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514d025c56
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 514d025c56 |
45
README.md
45
README.md
@@ -538,27 +538,6 @@ Both are click-copyable. Truncating to 4 decimals in summary views is acceptable
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for scannability, but the detail view must never discard precision — it is the
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one place the user can always use to verify exact details.
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#### Partial USD totals
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Prices are fetched for the top 25 tokens only, so an address can hold assets the
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extension has no price for. Worth zero and worth an unknown amount are different
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facts and are never collapsed into one number. `getAddressValue()` in
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`src/shared/prices.js` returns `{ usd, partial }` — the value of the priced
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holdings, and whether an unpriced holding was left out of it — and every screen
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renders it through `formatAddressTotal()`, so the wording cannot drift:
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- Nothing knowable (testnet, or before the first price fetch): no total line.
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- Everything priced: `Total: $5,500.00`.
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- Part priced: `Total: $3,000.00 plus unpriced tokens` — the figure is real as
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far as it goes and is kept, named as a floor rather than the total.
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- Nothing priced but something held: `Total: unpriced tokens only`. No figure,
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because the only figure available would be the `$0.00` sum of an empty set,
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and on the address-removal confirmation that sits directly under "This address
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holds a balance."
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The per-token balance lines are unaffected: each shows its quantity, and a USD
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column that is blank for a token with no price.
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#### Language & Labeling
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All user-facing text avoids unnecessary jargon wherever possible:
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@@ -694,9 +673,7 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
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- **When**: At least one wallet exists. This is the root screen.
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- **Elements**:
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- Active address ETH balance (large) + USD value in parentheses
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- "Total:" USD value across ETH and every token shown for the active
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address, written by `formatAddressTotal()` — see
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[Partial USD totals](#partial-usd-totals)
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- "Total:" USD value across ETH and every token shown for the active address
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- Active address (color dot, full address, etherscan link, tap to copy)
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- Send / Receive quick-action buttons, both acting on the active address
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- ETH/USD price display
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@@ -758,7 +735,7 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
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- Title: "Wallet Name — Address N"
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- ENS name (if resolved, bold above the address)
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- Full address (color dot, etherscan link, tap to copy)
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- USD total for address (see [Partial USD totals](#partial-usd-totals))
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- USD total for address
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- Balance list: ETH + the ERC-20 tokens shown for this address (4 decimal
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places, USD inline). Each balance row is clickable → **AddressToken**
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- Send / Receive / + Token buttons and a "···" menu button
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@@ -1124,13 +1101,11 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
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xprv wallet has no recovery phrase to re-import.
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- A warning when the address holds anything, ETH or any tracked ERC-20,
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followed by the holdings themselves via `balanceLinesForAddress()` and the
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USD total via `formatAddressTotal()` (see
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[Partial USD totals](#partial-usd-totals)). The sentence names no figure
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of its own: the lines round to four decimals, so a sentence built from a
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rounded number would report `0.0000 ETH` for an address holding real
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money. The predicate is `addressHoldsFunds()` in
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`src/popup/views/helpers.js`, unrounded and token-aware. A balance is a
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warning, never a refusal.
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USD total via `getAddressValueUsd()`. The sentence names no figure of its
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own: the lines round to four decimals, so a sentence built from a rounded
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number would report `0.0000 ETH` for an address holding real money. The
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predicate is `addressHoldsFunds()` in `src/popup/views/helpers.js`,
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unrounded and token-aware. A balance is a warning, never a refusal.
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- The rule that a wallet always keeps at least one address, and that
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removing the last one means deleting the wallet from Settings
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- Error line
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@@ -1200,11 +1175,7 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
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opening the window, so the screen shows a complete transaction and the signed
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artifact can be compared with it field for field. A request that cannot be
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populated — unreachable node, reverting gas estimate — opens no window and is
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failed back to the site. Only one transaction approval exists at a time:
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populating fixes the nonce, so a second `eth_sendTransaction` arriving while
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one is unanswered is refused with EIP-1193 code `-32002` rather than being
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populated at the same nonce. It opens no window and takes no nonce, and the
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site can send it again once the pending one is answered.
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failed back to the site.
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- **Elements**:
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- "Transaction Request" heading
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- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
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41
TODO.md
41
TODO.md
@@ -58,22 +58,6 @@ undefined identifiers, which is how
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screen's container holds at 20px with the following section at the same offset
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for the old string, the new string and the empty reserved state
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([#265](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/265)).
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- 2026-08-17: An address total no longer reports `$0.00` for holdings it cannot
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price. Prices exist for the top 25 tokens only, so the priced-only sum was
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printed as the total and an address holding nothing but unpriced ERC-20s was
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shown as worth nothing — directly under "This address holds a balance." on the
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address-removal confirmation. `getAddressValue()` in `src/shared/prices.js`
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now returns `{ usd, partial }`, keeping worth-zero and worth-an-unknown-amount
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apart the way an absent `holders_count` is kept apart from a count of zero,
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and every screen renders it through the one `formatAddressTotal()`: the figure
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when it covers everything, the figure marked `plus unpriced tokens` when it
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covers part, and `Total: unpriced tokens only` when it would cover nothing.
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Home, AddressDetail and the removal confirmation all read it, and
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`getWalletValue()`/`getTotalValue()` carry `partial` up. Covered by
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`tests/addressValue.test.js` — the only-unpriced, genuinely-zero and
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fully-priced cases at the helper and at both call sites that return their
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markup — demonstrated failing first
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([#261](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/261)).
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- 2026-08-17: `README.md` no longer advertises a defect the wallet does not
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have. The End-to-End Tests section listed the EIP-1193 code being dropped in
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the last hop into the page as a standing limit of the dApp coverage; that
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@@ -83,31 +67,6 @@ undefined identifiers, which is how
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stubbed RPC and the unobservable toolbar popup — were checked against the
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current `src/content/inpage.js` and `tests/e2e/` and left as they are
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([#285](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/285)).
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- 2026-08-17: One transaction approval at a time. Populating in the background
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before the window opens is what makes the displayed object the verified
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object, and it also fixes the nonce: two `eth_sendTransaction` calls populated
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concurrently took the same nonce from a node that had seen neither broadcast,
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and the second could then never be sent, because the only way to give it a
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fresh nonce is to populate it again after the user has read the old one off
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the screen. A second request is now refused with EIP-1193 `-32002` while one
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is unanswered — the slot is taken immediately before population, after the
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authorization checks, so no second nonce is allocated, no second window opens,
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and a page the wallet refuses anyway cannot hold the slot against the
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connected site. The slot is freed at `settleApproval()`, the single point an
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approval is retired, so every path that ends an approval ends the hold with
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it; an approval whose window is gone and whose attempt has failed is settled
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there rather than left waiting on a window that no longer exists, and an
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approval window that could not be opened at all is answered with `-32603`
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instead of holding the page's promise open. Signature approvals are not gated,
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consuming no nonce. A collision that does happen is also reported accurately
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now: a broadcast the node refused for the nonce, and an approval carrying a
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nonce this worker has already broadcast for that address on that chain (caught
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before the node is asked at all), both say the transaction did not reach the
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network and to send it again, instead of warning that it may have sent. The
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record is keyed by chain as well as address, because nonce spaces are per
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chain and low nonces overlap across them. `already known` deliberately keeps
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the ambiguous wording, because a node that says it has the transaction has it
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([#271](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/271)).
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- 2026-08-14: The parts of the
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[#150](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/150) and
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[#151](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/151) definition of done the
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@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ const {
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TX_STAGE_VERIFY,
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TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,
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TX_STAGE_INFLIGHT,
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TX_STAGE_NONCE,
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} = require("../shared/approvalVerify");
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const { prepareApprovalTx } = require("../shared/approvalTx");
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const {
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@@ -58,114 +57,6 @@ const connectedSites = {};
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// Pending approval requests: { id: { origin, hostname, resolve } }
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const pendingApprovals = {};
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||||
// One transaction approval at a time, wallet-wide.
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//
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// The transaction a site asks for is populated before its approval window
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||||
// opens, so that the object the user is shown is the object the signed
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// artifact is verified against. Populating fixes the nonce. Two requests
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||||
// populated concurrently therefore take the SAME nonce — the node reports the
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// same pending count to both, neither having been broadcast — and whichever is
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||||
// broadcast second is refused by the network for a nonce it can never be
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// re-signed at, because re-signing it would mean signing something other than
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// what was displayed.
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//
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||||
// So the second request is refused while the first is unanswered. It is
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// refused before anything is populated, so no second nonce is allocated at
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||||
// all, and while the page is still waiting with nothing on screen. The
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// alternatives were considered and rejected in
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// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/271: populating again at Confirm
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||||
// puts a nonce on screen that is not the nonce that gets signed, and
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||||
// allocating around in-flight approvals makes the wallet's own bookkeeping the
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||||
// authority on a nonce the network has not accepted, which an abandoned
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||||
// approval then leaves a hole in.
