feat: remove an address from an HD wallet, behind a confirmation (closes #162)

Address rows on Home now carry an [x] control on wallets that derive their
addresses from an extended key and hold more than one; it opens a confirmation
screen before anything is removed.

Removing an address destroys nothing: it stays derivable from key material the
wallet still holds, and any funds at it stay where they are. That is also why
the screen is not password-gated, unlike delete-wallet — a password gates the
disclosure or destruction of a secret, and this does neither.

Getting the address back into the list is another matter, and the copy states
it exactly rather than promising a route the app refuses. "+" derives the next
unused index, because the derivation counter is a high-water mark and is not
rewound, and re-importing the wallet's key material is rejected as a duplicate
for as long as the wallet is present — which it always is here, since a wallet
never gives up its last address. What works is deleting the whole wallet in
Settings, which asks for the password and destroys the stored secret, then
importing again: the scan that follows rediscovers the address only if it has
on-chain activity, and an address that was never used is not found by that
scan. The text is built by recoveryPathText() rather than sitting in index.html
so it can name the wallet's own kind of key material, an xprv wallet having no
recovery phrase to re-import.

A balance is surfaced as a warning, never a refusal, and holding something
means any ERC-20 as well as ETH, at any size: an address with no ETH and a
stablecoin position must not get a blank line on the screen whose job is to
warn. The warning names no figure of its own, because the balance lines round
to four decimals and a sentence built from a rounded number would report
0.0000 ETH for an address holding real money; the amounts come from the same
balanceLinesForAddress() and getAddressValueUsd() every other screen uses.

The state transition lives next to the wallet one in
src/shared/walletDelete.js and shares its address comparison, site-permission
cleanup and broadcast, so the rules match one level down: the last address of
a wallet is never removable, the selection moves only when it was the address
removed, an index after the splice is decremented, a selection in another
wallet is untouched, and AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED is broadcast when the
active address moves so a connected site stops being told about an address the
user removed.

README.md

@@ -88,13 +88,21 @@ provide:
 - `script/lint` — run the linter
 - `script/fmt` — format all files (writes)
 - `script/fmt-check` — check formatting (read-only)
-- `script/check` — run test, lint, and fmt-check
+- `script/check` — run test, test-verify-build, lint, and fmt-check
 - `script/verify-build` — assert the compiled `DEBUG` state of the bundles in
   `dist/`: every bundle containing `src/shared/constants.js` must have `DEBUG`
   off, or on when `AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1`. Run automatically at the end of
   `make build` and `make build-debug`; fails loudly rather than passing if it
   cannot determine a bundle's state. Not part of `make check`, which does not
   depend on build artifacts existing.
+- `script/test-verify-build` — exercise every failure mode of
+  `script/verify-build` against a fixture tree in a temp dir, asserting the exit
+  status and the message of each. Part of `make check`; it reads no build
+  artifacts and writes nothing under `dist/`. The cases that depend on file
+  permissions cannot mean anything for a process that is not subject to them, so
+  the harness proves its runner against a mode-000 file before counting them,
+  dropping to an unprivileged user when run as root; if it cannot, it skips
+  those cases and says so in a banner rather than passing them.
 - `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged via `script/projectname`
 - `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: plain `docker build .`
 - `script/precommit` — run by the git pre-commit hook; runs `script/check`
@@ -224,6 +232,7 @@ src/
     prices.js         — ETH/USD and token/USD via CoinDesk API
     scamlist.js       — known fraud contract addresses
     state.js          — persisted state (extension storage)
+    symbolSpoof.js    — the known-symbol spoof rule, shared by all surfaces
     tokenList.js      — top ERC-20 tokens by market cap (hardcoded)
     transactions.js   — tx history fetching + anti-poisoning filters
     uniswap.js        — Uniswap Universal Router calldata decoder
@@ -453,11 +462,12 @@ Which tokens an address shows is decided by `fetchTokenBalances()` in
 tokens do appear without the user adding them. An ERC-20 is shown when its
 balance is nonzero and it is in the bundled known-token list, is tracked by the
 user, or has 1,000 or more holders; a token claiming a symbol from the bundled
-list from any other contract address is always dropped. That filter is
+list from any other contract address is always dropped, and so is any token
-unconditional — the "Hide tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders" setting governs
+claiming a symbol that belongs to the native asset and therefore has no
-the transaction history and the send-screen token selector, not this list.
+legitimate contract at all (`"ETH"`). That filter is unconditional — the "Hide
-Tracked tokens with a zero balance are listed as well while "Show tracked tokens
+tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders" setting governs the transaction history
-with zero balance" is on.
+and the send-screen token selector, not this list. Tracked tokens with a zero
+balance are listed as well while "Show tracked tokens with zero balance" is on.
 
 #### Navigation
 
@@ -494,6 +504,14 @@ ExportPrivKey and ShowRecoveryPhrase — are deliberately absent from that list,
 so the popup can never reopen onto one of them with no password prompt in front
 of it.
 
+Every screen that holds secret material in the page registers a cleanup with
+`onViewLeave()` (`src/popup/views/helpers.js`), which `showView()` runs on every
+exit from that screen rather than only on its "Back" button, so nothing secret
+survives in a hidden view once the user has navigated away by any route. That
+covers the revealed private key and recovery phrase, the recovery phrase,
+private key or extended private key entered on AddWallet, and the password typed
+on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
+
 #### Welcome (`welcome`)
 
 - **When**: No wallets exist yet (`state.hasWallet` is false). This is the root
@@ -606,10 +624,15 @@ of it.
     - "Reveal" (correct password) → decrypts the wallet secret, derives this
       address's key, hides the password input and shows the key (no screen
       change)
-    - "Reveal" (wrong password) → "Wrong password." on the error line, nothing
+    - "Reveal" (wrong password) → full-sentence error on the error line, nothing
-      revealed
+      revealed (no screen change)
-    - "Back" → clears the key and password from the DOM, then → previous screen
+    - "Back" → previous screen (AddressDetail)
-      (AddressDetail)
+- **Secret handling**: nothing is decrypted, no key is derived, and nothing is
+  written into the page until the password is accepted; the key is never stored
+  in state, and it is wiped from the page whenever the screen is left by any
+  route, including the Settings gear. A decrypt still running when the screen is
+  left is discarded rather than written. The screen is not restorable, so
+  reopening the popup lands on Home rather than back on the key.
 
 #### AddressToken (`address-token`)
 
@@ -698,10 +721,23 @@ of it.
     - To: color dot + full address + etherscan link
     - Transaction hash: full hash (tap to copy) + etherscan link
     - Count-up timer: "Waiting for confirmation... Ns"
-- **Behavior**: Polls `getTransactionReceipt` every 10 seconds.
+- **Behavior**: Polls `getTransactionReceipt` every 10 seconds. The wait is
+  persisted: closing and reopening the popup resumes the poll, with the elapsed
+  counter and the timeout deadline still measured from the original broadcast. A
+  lookup that fails is retried on the next tick rather than counted as a missing
+  receipt, because a failed lookup says nothing about the transaction; but six
+  failures in a row (60 seconds at the poll cadence) end the wait, so an RPC
+  that never answers cannot leave it running indefinitely. Any lookup that
+  answers resets that count.
 - **Transitions**:
     - Receipt found → **SuccessTx**
-    - 60 seconds without confirmation → **ErrorTx** (timeout message)
+    - A lookup that answers "no receipt" 60 seconds or more after broadcast →
+      **ErrorTx** (timeout message)
+    - Six consecutive failed lookups → **ErrorTx**, with a message naming the
+      unreachable network and pointing at the RPC URL in Settings. This is a
+      different fact from the timeout — the chain was never asked — and says so
+    - Exactly one outcome: a receipt found on the tick that crosses the deadline
+      wins, and no outcome can be rendered over another
 
 #### SuccessTx (`success-tx`)
 
@@ -908,10 +944,10 @@ of it.
       works is deleting the whole wallet in Settings — password-gated, and it
       destroys the stored secret — then importing again, whereupon
       `scanForAddresses()` rediscovers the address **only if it has on-chain
-      activity**. An address that was never used does not come back. The text is
+      activity**. An address that was never used is not found by that scan. The
-      written by `recoveryPathText()` rather than sitting in `index.html`, so it
+      text is written by `recoveryPathText()` rather than sitting in
-      can name the wallet's own kind of key material: an xprv wallet has no
+      `index.html`, so it can name the wallet's own kind of key material: an
-      recovery phrase to re-import.
+      xprv wallet has no recovery phrase to re-import.
     - A warning when the address holds anything, ETH or any tracked ERC-20,
       followed by the holdings themselves via `balanceLinesForAddress()` and the
       USD total via `getAddressValueUsd()`. The sentence names no figure of its
@@ -1300,14 +1336,15 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
   that is the only thing that populates it. In the transaction history the check
   is the "Hide fake tokens impersonating a known symbol" setting, on by default;
   with it off, spoofed transfers are shown and no new blocklist entries are
-  learned from them. The send-screen token selector applies the same check
+  learned from them. The send-screen token selector and the balance list apply
-  unconditionally, because it decides which tokens the user can act on rather
+  the same check unconditionally, because they decide which tokens the user can
-  than what the history displays. The balance list applies it unconditionally
+  act on and what the user believes they own rather than what the history
-  too, but not identically: it exempts symbols that `KNOWN_SYMBOLS` maps to
+  displays. All three surfaces read the rule from `src/shared/symbolSpoof.js`,
-  `null`, and `"ETH"` is the only one. So the fake "Ethereum" token above is
+  so they cannot answer the question differently. A symbol the list maps to no
-  filtered from the transaction history and from the send selector, but a
+  contract at all — `"ETH"`, the native asset, is the only one — may be borne by
-  fake-`ETH` ERC-20 that clears the balance list's own 1,000-holder floor — or
+  no contract, so every ERC-20 claiming it is a spoof on all three. The user's
-  that the user tracked manually — is still shown in the balance list.
+  real ETH balance is not an ERC-20 and is read over RPC, so the rule never sees
+  it.
 
 - **Low-holder token filtering**: Token transfers from ERC-20 contracts with
   fewer than 1,000 holders are hidden from transaction history by default.
@@ -1343,13 +1380,12 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
   a sharp tool — users who understand the risks can configure the wallet to show
   everything unfiltered, unix-style. All four settings govern the transaction
   history; what else each one reaches varies. The known-symbol check also runs
-  unconditionally on the send-screen token selector, and on the balance list
+  unconditionally on the send-screen token selector and on the balance list, in
-  except for symbols mapped to `null` (`"ETH"` alone), which the balance list
+  both cases identically to the history. The fraud contract blocklist is applied
-  does not filter. The fraud contract blocklist is applied unconditionally on
+  unconditionally on that selector and is not consulted by the balance list at
-  that selector and is not consulted by the balance list at all. The low-holder
+  all. The low-holder setting also gates the send selector, while the balance
-  setting also gates the send selector, while the balance list's own
+  list's own 1,000-holder floor is unconditional (see Data Model). The dust
-  1,000-holder floor is unconditional (see Data Model). The dust threshold
+  threshold applies to the transaction history alone.
-  applies to the transaction history alone.
 
