fix: settle a site approval on the port that carries its teardown (closes #275)

Approve and window.close() left the popup on the next line, and the decision
and the disconnect the close caused travelled independent channels with nothing
ordering them. The disconnect handler settled a pending site approval as a
rejection, so whichever landed first decided the outcome. Driven in a tab the
teardown won every time: the user allowed the connection and the dApp was told
they had refused.

The decision now goes out on the approval port the popup already opens, which
is the same port the close disconnects. One channel is ordered -- a message
posted on a port is delivered before that port's own disconnect -- so the
approval is settled before the teardown is even seen, and the disconnect then
finds nothing pending to reject. Nothing waits, nothing is timed, and the popup
closes exactly as immediately as before.

windows.onRemoved no longer decides a site approval whose port is connected
either. In the fallback-window shape that event races the decision on a channel
of its own, which is the same defect one level over; the port disconnect says
the same thing in a defined order, so it is left to say it. A window that
closes before its popup ever connected has nothing else to speak for it and is
still rejected there, so no dApp is left waiting on a window that is gone.

Rejecting reports a rejection, and so does closing without deciding, in both
shapes. AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_RESPONSE is gone; the port name carries the
approval id, so the popup no longer names one, and the sender check the message
carried moved to the port.

tests/backgroundApproval.test.js drives decide-then-disconnect with nothing
awaited in between, in the toolbar-popup shape that production uses and in the
fallback-window shape, and asserts every close-without-deciding path still
rejects. tests/e2e/run.js drops the deferred-window.close() accommodation it
carried for this bug, so the two site-prompt tests now drive the shipped
decide-then-close in a real Chromium.

Makefile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e lint fmt fmt-check check docker hooks build build-debug verify-build clean dev
+.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e test-e2e-firefox lint fmt fmt-check check docker hooks build build-debug verify-build clean dev
 
 # Standard targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
 # per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
@@ -16,10 +16,13 @@ install:
 test:
 	@script/test
 
-# Browser end-to-end suite. Requires docker; not part of check.
+# Browser end-to-end suites. Both require docker; neither is part of check.
 test-e2e:
 	@script/test-e2e
 
+test-e2e-firefox:
+	@script/test-e2e-firefox
+
 lint:
 	@script/lint
 

README.md

@@ -83,7 +83,10 @@ provide:
   git pre-commit hook
 - `script/projectname` — print the project name (used for the Docker image tag)
 - `script/test` — run the test suite (jest)
-- `script/test-e2e` — run the browser end-to-end suite (docker required; see
+- `script/test-e2e` — run the Chrome browser end-to-end suite (docker required;
+  see [End-to-End Tests](#end-to-end-tests))
+- `script/test-e2e-firefox` — run the Firefox browser end-to-end suite (docker
+  required; builds its own pinned image, see
   [End-to-End Tests](#end-to-end-tests))
 - `script/lint` — run the linter
 - `script/fmt` — format all files (writes)
@@ -123,6 +126,14 @@ The Makefile shims to those. It also carries a few targets that have no
 
 ## End-to-End Tests
 
+There are two suites, one per browser, and they share no code. Chrome runs on
+Playwright; Firefox has its own WebDriver client, because Playwright cannot
+observe errors on a Firefox extension page at all — see
+[Firefox](#firefox-make-test-e2e-firefox) below. Both require docker, and both
+are outside `make check`.
+
+### Chrome (`make test-e2e`)
+
 `make test-e2e` builds `dist/chrome/` and drives the **real popup in a real
 Chrome**, loaded as an unpacked MV3 extension inside a pinned
 `mcr.microsoft.com/playwright` container (pinned by digest in `script/test-e2e`;
@@ -158,6 +169,34 @@ reserve while sitting on the same side of the estimate, so swapping the two in
 what [#154](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/154) was, and it was
 previously correct by reading only.
 
+It also covers the **dApp approval round trips** — the one place where the
+content script, the inpage provider, the background worker and the approval
+popup all have to work together. A local test page is served by the route
+handler on a reserved-TLD origin, gets `window.ethereum` from the shipped
+`MAIN`-world content script like any other page, and drives
+`eth_requestAccounts`, `personal_sign`, `eth_signTypedData_v4` and
+`eth_sendTransaction` through the real prompts. Every signature is recovered in
+the runner and compared against the active address, the transaction assertions
+run against the raw signed transaction captured at `eth_sendRawTransaction`
+rather than against anything the extension reported, rejecting each prompt is
+required to return a rejection to the page rather than hang or resolve, and the
+password is required to be absent from every message the approval window sends
+to the background — with the message that would carry it required to be present,
+so that check cannot pass by observing nothing. That last one is the standing
+floor under [#157](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/157).
+
+Three limits of that coverage, none of them papered over. The RPC is stubbed
+throughout, so this is **not** a real dApp against a real network with real
+funds; that remains a human pass before 1.0.0. The site-connection prompt is
+raised through `chrome.action.openPopup()`, and headless Chromium's
+browser-action popup is not a page Playwright can see or click, so that one
+prompt is driven at the URL the extension itself puts on the action — the same
+page and the same approval id, but whether a real toolbar click shows it is not
+observable here. And the EIP-1193 error code does not survive the last hop: the
+rejection that crosses the boundary carries code 4001 and is asserted to, but
+`src/content/inpage.js` rebuilds it as `new Error(message)`, so the calling page
+catches an error with no `code` property.
+
 Any test that drives a failure path on purpose declares the `console.error` it
 is about to provoke, via `errors.expect()`. That is not a mute: the declaration
 consumes exactly one matching record, and a declaration nothing matched fails
@@ -200,12 +239,90 @@ a `ReferenceError` from a used-but-not-imported identifier is invisible to
 `make check` (`script/lint` is only `prettier --check`) but fatal in a browser,
 and this suite exists because exactly that class of bug shipped twice.
 
-`make test-e2e` is deliberately **not** part of `make check` or `make test`.
-`REPO_POLICIES.md` caps `make test` at 20 seconds and a browser suite does not
-fit; nothing in `tests/e2e/` is named `*.test.js`, so jest cannot pick it up
-either. It is also not wired into the Gitea workflow yet — docker-in-docker in
-CI is a separate question. Run it locally before changing anything under
-`src/popup/views/`.
+### Firefox (`make test-e2e-firefox`)
+
+`make test-e2e-firefox` builds `dist/firefox/` and drives the **real popup in a
+real Firefox**, installed as an unpacked MV2 temporary add-on via geckodriver.
+It covers popup load, wallet creation through the UI, and the Add Token screen.
+The suite lives in `tests/e2e/firefox/` and has **no npm dependencies at all**:
+it is a small WebDriver client built on global `fetch` and `child_process`
+against geckodriver's HTTP API.
+
+Unlike the Chrome suite it builds its own container image rather than pulling a
+published one, because no published image carries both a pinned Firefox and a
+matching geckodriver. `tests/e2e/firefox/Dockerfile` pins all three external
+artifacts by digest — the `node` base image, the Firefox 153.0.3 tarball, and
+geckodriver 0.36.0 — and the Firefox version in particular must not float:
+`-remote-allow-system-access` is **mandatory** on 153 and was not on 142.
+Without that flag, both navigating to `moz-extension://` and running
+chrome-context script fail with `unsupported operation`. The flag grants the
+driver full chrome privileges over that browser, which is acceptable only
+because it is a throwaway container.
+
+The popup's `moz-extension://` uuid is **pinned, not discovered**: the profile
+pref `extensions.webextensions.uuids` maps the extension id that
+`manifest/firefox.json` already declares to a fixed uuid, so the popup URL is
+deterministic. Navigation uses **classic** WebDriver `POST /session/{id}/url`,
+because BiDi's `browsingContext.navigate` refuses `moz-extension://` outright.
+
+**Any uncaught error from a `moz-extension://` source fails the run**, including
+errors from the background page, which the suite never navigates to: a `throw`
+at the top of `src/background/index.js` kills the background page and fails
+step 1. Content-script errors should arrive by the same route, but this suite
+does not exercise it and does not claim it — with `--network none` there is no
+`http://` page for a content script to be injected into. Errors from add-on
+install and background startup are folded into step 1 rather than discarded.
+Errors are read from the privileged `nsIConsoleService` in Marionette's chrome
+context and filtered to non-warning entries whose `sourceName` is the extension
+origin. That mechanism is not a stylistic choice. WebDriver BiDi's
+`log.entryAdded` delivers **nothing** for extension pages: on a plain `http://`
+page it reports uncaught errors with stack traces, and on the `moz-extension://`
+popup it reports zero events, because Firefox's remote agent excludes extension
+browsing contexts from BiDi observation. Any harness built on Playwright-BiDi or
+Puppeteer-BiDi would therefore see nothing and report success, which is exactly
+the vacuous check this repo has already shipped twice. Do not migrate this suite
+to BiDi.
+
+Two limits are worth knowing, both real differences from the Chrome suite:
+
+- **Error capture is poll-based, not event-streamed.** The console is drained at
+  each step boundary, so an error is attributed to the step it was drained
+  after, not to a moment within it. The window that is drained runs from add-on
+  install to **≈1.5s** after the last step returns — a 500ms settle, a 1000ms
+  tail sleep and two drain round trips — and then the browser is torn down. That
+  cut-off is not a hard boundary: with throws scheduled at fixed offsets, three
+  runs reported everything up to +1.5s and one of the three also reported +1.6s,
+  so an error landing near it may or may not be seen, and anything well past it
+  is not. Inside the window there is no race — each drain reads and clears the
+  console in a single chrome round trip, so an error logged mid-drain lands in
+  that batch or the next rather than being destroyed unread — but there is a
+  **capacity limit**: `nsIConsoleService` keeps a ring buffer of 250 messages
+  and silently evicts the oldest, so more than 250 console messages between two
+  drains destroys the excess unread. 400 throws inside one step are reported as
+  exactly the newest 250, three runs running. That buffer is shared with
+  Firefox's own console noise; a clean run peaks at 4 of 250 at the install
+  drain and 0 at every later drain, so the three steps here have wide headroom,
+  but a step that logs heavily could evict unread errors. What poll-based costs
+  is location, not coverage: an error cannot be placed within a step the way the
+  Chrome suite's `pageerror` events place it.
+- **Nothing is stubbed, which inverts the coverage of network-dependent code.**
+  There is no fixture layer; the container runs with `--network none` instead,
+  so the run is offline and deterministic and no request can escape. The
+  extension swallows its own fetch failures, so the flows are unaffected — but
+  every network call fails, so only the _failure_ branches of code that depends
+  on one are ever executed. A `ReferenceError` in the success path of
+  `renderTransactions`, or of price or balance rendering, passes this suite
+  green. The offline run is also weaker than the Chrome suite's interception: it
+  proves nothing got out, but it cannot report which requests were attempted.
+  Closing that gap needs a fixture layer, deliberately out of scope for this
+  harness.
+
+Neither `make test-e2e` nor `make test-e2e-firefox` is part of `make check` or
+`make test`. `REPO_POLICIES.md` caps `make test` at 20 seconds and a browser
+suite does not fit; nothing in `tests/e2e/` is named `*.test.js`, so jest cannot
+pick it up either. Neither is wired into the Gitea workflow yet —
+docker-in-docker in CI is a separate question. Run them locally before changing
+anything under `src/popup/views/`.
 
 ## Rationale
 
@@ -521,6 +638,21 @@ ExportPrivKey and ShowRecoveryPhrase — are deliberately absent from that list,
 so the popup can never reopen onto one of them with no password prompt in front
 of it.
 
+A reopened popup renders the wallet list and the one screen it restores onto,
+and nothing else, so every screen on the stack behind that one is still the
+blank template from `index.html`. "Back" therefore renders its target rather
+than only unhiding it, through the same dispatch and data guards as the restore
+(`src/popup/viewRouter.js`), and falls back to Home when the state the target
+would render is gone.
+
+It renders only a screen this page load has not rendered yet. Forward navigation
+renders as it goes, and `viewRouter.js` records every screen that reaches
+`showView()`, so "Back" onto a screen already on the page unhides it and nothing
+more — rendering it a second time would re-fetch and overwrite what it holds,
+such as an edit typed into Settings and not yet saved. Home is the one screen
+"Back" always re-renders, so the wallet list reflects anything that changed
+while the user was away from it.
+
 Every screen that holds secret material in the page registers a cleanup with
 `onViewLeave()` (`src/popup/views/helpers.js`), which `showView()` runs on every
 exit from that screen rather than only on its "Back" button, so nothing secret
@@ -1041,7 +1173,12 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
 - **When**: A connected website requests a transaction via
   `eth_sendTransaction`. Always opened in a separate popup window by the
   background script (`windows.create()`), because the request is triggered
-  programmatically rather than by a user gesture.
+  programmatically rather than by a user gesture. The background populates the
+  transaction (nonce, gas limit, fees, chain id) against the RPC node _before_
+  opening the window, so the screen shows a complete transaction and the signed
+  artifact can be compared with it field for field. A request that cannot be
+  populated — unreachable node, reverting gas estimate — opens no window and is
+  failed back to the site.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Transaction Request" heading
     - Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
@@ -1053,13 +1190,16 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign.
     - Contract: color dot + full address + etherscan link (or "contract
       creation"), token symbol label if known
     - Value: amount in ETH (4 decimal places, USD in parentheses)
+    - Network fee (max): gas limit × fee per gas in ETH (4 decimal places, USD
+      in parentheses), with the gas limit and the fee per gas in gwei below it
+    - Network and nonce
     - Raw data: full calldata displayed inline (shown if present)
     - Password input and an error line
     - "Confirm" / "Reject" buttons
 - **Transitions**:
-    - "Confirm" (correct password) → decrypts and signs in the popup, hands the
-      signed transaction to the background to broadcast, then → **WaitTx** in
-      the same popup window
+    - "Confirm" (correct password) → decrypts and signs the transaction it was
+      shown, exactly as shown, hands the signed transaction to the background to
+      broadcast, then → **WaitTx** in the same popup window
     - "Confirm" (wrong password) → error line, no screen change
     - "Reject" → closes popup (returns rejection to background)
     - Popup window closed without answering → the request is rejected with

TODO.md

@@ -30,9 +30,10 @@ compiled off.
 
 The backlog lives on the
 [Gitea tracker](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues), which is
-authoritative; this file does not duplicate it. Full policy file set present. A
-real-browser end-to-end suite (`make test-e2e`) now sits alongside `make check`,
-which cannot see a runtime `ReferenceError` in a popup view.
+authoritative; this file does not duplicate it. Full policy file set present.
+Real-browser end-to-end suites (`make test-e2e` for Chrome,
+`make test-e2e-firefox` for Firefox) now sit alongside `make check`, which
+cannot see a runtime `ReferenceError` in a popup view.
 
 # Next Step
 
@@ -44,6 +45,141 @@ undefined identifiers, which is how
 
 # Completed Steps
 
+- 2026-08-14: Approving a site connection is no longer a race against the popup
+  closing. The decision now rides the approval port the popup already holds,
+  which is the same channel the close disconnects, so it is delivered ahead of
+  that disconnect however fast the teardown is; `windows.onRemoved` no longer
+  decides a site approval whose port is connected, since that event is ordered
+  against nothing either. Rejecting and closing without deciding both still
+  report a rejection, and the popup delays its own close by nothing. The e2e
+  harness's deferred-`window.close()` accommodation is gone with it, so the two
+  site-prompt tests now drive the shipped decide-then-close in a real Chromium;
+  against the unfixed code the approval came back to the page as
+  `{"settled":"rejected","code":4001}`
+  ([#275](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/275)).
+- 2026-08-12: EIP-1193 error codes now reach the page. `src/content/inpage.js`
+  rebuilt every failure as `new Error(error.message)`, so the code the
+  background produced and the content script relayed intact was dropped in the
+  last hop and a dApp checking `err.code === 4001` saw `undefined` — a wallet
+  the user deliberately declined was indistinguishable from one that broke. The
+  provider now rejects with a `ProviderRpcError` carrying `code` and, where the
+  boundary sent one, `data`, passed through verbatim rather than matched against
+  a list, so 4001, 4100 and 4902 all arrive and a future code needs no edit
+  here. An error the background sent with no code stays a plain `Error` with no
+  `code` property, and `message` is unchanged in every case. All four request
+  entry points (`request`, `enable`, `send`, `sendAsync`) are covered by
+  `tests/inpageErrors.test.js`, and the e2e probe that printed the missing code
+  now requires it on the page's Error as well as on the wire, for all four
+  rejected flows ([#274](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/274)).
+- 2026-08-12: "Back" now renders the screen it lands on instead of only unhiding
+  it. A reopened popup renders the wallet list and the one screen it restores
+  onto, so every screen further down the stack was still the blank template from
+  `index.html`, and Back walked straight onto it — an empty address, no
+  balances, no QR code. The Back path now goes through the same per-view
+  dispatch and data guards as the restore (`src/popup/viewRouter.js`, shared
+  with `restoreView()`), falling back to Home when the state the target would
+  render is gone. It renders only a view this page load has not rendered yet:
+  `viewRouter.js` records every view that reaches `showView()`, which is where
+  forward navigation and the restore both end, so Back onto a view already on
+  the page unhides it and nothing more. That is what keeps a second render from
+  re-fetching and overwriting what the view holds — an unsaved edit in Settings,
+  a transaction list already loaded. Home is the exception and is always
+  re-rendered, as it was before. Covered by unit tests on the real `goBack()`
+  and by three end-to-end cases against the real popup, each demonstrated
+  failing on the unfixed build
+  ([#268](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/268)).
+- 2026-08-12: `KNOWN_SYMBOLS` now maps a symbol to the set of contract addresses
+  that bear it, not to one of them. A ticker is not unique: seven of the 512
+  bundled tokens — `FRAX`, `REUSD`, `TON`, `EURE`, `MSUSD`, `MUSD` and `JPYC` —
+  share a symbol with another bundled entry at a different real contract, and
+  the table, built from the list first-wins, kept only the earlier one. The
+  other seven were judged spoofs of their own symbol at their own address and
+  hidden from the balance list, the history and the send selector, so a holder
+  could not spend them. Both contracts of each pair come from the same CoinGecko
+  fetch of 2026-02-27, so neither was stale and neither was dropped.
+  `isSpoofedSymbol()` asks set membership instead of equality, which does not
+  loosen the rule — a contract outside the set is still a spoof — and a test now
+  walks `TOKENS` asserting no bundled token is filtered at its own address,
+  which is the walk the suite lacked
+  ([#276](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/276)).
+- 2026-08-12: The dApp approval round trips are driven end to end in the
+  browser. A test page served by the harness speaks EIP-1193 to the real inpage
+  provider through the real content script, background worker and approval popup
+  for `eth_requestAccounts`, `personal_sign`, `eth_signTypedData_v4` and
+  `eth_sendTransaction`. Every signature is recovered and compared against the
+  active address, the transaction is checked against the bytes handed to the
+  stubbed RPC, each rejection must reach the page as a rejection, and the
+  password must appear in no message the approval window sends — the assertion
+  that gives [#157](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/157) a permanent
+  floor. This does not discharge a real dApp with real funds against mainnet
+  ([#183](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/183)).
+- 2026-08-12: The known-symbol spoof rule now judges the symbol a user actually
+  sees. `isSpoofedSymbol()` normalizes before the lookup — NFKC, then every
+  character that paints nothing removed (the format and default-ignorable
+  characters, plus U+007F), then trimmed — so `" ETH "`, a no-break space, a
+  zero-width space, a Hangul filler, a variation selector, a DELETE and a
+  fullwidth `ＥＴＨ` are all caught on the balance list, the history and the
+  send selector at once. Confusables that are distinct letters (Cyrillic `Е`),
+  bidi reordering and the visible C0/C1 controls — which measure 48.00px, a box,
+  in the pinned e2e Chromium where an invisible prefix measures 32.00px — stay
+  knowingly open and are asserted as open in the suite. No bundled symbol
+  contains whitespace or a non-ASCII character, so nothing legitimate is newly
+  filtered; the balance list's token-type gate also became case-insensitive,
+  which no longer drops a real holding if an explorer writes `erc-20`
+  ([#260](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/260)).
+- 2026-08-12: A containerized Firefox end-to-end harness
+  (`make test-e2e-firefox`) drives the real popup in a real Firefox with the MV2
+  build installed as a temporary add-on. Zero npm dependencies — a WebDriver
+  client over `fetch` against geckodriver — with `node`, Firefox 153.0.3 and
+  geckodriver 0.36.0 all pinned by digest. Uncaught errors are read from the
+  privileged console service in Marionette's chrome context, because BiDi
+  `log.entryAdded` reports nothing at all for extension pages; each drain reads
+  and clears the console in one chrome round trip, so no error is destroyed
+  unread by the drain itself, and errors logged during add-on install and
+  background startup are folded into step 1 instead of being cleared. The two
+  measured limits are documented rather than claimed away: the console ring
+  buffer holds 250 messages (a clean run peaks at 4), and the drained window
+  ends ≈1.5s after the last step returns. Demonstrated discriminating by exiting
+  1 on a `throw` at the top of `src/background/index.js`, on a build with one
+  import removed, on a `setTimeout` throw whose UI assertions all pass, on an
+  unhandled `Promise.reject` and on an undefined identifier in `home.js`, and 0
+  on the branch as it stands
+  ([#184](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/184)).
+- 2026-08-12: The transaction a dApp asks for is now populated in the background
+  before the approval window opens, so the object the user is shown is the
+  object the signed artifact is verified against — nonce, gas limit and every
+  fee field are compared exactly instead of being left to the ceilings, which
+  stay as a backstop against what a lying RPC node can talk the wallet into
+  displaying. The approval also pins the address it was raised for, so an
+  address switch between approval and signing refuses rather than signing from
+  an account the screen never named, and a request naming an address that is not
+  the active one is refused outright. The approval screen now shows the fee, gas
+  limit, network and nonce it vouches for
+  ([#216](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/216)).
+- 2026-08-12: The restored navigation stack is filtered against
+  `RESTORABLE_VIEWS` on load, truncated at the first entry the popup would not
+  render so that every surviving entry keeps the Back target it had. Back after
+  reopening can no longer land on a view the popup declined to restore, such as
+  `export-privkey` or `show-phrase`
+  ([#224](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/224)). Restorable views in
+  the stack are still unhidden without being re-rendered; that is tracked
+  separately in ([#268](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/268)).
+- 2026-08-12: One wording for a rejected password on every screen that asks for
+  one — the send confirmation and the delete-wallet confirmation no longer say
+  "Wrong password." (a fragment, which `RULES.md` Language & Labeling forbids)
+  and the two reveal screens no longer say "not correct", so all five
+  `decryptWithPassword` call sites now show the sentence the dApp approval paths
+  introduced. Strings only, no behaviour change, and each error container
+  measured at a 360px viewport in the pinned Playwright container
+  ([#172](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/172)).
+- 2026-08-12: Closed the empty-array hole in the end-to-end unstubbed-request
+  guard. `batch.every()` is vacuously true on `[]`, so a POST with body `[]` was
+  answered `200 []` instead of failing the suite; the guard now rejects an empty
+  batch, demonstrated green-before/red-after with a throwaway probe. The comment
+  claiming `postData()` returns `null` for undecodable bodies was corrected to
+  the two real paths — an absent or empty body decodes to `null`, a binary body
+  decodes lossily into invalid JSON
+  ([#187](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/187)).
 - 2026-08-12: The transaction confirmation screen has browser coverage. The
   end-to-end suite reaches ConfirmTx for both the native ETH and the ERC-20 path
   off a funded-balance fixture, and asserts the pending, funded, over-balance
@@ -244,9 +380,9 @@ tracker.
 - Pre-1.0 security review of the extension (key handling, DEBUG mode policy, RPC
   input validation) before any 1.0rc tag. Individual filed issues are parts of
   it, but the review is broader than any of them.
-- Decide whether docker-in-docker makes `make test-e2e` runnable in the Gitea
-  workflow. Extending the suite itself is tracked as
-  [#183](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/183) and
-  [#184](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/184).
+- Decide whether docker-in-docker makes `make test-e2e` and
+  `make test-e2e-firefox` runnable in the Gitea workflow. Extending the Chrome
+  suite itself is tracked as
+  [#183](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/183).
 - Cut 1.0.0 once the milestone is empty, then continue tagging as milestones
   land.