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//
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||||
// Sign approvals are not gated: a signature consumes no nonce.
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||||
//
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||||
// The slot is null when free, and otherwise the handle of the request holding
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||||
// it. Once that request has raised its approval the handle carries the
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||||
// approval's id, so that retiring the approval frees the slot: every exit from
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||||
// pendingApprovals goes through settleApproval(), which makes that one hook
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// complete. The holder's own finally is the backstop for the interval before
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// the approval exists.
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||||
let txApprovalSlot = null;
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||||
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||||
// EIP-1474 "resource unavailable": the standard code for a request that is
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// refused because another one is already pending.
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||||
const TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE = -32002;
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||||
|
||||
// True at every moment this can be sent: the slot is taken immediately before
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||||
// the transaction is populated, so the other request is either being prepared
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||||
// or on screen. It does not claim the other one is displayed yet, because for
|
||||
// the length of one network round trip it is not.
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||||
const TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE =
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"AutistMask handles one transaction at a time, and another one is" +
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||||
" already in progress, so this one was not sent. Please finish that" +
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||||
" transaction, then send this one again.";
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||||
|
||||
// Take the slot, or refuse. Nothing awaits between the test and the set, so
|
||||
// two requests that reach this in the same tick cannot both pass it — the
|
||||
// position of the call in the handler is irrelevant to that, which is why it
|
||||
// sits after the authorization checks. A page the wallet is going to refuse
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||||
// anyway must not be able to take the slot away from the connected site.
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||||
function reserveTxApprovalSlot() {
|
||||
if (txApprovalSlot) return null;
|
||||
txApprovalSlot = { approvalId: null };
|
||||
return txApprovalSlot;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Free the slot, if this handle is still the one holding it.
|
||||
function releaseTxApprovalSlot(handle) {
|
||||
if (handle && txApprovalSlot !== handle) return;
|
||||
txApprovalSlot = null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Free the slot held on behalf of a retired approval. Called from
|
||||
// settleApproval() for every approval, and a no-op for the ones the slot was
|
||||
// not taken for.
|
||||
function releaseTxApprovalSlotFor(approvalId) {
|
||||
if (txApprovalSlot && txApprovalSlot.approvalId === approvalId) {
|
||||
txApprovalSlot = null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Nonces this worker has already handed to the node, per chain and address.
|
||||
// This is the wallet's own knowledge that a nonce is spent, and it is checked
|
||||
// before a broadcast rather than after: a node's pending count can lag a
|
||||
// transaction it has itself just accepted, and a request populated inside that
|
||||
// window would otherwise be signed and sent at a nonce this wallet has already
|
||||
// used.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The chain is part of the key because nonce spaces are per chain and the
|
||||
// wallet switches networks. Without it a nonce spent on one chain would refuse
|
||||
// that nonce on every other chain — and low nonces overlap across chains as a
|
||||
// matter of course, so the refusal would be both routine and false.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The record dies with the worker, which is correct rather than merely
|
||||
// convenient: after a restart the node's count is the only answer available,
|
||||
// and a transaction of this wallet's that the node has forgotten is one the
|
||||
// user does want to be able to send again.
|
||||
const broadcastNonces = {};
|
||||
|
||||
function broadcastNoncesFor(chainId, address) {
|
||||
const key =
|
||||
String(chainId).toLowerCase() +
|
||||
":" +
|
||||
String(address || "").toLowerCase();
|
||||
if (!broadcastNonces[key]) broadcastNonces[key] = new Set();
|
||||
return broadcastNonces[key];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// An approved transaction's nonce as a decimal string, or null if it cannot be
|
||||
// read as a number. Verification refuses an unreadable nonce before this is
|
||||
// ever reached; null here only keeps the record from holding junk.
|
||||
function approvedNonce(approvedTx) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
return BigInt(approvedTx.nonce).toString();
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function getState() {
|
||||
const result = await storageApi.get("autistmask");
|
||||
return (
|
||||
@@ -257,41 +148,11 @@ function settleApproval(id, result, options) {
|
||||
const holdsClaim = !!(options && options.holdsClaim);
|
||||
if (approval.attemptInFlight && !holdsClaim) return false;
|
||||
delete pendingApprovals[id];
|
||||
// The transaction-approval slot is held for exactly as long as the
|
||||
// approval it was taken for is alive, and this is the one place an
|
||||
// approval stops being alive.
|
||||
releaseTxApprovalSlotFor(id);
|
||||
approval.resolve(result);
|
||||
resetPopupUrl();
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// What a pending approval resolves to when it is given up on rather than
|
||||
// answered: the window was closed, or could not be opened at all. A tx or sign
|
||||
// approval answers the requesting page in EIP-1193 shape; a site-connection
|
||||
// approval answers the connection handler in its own.
|
||||
function abandonedResult(approval, code, message) {
|
||||
if (approval.type === "tx" || approval.type === "sign") {
|
||||
return { error: { code, message } };
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { approved: false, remember: false };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A window the user closed without answering is a refusal by the user, which
|
||||
// is 4001 and the wording every other rejection path already uses.
|
||||
const APPROVAL_REJECTED_CODE = 4001;
|
||||
const APPROVAL_REJECTED_MESSAGE = "User rejected the request.";
|
||||
|
||||
// The window could not be opened, so the user was never asked. This is the
|
||||
// wallet failing, not the user refusing, so it does not claim to be a
|
||||
// rejection: -32603 is the JSON-RPC code for the wallet's own internal
|
||||
// failure, and the page is told plainly that nothing was shown.
|
||||
const APPROVAL_WINDOW_FAILED_CODE = -32603;
|
||||
|
||||
const APPROVAL_WINDOW_FAILED_MESSAGE =
|
||||
"AutistMask could not open its approval window, so this request was not" +
|
||||
" shown to you and nothing was sent.";
|
||||
|
||||
// Take exclusive hold of a pending approval for one attempt, or refuse.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// An approval that failed retryably has to stay in pendingApprovals, so its
|
||||
@@ -311,26 +172,8 @@ function claimApproval(approval) {
|
||||
|
||||
// Release an approval whose attempt failed in a way the user can retry.
|
||||
// Nothing was broadcast, so the next attempt may claim it.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Unless the window it would be retried in is already gone. The user closed it
|
||||
// while the attempt was running and settleApproval() declined then, correctly,
|
||||
// because the attempt still owned the approval; the attempt has now failed, so
|
||||
// nothing owns it and nothing can reach it. Left standing it would hold the
|
||||
// requesting page's promise open forever and, with it, the transaction
|
||||
// approval slot. It is settled here as the rejection the closed window
|
||||
// already meant.
|
||||
function releaseApproval(approval) {
|
||||
approval.attemptInFlight = false;
|
||||
if (approval.windowClosed) {
|
||||
settleApproval(
|
||||
approval.id,
|
||||
abandonedResult(
|
||||
approval,
|
||||
APPROVAL_REJECTED_CODE,
|
||||
APPROVAL_REJECTED_MESSAGE,
|
||||
),
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Open approval in a separate popup window.
|
||||
@@ -357,36 +200,10 @@ function openApprovalWindow(id) {
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
windowsApi.create(opts, (win) => {
|
||||
const approval = pendingApprovals[id];
|
||||
if (!approval) {
|
||||
// Settled while the window was opening — an address switch,
|
||||
// say. Nothing is waiting on it, and a window showing an
|
||||
// approval that no longer exists is not left on screen.
|
||||
if (win) {
|
||||
windowsApi.remove(win.id, () => {
|
||||
if (runtime.lastError) {
|
||||
// window already closed
|
||||
pendingApprovals[id].windowId = win.id;
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!win) {
|
||||
// No window means no way to ever answer this approval, and an
|
||||
// approval nothing can answer holds the requesting page's
|
||||
// promise open forever. Settle it now instead.
|
||||
settleApproval(
|
||||
id,
|
||||
abandonedResult(
|
||||
approval,
|
||||
APPROVAL_WINDOW_FAILED_CODE,
|
||||
APPROVAL_WINDOW_FAILED_MESSAGE,
|
||||
),
|
||||
);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
approval.windowId = win.id;
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -395,7 +212,7 @@ function openApprovalWindow(id) {
|
||||
function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
|
||||
return new Promise((resolve) => {
|
||||
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
|
||||
pendingApprovals[id] = { id, origin, hostname, resolve };
|
||||
pendingApprovals[id] = { origin, hostname, resolve };
|
||||
|
||||
if (actionApi && typeof actionApi.openPopup === "function") {
|
||||
actionApi.setPopup({
|
||||
@@ -426,13 +243,10 @@ function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
|
||||
// it is pinned here rather than read again at signing time — an address switch
|
||||
// between approval and signing must refuse, not sign from an account this
|
||||
// screen never named.
|
||||
// `slot` is the transaction-approval slot its caller holds. Handing the
|
||||
// approval's id to it is what makes retiring the approval free the slot.