 #### Phishing Domain Protection
 

TODO.md

@@ -49,6 +49,33 @@ undefined identifiers, which is how
   state transitions with wallet deletion so the selection, site permissions and
   active-address broadcast follow the same rules
   ([#162](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/162)).
+- 2026-08-12: The known-symbol spoof rule moved into `src/shared/symbolSpoof.js`
+  and is now the only copy. The balance list had exempted symbols the token list
+  maps to `null` — `"ETH"` alone — so a fake ETH ERC-20 was hidden from the
+  transaction history and the Send selector but listed as a holding named ETH. A
+  symbol with no legitimate contract may now be borne by no contract on any of
+  the three surfaces, and the native exemption is "has no contract address", so
+  a second null-mapped symbol needs no call-site change. The user's real ETH
+  balance is read over RPC and never passes through the rule
+  ([#235](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/235)).
+- 2026-08-12: `script/verify-build`'s failure modes are now a committed target,
+  `script/test-verify-build`, run by `make check`. It asserts the exit status
+  and the message of every case against a fixture tree in a temp dir, and drops
+  privileges (proving the runner against a mode-000 file first) for the cases
+  that only mean something when file permissions are in force
+  ([#227](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/227)).
+- 2026-08-12: WaitTx lifecycle: a receipt and the 60-second timeout can no
+  longer both render on one tick, no timer or in-flight lookup outlives its
+  wait, a failed receipt lookup no longer counts as a timeout (but six in a row
+  end the wait, reported as an unreachable network rather than as a timeout),
+  and the wait now resumes after a popup close
+  ([#155](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/155)).
+- 2026-08-12: The private key export screen now wipes the key from the page
+  whenever it is left by any route, and a decrypt still in flight when the
+  screen is left is discarded instead of written; the same `onViewLeave()`
+  cleanup was extended to every other screen holding secret material in the DOM
+  (AddWallet, ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx, ApproveSign)
+  ([#221](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/221)).
 - 2026-08-12: An xprv wallet already in storage that was imported from a
   non-master key is detected from the depth of its stored `xpub`, explained in
   the wallet list, and blocked from signing, sending and private-key export

script/check

@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-# script/check: run all checks (test, lint, fmt-check). Our own
+# script/check: run all checks (test, test-verify-build, lint, fmt-check).
-# extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all. Must not modify any files.
+# Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all. Must not modify any files.
 set -eu
 
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
 
 main() {
     "$SCRIPT_DIR/test"
+    "$SCRIPT_DIR/test-verify-build"
     "$SCRIPT_DIR/lint"
     "$SCRIPT_DIR/fmt-check"
 }

script/test-verify-build

@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# script/test-verify-build: exercise every failure mode of
+# script/verify-build. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run
+# from script/check so make check covers it.
+#
+# Why this exists: verify-build is the build-integrity guard, and three
+# separate reviews of it each found a fresh vacuous pass — the grep exit-2
+# conflation, the discarded find status, the line-delimited walk. Every one
+# was caught by someone building a tree by hand, because nothing in make check
+# could catch it. This is that hand battery, committed and automated.
+#
+# Each case asserts the exit status AND a substring of the message. A guard
+# that fails for the wrong reason (right status, different fault) is itself a
+# defect, so matching the status alone would not be a test of anything.
+#
+# The fixture is a temp tree containing script/verify-build as a SYMLINK to
+# the real script: verify-build takes its ROOT from dirname "$0"/.., so it
+# operates on the fixture's dist/ and never reads or writes the repo's build
+# output. The symlink rather than a copy is what makes a deliberate break in
+# the real script fail here.
+set -eu
+
+ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
+VERIFY_BUILD="$ROOT/script/verify-build"
+
+MARKER_ON="autistmask-build-debug=on"
+MARKER_OFF="autistmask-build-debug=off"
+
+NEWLINE='
+'
+
+PASSED=0
+FAILED=0
+SKIPPED=0
+SKIPPED_NAMES=""
+
+# The command prefix that runs the permission-dependent cases as a user who
+# is actually subject to file permissions, and whether those cases can run at
+# all. Both are decided by probe_permission_runner, never assumed.
+UNPRIV=""
+PERM_ENABLED=no
+PERM_HOW=""
+
+WORK=""
+
+cleanup() {
+    [ -n "$WORK" ] || return 0
+    # The cases chmod 000 files and directories on purpose.
+    chmod -R u+rwX "$WORK" 2>/dev/null || true
+    rm -rf "$WORK"
+}
+trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
+
+WORK="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-test-verify-build.XXXXXX")"
+FIXTURE="$WORK/fixture"
+
+# verify-build mktemps its dist/ listing under TMPDIR. Pointing that inside
+# our work dir keeps the run leaving no residue, and keeps it writable for the
+# unprivileged user the permission cases run as.
+TMPDIR="$WORK/tmp"
+export TMPDIR
+mkdir -p "$TMPDIR"
+chmod 1777 "$TMPDIR"
+chmod 755 "$WORK"
+
+# --- fixture ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# A stand-in for an emitted bundle: some text plus one marker literal, which
+# is all verify-build reads out of the real thing.
+write_bundle() {
+    printf 'var a=1;/* %s */\nvar b=2;\n' "$2" >"$1"
+}
+
+# A dist/ shaped like a real build: two listed bundles under different
+# browsers, an unlisted subtree to make unwalkable, and unlisted files that
+# carry no marker and must not be objected to.
+build_fixture() {
+    chmod -R u+rwX "$FIXTURE" 2>/dev/null || true
+    rm -rf "$FIXTURE"
+
+    mkdir -p "$FIXTURE/script"
+    ln -s "$VERIFY_BUILD" "$FIXTURE/script/verify-build"
+
+    mkdir -p "$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/popup" \
+        "$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/content" \
+        "$FIXTURE/dist/firefox/src/popup"
+
+    write_bundle "$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js" "$MARKER_OFF"
+    write_bundle "$FIXTURE/dist/firefox/src/popup/index.js" "$MARKER_OFF"
+    printf 'body{color:#000}\n' >"$FIXTURE/dist/styles.css"
+    printf 'var c=3;\n' >"$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/content/content.js"
+
+    {
+        echo "dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js"
+        echo "dist/firefox/src/popup/index.js"
+    } >"$FIXTURE/dist/constants-bundles.txt"
+
+    # Readable and traversable by the unprivileged user the permission cases
+    # run as, before those cases take that away again on purpose.
+    chmod -R a+rX "$FIXTURE"
+}
+
+# --- permission runner ------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Run a command through the current unprivileged runner. Unquoted on purpose:
+# UNPRIV is a command prefix that has to word-split.
+run_unpriv() {
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+    $UNPRIV "$@"
+}
+
+# Decide whether the permission-dependent cases can run, and prove it rather
+# than assuming it.
+#
+# The problem: the CI image declares no USER, so CI runs as root, and root is
+# not subject to file permissions — chmod 000 stops neither find nor grep. A
+# permission case run as root passes vacuously, which is worse than no case at
+# all because it reads as coverage.
+#
+# So the runner is validated with two probes before any permission case is
+# counted:
+#
+#   - a mode-644 file MUST be readable through it. If not, the runner itself
+#     is broken (missing helper, no such user, sandbox), and every case run
+#     through it would fail for the wrong reason.
+#   - a mode-000 file MUST NOT be readable through it. If it is, permissions
+#     are not in force and the cases would pass without proving anything.
+#
+# Unprivileged: the runner is empty and both probes are about this process,
+# which is the honest answer. Root: setpriv and runuser are tried, both
+# present in the pinned CI base image. Only when no candidate passes both
+# probes are the cases skipped, and a skipped run says so unmistakably.
+probe_permission_runner() {
+    _probe="$WORK/probe"
+    mkdir -p "$_probe"
+    printf 'readable\n' >"$_probe/public"
+    printf 'secret\n' >"$_probe/private"
+    chmod 755 "$_probe"
+    chmod 644 "$_probe/public"
+    chmod 000 "$_probe/private"
+
+    if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
+        _candidates="setpriv|setpriv --reuid=65534 --regid=65534 --clear-groups --
+runuser|runuser -u nobody --"
+    else
+        _candidates="direct|"
+    fi
+
+    _tried=""
+    _saved_ifs="$IFS"
+    IFS="$NEWLINE"
+    for _line in $_candidates; do
+        IFS="$_saved_ifs"
+        _label="${_line%%|*}"
+        _cmd="${_line#*|}"
+        _tried="${_tried:+$_tried, }$_label"
+
+        if [ -n "$_cmd" ]; then
+            _bin="${_cmd%% *}"
+            command -v "$_bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 || continue
+        fi
+
+        UNPRIV="$_cmd"
+        # Broken or unusable runner: the cases would fail for the wrong
+        # reason. Reaching the script under test is part of usable.
+        run_unpriv cat "$_probe/public" >/dev/null 2>&1 || continue
+        run_unpriv cat "$VERIFY_BUILD" >/dev/null 2>&1 || continue
+        # Permissions not in force through this runner: the cases would pass
+        # without testing anything.
+        if run_unpriv cat "$_probe/private" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            continue
+        fi
+
+        PERM_ENABLED=yes
+        PERM_HOW="$_label"
+        IFS="$_saved_ifs"
+        return 0
+    done
+    IFS="$_saved_ifs"
+
+    UNPRIV=""
+    PERM_ENABLED=no
+    PERM_HOW="$_tried"
+}
+
+# --- case runner ------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# check_case <name> <perm:yes|no> <mode:release|debug> <status> <text> <setup>
+#
+# Rebuilds the fixture, applies <setup> inside it, runs verify-build, and
+# requires both the exit status and the message. <perm> marks a case that only
+# means anything when file permissions are in force.
+check_case() {
+    _name="$1"
+    _perm="$2"
+    _mode="$3"
+    _want_status="$4"
+    _want_text="$5"
+    _setup="$6"
+
+    if [ "$_perm" = yes ] && [ "$PERM_ENABLED" != yes ]; then
+        SKIPPED=$((SKIPPED + 1))
+        SKIPPED_NAMES="$SKIPPED_NAMES##   - $_name$NEWLINE"
+        echo "  SKIP (permissions not in force): $_name"
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    build_fixture
+    if ! (cd "$FIXTURE" && "$_setup") >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
+        echo "  FAIL: $_name"
+        echo "    the case's own setup failed, so nothing was tested."
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    if [ "$_mode" = debug ]; then
+        _debug=1
+    else
+        _debug=""
+    fi
+
+    # Exported rather than set as a command prefix: run_unpriv is a function,
+    # and an assignment prefixed to a function call is not portable.
+    AUTISTMASK_DEBUG="$_debug"
+    export AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
+
+    _status=0
+    if [ "$_perm" = yes ]; then
+        _out="$(run_unpriv "$FIXTURE/script/verify-build" 2>&1)" || _status=$?
+    else
+        _out="$("$FIXTURE/script/verify-build" 2>&1)" || _status=$?
+    fi
+
+    _ok=yes
+    _why=""
+
+    if [ "$_status" -ne "$_want_status" ]; then
+        _ok=no
+        _why="exit status $_status, wanted $_want_status"
+    fi
+
+    # Same discipline verify-build itself applies to grep: 0 and 1 are
+    # answers, anything else is not, and must not be read as "no match".
+    _g=0
+    printf '%s\n' "$_out" | grep -q -F -e "$_want_text" || _g=$?
+    case "$_g" in
+    0) ;;
+    1)
+        _ok=no
+        _why="${_why:+$_why; }message did not contain: $_want_text"
+        ;;
+    *)
+        _ok=no
+        _why="${_why:+$_why; }grep exited $_g matching the message, so the
+      message was never checked"
+        ;;
+    esac
+
+    if [ "$_ok" = yes ]; then
+        PASSED=$((PASSED + 1))
+        echo "  ok: $_name"
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
+    echo "  FAIL: $_name"
+    echo "    $_why"
+    echo "    --- verify-build output ---"
+    printf '%s\n' "$_out" | sed 's/^/    /'
+    echo "    --- end output ---"
+}
+
+# --- cases ------------------------------------------------------------------
+#
+# Each runs with the fixture as its working directory.
+
+c_control() { :; }
+
+c_trailing_space() {
+    cp dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js "dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js "
+}
+
+c_embedded_newline() {
+    cp dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js "dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js$NEWLINE"
+}
+
+c_dist_symlink() {
+    mv dist dist.real
+    ln -s dist.real dist
+}
+
+c_unwalkable_subtree() { chmod 000 dist/chrome/src/content; }
+
+c_dangling_symlink() {
+    ln -s /nonexistent-target-for-test-verify-build dist/chrome/dangling.js
+}
+
+c_dir_symlink() { ln -s src dist/chrome/link-to-dir; }
+
+c_alias_symlink() { ln -s popup/index.js dist/chrome/src/aliased.js; }
+
+c_manifest_missing() { rm dist/constants-bundles.txt; }
+
+c_manifest_empty() { : >dist/constants-bundles.txt; }
+
+c_manifest_unreadable() { chmod 000 dist/constants-bundles.txt; }
+
+c_bundle_missing() { rm dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js; }
+
+c_bundle_empty() { : >dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js; }
+
+c_bundle_unreadable() { chmod 000 dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js; }
+
+c_unlisted_extension() {
+    cp dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js dist/chrome/src/popup/extra.mjs
+}
+
+c_no_marker() { printf 'var d=4;\n' >dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js; }
+
+c_both_markers() {
+    printf '/* %s */\n' "$MARKER_ON" >>dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js
+}
+
+run_cases() {
+    check_case "control: untouched dist passes" \
+        no release 0 "2 bundle(s) verified $MARKER_OFF" c_control
+
+    check_case "unlisted marker-carrying file, trailing space in name" \
+        no release 1 "carries a debug marker but is absent from" \
+        c_trailing_space
+
+    check_case "unlisted marker-carrying file, newline in name" \
+        no release 1 "carries a debug marker but is absent from" \
+        c_embedded_newline
+
+    check_case "dist/ replaced by a symlink" \
+        no release 1 "dist is a symlink, not a directory." c_dist_symlink
+
+    check_case "unwalkable subtree under dist/" \
+        yes release 1 "enumerating dist/, so part of the tree" \
+        c_unwalkable_subtree
+
+    check_case "dangling symlink under dist/" \
+        no release 1 \
+        "reading dist/chrome/dangling.js, so the file could not be" \
+        c_dangling_symlink
+
+    check_case "symlink to a directory under dist/" \
+        no release 1 \
+        "reading dist/chrome/link-to-dir, so the file could not be" \
+        c_dir_symlink
+
+    check_case "symlink to a listed bundle under an unlisted path" \
+        no release 1 \
+        "dist/chrome/src/aliased.js carries a debug marker but is absent" \
+        c_alias_symlink
+
+    check_case "manifest missing" \
+        no release 1 "dist/constants-bundles.txt is missing." \
+        c_manifest_missing
+
+    check_case "manifest empty" \
+        no release 1 "is empty, so no emitted bundle was found to contain" \
+        c_manifest_empty
+
+    check_case "manifest unreadable" \
+        yes release 1 "is not readable, so nothing was inspected." \
+        c_manifest_unreadable
+
+    check_case "listed bundle missing" \
+        no release 1 \
+        "lists dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js, which does not exist." \
+        c_bundle_missing
+
+    check_case "listed bundle empty" \
+        no release 1 "which is empty. An empty bundle" c_bundle_empty
+
+    check_case "listed bundle unreadable" \
+        yes release 1 \
+        "reading dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js, so the file could not be" \
+        c_bundle_unreadable
+
+    check_case "unlisted extension carrying a marker" \
+        no release 1 \
+        "dist/chrome/src/popup/extra.mjs carries a debug marker but is" \
+        c_unlisted_extension
+
+    check_case "listed bundle carries no marker" \
+        no release 1 "carries no debug marker, so its DEBUG state cannot be" \
+        c_no_marker
+
+    check_case "listed bundle carries both markers" \
+        no release 1 "carries both debug markers, so DEBUG was not resolved" \
+        c_both_markers
+
+    check_case "wrong marker for the requested mode" \
+        no debug 1 "is $MARKER_OFF but this build expects $MARKER_ON" \
+        c_control
+}
+
+# --- main --------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+main() {
+    cd "$ROOT"
+
+    [ -x "$VERIFY_BUILD" ] || {
+        echo "test-verify-build: $VERIFY_BUILD is missing or not executable" >&2
+        exit 1
+    }
+
+    echo "Testing script/verify-build failure modes..."
+    probe_permission_runner
+    if [ "$PERM_ENABLED" = yes ]; then
+        echo "  permission cases: enabled (runner: $PERM_HOW, proved against" \
+            "a mode-000 file)"
+    fi
+
+    run_cases
+
+    if [ "$FAILED" -ne 0 ]; then
+        echo "test-verify-build: $FAILED case(s) FAILED," \
+            "$PASSED passed, $SKIPPED skipped" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+
+    if [ "$SKIPPED" -ne 0 ]; then
+        cat <<EOF
+################################################################################
+## WARNING: $SKIPPED PERMISSION CASE(S) DID NOT RUN, AND THIS RUN DOES NOT
+## PROVE THEM. This process is uid $(id -u), and no runner subject to file
+## permissions was available. Tried: $PERM_HOW.
+## Under root, chmod 000 stops neither find nor grep, so these cases would
+## have passed without testing anything. They were skipped, not counted:
+$SKIPPED_NAMES################################################################################
+EOF
+        echo "test-verify-build: $PASSED case(s) passed," \
+            "$SKIPPED SKIPPED AND NOT PROVEN (see the warning above)"
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    echo "test-verify-build: $PASSED case(s) passed"
+}
+
+main "$@"

