test: drive WaitTx's timeout and failed-lookup exits end to end (closes #315)

Two Chrome end-to-end cases send ETH and leave the wait for its receipt
running. In one, lookups answer "no receipt" until the 60-second deadline
ends the wait with the timeout message. In the other, a new fixture switch
makes every receipt lookup fail, and the sixth failure in a row ends the
wait with the message naming the unreachable network. Both check the exact
message and that Done returns to the address screen. Both wait in real
time: Playwright's clock would apply to every later test, and backdating
the stored broadcast time races the popup's own save.

Model: opus-5-5

README.md

@@ -376,6 +376,12 @@ reserve while sitting on the same side of the estimate, so swapping the two in
 what [#154](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/154) was, and it was
 previously correct by reading only.
 
+It also covers both ways the wait for a sent transaction's receipt ends on the
+error screen: lookups that still find no receipt 60 seconds after the broadcast,
+and six lookups in a row that fail. Each must show its own message, and Done
+must lead back to the address screen. Both wait in real time, about a minute
+each.
+
 It also covers the **dApp approval round trips** — the one place where the
 content script, the inpage provider, the background worker and the approval
 popup all have to work together. A local test page is served by the route
@@ -640,7 +646,9 @@ suite outright if its network interception is not in effect.
 Measured on this repo's runner: `e2e-chrome` about 1m55s cold, almost all of it
 the one-time pull of the pinned ~800MB Playwright layer, and well under a minute
 once that layer is cached. `e2e-firefox` about 1m05s cold, and it caches its
-Firefox and geckodriver downloads the same way.
+Firefox and geckodriver downloads the same way. The `e2e-chrome` figures predate
+the two cases that wait for a receipt to end in error, which add about two
+minutes of real waiting.
 
 ### Element id guard (part of `make check`)
 

TODO.md

@@ -45,6 +45,26 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
 
 # Completed Steps
 
+- 2026-10-05: The Chrome end-to-end suite drives both ways the wait for a
+  transaction's receipt ends on the error screen
+  ([#315](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/315)): lookups that still
+  find no receipt 60 seconds after the broadcast end it with the timeout
+  message, and six lookups that fail in a row end it with the message naming the
+  unreachable network. Done then returns to the address screen. Both cases wait
+  in real time, about a minute each. Playwright's clock would apply to every
+  later test in the run and cannot be removed, and moving the stored broadcast
+  time back can be undone by the save the popup makes every ten seconds.
+
+- 2026-10-05: Each control that leads to a signature or to the private key has a
+  test that it refuses a defective wallet before asking for a password
+  ([#254](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/254)): Send on the main,
+  address and token screens, Export Private Key, and both approval screens, as
+  drawn and as clicked. Send on the confirmation screen refuses it too now,
+  because the popup reopens onto that screen from a saved view. The comments
+  that said the wallet's key cannot be derived now say that
+  `getSignerForAddress` refuses it, and the module comment in
+  `src/shared/walletDefects.js` names both earlier import paths.
+
 - 2026-10-05: The Chrome end-to-end suite drives the private key export screen
   as it drives the recovery phrase screen
   ([#253](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/253)): the correct

src/popup/views/addressDetail.js

@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
 
 // The defect of the wallet the selected address belongs to, or null. Both the
 // send and the private-key export path check it before asking for a password,
-// so a wallet that cannot derive its keys says so instead of failing after the
+// so a wallet whose key getSignerForAddress refuses says so instead of failing
-// user has typed one in.
+// after the user has typed one in.
 function selectedWalletDefect() {
     if (state.selectedWallet === null) return null;
     return walletDefect(state.wallets[state.selectedWallet]);
@@ -259,9 +259,10 @@ function init(_ctx) {
     $("btn-export-privkey").addEventListener("click", () => {
         moreDropdown.classList.add("hidden");
         moreBtn.classList.remove("bg-fg", "text-bg");
-        // There is no private key to export for an address this wallet
+        // This address's private key can be derived from the stored key,
-        // cannot derive. Without this the export screen would take a
+        // but export goes through getSignerForAddress, which refuses a key
-        // password and then report it as wrong.
+        // that is not a master key. Without this the export screen would
+        // take a password and then report that refusal as a wrong password.
         const defect = selectedWalletDefect();
         if (defect) {
             showFlash(defect.shortMessage);

