
||||
local: {
|
||||
get: async (key) => {
|
||||
mockStorageTick();
|
||||
return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(
|
||||
storageStore,
|
||||
key,
|
||||
)
|
||||
? { [key]: storageStore[key] }
|
||||
: {};
|
||||
},
|
||||
set: async (items) => {
|
||||
mockStorageTick();
|
||||
Object.assign(storageStore, items);
|
||||
},
|
||||
remove: async (key) => {
|
||||
delete storageStore[key];
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
runtime: {
|
||||
onMessage: { addListener: jest.fn() },
|
||||
onConnect: { addListener: jest.fn() },
|
||||
onInstalled: {
|
||||
addListener: jest.fn((fn) => listeners.onInstalled.push(fn)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
onStartup: {
|
||||
addListener: jest.fn((fn) => listeners.onStartup.push(fn)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
getURL: (p) => "chrome-extension://test/" + p,
|
||||
lastError: null,
|
||||
},
|
||||
windows: {
|
||||
onRemoved: { addListener: jest.fn() },
|
||||
create: jest.fn(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
tabs: { query: jest.fn(), sendMessage: jest.fn() },
|
||||
action: { setPopup: jest.fn() },
|
||||
};
|
||||
global.fetch = jest.fn(async () => ({
|
||||
ok: true,
|
||||
json: async () => ({ blacklist: [] }),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
jest.resetModules();
|
||||
require("../src/background/index");
|
||||
return { alarmsStub, listeners, store: storageStore };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Flush the promise chains the startup path and the alarm handlers run on.
|
||||
async function settle() {
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
|
||||
await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe("background worker scheduling", () => {
|
||||
let alarmsStub;
|
||||
let timers;
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
mockSetIntervalCalls = 0;
|
||||
timers = {
|
||||
setInterval: jest
|
||||
.spyOn(global, "setInterval")
|
||||
.mockImplementation(() => {
|
||||
mockSetIntervalCalls++;
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}),
|
||||
};
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
timers.setInterval.mockRestore();
|
||||
delete global.chrome;
|
||||
delete global.fetch;
|
||||
jest.resetModules();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("startup schedules the recurring jobs as alarms, not timers", async () => {
|
||||
alarmsStub = loadBackground().alarmsStub;
|
||||
// Let the startup path's promises settle.
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
const names = alarmsStub.created.map((c) => c.name).sort();
|
||||
const {
|
||||
BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM,
|
||||
PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM,
|
||||
} = require("../src/shared/alarms");
|
||||
expect(names).toEqual(
|
||||
[BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM, PHISHING_REFRESH_ALARM].sort(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(mockSetIntervalCalls).toBe(0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("an onAlarm listener is installed on startup", async () => {
|
||||
alarmsStub = loadBackground().alarmsStub;
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
expect(alarmsStub.listenerCount()).toBe(1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("onInstalled and onStartup both re-establish the schedule", async () => {
|
||||
const loaded = loadBackground();
|
||||
alarmsStub = loaded.alarmsStub;
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(loaded.listeners.onInstalled).toHaveLength(1);
|
||||
expect(loaded.listeners.onStartup).toHaveLength(1);
|
||||
|
||||
// A browser start after the alarms were dropped must put them back.
|
||||
alarmsStub.alarms.clear();
|
||||
alarmsStub.created.length = 0;
|
||||
loaded.listeners.onStartup[0]();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
expect(alarmsStub.created).toHaveLength(2);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the install-time listener and the top-level call share one run", async () => {
|
||||
// On a fresh install both fire, close enough that both could observe
|
||||
// an alarm missing and create it — and a second create restarts the
|
||||
// period the first one just set.
|
||||
const loaded = loadBackground();
|
||||
alarmsStub = loaded.alarmsStub;
|
||||
loaded.listeners.onInstalled[0]();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(alarmsStub.created).toHaveLength(2);
|
||||
expect(alarmsStub.created.map((c) => c.name).sort()).toEqual(
|
||||
[
|
||||
"autistmask-balance-refresh",
|
||||
"autistmask-phishing-refresh",
|
||||
].sort(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The alarm period alone must set the cadence. A freshness guard timed to the
|
||||
// period vetoes the very tick it gates, because the guard is measured from
|
||||
// when the last run finished and the alarm fires one run-duration before that.
|
||||
// These tests measure the interval between refreshes that actually ran.
|
||||
describe("balance refresh steady-state cadence", () => {
|
||||
const {
|
||||
BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES,
|
||||
BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM,
|
||||
} = require("../src/shared/alarms");
|
||||
const PERIOD_MS = BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES * 60 * 1000;
|
||||
|
||||
let clockSpy;
|
||||
let timerSpy;
|
||||
|
||||
function seededStore() {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
autistmask: {
|
||||
hasWallet: true,
|
||||
wallets: [
|
||||
{ address: "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001" },
|
||||
],
|
||||
lastBalanceRefresh: 0,
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
mockNow = Date.UTC(2026, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0);
|
||||
mockBalanceRefreshAt.length = 0;
|
||||
mockSetIntervalCalls = 0;
|
||||
mockStorageOpCount = 0;
|
||||
mockStorageJitter = false;
|
||||
clockSpy = jest.spyOn(Date, "now").mockImplementation(() => mockNow);
|
||||
timerSpy = jest.spyOn(global, "setInterval").mockImplementation(() => {
|
||||
mockSetIntervalCalls++;
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
mockStorageJitter = false;
|
||||
clockSpy.mockRestore();
|
||||
timerSpy.mockRestore();
|
||||
delete global.chrome;
|
||||
delete global.fetch;
|
||||
jest.resetModules();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("ten alarm ticks produce ten refreshes, one per period", async () => {
|
||||
const { alarmsStub } = loadBackground(seededStore());
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
mockStorageJitter = true;
|
||||
|
||||
const TICKS = 10;
|
||||
let tickAt = mockNow + PERIOD_MS;
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < TICKS; i++) {
|
||||
mockNow = tickAt;
|
||||
tickAt += PERIOD_MS;
|
||||
alarmsStub.fire(BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM);
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// No tick was a no-op. This is the assertion that fails when the guard
|
||||
// is timed to the alarm period.
|
||||
expect(mockBalanceRefreshAt).toHaveLength(TICKS);
|
||||
|
||||
// And the observed cadence is one period, not two.
|
||||
const intervals = mockBalanceRefreshAt
|
||||
.slice(1)
|
||||
.map((t, i) => t - mockBalanceRefreshAt[i]);
|
||||
for (const interval of intervals) {
|
||||
expect(interval).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(
|
||||
PERIOD_MS - MOCK_MAX_STORAGE_LATENCY_MS,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(interval).toBeLessThanOrEqual(
|
||||
PERIOD_MS + MOCK_MAX_STORAGE_LATENCY_MS,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a refresh an open popup just did still suppresses the tick", async () => {
|
||||
// The guard's actual job, and the reason it is shortened rather than
|
||||
// removed: while the popup is open it refreshes every 10 seconds and
|
||||
// stamps the same field, and the background job has nothing to add.
|
||||
const store = seededStore();
|
||||
const { alarmsStub } = loadBackground(store);
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
mockNow += PERIOD_MS;
|
||||
store.autistmask.lastBalanceRefresh = mockNow - 10 * 1000;
|
||||
alarmsStub.fire(BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM);
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(mockBalanceRefreshAt).toHaveLength(0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -1,355 +0,0 @@
|
||||
const { Network, Transaction, Wallet } = require("ethers");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
verifySignedTx,
|
||||
verifySignature,
|
||||
sameAddress,
|
||||
} = require("../src/shared/approvalVerify");
|
||||
const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../src/shared/wallet");
|
||||
|
||||
// Fixed test keys — never used for anything but these tests.
|
||||
const SIGNER_KEY =
|
||||
"0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
|
||||
const OTHER_KEY =
|
||||
"0x5de4111afa1a4b94908f83103eb1f1706367c2e68ca870fc3fb9a804cdab365a";
|
||||
|
||||
const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
|
||||
const other = new Wallet(OTHER_KEY);
|
||||
|
||||
const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
|
||||
const OTHER_RECIPIENT = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
|
||||
|
||||
// Approved parameters as a dApp would supply them over eth_sendTransaction.
|
||||
const TX_PARAMS = {
|
||||
from: signer.address,
|
||||
to: RECIPIENT,
|
||||
value: "0x2386f26fc10000",
|
||||
data: "0xdeadbeef",
|
||||
gas: "0x5208",
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Build a signable transaction from approved params. The popup does the same
|
||||
// thing through populateTransaction(); here the fields are fixed so the test
|
||||
// needs no provider.
|
||||
function txFor(params) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
chainId: 1,
|
||||
nonce: 7,
|
||||
gasLimit: 100000n,
|
||||
maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
|
||||
maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
|
||||
type: 2,
|
||||
to: params.to,
|
||||
value: params.value === undefined ? 0n : BigInt(params.value),
|
||||
data: params.data || "0x",
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function signedFor(params, withWallet) {
|
||||
return (withWallet || signer).signTransaction(txFor(params));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe("sameAddress", () => {
|
||||
test("compares checksummed and lowercase forms as equal", () => {
|
||||
expect(sameAddress(RECIPIENT, RECIPIENT.toLowerCase())).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("treats two absent addresses as equal (contract creation)", () => {
|
||||
expect(sameAddress(null, undefined)).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(sameAddress("", null)).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("treats one absent address as unequal", () => {
|
||||
expect(sameAddress(RECIPIENT, null)).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(sameAddress(null, RECIPIENT)).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("does not throw on values that are not addresses", () => {
|
||||
expect(sameAddress("not-an-address", RECIPIENT)).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("verifySignedTx", () => {
|
||||
test("accepts the approved transaction signed by the approved address", async () => {
|
||||
const raw = await signedFor(TX_PARAMS);
|
||||
const parsed = verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address);
|
||||
expect(parsed.from).toBe(signer.address);
|
||||
expect(parsed.hash).toBe(Transaction.from(raw).hash);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("accepts a contract creation with no recipient", async () => {
|
||||
const params = { to: undefined, value: "0x0", data: "0x600160005500" };
|
||||
const raw = await signedFor(params);
|
||||
expect(() => verifySignedTx(raw, params, signer.address)).not.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("accepts an absent value as zero", async () => {
|
||||
const approved = { to: RECIPIENT, data: "0x" };
|
||||
const raw = await signedFor(approved);
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address),
|
||||
).not.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("accepts call data whose case differs from the approval", async () => {
|
||||
const approved = { to: RECIPIENT, value: "0x0", data: "0xDEADBEEF" };
|
||||
const raw = await signedFor(approved);
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address),
|
||||
).not.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects a swapped recipient", async () => {
|
||||
const raw = await signedFor({
|
||||
...TX_PARAMS,
|
||||
to: OTHER_RECIPIENT,
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(() => verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address)).toThrow(
|
||||
/approved recipient/,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects an inflated value", async () => {
|
||||
const raw = await signedFor({
|
||||
...TX_PARAMS,
|
||||
value: "0x4563918244f40000",
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(() => verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address)).toThrow(
|
||||
/approved value/,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects substituted call data", async () => {
|
||||
const raw = await signedFor({ ...TX_PARAMS, data: "0xc0ffee" });
|
||||
expect(() => verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address)).toThrow(
|
||||
/approved call data/,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects a transaction signed by a different address", async () => {
|
||||
const raw = await signedFor(TX_PARAMS, other);
|
||||
expect(() => verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address)).toThrow(
|
||||
/different address/,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects an unsigned transaction", () => {
|
||||
const unsigned = Transaction.from(txFor(TX_PARAMS)).unsignedSerialized;
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
verifySignedTx(unsigned, TX_PARAMS, signer.address),
|
||||
).toThrow(/no valid signature/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects a missing or malformed payload", () => {
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
verifySignedTx(undefined, TX_PARAMS, signer.address),
|
||||
).toThrow(/missing or malformed/);
|
||||
expect(() => verifySignedTx("nope", TX_PARAMS, signer.address)).toThrow(
|
||||
/missing or malformed/,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
verifySignedTx("0xc0ffee", TX_PARAMS, signer.address),
|
||||
).toThrow(/could not be decoded/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("every rejection message is a full sentence", async () => {
|
||||
const raw = await signedFor({ ...TX_PARAMS, to: OTHER_RECIPIENT });
|
||||
try {
|
||||
verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address);
|
||||
throw new Error("expected a rejection");
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
expect(e.message).toMatch(/^[A-Z].*\.$/);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const TYPED_DATA = JSON.stringify({
|
||||
domain: {
|
||||
name: "AutistMask Test",
|
||||
version: "1",
|
||||
chainId: 1,
|
||||
verifyingContract: OTHER_RECIPIENT,
|
||||
},
|
||||
primaryType: "Mail",
|
||||
types: {
|
||||
EIP712Domain: [
|
||||
{ name: "name", type: "string" },
|
||||
{ name: "version", type: "string" },
|
||||
{ name: "chainId", type: "uint256" },
|
||||
{ name: "verifyingContract", type: "address" },
|
||||
],
|
||||
Mail: [
|
||||
{ name: "from", type: "address" },
|
||||
{ name: "to", type: "address" },
|
||||
{ name: "contents", type: "string" },
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
message: {
|
||||
from: signer.address,
|
||||
to: RECIPIENT,
|
||||
contents: "hello",
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("verifySignature", () => {
|
||||
// "Hello AutistMask" as the hex string a dApp passes to personal_sign.