src/popup/index.js

@@ -170,6 +170,12 @@ function restoreView() {
                 fallbackView();
             }
             break;
+        case "wait-tx":
+            // Resumes the receipt poll from the persisted broadcast time.
+            if (!txStatus.restoreWait()) {
+                fallbackView();
+            }
+            break;
         case "success-tx":
             if (state.viewData && state.viewData.hash) {
                 txStatus.renderSuccess();

src/popup/restorableViews.js

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ const RESTORABLE_VIEWS = new Set([
     "settings-addtoken",
     "confirm-tx",
     "transaction",
+    "wait-tx",
     "success-tx",
     "error-tx",
 ]);

src/popup/views/addWallet.js

@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@
-const { $, showView, showFlash, goBack, clearViewStack } = require("./helpers");
+const {
+    $,
+    showView,
+    showFlash,
+    goBack,
+    clearViewStack,
+    onViewLeave,
+} = require("./helpers");
 const {
     generateMnemonic,
     hdWalletFromMnemonic,
@@ -66,13 +73,23 @@ function switchMode(mode) {
     $("add-wallet-password-hint").textContent = PASSWORD_HINTS[mode];
 }
 
-function show() {
+// Wipe the secret material this screen holds in the DOM: a generated or
+// pasted recovery phrase, an imported private key or extended private key,
+// and the password that would encrypt them. Registered as the view-leave
+// handler as well as run on entry, so none of it survives in the hidden
+// view after the user navigates away by any route, including the Settings
+// gear and the import itself.
+function clear() {
     $("wallet-mnemonic").value = "";
     $("import-private-key").value = "";
     $("import-xprv-key").value = "";
     $("add-wallet-password").value = "";
     $("add-wallet-password-confirm").value = "";
     $("add-wallet-phrase-warning").style.visibility = "hidden";
+}
+
+function show() {
+    clear();
     switchMode("mnemonic");
     showView("add-wallet");
 }
@@ -288,6 +305,8 @@ async function importXprvKey(ctx) {
 }
 
 function init(ctx) {
+    onViewLeave("add-wallet", clear);
+
     // Tab click handlers
     $("tab-mnemonic").addEventListener("click", () => switchMode("mnemonic"));
     $("tab-privkey").addEventListener("click", () => switchMode("privkey"));

src/popup/views/addressDetail.js

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ const {
     $,
     showView,
     showFlash,
-    flashCopyFeedback,
     balanceLinesForAddress,
     addressDotHtml,
     addressTitle,
@@ -27,8 +26,7 @@ const {
 } = require("./send");
 const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
 const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
-const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
+const exportPrivkey = require("./exportPrivkey");
-const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
 const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
 
 // The defect of the wallet the selected address belongs to, or null. Both the
@@ -321,81 +319,12 @@ function init(_ctx) {
             showFlash(defect.shortMessage);
             return;
         }
-        pushCurrentView();
+        // No pushCurrentView() here: exportPrivkey.show() can return
-        const wallet = state.wallets[state.selectedWallet];
+        // without navigating, so it does its own push.
-        const addr = wallet.addresses[state.selectedAddress];
+        exportPrivkey.show(state.selectedWallet, state.selectedAddress);
-        const blockieEl = $("export-privkey-jazzicon");
-        blockieEl.innerHTML = "";
-        const bImg = document.createElement("img");
-        bImg.src = makeBlockie(addr.address);
-        bImg.width = 48;
-        bImg.height = 48;
-        bImg.style.imageRendering = "pixelated";
-        bImg.style.borderRadius = "50%";
-        blockieEl.appendChild(bImg);
-        $("export-privkey-title").textContent =
-            wallet.name + " \u2014 Address " + (state.selectedAddress + 1);
-        const exportAddrContainer = $("export-privkey-dot").parentElement;
-        exportAddrContainer.innerHTML = renderAddressHtml(addr.address);
-        attachCopyHandlers(exportAddrContainer);
-        $("export-privkey-password").value = "";
-        $("export-privkey-flash").textContent = "";
-        $("export-privkey-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
-        $("export-privkey-password-section").classList.remove("hidden");
-        $("export-privkey-result").classList.add("hidden");
-        $("export-privkey-value").textContent = "";
-        showView("export-privkey");
     });
 
-    $("btn-export-privkey-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
+    exportPrivkey.init();
-        const password = $("export-privkey-password").value;
-        if (!password) {
-            $("export-privkey-flash").textContent = "Password is required.";
-            $("export-privkey-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
-            return;
-        }
-        const btn = $("btn-export-privkey-confirm");
-        btn.disabled = true;
-        btn.classList.add("text-muted");
-        const wallet = state.wallets[state.selectedWallet];
-        try {
-            const secret = await decryptWithPassword(
-                wallet.encryptedSecret,
-                password,
-            );
-            const signer = getSignerForAddress(
-                wallet,
-                state.selectedAddress,
-                secret,
-            );
-            const privateKey = signer.privateKey;
-            $("export-privkey-password-section").classList.add("hidden");
-            $("export-privkey-value").textContent = privateKey;
-            $("export-privkey-result").classList.remove("hidden");
-            $("export-privkey-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
-        } catch {
-            $("export-privkey-flash").textContent = "Wrong password.";
-            $("export-privkey-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
-        } finally {
-            btn.disabled = false;
-            btn.classList.remove("text-muted");
-        }
-    });
-
-    $("export-privkey-value").addEventListener("click", () => {
-        const key = $("export-privkey-value").textContent;
-        if (key) {
-            navigator.clipboard.writeText(key);
-            showFlash("Copied!");
-            flashCopyFeedback($("export-privkey-value"));
-        }
-    });
-
-    $("btn-export-privkey-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
-        $("export-privkey-value").textContent = "";
-        $("export-privkey-password").value = "";
-        goBack();
-    });
 }
 
 module.exports = { init, show };

src/popup/views/approval.js

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ const {
     hideError,
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
+    onViewLeave,
 } = require("./helpers");
 const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
 const {
@@ -461,7 +462,24 @@ function findActiveWallet() {
     return null;
 }
 