docs/README.md

@@ -311,10 +311,15 @@ pages. When a site requests access to your wallet:
    time.
 
 When a connected site requests a transaction, a separate approval popup appears
-showing the transaction details (from, to, value, data). You must enter your
-password and click "Confirm" to authorize it. Message and typed-data signature
-requests work the same way, with a "Sign" button, and also require your
-password.
+showing the transaction details (from, to, value, data, network fee, network and
+nonce). Every one of those values is checked against the transaction that is
+actually signed before anything is broadcast, so what you read on that screen is
+what goes out or nothing does. The popup appears once the wallet has worked out
+the fee and gas from the network, which takes a moment; if that fails, no popup
+appears and the site is told the transaction could not be prepared. You must
+enter your password and click "Confirm" to authorize it. Message and typed-data
+signature requests work the same way, with a "Sign" button, and also require
+your password.
 
 If the requesting site's domain is on the phishing blocklist, all three approval
 screens show a red phishing warning before you decide.

script/test-e2e-firefox

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# script/test-e2e-firefox: build the extension and drive the real popup in
+# a real Firefox inside a pinned container. The Firefox counterpart to
+# script/test-e2e. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all.
+#
+# Deliberately NOT called by script/check or script/test, for the same
+# reason as the Chrome suite: REPO_POLICIES.md caps make test at 20 seconds
+# and a browser suite does not fit.
+#
+# Unlike script/test-e2e this builds its image locally, because no
+# published image carries both a pinned Firefox and a matching geckodriver.
+# All three external artifacts are pinned by digest inside the Dockerfile;
+# see tests/e2e/firefox/Dockerfile.
+set -eu
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
+ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
+
+IMAGE="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")-e2e-firefox"
+
+main() {
+    cd "$ROOT"
+
+    if ! command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "test-e2e-firefox: docker is required to run the e2e suite" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+
+    echo "Building extension for e2e..."
+    yarn run build 2>&1
+
+    # The build context is tests/e2e/firefox/ and holds nothing but the
+    # Dockerfile: the harness itself arrives over the bind mount below, so
+    # editing it never invalidates an image layer.
+    echo "Building the pinned Firefox e2e image..."
+    docker build -t "$IMAGE" "$ROOT/tests/e2e/firefox"
+
+    echo "Running the Firefox e2e suite..."
+    # --shm-size=1g: Firefox needs more than the default 64MB /dev/shm.
+    # --network none: the suite stubs nothing, so this is what keeps the
+    #   run offline and deterministic. The extension swallows its own
+    #   fetch failures, so the popup flows work unchanged; see the
+    #   network note in README.md. Weaker than the Chrome suite's
+    #   fixture interception, and honestly so — it proves no request
+    #   escaped, but it cannot report which ones were attempted.
+    # --user: keep files the suite touches owned by the caller, not root.
+    # HOME=/tmp: the mapped uid has no home directory in the image.
+    #
+    # No --privileged. Firefox's sandbox logs
+    # "CanCreateUserNamespace() clone() failure: EPERM" on startup here;
+    # it is cosmetic and headless Firefox runs fine without it.
+    docker run --rm \
+        --shm-size=1g \
+        --network none \
+        --user "$(id -u):$(id -g)" \
+        -e HOME=/tmp \
+        -v "$ROOT:/work" \
+        -w /work \
+        "$IMAGE" \
+        node tests/e2e/firefox/run.js dist/firefox
+}
+
+main "$@"

src/background/index.js

@@ -18,11 +18,14 @@ const {
     verifySignature,
     failureIsRetryable,
     describeTxFailure,
+    sameAddress,
+    ApprovalMismatchError,
     TX_STAGE_SIGN,
     TX_STAGE_VERIFY,
     TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,
     TX_STAGE_INFLIGHT,
 } = require("../shared/approvalVerify");
+const { prepareApprovalTx } = require("../shared/approvalTx");
 const {
     isPhishingDomain,
     refreshPhishingListOnSchedule,
@@ -77,6 +80,14 @@ async function getActiveAddress() {
     return null;
 }
 
+// Whether a request names a signing address other than the active one. Such a
+// request is refused rather than quietly signed as whichever address happens
+// to be active: the page asked for account A and would otherwise be handed
+// something from account B.
+function namesAnotherAddress(requested, activeAddress) {
+    return !!requested && !sameAddress(requested, activeAddress);
+}
+
 async function getRpcUrl() {
     const s = await getState();
     return s.rpcUrl || DEFAULT_RPC_URL;
@@ -225,13 +236,21 @@ function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
 // Uses windows.create() directly because tx approvals are triggered programmatically
 // (from a dApp RPC call), not from a user gesture, so action.openPopup() is
 // unreliable in this context.
-function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, txParams) {
+//
+// `approvedTx` is the fully populated transaction (see approvalTx.js): the
+// object the popup displays, the object it signs, and the object the artifact
+// is verified against. `approvedFrom` is the address that is active now, and
+// it is pinned here rather than read again at signing time — an address switch
+// between approval and signing must refuse, not sign from an account this
+// screen never named.
+function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
         pendingApprovals[id] = {
             origin,
             hostname,
-            txParams,
+            approvedTx,
+            approvedFrom,
             resolve,
             type: "tx",
         };
@@ -244,13 +263,14 @@ function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, txParams) {
 // Uses windows.create() directly because sign approvals are triggered programmatically
 // (from a dApp RPC call), not from a user gesture, so action.openPopup() is
 // unreliable in this context.
-function requestSignApproval(origin, hostname, signParams) {
+function requestSignApproval(origin, hostname, signParams, approvedFrom) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
         pendingApprovals[id] = {
             origin,
             hostname,
             signParams,
+            approvedFrom,
             resolve,
             type: "sign",
         };
@@ -259,13 +279,50 @@ function requestSignApproval(origin, hostname, signParams) {
     });
 }
 
-// Detect when an approval popup (browser-action) closes without a response.
-// TX and sign approvals now use windows.create() and are handled by the
-// windowsApi.onRemoved listener below, but we still handle site-connection
-// approval disconnects here.
+// Anything only the extension's own pages may say. A content script speaks
+// with the page's URL, so this is what separates the popup from the site the
+// popup is being asked about.
+function isExtensionSender(sender) {
+    const extUrl = runtime.getURL("");
+    return !!(sender && sender.url && sender.url.startsWith(extUrl));
+}
+
+// The approval popup's port: it carries the user's decision on a
+// site-connection approval, and its disconnect is how that approval learns the
+// popup closed without one.
+//
+// The decision travels this port rather than a one-off runtime.sendMessage()
+// for exactly one reason: the port is also what the popup's window.close()
+// disconnects. A message posted on a port is delivered before that port's
+// disconnect, so approve-then-close settles as an approval no matter how fast
+// the teardown is. Sent as a one-off message the two crossed on independent
+// channels with nothing ordering them, and the teardown won every time when
+// the prompt was driven in a tab: the user approved and the dApp was told they
+// had refused.
+//
+// TX and sign approvals do not decide here. They stay pending across a
+// disconnect — the user can reopen the toolbar popup — and are rejected by the
+// windowsApi.onRemoved listener below.
 runtime.onConnect.addListener((port) => {
     if (port.name.startsWith("approval:")) {
         const id = port.name.split(":")[1];
+        if (pendingApprovals[id]) {
+            // This approval has a popup that can speak for it, so its
+            // disconnect is a trustworthy "closed"; see onRemoved below.
+            pendingApprovals[id].portConnected = true;
+        }
+        port.onMessage.addListener((msg) => {
+            if (!msg || msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_DECISION") return;
+            if (!isExtensionSender(port.sender)) return;
+            const approval = pendingApprovals[id];
+            if (!approval || approval.type === "tx" || approval.type === "sign")
+                return;
+            settleApproval(id, {
+                approved: !!msg.approved,
+                remember: !!msg.remember,
+            });
+            resetPopupUrl();
+        });
         port.onDisconnect.addListener(() => {
             const approval = pendingApprovals[id];
             if (approval) {
@@ -502,6 +559,16 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
                 ? { method, message: params[0], from: params[1] }
                 : { method, message: params[1], from: params[0] };
 
+        if (namesAnotherAddress(signParams.from, activeAddress)) {
+            return {
+                error: {
+                    code: 4100,
+                    message:
+                        "This site asked to sign as an address that is not the active one.",
+                },
+            };
+        }
+
         if (method === "eth_sign") {
             signParams.dangerWarning =
                 "\u26a0\ufe0f DANGER: This site is requesting to sign a raw hash. " +
@@ -513,6 +580,7 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
             origin,
             hostname,
             signParams,
+            activeAddress,
         );
         if (decision.error) return { error: decision.error };
         return { result: decision.signature };
@@ -534,10 +602,20 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         }
 
         const signParams = { method, typedData: params[1], from: params[0] };
+        if (namesAnotherAddress(signParams.from, activeAddress)) {
+            return {
+                error: {
+                    code: 4100,
+                    message:
+                        "This site asked to sign as an address that is not the active one.",
+                },
+            };
+        }
         const decision = await requestSignApproval(
             origin,
             hostname,
             signParams,
+            activeAddress,
         );
         if (decision.error) return { error: decision.error };
         return { result: decision.signature };
@@ -559,7 +637,51 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         }
 
         const txParams = params?.[0] || {};
-        const decision = await requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, txParams);
+        if (namesAnotherAddress(txParams.from, activeAddress)) {
+            return {
+                error: {
+                    code: 4100,
+                    message:
+                        "This site asked to send from an address that is not the active one.",
+                },
+            };
+        }
+
+        // Populate here, before any window opens, so that the transaction the
+        // user is shown is a complete one and is the same object the signed
+        // artifact is checked against. A failure raises no approval at all and
+        // is reported to the requesting page; see approvalTx.js.
+        let approvedTx;
+        try {
+            approvedTx = await prepareApprovalTx(
+                getProvider(await getRpcUrl()),
+                activeAddress,
+                txParams,
+            );
+        } catch (e) {
+            return { error: { message: e.message } };
+        }
+
+        // Population is a network round trip, and the user can switch address
+        // during it. Raising the approval anyway would put an account on the
+        // screen that the wallet is no longer on, and it could never be signed
+        // — the signing handler refuses exactly that. Refuse it here instead,
+        // while the page is still waiting and nothing has been displayed.
+        if (!sameAddress(await getActiveAddress(), activeAddress)) {
+            return {
+                error: {
+                    message:
+                        "The active address changed while this transaction was being prepared, so it was not sent.",
+                },
+            };
+        }
+
+        const decision = await requestTxApproval(
+            origin,
+            hostname,
+            approvedTx,
+            activeAddress,
+        );
         if (decision.error) return { error: decision.error };
         return { result: decision.txHash };
     }
@@ -747,20 +869,32 @@ startBackgroundJobs();
 // window is an ordinary event with an attempt already in flight behind it.
 // settleApproval() refuses those, which leaves the attempt to report its real
 // outcome to the page.
+//
+// A site-connection approval whose popup connected its port is not decided
+// here. That popup approves and closes in the same breath, and this event
+// races the decision on a channel of its own — the same race the port exists
+// to end. Its port disconnect says the same thing this event does, in an order
+// that is defined, so the disconnect is left to say it. The window closing
+// before any port connected is the one case with nothing else to speak for it,
+// and is rejected here so the dApp is not left waiting on a window that is
+// gone.
 if (windowsApi && windowsApi.onRemoved) {
     windowsApi.onRemoved.addListener((windowId) => {
         for (const [id, approval] of Object.entries(pendingApprovals)) {
             if (approval.windowId !== windowId) continue;
-            const rejection =
-                approval.type === "tx" || approval.type === "sign"
-                    ? {
+            const isSite = approval.type !== "tx" && approval.type !== "sign";
+            if (isSite && approval.portConnected) continue;
+            settleApproval(
+                id,
+                isSite
+                    ? { approved: false, remember: false }
+                    : {
                           error: {
                               code: 4001,
                               message: "User rejected the request.",
                           },
-                      }
-                    : { approved: false, remember: false };
-            settleApproval(id, rejection);
+                      },
+            );
         }
     });
 }
@@ -787,18 +921,16 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
     }
 
     // Validate that popup-only messages originate from the extension itself.
+    // The site-connection decision is not here: it is a port message, and it
+    // is checked the same way where the port is served.
     const POPUP_ONLY_TYPES = [
         "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL",
-        "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_RESPONSE",
         "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
         "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
     ];
-    if (POPUP_ONLY_TYPES.includes(msg.type)) {
-        const extUrl = runtime.getURL("");
-        if (!sender.url || !sender.url.startsWith(extUrl)) {
-            sendResponse({ error: "Unauthorized sender" });
-            return false;
-        }
+    if (POPUP_ONLY_TYPES.includes(msg.type) && !isExtensionSender(sender)) {
+        sendResponse({ error: "Unauthorized sender" });
+        return false;
     }
 
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") {
@@ -810,11 +942,16 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
             };
             if (approval.type === "tx") {
                 resp.type = "tx";
-                resp.txParams = approval.txParams;
+                // The populated transaction, and the address it was raised
+                // for. The popup displays and signs exactly this and does not
+                // populate or re-read anything itself.
+                resp.approvedTx = approval.approvedTx;
+                resp.approvedFrom = approval.approvedFrom;
             }
             if (approval.type === "sign") {
                 resp.type = "sign";
                 resp.signParams = approval.signParams;
+                resp.approvedFrom = approval.approvedFrom;
             }
             // Flag if the requesting domain is on the phishing blocklist.
             resp.isPhishingDomain = isPhishingDomain(approval.hostname);
@@ -825,15 +962,6 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
         return false;
     }
 
-    if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_RESPONSE") {
-        settleApproval(msg.id, {
-            approved: msg.approved,
-            remember: msg.remember,
-        });
-        resetPopupUrl();
-        return false;
-    }
-
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE") {
         const approval = pendingApprovals[msg.id];
         if (!approval) return false;
@@ -888,14 +1016,27 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
             try {
                 await loadState();
                 const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+                // An address switch between approval and signing refuses. The
+                // approval named one account; signing from whichever account
+                // is active now would send funds from an account this screen
+                // never showed. A switch normally rejects every pending
+                // approval on its way through broadcastAccountsChanged(), so
+                // this is the case where that did not reach the approval —
+                // and it is a refusal, not a retry, because the transaction
+                // the user saw is no longer the transaction that would go out.
+                if (!sameAddress(activeAddress, approval.approvedFrom)) {
+                    throw new ApprovalMismatchError(
+                        "The active address changed after this transaction was approved, so it was not sent.",
+                    );
+                }
                 // The popup holds the secret, but the background stays the
                 // authority on what is broadcast: the raw transaction must be
-                // the approved one, signed by the approved address, on the
-                // network that is selected.
+                // the transaction that was displayed, signed by the address
+                // the approval named, on the network that is selected.
                 verifySignedTx(
                     msg.rawSignedTx,
-                    approval.txParams,
-                    activeAddress,
+                    approval.approvedTx,
+                    approval.approvedFrom,
                     currentNetwork().chainId,
                 );
             } catch (e) {
@@ -932,10 +1073,10 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
                 sendResponse({ txHash: tx.hash });
             } catch (e) {
                 // Terminal, never retried: the node may have accepted the
-                // transaction and still failed to answer, and the popup's
-                // retry re-signs at a freshly fetched nonce rather than
-                // re-broadcasting these bytes. Retrying would send the
-                // approved transfer a second time.
+                // transaction and still failed to answer, so the wallet cannot
+                // tell a transaction that never left from one already in the
+                // mempool. The page has been given its outcome for this
+                // request; a second attempt would report a second one.
                 const outcome = describeTxFailure(TX_STAGE_BROADCAST, e);
                 settleApproval(
                     msg.id,
@@ -998,12 +1139,24 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
         (async () => {
             try {
                 const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
+                // Same as the transaction path: the address the approval named
+                // is the one that must have signed, and a switch since then is
+                // a refusal rather than a signature from another account.
+                if (!sameAddress(activeAddress, approval.approvedFrom)) {
+                    throw new ApprovalMismatchError(
+                        "The active address changed after this request was approved, so it was not signed.",
+                    );
+                }
                 // The popup holds the secret, but the background stays the
                 // authority on what is handed back to the page: the signature
-                // must cover the approved payload and recover to the approved
-                // address.
+                // must cover the approved payload and recover to the address
+                // the approval named.
                 const signature = msg.signature;
-                verifySignature(approval.signParams, signature, activeAddress);
+                verifySignature(
+                    approval.signParams,
+                    signature,
+                    approval.approvedFrom,
+                );
                 settleApproval(msg.id, { signature }, { holdsClaim: true });
                 sendResponse({ signature });
             } catch (e) {

src/content/inpage.js

@@ -11,6 +11,39 @@
     let nextId = 1;
     const pending = {};
 
