fix: floor the persisted fields a restore dereferences, and make each field's floor an executable claim (closes #362)

A persisted container was checked while its ENTRIES were dereferenced
unchecked. A stored `{"0x…": "notalist"}` in allowedSites passes the state
gate, renders a working popup, and then throws inside saveState()'s per-
hostname merge, so every save from that moment on fails while the UI looks
entirely healthy. deniedSites has the identical shape; fraudContracts is the
same class with a milder consequence.

The sweep for that class found four more:

- selectedToken, dereferenced as text behind a truthiness-only restore gate.
- rpcUrl, handed whole to `new JsonRpcProvider()` by getProvider(), which
  throws SYNCHRONOUSLY for a non-string — from txStatus.js and addWallet.js,
  neither inside a try, and the first reachable from a stored
  `currentView: "wait-tx"` through the unguarded restoreView().
- The ENTRIES of viewData. Four restore branches gate on one truthy field and
  hand the rest to a renderer that calls address.toLowerCase(): a stored
  `{"currentView":"success-tx","viewData":{"hash":"0x1"}}` throws out of
  restoreView(), skipping the rest of popup init.
- selectedWallet / selectedAddress. `wallets` is a real Array, so a stored
  "map", "length", "constructor" or "__proto__" is TRUTHY: hasValidAddress()'s
  `&&` does not short-circuit and `.addresses[…]` throws. A stale INTEGER index
  is the safe case.

Floors, in src/shared/persistedState.js: allowedSites/deniedSites through
siteMap(), fraudContracts and each hostname list through textList(),
selectedToken and activeAddress as text-or-null, rpcUrl and blockscoutUrl as
non-empty text, selectedWallet and selectedAddress as a non-negative integer
or null, and each networkEndpoints pair's two URL fields — which
applyChainSwitchFields() assigns straight onto s.rpcUrl on the next switch.

Guards, in src/popup/viewRouter.js: the four restore branches that gate on one
truthy field now check the entries their renderer dereferences, as
txStatus.restoreWait() has always done for wait-tx. "confirm-tx" joins
ADDRESS_VIEWS, because its Sign button dereferences
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet] behind no guard of its own.

A stored own "__proto__" key is dropped by siteMap(): it can never be a wallet
address, so it grants nothing, and keeping it only keeps a value the next save
would hand to the prototype setter. networkEndpoints keeps unknown keys by
design, so mergeMapByKey() in src/shared/state.js now writes with
defineProperty as well — the guard in the floor was being undone one layer
downstream.

A save that fails is also told, not merely repaired: onSaveFailure() reports
every failed save, awaited or not (the save queue's own rejection handler is
what made a failure vanish), and the popup raises a persistent "NOT SAVED"
banner naming the reason. doRefreshAndRender() no longer rejects, since every
one of its call sites fires it and walks away.

The per-field justification in the header of src/shared/stateSchema.js is
replaced by tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js. That comment shipped a false
claim in three consecutive changes; the artifact was the problem. The test is
one row per persisted field, declaring the property that field's floor is
claimed to have and PROVING it by driving the real code with hostile values —
the gate for a field the gate refuses, normalizePersisted() for a field it
floors, the real JsonRpcProvider constructor for rpcUrl, and — for every field
whose only defence is that nothing dereferences it structurally — a boot of the
real popup entry point over that value onto EVERY view the popup can reopen
onto.

That last part is what makes the claim falsifiable, and it is why this defect
class is worth a harness at all: it lives on the RESTORE path and not on Home.
So the suite goes red on a field one of those boots corrupts and a restorable
view dereferences on its render, at EITHER POLARITY — a value nothing in src/
writes is a wrong-typed one and therefore truthy, so every such field is also
driven falsy, or proven unable to be falsy after the floor. Without that, a
dereference behind `if (!state.x)` is never reached on the very boot that
corrupts x, and for three of these fields the falsy answer is the DEFAULT_STATE
default: the branch every ordinary install takes. It goes red too on a field
that gains a floor while its row still claims it has none, and on a field added
to PERSISTED_FIELDS with no row.