+// Drop the password from the DOM when either approval screen is left. The
+// approval window navigates on after a signature — approve-tx goes to the
+// wait screen — and the password must not sit in the hidden view for the
+// life of that window.
+function clearTxPassword() {
+    $("approve-tx-password").value = "";
+    hideError("approve-tx-error");
+}
+
+function clearSignPassword() {
+    $("approve-sign-password").value = "";
+    hideError("approve-sign-error");
+}
+
 function init(ctx) {
+    onViewLeave("approve-tx", clearTxPassword);
+    onViewLeave("approve-sign", clearSignPassword);
+
     $("approve-remember").addEventListener("change", async () => {
         state.rememberSiteChoice = $("approve-remember").checked;
         await saveState();

src/popup/views/confirmTx.js

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ const {
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
     goBack,
+    onViewLeave,
 } = require("./helpers");
 const { state, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
 const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
@@ -390,7 +391,17 @@ async function checkRecipientHistory(txInfo) {
     }
 }
 
+// Drop the password from the DOM. Registered as the view-leave handler so
+// it does not sit in the hidden view once the screen navigates on — to the
+// wait screen after a send, or anywhere else the user goes.
+function clearPassword() {
+    $("confirm-tx-password").value = "";
+    hideError("confirm-tx-password-error");
+}
+
 function init(ctx) {
+    onViewLeave("confirm-tx", clearPassword);
+
     $("btn-confirm-send").addEventListener("click", async () => {
         const password = $("confirm-tx-password").value;
         if (!password) {

src/popup/views/deleteWallet.js

@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@
-const { $, showView, showFlash, goBack, clearViewStack } = require("./helpers");
+const {
+    $,
+    showView,
+    showFlash,
+    goBack,
+    clearViewStack,
+    onViewLeave,
+} = require("./helpers");
 const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
 const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
 const {
@@ -9,22 +16,34 @@ const {
 let deleteWalletIndex = null;
 let ctx = null;
 
+// Drop the password from the DOM and the wallet selection from the
+// closure. Registered as the view-leave handler as well as run on entry,
+// so the typed password does not sit in the hidden view after the user
+// navigates away by any route, including the Settings gear.
+function clear() {
+    deleteWalletIndex = null;
+    $("delete-wallet-password").value = "";
+    $("delete-wallet-flash").textContent = "";
+    $("delete-wallet-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
+}
+
 function show(walletIdx) {
+    clear();
     deleteWalletIndex = walletIdx;
     const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
     $("delete-wallet-name").textContent =
         wallet.name || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
-    $("delete-wallet-password").value = "";
-    $("delete-wallet-flash").textContent = "";
-    $("delete-wallet-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
     showView("delete-wallet-confirm");
 }
 
 function init(_ctx) {
     ctx = _ctx;
 
+    onViewLeave("delete-wallet-confirm", clear);
+
+    // No wipe here: goBack() routes through showView(), which runs the
+    // leave hook.
     $("btn-delete-wallet-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
-        deleteWalletIndex = null;
         goBack();
     });
 

src/popup/views/exportPrivkey.js

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+// Private key export for a single address.
+//
+// The key controls the address outright — anyone holding it can move every
+// token in it, from any device, forever — so this screen is handled under
+// the same rules as the recovery phrase screen (./showPhrase.js):
+//
+//   1. Nothing is decrypted, no key is derived, and nothing is written into
+//      the DOM until decryptWithPassword has accepted the password.
+//   2. Leaving the screen by any path wipes it, via the onViewLeave hook,
+//      and a decrypt still in flight when that happens is discarded
+//      instead of written (revealGeneration).
+//   3. The key never reaches the logger. This module deliberately does not
+//      import src/shared/log.js.
+//
+// The key is also never assigned to `state`, so it cannot be persisted to
+// extension storage, and "export-privkey" is excluded from RESTORABLE_VIEWS
+// so the popup can never reopen onto it.
+
+const {
+    $,
+    showView,
+    showFlash,
+    flashCopyFeedback,
+    goBack,
+    onViewLeave,
+    pushCurrentView,
+    renderAddressHtml,
+    attachCopyHandlers,
+} = require("./helpers");
+const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
+const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
+const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
+const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
+
+const VIEW = "export-privkey";
+
+let walletIndex = null;
+let addressIndex = null;
+
+// Bumped by every clear(), which is what leaving the screen runs. reveal()
+// captures it before awaiting the decrypt and refuses to touch the DOM if
+// it has moved: a decrypt still in flight when the screen is left would
+// otherwise write the key *after* the wipe, with nothing scheduled to wipe
+// it again, leaving it in the hidden view for the life of the popup.
+let revealGeneration = 0;
+
+// True only if the reveal that captured `generation` is still the live one:
+// the screen has not been left, cleared, or re-entered for another address
+// since it started.
+function isCurrentReveal(generation) {
+    return (
+        generation === revealGeneration &&
+        walletIndex !== null &&
+        addressIndex !== null &&
+        state.currentView === VIEW
+    );
+}
+
+function fail(message) {
+    $("export-privkey-flash").textContent = message;
+    $("export-privkey-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
+}
+
+// Wipe every trace of the key and drop the address selection. Safe to call
+// when nothing was ever revealed, and safe to call twice.
+function clear() {
+    walletIndex = null;
+    addressIndex = null;
+    revealGeneration += 1;
+    $("export-privkey-value").textContent = "";
+    $("export-privkey-password").value = "";
+    $("export-privkey-result").classList.add("hidden");
+    $("export-privkey-password-section").classList.remove("hidden");
+    $("export-privkey-flash").textContent = "";
+    $("export-privkey-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
+}
+
+function show(walletIdx, addrIdx) {
+    const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
+    const addr = wallet && wallet.addresses[addrIdx];
+    if (!addr) {
+        showFlash("That address is no longer available.");
+        return;
+    }
+    clear();
+    walletIndex = walletIdx;
+    addressIndex = addrIdx;
+
+    const blockieEl = $("export-privkey-jazzicon");
+    blockieEl.innerHTML = "";
+    const img = document.createElement("img");
+    img.src = makeBlockie(addr.address);
+    img.width = 48;
+    img.height = 48;
+    img.style.imageRendering = "pixelated";
+    img.style.borderRadius = "50%";
+    blockieEl.appendChild(img);
+
+    $("export-privkey-title").textContent =
+        wallet.name + " — Address " + (addrIdx + 1);
+    const addrContainer = $("export-privkey-dot").parentElement;
+    addrContainer.innerHTML = renderAddressHtml(addr.address);
+    attachCopyHandlers(addrContainer);
+
+    // Pushed here rather than by the caller: this function can return
+    // without navigating, and a push that happened anyway would leave an
+    // entry on the stack that no screen transition matches.
+    pushCurrentView();
+    showView(VIEW);
+}
+
+async function reveal() {
+    const password = $("export-privkey-password").value;
+    if (!password) {
+        fail("Password is required.");
+        return;
+    }
+    if (walletIndex === null) {
+        fail("No address is selected.");
+        return;
+    }
+    const wallet = state.wallets[walletIndex];
+
+    const btn = $("btn-export-privkey-confirm");
+    btn.disabled = true;
+    btn.classList.add("text-muted");
+    const generation = revealGeneration;
+    try {
+        const secret = await decryptWithPassword(
+            wallet.encryptedSecret,
+            password,
+        );
+        // The only suspension point in this view, and the gate on the only
+        // place a secret is written: if the screen was left while the
+        // decrypt ran, the wipe has already happened, so the key is not
+        // even derived, let alone written.
+        if (!isCurrentReveal(generation)) return;
+        const signer = getSignerForAddress(wallet, addressIndex, secret);
+        $("export-privkey-password").value = "";
+        $("export-privkey-password-section").classList.add("hidden");
+        $("export-privkey-value").textContent = signer.privateKey;
+        $("export-privkey-result").classList.remove("hidden");
+        $("export-privkey-flash").textContent = "";
+        $("export-privkey-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
+    } catch {
+        if (!isCurrentReveal(generation)) return;
+        fail("That password is not correct. Please try again.");
+    } finally {
+        btn.disabled = false;
+        btn.classList.remove("text-muted");
+    }
+}
+
+function init() {
+    onViewLeave(VIEW, clear);
+
+    // No wipe here: goBack() routes through showView(), which runs the
+    // leave hook. A per-button wipe would only cover this one path.
+    $("btn-export-privkey-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
+        goBack();
+    });
+
+    $("btn-export-privkey-confirm").addEventListener("click", reveal);
+
+    $("export-privkey-value").addEventListener("click", () => {
+        const key = $("export-privkey-value").textContent;
+        if (!key) return;
+        navigator.clipboard.writeText(key);
+        showFlash("Copied!");
+        flashCopyFeedback($("export-privkey-value"));
+    });
+}
+
+module.exports = { init, show };

src/popup/views/send.js

@@ -12,8 +12,9 @@ const {
 const { state, currentAddress } = require("../../shared/state");
 let ctx;
 const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
-const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS, resolveSymbol } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
+const { resolveSymbol } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
 const { isLowHolderCount } = require("../../shared/holders");
+const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("../../shared/symbolSpoof");
 const { getAddress } = require("ethers");
 
 const ZERO_ADDRESS = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
@@ -116,14 +117,6 @@ function updateToValidation() {
     }
 }
 
-function isSpoofedToken(t) {
-    const upper = (t.symbol || "").toUpperCase();
-    if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(upper)) return false;
-    const legit = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(upper);
-    if (legit === null) return true;
-    return t.address.toLowerCase() !== legit;
-}
-
 function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
     const sel = $("send-token");
     sel.innerHTML = '<option value="ETH">ETH</option>';
@@ -131,7 +124,7 @@ function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
         (state.fraudContracts || []).map((a) => a.toLowerCase()),
     );
     for (const t of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
-        if (isSpoofedToken(t)) continue;
+        if (isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address)) continue;
         if (fraudSet.has(t.address.toLowerCase())) continue;
         // An unknown holder count does not withhold a token the user holds:
         // only a count the explorer actually reported as below the threshold

src/popup/views/txStatus.js

@@ -16,11 +16,36 @@ const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
 const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
 const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
 
+// Receipt poll cadence and the deadline after which the wait is reported as
+// a timeout. Both are documented in the WaitTx section of README.md.
+const POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 10000;
+const TIMEOUT_MS = 60000;
+
+// How many receipt lookups may fail in a row before the wait is ended and
+// the failure reported. A lookup that throws says nothing about the
+// transaction, so one must not end the wait — but an RPC that never answers
+// (a mistyped URL in settings is the ordinary case) must not leave the wait
+// running forever either, least of all a persisted one that every popup
+// open would resume. Six is 60 seconds at the poll cadence: the same
+// patience the confirmation deadline gets. Any lookup that answers, with a
+// receipt or with null, resets the count.
+const MAX_CONSECUTIVE_LOOKUP_FAILURES = 6;
+
 let ctx;
 let elapsedTimer = null;
 let pollTimer = null;
 