|
||||
function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
|
||||
function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom) {
|
||||
return new Promise((resolve) => {
|
||||
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
|
||||
pendingApprovals[id] = {
|
||||
id,
|
||||
origin,
|
||||
hostname,
|
||||
approvedTx,
|
||||
@@ -440,7 +254,6 @@ function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
|
||||
resolve,
|
||||
type: "tx",
|
||||
};
|
||||
if (slot) slot.approvalId = id;
|
||||
|
||||
openApprovalWindow(id);
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -454,7 +267,6 @@ function requestSignApproval(origin, hostname, signParams, approvedFrom) {
|
||||
return new Promise((resolve) => {
|
||||
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
|
||||
pendingApprovals[id] = {
|
||||
id,
|
||||
origin,
|
||||
hostname,
|
||||
signParams,
|
||||
@@ -773,30 +585,10 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (method === "eth_sendTransaction") {
|
||||
return await handleSendTransaction(params, origin);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Proxy safe read-only methods to the RPC node
|
||||
if (PROXY_METHODS.includes(method)) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const result = await proxyRpc(method, params);
|
||||
return { result };
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
return { error: { message: e.message } };
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return { error: { message: "Unsupported method: " + method } };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The body of eth_sendTransaction, from the connection check through to the
|
||||
// user's decision. It takes the single transaction-approval slot once it knows
|
||||
// it is going to populate a transaction, and holds it until the requesting
|
||||
// page has its answer.
|
||||
async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
|
||||
const s = await getState();
|
||||
const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
|
||||
if (!activeAddress) return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
|
||||
if (!activeAddress)
|
||||
return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
|
||||
|
||||
const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
|
||||
const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
|
||||
@@ -818,23 +610,6 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Everything above refuses without populating anything, so the slot is
|
||||
// taken here rather than at the top of the handler: a page the wallet was
|
||||
// never going to serve must not be able to hold the slot and make the
|
||||
// connected site's own transaction fail as "already in progress". The
|
||||
// reservation is atomic because nothing awaits between its test and its
|
||||
// set, not because of where it sits.
|
||||
const slot = reserveTxApprovalSlot();
|
||||
if (!slot) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
error: {
|
||||
code: TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
|
||||
message: TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
// Populate here, before any window opens, so that the transaction the
|
||||
// user is shown is a complete one and is the same object the signed
|
||||
// artifact is checked against. A failure raises no approval at all and
|
||||
@@ -869,17 +644,22 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
|
||||
hostname,
|
||||
approvedTx,
|
||||
activeAddress,
|
||||
slot,
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (decision.error) return { error: decision.error };
|
||||
return { result: decision.txHash };
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
// Retiring the approval has normally freed the slot already, through
|
||||
// settleApproval(); this covers the paths that return before an
|
||||
// approval exists at all, and frees nothing if another request has
|
||||
// since taken the slot.
|
||||
releaseTxApprovalSlot(slot);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Proxy safe read-only methods to the RPC node
|
||||
if (PROXY_METHODS.includes(method)) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const result = await proxyRpc(method, params);
|
||||
return { result };
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
return { error: { message: e.message } };
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return { error: { message: "Unsupported method: " + method } };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Broadcast chainChanged to all tabs when the network is switched.
|
||||
@@ -914,11 +694,15 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
|
||||
// being signed and broadcast right now, and neither rejecting it to the
|
||||
// page nor closing the window it is reporting into is survivable.
|
||||
for (const [id, approval] of Object.entries(pendingApprovals)) {
|
||||
const rejection = abandonedResult(
|
||||
approval,
|
||||
APPROVAL_REJECTED_CODE,
|
||||
APPROVAL_REJECTED_MESSAGE,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const rejection =
|
||||
approval.type === "tx" || approval.type === "sign"
|
||||
? {
|
||||
error: {
|
||||
code: 4001,
|
||||
message: "User rejected the request.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
: { approved: false, remember: false };
|
||||
if (!settleApproval(id, rejection)) continue;
|
||||
if (approval.windowId) {
|
||||
windowsApi.remove(approval.windowId, () => {
|
||||
@@ -1047,19 +831,21 @@ startBackgroundJobs();
|
||||
// verify and broadcast it is waiting on, so a user closing an apparently-hung
|
||||
// window is an ordinary event with an attempt already in flight behind it.
|
||||
// settleApproval() refuses those, which leaves the attempt to report its real
|
||||
// outcome to the page — and the window is recorded as gone, so that an attempt
|
||||
// which then fails retryably settles instead of waiting in a window that no
|
||||
// longer exists.
|
||||
// outcome to the page.
|
||||
if (windowsApi && windowsApi.onRemoved) {
|
||||
windowsApi.onRemoved.addListener((windowId) => {
|
||||
for (const [id, approval] of Object.entries(pendingApprovals)) {
|
||||
if (approval.windowId !== windowId) continue;
|
||||
const rejection = abandonedResult(
|
||||
approval,
|
||||
APPROVAL_REJECTED_CODE,
|
||||
APPROVAL_REJECTED_MESSAGE,
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (!settleApproval(id, rejection)) approval.windowClosed = true;
|
||||
const rejection =
|
||||
approval.type === "tx" || approval.type === "sign"
|
||||
? {
|
||||
error: {
|
||||
code: 4001,
|
||||
message: "User rejected the request.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
: { approved: false, remember: false };
|
||||
settleApproval(id, rejection);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1173,7 +959,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
|
||||
sendResponse({
|
||||
error: outcome.error,
|
||||
retryable: outcome.retryable,
|
||||
stage: outcome.stage,
|
||||
stage: TX_STAGE_SIGN,
|
||||
});
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1189,15 +975,8 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
(async () => {
|
||||
// The chain this attempt is on, read once. Verification below
|
||||
// refuses an artifact signed for any other chain, and the nonce
|
||||
// record is both consulted and written under this one, so a
|
||||
// network switch part-way through cannot make the check and the
|
||||
// record disagree about which chain the nonce was spent on.
|
||||
let chainId;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await loadState();
|
||||
chainId = currentNetwork().chainId;
|
||||
const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
|
||||
// An address switch between approval and signing refuses. The
|
||||
// approval named one account; signing from whichever account
|
||||
@@ -1220,7 +999,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
|
||||
msg.rawSignedTx,
|
||||
approval.approvedTx,
|
||||
approval.approvedFrom,
|
||||
chainId,
|
||||
currentNetwork().chainId,
|
||||
);
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
// A signed transaction that is not the approved one is not
|
||||
@@ -1240,31 +1019,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
|
||||
sendResponse({
|
||||
error: outcome.error,
|
||||
retryable: outcome.retryable,
|
||||
stage: outcome.stage,
|
||||
});
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A nonce this worker has already broadcast for this address on
|
||||
// this chain. The node is not asked: it has answered once already,
|
||||
// and the wallet holding the receipt of that answer is what makes
|
||||
// this failure one the user can be told did not reach the network.
|
||||
// A nonce spent on another chain is not spent here — the chains
|
||||
// count separately, and refusing across them would block ordinary
|
||||
// use with a message that is not true.
|
||||
const nonce = approvedNonce(approval.approvedTx);
|
||||
const spent = broadcastNoncesFor(chainId, approval.approvedFrom);
|
||||
if (nonce !== null && spent.has(nonce)) {
|
||||
const outcome = describeTxFailure(TX_STAGE_NONCE, null);
|
||||
settleApproval(
|
||||
msg.id,
|
||||
{ error: { message: outcome.error } },
|
||||
{ holdsClaim: true },
|
||||
);
|
||||
sendResponse({
|
||||
error: outcome.error,
|
||||
retryable: outcome.retryable,
|
||||
stage: outcome.stage,
|
||||
stage: TX_STAGE_VERIFY,
|
||||
});
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1272,7 +1027,6 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
|
||||
const tx = await provider.broadcastTransaction(msg.rawSignedTx);
|
||||
if (nonce !== null) spent.add(nonce);
|
||||
settleApproval(
|
||||
msg.id,
|
||||
{ txHash: tx.hash },
|
||||
@@ -1285,11 +1039,6 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
|
||||
// tell a transaction that never left from one already in the
|
||||
// mempool. The page has been given its outcome for this
|
||||
// request; a second attempt would report a second one.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Unless the node blamed the nonce, which is the one answer
|
||||
// that says plainly it did not take the transaction:
|
||||
// describeTxFailure() reclassifies that, and the stage it
|
||||
// returns is the one reported.