Two things it does not drive, and the artifacts say so rather than claiming
total coverage: a MIX of polarities, since one boot puts every corrupted field
on the same slot, so a branch reached only when one is truthy and another falsy
is not entered; and whatever no stored record reaches by itself — a view only
forward navigation opens, and anything behind a click. The header and the
README mirror now point at the test instead of restating it.

The boots are cheap enough to keep by construction rather than by sampling.
Every field the router itself reads is driven onto each view individually,
since a hostile value in one of those legitimately changes which view renders;
every other unfloored field is corrupted on the SAME boot, and that boot has to
land on the view it stored — so a field that does move the routing cannot hide
in the crowd, and the failure path re-boots one field at a time to name it.
That is forty-four boots instead of several hundred; the suite runs in 12.7s
against a 30s cap.

The DOM stub in tests/support/popupBoot.js gained one thing to make any of that
possible: an element's parentElement. Without it success-tx and transaction
threw on the first line that hides a field's wrapper, so neither renderer could
be booted onto at all — every boot aimed at them fell back to Home instead, and
the base profile the sweep starts from is now asserted to render each view
rather than fall back, so that cannot go unnoticed again.

README.md

@@ -1052,14 +1052,19 @@ driving the real code with hostile values — and, for every field whose only
 defence is that nothing dereferences it, by booting the real popup entry point
 over that value onto every view the popup can reopen onto. That last part is
 what makes the claim falsifiable, because this defect class lives on the restore
-path rather than on the home screen: a field that gains a structural dereference
-in any restorable view's render fails `make check`, as does a field that gains a
-floor while its row still claims it has none, and as does a field added to
-`PERSISTED_FIELDS` with no row at all. What the boot does not reach is what no
-stored record reaches by itself — a view only forward navigation opens, and
-anything behind a click. The per-field justification that used to live in the
-header of `src/shared/stateSchema.js` shipped a false claim in three consecutive
-changes, each caught only by a reviewer re-deriving thirty fields by hand.
+path rather than on the home screen: a field one of those boots corrupts and a
+restorable view dereferences on its render fails `make check`, at either
+polarity — a value nothing writes is a wrong-typed one and therefore truthy, so
+each such field is also driven falsy, or proven unable to be falsy after the
+floor. So does a field that gains a floor while its row still claims it has
+none, and so does a field added to `PERSISTED_FIELDS` with no row at all. Two
+things the boots do not drive: a MIX of polarities, since one boot puts every
+corrupted field on the same slot, so a branch reached only when one is truthy
+and another falsy is not entered; and whatever no stored record reaches by
+itself — a view only forward navigation opens, and anything behind a click. The
+per-field justification that used to live in the header of
+`src/shared/stateSchema.js` shipped a false claim in three consecutive changes,
+each caught only by a reviewer re-deriving thirty fields by hand.
 
 The `allowedSites` case is why the entry check is not optional. A stored
 `{"0x…": "notalist"}` is a well-formed object holding a malformed entry: it

TODO.md

@@ -82,9 +82,12 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
   proven by driving the real code with hostile values — and, for a field whose
   only defence is that nothing dereferences it, by booting the real popup entry
   point over that value onto every view the popup can reopen onto, since that is
-  the path this whole class of defect lives on. A field with no row, a field
-  that gains a floor while its row still claims it has none, and a field any
-  restorable view dereferences on render now all fail `make check`.
+  the path this whole class of defect lives on. Each such field is driven at
+  both polarities — a value nothing writes is wrong-typed and so truthy, so a
+  falsy slot is driven too, or the field is proven unable to be falsy after the
+  floor. A field with no row, a field that gains a floor while its row still
+  claims it has none, and a field one of those boots corrupts and a restorable
+  view dereferences on its render now all fail `make check`.
 - 2026-08-23: A swap amount and the token it is counted in now always come from
   the same hop, on both sides of the approval screen
   ([#359](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/359) and