-function clearTimers() {
+// Identifies the wait currently on screen. Bumped by endWait(), so a timer
+// callback or an in-flight receipt lookup that outlives its wait can tell
+// that it is stale and leave the current view alone. Without it, a receipt
+// resolving after the wait has ended renders over whatever view replaced it.
+let waitId = 0;
+
+// End the wait on screen: stop its timers and invalidate its pending async
+// work. Called on receipt, on timeout, when a new wait starts, and when the
+// user navigates away.
+function endWait() {
+    waitId++;
     if (elapsedTimer) {
         clearInterval(elapsedTimer);
         elapsedTimer = null;
@@ -47,8 +72,13 @@ function blockNumberHtml(blockNumber) {
     return copyableHtml(num) + etherscanLinkHtml(link);
 }
 
-function showWait(txInfo, txHash) {
+// Render the wait view and start polling for the receipt. broadcastTime is
-    clearTimers();
+// when the transaction was broadcast, which is what the elapsed counter and
+// the timeout deadline are both measured from; pollNow runs one lookup
+// immediately instead of waiting a full poll interval.
+function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
+    endWait();
+    const id = waitId;
 
     const symbol = txInfo.token === "ETH" ? "ETH" : txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?";
     $("wait-tx-summary").textContent = txInfo.amount + " " + symbol;
@@ -56,41 +86,130 @@ function showWait(txInfo, txHash) {
     $("wait-tx-hash").innerHTML = txHashHtml(txHash);
     attachCopyHandlers("view-wait-tx");
 
-    const broadcastTime = Date.now();
+    // Persisted so closing and reopening the popup resumes this wait
-    $("wait-tx-status").textContent = "Waiting for confirmation... 0s";
+    // instead of silently abandoning it.
+    state.viewData = {
+        pendingWait: {
+            txInfo: txInfo,
+            hash: txHash,
+            broadcastTime: broadcastTime,
+        },
+    };
 
-    elapsedTimer = setInterval(() => {
+    function renderElapsed() {
         const elapsed = Math.floor((Date.now() - broadcastTime) / 1000);
         $("wait-tx-status").textContent =
             "Waiting for confirmation... " + elapsed + "s";
+    }
+    renderElapsed();
+
+    elapsedTimer = setInterval(() => {
+        if (id !== waitId) return;
+        renderElapsed();
     }, 1000);
 
     const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
-    pollTimer = setInterval(async () => {
+    let consecutiveFailures = 0;
+
+    async function poll() {
+        if (id !== waitId) return;
+        let receipt = null;
+        let answered = true;
         try {
-            const receipt = await provider.getTransactionReceipt(txHash);
+            receipt = await provider.getTransactionReceipt(txHash);
-            if (receipt) {
-                showSuccess(txInfo, txHash, receipt.blockNumber);
-            }
         } catch (e) {
+            // A thrown lookup means "no answer this tick", not "no
+            // receipt": the RPC failed, the chain said nothing. Declaring
+            // the timeout off it would report a confirmed transaction as
+            // failed — which matters most on a resumed wait, where the
+            // first poll is already past the deadline.
+            answered = false;
             log.errorf("poll receipt failed:", e.message);
         }
-
+        // The lookup is async: the wait may have ended while it was in
-        const elapsed = Math.floor((Date.now() - broadcastTime) / 1000);
+        // flight, in which case this result must not touch the view.
-        if (elapsed >= 60) {
+        if (id !== waitId) return;
+        // Exactly one outcome per wait. A receipt wins even on the tick
+        // that crosses the deadline, because the transaction did confirm.
+        if (receipt) {
+            showSuccess(txInfo, txHash, receipt.blockNumber);
+            return;
+        }
+        if (!answered) {
+            consecutiveFailures++;
+            // The failure is the user's news, and it is a different fact
+            // from "the transaction did not confirm" — the chain was never
+            // asked. Ending the wait here is what keeps it bounded and
+            // gives the user a Done button to leave by.
+            if (consecutiveFailures >= MAX_CONSECUTIVE_LOOKUP_FAILURES) {
+                showError(
+                    txInfo,
+                    txHash,
+                    "The network could not be reached to check this transaction — " +
+                        MAX_CONSECUTIVE_LOOKUP_FAILURES +
+                        " lookups failed in a row. Check the RPC URL in Settings. The transaction may still have confirmed — check Etherscan.",
+                );
+            }
+            // Otherwise keep polling: the next tick may answer.
+            return;
+        }
+        consecutiveFailures = 0;
+        if (Date.now() - broadcastTime >= TIMEOUT_MS) {
             showError(
                 txInfo,
                 txHash,
                 "Transaction was not confirmed within 60 seconds. It may still confirm later \u2014 check Etherscan.",
             );
         }
-    }, 10000);
+    }
+
+    pollTimer = setInterval(poll, POLL_INTERVAL_MS);
 
     showView("wait-tx");
+
+    if (pollNow) poll();
+}
+
+function showWait(txInfo, txHash) {
+    startWait(txInfo, txHash, Date.now(), false);
+}
+
+// Resume a wait persisted by a previous popup session. The deadline still
+// runs from the original broadcast, so a wait that has already outlived it
+// resolves on the immediate first poll rather than restarting the clock.
+// Returns false when there is nothing resumable to resume. Every field
+// startWait() goes on to use is validated, not just the presence of the
+// containers: txInfo.to reaches addressTitle(), which calls
+// address.toLowerCase(), and txInfo.amount is rendered into the summary, so
+// an object merely missing one of them throws a TypeError out of
+// restoreView() — which init() does not guard, skipping the rest of popup
+// init and leaving wait-tx on screen with no back control. A non-numeric
+// broadcastTime leaves an unexitable wait counting "NaNs". txInfo.token and
+// txInfo.tokenSymbol are deliberately unchecked: they are compared and
+// coalesced rather than dereferenced, and tokenSymbol is null for ETH.
+function restoreWait() {
+    const d = state.viewData;
+    if (!d || !d.pendingWait) return false;
+    const w = d.pendingWait;
+    if (!w.hash) return false;
+    // typeof [] is "object", so an array passes an object check.
+    const info = w.txInfo;
+    if (!info || typeof info !== "object" || Array.isArray(info)) return false;
+    // A string is the whole requirement: the empty string is what a
+    // contract-deployment approval persists (approval.js writes `to: toAddr
+    // || ""`), and both fields render harmlessly when empty, so refusing it
+    // would abandon a wait the live path itself created.
+    if (typeof info.to !== "string") return false;
+    if (typeof info.amount !== "string") return false;
+    if (typeof w.broadcastTime !== "number" || !isFinite(w.broadcastTime)) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    startWait(w.txInfo, w.hash, w.broadcastTime, true);
+    return true;
 }
 
 function showSuccess(txInfo, txHash, blockNumber) {
-    clearTimers();
+    endWait();
 
     const symbol = txInfo.token === "ETH" ? "ETH" : txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?";
     state.viewData = {
@@ -182,7 +301,7 @@ function renderSuccess() {
 }
 
 function showError(txInfo, txHash, message) {
-    clearTimers();
+    endWait();
 
     const symbol = txInfo.token === "ETH" ? "ETH" : txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?";
     state.viewData = {
@@ -218,6 +337,9 @@ function isApprovalPopup() {
 }
 
 function navigateBack() {
+    // Nothing should still be polling by now, but leaving a view is the
+    // point at which its timers must be gone.
+    endWait();
     if (isApprovalPopup()) {
         window.close();
         return;
@@ -242,4 +364,12 @@ function init(_ctx) {
     $("btn-error-tx-done").addEventListener("click", navigateBack);
 }
 
-module.exports = { init, showWait, showError, renderSuccess, renderError };
+module.exports = {
+    init,
+    showWait,
+    restoreWait,
+    endWait,
+    showError,
+    renderSuccess,
+    renderError,
+};

src/shared/balances.js

@@ -11,8 +11,9 @@ const {
 const { ERC20_ABI } = require("./constants");
 const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
 const { deriveAddressFromXpub } = require("./wallet");
-const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS, TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
+const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
 const { LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD, parseHoldersCount } = require("./holders");
+const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
 
 // Use a static network to skip auto-detection (which can fail and cause
 // "could not coalesce error" on some RPC endpoints like Cloudflare).
@@ -89,15 +90,11 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
             // Skip spam tokens the user never asked to see
             if (!isKnown && !isTracked && !hasEnoughHolders) continue;
 
-            // Skip tokens spoofing a known symbol from a different address
+            // Skip tokens spoofing a known symbol from a different address.
-            const sym = (item.token.symbol || "").toUpperCase();
+            // Every row here is an ERC-20 the explorer reported, so it has a
-            const legitAddr = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(sym);
+            // contract address; the native ETH balance is fetched over RPC in
-            if (
+            // refreshBalances and never passes through this loop.
-                legitAddr !== undefined &&
+            if (isSpoofedSymbol(item.token.symbol, tokenAddr)) continue;
-                legitAddr !== null &&
-                tokenAddr !== legitAddr
-            )
-                continue;
 
             balances.push({
                 address: item.token.address_hash,

src/shared/symbolSpoof.js

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+// The known-symbol spoof rule, in one place.
+//
+// A token that borrows a known symbol from a contract that is not the one
+// that symbol belongs to is a spoof, and the wallet hides it.  Three surfaces
+// ask that question — the transaction history, the Send token selector and
+// the balance list — and they must answer it identically: a token the history
+// calls fake while the balance list lists it as a holding is worse than
+// either verdict alone, because the balance list is where the user forms
+// their belief about what they own (issue #235).
+//
+// KNOWN_SYMBOLS maps a symbol to the lowercased contract address that may
+// bear it, or to null.  Null means the symbol belongs to the native asset,
+// which has no contract at all, so no contract may bear it and every one
+// that does is a spoof.  "ETH" is the only such entry today; the rule is
+// written so that a second one needs no change here or at any call site.
+
+const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS } = require("./tokenList");
+
+// Ethereum addresses are case-insensitive: EIP-55 mixed case is a checksum
+// over the address, not part of its identity.
+function normalizeAddress(addr) {
+    return (addr || "").toLowerCase();
+}
+
+// True when a token bearing `symbol` from contract `contractAddress` is
+// impersonating a known symbol.
+//
+// An empty contract address is the native asset, which is never a spoof:
+// this is what keeps the user's real ETH out of the rule, and it holds for
+// any symbol that becomes null-mapped later, not just for ETH.
+function isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, contractAddress) {
+    const contract = normalizeAddress(contractAddress);
+    if (!contract) return false;
+    const sym = (symbol || "").toUpperCase();
+    if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(sym)) return false;
+    const legit = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(sym);
+    if (legit === null) return true;
+    return contract !== normalizeAddress(legit);
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+    isSpoofedSymbol,
+};

src/shared/transactions.js

@@ -8,8 +8,9 @@
 
 const { formatEther, formatUnits } = require("ethers");
 const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
-const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS, TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
+const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
 const { parseHoldersCount, isLowHolderCount } = require("./holders");
+const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
 
 // Ethereum addresses are case-insensitive: EIP-55 mixed case is a checksum
 // over the address, not part of its identity.  Every address comparison in
@@ -245,18 +246,6 @@ async function fetchRecentTransactions(address, blockscoutUrl, count = 25) {
     return result;
 }
 
-// Check if a token transfer is spoofing a known symbol.
-// Returns true if the symbol matches a known token but the contract
-// address doesn't match the legitimate one.
-function isSpoofedSymbol(tx) {
-    if (!tx.contractAddress) return false;
-    const symbol = (tx.symbol || "").toUpperCase();
-    if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(symbol)) return false;
-    const legit = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(symbol);
-    if (legit === null) return true; // "ETH" as ERC-20 is always fake
-    return normalizeAddress(tx.contractAddress) !== normalizeAddress(legit);
-}
-
 // Pure filter function. Takes raw transactions and filter settings,
 // returns { transactions, newFraudContracts }.
 function filterTransactions(txs, filters = {}) {
@@ -283,7 +272,7 @@ function filterTransactions(txs, filters = {}) {
         const contract = normalizeAddress(tx.contractAddress);
 