|
||||
const outcome = describeTxFailure(TX_STAGE_BROADCAST, e);
|
||||
settleApproval(
|
||||
msg.id,
|
||||
@@ -1299,7 +1048,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
|
||||
sendResponse({
|
||||
error: outcome.error,
|
||||
retryable: outcome.retryable,
|
||||
stage: outcome.stage,
|
||||
stage: TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
})();
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ const {
|
||||
pushCurrentView,
|
||||
} = require("./helpers");
|
||||
const { state, currentAddress, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { formatAddressTotal, getAddressValue } = require("../../shared/prices");
|
||||
const { formatUsd, getAddressValueUsd } = require("../../shared/prices");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
fetchRecentTransactions,
|
||||
filterTransactions,
|
||||
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ function show() {
|
||||
});
|
||||
$("address-line").dataset.full = addr.address;
|
||||
attachCopyHandlers($("address-line"));
|
||||
const usdTotal = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));
|
||||
const usdTotal = formatUsd(getAddressValueUsd(addr));
|
||||
$("address-usd-total").innerHTML = usdTotal || " ";
|
||||
const ensEl = $("address-ens");
|
||||
// ENS is now shown inside renderAddressHtml, hide the separate element
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,7 +18,11 @@ const {
|
||||
} = require("./helpers");
|
||||
const { state, currentAddress, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS, resolveSymbol } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
|
||||
const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
formatUsd,
|
||||
getPrice,
|
||||
getAddressValueUsd,
|
||||
} = require("../../shared/prices");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
fetchRecentTransactions,
|
||||
filterTransactions,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ const {
|
||||
addressHoldsFunds,
|
||||
balanceLinesForAddress,
|
||||
} = require("./helpers");
|
||||
const { formatAddressTotal, getAddressValue } = require("../../shared/prices");
|
||||
const { formatUsd, getAddressValueUsd } = require("../../shared/prices");
|
||||
const { walletHasRecoveryPhrase } = require("../../shared/wallet");
|
||||
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
@@ -84,16 +84,16 @@ function recoveryPathText(wallet) {
|
||||
// own: the rendered lines round to four decimals, so a sentence built from a
|
||||
// rounded number would report "0.0000 ETH" for an address holding real money.
|
||||
// The lines below it carry the amounts, in the same format as Home and
|
||||
// AddressDetail, followed by the USD total when there is one to give — no
|
||||
// total line at all on testnet or before the first price fetch, and no figure
|
||||
// when every holding here is one with no price, since "$0.00" directly under
|
||||
// "This address holds a balance." is a contradiction.
|
||||
// AddressDetail, followed by the USD total when prices are known (null on
|
||||
// testnet and before the first price fetch, where the line is left off rather
|
||||
// than printed as $0.00).
|
||||
function balanceWarningHtml(addr) {
|
||||
if (!addressHoldsFunds(addr)) return " ";
|
||||
const line = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));
|
||||
const total = line
|
||||
? `<div class="text-xs text-muted mt-1">${line}</div>`
|
||||
: "";
|
||||
const usd = getAddressValueUsd(addr);
|
||||
const total =
|
||||
usd === null
|
||||
? ""
|
||||
: `<div class="text-xs text-muted mt-1">Total: ${formatUsd(usd)}</div>`;
|
||||
return (
|
||||
`<p class="mb-1">This address holds a balance. Removing it does not ` +
|
||||
`move or spend anything; the balance stays at the address.</p>` +
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
|
||||
// Shared DOM helpers used by all views.
|
||||
|
||||
const { isDebug } = require("../../shared/log");
|
||||
const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
formatUsd,
|
||||
getPrice,
|
||||
getAddressValueUsd,
|
||||
} = require("../../shared/prices");
|
||||
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
|
||||
const { markViewRendered } = require("../viewRouter");
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,9 +28,8 @@ const {
|
||||
} = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
formatUsd,
|
||||
formatAddressTotal,
|
||||
getPrice,
|
||||
getAddressValue,
|
||||
getAddressValueUsd,
|
||||
} = require("../../shared/prices");
|
||||
const {
|
||||
fetchRecentTransactions,
|
||||
@@ -72,7 +71,9 @@ function renderTotalValue() {
|
||||
el.textContent = ethStr + ethUsd;
|
||||
|
||||
if (subEl) {
|
||||
subEl.innerHTML = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr)) || " ";
|
||||
const totalUsd = getAddressValueUsd(addr);
|
||||
subEl.innerHTML =
|
||||
totalUsd !== null ? "Total: " + formatUsd(totalUsd) : " ";
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -256,8 +257,8 @@ function walletListHtml() {
|
||||
html += `<span class="flex items-center break-all">${addr.ensName ? "" : dot}${addr.address}</span>`;
|
||||
html += `<span class="flex-shrink-0 ml-1">${infoBtn}${removeBtn}</span>`;
|
||||
html += `</div>`;
|
||||
const addrTotal = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));
|
||||
html += `<div class="text-xs text-muted text-right min-h-[1rem]">${addrTotal || " "}</div>`;
|
||||
const addrUsd = formatUsd(getAddressValueUsd(addr));
|
||||
html += `<div class="text-xs text-muted text-right min-h-[1rem]">${addrUsd || " "}</div>`;
|
||||
html += balanceLinesForAddress(
|
||||
addr,
|
||||
state.trackedTokens,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -602,12 +602,6 @@ const TX_STAGE_BROADCAST = "broadcast";
|
||||
// may yet succeed, so the one thing the popup must not say is "start again
|
||||
// from the site".
|
||||
const TX_STAGE_INFLIGHT = "inflight";
|
||||
// A transaction refused for a nonce that is already spoken for, either by the
|
||||
// node's own answer or by this wallet's record of what it has broadcast. It is
|
||||
// the one broadcast-stage failure that is not ambiguous: the transaction was
|
||||
// not taken, so the user is told it did not reach the network and to send it
|
||||
// again, rather than being warned that it might already be out there.
|
||||
const TX_STAGE_NONCE = "nonce";
|
||||
|
||||
function errorText(err) {
|
||||
if (typeof err === "string" && err !== "") return err;
|
||||
@@ -617,59 +611,6 @@ function errorText(err) {
|
||||
return "The transaction could not be sent.";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Every string a failure might carry its reason in. ethers reports the node's
|
||||
// own words in `shortMessage`, but a JSON-RPC error it could not classify is
|
||||
// nested under `error` or `info.error` with the node's message intact, and the
|
||||
// classification below has to see that too.
|
||||
function failureTexts(err) {
|
||||
if (typeof err === "string") return [err];
|
||||
if (!err || typeof err !== "object") return [];
|
||||
const texts = [];
|
||||
for (const text of [err.shortMessage, err.message, err.reason]) {
|
||||
if (text) texts.push(String(text));
|
||||
}
|
||||
const nested = err.error || (err.info && err.info.error);
|
||||
if (nested && nested.message) texts.push(String(nested.message));
|
||||
return texts;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// What the Ethereum clients say when a transaction's nonce is already spoken
|
||||
// for: either it is below the account's next nonce, or another transaction is
|
||||
// sitting in the pool at that nonce and this one did not outbid it. Either way
|
||||
// the node answered, and its answer was that it did not take this transaction.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// "already known" is deliberately absent. A node that says it knows the
|
||||
// transaction has it, so that transaction did reach the network and the
|
||||
// ambiguous broadcast wording is the correct one for it.
|
||||
const NONCE_COLLISION_PATTERNS = [
|
||||
/nonce too low/i,
|
||||
/nonce has already been used/i,
|
||||
/invalid nonce/i,
|
||||
/oldnonce/i,
|
||||
/replacement transaction underpriced/i,
|
||||
/replacement fee too low/i,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
// ethers' own classification of the same two conditions.
|
||||
const NONCE_COLLISION_CODES = ["NONCE_EXPIRED", "REPLACEMENT_UNDERPRICED"];
|
||||
|
||||
// Whether a failed send is a nonce collision.
|
||||
function isNonceCollision(err) {
|
||||
if (!err) return false;
|
||||
if (err.code && NONCE_COLLISION_CODES.includes(err.code)) return true;
|
||||
return failureTexts(err).some((text) =>
|
||||
NONCE_COLLISION_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(text)),
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// What both the requesting page and the popup are told about a nonce
|
||||
// collision. The node's own words ("nonce too low") are a fragment and are
|
||||
// replaced rather than passed through: they are not a sentence, and they say
|
||||
// less than the wallet knows.
|
||||
const NONCE_COLLISION_MESSAGE =
|
||||
"The transaction was not sent, because its nonce had already been used" +
|
||||
" by another transaction.";
|
||||
|
||||
// What the background does with a pending transaction approval after a failed
|
||||
// attempt: what it tells the popup, and whether the approval is spent
|
||||
// (resolved to the requesting page as an error and deleted) or left standing
|
||||
@@ -686,31 +627,12 @@ const NONCE_COLLISION_MESSAGE =
|
||||
// that never left from one that is already in the mempool. The approval is
|
||||
// spent and the requesting page has been given its outcome; a second
|
||||
// attempt against it would report a second outcome for one request.
|
||||
// - nonce: terminal too, and the one case where the wallet does know the
|
||||
// transaction never left. The approval carries a nonce that is spent, so
|
||||
// the artifact signed against it can never be accepted and the user is told
|
||||
// to send it again from the site.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The stage comes back out because a broadcast failure the node blamed on the
|
||||
// nonce is reclassified here; the caller reports the stage this returns rather
|
||||
// than the one it passed in.