src/popup/views/approval.js

@@ -822,9 +822,10 @@ function setSignButtonBusy(busy) {
 }
 
 // Say so on the approval screen itself, and disable the approve button, when
-// the address the approval was raised for belongs to a wallet whose keys
+// the address the approval was raised for belongs to a wallet whose key
-// cannot be derived. Without this the screen would take a password and fail
+// getSignerForAddress refuses. Without this the screen would take a password
-// after deriving it. Reject stays available; the wallet is not touched.
+// and fail after deriving it. Reject stays available; the wallet is not
+// touched.
 // Returns true when it gated.
 function gateOnWalletDefect(errorId, buttonId, address) {
     const owner = findWalletFor(address);

src/popup/views/confirmTx.js

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ const {
 } = require("./helpers");
 const { state, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
 const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
+const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
 const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
 const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
 const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
@@ -537,6 +538,15 @@ function init(_ctx) {
     onViewLeave("confirm-tx", clearPassword);
 
     $("btn-confirm-send").addEventListener("click", async () => {
+        const wallet = state.wallets[state.selectedWallet];
+        // Every Send button refuses a defective wallet before this screen,
+        // but the popup also reopens onto it from a saved view.
+        const defect = walletDefect(wallet);
+        if (defect) {
+            showError("confirm-tx-password-error", defect.shortMessage);
+            return;
+        }
+
         const password = $("confirm-tx-password").value;
         if (!password) {
             showError(
@@ -546,7 +556,6 @@ function init(_ctx) {
             return;
         }
 
-        const wallet = state.wallets[state.selectedWallet];
         let decryptedSecret;
         hideError("confirm-tx-password-error");
 

src/shared/walletDefects.js

@@ -13,11 +13,17 @@ const NON_MASTER_XPRV = "non-master-xprv";
 
 // An "xprv" wallet stores the neutered BIP-44 Ethereum node, four levels below
 // the key that was imported: the current import path derives the absolute
-// m/44'/60'/0'/0 from a depth-0 key, and the pre-#210 path derived the same
+// m/44'/60'/0'/0 from a depth-0 key, and the path before #210 (57959b7)
-// four levels as a relative path beneath whatever depth it was given. A master
+// derived the same four levels as a relative path beneath whatever depth it
-// import therefore stores a depth-4 xpub and a depth-d import stores depth
+// was given. A master import therefore stores a depth-4 xpub and a depth-d
-// d + 4, which makes the stored xpub an exact read on the imported key's
+// import stores depth d + 4, which makes the stored xpub an exact read on the
-// depth — and it is readable without the password, unlike the key itself.
+// imported key's depth — and it is readable without the password, unlike the
+// key itself.
+//
+// The first import path (7a7f9c5) does not fit: it stored the imported key's
+// own xpub with no derivation, so a wallet it wrote is judged wrongly here (a
+// master import as defective, a depth-4 import as sound). 57959b7 replaced it
+// in the same push, and no tag contains it.
 const BIP44_ETH_XPUB_DEPTH = 4;
 
 const DEFECTS = {

tests/e2e/network.js

@@ -448,6 +448,16 @@ function rpcReply(req, opts, report) {
         return Object.assign(envelope, { result: ethCallResult(req, opts) });
     }
     if (req.method === "eth_getTransactionReceipt") {
+        // A lookup that fails, which the wait screen counts differently from
+        // one that answers "not mined yet" (README.md, WaitTx).
+        if (opts.failReceiptLookup) {
+            return Object.assign(envelope, {
+                error: {
+                    code: -32000,
+                    message: "e2e fixture: receipt lookup failed",
+                },
+            });
+        }
         const hash = Array.isArray(req.params) ? req.params[0] : null;
         return Object.assign(envelope, {
             result: opts.seedReceipt && hash ? transactionReceipt(hash) : null,
@@ -607,6 +617,8 @@ function traceEnabled(raw) {
  *   symbol is markup; read at request time.
  * @param {boolean} [opts.seedReceipt]  answer eth_getTransactionReceipt with a
  *   confirmed receipt instead of null, so a wait screen resolves.
+ * @param {boolean} [opts.failReceiptLookup]  answer eth_getTransactionReceipt
+ *   with an error, so every receipt lookup fails; read at request time.
  * @returns {Promise<{waitForServiceWorkerTraffic: (ms: number) =>
  *   Promise<string|null>}>}
  */