         // Filter spoofed known symbols and record the fraud contract
-        if (hideSpoofed && isSpoofedSymbol(tx)) {
+        if (hideSpoofed && isSpoofedSymbol(tx.symbol, tx.contractAddress)) {
             if (contract && !fraudSet.has(contract)) {
                 fraudSet.add(contract);
                 newFraud.push(contract);

tests/exportPrivkey.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
+// Tests for the private key export screen (issue #221).
+//
+// The screen holds the one secret that owns an address outright, so what is
+// pinned here is disposal: the key is wiped from the DOM whenever the screen
+// is left by any route, and a decrypt still in flight when the screen is
+// left never writes at all. That last case is the one a per-button wipe and
+// a naive leave hook both miss — the write lands after the wipe, with
+// nothing scheduled to wipe it again.
+//
+// The view is driven against a minimal DOM stub rather than a real browser:
+// the module is deliberately shaped like src/popup/views/showPhrase.js, with
+// no dependency that needs a document beyond the nodes it reads and writes.
+
+const mockPrivateKey = "0x" + "ab".repeat(32);
+
+jest.mock("ethereum-blockies-base64", () => () => "");
+jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
+    decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
+}));
+jest.mock("../src/shared/wallet", () => ({
+    getSignerForAddress: jest.fn(() => ({ privateKey: mockPrivateKey })),
+}));
+
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/popup/restorableViews");
+
+const VIEW = "export-privkey";
+const PASSWORD = "correct horse battery";
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------ DOM stub
+
+function makeElement(id, withParent) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        listeners: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
+            el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
+            el.listeners[name].push(fn);
+        },
+        appendChild: () => {},
+        remove: () => {},
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+    };
+    el.parentElement = withParent ? makeElement(id + "-parent", false) : null;
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id, true));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created", false),
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------ harness
+
+function load() {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    globalThis.chrome = {
+        storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+    };
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+
+    const helpers = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+    const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+    const vault = require("../src/shared/vault");
+    const wallet = require("../src/shared/wallet");
+    const exportPrivkey = require("../src/popup/views/exportPrivkey");
+
+    state.wallets = [
+        {
+            name: "Wallet 1",
+            type: "key",
+            encryptedSecret: "ciphertext",
+            addresses: [
+                {
+                    address: "0x" + "11".repeat(20),
+                    balance: "0.0000",
+                    tokenBalances: [],
+                },
+                {
+                    address: "0x" + "22".repeat(20),
+                    balance: "0.0000",
+                    tokenBalances: [],
+                },
+            ],
+        },
+    ];
+    state.viewStack = [];
+    state.currentView = "address";
+
+    exportPrivkey.init();
+    return { helpers, state, vault, wallet, exportPrivkey };
+}
+
+function click(id) {
+    const el = globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+    return Promise.all((el.listeners.click || []).map((fn) => fn()));
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+// Start a reveal and hand back both the promise it returns and the resolver
+// for the decrypt it is waiting on, so a test can navigate away mid-flight.
+function startReveal(vault) {
+    let resolveDecrypt;
+    let rejectDecrypt;
+    vault.decryptWithPassword.mockImplementation(
+        () =>
+            new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+                resolveDecrypt = resolve;
+                rejectDecrypt = reject;
+            }),
+    );
+    node("export-privkey-password").value = PASSWORD;
+    const pending = click("btn-export-privkey-confirm");
+    return {
+        pending,
+        resolve: (v) => resolveDecrypt(v),
+        reject: (e) => rejectDecrypt(e),
+    };
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------ tests
+
+describe("a decrypt still running when the screen is left", () => {
+    // The load-bearing case. Without the liveness guard in reveal(), the
+    // write lands after the leave hook has already wiped, and the key sits
+    // in the hidden view for the life of the popup.
+    test("never writes the key into the DOM", async () => {
+        const { helpers, vault, wallet, exportPrivkey } = load();
+        exportPrivkey.show(0, 0);
+
+        const reveal = startReveal(vault);
+        // The settings gear, mid-decrypt.
+        helpers.showView("settings");
+        reveal.resolve("wallet secret");
+        await reveal.pending;
+
+        expect(node("export-privkey-value").textContent).toBe("");
+        // Nothing was even derived: the guard sits in front of the
+        // derivation, not just in front of the write.
+        expect(wallet.getSignerForAddress).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    // The generation counter, not merely the current-view check: by the time
+    // the stale decrypt resolves the user is back on the screen, so a guard
+    // that only asked "is this view showing?" would let the write through.
+    test("never writes it after the screen is re-entered", async () => {
+        const { helpers, vault, exportPrivkey } = load();
+        exportPrivkey.show(0, 0);
+
+        const stale = startReveal(vault);
+        helpers.showView("settings");
+        exportPrivkey.show(0, 1);
+        expect(node("export-privkey-value").textContent).toBe("");
+
+        stale.resolve("wallet secret");
+        await stale.pending;
+
+        expect(node("export-privkey-value").textContent).toBe("");
+        expect(node("export-privkey-result").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(
+            true,
+        );
+    });
+
+    // Same hole on the failure path: a wrong-password error written after
+    // the wipe would restore the flash line on a screen the user has left.
+    test("never writes the failure message either", async () => {
+        const { helpers, vault, exportPrivkey } = load();
+        exportPrivkey.show(0, 0);
+
+        const reveal = startReveal(vault);
+        helpers.showView("settings");
+        reveal.reject(new Error("decryption failed"));
+        await reveal.pending;
+
+        expect(node("export-privkey-flash").textContent).toBe("");
+        expect(node("export-privkey-flash").style.visibility).toBe("hidden");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a reveal that is not interrupted", () => {
+    // Guards the guard: a liveness check that rejected every write would
+    // pass every test above and ship a screen that reveals nothing.
+    test("puts the key on screen", async () => {
+        const { vault, exportPrivkey } = load();
+        exportPrivkey.show(0, 0);
+
+        const reveal = startReveal(vault);
+        reveal.resolve("wallet secret");
+        await reveal.pending;
+
+        expect(node("export-privkey-value").textContent).toBe(mockPrivateKey);
+        expect(node("export-privkey-result").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(
+            false,
+        );
+        // The password is dropped as soon as it has been spent.
+        expect(node("export-privkey-password").value).toBe("");
+    });
+
+    test("writes nothing before the password is accepted", async () => {
+        const { vault, exportPrivkey } = load();
+        exportPrivkey.show(0, 0);
+
+        const reveal = startReveal(vault);
+        expect(node("export-privkey-value").textContent).toBe("");
+        reveal.resolve("wallet secret");
+        await reveal.pending;
+    });
+
+    test("reveals nothing when the password is wrong", async () => {
+        const { vault, exportPrivkey } = load();
+        exportPrivkey.show(0, 0);
+
+        const reveal = startReveal(vault);
+        reveal.reject(new Error("decryption failed"));
+        await reveal.pending;
+
+        expect(node("export-privkey-value").textContent).toBe("");
+        expect(node("export-privkey-flash").textContent).toBe(
+            "That password is not correct. Please try again.",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("leaving the screen after the key is on it", () => {
+    async function revealed() {
+        const loaded = load();
+        loaded.exportPrivkey.show(0, 0);
+        const reveal = startReveal(loaded.vault);
+        reveal.resolve("wallet secret");
+        await reveal.pending;
+        expect(node("export-privkey-value").textContent).toBe(mockPrivateKey);
+        return loaded;
+    }
+
+    test("the Back button clears the key", async () => {
+        await revealed();
+        await click("btn-export-privkey-back");
+
+        expect(node("export-privkey-value").textContent).toBe("");
+        expect(node("export-privkey-password").value).toBe("");
+    });
+
+    test("the settings gear clears the key", async () => {
+        const { helpers } = await revealed();
+        helpers.showView("settings");
+
+        expect(node("export-privkey-value").textContent).toBe("");
+        expect(node("export-privkey-password").value).toBe("");
+        // And the screen is back to its password prompt, not to a result
+        // panel that would flash an empty well on the next visit.
+        expect(node("export-privkey-result").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(
+            true,
+        );
+        expect(
+            node("export-privkey-password-section").classList.contains(
+                "hidden",
+            ),
+        ).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    // Any other navigation: the same hook covers routes that do not exist
+    // yet, which is the point of registering it on the view rather than on
+    // the controls that leave it.
+    test("any other navigation clears the key", async () => {
+        const { helpers } = await revealed();
+        helpers.showView("main");
+
+        expect(node("export-privkey-value").textContent).toBe("");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("views the popup may reopen onto", () => {
+    // Restoring onto this screen would put a private key on display with no
+    // password prompt in front of it, on a popup reopened by accident.
+    test("the private key export screen is not restorable", () => {
+        expect(RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(VIEW)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("it is still a registered view", () => {
+        const { helpers } = load();
+        expect(helpers.VIEWS).toContain(VIEW);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the key cannot reach the logger", () => {
+    const fs = require("fs");
+    const path = require("path");
+    const source = fs.readFileSync(
+        path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "popup", "views", "exportPrivkey.js"),
+        "utf8",
+    );
+
+    test("the view does not import src/shared/log.js", () => {
+        expect(source).not.toMatch(/require\(["'][^"']*shared\/log["']\)/);
+    });
+
+    test("the view calls no logger method", () => {
+        expect(source).not.toMatch(/\blog\.(debugf|infof|warnf|errorf)\b/);
+    });
+});