|
||||
const MESSAGE = "0x48656c6c6f204175746973744d61736b";
|
||||
const personalParams = {
|
||||
method: "personal_sign",
|
||||
message: MESSAGE,
|
||||
from: signer.address,
|
||||
};
|
||||
const typedParams = {
|
||||
method: "eth_signTypedData_v4",
|
||||
typedData: TYPED_DATA,
|
||||
from: signer.address,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
async function signPersonal(withWallet) {
|
||||
return (withWallet || signer).signMessage(
|
||||
Buffer.from(MESSAGE.slice(2), "hex"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function signTyped(withWallet) {
|
||||
const { domain, types, message } = JSON.parse(TYPED_DATA);
|
||||
delete types.EIP712Domain;
|
||||
return (withWallet || signer).signTypedData(domain, types, message);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
test("accepts a personal_sign signature from the approved address", async () => {
|
||||
const signature = await signPersonal();
|
||||
expect(verifySignature(personalParams, signature, signer.address)).toBe(
|
||||
signer.address,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("accepts an eth_sign signature the same way", async () => {
|
||||
const signature = await signPersonal();
|
||||
const params = { ...personalParams, method: "eth_sign" };
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
verifySignature(params, signature, signer.address),
|
||||
).not.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("accepts a typed data signature from the approved address", async () => {
|
||||
const signature = await signTyped();
|
||||
expect(verifySignature(typedParams, signature, signer.address)).toBe(
|
||||
signer.address,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("does not mutate the approved typed data while verifying", async () => {
|
||||
const signature = await signTyped();
|
||||
const before = typedParams.typedData;
|
||||
verifySignature(typedParams, signature, signer.address);
|
||||
expect(typedParams.typedData).toBe(before);
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
JSON.parse(typedParams.typedData).types.EIP712Domain,
|
||||
).toBeDefined();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects a personal_sign signature from a different address", async () => {
|
||||
const signature = await signPersonal(other);
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
verifySignature(personalParams, signature, signer.address),
|
||||
).toThrow(/different address/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects a typed data signature from a different address", async () => {
|
||||
const signature = await signTyped(other);
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
verifySignature(typedParams, signature, signer.address),
|
||||
).toThrow(/different address/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects a signature over a different message", async () => {
|
||||
const signature = await signer.signMessage(
|
||||
Buffer.from("00112233", "hex"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
verifySignature(personalParams, signature, signer.address),
|
||||
).toThrow(/different address/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects a missing or malformed signature", async () => {
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
verifySignature(personalParams, undefined, signer.address),
|
||||
).toThrow(/missing or malformed/);
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
verifySignature(personalParams, "0x1234", signer.address),
|
||||
).toThrow(/could not be verified/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// End-to-end over the messaging boundary, without a browser: run the exact
|
||||
// sequence the approval popup runs, then hand the artifact to the exact check
|
||||
// the background runs before it broadcasts or resolves. Only what the popup
|
||||
// puts on the wire is passed along, so this also pins down that the wire
|
||||
// payload is sufficient on its own.
|
||||
describe("popup signing sequence to background verification", () => {
|
||||
// Stand-in for the JSON-RPC provider. populateTransaction only needs the
|
||||
// nonce, the gas estimate, the network and the fee data.
|
||||
const fakeProvider = {
|
||||
getNetwork: async () => Network.from(1),
|
||||
getTransactionCount: async () => 7,
|
||||
estimateGas: async () => 21000n,
|
||||
getFeeData: async () => ({
|
||||
gasPrice: 2000000000n,
|
||||
maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
|
||||
maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// A private-key wallet as it is persisted in state, so the test goes
|
||||
// through getSignerForAddress() the way the popup does.
|
||||
const walletData = { type: "privkey" };
|
||||
|
||||
async function popupSignsTx(txParams) {
|
||||
const localSigner = getSignerForAddress(walletData, 0, SIGNER_KEY);
|
||||
const connected = localSigner.connect(fakeProvider);
|
||||
const populated = await connected.populateTransaction(txParams);
|
||||
delete populated.from;
|
||||
return connected.signTransaction(populated);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
test("a populated, signed transaction is accepted and broadcastable", async () => {
|
||||
const rawSignedTx = await popupSignsTx(TX_PARAMS);
|
||||
const parsed = verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, TX_PARAMS, signer.address);
|
||||
expect(parsed.nonce).toBe(7);
|
||||
expect(parsed.chainId).toBe(1n);
|
||||
expect(parsed.gasLimit).toBe(21000n);
|
||||
expect(parsed.to).toBe(RECIPIENT);
|
||||
expect(parsed.value).toBe(BigInt(TX_PARAMS.value));
|
||||
expect(parsed.data).toBe(TX_PARAMS.data);
|
||||
expect(parsed.signature).not.toBeNull();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the wire payload carries no password and no secret", async () => {
|
||||
const rawSignedTx = await popupSignsTx(TX_PARAMS);
|
||||
const payload = {
|
||||
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
|
||||
id: "test-approval-id",
|
||||
approved: true,
|
||||
rawSignedTx,
|
||||
};
|
||||
expect(Object.keys(payload).sort()).toEqual([
|
||||
"approved",
|
||||
"id",
|
||||
"rawSignedTx",
|
||||
"type",
|
||||
]);
|
||||
const wire = JSON.stringify(payload).toLowerCase();
|
||||
expect(wire).not.toContain("password");
|
||||
expect(wire).not.toContain(SIGNER_KEY.slice(2).toLowerCase());
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the background rejects a transaction the popup did not approve", async () => {
|
||||
const rawSignedTx = await popupSignsTx({
|
||||
...TX_PARAMS,
|
||||
to: OTHER_RECIPIENT,
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, TX_PARAMS, signer.address),
|
||||
).toThrow(/approved recipient/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
|
||||
const {
|
||||
DEBUG,
|
||||
BUILD_DEBUG_MARKER,
|
||||
ETHEREUM_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID,
|
||||
DEFAULT_RPC_URL,
|
||||
BIP44_ETH_PATH,
|
||||
@@ -21,24 +19,6 @@ describe("constants", () => {
|
||||
expect(BIP44_ETH_PATH).toBe("m/44'/60'/0'/0");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// This does not replace script/verify-build, which is the only thing that
|
||||
// can see the compiled DEBUG state of a real bundle. It pins the source
|
||||
// invariant that the marker tracks DEBUG, so the two cannot be edited
|
||||
// apart and leave verify-build asserting something that is no longer the
|
||||
// flag the code branches on.
|
||||
test("build debug marker is derived from DEBUG", () => {
|
||||
expect(BUILD_DEBUG_MARKER).toBe(
|
||||
DEBUG ? "autistmask-build-debug=on" : "autistmask-build-debug=off",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Outside a bundle there is no __BUILD_DEBUG__ define, and the fallback
|
||||
// must be the safe one.
|
||||
test("DEBUG is off when loaded outside a bundle", () => {
|
||||
expect(DEBUG).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(BUILD_DEBUG_MARKER).toBe("autistmask-build-debug=off");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("exports ERC-20 ABI with expected functions", () => {
|
||||
expect(Array.isArray(ERC20_ABI)).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(ERC20_ABI.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,289 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// End-to-end harness: launches a real Chromium with the unpacked MV3
|
||||
// build loaded, collects every uncaught page error and console.error, and
|
||||
// exposes the popup flows the tests drive.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This runs inside the pinned Playwright container; see script/test-e2e.
|
||||
// It is deliberately NOT part of make check — REPO_POLICIES.md caps
|
||||
// make test at 20 seconds and a browser suite does not fit.
|
||||
|
||||
"use strict";
|
||||
|
||||
const fs = require("fs");
|
||||
const os = require("os");
|
||||
const path = require("path");
|
||||
|
||||
const { chromium } = require("playwright-core");
|
||||
const { installNetworkStubs } = require("./network");
|
||||
|
||||
const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "..");
|
||||
const EXT_PATH = path.join(REPO_ROOT, "dist", "chrome");
|
||||
|
||||
// Page errors that are known, tracked, and deliberately tolerated. Every
|
||||
// entry must name the issue that will remove it. This list is the one
|
||||
// concession in an otherwise zero-tolerance policy: an uncaught error is
|
||||
// how this harness caught issue #150 in the first place.
|
||||
const ALLOWED_ERRORS = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
// libsodium ships a WASM build and an asm.js fallback. The
|
||||
// extension CSP (script-src 'self', with no wasm-unsafe-eval)
|
||||
// refuses the WASM module on every popup load; libsodium catches
|
||||
// it and falls back to asm.js, so the wallet works. Deciding
|
||||
// which backend actually ships is issue #182, and this entry gets
|
||||
// deleted when that lands.
|
||||
issue: "#182",
|
||||
pattern: /Refused to compile or instantiate WebAssembly module/,
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
function isAllowed(text) {
|
||||
return ALLOWED_ERRORS.some((a) => a.pattern.test(text));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Collects every uncaught page error, console.error and unstubbed
|
||||
// request, and hands each one to exactly one reporter.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This deliberately has NO window API. It used to expose mark()/since()
|
||||
// so a test could ask for "the errors since I started", and that shape
|
||||
// produced a green run that proved nothing twice over: first the mark
|
||||
// started after test 1, so everything recorded during launch was
|
||||
// discarded, then the tail after the final test was never read at all. In
|
||||
// both cases a record fell outside somebody's window and vanished, which
|
||||
// is the precise failure this harness exists to prevent.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// So there is no window left to fall outside of. take() is the only
|
||||
// reader and it always takes everything outstanding, so successive takes
|
||||
// partition the entire record stream with no gaps, and the runner turns
|
||||
// every record it reads into a failure.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Observation ends when the browser context is closed. Nothing records
|
||||
// after that — the route handler and the console listeners are gone with
|
||||
// the context — so there is no post-teardown phase to collect, and this
|
||||
// class deliberately offers no mechanism pretending to cover one.
|
||||
class ErrorCollector {
|
||||
constructor() {
|
||||
this.entries = [];
|
||||
this.taken = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
record(kind, text) {
|
||||
const line = kind + ": " + String(text).split("\n")[0];
|
||||
if (isAllowed(line)) return;
|
||||
this.entries.push(line);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Everything recorded since the previous take(). Never yields a
|
||||
// record twice and never skips one.
|
||||
take() {
|
||||
const out = this.entries.slice(this.taken);
|
||||
this.taken = this.entries.length;
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function attachErrorListeners(ctx, errors) {
|
||||
const attachPage = (page) => {
|
||||
page.on("pageerror", (err) => {
|
||||
errors.record("pageerror", err.message || String(err));
|
||||
});
|
||||
page.on("console", (msg) => {
|
||||
if (msg.type() === "error") {
|
||||
errors.record("console.error", msg.text());
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
};
|
||||
ctx.pages().forEach(attachPage);
|
||||
ctx.on("page", attachPage);
|
||||
// Per-page listeners only: the context-level "weberror" event covers
|
||||
// the same page exceptions and would double-report them. Playwright
|
||||
// exposes no error EVENT for service workers, so an uncaught
|
||||
// exception in the background worker is not visible here — everything
|
||||
// this suite drives lives in the popup page. That is an error-channel
|
||||
// gap only: worker NETWORK traffic is intercepted and reported like
|
||||
// any other, and assertWorkerTrafficIntercepted() below fails the run
|
||||
// if it ever stops being.
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function serviceWorker(ctx) {
|
||||
const [existing] = ctx.serviceWorkers();
|
||||
if (existing) return existing;
|
||||
return ctx.waitForEvent("serviceworker", { timeout: 30000 });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// How long to wait for the background worker's first outbound request.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The margin that actually decides whether this check is sound is not
|
||||
// this timeout — it is whether the route handler is installed before the
|
||||
// worker fetches. Measured over several runs: route installation
|
||||
// completes 11-23ms after the context comes up, and the worker's
|
||||
// blocklist fetch arrives 525-883ms after that, so the route wins by
|
||||
// roughly 25-50x. This 30s figure is only slack for a loaded machine on
|
||||
// top of that; losing the race fails the run rather than passing it
|
||||
// quietly, which was verified by forcing a 3s delay before route
|
||||
// installation.
|
||||
const WORKER_TRAFFIC_TIMEOUT_MS = 30000;
|
||||
|
||||
// ctx.route() only sees service-worker requests when Playwright runs with
|
||||
// PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1, which script/test-e2e
|
||||
// sets. Without it the worker's traffic — notably the phishing blocklist
|
||||
// fetch src/background/index.js issues at startup — goes to the real
|
||||
// internet, and nothing says so, because src/shared/phishingDomains.js
|
||||
// swallows fetch failures. A harness whose isolation can lapse in silence
|
||||
// is worthless, so this does not take the flag on trust: the background
|
||||
// worker's own startup fetch has to show up in the route handler, or the
|
||||
// suite refuses to run.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Deliberately NOT a synthetic probe fetched through worker.evaluate():
|
||||
// evaluating in an extension worker this early kills it (the call fails
|
||||
// with "Target page, context or browser has been closed" and the worker
|
||||
// disappears), which would break the very thing being measured. Observing
|
||||
// traffic the extension already generates costs nothing and cannot
|
||||
// perturb it.
|
||||
async function assertWorkerTrafficIntercepted(stubs) {
|
||||
const seen = await stubs.waitForServiceWorkerTraffic(
|
||||
WORKER_TRAFFIC_TIMEOUT_MS,
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (seen) return seen;
|
||||
|
||||
// State the observation, not a conclusion. This fires for at least
|
||||
// two quite different causes and the harness cannot tell them apart
|
||||
// from here, so guessing one of them in the message sends the reader
|
||||
// the wrong way.