+    // EIP-1193 ProviderRpcError: `code`, `message`, optional `data`. A class
+    // rather than properties bolted onto an Error because this object crosses
+    // no boundary after construction — it is built in the page's own realm and
+    // handed straight to the caller's catch — so the prototype survives and
+    // `error.name` is a stable thing for a dApp to see.
+    class ProviderRpcError extends Error {
+        constructor(code, message, data) {
+            super(message);
+            this.name = "ProviderRpcError";
+            this.code = code;
+            if (data !== undefined) this.data = data;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Rebuild a boundary error as the error the page catches, carrying the
+    // code (and data) the extension reported. Without this a dApp cannot tell
+    // a user's refusal (4001) from a wallet that broke, and retries or shows
+    // an error instead of accepting the refusal.
+    //
+    // Whatever code arrived is passed through verbatim rather than being
+    // matched against a list: the extension emits 4001, 4100 and 4902 today,
+    // and a code this file has never heard of is still the truth about what
+    // happened. An error reported with no code at all stays a plain Error —
+    // a ProviderRpcError whose `code` is undefined would advertise a
+    // conformance it does not have. `message` is untouched in every case.
+    function toPageError(error) {
+        const message = (error && error.message) || "Request failed";
+        if (error && error.code !== undefined && error.code !== null) {
+            return new ProviderRpcError(error.code, message, error.data);
+        }
+        return new Error(message);
+    }
+
     // Listen for responses from the content script
     window.addEventListener("message", function onUuid(event) {
         if (event.source !== window) return;
@@ -20,7 +53,7 @@
         if (!p) return;
         delete pending[id];
         if (error) {
-            p.reject(new Error(error.message || "Request failed"));
+            p.reject(toPageError(error));
         } else {
             p.resolve(result);
         }

src/popup/index.html

@@ -1496,6 +1496,33 @@
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Value</div>
                     <div id="approve-tx-value" class="text-xs font-bold"></div>
                 </div>
+                <div class="mb-3">
+                    <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Network fee (max)</div>
+                    <div
+                        id="approve-tx-fee"
+                        class="text-xs font-bold min-h-[1rem]"
+                    ></div>
+                    <div
+                        id="approve-tx-fee-detail"
+                        class="text-xs text-muted min-h-[1rem]"
+                    ></div>
+                </div>
+                <div class="mb-3 flex justify-between">
+                    <div>
+                        <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Network</div>
+                        <div
+                            id="approve-tx-network"
+                            class="text-xs min-h-[1rem]"
+                        ></div>
+                    </div>
+                    <div>
+                        <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Nonce</div>
+                        <div
+                            id="approve-tx-nonce"
+                            class="text-xs min-h-[1rem]"
+                        ></div>
+                    </div>
+                </div>
                 <div id="approve-tx-data-section" class="mb-3 hidden">
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Raw data</div>
                     <div id="approve-tx-data" class="text-xs break-all"></div>

src/popup/index.js

@@ -9,16 +9,17 @@ const {
     $,
     showView,
     updateDebugBanner,
-    setRenderMain,
+    setBackRenderer,
     pushCurrentView,
     goBack,
     clearViewStack,
 } = require("./views/helpers");
 const { applyTheme } = require("./theme");
-// Views that can be fully re-rendered from persisted state. All others fall
-// back to the nearest restorable parent; see the module for why the
-// secret-bearing views are absent.
-const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("./restorableViews");
+// Renders a view the popup lands on without having navigated to it forward:
+// on restore here, and on Back. Only the views that can be fully re-rendered
+// from persisted state (RESTORABLE_VIEWS, src/popup/restorableViews.js) go
+// through it; anything else falls back to the nearest restorable parent.
+const { renderView, makeBackRenderer } = require("./viewRouter");
 
 const home = require("./views/home");
 const welcome = require("./views/welcome");
@@ -108,91 +109,22 @@ const ctx = {
     },
 };
 
-function needsAddress(view) {
-    return (
-        view === "address" ||
-        view === "address-token" ||
-        view === "receive" ||
-        view === "transaction"
-    );
-}
-
-function hasValidAddress() {
-    return (
-        state.selectedWallet !== null &&
-        state.selectedAddress !== null &&
-        state.wallets[state.selectedWallet] &&
-        state.wallets[state.selectedWallet].addresses[state.selectedAddress]
-    );
-}
+// The view modules the router renders through, keyed as it expects them.
+const viewModules = {
+    main: { show: () => fallbackView() },
+    addressDetail,
+    addressToken,
+    receive,
+    settings,
+    settingsAddToken,
+    confirmTx,
+    transactionDetail,
+    txStatus,
+};
 
 function restoreView() {
-    const view = state.currentView;
-    if (!view || !RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view)) {
-        return fallbackView();
-    }
-
-    if (needsAddress(view) && !hasValidAddress()) {
-        return fallbackView();
-    }
-
-    if (view === "address-token" && !state.selectedToken) {
-        return fallbackView();
-    }
-
-    switch (view) {
-        case "address":
-            addressDetail.show();
-            break;
-        case "address-token":
-            addressToken.show();
-            break;
-        case "receive":
-            receive.show();
-            break;
-        case "settings":
-            settings.show();
-            break;
-        case "settings-addtoken":
-            settingsAddToken.show();
-            break;
-        case "confirm-tx":
-            if (state.viewData && state.viewData.pendingTx) {
-                confirmTx.restore();
-            } else {
-                fallbackView();
-            }
-            break;
-        case "transaction":
-            if (state.viewData && state.viewData.tx) {
-                transactionDetail.render();
-            } else {
-                fallbackView();
-            }
-            break;
-        case "wait-tx":
-            // Resumes the receipt poll from the persisted broadcast time.
-            if (!txStatus.restoreWait()) {
-                fallbackView();
-            }
-            break;
-        case "success-tx":
-            if (state.viewData && state.viewData.hash) {
-                txStatus.renderSuccess();
-            } else {
-                fallbackView();
-            }
-            break;
-        case "error-tx":
-            if (state.viewData && state.viewData.message) {
-                txStatus.renderError();
-            } else {
-                fallbackView();
-            }
-            break;
-        default:
-            fallbackView();
-            break;
+    if (!renderView(state.currentView, state, viewModules)) {
+        fallbackView();
     }
 }
 
@@ -247,7 +179,7 @@ async function init() {
         settings.show();
     });
 
-    setRenderMain(renderWalletList);
+    setBackRenderer(makeBackRenderer(state, viewModules));
 
     welcome.init(ctx);
     addWallet.init(ctx);

src/popup/viewRouter.js

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+// Rendering a view the popup lands on without having navigated to it
+// forward: on restore, and on Back. In both cases the view may never have
+// been rendered in this page load — a reopened popup renders only the
+// wallet list and the view it restores onto, so every other view is still
+// the blank static template from index.html — so unhiding it is not enough.
+//
+// Forward navigation renders as it goes and must NOT come through here:
+// rendering a second time would re-fetch and clobber whatever the view has
+// in flight.
+//
+// The view modules are injected and nothing here touches the DOM, so the
+// dispatch and its data guards can be tested directly; src/popup/index.js
+// cannot be required outside a browser.
+
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("./restorableViews");
+
+// The views this page load has rendered.
+//
+// The Back path cannot otherwise tell its two cases apart. A view the popup
+// never rendered is still the blank template from index.html and has to be
+// rendered; a view already on the page must NOT be rendered again, because
+// a second render re-fetches and overwrites whatever the user has typed
+// into it and not yet saved.
+//
+// Registration is showView() in views/helpers.js, which is the last thing
+// every render path runs — restoreView()'s, the Back path's, and every
+// forward show(). That is the point of putting it there rather than in the
+// individual views: a view added later registers itself with no one having
+// to remember it, so this cannot decay.
+//
+// Module scope is page-load scope: the popup loads this module once per
+// page load, and a reopened popup gets a fresh, empty set — which is
+// exactly the state that makes the Back path render.
+const renderedViews = new Set();
+
+function markViewRendered(view) {
+    if (view) renderedViews.add(view);
+}
+
+// Begin a fresh page-load scope. The popup gets one by being loaded; the
+// unit tests, which simulate several page loads against one module
+// instance, ask for one.
+function resetRenderedViews() {
+    renderedViews.clear();
+}
+
+// Home is the exception: Back re-renders it every time, which is what the
+// popup did before this router existed (index.js registered
+// renderWalletList() as setRenderMain(), and goBack() called it on every
+// Back onto "main"). It must stay that way — the wallet list has to reflect
+// what changed while the user was away from it, such as a wallet renamed or
+// an address removed in Settings — and Home holds no unsaved input to lose.
+const ALWAYS_RENDER_ON_BACK = new Set(["main"]);
+
+// Views that render an address the user picked and cannot be rendered
+// without one.
+const ADDRESS_VIEWS = new Set([
+    "address",
+    "address-token",
+    "receive",
+    "transaction",
+]);
+
+function needsAddress(view) {
+    return ADDRESS_VIEWS.has(view);
+}
+
+function hasValidAddress(state) {
+    return Boolean(
+        state.selectedWallet !== null &&
+        state.selectedAddress !== null &&
+        state.wallets[state.selectedWallet] &&
+        state.wallets[state.selectedWallet].addresses[state.selectedAddress],
+    );
+}
+
+// Render `view` from persisted state. Each view module shows itself, so a
+// true return means the view is both rendered and on screen.
+//
+// Returns false when the view is not one the popup renders from state, or
+// when the state it would render is gone — a token no longer selected, a
+// transaction no longer persisted. The caller falls back rather than
+// putting an empty template on screen.
+function renderView(view, state, views) {
+    if (!view || !RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view)) return false;
+    if (needsAddress(view) && !hasValidAddress(state)) return false;
+    if (view === "address-token" && !state.selectedToken) return false;
+
+    const data = state.viewData || {};
+    switch (view) {
+        case "main":
+            views.main.show();
+            return true;
+        case "address":
+            views.addressDetail.show();
+            return true;
+        case "address-token":
+            views.addressToken.show();
+            return true;
+        case "receive":
+            views.receive.show();
+            return true;
+        case "settings":
+            views.settings.show();
+            return true;
+        case "settings-addtoken":
+            views.settingsAddToken.show();
+            return true;
+        case "confirm-tx":
+            if (!data.pendingTx) return false;
+            views.confirmTx.restore();
+            return true;
+        case "transaction":
+            if (!data.tx) return false;
+            views.transactionDetail.render();
+            return true;
+        case "wait-tx":
+            // Resumes the receipt poll from the persisted broadcast time,
+            // and answers false when there is nothing resumable left.
+            return Boolean(views.txStatus.restoreWait());
+        case "success-tx":
+            if (!data.hash) return false;
+            views.txStatus.renderSuccess();
+            return true;
+        case "error-tx":
+            if (!data.message) return false;
+            views.txStatus.renderError();
+            return true;
+        default:
+            return false;
+    }
+}
+
+// The Back-path renderer, registered with setBackRenderer() in
+// views/helpers.js.
+//
+// Returns false — leaving goBack() to unhide the view, as it always did —
+// in the two cases where the view is known to be on the page already:
+//
+//   - It is not one the popup renders from persisted state. The restored
+//     stack is filtered against RESTORABLE_VIEWS, so such a view can only
+//     be on the stack from this page load, where forward navigation
+//     rendered it on the way in.
+//   - This page load has rendered it. Re-rendering would re-fetch and
+//     clobber what it holds; Home is rendered anyway, see above.
+//
+// What is left is the case the router exists for: a view on the stack that
+// this page load has never rendered, whose template is still blank.
+function makeBackRenderer(state, views) {
+    return function renderBack(view) {
+        if (!RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view)) return false;
+        if (renderedViews.has(view) && !ALWAYS_RENDER_ON_BACK.has(view)) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        if (!renderView(view, state, views)) {
+            views.main.show();
+        }
+        return true;
+    };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+    renderView,
+    makeBackRenderer,
+    markViewRendered,
+    resetRenderedViews,
+};

src/popup/views/approval.js

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ const {
     onViewLeave,
 } = require("./helpers");
 const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
+const { networkByChainId } = require("../../shared/networks");
 const {
     formatEther,
     formatUnits,
@@ -23,7 +24,6 @@ const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
 const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
 const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
 const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
-const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
 const { describeSigningFailure } = require("../../shared/approvalVerify");
 const txStatus = require("./txStatus");
 const uniswap = require("../../shared/uniswap");
@@ -159,21 +159,61 @@ function showPhishingWarning(elementId, isPhishing) {
     }
 }
 
+// The fields of the approved transaction the value and recipient lines do not
+// already carry: network, gas limit, fee per gas, the most the fee can come to,
+// and the nonce. The background compares every one of them against the signed
+// artifact, so every one of them has to be on the screen — a number that is
+// verified but never displayed is verified against nothing the user agreed to.
+function showTxFee(approvedTx, ethPrice) {
+    const network = networkByChainId(approvedTx.chainId);
+    $("approve-tx-network").textContent = network
+        ? network.name
+        : "Unknown network (chain id " + BigInt(approvedTx.chainId) + ")";
+
+    const gasLimit = BigInt(approvedTx.gasLimit);
+    const feePerGas = BigInt(approvedTx.maxFeePerGas || approvedTx.gasPrice);
+    const maxFeeEth = formatTxValue(formatEther(gasLimit * feePerGas));
+    const usdStr = formatUsd(
+        ethPrice ? parseFloat(maxFeeEth) * ethPrice : null,
+    );
+    $("approve-tx-fee").textContent =
+        maxFeeEth + " ETH" + (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
+
+    let detail =
+        gasLimit.toString() +
+        " gas at up to " +
+        formatUnits(feePerGas, 9) +
+        " gwei";
+    if (approvedTx.maxPriorityFeePerGas) {
+        detail +=
+            ", " +
+            formatUnits(approvedTx.maxPriorityFeePerGas, 9) +
+            " gwei priority";
+    }
+    $("approve-tx-fee-detail").textContent = detail;
+    $("approve-tx-nonce").textContent = BigInt(approvedTx.nonce).toString();
+}
+
 function showTxApproval(details) {
     showPhishingWarning(
         "approve-tx-phishing-warning",
         details.isPhishingDomain,
     );
 
-    pendingTxParams = details.txParams;
+    // The transaction the background populated. It is displayed as it stands,
+    // signed as it stands, and verified against as it stands — the popup fills
+    // nothing in, so there is no number on this screen that the background
+    // cannot compare with the artifact it gets back.
+    pendingTxParams = details.approvedTx;
+    const approvedTx = details.approvedTx;
 
-    const toAddr = details.txParams.to;
+    const toAddr = approvedTx.to;
     const token = toAddr ? TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(toAddr.toLowerCase()) : null;
-    const ethValue = formatEther(details.txParams.value || "0");
+    const ethValue = formatEther(approvedTx.value || "0");
 
     // Build txInfo for status screens
     pendingTxDetails = {
-        from: state.activeAddress,
+        from: details.approvedFrom,
         to: toAddr || "",
         amount: formatTxValue(ethValue),
         token: "ETH",
@@ -181,7 +221,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     };
 
     // If this is an ERC-20 call, try to extract the real recipient and amount
-    const decoded = decodeCalldata(details.txParams.data, toAddr || "");
+    const decoded = decodeCalldata(approvedTx.data, toAddr || "");
     if (decoded && decoded.details) {
         let decodedTokenAddr = null;
         let decodedTokenSymbol = null;
@@ -219,7 +259,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     }
 
     $("approve-tx-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
-    $("approve-tx-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(state.activeAddress);
+    $("approve-tx-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(details.approvedFrom);
 
     // Show token symbol next to contract address if known
     const symbol = toAddr ? tokenLabel(toAddr) : null;
@@ -235,7 +275,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     }
 
     const ethValueFormatted = formatTxValue(
-        formatEther(details.txParams.value || "0"),
+        formatEther(approvedTx.value || "0"),
     );
     const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
     const ethUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(ethValueFormatted) * ethPrice : null;
@@ -243,6 +283,8 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     $("approve-tx-value").textContent =
         ethValueFormatted + " ETH" + (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
 
+    showTxFee(approvedTx, ethPrice);
+
     // Decode calldata (reuse decoded from above)
     const decodedEl = $("approve-tx-decoded");
     if (decoded) {
@@ -271,8 +313,8 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     }
 
     // Always show raw data when present
-    if (details.txParams.data && details.txParams.data !== "0x") {
-        $("approve-tx-data").textContent = details.txParams.data;
+    if (approvedTx.data && approvedTx.data !== "0x") {
+        $("approve-tx-data").textContent = approvedTx.data;
         $("approve-tx-data-section").classList.remove("hidden");
     } else {
         $("approve-tx-data-section").classList.add("hidden");
@@ -283,7 +325,11 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
 
     showView("approve-tx");
     attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-tx");
-    gateOnWalletDefect("approve-tx-error", "btn-approve-tx");
+    gateOnWalletDefect(
+        "approve-tx-error",
+        "btn-approve-tx",
+        details.approvedFrom,
+    );
 }
 
 function decodeHexMessage(hex) {
@@ -342,9 +388,12 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
 
     const sp = details.signParams;
     pendingSignParams = sp;
+    pendingSignFrom = details.approvedFrom;
 
     $("approve-sign-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
-    $("approve-sign-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(sp.from);
+    $("approve-sign-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(
+        details.approvedFrom,
+    );
 
     const isTyped =
         sp.method === "eth_signTypedData_v4" ||
@@ -383,12 +432,16 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
 
     showView("approve-sign");
     attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-sign");
-    gateOnWalletDefect("approve-sign-error", "btn-approve-sign");
+    gateOnWalletDefect(
+        "approve-sign-error",
+        "btn-approve-sign",
+        details.approvedFrom,
+    );
 }
 
 function show(id) {
     approvalId = id;
-    runtime.connect({ name: "approval:" + id });
+    approvalPort = runtime.connect({ name: "approval:" + id });
     runtime.sendMessage({ type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id }, (details) => {
         if (!details) {
             window.close();
@@ -417,12 +470,24 @@ function show(id) {
 }
 
 let approvalId = null;
+// The port this approval was opened on. Closing this window disconnects it,
+// and the background treats that disconnect as "closed without deciding" for a
+// site connection — so the decision goes out on this same port and not as a
+// one-off message. One channel is ordered: a message posted on it is delivered
+// before its own disconnect, however immediately the close follows. Two
+// channels were not, and the close won, reporting a user who approved as
+// having refused.
+let approvalPort = null;
 let pendingTxDetails = null;
-// The exact parameters shown to the user, kept so the popup signs what it
-// displayed rather than re-fetching anything at approval time. Both are
-// repopulated by show() when the popup is closed and reopened.
+// The exact objects shown to the user, kept so the popup signs what it
+// displayed rather than re-fetching or re-populating anything at approval
+// time. All are repopulated by show() when the popup is closed and reopened.
 let pendingTxParams = null;
 let pendingSignParams = null;
+// The address the approval was raised for. Signing uses this rather than the
+// active address, so that an address switch since the approval fails here
+// instead of producing a signature from an account the screen never named.
+let pendingSignFrom = null;
 
 // Approve buttons stay disabled and muted while the popup derives the key and
 // signs, which is slow enough (Argon2id) that a double click is likely.
@@ -437,12 +502,13 @@ function setSignButtonBusy(busy) {
 }
 
 // Say so on the approval screen itself, and disable the approve button, when
-// the active address belongs to a wallet whose keys cannot be derived. Without
-// this the screen would take a password and fail after deriving it. Reject
-// stays available; the wallet is not touched. Returns true when it gated.
-function gateOnWalletDefect(errorId, buttonId) {
-    const active = findActiveWallet();
-    const defect = active ? walletDefect(active.wallet) : null;
+// the address the approval was raised for belongs to a wallet whose keys
+// cannot be derived. Without this the screen would take a password and fail
+// after deriving it. Reject stays available; the wallet is not touched.
+// Returns true when it gated.
+function gateOnWalletDefect(errorId, buttonId, address) {
+    const owner = findWalletFor(address);
+    const defect = owner ? walletDefect(owner.wallet) : null;
     if (!defect) return false;
     showError(errorId, defect.shortMessage);
     $(buttonId).disabled = true;
@@ -450,12 +516,14 @@ function gateOnWalletDefect(errorId, buttonId) {
     return true;
 }
 
-// Locate the wallet and the address index owning the currently active
-// address. Returns null when no wallet holds it.
-function findActiveWallet() {
+// Locate the wallet and the address index owning an address. Returns null when
+// no wallet holds it. Approvals look up the address they were raised for, not
+// whichever address is active now: the approval named one account, and signing
+// with another is what verification refuses.
+function findWalletFor(address) {
     for (const wallet of state.wallets) {
         for (let i = 0; i < wallet.addresses.length; i++) {
-            if (wallet.addresses[i].address === state.activeAddress) {
+            if (wallet.addresses[i].address === address) {
                 return { wallet, addrIndex: i };
             }
         }
@@ -477,6 +545,20 @@ function clearSignPassword() {
     hideError("approve-sign-error");
 }
 
+// Answer a site-connection approval and close. The decision goes out on the
+// approval port — see approvalPort above for why — and carries no approval id,
+// because the port name already names the approval the background will settle.
+function decideSite(approved) {
+    if (approvalPort) {
+        approvalPort.postMessage({
+            type: "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_DECISION",
+            approved,
+            remember: $("approve-remember").checked,
+        });
+    }
+    window.close();
+}
+
 function init(ctx) {
     onViewLeave("approve-tx", clearTxPassword);
     onViewLeave("approve-sign", clearSignPassword);
@@ -487,25 +569,11 @@ function init(ctx) {
     });
 
     $("btn-approve").addEventListener("click", () => {
-        const remember = $("approve-remember").checked;
-        runtime.sendMessage({
-            type: "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_RESPONSE",
-            id: approvalId,
-            approved: true,
-            remember,
-        });
-        window.close();
+        decideSite(true);
     });
 
     $("btn-reject").addEventListener("click", () => {
-        const remember = $("approve-remember").checked;
-        runtime.sendMessage({
-            type: "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_RESPONSE",
-            id: approvalId,
-            approved: false,
-            remember,
-        });
-        window.close();
+        decideSite(false);
     });
 