tests/symbolSpoof.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
+// Tests for the known-symbol spoof rule (src/shared/symbolSpoof.js) and for
+// its application on all three surfaces that show tokens: the transaction
+// history, the Send token selector, and the balance list.
+//
+// Issue #235: the three surfaces disagreed about what a `null` entry in
+// KNOWN_SYMBOLS means.  The history and the selector read it as "no contract
+// may bear this symbol" and filtered a fake `ETH` ERC-20; the balance list
+// read it as "no comparison is possible" and listed the fake token next to
+// the user's real ETH, which is where a user forms their belief about what
+// they own.  The rule now lives in one module, so a fourth surface cannot
+// reintroduce a fourth reading, and these tests assert the same attack on
+// each surface.
+//
+// Nothing here touches the network: global.fetch is a throwing stub and the
+// only fetch path in the modules under test (debugFetch, from
+// src/shared/log) is mocked at the module boundary.
+
+// The RPC provider is replaced so that refreshBalances can be driven end to
+// end: the native balance it reports must survive a balance list in which
+// every ERC-20 row is a fake ETH.  Everything else in ethers is the real
+// module, including the formatters the assertions depend on.
+jest.mock("ethers", () => {
+    const actual = jest.requireActual("ethers");
+    class StubProvider {
+        async getBalance() {
+            return 1234500000000000000n;
+        }
+        async lookupAddress() {
+            return null;
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        ...actual,
+        JsonRpcProvider: StubProvider,
+        Network: { from: () => ({}) },
+    };
+});
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
+    log: {
+        debugf: () => {},
+        infof: () => {},
+        warnf: () => {},
+        errorf: () => {},
+    },
+    debugFetch: jest.fn(),
+    setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
+    isDebug: () => false,
+}));
+
+global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
+    throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
+});
+global.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("../src/shared/symbolSpoof");
+const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS } = require("../src/shared/tokenList");
+const { filterTransactions } = require("../src/shared/transactions");
+const {
+    fetchTokenBalances,
+    refreshBalances,
+} = require("../src/shared/balances");
+const { renderSendTokenSelect } = require("../src/popup/views/send");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const { debugFetch } = require("../src/shared/log");
+
+// The fake "Ethereum" token with symbol "ETH" from the attack documented in
+// README.md, given a holder count high enough to clear every other filter so
+// that only the known-symbol rule can catch it.
+const FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT = "0xd05339f9ea5ab9d9f03b9d57f671d2abd1f55c82";
+const HOLDER = "0x66133e8ea0f5d1d612d2502a968757d1048c214a";
+const USDC_CONTRACT = "0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48";
+const WETH_CONTRACT = "0xc02aaa39b223fe8d0a0e5c4f27ead9083c756cc2";
+const BLOCKSCOUT = "https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2";
+
+describe("the shared rule", () => {
+    test('"ETH" is still the null-mapped symbol these tests assume', () => {
+        expect(KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("ETH")).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("a contract bearing a null-mapped symbol is a spoof", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("even a genuine contract may not bear a null-mapped symbol", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("ETH", WETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("the native asset carries no contract and is never a spoof", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("ETH", null)).toBe(false);
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("ETH", undefined)).toBe(false);
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("ETH", "")).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    // The native exemption is "has no contract address", not "the symbol is
+    // ETH".  A second null-mapped symbol added to the table later inherits
+    // both halves of the rule without any call site being revisited.
+    test("a newly null-mapped symbol behaves the same way", () => {
+        const added = !KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has("XTZTEST");
+        KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set("XTZTEST", null);
+        try {
+            expect(isSpoofedSymbol("XTZTEST", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
+            expect(isSpoofedSymbol("XTZTEST", null)).toBe(false);
+        } finally {
+            if (added) KNOWN_SYMBOLS.delete("XTZTEST");
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("a known symbol from its own contract is not a spoof", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("USDC", USDC_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("usdc", USDC_CONTRACT.toUpperCase())).toBe(
+            false,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a known symbol from another contract is a spoof", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("USDC", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("a symbol that is not in the table is not judged here", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("SPAMTKN", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("surface 1: the transaction history", () => {
+    function fakeEthTransfer() {
+        return {
+            hash: "0x" + "1".repeat(64),
+            symbol: "ETH",
+            contractAddress: FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT,
+            holders: 900000,
+            valueGwei: null,
+            isContractCall: false,
+        };
+    }
+
+    test("a fake ETH token transfer is filtered", () => {
+        const result = filterTransactions([fakeEthTransfer()], {
+            hideSpoofedSymbols: true,
+            hideFraudContracts: true,
+            hideLowHolderTokens: true,
+            hideDustTransactions: true,
+            dustThresholdGwei: 100000,
+        });
+        expect(result.transactions).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("a real native ETH transfer survives", () => {
+        const native = {
+            hash: "0x" + "2".repeat(64),
+            symbol: "ETH",
+            contractAddress: null,
+            holders: null,
+            valueGwei: 5000000,
+            isContractCall: false,
+        };
+        const result = filterTransactions([native], {
+            hideSpoofedSymbols: true,
+            hideFraudContracts: true,
+            hideLowHolderTokens: true,
+            hideDustTransactions: true,
+            dustThresholdGwei: 100000,
+        });
+        expect(result.transactions).toEqual([native]);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("surface 2: the Send token selector", () => {
+    let select;
+
+    function render(tokenBalances) {
+        select = { innerHTML: "", children: [] };
+        select.appendChild = (child) => select.children.push(child);
+        globalThis.document = {
+            getElementById: (id) => (id === "send-token" ? select : null),
+            createElement: () => ({ value: "", textContent: "" }),
+        };
+        renderSendTokenSelect({
+            address: "0x" + "a".repeat(40),
+            tokenBalances,
+        });
+    }
+
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        state.fraudContracts = [];
+        state.hideLowHolderTokens = true;
+    });
+
+    test("a fake ETH token is not selectable", () => {
+        render([
+            {
+                address: FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT,
+                symbol: "ETH",
+                decimals: 18,
+                balance: "0.005",
+                holders: 900000,
+            },
+        ]);
+        expect(select.children).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("native ETH remains the always-present option", () => {
+        render([]);
+        expect(select.innerHTML).toBe('<option value="ETH">ETH</option>');
+    });
+});
+
+describe("surface 3: the balance list", () => {
+    function respondWith(items) {
+        debugFetch.mockImplementation(async () => ({
+            ok: true,
+            status: 200,
+            statusText: "OK",
+            json: async () => items,
+        }));
+    }
+
+    function fakeEthItem(overrides = {}) {
+        return {
+            value: "5000000000000000",
+            token: {
+                type: "ERC-20",
+                address_hash: FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT,
+                symbol: "ETH",
+                name: "Ethereum",
+                decimals: "18",
+                holders_count: "900000",
+                ...overrides,
+            },
+        };
+    }
+
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        debugFetch.mockReset();
+    });
+
+    // The bug in issue #235: this token cleared the balance list's own
+    // 1,000-holder floor and was listed as a holding named ETH.
+    test("a fake ETH token clearing the holder floor is filtered", async () => {
+        respondWith([fakeEthItem()]);
+        expect(await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [])).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("tracking the fake token manually does not admit it either", async () => {
+        respondWith([fakeEthItem({ holders_count: "0" })]);
+        const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [
+            { address: FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT },
+        ]);
+        expect(balances).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("a genuine token keeps its place in the list", async () => {
+        respondWith([
+            fakeEthItem({
+                address_hash: USDC_CONTRACT,
+                symbol: "USDC",
+                name: "USD Coin",
+                decimals: "6",
+            }),
+        ]);
+        const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, []);
+        expect(balances).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(balances[0].symbol).toBe("USDC");
+    });
+
+    // The trap in this change: the user's real ETH balance is not an ERC-20
+    // and is fetched over RPC in refreshBalances, so it never passes through
+    // this loop at all.  An explorer row that is not an ERC-20 is dropped
+    // before the symbol rule is consulted.
+    test("a non-ERC-20 row claiming ETH never reaches the symbol rule", async () => {
+        respondWith([fakeEthItem({ type: "ERC-721" })]);
+        expect(await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [])).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    // The money test: the user holds real ETH and has been airdropped a fake
+    // ETH ERC-20.  The fake is gone from the list of tokens; the real balance
+    // is exactly what the node reported.
+    test("the real native ETH balance survives a fake ETH airdrop", async () => {
+        respondWith([fakeEthItem()]);
+        const addr = { address: HOLDER };
+        await refreshBalances(
+            [{ addresses: [addr] }],
+            "https://rpc.example.invalid",
+            BLOCKSCOUT,
+            [],
+        );
+        expect(addr.balance).toBe("1.2345");
+        expect(addr.tokenBalances).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("no test in this file performed a network request", () => {
+        expect(global.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+});