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
"observed no service-worker request in the route handler within " +
|
||||
WORKER_TRAFFIC_TIMEOUT_MS +
|
||||
"ms. Under working interception the background worker's " +
|
||||
"startup blocklist fetch (src/background/index.js) reaches the " +
|
||||
"handler about half a second after the route is installed. " +
|
||||
"Two causes are plausible and this check cannot distinguish " +
|
||||
"them: (1) service-worker interception is not in effect, so " +
|
||||
"that traffic went to the real internet unobserved — the suite " +
|
||||
"must be run through script/test-e2e, which sets " +
|
||||
"PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1, and a " +
|
||||
"Playwright upgrade may have dropped or renamed that flag; " +
|
||||
"(2) no worker request was made in the first place — the route " +
|
||||
"lost the startup race, or the worker no longer fetches at " +
|
||||
"startup, in which case this check needs a new anchor because " +
|
||||
"there is no longer any worker traffic to observe. Either way " +
|
||||
"the fix is a replacement mechanism or an honest downgrade of " +
|
||||
"the isolation claims in tests/e2e/network.js and README.md — " +
|
||||
"not deleting this check",
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function launch(routeOpts) {
|
||||
if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(EXT_PATH, "manifest.json"))) {
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
"no unpacked build at " +
|
||||
EXT_PATH +
|
||||
" — run make build before the e2e suite",
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const userDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "autistmask-e2e-"));
|
||||
const ctx = await chromium.launchPersistentContext(userDir, {
|
||||
// channel: "chromium" is load-bearing. The default headless mode
|
||||
// uses the headless shell, which silently refuses to load
|
||||
// extensions: there is no error at all, the service worker simply
|
||||
// never appears. This cost real debugging time once already.
|
||||
channel: "chromium",
|
||||
headless: true,
|
||||
args: [
|
||||
"--disable-extensions-except=" + EXT_PATH,
|
||||
"--load-extension=" + EXT_PATH,
|
||||
// The container runs unprivileged; Chrome's sandbox needs
|
||||
// capabilities the harness deliberately does not grant it.
|
||||
"--no-sandbox",
|
||||
// Belt to the interception braces: nothing that slips past
|
||||
// the route handler can resolve a name, so a request that
|
||||
// escapes cannot actually reach the internet. Detection is
|
||||
// still assertWorkerTrafficIntercepted()'s job — this only
|
||||
// bounds the damage while a gap goes unnoticed. Playwright
|
||||
// fulfils routed requests without touching the resolver, and
|
||||
// it drives the browser over a pipe, so neither is affected.
|
||||
"--host-resolver-rules=MAP * ~NOTFOUND",
|
||||
],
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const cleanup = async () => {
|
||||
await ctx.close().catch(() => {});
|
||||
fs.rmSync(userDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const errors = new ErrorCollector();
|
||||
attachErrorListeners(ctx, errors);
|
||||
routeOpts.report = (text) => errors.record("network", text);
|
||||
const stubs = await installNetworkStubs(ctx, routeOpts);
|
||||
|
||||
await assertWorkerTrafficIntercepted(stubs);
|
||||
|
||||
// The extension id is derived from the unpacked path, so it
|
||||
// changes and must never be hardcoded. It is the host part of the
|
||||
// service worker URL.
|
||||
const sw = await serviceWorker(ctx);
|
||||
const id = new URL(sw.url()).host;
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
ctx,
|
||||
errors,
|
||||
extensionId: id,
|
||||
popupUrl: "chrome-extension://" + id + "/src/popup/index.html",
|
||||
close: cleanup,
|
||||
};
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
// Anything that fails after the browser is up has to tear it down
|
||||
// on the way out: an orphaned context keeps node alive forever,
|
||||
// turning a clean failure into a hung run.
|
||||
await cleanup();
|
||||
throw e;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- flows
|
||||
|
||||
const PASSWORD = "e2e-harness-password";
|
||||
|
||||
async function visible(page, selector, timeout = 15000) {
|
||||
await page.waitForSelector(selector, { state: "visible", timeout });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function openPopup(ctx, popupUrl) {
|
||||
const page = await ctx.newPage();
|
||||
await page.goto(popupUrl);
|
||||
return page;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Full wallet creation through the real UI: BIP-39 generation, libsodium
|
||||
// vault encryption and extension storage persistence, for real.
|
||||
async function createWallet(page) {
|
||||
await page.click("#btn-welcome-add");
|
||||
await visible(page, "#view-add-wallet");
|
||||
await page.click("#btn-generate-phrase");
|
||||
await page.waitForFunction(() => {
|
||||
const el = document.getElementById("wallet-mnemonic");
|
||||
return el && el.value.trim().split(/\s+/).length >= 12;
|
||||
});
|
||||
await page.fill("#add-wallet-password", PASSWORD);
|
||||
await page.fill("#add-wallet-password-confirm", PASSWORD);
|
||||
await page.click("#btn-add-wallet-confirm");
|
||||
await visible(page, "#view-main", 60000);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reach the address detail screen from wherever the popup restored to.
|
||||
// Clicking .address-row does not open it; the [info] button does.
|
||||
async function openAddressDetail(page) {
|
||||
const onAddress = await page.isVisible("#view-address");
|
||||
if (!onAddress) {
|
||||
await visible(page, "#view-main");
|
||||
await page.click("#wallet-list .btn-addr-info");
|
||||
}
|
||||
await visible(page, "#view-address");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
module.exports = {
|
||||
createWallet,
|
||||
launch,
|
||||
openAddressDetail,
|
||||
openPopup,
|
||||
visible,
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -1,334 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Browser-level network interception for the end-to-end suite.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Every http(s) request the extension makes — from the popup page AND
|
||||
// from the MV3 background service worker — is fulfilled from these
|
||||
// fixtures, so the suite is deterministic and runs entirely offline. The
|
||||
// probe that motivated this harness (see issue #181) observed live calls
|
||||
// to Blockscout returning 401 inside the container, which would make any
|
||||
// assertion about rendered transaction data worthless.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Service-worker coverage is not free: ctx.route() only sees worker
|
||||
// traffic when PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1 is set in
|
||||
// the environment, which script/test-e2e does. Without it the phishing
|
||||
// blocklist fetch that src/background/index.js issues at worker startup
|
||||
// silently reaches raw.githubusercontent.com on the open internet, and
|
||||
// src/shared/phishingDomains.js swallows the failure so nothing surfaces
|
||||
// it. That is not left to trust: waitForServiceWorkerTraffic() below
|
||||
// backs the launch-time canary in harness.js, which fails the entire
|
||||
// suite if worker requests stop being visible here.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Anything not explicitly stubbed here is aborted AND reported to the
|
||||
// error collector, so a newly added outbound call shows up as a test
|
||||
// failure rather than as intermittent flakiness.
|
||||
|
||||
"use strict";
|
||||
|
||||
// Fictional ERC-20 used to seed the transaction-detail test. The symbol
|
||||
// must not collide with any entry in src/shared/tokenList.js, or
|
||||
// isSpoofedSymbol() in src/shared/transactions.js drops the transfer as a
|
||||
// symbol-spoofing attempt; holders_count must be >= 1000 or the default
|
||||
// hideLowHolderTokens filter drops it. Either would make the test pass
|
||||
// vacuously by never rendering a row at all.
|
||||
const STUB_TOKEN = {
|
||||
address: "0xe2e0000000000000000000000000000000000e2e",
|
||||
symbol: "E2E",
|
||||
name: "End To End Test Token",
|
||||
decimals: "6",
|
||||
holders: "12345",
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const STUB_COUNTERPARTY = "0xc0ffee0000000000000000000000000000c0ffee";
|
||||
|
||||
const STUB_TX_HASH =
|
||||
"0xe2e0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e2e";
|
||||
|
||||
const STUB_BLOCK_NUMBER = 21000000;
|
||||
|
||||
// Fixed instant so timeAgo() output is stable across runs.
|
||||
const STUB_TX_TIMESTAMP = "2026-01-02T03:04:05.000000Z";
|
||||
|
||||
// A 32-byte zero word. Returned for every eth_call, which is what makes
|
||||
// ethers' ENS reverse lookup resolve to "no resolver set" and return null
|
||||
// instead of throwing. A throw would be logged by src/shared/ens.js via
|
||||
// log.errorf(), i.e. console.error, which fails the run on its own.
|
||||
const ZERO_WORD = "0x" + "0".repeat(64);
|
||||
|
||||
const RPC_RESULTS = {
|
||||
eth_chainId: "0x1",
|
||||
net_version: "1",
|
||||
eth_blockNumber: "0x1406f40",
|
||||
eth_getBalance: "0x0",
|
||||
eth_call: ZERO_WORD,
|
||||
eth_gasPrice: "0x3b9aca00",
|
||||
eth_estimateGas: "0x5208",
|
||||
eth_getTransactionCount: "0x0",
|
||||
eth_maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
function tokenObject() {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
address_hash: STUB_TOKEN.address,
|
||||
address: STUB_TOKEN.address,
|
||||
symbol: STUB_TOKEN.symbol,
|
||||
name: STUB_TOKEN.name,
|
||||
decimals: STUB_TOKEN.decimals,
|
||||
holders_count: STUB_TOKEN.holders,
|
||||
type: "ERC-20",
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// One received ERC-20 transfer of 1.5 E2E to the address under test.
|
||||
function tokenTransferItems(address) {
|
||||
return [
|
||||
{
|
||||
transaction_hash: STUB_TX_HASH,
|
||||
block_number: STUB_BLOCK_NUMBER,
|
||||
timestamp: STUB_TX_TIMESTAMP,
|
||||
from: { hash: STUB_COUNTERPARTY },
|
||||
to: { hash: address },
|
||||
total: { decimals: STUB_TOKEN.decimals, value: "1500000" },
|
||||
token: tokenObject(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Full details for STUB_TX_HASH. raw_input is "0x" so the calldata
|
||||
// decoder short-circuits; the on-chain detail fields still populate.
|
||||
function transactionDetails() {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
hash: STUB_TX_HASH,
|
||||
block_number: STUB_BLOCK_NUMBER,
|
||||
nonce: 7,
|
||||
gas_used: "51000",
|
||||
gas_price: "1000000000",
|
||||
fee: { value: "51000000000000" },
|
||||
raw_input: "0x",
|
||||
status: "ok",
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function jsonResponse(route, body) {
|
||||
return route.fulfill({
|
||||
status: 200,
|
||||
contentType: "application/json",
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify(body),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Extract the address from a Blockscout /addresses/<addr>/... path.
|
||||
function blockscoutAddress(pathname) {
|
||||
const m = pathname.match(/\/addresses\/(0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40})\//);
|
||||
return m ? m[1] : null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function handleRpc(route, postData, report) {
|
||||
let payload;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
payload = JSON.parse(postData || "null");
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
report("unstubbed RPC: unparseable body " + String(postData));
|
||||
return route.abort();
|
||||
}
|
||||
// ethers batches by default, so the body may be an array.
|
||||
const batch = Array.isArray(payload) ? payload : [payload];
|
||||
|
||||
// Anything that is not a JSON-RPC object, or a batch of them, is not
|
||||
// RPC at all and must be reported like any other unrecognised
|
||||
// outbound traffic rather than dereferenced. request.postData()
|
||||
// returns null both for a bodyless POST and for a body Playwright
|
||||
// cannot decode as UTF-8 (sendBeacon with a Blob, or any binary
|
||||
// payload), so this is not an empty-string special case: it rejects
|
||||
// every non-object payload, exactly as the catch above rejects every
|
||||
// unparseable one.
|
||||
if (
|
||||
payload === null ||
|
||||
typeof payload !== "object" ||
|
||||
!batch.every((req) => req !== null && typeof req === "object")
|
||||
) {
|
||||
report("unstubbed request: POST " + route.request().url());
|
||||
return route.abort();
|
||||
}
|
||||
const replies = batch.map((req) => {
|
||||
const result = RPC_RESULTS[req.method];
|
||||
if (result === undefined) {
|
||||
report("unstubbed RPC method: " + req.method);
|
||||
return {
|
||||
jsonrpc: "2.0",
|
||||
id: req.id,
|
||||
error: { code: -32601, message: "unstubbed in e2e harness" },
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { jsonrpc: "2.0", id: req.id, result };
|
||||
});
|
||||
return jsonResponse(route, Array.isArray(payload) ? replies : replies[0]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const TRACE_TRUE = ["1", "true", "yes", "on"];
|
||||
const TRACE_FALSE = ["", "0", "false", "no", "off"];
|
||||
|
||||
// Whether E2E_TRACE_NETWORK asks for the request trace.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// A set-but-unrecognised value is a hard error rather than a quiet
|
||||
// "off": E2E_TRACE_NETWORK=true asking for a trace and getting silence
|
||||
// is the operator being lied to about what the harness is doing, which
|
||||
// is the whole failure mode this suite exists to eliminate. Refusing to
|
||||
// guess costs one line and one obvious error message.
|
||||
function traceEnabled(raw) {
|
||||
if (raw === undefined || raw === null) return false;
|
||||
const v = String(raw).trim().toLowerCase();
|
||||
if (TRACE_TRUE.includes(v)) return true;
|
||||
if (TRACE_FALSE.includes(v)) return false;
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
"E2E_TRACE_NETWORK is set to " +
|
||||
JSON.stringify(String(raw)) +
|
||||
", which is not a recognised on/off value. Use one of " +
|
||||
TRACE_TRUE.join(", ") +
|
||||
" to enable the request trace, or one of " +
|
||||
TRACE_FALSE.slice(1).join(", ") +
|
||||
" to disable it. Refusing to guess: a diagnostic that silently " +
|
||||
"does nothing is worse than one that is not there",
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Route every http(s) request through local fixtures.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param {import("playwright-core").BrowserContext} ctx
|
||||
* @param {object} opts
|
||||
* @param {(text: string) => void} opts.report called for unstubbed traffic
|
||||
* @param {boolean} [opts.seedTokenTransfer] serve the stubbed ERC-20
|
||||
* transfer. Read at request time, so a test can flip it on the same
|
||||
* options object without re-registering the route.