     $("btn-approve-tx").addEventListener("click", async () => {
@@ -517,12 +585,12 @@ function init(ctx) {
         hideError("approve-tx-error");
         setTxButtonBusy(true);
 
-        const active = findActiveWallet();
+        const active = findWalletFor(pendingTxParams.from);
         if (!active) {
             password = null;
             showError(
                 "approve-tx-error",
-                "No wallet was found for the active address.",
+                "No wallet was found for the address this transaction was approved for.",
             );
             setTxButtonBusy(false);
             return;
@@ -569,15 +637,16 @@ function init(ctx) {
                 active.addrIndex,
                 decryptedSecret,
             );
-            const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
-            const connected = signer.connect(provider);
-            // This is the sequence ethers' own sendTransaction() runs
-            // internally, so nonce, gas, fee and chain id population are
-            // identical to when the background did the signing.
-            const populated =
-                await connected.populateTransaction(pendingTxParams);
-            delete populated.from;
-            payload.rawSignedTx = await connected.signTransaction(populated);
+            // Sign the approved transaction exactly as it was displayed. The
+            // background populated it before this screen was drawn and checks
+            // the artifact against it field for field, so there is nothing to
+            // fill in here and no provider to fill it in from. The copy is
+            // because ethers may strip `from` off what it is handed, and the
+            // approval has to survive a retry intact; keeping `from` on it
+            // makes ethers refuse a key that is not the approved address.
+            payload.rawSignedTx = await signer.signTransaction({
+                ...pendingTxParams,
+            });
         } catch (e) {
             payload.error =
                 e.shortMessage || e.message || "Transaction signing failed.";
@@ -626,12 +695,12 @@ function init(ctx) {
         hideError("approve-sign-error");
         setSignButtonBusy(true);
 
-        const active = findActiveWallet();
+        const active = findWalletFor(pendingSignFrom);
         if (!active) {
             password = null;
             showError(
                 "approve-sign-error",
-                "No wallet was found for the active address.",
+                "No wallet was found for the address this request was approved for.",
             );
             setSignButtonBusy(false);
             return;

src/popup/views/confirmTx.js

@@ -422,7 +422,10 @@ function init(ctx) {
                 password,
             );
         } catch (e) {
-            showError("confirm-tx-password-error", "Wrong password.");
+            showError(
+                "confirm-tx-password-error",
+                "That password is incorrect. Please try again.",
+            );
             return;
         }
 

src/popup/views/deleteWallet.js

@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ function init(_ctx) {
         try {
             await decryptWithPassword(wallet.encryptedSecret, pw);
         } catch (_e) {
-            $("delete-wallet-flash").textContent = "Wrong password.";
+            $("delete-wallet-flash").textContent =
+                "That password is incorrect. Please try again.";
             $("delete-wallet-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
             btn.disabled = false;
             btn.classList.remove("text-muted");

src/popup/views/exportPrivkey.js

@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ async function reveal() {
         $("export-privkey-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
     } catch {
         if (!isCurrentReveal(generation)) return;
-        fail("That password is not correct. Please try again.");
+        fail("That password is incorrect. Please try again.");
     } finally {
         btn.disabled = false;
         btn.classList.remove("text-muted");

src/popup/views/helpers.js

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ const {
     getAddressValueUsd,
 } = require("../../shared/prices");
 const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
+const { markViewRendered } = require("../viewRouter");
 
 // When views are added, removed, or transitions between them change,
 // update the view-navigation documentation in README.md to match.
@@ -76,6 +77,10 @@ function showView(name) {
     }
     clearFlash();
     state.currentView = name;
+    // A view's show() ends here, so this is where the Back path learns the
+    // view is no longer the blank template from index.html and must not be
+    // rendered a second time. See viewRouter.js.
+    markViewRendered(name);
     saveState();
     updateDebugBanner(name);
 }
@@ -111,12 +116,19 @@ function updateDebugBanner(viewName) {
     }
 }
 
-// Callback to re-render the main/home view when navigating back to it.
-// Set once by index.js via setRenderMain().
-let _renderMain = null;
+// Callback that renders a view being navigated BACK onto. Set once by
+// index.js via setBackRenderer(), which routes the view through the same
+// per-view render and data guards restoreView() uses.
+//
+// It answers true when it took the navigation — the view is rendered and
+// shown, or its backing data was gone and it fell back — and false for a
+// view the popup does not render from persisted state. Those can only be
+// on the stack from this page load, because the stack is filtered on load,
+// so they have already been rendered and only need unhiding.
+let _renderBack = null;
 
-function setRenderMain(fn) {
-    _renderMain = fn;
+function setBackRenderer(fn) {
+    _renderBack = fn;
 }
 
 // Push the current view onto the navigation stack so goBack() can
@@ -136,9 +148,11 @@ function goBack() {
     } else {
         target = "main";
     }
-    if (target === "main" && _renderMain) {
-        _renderMain();
-    }
+    // A popped view is landed on, not navigated to. If the popup has been
+    // closed and reopened since the view was pushed, nothing has ever
+    // rendered it in this page load and its template is still blank, so it
+    // has to be rendered here rather than merely unhidden.
+    if (_renderBack && _renderBack(target)) return;
     showView(target);
 }
 
@@ -470,7 +484,7 @@ module.exports = {
     showView,
     onViewLeave,
     updateDebugBanner,
-    setRenderMain,
+    setBackRenderer,
     pushCurrentView,
     goBack,
     clearViewStack,

src/popup/views/showPhrase.js

@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ async function reveal() {
         if (!isCurrentReveal(generation)) return;
         // Deliberately not the caught error: the message is fixed so that
         // nothing derived from the ciphertext or the attempt can surface.
-        fail("That password is not correct. Please try again.");
+        fail("That password is incorrect. Please try again.");
     } finally {
         btn.disabled = false;
         btn.classList.remove("text-muted");

src/shared/approvalTx.js

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+// Preparation of the transaction an approval screen displays.
+//
+// A dApp's eth_sendTransaction normally fixes only `to`, `value` and `data`.
+// The nonce, the gas limit and the fees have to be filled in from the network
+// before anything can be signed, and whoever fills them in decides what the
+// user is shown. That work used to happen in the popup, after the user had
+// already approved: the numbers on the approval screen came from the popup and
+// were compared against nothing, so a compromised popup could display one fee
+// and sign another, and the ceilings in approvalVerify.js were all that stood
+// between the user and a fee that hands the validator the balance.
+//
+// So it happens here instead, in the background, before the approval window is
+// opened. The background populates the transaction, shows that object, and
+// verifies the signed artifact against that same object — the popup is handed
+// a finished transaction and signs it as given. Every field the user reads is
+// then a field that is compared.
+//
+// The cost is an RPC round trip before the approval window exists. Nothing is
+// displayed while it is in flight, and a failure — an unreachable node, a
+// reverting gas estimate, a transaction type this wallet does not sign, a fee
+// past the ceilings — means no approval and no window at all: the error goes
+// back to the requesting page, which is where the user's click came from. That
+// is deliberate. The alternative, opening the window first and populating
+// behind a spinner, needs a pending approval that exists before it can be
+// displayed or signed, and a half-initialised approval is exactly the state
+// the settle interlock in the background exists to keep out of that record.
+// The failure also lands earlier than it used to rather than later: the same
+// estimate previously failed after the user had typed their password.
+
+const {
+    VoidSigner,
+    accessListify,
+    getAddress,
+    getBytes,
+    hexlify,
+    toQuantity,
+} = require("ethers");
+const {
+    ALLOWED_TX_TYPES,
+    SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
+    assertWithinCeilings,
+} = require("./approvalVerify");
+
+// How long the population may take before the request is failed back to the
+// page. Without a bound a hung RPC endpoint leaves the dApp's promise pending
+// forever with nothing on screen to explain it; ethers' own request timeout is
+// minutes long, which is not a wait anyone will sit through.
+const POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS = 20000;
+
+// The request fields taken from the page. Anything else is dropped rather than
+// passed to ethers: the object is page-controlled, and a future ethers that
+// learns to carry a new transaction field must not start picking one up out of
+// it without this module knowing.
+const REQUEST_FIELDS = [
+    "to",
+    "value",
+    "data",
+    "nonce",
+    "gasLimit",
+    "gasPrice",
+    "maxFeePerGas",
+    "maxPriorityFeePerGas",
+    "chainId",
+    "accessList",
+    "type",
+];
+
+class ApprovalPrepareError extends Error {
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = "ApprovalPrepareError";
+    }
+}
+
+function fail(message) {
+    return new ApprovalPrepareError(message);
+}
+
+function present(v) {
+    return v !== null && v !== undefined && v !== "";
+}
+
+// These strings reach the user through the requesting page, so they are full
+// sentences even when the tail of one came from ethers or from the node.
+function sentence(text) {
+    return /[.!?]$/.test(text) ? text : text + ".";
+}
+
+// Reject a promise that has taken too long, and never leave the timer behind.
+async function withTimeout(promise, ms, message) {
+    let timer = null;
+    try {
+        return await Promise.race([
+            promise,
+            new Promise((_resolve, reject) => {
+                timer = setTimeout(() => reject(fail(message)), ms);
+            }),
+        ]);
+    } finally {
+        if (timer !== null) clearTimeout(timer);
+    }
+}
+
+// The page's request, reduced to the fields this wallet acts on.
+function requestFrom(txParams, from) {
+    const request = { from: getAddress(from) };
+    for (const key of REQUEST_FIELDS) {
+        if (present(txParams[key])) request[key] = txParams[key];
+    }
+    if (
+        present(request.type) &&
+        !ALLOWED_TX_TYPES.includes(Number(request.type))
+    ) {
+        throw fail(
+            "The site asked for a transaction of a type this wallet does not sign.",
+        );
+    }
+    return request;
+}
+
+// Turn a populated transaction into the object that crosses to the popup, is
+// displayed, and is compared with the signed artifact. It carries exactly the
+// fields its type serializes, plus the address it is to be signed by, and
+// every quantity as a hex string: extension messaging is JSON, which has no
+// bigint, and a field that did not survive the trip would be a field the user
+// was shown and nothing compared.
+function serializeApprovedTx(populated, from) {
+    const type = Number(populated.type);
+    if (!ALLOWED_TX_TYPES.includes(type)) {
+        throw fail(
+            "This transaction would have to be sent as a type this wallet does not sign.",
+        );
+    }
+    const approved = { type, from: getAddress(from) };
+    for (const key of SERIALIZED_FIELDS[type]) {
+        if (key === "to") {
+            approved.to = present(populated.to)
+                ? getAddress(populated.to)
+                : null;
+        } else if (key === "data") {
+            approved.data = present(populated.data)
+                ? hexlify(getBytes(populated.data))
+                : "0x";
+        } else if (key === "accessList") {
+            approved.accessList = accessListify(populated.accessList || []);
+        } else if (key === "value") {
+            approved.value = toQuantity(populated.value || 0);
+        } else if (!present(populated[key])) {
+            // Unreachable while populateTransaction() fills every quantity of
+            // the type it produced. If it ever does not, the approval must not
+            // be raised: an unfixed quantity is one the artifact cannot be
+            // checked against.
+            throw fail(
+                "The transaction could not be prepared: the network did not supply a " +
+                    key +
+                    ".",
+            );
+        } else {
+            approved[key] = toQuantity(populated[key]);
+        }
+    }
+    return approved;
+}
+
+// Populate the transaction a site asked for, as the address it will be signed
+// by, and return the object to display, sign and verify against. Throws with a
+// full sentence when no approval can be raised.
+async function prepareApprovalTx(provider, from, txParams) {
+    if (!present(from)) {
+        throw fail("There is no active address to send this transaction from.");
+    }
+    const request = requestFrom(txParams || {}, from);
+
+    let populated;
+    try {
+        // The sequence ethers' own sendTransaction() runs internally, so the
+        // nonce, gas, fee and chain id are populated exactly as they were when
+        // the popup did this. VoidSigner cannot sign, which is the point: the
+        // background prepares, the popup signs.
+        populated = await withTimeout(
+            new VoidSigner(getAddress(from), provider).populateTransaction(
+                request,
+            ),
+            POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS,
+            "The transaction could not be prepared: the network did not answer in time.",
+        );
+    } catch (e) {
+        if (e instanceof ApprovalPrepareError) throw e;
+        throw fail(
+            sentence(
+                "The transaction could not be prepared: " +
+                    (e.shortMessage ||
+                        e.message ||
+                        "the network did not answer"),
+            ),
+        );
+    }
+
+    const approved = serializeApprovedTx(populated, from);
+    // The backstop, applied before the user is shown anything rather than
+    // after they have approved it: what is displayed here is what gets signed,
+    // so an RPC node reporting an absurd fee has to be refused here.
+    assertWithinCeilings(approved);
+    return approved;
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+    prepareApprovalTx,
+    serializeApprovedTx,
+    ApprovalPrepareError,
+    POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS,
+    REQUEST_FIELDS,
+};

src/shared/approvalVerify.js

@@ -7,6 +7,13 @@
 // the signer from the artifact and checks it against the approval it is
 // holding before acting on it. All recovery is delegated to ethers.
 //
+// What the artifact is checked against is the transaction the background
+// populated and the popup displayed (see approvalTx.js), not the request the
+// dApp made. The two differ in every field a dApp normally leaves out — nonce,
+// gas limit, fees — and those are the fields the user reads off the approval
+// screen, so comparing against the request would leave the numbers on screen
+// vouched for by nothing.
+//
 // The check is an allowlist, in both directions, because a denylist cannot be
 // correct against a transaction format that keeps gaining fields:
 //
@@ -31,14 +38,12 @@
 // never a warning: what the user approved is what gets broadcast, or nothing
 // does.
 //
-// Fields the approval does not carry are not treated as zero. The popup
-// populates nonce, gas limit, fee and chain id through populateTransaction()
-// when the requesting page did not fix them, so there is no approved value to
-// compare against; treating absent as zero would refuse every legitimate
-// transaction. Those fields are instead held to the absolute ceilings below,
-// and the chain id is always checked against the selected network rather than
-// against the approval alone, which is what makes a cross-chain replay
-// impossible.
+// The approved transaction is required to fix every field its type serializes,
+// so there is no "the approval did not say" branch to fall through: a quantity
+// the approval does not carry is a refusal, because an artifact that cannot be
+// compared with what was displayed has not been checked. The chain id is
+// checked against the selected network as well as against the approval, which
+// is what makes a cross-chain replay impossible.
 //
 // Every failure message is a full sentence, because these strings are shown to
 // the user and returned to the dApp.
@@ -113,6 +118,17 @@ const FORBIDDEN_FIELDS = [
     },
 ];
 
+// Absolute ceilings — a BACKSTOP, not the primary control.
+//
+// The primary control is equality: every field of the artifact is compared
+// with the populated transaction the user was shown, so nothing the popup
+// signs can differ from the screen. What equality cannot bound is the
+// populated transaction itself, which is built from what the configured RPC
+// node answered — a node that reports an absurd fee gets that fee displayed,
+// and a user who does not read the fee line would approve it. These ceilings
+// bound that, and they are therefore applied where the transaction is
+// populated (approvalTx.js) as well as here.
+//
 // Above the block gas limit of every supported network (see networks.js), so
 // no transaction that could ever be included is refused by it.
 const MAX_GAS_LIMIT = 100000000n;
@@ -224,40 +240,151 @@ function normalizeData(v) {
     return String(v).toLowerCase();
 }
 
-// Quantity fields the requesting page may fix in the approval. Each is
-// compared exactly when the approval carries it, and left to the ceilings
-// above when it does not.
-const APPROVED_QUANTITIES = [
-    {
-        key: "nonce",
+// How each field of an approved transaction is compared with the artifact.
+// There is an entry here for every field any allowed type serializes — a test
+// pins that against SERIALIZED_FIELDS — so the comparison loop covers the
+// whole of what gets signed and cannot silently skip a field for want of a
+// comparator.
+//
+// `kind` decides how the two sides are made comparable. A `quantity` must be
+// fixed by the approval: it is one of the numbers on the approval screen, and
+// an absent one means the artifact cannot be checked against what was
+// displayed. `to`, `value`, `data` and `accessList` have canonical absent
+// forms — contract creation, zero, "0x" and the empty list — so they are
+// normalized on both sides instead.
+const APPROVED_FIELDS = {
+    chainId: {
+        kind: "quantity",
+        label: "network",
+        message:
+            "The signed transaction is for a different network than the one that was approved.",
+    },
+    nonce: {
+        kind: "quantity",
         label: "nonce",
         message: "The signed transaction does not carry the approved nonce.",
     },
-    {
-        key: "gasLimit",
+    gasLimit: {
+        kind: "quantity",
         label: "gas limit",
         message:
             "The signed transaction does not carry the approved gas limit.",
     },
-    {
-        key: "gasPrice",
+    gasPrice: {
+        kind: "quantity",
         label: "gas price",
         message:
             "The signed transaction does not carry the approved gas price.",
     },
-    {
-        key: "maxFeePerGas",
+    maxFeePerGas: {
+        kind: "quantity",
         label: "maximum fee per gas",
         message:
             "The signed transaction does not carry the approved maximum fee per gas.",
     },
-    {
-        key: "maxPriorityFeePerGas",
+    maxPriorityFeePerGas: {
+        kind: "quantity",
         label: "maximum priority fee per gas",
         message:
             "The signed transaction does not carry the approved maximum priority fee per gas.",
     },
-];
+    to: {
+        kind: "address",
+        label: "recipient",
+        message:
+            "The signed transaction does not go to the approved recipient.",
+    },
+    value: {
+        kind: "value",
+        label: "value",
+        message: "The signed transaction does not carry the approved value.",
+    },
+    data: {
+        kind: "data",
+        label: "call data",
+        message:
+            "The signed transaction does not carry the approved call data.",
+    },
+    accessList: {
+        kind: "accessList",
+        label: "access list",
+        message:
+            "The signed transaction does not carry the approved access list.",
+    },
+};
+
+// Compare one field of the artifact with the approved transaction. A field
+// with no entry in the table above is refused rather than skipped: the loop
+// below runs over the fields the type serializes, so an unmatched key means
+// something that gets signed has no comparator at all.
+function assertFieldMatches(key, parsed, approvedTx) {
+    const field = APPROVED_FIELDS[key];
+    if (!field) {
+        throw refuse(
+            "The signed transaction carries a field this wallet cannot compare with the approval.",
+        );
+    }
+    switch (field.kind) {
+        case "quantity": {
+            if (!present(approvedTx[key])) {
+                throw refuse(
+                    "The approved transaction fixes no " +
+                        field.label +
+                        ", so the signed transaction cannot be checked" +
+                        " against what was shown.",
+                );
+            }
+            const approved = normalizeQuantity(approvedTx[key], field.label);
+            if (normalizeQuantity(parsed[key], field.label) !== approved) {
+                throw refuse(field.message);
+            }
+            return;
+        }
+        case "address":
+            if (!sameAddress(parsed[key], approvedTx[key])) {
+                throw refuse(field.message);
+            }
+            return;
+        case "value":
+            if (normalizeValue(parsed[key]) !== normalizeValue(approvedTx[key]))
+                throw refuse(field.message);
+            return;
+        case "data":
+            if (normalizeData(parsed[key]) !== normalizeData(approvedTx[key]))
+                throw refuse(field.message);
+            return;
+        default:
+            if (
+                normalizeAccessList(parsed[key]) !==
+                normalizeAccessList(approvedTx[key])
+            ) {
+                throw refuse(field.message);
+            }
+    }
+}
+
+// The ceilings, applied to a transaction that is either about to be displayed
+// or about to be broadcast. See MAX_GAS_LIMIT above for what they are for:
+// they bound what the RPC node can talk this wallet into showing the user,
+// which is the one thing comparing the artifact with the screen cannot do.
+function assertWithinCeilings(tx) {
+    if (
+        present(tx.gasLimit) &&
+        normalizeQuantity(tx.gasLimit, "gas limit") > MAX_GAS_LIMIT
+    ) {
+        throw refuse(
+            "The signed transaction sets a gas limit no network this wallet supports can accept.",
+        );
+    }
+    for (const key of ["gasPrice", "maxFeePerGas", "maxPriorityFeePerGas"]) {
+        if (!present(tx[key])) continue;
+        if (normalizeQuantity(tx[key], "fee per gas") > MAX_FEE_PER_GAS) {
+            throw refuse(
+                "The signed transaction sets a fee per gas far above any plausible value.",
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
 