tests/txStatus.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+// Lifecycle tests for the post-broadcast transaction status views
+// (src/popup/views/txStatus.js).
+//
+// The bug these pin down: the receipt poll rendered both outcomes on the tick
+// that crossed the 60-second deadline, so a confirmed transaction was replaced
+// by "not confirmed within 60 seconds" — the user is told their transaction
+// failed when it succeeded. The same shape applies to any callback that
+// outlives its wait: a receipt lookup still in flight when the view is left
+// must not render over whatever replaced it.
+//
+// Fake timers make the race deterministic: the receipt promise is already
+// resolved when the deadline tick runs, so in the unfixed code showSuccess()
+// is always followed by showError() on that tick.
+//
+// No network: getProvider is mocked at the module boundary and there is no
+// jsdom in this repo, so the handful of DOM calls these views make are served
+// by the stub below.
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
+    log: {
+        debugf: () => {},
+        infof: () => {},
+        warnf: () => {},
+        errorf: () => {},
+    },
+    debugFetch: jest.fn(),
+    setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
+    isDebug: () => false,
+}));
+
+const mockReceiptLookup = jest.fn();
+jest.mock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
+    getProvider: () => ({ getTransactionReceipt: mockReceiptLookup }),
+    refreshBalances: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
+    throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
+});
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Minimal DOM. Every element is created on demand and remembered by id, so a
+// test can read back what a view wrote into it.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const elements = new Map();
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set(["view", "hidden"]);
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        style: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (c) => classes.add(c),
+            remove: (c) => classes.delete(c),
+            contains: (c) => classes.has(c),
+            toggle: (c, on) => (on ? classes.add(c) : classes.delete(c)),
+        },
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        remove: () => {},
+        prepend: () => {},
+    };
+    // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+    Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
+        get: () => getElement(id + "-parent"),
+    });
+    return el;
+}
+
+function getElement(id) {
+    if (!elements.has(id)) elements.set(id, makeElement(id));
+    return elements.get(id);
+}
+
+global.document = {
+    getElementById: (id) => getElement(id),
+    // escapeHtml() builds a detached div; textContent in, escaped HTML out.
+    createElement: () => {
+        const el = { innerHTML: "" };
+        Object.defineProperty(el, "textContent", {
+            set(v) {
+                el.innerHTML = String(v)
+                    .replace(/&/g, "&")
+                    .replace(/</g, "&lt;")
+                    .replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
+            },
+        });
+        return el;
+    },
+    body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    addEventListener: () => {},
+};
+
+global.window = { location: { search: "" } };
+
+const stored = {};
+global.chrome = {
+    storage: {
+        local: {
+            set: (obj) => {
+                Object.assign(stored, obj);
+                return Promise.resolve();
+            },
+            get: () => Promise.resolve(stored),
+        },
+    },
+};
+
+const txStatus = require("../src/popup/views/txStatus");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/popup/restorableViews");
+
+const TX_HASH =
+    "0x85215772ed26ea8b39c2b3b18779030487efbe0b5fd7e882592b2f62b837be84";
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+const TX_INFO = {
+    to: RECIPIENT,
+    amount: "0.0050",
+    token: "ETH",
+    tokenSymbol: null,
+};
+
+// True when a view element is not hidden.
+function visible(view) {
+    return !getElement("view-" + view).classList.contains("hidden");
+}
+
+function waitStatusText() {
+    return getElement("wait-tx-status").textContent;
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    jest.useFakeTimers();
+    jest.setSystemTime(new Date("2026-08-11T12:00:00Z"));
+    elements.clear();
+    mockReceiptLookup.mockReset();
+    state.wallets = [];
+    state.viewData = {};
+    state.viewStack = [];
+    state.currentView = null;
+    txStatus.init({ doRefreshAndRender: jest.fn() });
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    txStatus.endWait();
+    jest.useRealTimers();
+});
+
+describe("WaitTx receipt/timeout race", () => {
+    test("a receipt arriving on the deadline tick leaves the user on SuccessTx", async () => {
+        // No receipt for the first five polls; the sixth — the tick at
+        // t=60s, which is also the timeout deadline — returns one.
+        mockReceiptLookup
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce(null)
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce(null)
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce(null)
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce(null)
+            .mockResolvedValueOnce(null)
+            .mockResolvedValue({ blockNumber: 21000000 });
+
+        txStatus.showWait(TX_INFO, TX_HASH);
+        expect(visible("wait-tx")).toBe(true);
+
+        await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(60000);
+
+        expect(visible("success-tx")).toBe(true);
+        expect(visible("error-tx")).toBe(false);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("success-tx");
+        expect(state.viewData.blockNumber).toBe(21000000);
+        expect(state.viewData.message).toBeUndefined();
+
+        // And nothing is left running to undo it.
+        expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(0);
+        await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(300000);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("success-tx");
+        expect(mockReceiptLookup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(6);
+    });
+
+    test("a genuine timeout still shows ErrorTx with the hash", async () => {
+        mockReceiptLookup.mockResolvedValue(null);
+
+        txStatus.showWait(TX_INFO, TX_HASH);
+        await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(60000);
+
+        expect(visible("error-tx")).toBe(true);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("error-tx");
+        expect(state.viewData.message).toMatch(
+            /not confirmed within 60 seconds/,
+        );
+        expect(state.viewData.hash).toBe(TX_HASH);
+        // The hash section carries the hash and the etherscan link.
+        expect(getElement("error-tx-hash").innerHTML).toContain(TX_HASH);
+        expect(getElement("error-tx-hash").innerHTML).toContain(
+            "/tx/" + TX_HASH,
+        );
+        expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    test("a receipt still in flight when the view is left does not render over it", async () => {
+        let resolveReceipt;
+        mockReceiptLookup.mockReturnValue(
+            new Promise((r) => {
+                resolveReceipt = r;
+            }),
+        );
+
+        txStatus.showWait(TX_INFO, TX_HASH);
+        await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(10000);
+        expect(mockReceiptLookup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+
+        // User leaves the wait (popup navigation / teardown) while the
+        // lookup is outstanding, then the lookup finally answers.
+        txStatus.endWait();
+        state.currentView = "main";
+        resolveReceipt({ blockNumber: 21000000 });
+        await Promise.resolve();
+        await Promise.resolve();
+
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
+        expect(visible("success-tx")).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("no timer survives the view being left", async () => {
+        mockReceiptLookup.mockResolvedValue(null);
+
+        txStatus.showWait(TX_INFO, TX_HASH);
+        expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+
+        txStatus.endWait();
+        expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(0);
+
+        await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(120000);
+        expect(mockReceiptLookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("WaitTx persistence across popup close", () => {
+    test("restoreWait resumes the poll with the deadline running from broadcast", async () => {
+        mockReceiptLookup.mockResolvedValue(null);
+
+        txStatus.showWait(TX_INFO, TX_HASH);
+        expect(state.viewData.pendingWait.hash).toBe(TX_HASH);
+        const persisted = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(state.viewData));
+
+        // Popup closes: timers die with the page.
+        txStatus.endWait();
+
+        // 45 seconds pass with the popup shut, then it is reopened.
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(45000);
+        state.viewData = persisted;
+        expect(txStatus.restoreWait()).toBe(true);
+
+        expect(visible("wait-tx")).toBe(true);
+        // Elapsed is counted from the broadcast, not from the reopen.
+        expect(waitStatusText()).toBe("Waiting for confirmation... 45s");
+        // The immediate poll on resume has already run.
+        await Promise.resolve();
+        expect(mockReceiptLookup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+
+        // The deadline is 15 seconds away, not 60.
+        await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(20000);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("error-tx");
+    });
+
+    test("a rejected lookup on the resume poll keeps waiting instead of reporting failure", async () => {
+        // A wait resumed after the deadline has already passed: the first
+        // poll is immediate and past 60s, so a thrown lookup must not be
+        // read as "no receipt". It means "no answer this tick" — keep
+        // polling, because the transaction may well have confirmed.
+        mockReceiptLookup.mockResolvedValue(null);
+        txStatus.showWait(TX_INFO, TX_HASH);
+        const persisted = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(state.viewData));
+        txStatus.endWait();
+
+        // Ten minutes with the popup shut, then it is reopened and the
+        // first receipt lookup fails transiently.
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(600000);
+        mockReceiptLookup.mockReset();
+        mockReceiptLookup
+            .mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error("rpc unavailable"))
+            .mockResolvedValue({ blockNumber: 21000000 });
+
+        state.viewData = persisted;
+        expect(txStatus.restoreWait()).toBe(true);
+        await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+
+        // The wait is still alive: no timeout was declared off one error.
+        expect(visible("wait-tx")).toBe(true);
+        expect(visible("error-tx")).toBe(false);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("wait-tx");
+        expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+
+        // And the next tick answers, so the confirmed transaction is
+        // reported as confirmed.
+        await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(10000);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("success-tx");
+        expect(state.viewData.blockNumber).toBe(21000000);
+    });
+
+    test("a lookup returning null past the deadline still times out", async () => {
+        // The counterpart to the test above: the deadline must still fire
+        // when the lookup actually answers "no receipt".
+        mockReceiptLookup.mockResolvedValue(null);
+        txStatus.showWait(TX_INFO, TX_HASH);
+        const persisted = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(state.viewData));
+        txStatus.endWait();
+
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(600000);
+        state.viewData = persisted;
+        expect(txStatus.restoreWait()).toBe(true);
+        await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
+
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("error-tx");
+        expect(state.viewData.message).toMatch(
+            /not confirmed within 60 seconds/,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("restoreWait reports nothing to resume when no wait is persisted", () => {
+        state.viewData = {};
+        expect(txStatus.restoreWait()).toBe(false);
+        expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    test("restoreWait rejects a persisted wait missing its txInfo or broadcast time", () => {
+        for (const bad of [
+            { hash: TX_HASH, broadcastTime: Date.now() },
+            { hash: TX_HASH, txInfo: TX_INFO },
+            { hash: TX_HASH, txInfo: TX_INFO, broadcastTime: "soon" },
+            { hash: TX_HASH, txInfo: TX_INFO, broadcastTime: NaN },
+            { hash: TX_HASH, txInfo: "nope", broadcastTime: Date.now() },
+            // An object that merely lacks a field startWait() dereferences
+            // is the shape that actually escaped: txInfo.to reaches
+            // addressTitle(), which calls address.toLowerCase(). typeof []
+            // is "object", so an array passes an object check.
+            { hash: TX_HASH, txInfo: {}, broadcastTime: Date.now() },
+            { hash: TX_HASH, txInfo: [], broadcastTime: Date.now() },
+            { hash: TX_HASH, txInfo: { to: 42 }, broadcastTime: Date.now() },
+            // Otherwise complete but for a non-string `to`: only the `to`
+            // check rejects this one, and without it addressTitle() throws
+            // out of restoreView().
+            {
+                hash: TX_HASH,
+                txInfo: { to: 42, amount: "0.0050" },
+                broadcastTime: Date.now(),
+            },
+            // Otherwise complete but an array: only Array.isArray() rejects
+            // it, since typeof [] is "object" and the fields are present.
+            {
+                hash: TX_HASH,
+                txInfo: Object.assign([], { to: RECIPIENT, amount: "0.0050" }),
+                broadcastTime: Date.now(),
+            },
+            {
+                hash: TX_HASH,
+                txInfo: { to: RECIPIENT },
+                broadcastTime: Date.now(),
+            },
+        ]) {
+            state.viewData = { pendingWait: bad };
+            expect(txStatus.restoreWait()).toBe(false);
+            expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(0);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("restoreWait resumes a wait whose recipient is the empty string", () => {
+        // The shape a contract-deployment approval persists: approval.js
+        // writes `to: toAddr || ""`, and showWait() renders it without
+        // complaint. Validation must not be stricter than the live path, or
+        // that wait is silently abandoned on every popup open.
+        mockReceiptLookup.mockResolvedValue(null);
+        state.viewData = {
+            pendingWait: {
+                hash: TX_HASH,
+                txInfo: { ...TX_INFO, to: "" },
+                broadcastTime: Date.now(),
+            },
+        };
+        expect(txStatus.restoreWait()).toBe(true);
+        expect(visible("wait-tx")).toBe(true);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("WaitTx against an RPC that never answers", () => {
+    test("a permanently failing lookup ends the wait instead of polling forever", async () => {
+        mockReceiptLookup.mockRejectedValue(new Error("rpc unavailable"));
+
+        txStatus.showWait(TX_INFO, TX_HASH);
+
+        // Six consecutive failures is 60 seconds at the 10s cadence — the
+        // same patience as the confirmation deadline.
+        await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(60000);
+
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("error-tx");
+        expect(visible("wait-tx")).toBe(false);
+        // The user is told what actually happened: the lookup failed. It is
+        // not the same fact as "the transaction did not confirm".
+        expect(state.viewData.message).toMatch(/could not be reached/i);
+        expect(state.viewData.message).not.toMatch(/not confirmed within/);
+        expect(state.viewData.hash).toBe(TX_HASH);
+
+        // Nothing is left running, and nothing is left to resume onto.
+        expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(0);
+        expect(state.viewData.pendingWait).toBeUndefined();
+
+        const calls = mockReceiptLookup.mock.calls.length;
+        await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(3600000);
+        expect(mockReceiptLookup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(calls);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("error-tx");
+    });
+
+    test("an answered lookup clears the failure count, so the bound is on consecutive failures", async () => {
+        // The bound counts failures in a row, not failures in total: a
+        // flaky RPC that keeps answering in between must not accumulate its
+        // way to a false "network unreachable".
+        //
+        // Polls 1-5 (t=10s..50s) alternate reject / null, so three fail and
+        // the last answer resets the count at poll 4. From poll 6 on every
+        // lookup fails. Six in a row is then poll 10, at t=100s. A counter
+        // that never reset would have reached six at poll 8, t=80s, so the
+        // window between those two is what this test occupies.
+        mockReceiptLookup.mockImplementation(() => {
+            const n = mockReceiptLookup.mock.calls.length;
+            if (n <= 5 && n % 2 === 0) return Promise.resolve(null);
+            return Promise.reject(new Error("flaky"));
+        });
+
+        txStatus.showWait(TX_INFO, TX_HASH);
+
+        // t=90s: eight failures in total, five of them in a row. A
+        // cumulative counter has long since fired; a consecutive one has not.
+        await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(90000);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("wait-tx");
+        expect(visible("wait-tx")).toBe(true);
+        expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+
+        // t=100s: the sixth in a row.
+        await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(10000);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("error-tx");
+        expect(state.viewData.message).toMatch(/could not be reached/i);
+        // No lookup ever answered "no receipt" past the deadline, so this
+        // is not the timeout and must not be reported as one.
+        expect(state.viewData.message).not.toMatch(/not confirmed within/);
+        expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    test("a resumed wait against a dead RPC also terminates", async () => {
+        // The reopen path is the one that made this unbounded: the wait is
+        // persisted, so without a bound every popup open resumes it forever.
+        mockReceiptLookup.mockResolvedValue(null);
+        txStatus.showWait(TX_INFO, TX_HASH);
+        const persisted = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(state.viewData));
+        txStatus.endWait();
+
+        jest.advanceTimersByTime(3600000);
+        mockReceiptLookup.mockReset();
+        mockReceiptLookup.mockRejectedValue(new Error("rpc unavailable"));
+
+        state.viewData = persisted;
+        expect(txStatus.restoreWait()).toBe(true);
+        await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(60000);
+
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("error-tx");
+        expect(state.viewData.message).toMatch(/could not be reached/i);
+        expect(jest.getTimerCount()).toBe(0);
+        expect(state.viewData.pendingWait).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("wait-tx is a view the popup may reopen onto", () => {
+    // The resume feature is wired through RESTORABLE_VIEWS: restoreView()
+    // refuses any view not in the set, so dropping "wait-tx" from it kills
+    // the resume silently — the tests above call restoreWait() directly and
+    // would all still pass. This pins the membership. Mirrors the exclusion
+    // assertions in tests/showPhrase.test.js.
+    test("wait-tx is restorable", () => {
+        expect(RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has("wait-tx")).toBe(true);
+    });
+});