|
||||
* @returns {Promise<{waitForServiceWorkerTraffic: (ms: number) =>
|
||||
* Promise<string|null>}>}
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
|
||||
const report = opts.report;
|
||||
|
||||
// First request seen that originated in a service worker, and the
|
||||
// resolver waiting for it. This is what proves worker interception is
|
||||
// actually in force; see waitForServiceWorkerTraffic below.
|
||||
let firstWorkerRequest = null;
|
||||
let announceWorkerRequest = null;
|
||||
|
||||
// E2E_TRACE_NETWORK=1 prints every request that reaches this handler,
|
||||
// tagged [sw] when it originated in the background service worker.
|
||||
// It exists so the isolation claim above can be re-checked by anyone
|
||||
// in one command, without editing files: the phishing blocklist fetch
|
||||
// showing up with an [sw] tag is the proof that the worker really is
|
||||
// intercepted and that the raw.githubusercontent.com stub below is
|
||||
// live code rather than decoration.
|
||||
const trace = traceEnabled(process.env.E2E_TRACE_NETWORK);
|
||||
|
||||
// Regex rather than a glob so chrome-extension:// resource loads are
|
||||
// never touched — routing those would break the popup itself.
|
||||
await ctx.route(/^https?:\/\//, async (route) => {
|
||||
const req = route.request();
|
||||
const url = new URL(req.url());
|
||||
const p = url.pathname;
|
||||
const fromWorker = !!req.serviceWorker();
|
||||
|
||||
if (fromWorker && !firstWorkerRequest) {
|
||||
firstWorkerRequest = req.method() + " " + req.url();
|
||||
if (announceWorkerRequest)
|
||||
announceWorkerRequest(firstWorkerRequest);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (trace) {
|
||||
const origin = fromWorker ? "[sw] " : "[page] ";
|
||||
console.log("# routed " + origin + req.method() + " " + req.url());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// JSON-RPC endpoint (any host): a POST with a JSON-RPC body.
|
||||
if (req.method() === "POST") {
|
||||
return handleRpc(route, req.postData(), report);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Blockscout v2
|
||||
if (p.includes("/api/v2/")) {
|
||||
if (/\/addresses\/0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\/transactions$/.test(p)) {
|
||||
return jsonResponse(route, { items: [] });
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (/\/addresses\/0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\/token-transfers$/.test(p)) {
|
||||
const addr = blockscoutAddress(p);
|
||||
return jsonResponse(route, {
|
||||
items:
|
||||
opts.seedTokenTransfer && addr
|
||||
? tokenTransferItems(addr)
|
||||
: [],
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (/\/addresses\/0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\/token-balances$/.test(p)) {
|
||||
return jsonResponse(route, []);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (p.endsWith("/transactions/" + STUB_TX_HASH)) {
|
||||
return jsonResponse(route, transactionDetails());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CoinDesk price tick
|
||||
if (url.hostname.endsWith("coindesk.com")) {
|
||||
return jsonResponse(route, { Data: {} });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// MetaMask phishing blocklist
|
||||
if (
|
||||
url.hostname === "raw.githubusercontent.com" ||
|
||||
p.endsWith("/eth-phishing-detect/main/src/config.json")
|
||||
) {
|
||||
return jsonResponse(route, {
|
||||
version: 2,
|
||||
tolerance: 2,
|
||||
fuzzylist: [],
|
||||
whitelist: [],
|
||||
blacklist: [],
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Best-effort Etherscan address labels: served as an empty page.
|
||||
if (url.hostname.endsWith("etherscan.io")) {
|
||||
return route.fulfill({
|
||||
status: 200,
|
||||
contentType: "text/html",
|
||||
body: "<html><body></body></html>",
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
report("unstubbed request: " + req.method() + " " + req.url());
|
||||
return route.abort();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Resolve with the first service-worker-originated request this
|
||||
* handler saw, or null if none arrives within `ms`.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The background worker fetches the phishing blocklist at
|
||||
* startup, unconditionally, within about a second of the context
|
||||
* coming up — so under working interception this resolves almost
|
||||
* immediately. Nothing arriving means worker traffic is bypassing
|
||||
* the handler entirely and going to the real internet, which the
|
||||
* caller turns into a hard failure of the whole suite.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
waitForServiceWorkerTraffic(ms) {
|
||||
if (firstWorkerRequest) return Promise.resolve(firstWorkerRequest);
|
||||
return new Promise((resolve) => {
|
||||
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
|
||||
announceWorkerRequest = null;
|
||||
resolve(null);
|
||||
}, ms);
|
||||
announceWorkerRequest = (req) => {
|
||||
clearTimeout(timer);
|
||||
announceWorkerRequest = null;
|
||||
resolve(req);
|
||||
};
|
||||
});
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
module.exports = {
|
||||
installNetworkStubs,
|
||||
STUB_TOKEN,
|
||||
STUB_TX_HASH,
|
||||
};
|
||||
264
tests/e2e/run.js
264
tests/e2e/run.js
@@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// End-to-end suite entrypoint. Run via script/test-e2e (which builds
|
||||
// dist/chrome/ and starts the pinned container); running it directly
|
||||
// requires a Chromium that playwright-core can find.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// A plain runner rather than jest on purpose: jest's default testMatch
|
||||
// would pull these files into script/test, and browser tests do not fit
|
||||
// inside the 20-second cap REPO_POLICIES.md puts on make test. Nothing
|
||||
// here is named *.test.js for the same reason.
|
||||
|
||||
"use strict";
|
||||
|
||||
const {
|
||||
createWallet,
|
||||
launch,
|
||||
openAddressDetail,
|
||||
openPopup,
|
||||
visible,
|
||||
} = require("./harness");
|
||||
const { STUB_TOKEN, STUB_TX_HASH } = require("./network");
|
||||
|
||||
const TEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 120000;
|
||||
|
||||
// How long to keep collecting after the final test returns; see the
|
||||
// trailing drain in main().
|
||||
const TRAILING_WATCH_MS = 1500;
|
||||
|
||||
const tests = [];
|
||||
|
||||
function test(name, fn) {
|
||||
tests.push({ name, fn });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function assert(cond, message) {
|
||||
if (!cond) throw new Error(message);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function withTimeout(promise, name) {
|
||||
let timer;
|
||||
const timeout = new Promise((_, reject) => {
|
||||
timer = setTimeout(
|
||||
() =>
|
||||
reject(new Error("timed out after " + TEST_TIMEOUT_MS + "ms")),
|
||||
TEST_TIMEOUT_MS,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
return Promise.race([promise, timeout]).finally(() => clearTimeout(timer));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ----------------------------------------------------------------- tests
|
||||
|
||||
test("popup loads and reaches the welcome view", async (env) => {
|
||||
env.page = await openPopup(env.ctx, env.popupUrl);
|
||||
await visible(env.page, "#view-welcome");
|
||||
const title = await env.page.title();
|
||||
assert(title === "AutistMask", "unexpected popup title: " + title);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("wallet creation through the UI reaches the main view", async (env) => {
|
||||
await createWallet(env.page);
|
||||
const addrCount = await env.page
|
||||
.locator("#wallet-list .btn-addr-info")
|
||||
.count();
|
||||
assert(addrCount > 0, "no addresses rendered in the wallet list");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("add token screen opens from address detail (#150)", async (env) => {
|
||||
await openAddressDetail(env.page);
|
||||
await env.page.click("#btn-add-token");
|
||||
await visible(env.page, "#view-add-token");
|
||||
const quickPicks = await env.page
|
||||
.locator("#common-token-list .common-token")
|
||||
.count();
|
||||
assert(quickPicks > 0, "no common-token quick-pick buttons rendered");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("transaction detail renders an ERC-20 transfer (#151)", async (env) => {
|
||||
// Serve the stubbed token transfer from here on, then reload so the
|
||||
// address detail screen refetches its transaction list.
|
||||
env.routeOpts.seedTokenTransfer = true;
|
||||
await env.page.reload();
|
||||
await openAddressDetail(env.page);
|
||||
|
||||
await visible(env.page, "#tx-list .tx-row");
|
||||
const rowText = await env.page
|
||||
.locator("#tx-list .tx-row")
|
||||
.first()
|
||||
.innerText();
|
||||
assert(
|
||||
rowText.includes(STUB_TOKEN.symbol),
|
||||
"token transfer row missing symbol " +
|
||||
STUB_TOKEN.symbol +
|
||||
", got: " +
|
||||
JSON.stringify(rowText),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
await env.page.locator("#tx-list .tx-row").first().click();
|
||||
await visible(env.page, "#view-transaction");
|
||||
|
||||
const hash = await env.page.locator("#tx-detail-hash").innerText();
|
||||
assert(
|
||||
hash.includes(STUB_TX_HASH),
|
||||
"transaction detail shows the wrong hash: " + hash,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// The token contract row is the field that crashes when
|
||||
// addressDotHtml is not imported: it renders only for transfers with
|
||||
// a contractAddress, which is every ERC-20 transfer.
|
||||
await visible(env.page, "#tx-detail-token-contract-section");
|
||||
const contract = env.page.locator("#tx-detail-token-contract");
|
||||
const contractText = await contract.innerText();
|
||||
assert(
|
||||
contractText.toLowerCase().includes(STUB_TOKEN.address),
|
||||
"token contract row missing the contract address, got: " +
|
||||
JSON.stringify(contractText),
|
||||
);
|
||||
const dots = await contract.locator('span[style*="border-radius"]').count();
|
||||
assert(dots > 0, "token contract row rendered without its colour dot");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- runner
|
||||
|
||||
async function main() {
|
||||
// A suite that runs nothing must never report success. If a refactor
|
||||
// drops the registrations above, or a require() of this file stops
|
||||
// reaching them, the only honest outcome is a red run — reporting
|
||||
// "0/0 passed" and exiting 0 is the same vacuous-check failure this
|
||||
// whole harness exists to prevent.
|
||||
if (tests.length === 0) {
|
||||
console.log("1..0");
|
||||
console.log("# FAILED: the e2e suite registered no tests");
|
||||
process.exitCode = 1;
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const routeOpts = { seedTokenTransfer: false };
|
||||
|
||||
let session;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
session = await launch(routeOpts);
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
// Never skip and report success: a browser we cannot start, or
|
||||
// one whose network interception is not in force, is a failure of
|
||||
// the suite, not an absent one.
|
||||
console.error("e2e: cannot run the suite: " + e.message);
|
||||
process.exitCode = 1;
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
console.log("# extension id: " + session.extensionId);
|
||||
console.log("1.." + tests.length);
|
||||
|
||||
const env = {
|
||||
ctx: session.ctx,
|
||||
popupUrl: session.popupUrl,
|
||||
routeOpts,
|
||||
page: null,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Attribution of collected errors is total. session.errors has no
|
||||
// window API at all: take() always drains everything outstanding, so
|
||||
// successive takes partition the whole stream, and the phases below
|
||||
// cover the entire life of the run. Nothing the collector holds can
|
||||
// go unread.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// launch .. end of test 1 -> test 1 (so the worker's startup
|
||||
// fetches land on a test, not
|
||||
// nowhere)
|
||||
// end of test k .. end of k+1 -> test k+1
|
||||
// last test .. teardown -> the suite, via the trailing drain
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Those three phases cover the entire life of the browser context.
|
||||
// There is no fourth: once the context is closed nothing can record,
|
||||
// because the route handler and the console listeners died with it.
|
||||
// Traffic that a test defers past the trailing drain is therefore
|
||||
// never observed at all — a real limit of this design, stated in the
|
||||
// README, and not one any post-teardown hook could close.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Two green-but-vacuous runs on this harness were the same shape: a
|
||||
// record falling outside somebody's window and being dropped. First
|
||||
// the mark started after test 1, discarding launch-time records;
|
||||
// then the tail after the last test was never read. Patching a
|
||||
// second boundary would have invited a third, so the window concept
|
||||
// is gone rather than fixed.
|
||||
let failed = 0;
|
||||
let n = 0;
|
||||
for (const t of tests) {
|
||||
n += 1;
|
||||
let failure = null;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await withTimeout(t.fn(env), t.name);
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
failure = e.message;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Any uncaught page error, console.error or unstubbed request
|
||||
// fails the test that provoked it, whether or not its assertions
|
||||
// passed. This is the mechanism that caught #150.
|
||||
const newErrors = session.errors.take();
|
||||
if (!failure && newErrors.length > 0) {
|
||||
failure = "uncaught browser errors during this test";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (failure) {
|
||||
failed += 1;
|
||||
console.log("not ok " + n + " - " + t.name);
|
||||
console.log(" " + failure);
|
||||
for (const line of newErrors) {
|
||||
console.log(" " + line);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
console.log("ok " + n + " - " + t.name);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Keep watching after the last test returns, before tearing the
|
||||
// browser down. A request a test fires without awaiting is still in
|
||||
// flight when its function resolves; measured here it reaches the
|
||||
// route handler about 10ms later, but closing the context does not
|
||||
// wait for it — with no window at all the request dies unobserved
|
||||
// and the run goes green, which is exactly how escaping traffic
|
||||
// stays invisible.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// A fixed bounded window rather than a quiescence poll on purpose:
|
||||
// the collector being quiet is not evidence, because a request that
|
||||
// has not been dispatched yet has recorded nothing to be quiet
|
||||
// about. Playwright offers no "is anything in flight" question to
|
||||
// ask either — the route handler is the only observation point — so
|
||||
// a grace period is the mechanism available, and this one is ~150x
|
||||
// the measured latency for 1.5s on a ~25s suite.