 // Refuse a field only a transaction type this wallet does not sign can carry.
 // The type allowlist keeps these unreachable in production, which is exactly
@@ -317,10 +444,28 @@ function assertCanonicalBytes(parsed, rawSignedTx) {
 // signed by the address the approval was raised for, on the network that is
 // selected. Returns the parsed ethers Transaction on success, throws
 // otherwise.
-function verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, txParams, expectedFrom, selectedChainId) {
+//
+// `approvedTx` is the populated transaction the approval screen displayed, and
+// `expectedFrom` is the address that was active when the approval was raised —
+// not whichever address is active now. An address switch between approval and
+// signing therefore refuses here rather than producing a transaction from an
+// account the approval did not name.
+function verifySignedTx(
+    rawSignedTx,
+    approvedTx,
+    expectedFrom,
+    selectedChainId,
+) {
     if (typeof rawSignedTx !== "string" || !rawSignedTx.startsWith("0x")) {
         throw refuse("The signed transaction is missing or malformed.");
     }
+    // Nothing to compare against is a refusal like any other: an approval that
+    // does not carry the transaction it displayed cannot vouch for one.
+    if (!approvedTx || typeof approvedTx !== "object") {
+        throw refuse(
+            "There is no approved transaction to check the signed transaction against.",
+        );
+    }
 
     let parsed;
     try {
@@ -360,46 +505,15 @@ function verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, txParams, expectedFrom, selectedChainId) {
             "The signed transaction is for a different network than the one that is selected.",
         );
     }
-    if (
-        present(txParams.chainId) &&
-        parsed.chainId !== normalizeQuantity(txParams.chainId, "network")
-    ) {
-        throw refuse(
-            "The signed transaction is for a different network than the one that was approved.",
-        );
-    }
 
-    if (!sameAddress(parsed.to, txParams.to)) {
-        throw refuse(
-            "The signed transaction does not go to the approved recipient.",
-        );
-    }
-    if (normalizeValue(parsed.value) !== normalizeValue(txParams.value)) {
-        throw refuse(
-            "The signed transaction does not carry the approved value.",
-        );
-    }
-    if (normalizeData(parsed.data) !== normalizeData(txParams.data)) {
-        throw refuse(
-            "The signed transaction does not carry the approved call data.",
-        );
-    }
-    if (
-        normalizeAccessList(parsed.accessList) !==
-        normalizeAccessList(txParams.accessList)
-    ) {
-        throw refuse(
-            "The signed transaction does not carry the approved access list.",
-        );
-    }
-
-    // An approval that fixed EIP-1559 fees must not be signed as a legacy
-    // transaction, and vice versa: the fee the user agreed to is only
-    // meaningful under the mechanism it was quoted in.
+    // The approved fee mechanism, named before the type comparison below
+    // subsumes it: the fee the user agreed to is only meaningful under the
+    // mechanism it was quoted in, and saying so is more use than "a different
+    // transaction type".
     const approvedEip1559 =
-        present(txParams.maxFeePerGas) ||
-        present(txParams.maxPriorityFeePerGas);
-    const approvedLegacy = present(txParams.gasPrice);
+        present(approvedTx.maxFeePerGas) ||
+        present(approvedTx.maxPriorityFeePerGas);
+    const approvedLegacy = present(approvedTx.gasPrice);
     const signedEip1559 = parsed.type === 2;
     if (
         (approvedEip1559 && !signedEip1559) ||
@@ -410,28 +524,33 @@ function verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, txParams, expectedFrom, selectedChainId) {
         );
     }
 
-    for (const field of APPROVED_QUANTITIES) {
-        if (!present(txParams[field.key])) continue;
-        const approved = normalizeQuantity(txParams[field.key], field.label);
-        if (normalizeQuantity(parsed[field.key], field.label) !== approved) {
-            throw refuse(field.message);
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (parsed.gasLimit > MAX_GAS_LIMIT) {
+    // The type decides which fields are compared, so it is compared first and
+    // against the approval, not merely checked for membership of the
+    // allowlist above.
+    if (!present(approvedTx.type)) {
         throw refuse(
-            "The signed transaction sets a gas limit no network this wallet supports can accept.",
+            "The approved transaction fixes no transaction type, so the signed transaction cannot be checked against what was shown.",
         );
     }
-    for (const key of ["gasPrice", "maxFeePerGas", "maxPriorityFeePerGas"]) {
-        const fee = parsed[key];
-        if (fee !== null && fee !== undefined && fee > MAX_FEE_PER_GAS) {
-            throw refuse(
-                "The signed transaction sets a fee per gas far above any plausible value.",
-            );
-        }
+    if (
+        BigInt(parsed.type) !==
+        normalizeQuantity(approvedTx.type, "transaction type")
+    ) {
+        throw refuse(
+            "The signed transaction does not use the approved transaction type.",
+        );
     }
 
+    // Every field this type serializes, compared with the transaction the user
+    // was shown. Driving the loop off SERIALIZED_FIELDS is what keeps this
+    // exhaustive: the same table decides what assertNothingUnchecked() rebuilds
+    // from, so a field that gets signed and is not compared here cannot exist.
+    for (const key of SERIALIZED_FIELDS[parsed.type]) {
+        assertFieldMatches(key, parsed, approvedTx);
+    }
+
+    assertWithinCeilings(parsed);
+
     assertNothingUnchecked(parsed);
     assertCanonicalBytes(parsed, rawSignedTx);
 
@@ -504,10 +623,10 @@ function errorText(err) {
 //    approval. Anything else failed before the check ran and is retryable.
 //  - broadcast: always terminal. A broadcast that throws after the node
 //    accepted the transaction is routine (a timeout, a dropped response, a
-//    node answering "already known"), and the popup's retry does not
-//    re-broadcast these bytes — it re-runs populateTransaction() and signs
-//    again at a freshly fetched pending-tag nonce. Retrying would therefore
-//    put a second transaction on the chain for one approval.
+//    node answering "already known"), so the wallet cannot tell a transaction
+//    that never left from one that is already in the mempool. The approval is
+//    spent and the requesting page has been given its outcome; a second
+//    attempt against it would report a second outcome for one request.
 function describeTxFailure(stage, err) {
     const error = errorText(err);
     const retryable =
@@ -553,6 +672,7 @@ module.exports = {
     assertNoForbiddenFields,
     assertNothingUnchecked,
     assertCanonicalBytes,
+    assertWithinCeilings,
     sameAddress,
     failureIsRetryable,
     describeTxFailure,
@@ -561,6 +681,7 @@ module.exports = {
     ALLOWED_TX_TYPES,
     SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
     FORBIDDEN_FIELDS,
+    APPROVED_FIELDS,
     TX_STAGE_SIGN,
     TX_STAGE_VERIFY,
     TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,

src/shared/balances.js

@@ -66,7 +66,12 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
 
         const balances = [];
         for (const item of items) {
-            if (item.token?.type !== "ERC-20") continue;
+            // Case-insensitive: the token type is an explorer's label, not a
+            // protocol value, and an exact comparison silently drops a real
+            // holding if one ever writes "erc-20".  Which types are admitted
+            // is unchanged.
+            const type = String(item.token?.type || "").toUpperCase();
+            if (type !== "ERC-20") continue;
             const decimals = parseInt(item.token.decimals || "18", 10);
             const bal = formatTokenBalance(item.value || "0", decimals);
             if (bal === "0.0") continue;

src/shared/state.js

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 
 const { DEFAULT_RPC_URL, DEFAULT_BLOCKSCOUT_URL } = require("./constants");
 const { networkById } = require("./networks");
+// Dependency-free constant module; safe to pull into a background bundle.
+const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../popup/restorableViews");
 
 const storageApi =
     typeof browser !== "undefined"
@@ -43,6 +45,39 @@ const state = {
     viewStack: [],
 };
 
+// Keep only the leading run of stored views the popup is willing to render.
+//
+// restoreView() refuses to reopen ONTO a non-restorable view, but the stack
+// behind it used to be restored verbatim, so Back could walk onto a screen
+// whose content is deliberately never re-rendered — and "show-phrase" has no
+// Back control to leave by. Truncating at the first such entry instead of
+// splicing it out keeps the result a prefix of the stored stack, so every
+// surviving entry's Back target is exactly the one it had; splicing would
+// silently re-point the entry above the hole at a different screen.
+//
+// Filtering happens here on load rather than in saveState(): the live
+// in-session stack is legitimate (the screen really is rendered while the
+// popup is open), and only a load-side filter also repairs the stacks
+// already in storage, including ones written before a view left the set.
+function restorableStack(stored, currentView) {
+    // A stored stack that is missing or not an array keeps nothing, but it
+    // still goes through the never-empty rule below rather than returning
+    // early: otherwise a corrupt stack would depend on exactly the goBack()
+    // fallback that the explicit ["main"] exists in order not to depend on.
+    const source = Array.isArray(stored) ? stored : [];
+    const cut = source.findIndex((view) => !RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view));
+    const kept = cut === -1 ? source.slice() : source.slice(0, cut);
+    // A view restored below the root still needs somewhere for Back to go.
+    if (
+        kept.length === 0 &&
+        currentView !== "main" &&
+        RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(currentView)
+    ) {
+        return ["main"];
+    }
+    return kept;
+}
+
 // Return the network configuration for the currently selected network.
 function currentNetwork() {
     return networkById(state.networkId);
@@ -150,7 +185,7 @@ async function loadState() {
             saved.selectedAddress !== undefined ? saved.selectedAddress : null;
         state.selectedToken = saved.selectedToken || null;
         state.viewData = saved.viewData || {};
-        state.viewStack = Array.isArray(saved.viewStack) ? saved.viewStack : [];
+        state.viewStack = restorableStack(saved.viewStack, state.currentView);
     }
 }
 

src/shared/symbolSpoof.js

@@ -8,11 +8,23 @@
 // either verdict alone, because the balance list is where the user forms
 // their belief about what they own (issue #235).
 //
-// KNOWN_SYMBOLS maps a symbol to the lowercased contract address that may
-// bear it, or to null.  Null means the symbol belongs to the native asset,
-// which has no contract at all, so no contract may bear it and every one
-// that does is a spoof.  "ETH" is the only such entry today; the rule is
+// KNOWN_SYMBOLS maps a symbol to the set of lowercased contract addresses
+// that may bear it, or to null.  Null means the symbol belongs to the native
+// asset, which has no contract at all, so no contract may bear it and every
+// one that does is a spoof.  "ETH" is the only such entry today; the rule is
 // written so that a second one needs no change here or at any call site.
+//
+// The value is a set because a ticker is not unique: seven symbols in the
+// bundled list belong to two real contracts each, and answering with one of
+// them hid the other one's holders' money (issue #276).  Membership, not
+// equality, is therefore the question — but it is the same question, asked of
+// a table that can now state the truth.  Every address in a set is one the
+// wallet ships as a real token; a contract outside the set is still a spoof.
+//
+// The symbol is attacker-controlled — it is whatever the ERC-20 contract
+// returns — so the lookup is done on a normalized form (issue #260): the
+// question is whether the symbol reaches the user's eye as a known one,
+// since that is what the user acts on.
 
 const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS } = require("./tokenList");
 
@@ -22,6 +34,59 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
     return (addr || "").toLowerCase();
 }
 
+// Fold a symbol onto what a user actually sees, and no further:
+//
+//   NFKC        collapses compatibility variants that render as the ASCII
+//               letters they imitate — fullwidth ETH, styled mathematical
+//               letters — and maps the non-ASCII spaces onto U+0020.
+//   strip       drops what paints nothing: \p{Cf} plus
+//               \p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point} plus U+007F.  That covers
+//               the format characters (zero-width space, joiner and
+//               non-joiner, word joiner, soft hyphen, byte-order mark, bidi
+//               marks and overrides), the variation selectors, the Hangul
+//               fillers, and DELETE.  Removed everywhere, not merely at the
+//               ends.
+//   trim        removes surrounding whitespace, which HTML collapses:
+//               `" ETH "` is painted next to the user's real ETH as `ETH`.
+//   toUpperCase makes the comparison case-insensitive, as before.
+//
+// The rule is "strip what paints nothing".  The Unicode classes are how
+// that is spelled, not what it means, which is why U+007F is named on its
+// own: it is a control rather than a default-ignorable character, so no
+// class here reaches it, yet it paints nothing all the same.  Measured in
+// the repo's pinned e2e Chromium (16px sans-serif, plain `ETH` = 32.00px,
+// so an invisible prefix leaves 32.00px):
+//
+//   U+007F, U+3164, U+115F, U+FE0F, U+FE00   32.00px — invisible
+//   U+FFA0                                   40.00px — a box
+//   U+1160                                   48.00px — a box
+//   U+0001, U+0085, U+0090                   48.00px — a box
+//
+// U+1160 and U+FFA0 are `Default_Ignorable_Code_Point` members that font
+// fallback nonetheless draws, and they are stripped anyway: erring toward
+// hiding a token that does not look like `ETH` is the harmless direction of
+// the two.  The other controls are left alone for the same reason read the
+// other way — a symbol carrying a visible box does not reach the eye as
+// `ETH`, so filtering it would hide a token the user could not have
+// confused with the native asset.
+//
+// Deliberately not folded, and asserted as open in tests/symbolSpoof.test.js:
+// interior whitespace (`E T H` renders as `E T H`, so folding it would filter
+// a token nobody could confuse with the native asset), confusables that are
+// distinct letters rather than compatibility variants (Cyrillic capital Ie,
+// U+0415; Greek capital Epsilon, U+0395), bidi reordering, which needs the
+// bidi algorithm rather than a character filter, and the visible controls.
+//
+// This decides only how the question is asked.  Nothing here changes what a
+// surface displays; a token still shows the symbol it reports.
+function normalizeSymbol(symbol) {
+    return String(symbol || "")
+        .normalize("NFKC")
+        .replace(/[\p{Cf}\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}\x7F]/gu, "")
+        .trim()
+        .toUpperCase();
+}
+
 // True when a token bearing `symbol` from contract `contractAddress` is
 // impersonating a known symbol.
 //
@@ -31,11 +96,11 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
 function isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, contractAddress) {
     const contract = normalizeAddress(contractAddress);
     if (!contract) return false;
-    const sym = (symbol || "").toUpperCase();
+    const sym = normalizeSymbol(symbol);
     if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(sym)) return false;
     const legit = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(sym);
     if (legit === null) return true;
-    return contract !== normalizeAddress(legit);
+    return !legit.has(contract);
 }
 
 module.exports = {

src/shared/tokenList.js

@@ -3607,14 +3607,33 @@ for (const t of TOKENS) {
     TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.set(t.address.toLowerCase(), t);
 }
 
-// Build a map of symbol (uppercased) -> legitimate contract address (lowercased).
-// Used for spoofed-symbol detection. "ETH" maps to null (native token).
+// Build a map of symbol (uppercased) -> the set of contract addresses
+// (lowercased) that legitimately bear it.  Used for spoofed-symbol detection.
+// "ETH" maps to null: the native asset has no contract, so no contract may
+// bear its symbol.
+//
+// The value is a set and not a single address because tickers are not unique
+// and the list above proves it: seven of these 512 tokens share a symbol with
+// another entry — FRAX, REUSD, TON, EURE, MSUSD, MUSD and JPYC — at two
+// different real contracts each, all of them from the same source fetch.  A
+// one-address-per-symbol table can only answer that by picking a winner, and
+// the loser is then a token in our own bundled list that the spoof filter
+// hides from the balance list, the history and the send selector at its own
+// address, so the user cannot spend it (issue #276).  Naming every address
+// that bears the symbol is the only shape that says what is true; it does not
+// loosen the rule, because a contract outside the set is still a spoof.
 const KNOWN_SYMBOLS = new Map();
 KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set("ETH", null);
 for (const t of TOKENS) {
     const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
     if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(upper)) {
-        KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set(upper, t.address.toLowerCase());
+        KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set(upper, new Set());
+    }
+    const addresses = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(upper);
+    // A null entry is the native asset and stays null: an ERC-20 that reports
+    // the native symbol does not thereby become entitled to it.
+    if (addresses !== null) {
+        addresses.add(t.address.toLowerCase());
     }
 }
 

tests/approvalTx.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+// Preparation of the transaction the approval screen displays.
+//
+// This is the half of the fix that makes the verification in
+// approvalVerify.test.js mean anything: the numbers the user reads have to be
+// produced before the screen is drawn and be the numbers that get signed. What
+// is asserted here is that the object leaving this module is complete (nothing
+// is left for the popup to fill in), that it survives the messaging boundary
+// (extension messaging is JSON, which has no bigint), and that nothing the
+// requesting page or the RPC node can say turns it into an approval that
+// should never have been raised.
+
+const { Network, Wallet } = require("ethers");
+const {
+    prepareApprovalTx,
+    serializeApprovedTx,
+    POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS,
+} = require("../src/shared/approvalTx");
+const {
+    SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
+    MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
+    MAX_GAS_LIMIT,
+} = require("../src/shared/approvalVerify");
+
+const SIGNER_KEY =
+    "0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
+const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+// The ordinary dApp request: recipient, value, call data, and nothing else.
+const TX_PARAMS = {
+    from: signer.address,
+    to: RECIPIENT,
+    value: "0x2386f26fc10000",
+    data: "0xdeadbeef",
+};
+
+function providerWith(overrides) {
+    return {
+        getNetwork: async () => Network.from(1),
+        getTransactionCount: async () => 7,
+        estimateGas: async () => 21000n,
+        getFeeData: async () => ({
+            gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+            maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
+            maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+        }),
+        ...(overrides || {}),
+    };
+}
+
+// A node that only quotes a flat gas price, so populateTransaction produces a
+// legacy transaction rather than an EIP-1559 one.
+const legacyProvider = providerWith({
+    getFeeData: async () => ({
+        gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+        maxFeePerGas: null,
+        maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
+    }),
+});
+
+describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
+    test("fills in everything the request left out", async () => {
+        const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
+            providerWith(),
+            signer.address,
+            TX_PARAMS,
+        );
+        expect(approved).toEqual({
+            type: 2,
+            from: signer.address,
+            chainId: "0x1",
+            nonce: "0x7",
+            gasLimit: "0x5208",
+            maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
+            maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
+            to: RECIPIENT,
+            value: TX_PARAMS.value,
+            data: TX_PARAMS.data,
+            accessList: [],
+        });
+    });
+
+    // The object is displayed, signed and verified against on the far side of
+    // chrome.runtime.sendMessage, which is JSON: a bigint would throw on the
+    // way out and a field that did not survive the trip would be a field the
+    // user was shown and nothing compared.
+    test("survives the messaging boundary unchanged", async () => {
+        const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
+            providerWith(),
+            signer.address,
+            TX_PARAMS,
+        );
+        expect(JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(approved))).toEqual(approved);
+        for (const value of Object.values(approved)) {
+            expect(typeof value).not.toBe("bigint");
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("carries exactly the fields its type serializes, and the signer", async () => {
+        const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
+            providerWith(),
+            signer.address,
+            TX_PARAMS,
+        );
+        expect(Object.keys(approved).sort()).toEqual(
+            ["type", "from", ...SERIALIZED_FIELDS[2]].sort(),
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("produces a legacy transaction when that is all the node quotes", async () => {
+        const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
+            legacyProvider,
+            signer.address,
+            TX_PARAMS,
+        );
+        expect(approved.type).toBe(0);
+        expect(approved.gasPrice).toBe("0x77359400");
+        expect(approved.maxFeePerGas).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(Object.keys(approved).sort()).toEqual(
+            ["type", "from", ...SERIALIZED_FIELDS[0]].sort(),
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("keeps a nonce, gas limit and fee the request did fix", async () => {
+        const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
+            providerWith(),
+            signer.address,
+            {
+                ...TX_PARAMS,
+                nonce: "0x2",
+                gasLimit: "0x30d40",
+                maxFeePerGas: "0x12a05f200",
+                maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
+            },
+        );
+        expect(approved.nonce).toBe("0x2");
+        expect(approved.gasLimit).toBe("0x30d40");
+        expect(approved.maxFeePerGas).toBe("0x12a05f200");
+    });
+
+    test("carries an access list the request asked for", async () => {
+        const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
+            providerWith(),
+            signer.address,
+            {
+                ...TX_PARAMS,
+                accessList: [{ address: RECIPIENT, storageKeys: [] }],
+            },
+        );
+        expect(approved.accessList).toEqual([
+            { address: RECIPIENT, storageKeys: [] },
+        ]);
+    });
+
+    // The request is page-controlled. Anything this wallet does not act on is
+    // dropped before ethers sees it, so a field a future ethers learns to
+    // carry cannot be picked up out of it without this module knowing.
+    test("drops request fields this wallet does not act on", async () => {
+        const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
+            providerWith(),
+            signer.address,
+            {
+                ...TX_PARAMS,
+                authorizationList: [{ address: RECIPIENT }],
+                blobVersionedHashes: ["0x01" + "ab".repeat(31)],
+                customData: { anything: true },
+            },
+        );
+        expect(approved.authorizationList).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(approved.blobVersionedHashes).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(approved.customData).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(approved.type).toBe(2);
+    });
+
+    test("refuses a transaction type this wallet does not sign", async () => {
+        await expect(
+            prepareApprovalTx(providerWith(), signer.address, {
+                ...TX_PARAMS,
+                type: 4,
+            }),
+        ).rejects.toThrow(/type this wallet does not sign/);
+    });
+
+    test("refuses to raise an approval with no active address", async () => {
+        await expect(
+            prepareApprovalTx(providerWith(), null, TX_PARAMS),
+        ).rejects.toThrow(/no active address/);
+    });
+
+    // The ceilings as a backstop: equality with the screen cannot bound what
+    // the node talks the wallet into putting on the screen, so it is refused
+    // before the user is shown anything.
+    test("refuses a fee the node quoted above the ceiling", async () => {
+        const gouging = providerWith({
+            getFeeData: async () => ({
+                gasPrice: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS + 1n,
+                maxFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS + 1n,
+                maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+            }),
+        });
+        await expect(
+            prepareApprovalTx(gouging, signer.address, TX_PARAMS),
+        ).rejects.toThrow(/fee per gas far above any plausible value/);
+    });
+
+    test("refuses a gas limit the node estimated above the ceiling", async () => {
+        const absurd = providerWith({
+            estimateGas: async () => MAX_GAS_LIMIT + 1n,
+        });
+        await expect(
+            prepareApprovalTx(absurd, signer.address, TX_PARAMS),
+        ).rejects.toThrow(/gas limit no network this wallet supports/);
+    });
+
+    // No approval and no window: the failure goes back to the page the click
+    // came from, in a sentence.
+    test("reports a failed estimate as a full sentence", async () => {
+        const reverting = providerWith({
+            estimateGas: async () => {
+                throw new Error("execution reverted: ERC20: transfer amount");
+            },
+        });
+        let thrown;
+        try {
+            await prepareApprovalTx(reverting, signer.address, TX_PARAMS);
+        } catch (e) {
+            thrown = e;
+        }
+        expect(thrown.message).toMatch(
+            /^The transaction could not be prepared/,
+        );
+        expect(thrown.message).toMatch(/execution reverted/);
+        expect(thrown.message).toMatch(/^[A-Z].*\.$/);
+    });
+
+    // Without a bound, an unreachable node leaves the page's promise pending
+    // with nothing on screen to explain it.
+    test("gives up on a node that never answers", async () => {
+        jest.useFakeTimers();
+        try {
+            const hanging = providerWith({
+                estimateGas: () => new Promise(() => {}),
+            });
+            const pending = prepareApprovalTx(
+                hanging,
+                signer.address,
+                TX_PARAMS,
+            );
+            const settled = expect(pending).rejects.toThrow(
+                /did not answer in time/,
+            );
+            await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS + 1);
+            await settled;
+        } finally {
+            jest.useRealTimers();
+        }
+    });
+});
+
+describe("serializeApprovedTx", () => {
+    // Unreachable through prepareApprovalTx while the request type is checked
+    // first, which is what it is for: a node or an ethers upgrade that
+    // populates a type this wallet does not sign must not produce an approval.
+    test("refuses a populated transaction of a type this wallet does not sign", () => {
+        expect(() =>
+            serializeApprovedTx(
+                { type: 3, to: RECIPIENT, nonce: 7 },
+                signer.address,
+            ),
+        ).toThrow(/type this wallet does not sign/);
+    });
+
+    test("refuses a populated transaction missing a quantity", () => {
+        expect(() =>
+            serializeApprovedTx(
+                {
+                    type: 2,
+                    chainId: 1n,
+                    nonce: 7,
+                    gasLimit: 21000n,
+                    maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
+                    to: RECIPIENT,
+                    value: 0n,
+                    data: "0x",
+                },
+                signer.address,
+            ),
+        ).toThrow(/did not supply a maxPriorityFeePerGas/);
+    });
+
+    test("keeps a contract creation's absent recipient absent", () => {
+        const approved = serializeApprovedTx(
+            {
+                type: 0,
+                chainId: 1n,
+                nonce: 7,
+                gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+                gasLimit: 21000n,
+                to: null,
+                value: 0n,
+                data: "0x600160005500",
+            },
+            signer.address,
+        );
+        expect(approved.to).toBeNull();
+        expect(approved.value).toBe("0x0");
+        expect(approved.data).toBe("0x600160005500");
+    });
+});