tests/e2e/run.js

@@ -2699,6 +2699,84 @@ test("a token that lies about decimals() at signing time broadcasts nothing (#30
     }
 });
 
+// ------------------------------ the wait for a receipt ending in error (#315)
+//
+// README.md (WaitTx) documents two ways the wait ends on the error screen: a
+// lookup that answers "no receipt" 60 seconds or more after the broadcast, and
+// six lookups in a row that fail. They are different facts with different
+// messages, so each is driven to its own.
+//
+// Both wait in real time, about a minute each. The wait reads the popup's own
+// clock and its own ten-second timer. Playwright's clock would move both, but
+// it is installed on the whole browser context and cannot be removed, so every
+// later test would run on it. Moving the stored broadcast time back instead can
+// be undone by the save the popup makes every ten seconds.
+
+// Send ETH from the address screen and stop on the wait for its receipt.
+async function sendEthToWait(env) {
+    await goToConfirm(env.page, {
+        token: "ETH",
+        balance: FUNDED_ETH_TEXT + " ETH",
+        amount: COMFORTABLE_AMOUNT,
+    });
+    await waitForEstimate(env.page);
+    await fillPasswordAndSend(env.page);
+    await visible(env.page, "#view-wait-tx", 60000);
+}
+
+test("a wait still without a receipt after 60 seconds ends on the timeout message (#315)", async (env) => {
+    try {
+        await sendEthToWait(env);
+        // Lookups run every ten seconds and answer "no receipt", so the one
+        // that ends the wait comes about 60 seconds after the broadcast.
+        await visible(env.page, "#view-error-tx", 90000);
+        const message = (
+            await env.page.locator("#error-tx-message").innerText()
+        ).trim();
+        assert(
+            message ===
+                "Transaction was not confirmed within 60 seconds. It may still confirm later — check Etherscan.",
+            "the wait did not end on the timeout message: " +
+                JSON.stringify(message),
+        );
+        await env.page.click("#btn-error-tx-done");
+        await visible(env.page, "#view-address");
+    } finally {
+        await backToAddressAfterSend(env);
+    }
+});
+
+test("six failed receipt lookups in a row end on the unreachable-network message (#315)", async (env) => {
+    // Each failed lookup is logged through log.errorf, i.e. console.error.
+    // Exactly six are declared: a wait that ended sooner leaves one unmatched,
+    // and one that went on logs a seventh, and either fails this test.
+    for (let i = 1; i <= 6; i++) {
+        env.errors.expect(
+            "failed receipt lookup " + i + " of 6",
+            /poll receipt failed/,
+        );
+    }
+    env.routeOpts.failReceiptLookup = true;
+    try {
+        await sendEthToWait(env);
+        await visible(env.page, "#view-error-tx", 90000);
+        const message = (
+            await env.page.locator("#error-tx-message").innerText()
+        ).trim();
+        assert(
+            message ===
+                "The network could not be reached to check this transaction — 6 lookups failed in a row. Check the RPC URL in Settings. The transaction may still have confirmed — check Etherscan.",
+            "the wait did not end on the unreachable-network message: " +
+                JSON.stringify(message),
+        );
+        await env.page.click("#btn-error-tx-done");
+        await visible(env.page, "#view-address");
+    } finally {
+        env.routeOpts.failReceiptLookup = false;
+        await backToAddressAfterSend(env);
+    }
+});
+
 // ------------------------------------------- hostile token symbol (#307)
 //
 // The reproduction from the issue, in the real browser against the real
@@ -4302,6 +4380,8 @@ async function main() {
         // Whether eth_getTransactionReceipt confirms a transaction rather than
         // answering "not mined yet".
         seedReceipt: false,
+        // Whether eth_getTransactionReceipt fails instead of answering (#315).
+        failReceiptLookup: false,
         // Every raw signed transaction handed to eth_sendRawTransaction, in
         // order. The dApp transaction round trip asserts against these bytes
         // rather than against anything the extension reported about them.