|
||||
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, TRAILING_WATCH_MS));
|
||||
|
||||
await session.close();
|
||||
|
||||
// The tail. These cannot be blamed on any single test, so they are
|
||||
// reported against the suite rather than guessed at — but they are
|
||||
// reported, and they fail the run.
|
||||
const trailing = session.errors.take();
|
||||
|
||||
console.log(
|
||||
"# " + (tests.length - failed) + "/" + tests.length + " tests passed",
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
if (trailing.length > 0) {
|
||||
console.log(
|
||||
"# " +
|
||||
trailing.length +
|
||||
" browser error(s) recorded after the last test finished, " +
|
||||
"not attributable to any single test:",
|
||||
);
|
||||
for (const line of trailing) {
|
||||
console.log("# " + line);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (failed > 0 || trailing.length > 0) {
|
||||
console.log("# FAILED");
|
||||
process.exitCode = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
main().catch((e) => {
|
||||
console.error("e2e: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
|
||||
process.exitCode = 1;
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -1,24 +1,17 @@
|
||||
// Extension storage stub for the Node test environment. The module resolves
|
||||
// the storage API on use, so this only has to exist before the first call.
|
||||
// Values round-trip through JSON the way structured cloning would, so a test
|
||||
// cannot pass by holding a live reference to the module's own array.
|
||||
const storageStore = {};
|
||||
global.chrome = {
|
||||
storage: {
|
||||
local: {
|
||||
get: async (key) =>
|
||||
Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(storageStore, key)
|
||||
? { [key]: JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(storageStore[key])) }
|
||||
: {},
|
||||
set: async (items) => {
|
||||
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(items)) {
|
||||
storageStore[key] = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(value));
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
remove: async (key) => {
|
||||
delete storageStore[key];
|
||||
},
|
||||
// Provide a localStorage mock for Node.js test environment.
|
||||
// Must be set before requiring the module since it calls loadDeltaFromStorage()
|
||||
// at module load time.
|
||||
const localStorageStore = {};
|
||||
global.localStorage = {
|
||||
getItem: (key) =>
|
||||
Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(localStorageStore, key)
|
||||
? localStorageStore[key]
|
||||
: null,
|
||||
setItem: (key, value) => {
|
||||
localStorageStore[key] = String(value);
|
||||
},
|
||||
removeItem: (key) => {
|
||||
delete localStorageStore[key];
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,32 +21,19 @@ const {
|
||||
getBlocklistSize,
|
||||
getDeltaSize,
|
||||
hostnameVariants,
|
||||
DELTA_STORAGE_KEY,
|
||||
_reset,
|
||||
_getVendoredBlacklistSize,
|
||||
_getDeltaBlacklist,
|
||||
} = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
|
||||
|
||||
function clearStorage() {
|
||||
for (const key of Object.keys(storageStore)) {
|
||||
delete storageStore[key];
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The MV3 service worker is torn down when idle and re-evaluated on the next
|
||||
// event, which wipes every module-level variable. Re-requiring the module with
|
||||
// the registry reset is exactly that: fresh in-memory state, same extension
|
||||
// storage underneath.
|
||||
function restartWorker() {
|
||||
jest.resetModules();
|
||||
return require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reset delta state before each test to avoid cross-test contamination.
|
||||
// Note: vendored sets are immutable and always present.
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
_reset();
|
||||
clearStorage();
|
||||
// Clear localStorage mock between tests
|
||||
for (const key of Object.keys(localStorageStore)) {
|
||||
delete localStorageStore[key];
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("phishingDomains", () => {
|
||||
@@ -189,34 +169,15 @@ describe("phishingDomains", () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("extension storage persistence", () => {
|
||||
test("delta is persisted to extension storage, not localStorage", async () => {
|
||||
await loadConfig({
|
||||
describe("localStorage persistence", () => {
|
||||
test("saveDeltaToStorage persists delta under 256KiB", () => {
|
||||
loadConfig({
|
||||
blacklist: ["persisted-scam-xyz.com"],
|
||||
});
|
||||
const stored = storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY];
|
||||
expect(stored).toBeDefined();
|
||||
expect(stored.blacklist).toContain("persisted-scam-xyz.com");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the fetch timestamp is persisted alongside the delta", async () => {
|
||||
const before = Date.now();
|
||||
await loadConfig({ blacklist: ["timestamped-scam-xyz.com"] });
|
||||
const stored = storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY];
|
||||
expect(typeof stored.lastFetchTime).toBe("number");
|
||||
expect(stored.lastFetchTime).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(before);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("an oversized delta is dropped entirely, timestamp included", async () => {
|
||||
// A record above the 256 KiB cap is not worth keeping; the
|
||||
// timestamp goes with it so the next start re-fetches rather than
|
||||
// claiming freshness for a delta that was never stored.
|
||||
const huge = [];
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 20000; i++) {
|
||||
huge.push(`oversize-scam-${i}-xyzxyzxyzxyzxyz.com`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
await loadConfig({ blacklist: huge });
|
||||
expect(storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY]).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
const stored = localStorage.getItem("phishing-delta");
|
||||
expect(stored).not.toBeNull();
|
||||
const data = JSON.parse(stored);
|
||||
expect(data.blacklist).toContain("persisted-scam-xyz.com");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("delta is cleared on _reset", () => {
|
||||
@@ -242,332 +203,3 @@ describe("phishingDomains", () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("phishing list across a service worker restart", () => {
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
clearStorage();
|
||||
jest.resetModules();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
delete global.fetch;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a revived worker restores the persisted delta without re-fetching", async () => {
|
||||
const first = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
|
||||
await first.loadConfig({ blacklist: ["restart-scam-xyz.com"] });
|
||||
|
||||
const revived = restartWorker();
|
||||
// Nothing in memory yet — this is a brand new module instance.
|
||||
expect(revived.getDeltaSize()).toBe(0);
|
||||
|
||||
global.fetch = jest.fn();
|
||||
await revived.initPhishingList();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(global.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
expect(revived.getDeltaSize()).toBe(1);
|
||||
expect(revived.isPhishingDomain("restart-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("repeated wakes inside the cache window never re-fetch", async () => {
|
||||
const first = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
|
||||
await first.loadConfig({ blacklist: ["no-storm-scam-xyz.com"] });
|
||||
|
||||
global.fetch = jest.fn();
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
|
||||
const revived = restartWorker();
|
||||
await revived.initPhishingList();
|
||||
}
|
||||
expect(global.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a persisted timestamp older than the TTL causes a fetch on startup", async () => {
|
||||
const first = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
|
||||
await first.loadConfig({ blacklist: ["stale-scam-xyz.com"] });
|
||||
|
||||
// Age the persisted record past the 24-hour TTL.
|
||||
storageStore[first.DELTA_STORAGE_KEY].lastFetchTime =
|
||||
Date.now() - first.CACHE_TTL_MS - 1000;
|
||||
|
||||
const revived = restartWorker();
|
||||
global.fetch = jest.fn(async () => ({
|
||||
ok: true,
|
||||
json: async () => ({ blacklist: ["refreshed-scam-xyz.com"] }),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
await revived.initPhishingList();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(global.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
expect(revived.isPhishingDomain("refreshed-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(revived.isPhishingDomain("stale-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a first start with nothing persisted fetches immediately", async () => {
|
||||
const fresh = restartWorker();
|
||||
global.fetch = jest.fn(async () => ({
|
||||
ok: true,
|
||||
json: async () => ({ blacklist: ["first-run-scam-xyz.com"] }),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
await fresh.initPhishingList();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(global.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
expect(fresh.isPhishingDomain("first-run-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("updatePhishingList honours the persisted timestamp on its own", async () => {
|
||||
// The startup path calls updatePhishingList() directly, so it must
|
||||
// load persisted state itself rather than relying on anything else
|
||||
// having finished first.
|
||||
const first = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
|
||||
await first.loadConfig({ blacklist: ["alarm-tick-scam-xyz.com"] });
|
||||
|
||||
const revived = restartWorker();
|
||||
global.fetch = jest.fn();
|
||||
await revived.updatePhishingList();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(global.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
expect(revived.isPhishingDomain("alarm-tick-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The alarm period alone must set the cadence. lastFetchTime is stamped when
|
||||
// the fetch completes, so it lands one fetch latency after the alarm that
|
||||
// caused it; a freshness guard timed to the alarm period therefore vetoes
|
||||
// every scheduled tick and halves the real refresh rate. These tests measure
|
||||
// the interval between fetches that actually happened.
|
||||
describe("phishing refresh steady-state cadence", () => {
|
||||
const { PHISHING_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES } = require("../src/shared/alarms");
|
||||
const PERIOD_MS = PHISHING_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES * 60 * 1000;
|
||||
|
||||
let clockSpy;
|
||||
let now;
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
clearStorage();
|
||||
jest.resetModules();
|
||||
now = Date.UTC(2026, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0);
|
||||
clockSpy = jest.spyOn(Date, "now").mockImplementation(() => now);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
clockSpy.mockRestore();
|
||||
delete global.fetch;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
function fetchStub(latencyMs, seen) {
|
||||
return jest.fn(async () => {
|
||||
seen.push(now);
|
||||
// A network fetch takes time, and lastFetchTime is stamped after
|
||||
// it, not when the alarm fired.
|
||||
now += latencyMs;
|
||||
return { ok: true, json: async () => ({ blacklist: [] }) };
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
test("ten alarm ticks produce ten fetches, one per period", async () => {
|
||||
const fetchedAt = [];
|
||||
global.fetch = fetchStub(5000, fetchedAt);
|
||||
|
||||
const startup = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
|
||||
const T0 = now;
|
||||
await startup.initPhishingList();
|
||||
expect(fetchedAt).toEqual([T0]);
|
||||
|
||||
const TICKS = 10;
|
||||
let tickAt = T0 + PERIOD_MS;
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < TICKS; i++) {
|
||||
now = tickAt;
|
||||
tickAt += PERIOD_MS;
|
||||
// The browser wakes a terminated worker to deliver the alarm, so
|
||||
// every tick starts from cold memory and the persisted record.
|
||||
const revived = restartWorker();
|
||||
await revived.refreshPhishingListOnSchedule();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
expect(fetchedAt).toHaveLength(TICKS + 1);
|
||||
const intervals = fetchedAt.slice(1).map((t, i) => t - fetchedAt[i]);
|
||||
expect(intervals).toEqual(new Array(TICKS).fill(PERIOD_MS));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the scheduled tick fetches whatever the last fetch's latency was", async () => {
|
||||
// The alarm fires one period after the previous alarm, which is
|
||||
// `latency` short of one period since the fetch it caused completed.
|
||||
for (const latency of [200, 1000, 5000]) {
|
||||
clearStorage();
|
||||
jest.resetModules();
|
||||
storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY] = {
|
||||
blacklist: [],
|
||||
lastFetchTime: now - PERIOD_MS + latency,
|
||||
lastAttemptTime: now - PERIOD_MS,
|
||||
};
|
||||
const mod = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
|
||||
const fetchedAt = [];
|
||||
global.fetch = fetchStub(latency, fetchedAt);
|
||||
|
||||
await mod.refreshPhishingListOnSchedule();
|
||||
expect(fetchedAt).toHaveLength(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a worker wake inside the cache window still does not fetch", async () => {
|
||||
// The TTL is not removed, only taken off the scheduled path. Chrome
|
||||
// revives the worker every ~30 seconds and every revival runs the
|
||||
// startup path, so the TTL still has to keep that off the network.
|
||||
storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY] = {
|
||||
blacklist: [],
|
||||
lastFetchTime: now - PERIOD_MS + 5000,
|
||||
lastAttemptTime: now - PERIOD_MS,
|
||||
};
|
||||
const mod = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
|
||||
global.fetch = jest.fn();
|
||||
|
||||
await mod.initPhishingList();
|
||||
expect(global.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("phishing list timestamps that cannot be trusted", () => {
|
||||
let clockSpy;
|
||||
let now;
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
clearStorage();
|
||||
jest.resetModules();
|
||||
now = Date.UTC(2026, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0);
|
||||
clockSpy = jest.spyOn(Date, "now").mockImplementation(() => now);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
clockSpy.mockRestore();
|
||||
delete global.fetch;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
function okFetch() {
|
||||
return jest.fn(async () => ({
|
||||
ok: true,
|
||||
json: async () => ({ blacklist: ["recovered-scam-xyz.com"] }),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// jest.resetModules() clears the call record of a jest.fn, and simulating
|
||||
// a worker restart is exactly that call. Anything counted across restarts
|
||||
// has to be counted outside the mock.
|
||||
function countingFetch(counter, response) {
|
||||
return async () => {
|
||||
counter.calls++;
|
||||
return response();
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
test("a lastFetchTime in the future is discarded rather than trusted", async () => {
|
||||
// Clock skew or a restored profile backup writes one. Every guard
|
||||
// measures `Date.now() - stamp` and only tests the lower bound, so a
|
||||
// stamp a year ahead would suppress updates for a year, and now that
|
||||
// the value is persisted it would outlive every worker.
|
||||
storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY] = {
|
||||
blacklist: ["poisoned-scam-xyz.com"],
|
||||
lastFetchTime: now + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
|
||||
lastAttemptTime: 0,
|
||||
};
|
||||
const mod = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
|
||||
global.fetch = okFetch();
|
||||
|
||||
await mod.initPhishingList();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(global.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
expect(mod.isPhishingDomain("recovered-scam-xyz.com")).toBe(true);
|
||||
// And the record it leaves behind is sane, so recovery is permanent.