tests/approvalVerify.test.js

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ const {
     assertNoForbiddenFields,
     assertNothingUnchecked,
     assertCanonicalBytes,
+    assertWithinCeilings,
     sameAddress,
     failureIsRetryable,
     describeTxFailure,
@@ -18,12 +19,14 @@ const {
     ALLOWED_TX_TYPES,
     SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
     FORBIDDEN_FIELDS,
+    APPROVED_FIELDS,
     TX_STAGE_SIGN,
     TX_STAGE_VERIFY,
     TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,
     MAX_GAS_LIMIT,
     MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
 } = require("../src/shared/approvalVerify");
+const { prepareApprovalTx } = require("../src/shared/approvalTx");
 const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../src/shared/wallet");
 
 // Fixed test keys — never used for anything but these tests.
@@ -42,7 +45,10 @@ const OTHER_RECIPIENT = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
 const SELECTED = "0x1";
 const SEPOLIA = "0xaa36a7";
 
-// Approved parameters as a dApp would supply them over eth_sendTransaction.
+// Parameters as a dApp would supply them over eth_sendTransaction. Note what
+// is missing: nonce, gas limit and fees. The background fills those in before
+// the approval screen is drawn, which is why the approval below and not this
+// object is what every comparison runs against.
 const TX_PARAMS = {
     from: signer.address,
     to: RECIPIENT,
@@ -61,8 +67,8 @@ const POPULATED = {
     type: 2,
 };
 
-// Build a signable transaction from approved params. The popup does the same
-// thing through populateTransaction(); here the fields are fixed so the test
+// Build a signable transaction from a request. The background populates the
+// same fields through populateTransaction(); here they are fixed so the test
 // needs no provider. `overrides` stands in for what a tampered or misbuilt
 // popup would put on the wire.
 function txFor(params, overrides) {
@@ -75,6 +81,21 @@ function txFor(params, overrides) {
     };
 }
 
+// The populated transaction the approval screen displayed, which is the object
+// the artifact is verified against. Built from the same fields as the signable
+// transaction above, because that is the point: displayed and verified are one
+// object.
+function approvedFor(params, overrides) {
+    return {
+        from: signer.address,
+        accessList: [],
+        ...txFor(params, overrides),
+    };
+}
+
+// The ordinary case: the dApp's request, populated.
+const APPROVED = approvedFor(TX_PARAMS);
+
 async function signedFor(params, withWallet, overrides) {
     return (withWallet || signer).signTransaction(txFor(params, overrides));
 }
@@ -108,7 +129,7 @@ describe("sameAddress", () => {
 describe("verifySignedTx", () => {
     test("accepts the approved transaction signed by the approved address", async () => {
         const raw = await signedFor(TX_PARAMS);
-        const parsed = verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED);
+        const parsed = verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED);
         expect(parsed.from).toBe(signer.address);
         expect(parsed.hash).toBe(Transaction.from(raw).hash);
     });
@@ -117,23 +138,23 @@ describe("verifySignedTx", () => {
         const params = { to: undefined, value: "0x0", data: "0x600160005500" };
         const raw = await signedFor(params);
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, params, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, approvedFor(params), signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).not.toThrow();
     });
 
     test("accepts an absent value as zero", async () => {
-        const approved = { to: RECIPIENT, data: "0x" };
-        const raw = await signedFor(approved);
+        const params = { to: RECIPIENT, data: "0x" };
+        const raw = await signedFor(params);
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, approvedFor(params), signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).not.toThrow();
     });
 
     test("accepts call data whose case differs from the approval", async () => {
-        const approved = { to: RECIPIENT, value: "0x0", data: "0xDEADBEEF" };
-        const raw = await signedFor(approved);
+        const params = { to: RECIPIENT, value: "0x0", data: "0xDEADBEEF" };
+        const raw = await signedFor(params);
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, approvedFor(params), signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).not.toThrow();
     });
 
@@ -143,7 +164,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx", () => {
             to: OTHER_RECIPIENT,
         });
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/approved recipient/);
     });
 
@@ -153,47 +174,64 @@ describe("verifySignedTx", () => {
             value: "0x4563918244f40000",
         });
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/approved value/);
     });
 
     test("rejects substituted call data", async () => {
         const raw = await signedFor({ ...TX_PARAMS, data: "0xc0ffee" });
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/approved call data/);
     });
 
     test("rejects a transaction signed by a different address", async () => {
         const raw = await signedFor(TX_PARAMS, other);
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/different address/);
     });
 
+    // The address the approval named, not whichever address is active when the
+    // artifact comes back: an approval raised for one account cannot be
+    // satisfied by a signature from another, whatever the wallet switched to
+    // in between.
+    test("rejects a signature from the address that is active now", async () => {
+        const raw = await signedFor(TX_PARAMS, other);
+        expect(() =>
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
+        ).toThrow(/different address than the one that was approved/);
+        // The same artifact against the same approval, verified for the other
+        // address, is what would have happened had expectedFrom been read from
+        // the wallet's current state.
+        expect(() =>
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, other.address, SELECTED),
+        ).not.toThrow();
+    });
+
     test("rejects an unsigned transaction", () => {
         const unsigned = Transaction.from(txFor(TX_PARAMS)).unsignedSerialized;
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(unsigned, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(unsigned, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/no valid signature/);
     });
 
     test("rejects a missing or malformed payload", () => {
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(undefined, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(undefined, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/missing or malformed/);
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx("nope", TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx("nope", APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/missing or malformed/);
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx("0xc0ffee", TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx("0xc0ffee", APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/could not be decoded/);
     });
 
     test("every rejection message is a full sentence", async () => {
         const raw = await signedFor({ ...TX_PARAMS, to: OTHER_RECIPIENT });
         try {
-            verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED);
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED);
             throw new Error("expected a rejection");
         } catch (e) {
             expect(e.message).toMatch(/^[A-Z].*\.$/);
@@ -201,20 +239,113 @@ describe("verifySignedTx", () => {
     });
 });
 
+// The defect this file's approvals now stand against: for every field the dApp
+// left out, the old comparison had nothing to compare and skipped the field,
+// so the fee and the nonce the user read off the screen were checked by the
+// ceilings alone. A populated approval fixes all of them, and an approval that
+// does not fix one is a refusal rather than a pass.
+describe("verifySignedTx against what was displayed", () => {
+    test("a fee differing from the displayed one is refused", async () => {
+        // Ten times the fee the screen showed, and far below the ceiling: the
+        // artifact the old comparison would have accepted.
+        const inflated = 20000000000n;
+        expect(inflated).toBeLessThan(MAX_FEE_PER_GAS);
+        const raw = await signedWith({ maxFeePerGas: inflated });
+        expect(() =>
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
+        ).toThrow(/approved maximum fee per gas/);
+    });
+
+    test("a nonce differing from the displayed one is refused", async () => {
+        const raw = await signedWith({ nonce: 8 });
+        expect(() =>
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
+        ).toThrow(/approved nonce/);
+    });
+
+    test("a gas limit differing from the displayed one is refused", async () => {
+        const raw = await signedWith({ gasLimit: 250000n });
+        expect(() =>
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
+        ).toThrow(/approved gas limit/);
+    });
+
+    test("an approval fixing no quantity is refused, not waved through", async () => {
+        const raw = await signedWith({});
+        for (const key of [
+            "chainId",
+            "nonce",
+            "gasLimit",
+            "maxFeePerGas",
+            "maxPriorityFeePerGas",
+        ]) {
+            const incomplete = { ...APPROVED };
+            delete incomplete[key];
+            let thrown;
+            try {
+                verifySignedTx(raw, incomplete, signer.address, SELECTED);
+                throw new Error("expected a rejection for " + key);
+            } catch (e) {
+                thrown = e;
+            }
+            expect(thrown.message).toMatch(/fixes no /);
+            expect(thrown.approvalMismatch).toBe(true);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("no approved transaction at all is refused", async () => {
+        const raw = await signedWith({});
+        for (const approved of [undefined, null, "0xdeadbeef"]) {
+            expect(() =>
+                verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            ).toThrow(/no approved transaction/);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("an approval fixing no transaction type is refused", async () => {
+        const raw = await signedWith({});
+        const incomplete = { ...APPROVED };
+        delete incomplete.type;
+        expect(() =>
+            verifySignedTx(raw, incomplete, signer.address, SELECTED),
+        ).toThrow(/fixes no transaction type/);
+    });
+
+    test("an artifact of a type other than the approved one is refused", async () => {
+        // Same fee mechanism on both sides, so only the type differs: a type 1
+        // artifact against a type 2 approval.
+        const approved = approvedFor(TX_PARAMS, {
+            type: 1,
+            gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+            maxFeePerGas: null,
+            maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
+        });
+        const raw = await signedWith({
+            type: 0,
+            gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+            maxFeePerGas: null,
+            maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
+        });
+        expect(() =>
+            verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
+        ).toThrow(/approved transaction type/);
+    });
+});
+
 // One case per consequential field: the field alone differs from what was
 // approved, and that alone must refuse the signature.
 describe("verifySignedTx field comparison", () => {
     test("rejects a chain id that is not the selected network", async () => {
         const raw = await signedWith({ chainId: 11155111 });
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/different network than the one that is selected/);
     });
 
     test("rejects a chain id that is not the approved one", async () => {
-        // Selected network and signed chain id agree; the dApp asked for a
-        // different chain, so the artifact is not what was approved.
-        const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, chainId: SEPOLIA };
+        // Selected network and signed chain id agree; the approval was raised
+        // for a different chain, so the artifact is not what was approved.
+        const approved = { ...APPROVED, chainId: SEPOLIA };
         const raw = await signedWith({});
         expect(() =>
             verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
@@ -224,58 +355,59 @@ describe("verifySignedTx field comparison", () => {
     test("refuses when the selected network is unknown", async () => {
         const raw = await signedWith({});
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, undefined),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, undefined),
         ).toThrow(/selected network is unknown/);
     });
 
     test("rejects a substituted nonce", async () => {
-        const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, nonce: 7 };
         const raw = await signedWith({ nonce: 8 });
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/approved nonce/);
     });
 
     test("rejects a substituted gas limit", async () => {
-        const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, gasLimit: "0x186a0" };
         const raw = await signedWith({ gasLimit: 250000n });
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/approved gas limit/);
     });
 
     test("rejects a substituted maximum fee per gas", async () => {
-        const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400" };
         const raw = await signedWith({ maxFeePerGas: 900000000000n });
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/approved maximum fee per gas/);
     });
 
     test("rejects a substituted maximum priority fee per gas", async () => {
-        const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00" };
         const raw = await signedWith({ maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1500000000n });
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/approved maximum priority fee per gas/);
     });
 
     test("rejects a substituted legacy gas price", async () => {
-        const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, gasPrice: "0x77359400" };
         const legacy = {
             type: 0,
-            gasPrice: 9000000000n,
+            gasPrice: 2000000000n,
             maxFeePerGas: null,
             maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
         };
-        const raw = await signedWith(legacy);
+        const approved = approvedFor(TX_PARAMS, legacy);
+        const raw = await signedWith({ ...legacy, gasPrice: 9000000000n });
         expect(() =>
             verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/approved gas price/);
     });
 
     test("rejects an approved legacy fee signed as an EIP-1559 fee", async () => {
-        const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, gasPrice: "0x77359400" };
+        const approved = approvedFor(TX_PARAMS, {
+            type: 0,
+            gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+            maxFeePerGas: null,
+            maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
+        });
         const raw = await signedWith({});
         expect(() =>
             verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
@@ -283,7 +415,6 @@ describe("verifySignedTx field comparison", () => {
     });
 
     test("rejects an approved EIP-1559 fee signed as a legacy fee", async () => {
-        const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400" };
         const raw = await signedWith({
             type: 0,
             gasPrice: 2000000000n,
@@ -291,36 +422,72 @@ describe("verifySignedTx field comparison", () => {
             maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
         });
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/approved fee mechanism/);
     });
 
+    // The ceilings are a backstop against what the RPC node can talk the
+    // wallet into populating and displaying, so they are checked against an
+    // approval that carries the absurd value too — equality alone would accept
+    // it, which is exactly what the ceiling is there for.
     test("rejects a gas limit above anything a supported network accepts", async () => {
-        const raw = await signedWith({ gasLimit: MAX_GAS_LIMIT + 1n });
+        const overrides = { gasLimit: MAX_GAS_LIMIT + 1n };
+        const raw = await signedWith(overrides);
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(
+                raw,
+                approvedFor(TX_PARAMS, overrides),
+                signer.address,
+                SELECTED,
+            ),
         ).toThrow(/gas limit no network this wallet supports/);
     });
 
-    test("rejects an absurd fee per gas the approval never fixed", async () => {
-        const raw = await signedWith({
+    test("rejects an absurd fee per gas even when it was displayed", async () => {
+        const overrides = {
             maxFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS + 1n,
             maxPriorityFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS + 1n,
-        });
+        };
+        const raw = await signedWith(overrides);
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(
+                raw,
+                approvedFor(TX_PARAMS, overrides),
+                signer.address,
+                SELECTED,
+            ),
         ).toThrow(/fee per gas far above any plausible value/);
     });
 
+    test("assertWithinCeilings is the same check on either side of the screen", () => {
+        expect(() =>
+            assertWithinCeilings({ gasLimit: MAX_GAS_LIMIT + 1n }),
+        ).toThrow(/gas limit no network this wallet supports/);
+        for (const key of [
+            "gasPrice",
+            "maxFeePerGas",
+            "maxPriorityFeePerGas",
+        ]) {
+            expect(() =>
+                assertWithinCeilings({ [key]: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS + 1n }),
+            ).toThrow(/fee per gas far above any plausible value/);
+        }
+        expect(() =>
+            assertWithinCeilings({
+                gasLimit: MAX_GAS_LIMIT,
+                maxFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
+                maxPriorityFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
+            }),
+        ).not.toThrow();
+        // Nothing to bound is not a failure: a type 2 approval carries no gas
+        // price, and a bare object must not be refused for lacking one.
+        expect(() => assertWithinCeilings({})).not.toThrow();
+    });
+
     test("every field mismatch is a refusal, not a warning", async () => {
         const raw = await signedWith({ nonce: 8 });
         try {
-            verifySignedTx(
-                raw,
-                { ...TX_PARAMS, nonce: 7 },
-                signer.address,
-                SELECTED,
-            );
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED);
             throw new Error("expected a rejection");
         } catch (e) {
             expect(e.approvalMismatch).toBe(true);
@@ -331,17 +498,17 @@ describe("verifySignedTx field comparison", () => {
 
 // The transaction type decides which fields exist, so an artifact of a type
 // this wallet does not sign carries consequences the approval cannot describe
-// and none of the field comparisons can see. The approval used here is the
-// ordinary dApp shape with no fee fields — the common case, since
-// populateTransaction() fills them — which is exactly the case the
-// fee-mechanism check cannot catch by accident.
+// and none of the field comparisons can see. The refusal has to come from the
+// type allowlist rather than from a field comparison, so these run against an
+// approval whose every other field matches the artifact exactly.
 describe("verifySignedTx transaction type", () => {
-    const BARE_APPROVAL = {
+    const BARE_REQUEST = {
         from: signer.address,
         to: RECIPIENT,
         value: "0x2386f26fc10000",
         data: "0x",
     };
+    const BARE_APPROVAL = approvedFor(BARE_REQUEST);
 
     // An EIP-7702 artifact that pays the approved amount to the approved
     // recipient and, in the same transaction, installs the attacker's code at
@@ -353,7 +520,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx transaction type", () => {
             chainId: 1,
             nonce: 8,
         });
-        const raw = await signedFor(BARE_APPROVAL, signer, {
+        const raw = await signedFor(BARE_REQUEST, signer, {
             type: 4,
             authorizationList: [authorization],
         });
@@ -366,7 +533,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx transaction type", () => {
     });
 
     test("refuses a type 3 blob artifact", async () => {
-        const raw = await signedFor(BARE_APPROVAL, signer, {
+        const raw = await signedFor(BARE_REQUEST, signer, {
             type: 3,
             maxFeePerBlobGas: 1000000000n,
             blobVersionedHashes: ["0x01" + "ab".repeat(31)],
@@ -390,7 +557,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx transaction type", () => {
             chainId: 1,
             nonce: 8,
         });
-        const raw = await signedFor(BARE_APPROVAL, signer, {
+        const raw = await signedFor(BARE_REQUEST, signer, {
             type: 4,
             authorizationList: [authorization],
         });
@@ -404,40 +571,45 @@ describe("verifySignedTx transaction type", () => {
     });
 
     test("accepts a legacy type 0 transaction", async () => {
-        const approved = { ...BARE_APPROVAL, gasPrice: "0x77359400" };
-        const raw = await signedFor(approved, signer, {
+        const legacy = {
             type: 0,
             gasPrice: 2000000000n,
             maxFeePerGas: null,
             maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
-        });
+        };
+        const raw = await signedFor(BARE_REQUEST, signer, legacy);
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(
+                raw,
+                approvedFor(BARE_REQUEST, legacy),
+                signer.address,
+                SELECTED,
+            ),
         ).not.toThrow();
     });
 
     test("accepts a type 1 transaction whose access list is the approved one", async () => {
-        const accessList = [{ address: OTHER_RECIPIENT, storageKeys: [] }];
-        const approved = {
-            ...BARE_APPROVAL,
-            gasPrice: "0x77359400",
-            accessList,
-        };
-        const raw = await signedFor(approved, signer, {
+        const overrides = {
             type: 1,
             gasPrice: 2000000000n,
             maxFeePerGas: null,
             maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
-            accessList,
-        });
+            accessList: [{ address: OTHER_RECIPIENT, storageKeys: [] }],
+        };
+        const raw = await signedFor(BARE_REQUEST, signer, overrides);
         expect(Transaction.from(raw).type).toBe(1);
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(
+                raw,
+                approvedFor(BARE_REQUEST, overrides),
+                signer.address,
+                SELECTED,
+            ),
         ).not.toThrow();
     });
 
     test("refuses an access list the approval never carried", async () => {
-        const raw = await signedFor(BARE_APPROVAL, signer, {
+        const raw = await signedFor(BARE_REQUEST, signer, {
             accessList: [{ address: OTHER_RECIPIENT, storageKeys: [] }],
         });
         expect(() =>
@@ -446,8 +618,11 @@ describe("verifySignedTx transaction type", () => {
     });
 
     test("treats an absent access list and an empty one as the same thing", async () => {
-        const approved = { ...BARE_APPROVAL, accessList: [] };
-        const raw = await signedFor(BARE_APPROVAL, signer, {});
+        const approved = { ...BARE_APPROVAL };
+        delete approved.accessList;
+        expect(approved.accessList).toBeUndefined();
+        const raw = await signedFor(BARE_REQUEST, signer, {});
+        expect(Transaction.from(raw).accessList).toEqual([]);
         expect(() =>
             verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).not.toThrow();
@@ -498,6 +673,25 @@ describe("verifySignedTx exhaustiveness", () => {
         expect(exposed.filter((name) => !accounted.has(name))).toEqual([]);
     });
 