|
||||
function describeTxFailure(stage, err) {
|
||||
if (
|
||||
stage === TX_STAGE_NONCE ||
|
||||
(stage === TX_STAGE_BROADCAST && isNonceCollision(err))
|
||||
) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
error: NONCE_COLLISION_MESSAGE,
|
||||
retryable: false,
|
||||
spendApproval: true,
|
||||
stage: TX_STAGE_NONCE,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
const error = errorText(err);
|
||||
const retryable =
|
||||
stage === TX_STAGE_SIGN ||
|
||||
(stage === TX_STAGE_VERIFY && failureIsRetryable(err));
|
||||
return { error, retryable, spendApproval: !retryable, stage };
|
||||
return { error, retryable, spendApproval: !retryable };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// What the popup shows and does after the background reports a failed signing
|
||||
@@ -720,20 +642,14 @@ function describeTxFailure(stage, err) {
|
||||
//
|
||||
// A failed broadcast gets its own wording: the transaction may already be on
|
||||
// the network, so telling the user to start again from the site is exactly the
|
||||
// wrong instruction. A nonce collision is the exception to that exception —
|
||||
// the transaction demonstrably did not go out, and saying it might have would
|
||||
// send the user hunting for a transaction that does not exist.
|
||||
// wrong instruction.
|
||||
function describeSigningFailure(response, fallbackMessage) {
|
||||
let message = (response && response.error) || fallbackMessage;
|
||||
if (!/[.!?]$/.test(message)) message += ".";
|
||||
const retryable = !!(response && response.retryable);
|
||||
const stage = response && response.stage;
|
||||
if (!retryable) {
|
||||
if (stage === TX_STAGE_NONCE) {
|
||||
message +=
|
||||
" The transaction did not reach the network." +
|
||||
" Please send it again from the site.";
|
||||
} else if (stage === TX_STAGE_BROADCAST) {
|
||||
if (stage === TX_STAGE_BROADCAST) {
|
||||
message +=
|
||||
" The transaction may still have reached the network." +
|
||||
" Check the account before sending it again.";
|
||||
@@ -759,11 +675,9 @@ module.exports = {
|
||||
assertWithinCeilings,
|
||||
sameAddress,
|
||||
failureIsRetryable,
|
||||
isNonceCollision,
|
||||
describeTxFailure,
|
||||
describeSigningFailure,
|
||||
ApprovalMismatchError,
|
||||
NONCE_COLLISION_MESSAGE,
|
||||
ALLOWED_TX_TYPES,
|
||||
SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
|
||||
FORBIDDEN_FIELDS,
|
||||
@@ -772,7 +686,6 @@ module.exports = {
|
||||
TX_STAGE_VERIFY,
|
||||
TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,
|
||||
TX_STAGE_INFLIGHT,
|
||||
TX_STAGE_NONCE,
|
||||
MAX_GAS_LIMIT,
|
||||
MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -55,77 +55,42 @@ function formatUsd(amount) {
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// What an address is worth, as { usd, partial }.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Prices are fetched for the top 25 tokens only, so an address can hold real
|
||||
// assets this code has no price for. Adding up the priced ones and calling the
|
||||
// result the total states a number the holdings do not support: an address
|
||||
// holding nothing but unpriced tokens comes out at $0.00, which tells the user
|
||||
// their address is worth nothing when it may hold a great deal. Worth zero and
|
||||
// worth an unknown amount are separate facts and get separate fields, the same
|
||||
// way an absent holders_count is not a count of zero.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// usd: the value of the holdings a price is known for, or null when
|
||||
// nothing is knowable at all — testnet, or before the first fetch.
|
||||
// partial: the address also holds a token with no price, so usd is a floor
|
||||
// and not the total.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Render it through formatAddressTotal() rather than reading usd alone.
|
||||
function getAddressValue(addr) {
|
||||
function getAddressValueUsd(addr) {
|
||||
const { currentNetwork } = require("./state");
|
||||
if (currentNetwork().isTestnet) return { usd: null, partial: false };
|
||||
if (!prices.ETH) return { usd: null, partial: false };
|
||||
let usd = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0") * prices.ETH;
|
||||
let partial = false;
|
||||
if (currentNetwork().isTestnet) return null;
|
||||
if (!prices.ETH) return null;
|
||||
let total = 0;
|
||||
const ethBal = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0");
|
||||
total += ethBal * prices.ETH;
|
||||
for (const token of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
|
||||
const tokenBal = parseFloat(token.balance || "0");
|
||||
// A balance of zero is not a holding: it can neither add to the total
|
||||
// nor make it incomplete.
|
||||
if (!(tokenBal > 0)) continue;
|
||||
if (prices[token.symbol]) {
|
||||
usd += tokenBal * prices[token.symbol];
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
partial = true;
|
||||
if (tokenBal > 0 && prices[token.symbol]) {
|
||||
total += tokenBal * prices[token.symbol];
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { usd, partial };
|
||||
return total;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The same pair for a whole wallet, and for every wallet at once. One
|
||||
// unpriced holding anywhere makes the sum a floor, so partial carries up.
|
||||
function getWalletValue(wallet) {
|
||||
return sumValues(wallet.addresses.map(getAddressValue));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function getTotalValue(wallets) {
|
||||
return sumValues(wallets.map(getWalletValue));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function sumValues(values) {
|
||||
let usd = null;
|
||||
let partial = false;
|
||||
for (const value of values) {
|
||||
if (value.usd === null) continue;
|
||||
usd = (usd === null ? 0 : usd) + value.usd;
|
||||
partial = partial || value.partial;
|
||||
function getWalletValueUsd(wallet) {
|
||||
const { currentNetwork } = require("./state");
|
||||
if (currentNetwork().isTestnet) return null;
|
||||
if (!prices.ETH) return null;
|
||||
let total = 0;
|
||||
for (const addr of wallet.addresses) {
|
||||
total += getAddressValueUsd(addr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { usd, partial };
|
||||
return total;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The one rendering of an address total, so no screen says it differently.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// A partial total is shown and named as partial: the figure is the ETH and
|
||||
// priced tokens the user does hold, which is worth having, and suppressing it
|
||||
// would throw away a number that is correct as far as it goes. What is never
|
||||
// shown is a figure covering no holdings at all — the $0.00 sum of an empty
|
||||
// set beside a list of tokens is the bug this replaces.
|
||||
function formatAddressTotal(value) {
|
||||
if (!value || value.usd === null) return "";
|
||||
if (!value.partial) return "Total: " + formatUsd(value.usd);
|
||||
if (value.usd > 0) {
|
||||
return "Total: " + formatUsd(value.usd) + " plus unpriced tokens";
|
||||
function getTotalValueUsd(wallets) {
|
||||
const { currentNetwork } = require("./state");
|
||||
if (currentNetwork().isTestnet) return null;
|
||||
if (!prices.ETH) return null;
|
||||
let total = 0;
|
||||
for (const wallet of wallets) {
|
||||
total += getWalletValueUsd(wallet);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "Total: unpriced tokens only";
|
||||
return total;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
module.exports = {
|
||||
@@ -134,8 +99,7 @@ module.exports = {
|
||||
clearPrices,
|
||||
getPrice,
|
||||
formatUsd,
|
||||
formatAddressTotal,
|
||||
getAddressValue,
|
||||
getWalletValue,
|
||||
getTotalValue,
|
||||
getAddressValueUsd,
|
||||
getWalletValueUsd,
|
||||
getTotalValueUsd,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,238 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// The USD total of an address that holds something this build cannot price
|
||||
// (issue #261).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Prices exist for the top 25 tokens only, so an address can hold real assets
|
||||
// with no price attached. Summing what is priced and printing the result as
|
||||
// the total says "$0.00" for an address holding nothing but unpriced tokens —
|
||||
// worth-nothing and worth-an-unknown-amount collapsed into one number, in the
|
||||
// direction that matters. The two are separate facts here, the same way an
|
||||
// absent holders_count is not a count of zero.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The value and its rendering are asserted directly, and then through the two
|
||||
// call sites that return their markup as a string: the wallet list on Home and
|
||||
// the balance warning on the address-removal confirmation. AddressDetail and
|
||||
// the Home summary line render into the DOM and are covered by tests/e2e.
|
||||
|
||||
// helpers.js pulls in state.js, which reads chrome.storage.local at load.
|
||||
globalThis.chrome = {
|
||||
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const {
|
||||
prices,
|
||||
clearPrices,
|
||||
getAddressValue,
|
||||
getWalletValue,
|
||||
getTotalValue,
|
||||
formatAddressTotal,
|
||||
} = require("../src/shared/prices");
|
||||
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
|
||||
const { walletListHtml } = require("../src/popup/views/home");
|
||||
const { balanceWarningHtml } = require("../src/popup/views/deleteAddress");
|
||||
|
||||
const USDC = "0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48";
|
||||
const NOVEL = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
|
||||
|
||||
// No ETH, and a token no price is known for. The case the user is told is
|
||||
// worth $0.00 today.