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY].lastFetchTime,
|
||||
).toBeLessThanOrEqual(now);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a lastAttemptTime in the future does not suppress the retry", async () => {
|
||||
storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY] = {
|
||||
lastAttemptTime: now + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
|
||||
};
|
||||
const mod = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
|
||||
global.fetch = okFetch();
|
||||
|
||||
await mod.initPhishingList();
|
||||
expect(global.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("an oversized delta does not re-download on every worker wake", async () => {
|
||||
// The delta and its freshness claim are both dropped, which is right,
|
||||
// but nothing then says a fetch just happened. Chrome cycles the
|
||||
// worker roughly every 30 seconds idle, so without the attempt stamp
|
||||
// this is a full blocklist download per wake, forever.
|
||||
const huge = [];
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 20000; i++) {
|
||||
huge.push(`oversize-scam-${i}-xyzxyzxyzxyzxyz.com`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const counter = { calls: 0 };
|
||||
global.fetch = countingFetch(counter, () => ({
|
||||
ok: true,
|
||||
json: async () => ({ blacklist: huge }),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
for (let wake = 0; wake < 4; wake++) {
|
||||
const revived = restartWorker();
|
||||
await revived.initPhishingList();
|
||||
now += 30 * 1000; // idle timeout, worker torn down and revived
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
expect(counter.calls).toBe(1);
|
||||
expect(storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY].blacklist).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
expect(typeof storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY].lastAttemptTime).toBe(
|
||||
"number",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a failing fetch is not retried on every worker wake either", async () => {
|
||||
const counter = { calls: 0 };
|
||||
global.fetch = countingFetch(counter, () => ({
|
||||
ok: false,
|
||||
status: 503,
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
for (let wake = 0; wake < 4; wake++) {
|
||||
const revived = restartWorker();
|
||||
await revived.initPhishingList();
|
||||
now += 30 * 1000;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
expect(counter.calls).toBe(1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the retry floor expires, so a failure is not permanent", async () => {
|
||||
const {
|
||||
MIN_FETCH_ATTEMPT_INTERVAL_MS,
|
||||
} = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
|
||||
const counter = { calls: 0 };
|
||||
global.fetch = countingFetch(counter, () => ({
|
||||
ok: false,
|
||||
status: 503,
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
await restartWorker().initPhishingList();
|
||||
expect(counter.calls).toBe(1);
|
||||
|
||||
// Still inside the floor: no retry.
|
||||
now += MIN_FETCH_ATTEMPT_INTERVAL_MS - 1000;
|
||||
await restartWorker().initPhishingList();
|
||||
expect(counter.calls).toBe(1);
|
||||
|
||||
// Past it: the extension goes back to the network.
|
||||
now += 2000;
|
||||
await restartWorker().initPhishingList();
|
||||
expect(counter.calls).toBe(2);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the scheduled tick ignores the retry floor", async () => {
|
||||
// The alarm period is far above the floor, but the floor exists to
|
||||
// throttle wakes, not the schedule.
|
||||
storageStore[DELTA_STORAGE_KEY] = { lastAttemptTime: now - 1000 };
|
||||
const mod = require("../src/shared/phishingDomains");
|
||||
global.fetch = okFetch();
|
||||
|
||||
await mod.refreshPhishingListOnSchedule();
|
||||
expect(global.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
|
||||
const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
|
||||
|
||||
function oneWallet() {
|
||||
return [{ name: "Wallet 1", type: "hd", addresses: [ADDRESS] }];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// state.js resolves the storage API at require time, so the stub has to exist
|
||||
// before the module is loaded, and the module registry has to be reset between
|
||||
// cases because `state` is a module-level singleton.
|
||||
function loadModuleWith(persisted) {
|
||||
jest.resetModules();
|
||||
const set = jest.fn(async () => {});
|
||||
global.chrome = {
|
||||
storage: {
|
||||
local: {
|
||||
get: jest.fn(async () =>
|
||||
persisted ? { autistmask: persisted } : {},
|
||||
),
|
||||
set,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
return { mod: require("../src/shared/state"), set };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
delete global.chrome;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("loadState hasWallet reconciliation", () => {
|
||||
// A profile that deleted its last wallet on a build predating the write
|
||||
// path fix keeps hasWallet: true forever. It must load as no wallet, which
|
||||
// is what sends the popup to the welcome view.
|
||||
test("stored hasWallet true with zero wallets loads as no wallet", async () => {
|
||||
const { mod } = loadModuleWith({ hasWallet: true, wallets: [] });
|
||||
await mod.loadState();
|
||||
expect(mod.state.hasWallet).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("stored hasWallet true with a missing wallets key loads as no wallet", async () => {
|
||||
const { mod } = loadModuleWith({ hasWallet: true });
|
||||
await mod.loadState();
|
||||
expect(mod.state.wallets).toEqual([]);
|
||||
expect(mod.state.hasWallet).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("stored hasWallet false with one wallet loads as having a wallet", async () => {
|
||||
const { mod } = loadModuleWith({
|
||||
hasWallet: false,
|
||||
wallets: oneWallet(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
await mod.loadState();
|
||||
expect(mod.state.hasWallet).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("absent hasWallet with wallets present loads as having a wallet", async () => {
|
||||
const { mod } = loadModuleWith({ wallets: oneWallet() });
|
||||
await mod.loadState();
|
||||
expect(mod.state.hasWallet).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("consistent stored states are preserved", async () => {
|
||||
const withWallet = loadModuleWith({
|
||||
hasWallet: true,
|
||||
wallets: oneWallet(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
await withWallet.mod.loadState();
|
||||
expect(withWallet.mod.state.hasWallet).toBe(true);
|
||||
|
||||
const without = loadModuleWith({ hasWallet: false, wallets: [] });
|
||||
await without.mod.loadState();
|
||||
expect(without.mod.state.hasWallet).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("empty storage leaves the default no-wallet state", async () => {
|
||||
const { mod } = loadModuleWith(null);
|
||||
await mod.loadState();
|
||||
expect(mod.state.hasWallet).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(mod.state.wallets).toEqual([]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The correction is derived on every load rather than written back, so a
|
||||
// load never has a storage side effect.
|
||||
test("loadState does not write to storage", async () => {
|
||||
const { mod, set } = loadModuleWith({ hasWallet: true, wallets: [] });
|
||||
await mod.loadState();
|
||||
expect(set).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Deriving must not disturb the rest of the load.
|
||||
test("other persisted fields still load", async () => {
|
||||
const { mod } = loadModuleWith({
|
||||
hasWallet: false,
|
||||
wallets: oneWallet(),
|
||||
networkId: "sepolia",
|
||||
theme: "dark",
|
||||
activeAddress: ADDRESS,
|
||||
});
|
||||
await mod.loadState();
|
||||
expect(mod.state.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
|
||||
expect(mod.state.theme).toBe("dark");
|
||||
expect(mod.state.activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -1,346 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Tests for src/shared/vault.js: the Argon2id + XSalsa20-Poly1305 encryption
|
||||
// that protects recovery phrases and private keys at rest.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The properties that matter here are the ones whose failure is silent. A
|
||||
// vault that decrypts under the wrong password, that hands back plaintext from
|
||||
// a ciphertext an attacker edited, that reuses a nonce, or that leaves the
|
||||
// recovery phrase readable somewhere in the stored blob all look exactly like
|
||||
// a working vault from the UI. So each test below asserts a negative: the
|
||||
// thing that must not happen.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Cost: every encrypt and decrypt runs one Argon2id pwhash at the production
|
||||
// interactive parameters, which the module hardcodes. The parameters are not
|
||||
// weakened or overridden anywhere in this file — they are pinned by the "key
|
||||
// derivation cost" tests, since they are the vault's only defence against an
|
||||
// offline attack on a stolen blob. The suite is kept inside script/test's
|
||||
// 30-second budget by sharing one encrypted fixture across the tamper cases
|
||||
// instead of re-encrypting per test.
|
||||
|
||||
const sodium = require("libsodium-wrappers-sumo");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
encryptWithPassword,
|
||||
decryptWithPassword,
|
||||
} = require("../src/shared/vault");
|
||||
|
||||
// A publicly known development phrase. Never fund it.
|
||||
const SECRET = "test test test test test test test test test test test junk";
|
||||
const PASSWORD = "correct horse battery staple";
|
||||
const WRONG_PASSWORD = "correct horse battery stapl";
|
||||
|
||||
const SALT_BYTES = 16;
|
||||
const NONCE_BYTES = 24;
|
||||
const POLY1305_TAG_BYTES = 16;
|
||||
|
||||
const BASE64 = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/_-]+={0,2}$/;
|
||||
|
||||
function b64decode(s) {
|
||||
return sodium.from_base64(s);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A shallow copy with one field replaced, so the shared fixture is never
|
||||
// mutated by a tamper test.
|
||||
function withField(blob, field, value) {
|
||||
return { ...blob, [field]: value };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Flip the low bit of one byte of a base64-encoded field.
|
||||
function flipByte(b64, index) {
|
||||
const bytes = b64decode(b64);
|
||||
bytes[index] ^= 0x01;
|
||||
return sodium.to_base64(bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let vault;
|
||||
|
||||
beforeAll(async () => {
|
||||
await sodium.ready;
|
||||
vault = await encryptWithPassword(SECRET, PASSWORD);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("stored blob shape", () => {
|
||||
test("is exactly the documented { salt, nonce, ciphertext }", () => {
|
||||
expect(Object.keys(vault).sort()).toEqual([
|
||||
"ciphertext",
|
||||
"nonce",
|
||||
"salt",
|
||||
]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("every field is a base64 string", () => {
|
||||
for (const field of ["salt", "nonce", "ciphertext"]) {
|
||||
expect(typeof vault[field]).toBe("string");
|
||||
expect(vault[field]).toMatch(BASE64);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("salt and nonce are full length", () => {
|
||||
expect(b64decode(vault.salt)).toHaveLength(SALT_BYTES);
|
||||
expect(b64decode(vault.nonce)).toHaveLength(NONCE_BYTES);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("ciphertext carries a Poly1305 authentication tag", () => {
|
||||
expect(b64decode(vault.ciphertext)).toHaveLength(
|
||||
SECRET.length + POLY1305_TAG_BYTES,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the blob survives JSON storage unchanged", async () => {
|
||||
const stored = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(vault));
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(stored, PASSWORD)).resolves.toBe(
|
||||
SECRET,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("no plaintext leakage", () => {
|
||||
test("the secret does not appear in the serialized vault", () => {
|
||||
const serialized = JSON.stringify(vault);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(serialized).not.toContain(SECRET);
|
||||
for (const word of new Set(SECRET.split(" "))) {
|
||||
expect(serialized).not.toContain(word);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the ciphertext bytes do not contain the secret bytes", () => {
|
||||
const bytes = Buffer.from(b64decode(vault.ciphertext));
|
||||
|
||||
expect(bytes.includes(Buffer.from(SECRET, "utf8"))).toBe(false);
|
||||
// Not even the first word, which would betray an unencrypted prefix.
|
||||
expect(bytes.includes(Buffer.from("test test", "utf8"))).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the password does not appear in the serialized vault", () => {
|
||||
expect(JSON.stringify(vault)).not.toContain(PASSWORD);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("round trip", () => {
|
||||
test("decrypts back to the original secret", async () => {
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(vault, PASSWORD)).resolves.toBe(
|
||||
SECRET,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("survives a non-ASCII plaintext byte for byte", async () => {
|
||||
const unicode = "recovery phrase é中文\u{1f600}";
|
||||
|
||||
const blob = await encryptWithPassword(unicode, PASSWORD);
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(blob, PASSWORD)).resolves.toBe(
|
||||
unicode,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("an empty password still round-trips and is not a bypass", async () => {
|
||||
const blob = await encryptWithPassword(SECRET, "");
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(blob, "")).resolves.toBe(SECRET);
|
||||
// An empty password must not act as a skeleton key on other vaults,
|
||||
// nor may a real password open an empty-password vault.