tests/walletDefects.test.js

@@ -4,8 +4,16 @@
 // already in storage: the import that created it ran before the refusal
 // existed. Such a wallet used to sign for the wrong tree and now throws on the
 // send screen instead. These tests pin down that it is named and explained in
-// the wallet list, that nothing on the way there throws, and that a wallet
+// the wallet list, that every control leading to a signature or to the private
-// imported from a real master key is untouched by any of it.
+// key refuses it before asking for a password, that nothing on the way there
+// throws, and that a wallet imported from a real master key is untouched by
+// any of it.
+
+// Mocked so that no password has to be hashed: the controls below are checked
+// for whether they decrypt at all.
+jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
+    decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
+}));
 
 const { HDNodeWallet, Mnemonic } = require("ethers");
 
@@ -237,6 +245,290 @@ describe("the wallet list", () => {
     });
 });
 
+// A minimal DOM for driving the popup views: any element exists on first
+// lookup, and click() runs the listeners a view attached to it.
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        title: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        listeners: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
+            el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
+            el.listeners[name].push(fn);
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+    // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+    Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
+        get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
+    });
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+function click(id) {
+    return Promise.all((node(id).listeners.click || []).map((fn) => fn()));
+}
+
+// getSignerForAddress refuses this wallet's key, but only once the password
+// has been typed and spent, and the screens report that refusal as a wrong
+// password or a failed send. So every control that leads to it refuses first.
+describe("every way to a signature or the private key refuses a defective wallet first", () => {
+    const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+    let state;
+    let decryptWithPassword;
+    let home;
+    let addressDetail;
+    let addressToken;
+    let approval;
+    let confirmTx;
+
+    let address;
+    let shortMessage;
+    // What the background answers when the approval window asks which
+    // approval it was opened for, and every message the popup sent it.
+    let approvalDetails;
+    let sent;
+
+    beforeAll(() => {
+        state = require("../src/shared/state").state;
+        decryptWithPassword =
+            require("../src/shared/vault").decryptWithPassword;
+        home = require("../src/popup/views/home");
+        addressDetail = require("../src/popup/views/addressDetail");
+        addressToken = require("../src/popup/views/addressToken");
+        approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+        confirmTx = require("../src/popup/views/confirmTx");
+    });
+
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        const broken = brokenXprvWallet();
+        // A balance, so that no Send button's zero-balance refusal can stand
+        // in for the defect check.
+        broken.addresses[0].balance = "1.0000";
+        broken.addresses[0].tokenBalances = [];
+        address = broken.addresses[0].address;
+        shortMessage = walletDefect(broken).shortMessage;
+
+        approvalDetails = null;
+        sent = [];
+        globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+        globalThis.window = { close: () => {} };
+        globalThis.chrome = {
+            storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+            runtime: {
+                connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+                sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+                    sent.push(msg);
+                    if (!reply) return;
+                    reply(
+                        msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL"
+                            ? approvalDetails
+                            : null,
+                    );
+                },
+            },
+        };
+        // What the wallet's stored secret decrypts to: the account-level key
+        // it was imported from.
+        decryptWithPassword.mockReset();
+        decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue(accountXprv(VECTOR_PHRASE));
+
+        state.wallets = [broken];
+        state.activeAddress = address;
+        state.selectedWallet = 0;
+        state.selectedAddress = 0;
+        state.selectedToken = "ETH";
+        state.viewStack = [];
+    });
+
+    afterEach(() => {
+        state.wallets = [];
+        state.activeAddress = null;
+        state.selectedWallet = null;
+        state.selectedAddress = null;
+        state.selectedToken = null;
+    });
+
+    test("Send on the main screen", async () => {