src/shared/stateSchema.js

@@ -38,12 +38,15 @@
 // real popup entry point onto EVERY view the popup can reopen onto.
 //
 // That last part is the whole point, because this defect class lives on the
-// RESTORE path and not on Home: a field that gains a structural dereference
-// in any restorable view's render turns that suite red, as does a field that
-// gains a floor while its row still claims it has none. What the boot does not
-// reach is what no stored record reaches by itself — a view only forward
-// navigation opens, and anything behind a click. A field added to
-// PERSISTED_FIELDS with no row fails the suite too.
+// RESTORE path and not on Home: a field one of those boots corrupts and a
+// restorable view dereferences on its render turns that suite red, at either
+// polarity — a value nothing writes is wrong-typed and so truthy, so each such
+// field is also driven falsy, or proven unable to be falsy after the floor. So
+// does a field that gains a floor while its row still claims it has none. Two
+// things the boots do not drive: a MIX of polarities, since one boot puts every
+// corrupted field on the same slot; and whatever no stored record reaches by
+// itself — a view only forward navigation opens, and anything behind a click. A
+// field added to PERSISTED_FIELDS with no row fails the suite too.
 //
 // That test exists because this comment did not work. It carried a
 // hand-written justification per field, and it shipped a false one in three

tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js

@@ -36,11 +36,20 @@
 // before trusting it. A row the ROUTER reads (`routes`) gets its own boot per
 // view, because a hostile value in it legitimately changes which view renders.
 // Every other swept field is corrupted on the SAME boot, one boot per view per
-// hostile slot, and that boot has to land on the view it stored — so a field
-// that does move the routing cannot hide in the crowd, and a field that is
-// dereferenced by any renderer reachable from a stored record turns this file
-// red. Booting each of them separately would be about six hundred boots and
-// half a minute; this is thirty-three.
+// slot, and that boot has to land on the view it stored — so a field that does
+// move the routing cannot hide in the crowd. Every swept field is driven at
+// BOTH POLARITIES: a value nothing in src/ writes is a wrong-typed one and so
+// always truthy, which leaves `if (!state.x) { state.y.deref() }` unentered on
+// the very boot that corrupts x. The last slot is the falsy one for that
+// reason, and a field that cannot be falsy after the floor says so in its row
+// and is proven so.
+//
+// What that buys: a field any restorable view dereferences on that view's
+// render turns this file red, at either polarity. What it does not buy is a
+// MIX of polarities — one boot puts every swept field on the same slot, so a
+// branch reached only when one swept field is truthy and another falsy is not
+// entered. Booting every field separately at every value would be several
+// hundred boots and most of the suite's budget; this is forty-four.
 //
 // The three claims this replaced, all false, all caught here by construction:
 // rpcUrl reaching `new JsonRpcProvider()` (a synchronous throw, not a caught
@@ -83,6 +92,14 @@ const everyEntry = (v, fn) => Array.isArray(v) && v.every(fn);
 // floor and the sweep is the regression guard on it.
 const swept = (row) => row.kind === KIND.LOOSE || Boolean(row.alsoSweep);
 
+// Every value a swept row drives through a boot: the hostile set, plus the
+// falsy slot that gives the field its other polarity. `hostile` values are all
+// TRUTHY by nature — a value nothing in src/ writes is a wrong-typed one, and
+// wrong-typed values are objects, non-empty strings and non-zero numbers. A
+// field that is only ever truthy on the boot that corrupts it cannot falsify
+// `if (!state.x) { state.y.deref() }`, so the falsy slot is not optional.
+const sweptValues = (row) => [...row.hostile, ...(row.falsy || [])];
+
 // ------------------------------------------------------------------ the table
 //
 // `hostile` is values a stored record can carry that nothing in src/ ever
@@ -92,6 +109,15 @@ const swept = (row) => row.kind === KIND.LOOSE || Boolean(row.alsoSweep);
 // floor alone, which is pure and free. `hostileRestore` is extra values driven
 // through the restore path only, for a value that means nothing until a
 // particular branch's gate has let it past.
+//
+// `falsy` is the other POLARITY of a swept field, driven for the same reason.
+// It is not a value src/ never writes — for three of these fields it is the
+// DEFAULT_STATE default, which is the branch every ordinary install takes —
+// and that is the point: without it, a dereference behind `if (!state.x)` is
+// unreachable on the one boot that corrupts x. A swept row that cannot supply
+// one says `neverFalsy` instead, which is proven rather than asserted: every
+// falsy value stored under that field comes back TRUTHY from the floor, so no
+// `!state.x` branch is reachable from a stored record at all.
 