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(vault, "")).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(blob, PASSWORD)).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("fresh salt and nonce", () => {
|
||||
test("two encryptions of the same plaintext differ in all three fields", async () => {
|
||||
const second = await encryptWithPassword(SECRET, PASSWORD);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(second.salt).not.toBe(vault.salt);
|
||||
expect(second.nonce).not.toBe(vault.nonce);
|
||||
expect(second.ciphertext).not.toBe(vault.ciphertext);
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(second, PASSWORD)).resolves.toBe(
|
||||
SECRET,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("key derivation cost", () => {
|
||||
// Argon2id's opslimit and memlimit are the whole of the vault's resistance
|
||||
// to an offline attack on a stolen blob, and lowering them breaks nothing
|
||||
// any other test here can see — the suite merely runs faster. So pin them
|
||||
// directly, both to libsodium's INTERACTIVE constants and to the absolute
|
||||
// values those constants must keep meaning.
|
||||
const INTERACTIVE_OPSLIMIT = 2;
|
||||
const INTERACTIVE_MEMLIMIT = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
|
||||
|
||||
test("the interactive constants still mean 2 passes over 64 MiB", () => {
|
||||
expect(sodium.crypto_pwhash_OPSLIMIT_INTERACTIVE).toBe(
|
||||
INTERACTIVE_OPSLIMIT,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(sodium.crypto_pwhash_MEMLIMIT_INTERACTIVE).toBe(
|
||||
INTERACTIVE_MEMLIMIT,
|
||||
);
|
||||
// The floor these must never quietly be swapped for: _MIN is one pass
|
||||
// over 8 KiB, an 8192x reduction in memory cost.
|
||||
expect(sodium.crypto_pwhash_OPSLIMIT_MIN).toBeLessThan(
|
||||
INTERACTIVE_OPSLIMIT,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(sodium.crypto_pwhash_MEMLIMIT_MIN).toBeLessThan(
|
||||
INTERACTIVE_MEMLIMIT,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a key derived at the interactive parameters opens the vault", () => {
|
||||
// Independent of any spy, and of the module's own code path: derive
|
||||
// the key here from the vault's published salt at the interactive cost
|
||||
// and open its ciphertext directly. A vault whose key came from any
|
||||
// other opslimit, memlimit or Argon2id variant yields a different key
|
||||
// and cannot be opened this way.
|
||||
const key = sodium.crypto_pwhash(
|
||||
sodium.crypto_secretbox_KEYBYTES,
|
||||
PASSWORD,
|
||||
b64decode(vault.salt),
|
||||
INTERACTIVE_OPSLIMIT,
|
||||
INTERACTIVE_MEMLIMIT,
|
||||
sodium.crypto_pwhash_ALG_ARGON2ID13,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const opened = sodium.crypto_secretbox_open_easy(
|
||||
b64decode(vault.ciphertext),
|
||||
b64decode(vault.nonce),
|
||||
key,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(sodium.to_string(opened)).toBe(SECRET);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test.each([
|
||||
[
|
||||
"encrypt",
|
||||
async () => {
|
||||
await encryptWithPassword(SECRET, PASSWORD);
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
[
|
||||
"decrypt",
|
||||
async () => {
|
||||
await decryptWithPassword(vault, PASSWORD);
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
])("%s derives exactly one key at the interactive cost", async (_, run) => {
|
||||
const spy = jest.spyOn(sodium, "crypto_pwhash");
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await run();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(spy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
const [keyBytes, , salt, opslimit, memlimit, alg] =
|
||||
spy.mock.calls[0];
|
||||
expect(keyBytes).toBe(sodium.crypto_secretbox_KEYBYTES);
|
||||
expect(salt).toHaveLength(SALT_BYTES);
|
||||
expect(opslimit).toBe(sodium.crypto_pwhash_OPSLIMIT_INTERACTIVE);
|
||||
expect(memlimit).toBe(sodium.crypto_pwhash_MEMLIMIT_INTERACTIVE);
|
||||
expect(alg).toBe(sodium.crypto_pwhash_ALG_ARGON2ID13);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
spy.mockRestore();
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("wrong password", () => {
|
||||
test("is rejected, and rejects cleanly", async () => {
|
||||
// rejects.toThrow asserts a rejected promise, not a synchronous throw
|
||||
// and not an unhandled rejection: the caller can catch this.
|
||||
await expect(
|
||||
decryptWithPassword(vault, WRONG_PASSWORD),
|
||||
).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("returns no plaintext, not even partially", async () => {
|
||||
const result = await decryptWithPassword(vault, WRONG_PASSWORD).catch(
|
||||
(err) => err,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(result).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
|
||||
expect(String(result)).not.toContain("test");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the empty password is rejected on a password-protected vault", async () => {
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(vault, "")).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("tampering", () => {
|
||||
test("a flipped ciphertext bit is rejected by the auth tag", async () => {
|
||||
const tampered = withField(
|
||||
vault,
|
||||
"ciphertext",
|
||||
flipByte(vault.ciphertext, 0),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(tampered, PASSWORD)).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a flipped bit in the authentication tag itself is rejected", async () => {
|
||||
const tagStart = b64decode(vault.ciphertext).length - 1;
|
||||
const tampered = withField(
|
||||
vault,
|
||||
"ciphertext",
|
||||
flipByte(vault.ciphertext, tagStart),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(tampered, PASSWORD)).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a flipped nonce bit is rejected", async () => {
|
||||
const tampered = withField(vault, "nonce", flipByte(vault.nonce, 0));
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(tampered, PASSWORD)).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a flipped salt bit is rejected", async () => {
|
||||
const tampered = withField(vault, "salt", flipByte(vault.salt, 0));
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(tampered, PASSWORD)).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a truncated ciphertext is rejected", async () => {
|
||||
const bytes = b64decode(vault.ciphertext);
|
||||
const tampered = withField(
|
||||
vault,
|
||||
"ciphertext",
|
||||
sodium.to_base64(bytes.slice(0, bytes.length - 4)),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(tampered, PASSWORD)).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a ciphertext shorter than the auth tag is rejected", async () => {
|
||||
const tampered = withField(
|
||||
vault,
|
||||
"ciphertext",
|
||||
sodium.to_base64(b64decode(vault.ciphertext).slice(0, 4)),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(tampered, PASSWORD)).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a truncated nonce is rejected", async () => {
|
||||
const tampered = withField(
|
||||
vault,
|
||||
"nonce",
|
||||
sodium.to_base64(b64decode(vault.nonce).slice(0, NONCE_BYTES - 1)),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(tampered, PASSWORD)).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a ciphertext from another vault is rejected", async () => {
|
||||
const other = await encryptWithPassword("a different secret", PASSWORD);
|
||||
const spliced = withField(vault, "ciphertext", other.ciphertext);
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(decryptWithPassword(spliced, PASSWORD)).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a missing field is rejected rather than decrypted", async () => {
|
||||
for (const field of ["salt", "nonce", "ciphertext"]) {
|
||||
const broken = { ...vault };
|
||||
delete broken[field];
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(
|
||||
decryptWithPassword(broken, PASSWORD),
|
||||
).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -1,410 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Tests for src/shared/wallet.js: the DEBUG build flag as it gates mnemonic
|
||||
// generation (first two describes), and HD key derivation against published
|
||||
// known-answer vectors (rest of the file).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The modules read the __BUILD_DEBUG__ global that esbuild replaces at bundle
|
||||
// time. Under jest the global is absent, which is exactly the release-build
|
||||
// case; the debug-build case is exercised by defining the global and
|
||||
// re-requiring the modules with a fresh registry.
|
||||
|
||||
const WORDS_IN_12_WORD_PHRASE = 12;
|
||||
|
||||
function loadWallet() {
|
||||
const constants = require("../src/shared/constants");
|
||||
const wallet = require("../src/shared/wallet");
|
||||
const log = require("../src/shared/log");
|
||||
return { constants, wallet, log };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe("generateMnemonic in a release build", () => {
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
jest.resetModules();
|
||||
delete globalThis.__BUILD_DEBUG__;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("DEBUG defaults to false when the build define is absent", () => {
|
||||
const { constants } = loadWallet();
|
||||
expect(constants.DEBUG).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("returns fresh, valid 12-word phrases that are not the test phrase", () => {
|
||||
const { constants, wallet } = loadWallet();
|
||||
|
||||
const first = wallet.generateMnemonic();
|
||||
const second = wallet.generateMnemonic();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(first).not.toBe(second);
|
||||
for (const phrase of [first, second]) {
|
||||
expect(wallet.isValidMnemonic(phrase)).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(phrase.split(" ")).toHaveLength(WORDS_IN_12_WORD_PHRASE);
|
||||
expect(phrase).not.toBe(constants.DEBUG_MNEMONIC);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("derives a usable HD wallet from the generated phrase", () => {
|
||||
const { wallet } = loadWallet();
|
||||
|
||||
const { xpub, firstAddress } = wallet.hdWalletFromMnemonic(
|
||||
wallet.generateMnemonic(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(xpub.startsWith("xpub")).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(firstAddress).toMatch(/^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the runtime debug toggle cannot re-enable the test phrase", () => {
|
||||
const { constants, wallet, log } = loadWallet();
|
||||
|
||||
// What the settings easter-egg toggle does at runtime.
|
||||
log.setRuntimeDebug(true);
|
||||
expect(log.isDebug()).toBe(true);
|
||||
|
||||
const phrase = wallet.generateMnemonic();
|
||||
expect(phrase).not.toBe(constants.DEBUG_MNEMONIC);
|
||||
expect(wallet.isValidMnemonic(phrase)).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(phrase).not.toBe(wallet.generateMnemonic());
|
||||
|
||||
log.setRuntimeDebug(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("generateMnemonic in a debug build", () => {
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
jest.resetModules();
|
||||
globalThis.__BUILD_DEBUG__ = true;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
delete globalThis.__BUILD_DEBUG__;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("DEBUG is true and the test phrase is returned", () => {
|
||||
const { constants, wallet } = loadWallet();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(constants.DEBUG).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(wallet.generateMnemonic()).toBe(constants.DEBUG_MNEMONIC);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the test phrase is itself a valid 12-word BIP-39 phrase", () => {
|
||||
const { constants, wallet } = loadWallet();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(wallet.isValidMnemonic(constants.DEBUG_MNEMONIC)).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(constants.DEBUG_MNEMONIC.split(" ")).toHaveLength(
|
||||
WORDS_IN_12_WORD_PHRASE,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Key derivation.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Every address below is a published constant, not something this codebase
|
||||
// produced. Asserting against what the implementation happens to return today
|
||||
// would pass just as happily with the wrong coin type, the wrong path depth or
|
||||
// a non-empty seed passphrase, all of which silently send funds to addresses
|
||||
// no other wallet can recover.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Vector sources:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// VECTOR_PHRASE / VECTOR_ADDRESSES / VECTOR_PRIVATE_KEYS — the standard
|
||||
// development recovery phrase and the first three accounts it yields at
|
||||
// m/44'/60'/0'/0/n with an empty seed passphrase, as published in the
|
||||
// Hardhat and Ganache documentation. Publicly known; never fund it.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// ZERO_ENTROPY_PHRASE / ZERO_ENTROPY_ADDRESS — the BIP-39 all-zero-entropy
|
||||
// phrase (Trezor's official BIP-39 vector set, first entry) and its
|
||||
// m/44'/60'/0'/0/0 Ethereum address with an empty seed passphrase. A second,
|
||||
// independently published phrase so the pin is not one vector deep.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// BIP32_VECTOR_1_XPRV — the master key of BIP-32 test vector 1
|
||||
// (seed 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The two Hardhat facts cross-check each other: VECTOR_PRIVATE_KEYS[n] is the
|
||||
// published key for VECTOR_ADDRESSES[n], so addressFromPrivateKey and the HD
|
||||
// path must meet at the same address from two different directions.
|
||||
|
||||
const { HDNodeWallet, Mnemonic, verifyMessage } = require("ethers");
|
||||
const wallet = require("../src/shared/wallet");
|
||||
const { BIP44_ETH_PATH } = require("../src/shared/constants");
|
||||
|
||||
const VECTOR_PHRASE =
|
||||
"test test test test test test test test test test test junk";
|
||||
|
||||
const VECTOR_ADDRESSES = [
|
||||
"0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266",
|
||||
"0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8",
|
||||
"0x3C44CdDdB6a900fa2b585dd299e03d12FA4293BC",
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
const VECTOR_PRIVATE_KEYS = [
|
||||
"0xac0974bec39a17e36ba4a6b4d238ff944bacb478cbed5efcae784d7bf4f2ff80",
|
||||
"0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d",
|
||||
"0x5de4111afa1a4b94908f83103eb1f1706367c2e68ca870fc3fb9a804cdab365a",
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
const ZERO_ENTROPY_PHRASE =
|
||||
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon " +
|
||||
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about";
|
||||
const ZERO_ENTROPY_ADDRESS = "0x9858EfFD232B4033E47d90003D41EC34EcaEda94";
|
||||
|
||||
const BIP32_VECTOR_1_XPRV =
|
||||
"xprv9s21ZrQH143K3QTDL4LXw2F7HEK3wJUD2nW2nRk4stbPy6cq3jPPqji" +
|
||||
"ChkVvvNKmPGJxWUtg6LnF5kejMRNNU3TGtRBeJgk33yuGBxrMPHi";
|
||||
|
||||
// The master (depth-0) extended private key for a phrase, which is what the
|
||||
// import-an-xprv flow is handed. Built with ethers rather than with the module
|
||||
// under test, so hdWalletFromXprv is not being checked against itself.
|
||||
function masterXprv(phrase, passphrase = "") {
|
||||
return HDNodeWallet.fromSeed(
|
||||
Mnemonic.fromPhrase(phrase, passphrase).computeSeed(),
|
||||
).extendedKey;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe("hdWalletFromMnemonic", () => {
|
||||
test("first address matches the published vector for m/44'/60'/0'/0/0", () => {
|
||||
expect(wallet.hdWalletFromMnemonic(VECTOR_PHRASE).firstAddress).toBe(
|
||||
VECTOR_ADDRESSES[0],
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("second published phrase derives its published address", () => {
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
wallet.hdWalletFromMnemonic(ZERO_ENTROPY_PHRASE).firstAddress,
|
||||
).toBe(ZERO_ENTROPY_ADDRESS);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("returns the account-level xpub, which is watch-only", () => {
|
||||
const { xpub } = wallet.hdWalletFromMnemonic(VECTOR_PHRASE);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(xpub.startsWith("xpub")).toBe(true);
|
||||
// A neutered ethers node exposes no private key at all, so accept
|
||||
// either absent or null rather than pinning which.