|
||||
const UNPRICED_ONLY = {
|
||||
address: "0x" + "a".repeat(40),
|
||||
balance: "0",
|
||||
tokenBalances: [{ address: NOVEL, symbol: "NOVEL", balance: "5000.0" }],
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Nothing at all: the address really is worth zero.
|
||||
const EMPTY = {
|
||||
address: "0x" + "b".repeat(40),
|
||||
balance: "0",
|
||||
tokenBalances: [],
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Every holding priced.
|
||||
const FULLY_PRICED = {
|
||||
address: "0x" + "c".repeat(40),
|
||||
balance: "1.5",
|
||||
tokenBalances: [{ address: USDC, symbol: "USDC", balance: "2500.0" }],
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Part priced, part not: 1.5 ETH plus a token with no price.
|
||||
const PARTLY_PRICED = {
|
||||
address: "0x" + "d".repeat(40),
|
||||
balance: "1.5",
|
||||
tokenBalances: [{ address: NOVEL, symbol: "NOVEL", balance: "5000.0" }],
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
clearPrices();
|
||||
prices.ETH = 2000;
|
||||
prices.USDC = 1;
|
||||
state.wallets = [];
|
||||
state.trackedTokens = [];
|
||||
state.showZeroBalanceTokens = false;
|
||||
state.activeAddress = null;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
clearPrices();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The total line only, in each of the two markup-returning call sites. The
|
||||
// ETH balance line above it legitimately reads $0.00 for an address with no
|
||||
// ETH, so the assertions have to name the line under test.
|
||||
function walletListTotal(addr) {
|
||||
state.wallets = [{ name: "Wallet 1", type: "hd", addresses: [addr] }];
|
||||
const match = walletListHtml().match(/min-h-\[1rem\]">([^<]*)</);
|
||||
return match && match[1];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function removalWarningTotal(addr) {
|
||||
const match = balanceWarningHtml(addr).match(/mt-1">([^<]*)</);
|
||||
return match && match[1];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe("the value of an address, and whether it is the whole value", () => {
|
||||
test("an address holding only unpriced tokens has an incomplete value", () => {
|
||||
expect(getAddressValue(UNPRICED_ONLY)).toEqual({
|
||||
usd: 0,
|
||||
partial: true,
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("an address holding nothing is complete, and zero", () => {
|
||||
expect(getAddressValue(EMPTY)).toEqual({ usd: 0, partial: false });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a fully priced address is complete, and unchanged", () => {
|
||||
expect(getAddressValue(FULLY_PRICED)).toEqual({
|
||||
usd: 5500,
|
||||
partial: false,
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a partly priced address keeps the part it can price", () => {
|
||||
expect(getAddressValue(PARTLY_PRICED)).toEqual({
|
||||
usd: 3000,
|
||||
partial: true,
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// A token balance of zero is not a holding, so it cannot make the total
|
||||
// incomplete: an address with a spent-out unpriced token is worth zero.
|
||||
test("a zero balance in an unpriced token leaves the value complete", () => {
|
||||
const addr = {
|
||||
address: "0x1",
|
||||
balance: "0",
|
||||
tokenBalances: [{ address: NOVEL, symbol: "NOVEL", balance: "0" }],
|
||||
};
|
||||
expect(getAddressValue(addr)).toEqual({ usd: 0, partial: false });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Before the first price fetch, and on testnet, nothing is knowable: that
|
||||
// is a third state, and it stays distinct from both of the others.
|
||||
test("no prices at all means no value, not an incomplete one", () => {
|
||||
clearPrices();
|
||||
expect(getAddressValue(FULLY_PRICED)).toEqual({
|
||||
usd: null,
|
||||
partial: false,
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("one unpriced holding makes a wallet and the grand total partial", () => {
|
||||
const wallet = { addresses: [FULLY_PRICED, UNPRICED_ONLY] };
|
||||
expect(getWalletValue(wallet)).toEqual({ usd: 5500, partial: true });
|
||||
expect(getTotalValue([wallet])).toEqual({ usd: 5500, partial: true });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a wallet of fully priced addresses stays complete", () => {
|
||||
const wallet = { addresses: [FULLY_PRICED, EMPTY] };
|
||||
expect(getWalletValue(wallet)).toEqual({ usd: 5500, partial: false });
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("how that value is written on screen", () => {
|
||||
test("a complete total is the figure", () => {
|
||||
expect(formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(FULLY_PRICED))).toBe(
|
||||
"Total: $5,500.00",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("an address worth zero says so", () => {
|
||||
expect(formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(EMPTY))).toBe("Total: $0.00");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The figure is still worth having — it is the ETH the user does hold —
|
||||
// but on its own it understates the address, so it is named as partial.
|
||||
test("a partly priced total is given, and marked as partial", () => {
|
||||
expect(formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(PARTLY_PRICED))).toBe(
|
||||
"Total: $3,000.00 plus unpriced tokens",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Nothing priced is held, so there is no figure to give: printing the
|
||||
// $0.00 sum of an empty set is the bug.
|
||||
test("a total with nothing priced in it gives no figure", () => {
|
||||
const line = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(UNPRICED_ONLY));
|
||||
expect(line).toBe("Total: unpriced tokens only");
|
||||
expect(line).not.toContain("$");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("an unknown value is written as nothing at all", () => {
|
||||
clearPrices();
|
||||
expect(formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(FULLY_PRICED))).toBe("");
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("the wallet list on Home", () => {
|
||||
test("an address holding only unpriced tokens is not totalled at $0.00", () => {
|
||||
expect(walletListTotal(UNPRICED_ONLY)).toBe(
|
||||
"Total: unpriced tokens only",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("an address holding nothing is still totalled at $0.00", () => {
|
||||
expect(walletListTotal(EMPTY)).toBe("Total: $0.00");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a fully priced address shows its total", () => {
|
||||
expect(walletListTotal(FULLY_PRICED)).toBe("Total: $5,500.00");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a partly priced address shows the priced part, marked partial", () => {
|
||||
expect(walletListTotal(PARTLY_PRICED)).toBe(
|
||||
"Total: $3,000.00 plus unpriced tokens",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("an address whose value is unknown keeps its blank line", () => {
|
||||
clearPrices();
|
||||
expect(walletListTotal(FULLY_PRICED)).toBe(" ");
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("the balance warning on the address-removal confirmation", () => {
|
||||
// "This address holds a balance." followed by "Total: $0.00" is a flat
|
||||
// contradiction, on the one screen whose job is to warn.
|
||||
test("an address holding only unpriced tokens is not totalled at $0.00", () => {
|
||||
expect(balanceWarningHtml(UNPRICED_ONLY)).toContain(
|
||||
"This address holds a balance.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(removalWarningTotal(UNPRICED_ONLY)).toBe(
|
||||
"Total: unpriced tokens only",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a fully priced address still shows its total", () => {
|
||||
expect(removalWarningTotal(FULLY_PRICED)).toBe("Total: $5,500.00");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a partly priced address shows the priced part, marked partial", () => {
|
||||
expect(removalWarningTotal(PARTLY_PRICED)).toBe(
|
||||
"Total: $3,000.00 plus unpriced tokens",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("no total line is written when the value is unknown", () => {
|
||||
clearPrices();
|
||||
expect(removalWarningTotal(FULLY_PRICED)).toBe(null);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -14,10 +14,8 @@ const {
|
||||
assertWithinCeilings,
|
||||
sameAddress,
|
||||
failureIsRetryable,
|
||||
isNonceCollision,
|
||||
describeTxFailure,
|
||||
describeSigningFailure,
|
||||
NONCE_COLLISION_MESSAGE,
|
||||
ALLOWED_TX_TYPES,
|
||||
SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
|
||||
FORBIDDEN_FIELDS,
|
||||
@@ -25,7 +23,6 @@ const {
|
||||
TX_STAGE_SIGN,
|
||||
TX_STAGE_VERIFY,
|
||||
TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,
|
||||
TX_STAGE_NONCE,
|
||||
MAX_GAS_LIMIT,
|
||||
MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
|
||||
} = require("../src/shared/approvalVerify");
|
||||
@@ -1194,6 +1191,7 @@ describe("signing failure and retry", () => {
|
||||
"already known",
|
||||
"timeout of 30000ms exceeded",
|
||||
"could not coalesce error",
|
||||
"replacement transaction underpriced",
|
||||
]) {
|
||||
const outcome = describeTxFailure(
|
||||
TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,
|
||||
@@ -1201,76 +1199,10 @@ describe("signing failure and retry", () => {
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(outcome.retryable).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(outcome.spendApproval).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(outcome.stage).toBe(TX_STAGE_BROADCAST);
|
||||
expect(outcome.error).toBe(message);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The one broadcast failure that is not ambiguous. The node answered, and
|
||||
// its answer was that the nonce was already spoken for, so this
|
||||
// transaction is not in a mempool anywhere.