+    // The comparison loop runs over the fields a type serializes and refuses a
+    // field it has no comparator for. That refusal is unreachable only while
+    // the table covers the whole of SERIALIZED_FIELDS, so the coverage is
+    // pinned here rather than assumed: adding a field to a type without a
+    // comparator would otherwise turn every transaction of that type into a
+    // refusal, and adding a comparator without the field would be a check that
+    // never runs.
+    test("every field a type serializes has a comparator", () => {
+        const serialized = new Set(
+            Object.values(SERIALIZED_FIELDS).flat().sort(),
+        );
+        expect([...serialized].filter((key) => !APPROVED_FIELDS[key])).toEqual(
+            [],
+        );
+        expect(
+            Object.keys(APPROVED_FIELDS).filter((key) => !serialized.has(key)),
+        ).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
     // The two layers behind the type allowlist. Nothing reachable through
     // verifySignedTx can trip either of them while the allowlist holds — that
     // is what they are for — so they are exercised directly rather than taken
@@ -553,49 +747,30 @@ describe("verifySignedTx exhaustiveness", () => {
     test("an accepted artifact of each allowed type rebuilds byte for byte", async () => {
         const shapes = [
             {
-                approved: { ...TX_PARAMS, gasPrice: "0x77359400" },
-                overrides: {
-                    type: 0,
-                    gasPrice: 2000000000n,
-                    maxFeePerGas: null,
-                    maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
-                },
+                type: 0,
+                gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+                maxFeePerGas: null,
+                maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
             },
             {
-                approved: {
-                    ...TX_PARAMS,
-                    gasPrice: "0x77359400",
-                    accessList: [
-                        {
-                            address: RECIPIENT,
-                            storageKeys: ["0x" + "11".repeat(32)],
-                        },
-                    ],
-                },
-                overrides: {
-                    type: 1,
-                    gasPrice: 2000000000n,
-                    maxFeePerGas: null,
-                    maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
-                    accessList: [
-                        {
-                            address: RECIPIENT,
-                            storageKeys: ["0x" + "11".repeat(32)],
-                        },
-                    ],
-                },
+                type: 1,
+                gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+                maxFeePerGas: null,
+                maxPriorityFeePerGas: null,
+                accessList: [
+                    {
+                        address: RECIPIENT,
+                        storageKeys: ["0x" + "11".repeat(32)],
+                    },
+                ],
             },
-            { approved: TX_PARAMS, overrides: {} },
+            {},
         ];
-        for (const shape of shapes) {
-            const raw = await signedFor(
-                shape.approved,
-                signer,
-                shape.overrides,
-            );
+        for (const overrides of shapes) {
+            const raw = await signedFor(TX_PARAMS, signer, overrides);
             const parsed = verifySignedTx(
                 raw,
-                shape.approved,
+                approvedFor(TX_PARAMS, overrides),
                 signer.address,
                 SELECTED,
             );
@@ -644,7 +819,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx canonical encoding", () => {
     test("refuses an artifact that is not its own canonical encoding", async () => {
         const mutated = await nonCanonical();
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(mutated, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(mutated, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/not encoded canonically/);
     });
 
@@ -659,7 +834,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx canonical encoding", () => {
         const raw = await signedWith({});
         const upper = "0x" + raw.slice(2).toUpperCase();
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(upper, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(upper, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).not.toThrow();
     });
 });
@@ -670,46 +845,33 @@ describe("verifySignedTx normalization", () => {
     test("accepts a decimal chain id against a hex selected network", async () => {
         const raw = await signedWith({});
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, 1),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, 1),
         ).not.toThrow();
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, "1"),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, "1"),
         ).not.toThrow();
     });
 
-    test("accepts an approved chain id written in hex", async () => {
+    // The approved transaction crosses to the popup as JSON, so it comes back
+    // spelled in hex quantities rather than in the bigints it was populated
+    // with. None of that is tampering.
+    test("accepts an approval spelled as the wire spells it", async () => {
         const raw = await signedWith({});
-        const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, chainId: "0x1" };
+        const wire = {
+            ...APPROVED,
+            chainId: "0x1",
+            nonce: "0x7",
+            gasLimit: "0x186a0",
+            maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
+            maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
+            value: "0x2386f26fc10000",
+        };
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(raw, wire, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).not.toThrow();
     });
 
-    test("accepts a hex nonce against a numeric one", async () => {
-        const raw = await signedWith({ nonce: 7 });
-        expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(
-                raw,
-                { ...TX_PARAMS, nonce: "0x7" },
-                signer.address,
-                SELECTED,
-            ),
-        ).not.toThrow();
-    });
-
-    test("accepts a decimal gas limit against a hex one", async () => {
-        const raw = await signedWith({ gasLimit: 100000n });
-        expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(
-                raw,
-                { ...TX_PARAMS, gasLimit: "100000" },
-                signer.address,
-                SELECTED,
-            ),
-        ).not.toThrow();
-    });
-
-    test("accepts fee fields spelled as hex, decimal, number and bigint", async () => {
+    test("accepts quantities spelled as hex, decimal, number and bigint", async () => {
         const raw = await signedWith({});
         for (const maxFee of [
             "0x77359400",
@@ -720,7 +882,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx normalization", () => {
             expect(() =>
                 verifySignedTx(
                     raw,
-                    { ...TX_PARAMS, maxFeePerGas: maxFee },
+                    { ...APPROVED, maxFeePerGas: maxFee },
                     signer.address,
                     SELECTED,
                 ),
@@ -728,24 +890,19 @@ describe("verifySignedTx normalization", () => {
         }
     });
 
-    test("accepts an approval that fixes no nonce, gas or fee at all", async () => {
-        const raw = await signedWith({});
-        expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
-        ).not.toThrow();
-    });
-
     test("accepts an approval whose recipient case differs", async () => {
         const raw = await signedWith({});
-        const approved = { ...TX_PARAMS, to: RECIPIENT.toLowerCase() };
+        const approved = { ...APPROVED, to: RECIPIENT.toLowerCase() };
         expect(() =>
             verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).not.toThrow();
     });
 
     test("accepts absent call data against 0x", async () => {
-        const approved = { to: RECIPIENT, value: "0x0" };
-        const raw = await signedFor({ ...approved, data: "0x" });
+        const params = { to: RECIPIENT, value: "0x0" };
+        const approved = approvedFor(params);
+        delete approved.data;
+        const raw = await signedFor({ ...params, data: "0x" });
         expect(() =>
             verifySignedTx(raw, approved, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).not.toThrow();
@@ -756,7 +913,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx normalization", () => {
         expect(() =>
             verifySignedTx(
                 raw,
-                { ...TX_PARAMS, maxFeePerGas: "cheap" },
+                { ...APPROVED, maxFeePerGas: "cheap" },
                 signer.address,
                 SELECTED,
             ),
@@ -774,7 +931,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx normalization", () => {
             try {
                 verifySignedTx(
                     raw,
-                    { ...TX_PARAMS, value },
+                    { ...APPROVED, value },
                     signer.address,
                     SELECTED,
                 );
@@ -793,7 +950,7 @@ describe("verifySignedTx normalization", () => {
         expect(() =>
             verifySignedTx(
                 raw,
-                { ...TX_PARAMS, accessList: ["nope"] },
+                { ...APPROVED, accessList: ["nope"] },
                 signer.address,
                 SELECTED,
             ),
@@ -934,7 +1091,7 @@ describe("signing failure and retry", () => {
     test("a mismatch spends the approval", async () => {
         const raw = await signedFor({ ...TX_PARAMS, to: OTHER_RECIPIENT });
         try {
-            verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED);
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED);
             throw new Error("expected a rejection");
         } catch (e) {
             expect(failureIsRetryable(e)).toBe(false);
@@ -1007,7 +1164,7 @@ describe("signing failure and retry", () => {
         const raw = await signedFor({ ...TX_PARAMS, to: OTHER_RECIPIENT });
         let outcome;
         try {
-            verifySignedTx(raw, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED);
+            verifySignedTx(raw, APPROVED, signer.address, SELECTED);
         } catch (e) {
             outcome = describeTxFailure(TX_STAGE_VERIFY, e);
         }
@@ -1061,12 +1218,13 @@ describe("signing failure and retry", () => {
     });
 });
 
-// End-to-end over the messaging boundary, without a browser: run the exact
-// sequence the approval popup runs, then hand the artifact to the exact check
-// the background runs before it broadcasts or resolves. Only what the popup
-// puts on the wire is passed along, so this also pins down that the wire
-// payload is sufficient on its own.
-describe("popup signing sequence to background verification", () => {
+// End-to-end over the messaging boundary, without a browser: the background
+// populates the transaction, the object that produces crosses to the popup as
+// JSON and is signed there, and the artifact goes back to the exact check the
+// background runs before it broadcasts. Only what each side puts on the wire is
+// passed along, so this also pins down that the wire payloads are sufficient on
+// their own.
+describe("background population to popup signing to verification", () => {
     // Stand-in for the JSON-RPC provider. populateTransaction only needs the
     // nonce, the gas estimate, the network and the fee data.
     const fakeProvider = {
@@ -1084,33 +1242,52 @@ describe("popup signing sequence to background verification", () => {
     // through getSignerForAddress() the way the popup does.
     const walletData = { type: "privkey" };
 
-    async function popupSignsTx(txParams) {
-        const localSigner = getSignerForAddress(walletData, 0, SIGNER_KEY);
-        const connected = localSigner.connect(fakeProvider);
-        const populated = await connected.populateTransaction(txParams);
-        delete populated.from;
-        return connected.signTransaction(populated);
+    // What the background does before the approval window opens.
+    async function backgroundPrepares(txParams) {
+        const approvedTx = await prepareApprovalTx(
+            fakeProvider,
+            signer.address,
+            txParams,
+        );
+        // Extension messaging is JSON; the popup sees the other side of it.
+        return JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(approvedTx));
     }
 
-    test("a populated, signed transaction is accepted and broadcastable", async () => {
-        const rawSignedTx = await popupSignsTx(TX_PARAMS);
+    // What the popup does with it: signs it as given, populating nothing.
+    async function popupSigns(approvedTx) {
+        const localSigner = getSignerForAddress(walletData, 0, SIGNER_KEY);
+        return localSigner.signTransaction({ ...approvedTx });
+    }
+
+    test("the populated transaction is what gets signed and what gets checked", async () => {
+        const approvedTx = await backgroundPrepares(TX_PARAMS);
+        const rawSignedTx = await popupSigns(approvedTx);
         const parsed = verifySignedTx(
             rawSignedTx,
-            TX_PARAMS,
+            approvedTx,
             signer.address,
             SELECTED,
         );
         expect(parsed.nonce).toBe(7);
         expect(parsed.chainId).toBe(1n);
         expect(parsed.gasLimit).toBe(21000n);
+        expect(parsed.maxFeePerGas).toBe(2000000000n);
         expect(parsed.to).toBe(RECIPIENT);
         expect(parsed.value).toBe(BigInt(TX_PARAMS.value));
         expect(parsed.data).toBe(TX_PARAMS.data);
         expect(parsed.signature).not.toBeNull();
+        // Every field the screen shows, and the artifact, are the same numbers.
+        expect(BigInt(approvedTx.nonce)).toBe(BigInt(parsed.nonce));
+        expect(BigInt(approvedTx.gasLimit)).toBe(parsed.gasLimit);
+        expect(BigInt(approvedTx.maxFeePerGas)).toBe(parsed.maxFeePerGas);
+        expect(BigInt(approvedTx.maxPriorityFeePerGas)).toBe(
+            parsed.maxPriorityFeePerGas,
+        );
     });
 
     test("the wire payload carries no password and no secret", async () => {
-        const rawSignedTx = await popupSignsTx(TX_PARAMS);
+        const approvedTx = await backgroundPrepares(TX_PARAMS);
+        const rawSignedTx = await popupSigns(approvedTx);
         const payload = {
             type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
             id: "test-approval-id",
@@ -1128,20 +1305,54 @@ describe("popup signing sequence to background verification", () => {
         expect(wire).not.toContain(SIGNER_KEY.slice(2).toLowerCase());
     });
 
+    // The popup is the component whose compromise this check exists to detect,
+    // so it is given the approved transaction and signs something else.
+    test("a popup that signs a different fee than it was given is refused", async () => {
+        const approvedTx = await backgroundPrepares(TX_PARAMS);
+        const rawSignedTx = await popupSigns({
+            ...approvedTx,
+            maxFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca000",
+        });
+        expect(() =>
+            verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, approvedTx, signer.address, SELECTED),
+        ).toThrow(/approved maximum fee per gas/);
+    });
+
+    test("a popup that signs a different nonce than it was given is refused", async () => {
+        const approvedTx = await backgroundPrepares(TX_PARAMS);
+        const rawSignedTx = await popupSigns({ ...approvedTx, nonce: "0x8" });
+        expect(() =>
+            verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, approvedTx, signer.address, SELECTED),
+        ).toThrow(/approved nonce/);
+    });
+
     test("the background rejects a transaction the popup did not approve", async () => {
-        const rawSignedTx = await popupSignsTx({
-            ...TX_PARAMS,
+        const approvedTx = await backgroundPrepares(TX_PARAMS);
+        const rawSignedTx = await popupSigns({
+            ...approvedTx,
             to: OTHER_RECIPIENT,
         });
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SELECTED),
+            verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, approvedTx, signer.address, SELECTED),
         ).toThrow(/approved recipient/);
     });
 
     test("the background rejects a transaction populated on another network", async () => {
-        const rawSignedTx = await popupSignsTx(TX_PARAMS);
+        const approvedTx = await backgroundPrepares(TX_PARAMS);
+        const rawSignedTx = await popupSigns(approvedTx);
         expect(() =>
-            verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, TX_PARAMS, signer.address, SEPOLIA),
+            verifySignedTx(rawSignedTx, approvedTx, signer.address, SEPOLIA),
         ).toThrow(/different network than the one that is selected/);
     });
+
+    // ethers refuses to sign for an address that is not the key's own, so a
+    // popup working from the approved object cannot quietly sign as whichever
+    // address the user has switched to.
+    test("the approved from stops the popup signing with another key", async () => {
+        const approvedTx = await backgroundPrepares(TX_PARAMS);
+        const otherSigner = getSignerForAddress(walletData, 0, OTHER_KEY);
+        await expect(
+            otherSigner.signTransaction({ ...approvedTx }),
+        ).rejects.toThrow(/from address mismatch/);
+    });
 });

tests/backNavigation.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+// Back after reopening the popup (#268).
+//
+// A reopened popup renders the wallet list and the one view it restores
+// onto; every other view is still the blank static template from
+// index.html. goBack() used to only unhide its target, so Back landed on
+// that blank template for any view the popup had not rendered in this page
+// load. These tests drive the real goBack() with the real router wired to
+// recording view modules, so what is asserted is which view render ran —
+// the thing that was missing.
+//
+// The rendering itself is asserted against the real popup in a real
+// browser by tests/e2e/run.js; here the DOM is a stub, because goBack()
+// only needs showView() to work.
+
+const els = new Map();
+
+function fakeEl() {
+    return {
+        textContent: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        classList: {
+            toggle() {},
+            add() {},
+            remove() {},
+            contains: () => false,
+        },
+        remove() {},
+    };
+}
+
+globalThis.document = {
+    getElementById(id) {
+        if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, fakeEl());
+        return els.get(id);
+    },
+};
+
+// helpers.js pulls in state.js, which reads chrome.storage.local at load.
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const {
+    showView,
+    goBack,
+    setBackRenderer,
+    pushCurrentView,
+} = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+const {
+    makeBackRenderer,
+    markViewRendered,
+    resetRenderedViews,
+} = require("../src/popup/viewRouter");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+
+const ADDRESS = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
+const TOKEN = "0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48";
+
+let calls;
+
+// Stand-ins for the view modules. Each records itself and then shows its
+// view, which is what every real view render ends with — so the assertions
+// can tell "rendered and shown" apart from "merely unhidden".
+function recorder(name, view) {
+    return () => {
+        calls.push(name);
+        showView(view);
+    };
+}
+
+function makeViews() {
+    return {
+        main: { show: recorder("main", "main") },
+        addressDetail: { show: recorder("addressDetail", "address") },
+        addressToken: { show: recorder("addressToken", "address-token") },
+        receive: { show: recorder("receive", "receive") },
+        settings: { show: recorder("settings", "settings") },
+        settingsAddToken: {
+            show: recorder("settingsAddToken", "settings-addtoken"),
+        },
+        confirmTx: { restore: recorder("confirmTx", "confirm-tx") },
+        transactionDetail: {
+            render: recorder("transactionDetail", "transaction"),
+        },
+        txStatus: {
+            restoreWait: () => {
+                calls.push("waitTx");
+                showView("wait-tx");
+                return true;
+            },
+            renderSuccess: recorder("successTx", "success-tx"),
+            renderError: recorder("errorTx", "error-tx"),
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+// The popup as it stands just after a reopen: one wallet with one address,
+// the view the popup restored onto, and the stack behind it.
+//
+// A reopen is a fresh page load, so the record of what has been rendered
+// starts empty — that emptiness is what makes the Back path render at all.
+// Returns the view modules so a test can drive forward navigation through
+// the same recorders the router renders through.
+function reopenedOn(view, stack, extra) {
+    calls = [];
+    resetRenderedViews();
+    state.wallets = [
+        {
+            name: "Wallet 1",
+            addresses: [{ address: ADDRESS, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] }],
+        },
+    ];
+    state.selectedWallet = 0;
+    state.selectedAddress = 0;
+    state.selectedToken = null;
+    state.viewData = null;
+    state.currentView = view;
+    state.viewStack = stack.slice();
+    Object.assign(state, extra || {});
+    // Restoring onto a view renders it, so the reopened popup has that one
+    // view on the page and nothing else.
+    markViewRendered(view);
+    const views = makeViews();
+    setBackRenderer(makeBackRenderer(state, views));
+    return views;
+}
+
+// The reproduction from the issue, step for step.
+describe("Back onto a view the reopened popup never rendered", () => {
+    test("Back from settings renders the address detail underneath", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "address"]);
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["addressDetail"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("address");
+        expect(state.viewStack).toEqual(["main"]);
+    });
+
+    test("Back onto the token detail renders it", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "address", "address-token"], {
+            selectedToken: TOKEN,
+        });
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["addressToken"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("address-token");
+    });
+
+    test("Back onto Receive renders it", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "address", "receive"]);
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["receive"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("receive");
+    });
+
+    test("Back onto the transaction detail renders it", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "transaction"], {
+            viewData: { tx: { hash: "0xdead" } },
+        });
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["transactionDetail"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("transaction");
+    });
+
+    test("Back onto the transaction confirmation restores it", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "confirm-tx"], {
+            viewData: { pendingTx: { to: ADDRESS, amount: "1" } },
+        });
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["confirmTx"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("confirm-tx");
+    });
+
+    test("Back onto the success screen renders it", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "success-tx"], {
+            viewData: { hash: "0xdead" },
+        });
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["successTx"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("success-tx");
+    });
+
+    test("Back onto the failure screen renders it", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "error-tx"], {
+            viewData: { message: "execution reverted" },
+        });
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["errorTx"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("error-tx");
+    });
+
+    test("Back onto Home renders the wallet list", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main"]);
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
+    });
+
+    test("Back with an empty stack renders Home", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", []);
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
+    });
+});
+
+// The guards are restoreView()'s, so a popped view whose backing data is
+// gone lands on Home rather than on an empty template.
+describe("Back onto a view whose backing data is gone", () => {
+    test("the token detail with no token selected falls back to Home", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "address-token"]);
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
+    });
+
+    test("the transaction detail with no transaction falls back to Home", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "transaction"]);
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
+    });
+
+    test("the confirmation with no pending transaction falls back to Home", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "confirm-tx"]);
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
+    });
+
+    test("an address view with no address selected falls back to Home", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "receive"], {
+            selectedAddress: null,
+        });
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
+    });
+
+    test("the success screen with no transaction hash falls back to Home", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "success-tx"]);
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
+    });
+
+    test("the failure screen with no message falls back to Home", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "error-tx"]);
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
+    });
+
+    test("a wait that can no longer be resumed falls back to Home", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "wait-tx"]);
+        const views = makeViews();
+        views.txStatus.restoreWait = () => false;
+        setBackRenderer(makeBackRenderer(state, views));
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
+    });
+});
+
+// Forward navigation renders as it goes, and a second render would re-fetch
+// and clobber whatever the view holds — an unsaved edit, a request in
+// flight. So the Back path renders only a view this page load has never
+// rendered, and merely unhides every other one: the views it does not
+// render from persisted state, and the views already on the page.
+describe("what the Back path leaves alone", () => {
+    test("forward navigation renders nothing by itself", () => {
+        reopenedOn("address", ["main"]);
+        pushCurrentView();
+        showView("send");
+        expect(calls).toEqual([]);
+        expect(state.viewStack).toEqual(["main", "address"]);
+    });
+
+    test("Back onto a live-session view only unhides it", () => {
+        reopenedOn("confirm-tx", ["main", "address", "send"]);
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual([]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("send");
+    });
+
+    test("Back renders its target exactly once", () => {
+        reopenedOn("settings", ["main", "address"]);
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls.filter((c) => c === "addressDetail")).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    test("Back onto a view this page load already rendered only unhides it", () => {
+        const views = reopenedOn("main", []);
+        pushCurrentView();
+        views.addressDetail.show();
+        pushCurrentView();
+        views.settings.show();
+        calls = [];
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual([]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("address");
+    });
+
+    // The unit mirror of the regression the browser suite pins: Settings
+    // reassigns its fields from persisted state on every render, so a
+    // re-render on the way back discards an edit the user has not saved.
+    test("Back onto Settings visited earlier in this page load does not re-render it", () => {
+        const views = reopenedOn("main", []);
+        pushCurrentView();
+        views.settings.show();
+        pushCurrentView();
+        views.settingsAddToken.show();
+        calls = [];
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual([]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("settings");
+    });
+
+    // Home is the deliberate exception, unchanged from the popup's
+    // behaviour before the router existed: it re-renders on every Back so
+    // the wallet list reflects what changed while the user was away.
+    test("Back onto Home renders it again even when it is already on the page", () => {
+        const views = reopenedOn("main", []);
+        pushCurrentView();
+        views.addressDetail.show();
+        calls = [];
+        goBack();
+        expect(calls).toEqual(["main"]);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
+    });
+});