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
HDNodeWallet.fromExtendedKey(xpub).privateKey ?? null,
|
||||
).toBeNull();
|
||||
expect(wallet.isValidXprv(xpub)).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the account path is the documented BIP-44 Ethereum path", () => {
|
||||
expect(BIP44_ETH_PATH).toBe("m/44'/60'/0'/0");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects an invalid recovery phrase rather than deriving from it", () => {
|
||||
expect(() => wallet.hdWalletFromMnemonic("not a phrase")).toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("deriveAddressFromXpub", () => {
|
||||
const { xpub } = wallet.hdWalletFromMnemonic(VECTOR_PHRASE);
|
||||
|
||||
test.each([0, 1, 2])(
|
||||
"child %i matches the published vector address",
|
||||
(index) => {
|
||||
expect(wallet.deriveAddressFromXpub(xpub, index)).toBe(
|
||||
VECTOR_ADDRESSES[index],
|
||||
);
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
test("agrees with hdWalletFromMnemonic at index 0", () => {
|
||||
expect(wallet.deriveAddressFromXpub(xpub, 0)).toBe(
|
||||
wallet.hdWalletFromMnemonic(VECTOR_PHRASE).firstAddress,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects garbage instead of returning an address", () => {
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
wallet.deriveAddressFromXpub("xpub-nonsense", 0),
|
||||
).toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("hdWalletFromMnemonic seed passphrase handling", () => {
|
||||
// The vectors above are only reproducible with an empty BIP-39 seed
|
||||
// passphrase. This pins that the empty string reaching
|
||||
// HDNodeWallet.fromPhrase is load-bearing: with any passphrase applied the
|
||||
// published address is unreachable, and a wallet derived that way could
|
||||
// not be restored anywhere else from the phrase alone.
|
||||
test("a non-empty seed passphrase would yield a different address", () => {
|
||||
const withPassphrase = HDNodeWallet.fromPhrase(
|
||||
VECTOR_PHRASE,
|
||||
"TREZOR",
|
||||
BIP44_ETH_PATH,
|
||||
).deriveChild(0).address;
|
||||
|
||||
expect(withPassphrase).not.toBe(VECTOR_ADDRESSES[0]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("hdWalletFromXprv", () => {
|
||||
// hdWalletFromMnemonic derives the absolute path "m/44'/60'/0'/0" while
|
||||
// hdWalletFromXprv derives the relative path "44'/60'/0'/0". For a
|
||||
// depth-0 master key the two are the same derivation; these tests pin that
|
||||
// equivalence to a published address rather than assuming it.
|
||||
test("master xprv for the vector phrase yields the vector address", () => {
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
wallet.hdWalletFromXprv(masterXprv(VECTOR_PHRASE)).firstAddress,
|
||||
).toBe(VECTOR_ADDRESSES[0]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("agrees with hdWalletFromMnemonic on xpub and address", () => {
|
||||
const fromPhrase = wallet.hdWalletFromMnemonic(VECTOR_PHRASE);
|
||||
const fromXprv = wallet.hdWalletFromXprv(masterXprv(VECTOR_PHRASE));
|
||||
|
||||
expect(fromXprv).toEqual(fromPhrase);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("derived xpub generates the same child addresses", () => {
|
||||
const { xpub } = wallet.hdWalletFromXprv(masterXprv(VECTOR_PHRASE));
|
||||
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
[0, 1, 2].map((i) => wallet.deriveAddressFromXpub(xpub, i)),
|
||||
).toEqual(VECTOR_ADDRESSES);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("accepts the BIP-32 test vector 1 master key", () => {
|
||||
const { xpub, firstAddress } =
|
||||
wallet.hdWalletFromXprv(BIP32_VECTOR_1_XPRV);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(xpub.startsWith("xpub")).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(firstAddress).toMatch(/^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects a watch-only xpub", () => {
|
||||
const { xpub } = wallet.hdWalletFromMnemonic(VECTOR_PHRASE);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(() => wallet.hdWalletFromXprv(xpub)).toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects garbage", () => {
|
||||
expect(() => wallet.hdWalletFromXprv("nonsense")).toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("isValidXprv", () => {
|
||||
test.each([
|
||||
["BIP-32 test vector 1 master key", BIP32_VECTOR_1_XPRV, true],
|
||||
["the empty string", "", false],
|
||||
["garbage", "not-a-key", false],
|
||||
["a bare private key", VECTOR_PRIVATE_KEYS[0], false],
|
||||
["a truncated xprv", BIP32_VECTOR_1_XPRV.slice(0, -6), false],
|
||||
["an xprv with an extra character", BIP32_VECTOR_1_XPRV + "a", false],
|
||||
])("%s -> %s", (_name, key, expected) => {
|
||||
expect(wallet.isValidXprv(key)).toBe(expected);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a watch-only xpub is not an xprv", () => {
|
||||
const { xpub } = wallet.hdWalletFromMnemonic(VECTOR_PHRASE);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(wallet.isValidXprv(xpub)).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Skipped: this asserts the correct behaviour, which the code does not
|
||||
// currently have. isValidXprv gates the paste-your-extended-private-key
|
||||
// import in src/popup/views/addWallet.js:215, and it accepts a key with a
|
||||
// one-character typo: ethers' HDNodeWallet.fromExtendedKey skips base58
|
||||
// checksum verification whenever the decoded payload is the usual 82
|
||||
// bytes, which is the whole point of that checksum. Measured on this
|
||||
// vector: changing any one of the last 14 characters passes validation,
|
||||
// and for 9 of those 14 positions the import silently yields a *different*
|
||||
// wallet (e.g. 0x3F334f0a356d6B46B1d70B590E7437D77100d28D instead of
|
||||
// 0x022b971dFF0C43305e691DEd7a14367AF19D6407) with no error shown.
|
||||
// Tracked as https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/210; out of scope
|
||||
// here, which is tests only. Unskip when it is fixed.
|
||||
test.skip("rejects an extended key with a one-character typo", () => {
|
||||
const index = BIP32_VECTOR_1_XPRV.length - 8;
|
||||
const typo =
|
||||
BIP32_VECTOR_1_XPRV.slice(0, index) +
|
||||
(BIP32_VECTOR_1_XPRV[index] === "a" ? "b" : "a") +
|
||||
BIP32_VECTOR_1_XPRV.slice(index + 1);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(wallet.isValidXprv(typo)).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("isValidMnemonic", () => {
|
||||
test.each([
|
||||
["the vector phrase", VECTOR_PHRASE, true],
|
||||
["the BIP-39 zero-entropy phrase", ZERO_ENTROPY_PHRASE, true],
|
||||
[
|
||||
"a 12-word phrase with a bad checksum",
|
||||
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon " +
|
||||
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon",
|
||||
false,
|
||||
],
|
||||
["an 11-word phrase", "abandon ".repeat(10) + "about", false],
|
||||
["a word outside the wordlist", VECTOR_PHRASE + " zzzzzz", false],
|
||||
["the empty string", "", false],
|
||||
["garbage", "correct horse battery staple", false],
|
||||
])("%s -> %s", (_name, phrase, expected) => {
|
||||
expect(wallet.isValidMnemonic(phrase)).toBe(expected);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("addressFromPrivateKey", () => {
|
||||
test.each([0, 1, 2])(
|
||||
"published key %i yields its published address",
|
||||
(index) => {
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
wallet.addressFromPrivateKey(VECTOR_PRIVATE_KEYS[index]),
|
||||
).toBe(VECTOR_ADDRESSES[index]);
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects a key of the wrong length", () => {
|
||||
expect(() => wallet.addressFromPrivateKey("0xdeadbeef")).toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("rejects the empty string", () => {
|
||||
expect(() => wallet.addressFromPrivateKey("")).toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("getSignerForAddress", () => {
|
||||
test.each([0, 1, 2])("hd wallet, address index %i", (index) => {
|
||||
const signer = wallet.getSignerForAddress(
|
||||
{ type: "hd" },
|
||||
index,
|
||||
VECTOR_PHRASE,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(signer.address).toBe(VECTOR_ADDRESSES[index]);
|
||||
expect(signer.privateKey).toBe(VECTOR_PRIVATE_KEYS[index]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test.each([0, 1, 2])("xprv wallet, address index %i", (index) => {
|
||||
const signer = wallet.getSignerForAddress(
|
||||
{ type: "xprv" },
|
||||
index,
|
||||
masterXprv(VECTOR_PHRASE),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(signer.address).toBe(VECTOR_ADDRESSES[index]);
|
||||
expect(signer.privateKey).toBe(VECTOR_PRIVATE_KEYS[index]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("single private key ignores the address index", () => {
|
||||
for (const index of [0, 1, 2]) {
|
||||
const signer = wallet.getSignerForAddress(
|
||||
{ type: "privkey" },
|
||||
index,
|
||||
VECTOR_PRIVATE_KEYS[1],
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(signer.address).toBe(VECTOR_ADDRESSES[1]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the returned signer signs recoverably as the expected address", async () => {
|
||||
const signer = wallet.getSignerForAddress(
|
||||
{ type: "hd" },
|
||||
1,
|
||||
VECTOR_PHRASE,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const message = "AutistMask derivation test";
|
||||
|
||||
const signature = await signer.signMessage(message);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(verifyMessage(message, signature)).toBe(VECTOR_ADDRESSES[1]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
|
||||
const {
|
||||
removeWalletFromState,
|
||||
broadcastActiveChanged,
|
||||
} = require("../src/shared/walletDelete");
|
||||
|
||||
// Fixed addresses — never used for anything but these tests.
|
||||
const A0 = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
|
||||
const A1 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
|
||||
const B0 = "0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599";
|
||||
const C0 = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
|
||||
|
||||
function wallet(name, addresses) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
name,
|
||||
addresses: addresses.map((address) => ({ address })),
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A three-wallet state; wallet A is an HD wallet with two addresses.
|
||||
function makeState(overrides = {}) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
hasWallet: true,
|
||||
wallets: [wallet("A", [A0, A1]), wallet("B", [B0]), wallet("C", [C0])],
|
||||
selectedWallet: 0,
|
||||
selectedAddress: 0,
|
||||
activeAddress: A0,
|
||||
allowedSites: {
|
||||
[A0]: ["a.example"],
|
||||
[A1]: ["b.example"],
|
||||
[B0]: ["c.example"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
deniedSites: { [A1]: ["d.example"], [C0]: ["e.example"] },
|
||||
...overrides,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe("removeWalletFromState", () => {
|
||||
test("deleting the last wallet clears hasWallet", () => {
|
||||
const state = makeState({
|
||||
wallets: [wallet("A", [A0])],
|
||||
allowedSites: { [A0]: ["a.example"] },
|
||||
deniedSites: {},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(state, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(state.hasWallet).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(state.wallets).toEqual([]);
|
||||
expect(state.selectedWallet).toBeNull();
|
||||
expect(state.selectedAddress).toBeNull();
|
||||
expect(state.activeAddress).toBeNull();
|
||||
expect(activeAddressChanged).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("deleting a non-selected wallet leaves the selection intact", () => {
|
||||
const state = makeState({
|
||||
selectedWallet: 2,
|
||||
selectedAddress: 0,
|
||||
activeAddress: C0,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(state, 1);
|
||||
|
||||
// Wallet C moved from index 2 to index 1 by the splice.
|
||||
expect(state.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual(["A", "C"]);
|
||||
expect(state.selectedWallet).toBe(1);
|
||||
expect(state.selectedAddress).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(state.activeAddress).toBe(C0);
|
||||
expect(activeAddressChanged).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(state.hasWallet).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("deleting a wallet after the selection does not shift it", () => {
|
||||
const state = makeState({
|
||||
selectedWallet: 1,
|
||||
selectedAddress: 0,
|
||||
activeAddress: B0,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(state, 2);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(state.selectedWallet).toBe(1);
|
||||
expect(state.activeAddress).toBe(B0);
|
||||
expect(activeAddressChanged).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("deleting the active wallet falls back to the first remaining address", () => {
|
||||
const state = makeState({
|
||||
selectedWallet: 0,
|
||||
selectedAddress: 1,
|
||||
activeAddress: A1,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(state, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(state.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual(["B", "C"]);
|
||||
expect(state.selectedWallet).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(state.selectedAddress).toBe(0);
|
||||
expect(state.activeAddress).toBe(B0);
|
||||
expect(activeAddressChanged).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(state.hasWallet).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("site permissions are dropped for every address of the wallet", () => {
|
||||
const state = makeState();
|
||||
|
||||
removeWalletFromState(state, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["c.example"] });
|
||||
expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["e.example"] });
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("broadcastActiveChanged", () => {
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
delete global.chrome;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("sends AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED to the background", () => {
|
||||
const sendMessage = jest.fn();
|
||||
global.chrome = { runtime: { sendMessage } };
|
||||
|
||||
broadcastActiveChanged();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(sendMessage).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
|
||||
type: "AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED",
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -2547,11 +2547,6 @@ pkg-dir@^4.2.0:
|
||||
dependencies:
|
||||
find-up "^4.0.0"
|
||||
|
||||
playwright-core@1.56.0:
|
||||
version "1.56.0"
|
||||
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/playwright-core/-/playwright-core-1.56.0.tgz#14b40ea436551b0bcefe19c5bfb8d1804c83739c"
|
||||
integrity sha512-1SXl7pMfemAMSDn5rkPeZljxOCYAmQnYLBTExuh6E8USHXGSX3dx6lYZN/xPpTz1vimXmPA9CDnILvmJaB8aSQ==
|
||||
|
||||
pngjs@^5.0.0:
|
||||
version "5.0.0"
|
||||
resolved "https://registry.npmjs.org/pngjs/-/pngjs-5.0.0.tgz"
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user