|
||||
test("a nonce the node refused is classified however it was worded", () => {
|
||||
for (const err of [
|
||||
new Error("nonce too low"),
|
||||
new Error("replacement transaction underpriced"),
|
||||
Object.assign(new Error("could not coalesce error"), {
|
||||
code: "NONCE_EXPIRED",
|
||||
}),
|
||||
Object.assign(new Error("could not coalesce error"), {
|
||||
code: "REPLACEMENT_UNDERPRICED",
|
||||
}),
|
||||
// The shape ethers hands up when it could not classify the node's
|
||||
// error itself: the node's own words are nested underneath.
|
||||
Object.assign(new Error("could not coalesce error"), {
|
||||
info: { error: { code: -32000, message: "OldNonce" } },
|
||||
}),
|
||||
]) {
|
||||
const outcome = describeTxFailure(TX_STAGE_BROADCAST, err);
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
describeSigningFailure(
|
||||
outcome,
|
||||
"The transaction could not be sent.",
|
||||
).message,
|
||||
).toMatch(/did not reach the network/);
|
||||
expect(outcome.retryable).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(outcome.spendApproval).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(outcome.error).toBe(NONCE_COLLISION_MESSAGE);
|
||||
expect(outcome.stage).toBe(TX_STAGE_NONCE);
|
||||
expect(isNonceCollision(err)).toBe(true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// A node that says it knows the transaction has it, so it did reach the
|
||||
// network and the ambiguous wording is the correct one.
|
||||
test("already known is not a nonce collision", () => {
|
||||
const err = new Error("already known");
|
||||
const outcome = describeTxFailure(TX_STAGE_BROADCAST, err);
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
describeSigningFailure(
|
||||
outcome,
|
||||
"The transaction could not be sent.",
|
||||
).message,
|
||||
).toMatch(/may still have reached the network/);
|
||||
expect(outcome.stage).toBe(TX_STAGE_BROADCAST);
|
||||
expect(isNonceCollision(err)).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a nonce collision says the transaction did not reach the network", () => {
|
||||
const outcome = describeTxFailure(
|
||||
TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,
|
||||
new Error("nonce too low"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
const copy = describeSigningFailure(
|
||||
outcome,
|
||||
"The transaction could not be sent.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(copy.retryable).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(copy.message).toMatch(/did not reach the network/);
|
||||
expect(copy.message).not.toMatch(/may still have reached the network/);
|
||||
expect(copy.message).toMatch(/Please send it again from the site\.$/);
|
||||
expect(copy.message).toMatch(/^[A-Z].*\.$/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a failed broadcast does not tell the user to send it again", () => {
|
||||
const outcome = describeSigningFailure(
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
|
||||
|
||||
const ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
|
||||
const HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
|
||||
// A page the wallet has never been connected to, whose requests are refused.
|
||||
const UNCONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
|
||||
const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
|
||||
|
||||
// What the dApp asks for: no nonce, no gas, no fees. This is the shape that
|
||||
@@ -53,16 +51,10 @@ const MESSAGE = "0x48656c6c6f204175746973744d61736b";
|
||||
// The transaction the background populates and the approval screen displays.
|
||||
// The nonce is a parameter because the duplicate case turns on two artifacts
|
||||
// differing in a field the dApp fixed nothing for.
|
||||
// The two chains the tests switch between, as both forms the code uses: the
|
||||
// hex chain id the wallet's network record carries, and the number the node
|
||||
// and the signed artifact carry.
|
||||
const MAINNET = { hex: "0x1", num: 1 };
|
||||
const SEPOLIA = { hex: "0xaa36a7", num: 11155111 };
|
||||
|
||||
function populated(nonce, chainId) {
|
||||
function populated(nonce) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
type: 2,
|
||||
chainId: chainId || MAINNET.num,
|
||||
chainId: 1,
|
||||
nonce,
|
||||
gasLimit: 100000n,
|
||||
maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
|
||||
@@ -73,17 +65,17 @@ function populated(nonce, chainId) {
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function signedAtNonce(nonce, withWallet, chainId) {
|
||||
return (withWallet || signer).signTransaction(populated(nonce, chainId));
|
||||
function signedAtNonce(nonce, withWallet) {
|
||||
return (withWallet || signer).signTransaction(populated(nonce));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The node the background populates against. Its answers are the numbers the
|
||||
// approval screen shows, so they are also the numbers every artifact below is
|
||||
// signed at.
|
||||
function fakeProvider(broadcastTransaction, overrides, chainId) {
|
||||
function fakeProvider(broadcastTransaction, overrides) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
broadcastTransaction,
|
||||
getNetwork: async () => Network.from(chainId || MAINNET.num),
|
||||
getNetwork: async () => Network.from(1),
|
||||
getTransactionCount: async () => NONCE,
|
||||
estimateGas: async () => 100000n,
|
||||
getFeeData: async () => ({
|
||||
@@ -119,20 +111,14 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
|
||||
const broadcastTransaction = jest.fn();
|
||||
const loadState = jest.fn(opts.loadState || (async () => {}));
|
||||
|
||||
// The network the wallet is on, which the tests switch under a pending
|
||||
// approval. The node the transaction is populated against is on the same
|
||||
// one, as it would be: switching networks switches the RPC endpoint too.
|
||||
let chain = MAINNET;
|
||||
|
||||
jest.doMock("../src/shared/state", () => ({
|
||||
state: { rpcUrl: "https://rpc.invalid", wallets: [] },
|
||||
loadState,
|
||||
saveState: jest.fn(async () => {}),
|
||||
currentNetwork: () => ({ chainId: chain.hex }),
|
||||
currentNetwork: () => ({ chainId: "0x1" }),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
|
||||
getProvider: () =>
|
||||
fakeProvider(broadcastTransaction, opts.provider, chain.num),
|
||||
getProvider: () => fakeProvider(broadcastTransaction, opts.provider),
|
||||
refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
|
||||
@@ -184,9 +170,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
|
||||
getLastFocused: (cb) => cb(null),
|
||||
create: (options2, cb) => {
|
||||
created.push(options2);
|
||||
// A browser that answers with no window at all. The approval
|
||||
// then has no window it can ever be answered in.
|
||||
cb(opts.noWindow ? undefined : { id: created.length });
|
||||
cb({ id: created.length });
|
||||
},
|
||||
remove: (id, cb) => {
|
||||
removed.push(id);
|
||||
@@ -220,12 +204,8 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
|
||||
|
||||
// Raise a pending transaction approval the way a dApp does, and dig the
|
||||
// approval id back out of the popup URL the background opened.
|
||||
function requestTx(txParams, origin) {
|
||||
function requestTx(txParams) {
|
||||
let rpcResult = null;
|
||||
// The window this request opens, if it opens one. A request refused
|
||||
// before an approval is raised opens none, and the window belonging to
|
||||
// some other request must not be handed back as this one's.
|
||||
const windowIndex = created.length;
|
||||
const sendResponse = jest.fn((r) => {
|
||||
rpcResult = r;
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -235,16 +215,11 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
|
||||
method: "eth_sendTransaction",
|
||||
params: [txParams || TX_PARAMS],
|
||||
},
|
||||
{ origin: origin || ORIGIN },
|
||||
{ origin: ORIGIN },
|
||||
sendResponse,
|
||||
);
|
||||
return {
|
||||
id: () =>
|
||||
created.length > windowIndex
|
||||
? new URL(created[windowIndex].url).searchParams.get(
|
||||
"approval",
|
||||
)
|
||||
: null,
|
||||
id: () => new URL(created[0].url).searchParams.get("approval"),
|
||||
result: () => rpcResult,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -294,10 +269,6 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
|
||||
setActiveAddress: (address) => {
|
||||
persisted.activeAddress = address;
|
||||
},
|
||||
// The user switching network in the toolbar popup.
|
||||
setNetwork: (network) => {
|
||||
chain = network;
|
||||
},
|
||||
fromPopup: { url: EXT_URL + "src/popup/index.html" },
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -473,318 +444,6 @@ describe("one approval, one broadcast", () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Populating the transaction before the approval window opens is what makes
|
||||
// the displayed object the verified object. It also fixes the nonce before the
|
||||
// user has answered anything: two requests populated concurrently take the
|
||||
// same nonce from a node that has seen neither of them broadcast, and the
|
||||
// second can then never be sent, because the only way to give it a fresh nonce
|
||||
// is to populate it again after the user has read the old one off the screen.
|
||||
// So the second request is refused while the first is unanswered.
|
||||
describe("one transaction approval at a time", () => {
|
||||
test("a second eth_sendTransaction while one is pending is refused before it takes a nonce", async () => {
|
||||
const getTransactionCount = jest.fn(async () => NONCE);
|
||||
const bg = loadBackground({ provider: { getTransactionCount } });
|
||||
|
||||
const first = bg.requestTx();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
expect(first.id()).toBeTruthy();
|
||||
expect(getTransactionCount).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
|
||||
const second = bg.requestTx();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(second.result()).toEqual({
|
||||
error: {
|
||||
code: -32002,
|
||||
message: expect.stringMatching(
|
||||
/one transaction at a time.+already in progress/,
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
// Where the refusal happened matters as much as that it happened: no
|
||||
// second window, and the node was never asked for a second nonce.