+        state.currentView = "main";
+        home.init({});
+
+        await click("btn-main-send");
+
+        expect(node("flash-msg").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
+    });
+
+    test("Send on the address screen", async () => {
+        state.currentView = "address";
+        addressDetail.init({});
+
+        await click("btn-send");
+
+        expect(node("flash-msg").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("address");
+    });
+
+    test("Export Private Key on the address screen", async () => {
+        state.currentView = "address";
+        addressDetail.init({});
+
+        await click("btn-export-privkey");
+
+        expect(node("flash-msg").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("address");
+    });
+
+    test("Send on a token's screen", async () => {
+        state.currentView = "address-token";
+        addressToken.init({});
+
+        await click("btn-address-token-send");
+
+        expect(node("flash-msg").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("address-token");
+    });
+
+    // The popup reopens onto this screen from a saved view, so the Send
+    // buttons above are not the only way onto it. The screen is not drawn,
+    // because drawing it starts a fee estimate against the network; with a
+    // decrypt that fails, a handler without the check stops at the password
+    // instead of going on to a transaction that was never set up.
+    test("Send on the confirmation screen", async () => {
+        decryptWithPassword.mockRejectedValue(new Error("wrong password"));
+        state.currentView = "confirm-tx";
+        confirmTx.init({});
+        node("confirm-tx-password").value = "any password";
+
+        await click("btn-confirm-send");
+
+        expect(decryptWithPassword).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(node("confirm-tx-password-error").textContent).toBe(
+            shortMessage,
+        );
+    });
+
+    async function openTxApproval() {
+        approvalDetails = {
+            type: "tx",
+            origin: "https://dapp.example",
+            isPhishingDomain: false,
+            approvedFrom: address,
+            approvedTx: {
+                from: address,
+                to: RECIPIENT,
+                value: "0x0",
+                data: "0x",
+                chainId: 1,
+                nonce: 0,
+                gasLimit: "21000",
+                maxFeePerGas: "1000000000",
+            },
+        };
+        approval.init({});
+        await approval.show(1);
+    }
+
+    async function openSignApproval() {
+        approvalDetails = {
+            type: "sign",
+            origin: "https://dapp.example",
+            isPhishingDomain: false,
+            approvedFrom: address,
+            // "Hello", as the hex a page sends.
+            signParams: {
+                method: "personal_sign",
+                message: "0x48656c6c6f",
+                from: address,
+            },
+        };
+        approval.init({});
+        await approval.show(1);
+    }
+
+    test("the transaction approval screen says so and disables Approve", async () => {
+        await openTxApproval();
+
+        expect(node("approve-tx-error").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+        expect(node("btn-approve-tx").disabled).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    // The stub runs a disabled button's listener, which a browser would not:
+    // what is asked here is whether the handler refuses on its own.
+    test("Approve on the transaction approval screen does not decrypt", async () => {
+        await openTxApproval();
+        node("approve-tx-password").value = "any password";
+
+        await click("btn-approve-tx");
+
+        expect(decryptWithPassword).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(sent.map((msg) => msg.type)).not.toContain(
+            "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
+        );
+        expect(node("approve-tx-error").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+    });
+
+    test("the signature approval screen says so and disables Approve", async () => {
+        await openSignApproval();
+
+        expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+        expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("Approve on the signature approval screen does not decrypt", async () => {
+        await openSignApproval();
+        node("approve-sign-password").value = "any password";
+
+        await click("btn-approve-sign");
+
+        expect(decryptWithPassword).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(sent.map((msg) => msg.type)).not.toContain(
+            "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
+        );
+        expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+    });
+});
+
 describe("no path throws an unhandled error for a defective wallet", () => {
     test("address derivation from the stored xpub still works", () => {
         // The stored xpub is at a non-standard depth but is a valid extended