 const CONTRACT = [
     {
@@ -266,6 +292,9 @@ const CONTRACT = [
         // coerces. Nothing renders FROM it without RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has()
         // first, and Set.has() answers false for any value.
         hostile: [42, "no-such-view", { a: 1 }],
+        // `saved.currentView || null`: the falsy polarity is the popup landing
+        // on Home, which every boot in "booting onto Home" below also drives.
+        falsy: [""],
     },
     {
         field: "viewData",
@@ -278,6 +307,10 @@ const CONTRACT = [
         // renderer something it dereferences, which is where the entries are
         // actually decided.
         hostile: [42, "notarecord", { a: 1 }, [1, 2]],
+        // `structuredClone(saved.viewData || {})`: the container is never falsy
+        // in state whatever was stored, so no `!state.viewData` branch exists to
+        // drive.
+        neverFalsy: true,
         hostileRestore: [
             // success-tx passes on `data.hash`, and renderSuccess() then calls
             // toAddressHtml(d.to) -> addressTitle() -> address.toLowerCase().
@@ -357,6 +390,10 @@ const CONTRACT = [
         // Arithmetic only: `now - (s.lastBalanceRefresh || 0)` compares false
         // for a non-number and forces a refresh.
         hostile: [true, "notatime", { a: 1 }],
+        // `|| 0` collapses every falsy stored value to 0, so 0 IS the whole
+        // falsy polarity of this field — and it is the DEFAULT_STATE default,
+        // the value a profile carries until its first refresh lands.
+        falsy: [0],
     },
     {
         field: "tokenHolderCache",
@@ -366,6 +403,8 @@ const CONTRACT = [
         // src/shared/state.js, which are safe for any value, and otherwise
         // only reset wholesale in src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js.
         hostile: [42, "notarecord", [1, 2]],
+        // `structuredClone(saved.tokenHolderCache || {})`.
+        neverFalsy: true,
     },
     {
         field: "theme",
@@ -373,11 +412,16 @@ const CONTRACT = [
         // Compared against "dark"/"light" in applyTheme() and otherwise falls
         // to the system branch; assigned into an input .value, which coerces.
         hostile: [42, "chartreuse", { a: 1 }],
+        // `saved.theme || "system"`.
+        neverFalsy: true,
     },
     {
         field: "dustThresholdGwei",
         kind: KIND.LOOSE,
         hostile: ["notanumber", true, { a: 1 }],
+        // Survives verbatim, so the falsy slot is also wrong-typed: "" reaches
+        // filterTransactions() as a comparand and a settings input .value.
+        falsy: [""],
     },
     ...[
         "rememberSiteChoice",
@@ -393,6 +437,10 @@ const CONTRACT = [
         kind: KIND.LOOSE,
         // A flag: only ever tested for truthiness, and written back verbatim.
         hostile: [42, "notabool", { a: 1 }],
+        // Both answers to that truthiness test have to be driven, and 0 is a
+        // value src/ never writes for a flag. For utcTimestamps and debugMode
+        // the falsy answer is also the DEFAULT_STATE default.
+        falsy: [0],
     })),
 ];
 
@@ -434,6 +482,10 @@ function profileWith(field, value) {
 }
 
 describe("the floor each row claims", () => {
+    // The falsy slot is deliberately NOT in here. `saved.x || default` is a
+    // floor on falsy values and on nothing else, so a falsy value is the one
+    // thing a LOOSE field need not carry through verbatim; what it has to carry
+    // through is being falsy, which "both polarities" below asserts.
     for (const row of CONTRACT) {
         const values = [...row.hostile, ...(row.floorOnly || [])];
 