|
||||
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
|
||||
expect(getTransactionCount).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
|
||||
// The refusal leaves the pending approval untouched, and it still
|
||||
// sends.
|
||||
bg.broadcastTransaction.mockResolvedValue({ hash: "0xfeed" });
|
||||
bg.send(
|
||||
{
|
||||
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
|
||||
id: first.id(),
|
||||
approved: true,
|
||||
rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
|
||||
);
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
expect(first.result()).toEqual({ result: "0xfeed" });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The slot is only defensible if the wallet was going to raise an approval
|
||||
// anyway. Taken any earlier, a request the wallet refuses outright still
|
||||
// holds it, and any page at all — connected or not — can deny the user's
|
||||
// own transactions for as long as it keeps asking.
|
||||
test("a request the wallet refuses does not take the slot from the connected site", async () => {
|
||||
const bg = loadBackground();
|
||||
|
||||
// Both delivered before either reaches its first suspension point,
|
||||
// which is the interleaving the slot exists for.
|
||||
const stranger = bg.requestTx(TX_PARAMS, UNCONNECTED_ORIGIN);
|
||||
const connected = bg.requestTx();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(stranger.result()).toEqual({
|
||||
error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" },
|
||||
});
|
||||
// The connected site's transaction was raised, not refused as one the
|
||||
// user already has in progress.
|
||||
expect(connected.result()).toBeNull();
|
||||
expect(connected.id()).toBeTruthy();
|
||||
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The user closes an approval window that looks hung while the attempt
|
||||
// behind it is still running, and that attempt then fails in a way that
|
||||
// would normally leave the approval standing for a retry. There is no
|
||||
// window left to retry in, so leaving it standing answers the requesting
|
||||
// page never — and holds the slot for the life of the worker with it.
|
||||
test("an approval whose window closed under a failed attempt is answered, and frees the next request", async () => {
|
||||
const stalled = deferred();
|
||||
const bg = loadBackground({
|
||||
loadState: async () => {
|
||||
await stalled.promise;
|
||||
throw new Error("The wallet data could not be read.");
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const first = bg.requestTx();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
bg.send(
|
||||
{
|
||||
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
|
||||
id: first.id(),
|
||||
approved: true,
|
||||
rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
|
||||
);
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
// The attempt owns the approval, so closing the window does not settle
|
||||
// it: the attempt may yet broadcast, and it is the one that reports.
|
||||
bg.closeWindow(1);
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
expect(first.result()).toBeNull();
|
||||
|
||||
stalled.resolve();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
expect(first.result()).toEqual({
|
||||
error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const second = bg.requestTx();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
expect(second.result()).toBeNull();
|
||||
expect(second.id()).toBeTruthy();
|
||||
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// An approval with no window is one nothing can ever answer.
|
||||
test("a request whose approval window cannot be opened is answered rather than left waiting", async () => {
|
||||
const bg = loadBackground({ noWindow: true });
|
||||
|
||||
const first = bg.requestTx();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
expect(first.result()).toEqual({
|
||||
error: {
|
||||
code: -32603,
|
||||
message: expect.stringMatching(
|
||||
/could not open its approval window/,
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// And it did not take the slot with it.
|
||||
const second = bg.requestTx();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
expect(second.result()).toEqual({
|
||||
error: {
|
||||
code: -32603,
|
||||
message: expect.stringMatching(
|
||||
/could not open its approval window/,
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("an answered approval frees the next request", async () => {
|
||||
const bg = loadBackground();
|
||||
const first = bg.requestTx();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
// The user closes the approval window, which rejects it.
|
||||
bg.closeWindow(1);
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
expect(first.result()).toEqual({
|
||||
error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const second = bg.requestTx();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
expect(second.id()).toBeTruthy();
|
||||
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a signature request is not held up by a pending transaction", async () => {
|
||||
const bg = loadBackground();
|
||||
bg.requestTx();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
// A signature consumes no nonce, so it has nothing to collide with.
|
||||
const signing = bg.requestSign();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
expect(signing.id()).toBeTruthy();
|
||||
expect(signing.result()).toBeNull();
|
||||
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// A nonce collision found before the transaction reaches the network is the
|
||||
// one send failure the wallet can speak about with certainty. The user is told
|
||||
// it did not go out and to send it again, rather than being warned it might
|
||||
// already be on the chain — which would send them looking for a transaction
|
||||
// that does not exist, and stop them retrying the one that never went.
|
||||
describe("a nonce collision is reported as a transaction that did not go out", () => {
|
||||
test("a broadcast the node refused for the nonce is not reported as possibly sent", async () => {
|
||||
const bg = loadBackground();
|
||||
const pending = bg.requestTx();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
bg.broadcastTransaction.mockRejectedValue(
|
||||
Object.assign(new Error("nonce too low"), {
|
||||
code: "NONCE_EXPIRED",
|
||||
}),
|
||||
);
|
||||
const answer = bg.send(
|
||||
{
|
||||
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
|
||||
id: pending.id(),
|
||||
approved: true,
|
||||
rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
|
||||
);
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
|
||||
error: expect.stringMatching(/nonce had already been used/),
|
||||
retryable: false,
|
||||
stage: "nonce",
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
|
||||
error: {
|
||||
message: expect.stringMatching(
|
||||
/transaction was not sent, because its nonce/,
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a nonce this wallet already broadcast is refused without asking the node again", async () => {
|
||||
const bg = loadBackground();
|
||||
const first = bg.requestTx();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
bg.broadcastTransaction.mockResolvedValue({ hash: "0xfeed" });
|
||||
bg.send(
|
||||
{
|
||||
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
|
||||
id: first.id(),
|
||||
approved: true,
|
||||
rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
|
||||
);
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
expect(first.result()).toEqual({ result: "0xfeed" });
|
||||
|
||||
// The stubbed node still reports NONCE as the next nonce — a pending
|
||||
// count that lags a broadcast the node has already taken — so this
|
||||
// second approval is populated at a nonce this worker has spent.
|
||||
const second = bg.requestTx();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
const answer = bg.send(
|
||||
{
|
||||
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
|
||||
id: second.id(),
|
||||
approved: true,
|
||||
rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
|
||||
);
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
|
||||
error: expect.stringMatching(/nonce had already been used/),
|
||||
retryable: false,
|
||||
stage: "nonce",
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(second.result()).toEqual({
|
||||
error: {
|
||||
message: expect.stringMatching(/nonce had already been used/),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Nonce spaces are per chain, and the wallet switches networks. A nonce
|
||||
// this wallet spent on one chain says nothing about the same nonce on
|
||||
// another — and low nonces overlap across chains as a matter of course, so
|
||||
// a record that ignored the chain would refuse ordinary transactions,
|
||||
// permanently and with a message that is not true of them.
|
||||
test("a nonce spent on one chain is not refused on another", async () => {
|
||||
const bg = loadBackground();
|
||||
|
||||
const first = bg.requestTx();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
bg.broadcastTransaction.mockResolvedValue({ hash: "0xfeed" });
|
||||
bg.send(
|
||||
{
|
||||
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
|
||||
id: first.id(),
|
||||
approved: true,
|
||||
rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
|
||||
);
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
expect(first.result()).toEqual({ result: "0xfeed" });
|
||||
|
||||
// The user switches network. On this chain the address has sent
|
||||
// nothing, so the node populates the next transaction at the same
|
||||
// nonce — correctly.
|
||||
bg.setNetwork(SEPOLIA);
|
||||
const second = bg.requestTx();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
bg.broadcastTransaction.mockResolvedValue({ hash: "0xbeef" });
|
||||
bg.send(
|
||||
{
|
||||
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
|
||||
id: second.id(),
|
||||
approved: true,
|
||||
rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE, undefined, SEPOLIA.num),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
|
||||
);
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
|
||||
expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
|
||||
expect(second.result()).toEqual({ result: "0xbeef" });
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The approval carries the transaction the user was shown and the address it
|
||||
// was raised for, and the artifact is checked against both. Every case here is
|
||||
// one the old comparison — against the dApp's request, for the address that is
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ describe("the balance warning on the removal confirmation", () => {
|
||||
expect(balanceWarningHtml(ETH_ONLY)).toContain("Total: $3,000.00");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// getAddressValue() reports no value on testnet and before the first
|
||||
// getAddressValueUsd() returns null on testnet and before the first
|
||||
// price fetch. A "Total: $0.00" there would be a lie about the holdings.
|
||||
test("no USD total is shown when prices are not known", () => {
|
||||
expect(balanceWarningHtml(TOKEN_ONLY)).not.toContain("Total:");
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user