@@ -506,9 +558,50 @@ const HEALTHY = { errors: [], blank: false };
 // unversionedValidProfile() stores no currentView, so every boot in here lands
 // on Home. That is the cheap half of the proof; the restore path below is the
 // half that matters.
+// Both polarities of every swept field are driven, or the field is proven
+// unable to take one of them. This is the guard on the sweep itself: a hostile
+// set is all-truthy by construction, so without a falsy slot a dereference
+// behind `if (!state.x)` is never reached on the boot that corrupts x — the
+// same falsy-collapse blind spot the fields below were floored for.
+describe("both polarities of every swept field are driven", () => {
+    const FALSY_STORED = [0, "", false, null];
+    const floored = (field, value) =>
+        normalizePersisted(profileWith(field, value))[field];
+
+    for (const row of CONTRACT) {
+        if (!swept(row)) continue;
+
+        if (row.neverFalsy) {
+            test(`${row.field}: cannot be falsy in state at all`, () => {
+                for (const value of FALSY_STORED) {
+                    expect({
+                        stored: value,
+                        truthy: Boolean(floored(row.field, value)),
+                    }).toEqual({ stored: value, truthy: true });
+                }
+            });
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        test(`${row.field}: truthy and falsy`, () => {
+            // What the boots below actually drive, floored the way a renderer
+            // sees it — not what the row says it drives.
+            const driven = [
+                ...sweptValues(row),
+                ...(row.hostileRestore || []).map((entry) => entry.value),
+            ].map((value) => floored(row.field, value));
+
+            expect({
+                truthy: driven.some((value) => Boolean(value)),
+                falsy: driven.some((value) => !value),
+            }).toEqual({ truthy: true, falsy: true });
+        });
+    }
+});
+
 describe("a hostile value for one field, booting onto Home", () => {
     for (const row of CONTRACT) {
-        for (const value of row.hostile) {
+        for (const value of sweptValues(row)) {
             test(`${row.field} = ${JSON.stringify(value)}`, async () => {
                 await expect(
                     bootHealth(profileWith(row.field, value)),
@@ -622,7 +715,7 @@ describe("a hostile routing value restoring onto", () => {
     for (const row of CONTRACT) {
         if (!swept(row) || !routes(row)) continue;
         const seen = new Set();
-        for (const value of row.hostile) {
+        for (const value of sweptValues(row)) {
             for (const view of RESTORABLE_VIEWS) {
                 const profile = restoringOnto(view, { [row.field]: value });
                 const key = JSON.stringify(profile);
@@ -645,18 +738,27 @@ describe("a hostile routing value restoring onto", () => {
 // routing turns this red and has to declare `routes` and take the individual
 // sweep above.
 //
-// Nothing is masked by combining: a throw fails the boot whichever field threw,
-// and the only other way a dereference could go unseen is the renderer not
-// running at all, which is exactly what `restored` forbids. When it does go
-// red, the same view is re-booted one field at a time so the failure names the
-// fields rather than leaving a reader to bisect twelve of them.
+// Combining does hide one thing, and the last slot is what stops it. A hostile
+// value is wrong-typed and therefore TRUTHY, so on a boot where every swept
+// field is hostile, no `if (!state.x)` branch is entered — and a dereference
+// inside such a branch would go unseen however loudly it throws. The last slot
+// is the falsy one: every swept field that CAN be falsy is falsy on it, which
+// is also the state an ordinary install boots in for three of them, while the
+// fields that cannot be falsy stay hostile. Beyond that, a throw fails the boot
+// whichever field threw, and a renderer that never ran is what `restored`
+// forbids. When it does go red, the same view is re-booted one field at a time
+// so the failure names the fields rather than leaving a reader to bisect twelve
+// of them.
 const UNROUTED = CONTRACT.filter((row) => swept(row) && !routes(row));
-const HOSTILE_SLOTS = Math.max(...UNROUTED.map((row) => row.hostile.length));
+const HOSTILE_SLOTS = Math.max(
+    ...UNROUTED.map((row) => sweptValues(row).length),
+);
 
 function unroutedValues(slot) {
     const fields = {};
     for (const row of UNROUTED) {
-        fields[row.field] = row.hostile[slot % row.hostile.length];
+        const values = sweptValues(row);
+        fields[row.field] = values[slot % values.length];
     }
     return fields;
 }