tests/backgroundApproval.test.js

@@ -8,22 +8,45 @@
 // already saw — which means the entry being present is not by itself proof
 // that no attempt is running. A second response carrying the same id (a
 // reloaded approval window re-rendering a live Approve button, a popup that
-// emits the message twice) must not start a second verify and broadcast: with
-// the ordinary dApp approval shape the page fixes no nonce, so two artifacts
-// signed at different nonces both verify, and the approved transfer would go
-// out twice.
+// emits the message twice) must not start a second verify and broadcast: the
+// same approved transaction signed twice verifies twice, and the transfer
+// would go out twice.
+//
+// It also covers what the approval is verified against. The approval now
+// carries the transaction the background populated and the screen displayed,
+// and the address that was active when it was raised — so a fee, a nonce or an
+// address that moved between approval and signing is refused rather than
+// signed.
 
-const { Wallet } = require("ethers");
+const { Network, Wallet } = require("ethers");
 
 const SIGNER_KEY =
     "0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
+const OTHER_KEY =
+    "0x5de4111afa1a4b94908f83103eb1f1706367c2e68ca870fc3fb9a804cdab365a";
 const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
+const other = new Wallet(OTHER_KEY);
 const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
 const HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
 
+// An origin the persisted state has never allowed, so asking to connect from
+// it raises a prompt rather than being answered from allowedSites.
+const FRESH_ORIGIN = "https://fresh.example";
+
+// The approval id in the most recent popup URL of a list, or null when none
+// of them carries one. Takes both shapes: the absolute URL windows.create()
+// is given and the extension-relative one action.setPopup() is given.
+function approvalIdIn(urls) {
+    for (let i = urls.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        if (!urls[i] || !urls[i].includes("?approval=")) continue;
+        return new URL(urls[i], EXT_URL).searchParams.get("approval");
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
 // What the dApp asks for: no nonce, no gas, no fees. This is the shape that
 // makes a duplicate broadcast possible at all.
 const TX_PARAMS = {
@@ -33,9 +56,16 @@ const TX_PARAMS = {
     data: "0x",
 };
 
-// The fields the popup's populateTransaction() would fill in. The nonce is a
-// parameter because the duplicate case turns on the two artifacts differing
-// in exactly the field nothing constrains.
+// The nonce the stubbed node reports, and so the nonce the background
+// populates the approval with.
+const NONCE = 7;
+
+// "Hello AutistMask" as the hex string a dApp passes to personal_sign.
+const MESSAGE = "0x48656c6c6f204175746973744d61736b";
+
+// The transaction the background populates and the approval screen displays.
+// The nonce is a parameter because the duplicate case turns on two artifacts
+// differing in a field the dApp fixed nothing for.
 function populated(nonce) {
     return {
         type: 2,
@@ -50,8 +80,26 @@ function populated(nonce) {
     };
 }
 
-function signedAtNonce(nonce) {
-    return signer.signTransaction(populated(nonce));
+function signedAtNonce(nonce, withWallet) {
+    return (withWallet || signer).signTransaction(populated(nonce));
+}
+
+// The node the background populates against. Its answers are the numbers the
+// approval screen shows, so they are also the numbers every artifact below is
+// signed at.
+function fakeProvider(broadcastTransaction, overrides) {
+    return {
+        broadcastTransaction,
+        getNetwork: async () => Network.from(1),
+        getTransactionCount: async () => NONCE,
+        estimateGas: async () => 100000n,
+        getFeeData: async () => ({
+            gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+            maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
+            maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+        }),
+        ...(overrides || {}),
+    };
 }
 
 // A promise whose settlement the test controls, so a broadcast can be held in
@@ -85,7 +133,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
         currentNetwork: () => ({ chainId: "0x1" }),
     }));
     jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
-        getProvider: () => ({ broadcastTransaction }),
+        getProvider: () => fakeProvider(broadcastTransaction, opts.provider),
         refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
     }));
     jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
@@ -113,8 +161,13 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
 
     let messageListener = null;
     let windowRemovedListener = null;
+    let connectListener = null;
     const created = [];
     const removed = [];
+    // Every URL the background put on the browser action. A site approval
+    // raised through action.openPopup() opens no window at all, so this is
+    // the only place its id appears.
+    const actionPopups = [];
 
     global.chrome = {
         storage: {
@@ -130,7 +183,14 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
                     messageListener = fn;
                 },
             },
-            onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
+            // Captured, not swallowed: the approval port is what carries a
+            // site connection's decision and the popup teardown that races
+            // it, so a no-op stub here hides the whole subject of #275.
+            onConnect: {
+                addListener: (fn) => {
+                    connectListener = fn;
+                },
+            },
             lastError: null,
         },
         windows: {
@@ -156,7 +216,17 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
             query: (q, cb) => cb([]),
             sendMessage: () => {},
         },
-        action: { setPopup: () => {} },
+        action: {
+            setPopup: (o) => {
+                actionPopups.push(o.popup);
+            },
+            // The production route for a site connection. Present only when
+            // a test asks for it, because with it the prompt is the toolbar
+            // popup: no window is created, so windows.onRemoved can never
+            // fire for it and the port disconnect is the only close signal
+            // that exists.
+            ...(opts.actionPopup ? { openPopup: () => Promise.resolve() } : {}),
+        },
     };
 
     require("../src/background/index");
@@ -171,7 +241,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
 
     // Raise a pending transaction approval the way a dApp does, and dig the
     // approval id back out of the popup URL the background opened.
-    function requestTx() {
+    function requestTx(txParams) {
         let rpcResult = null;
         const sendResponse = jest.fn((r) => {
             rpcResult = r;
@@ -180,7 +250,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
             {
                 type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
                 method: "eth_sendTransaction",
-                params: [TX_PARAMS],
+                params: [txParams || TX_PARAMS],
             },
             { origin: ORIGIN },
             sendResponse,
@@ -191,6 +261,94 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
         };
     }
 
+    // The same for a message-signing approval, which pins the signing address
+    // at approval time in exactly the same way.
+    function requestSign(from) {
+        let rpcResult = null;
+        messageListener(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
+                method: "personal_sign",
+                params: [MESSAGE, from || signer.address],
+            },
+            { origin: ORIGIN },
+            (r) => {
+                rpcResult = r;
+            },
+        );
+        return {
+            id: () =>
+                new URL(created[created.length - 1].url).searchParams.get(
+                    "approval",
+                ),
+            result: () => rpcResult,
+        };
+    }
+
+    // A dApp asking to connect. The origin defaults to one the persisted
+    // state has never allowed, so the request really does raise a prompt
+    // instead of being answered from allowedSites.
+    function requestSite(origin) {
+        let rpcResult = null;
+        messageListener(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
+                method: "eth_requestAccounts",
+                params: [],
+            },
+            { origin: origin || FRESH_ORIGIN },
+            (r) => {
+                rpcResult = r;
+            },
+        );
+        return {
+            // Wherever the prompt went: the toolbar popup URL when
+            // action.openPopup() carried it, the created window otherwise.
+            id: () =>
+                approvalIdIn(actionPopups) ||
+                approvalIdIn(created.map((c) => c.url)),
+            result: () => rpcResult,
+        };
+    }
+
+    // The popup's approval port, as the browser delivers it. Messages posted
+    // on a port and that port's disconnect travel one channel in FIFO order,
+    // which is exactly the property the fix rests on, so this stub delivers
+    // them in the order the caller emits them and never reorders them.
+    function connectApproval(id, senderUrl) {
+        const onMessage = [];
+        const onDisconnect = [];
+        const port = {
+            name: "approval:" + id,
+            sender: {
+                url:
+                    senderUrl === undefined
+                        ? EXT_URL + "src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id
+                        : senderUrl,
+            },
+            onMessage: { addListener: (fn) => onMessage.push(fn) },
+            onDisconnect: { addListener: (fn) => onDisconnect.push(fn) },
+        };
+        connectListener(port);
+        return {
+            decide: (approved, remember) => {
+                for (const fn of onMessage) {
+                    fn(
+                        {
+                            type: "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_DECISION",
+                            approved,
+                            remember: !!remember,
+                        },
+                        port,
+                    );
+                }
+            },
+            disconnect: () => {
+                for (const fn of onDisconnect) fn(port);
+            },
+        };
+    }
+
     // The user closes the approval popup. `created` is index-aligned with the
     // ids the window stub hands back, so window 1 is the first popup opened.
     function closeWindow(windowId) {
@@ -200,18 +358,29 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
     return {
         send,
         requestTx,
+        requestSign,
+        requestSite,
+        connectApproval,
         closeWindow,
         broadcastTransaction,
         loadState,
         created,
         removed,
+        // The user switching account in the toolbar popup, as the background
+        // sees it: the persisted active address changes underneath a pending
+        // approval.
+        setActiveAddress: (address) => {
+            persisted.activeAddress = address;
+        },
         fromPopup: { url: EXT_URL + "src/popup/index.html" },
     };
 }
 
-// Let the handler's promise chain run to the next suspension point.
+// Let the handler's promise chain run to the next suspension point. Raising a
+// transaction approval now populates it against the node first, which is
+// several awaits deep before the window is opened.
 async function settle() {
-    for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+    for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
 }
 
 afterEach(() => {
@@ -244,9 +413,11 @@ describe("one approval, one broadcast", () => {
         await settle();
         expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
 
-        // A reloaded approval window signs the same approval again. Nothing
-        // in the approval fixes a nonce, so this artifact verifies just as
-        // well as the first one.
+        // A reloaded approval window signs the same approval again, at another
+        // nonce. The claim is taken before anything is verified, so what this
+        // asserts is the interlock and not the nonce comparison: the refusal
+        // below is the claim's own message, which a verification failure does
+        // not produce.
         const second = bg.send(
             {
                 type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
@@ -376,6 +547,319 @@ describe("one approval, one broadcast", () => {
     });
 });
 
+// The approval carries the transaction the user was shown and the address it
+// was raised for, and the artifact is checked against both. Every case here is
+// one the old comparison — against the dApp's request, for the address that is
+// active now — would have broadcast.
+describe("what the approval is verified against", () => {
+    // The approval screen showed the populated fee. An artifact at ten times
+    // that fee, still far below the ceilings, is what the ceilings alone could
+    // not catch.
+    test("a fee differing from the displayed one is refused, not sent", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const pending = bg.requestTx();
+        await settle();
+        const id = pending.id();
+
+        const raw = await signer.signTransaction({
+            ...populated(NONCE),
+            maxFeePerGas: 20000000000n,
+        });
+        const answer = bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
+                id,
+                approved: true,
+                rawSignedTx: raw,
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            expect.objectContaining({
+                error: expect.stringMatching(/approved maximum fee per gas/),
+                retryable: false,
+                stage: "verify",
+            }),
+        );
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
+            error: {
+                message: expect.stringMatching(/approved maximum fee per gas/),
+            },
+        });
+    });
+
+    test("a nonce differing from the displayed one is refused, not sent", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const pending = bg.requestTx();
+        await settle();
+        const id = pending.id();
+
+        const answer = bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
+                id,
+                approved: true,
+                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE + 1),
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            expect.objectContaining({
+                error: expect.stringMatching(/approved nonce/),
+                retryable: false,
+                stage: "verify",
+            }),
+        );
+    });
+
+    // The address switch. The approval named one account; the wallet is on
+    // another by the time the artifact arrives. Both halves are covered: the
+    // popup signing as the account that is active now, and the popup correctly
+    // signing as the approved account while the wallet has moved on.
+    test("an artifact signed by the address that is active now is refused", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const pending = bg.requestTx();
+        await settle();
+        const id = pending.id();
+
+        bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
+        const answer = bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
+                id,
+                approved: true,
+                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE, other),
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            expect.objectContaining({ retryable: false, stage: "verify" }),
+        );
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
+            error: { message: expect.stringMatching(/active address changed/) },
+        });
+    });
+
+    test("an address switch refuses even the correctly signed artifact", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const pending = bg.requestTx();
+        await settle();
+        const id = pending.id();
+
+        bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
+        const answer = bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
+                id,
+                approved: true,
+                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            expect.objectContaining({
+                error: expect.stringMatching(/active address changed/),
+                retryable: false,
+                stage: "verify",
+            }),
+        );
+        // A refusal, so the approval is spent: the same artifact offered again
+        // finds nothing to answer.
+        const retry = bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
+                id,
+                approved: true,
+                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        expect(retry.sendResponse).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    test("a switch back to the approved address still sends", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const pending = bg.requestTx();
+        await settle();
+        const id = pending.id();
+
+        bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
+        bg.setActiveAddress(signer.address);
+        bg.broadcastTransaction.mockResolvedValue({ hash: "0xfeed" });
+        bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
+                id,
+                approved: true,
+                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(NONCE),
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: "0xfeed" });
+    });
+
+    // The popup is handed the populated transaction and the address it is for,
+    // and nothing else it would have to fetch or decide.
+    test("the popup is given the transaction it is to sign", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const pending = bg.requestTx();
+        await settle();
+
+        const details = bg.send(
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id: pending.id() },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        const shown = details.sendResponse.mock.calls[0][0];
+        expect(shown.type).toBe("tx");
+        expect(shown.approvedFrom).toBe(signer.address);
+        expect(shown.approvedTx).toEqual({
+            type: 2,
+            from: signer.address,
+            chainId: "0x1",
+            nonce: "0x7",
+            gasLimit: "0x186a0",
+            maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
+            maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
+            to: RECIPIENT,
+            value: TX_PARAMS.value,
+            data: "0x",
+            accessList: [],
+        });
+    });
+
+    // A request naming an account the wallet is not on is refused outright
+    // rather than signed as whichever account is active.
+    test("a request from another address raises no approval at all", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const pending = bg.requestTx({ ...TX_PARAMS, from: other.address });
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
+            error: {
+                code: 4100,
+                message: expect.stringMatching(/not the active one/),
+            },
+        });
+        expect(bg.created).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    // Message signing pins the address the same way, and refuses the same way.
+    // A signature is not a transaction, but a permit signed by an account the
+    // approval did not name spends that account's tokens all the same.
+    test("a sign approval refuses a signature after an address switch", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const pending = bg.requestSign();
+        await settle();
+
+        bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
+        const answer = bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
+                id: pending.id(),
+                approved: true,
+                signature: await signer.signMessage(
+                    Buffer.from(MESSAGE.slice(2), "hex"),
+                ),
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            expect.objectContaining({
+                error: expect.stringMatching(/active address changed/),
+                retryable: false,
+            }),
+        );
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
+            error: { message: expect.stringMatching(/active address changed/) },
+        });
+    });
+
+    test("a sign request from another address raises no approval at all", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const pending = bg.requestSign(other.address);
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
+            error: {
+                code: 4100,
+                message: expect.stringMatching(/not the active one/),
+            },
+        });
+        expect(bg.created).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    // Population is a network round trip with the user's hands free. An
+    // approval raised for the address that was active when it started could
+    // never be signed once the wallet has moved off it, so it is never raised.
+    test("an address switch during population raises no approval", async () => {
+        let bg;
+        bg = loadBackground({
+            provider: {
+                // The user switches account in the toolbar popup while the
+                // node is being asked for a gas estimate.
+                estimateGas: async () => {
+                    bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
+                    return 100000n;
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        const pending = bg.requestTx();
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
+            error: {
+                message: expect.stringMatching(
+                    /active address changed while this transaction was being prepared/,
+                ),
+            },
+        });
+        expect(bg.created).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    // Population happens before the window exists, so its failure is a failure
+    // of the request: no approval, no window, and the error goes back to the
+    // page the click came from.
+    test("a transaction that cannot be prepared opens no window", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({
+            provider: {
+                estimateGas: async () => {
+                    throw new Error("execution reverted");
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        const pending = bg.requestTx();
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
+            error: {
+                message: expect.stringMatching(
+                    /could not be prepared.*execution reverted/,
+                ),
+            },
+        });
+        expect(bg.created).toEqual([]);
+    });
+});
+
 // The interlock must not cost the retry the approval exists to allow.
 describe("the interlock releases a failed attempt", () => {
     test("a retryable failure before the broadcast leaves the approval usable", async () => {
@@ -677,3 +1161,136 @@ describe("popup-only messages", () => {
         });
     });
 });
+
+// A site connection decided in a popup that closes on the next line.
+//
+// The decision and the teardown are two events the popup emits back to back,
+// and the background must not be able to reach different outcomes depending on
+// which of them it processes first. It cannot, because they are now one
+// channel: the decision is posted on the approval port that the close then
+// disconnects, so it is delivered first. Every test here therefore emits the
+// close IMMEDIATELY after the decision, with nothing awaited in between —
+// which is what the popup does, and what used to report a user who approved as
+// having refused (#275).
+describe("a site connection decided as the popup closes", () => {
+    // The production route: chrome.action.openPopup() put the prompt in the
+    // toolbar popup, which is not a window, so nothing but the port
+    // disconnect can tell the background this prompt is gone.
+    test("approving in the toolbar popup connects the site", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const pending = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        const id = pending.id();
+        expect(id).toBeTruthy();
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(0);
+
+        const port = bg.connectApproval(id);
+        port.decide(true, false);
+        port.disconnect();
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+    });
+
+    test("closing the toolbar popup without deciding is a rejection", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const pending = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+
+        const port = bg.connectApproval(pending.id());
+        port.disconnect();
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
+            error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
+        });
+    });
+
+    test("rejecting is a rejection, and the close that follows adds nothing", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const pending = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+
+        const port = bg.connectApproval(pending.id());
+        port.decide(false, false);
+        port.disconnect();
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
+            error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
+        });
+    });
+
+    // The port carries a decision now, so it carries the sender check the
+    // one-off message used to carry. A content script that guessed an
+    // approval id must not be able to connect the site it is running on.
+    test("a decision from a page sender is ignored, and the close rejects", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const pending = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+
+        const port = bg.connectApproval(pending.id(), FRESH_ORIGIN + "/x.html");
+        port.decide(true, true);
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toBeNull();
+
+        port.disconnect();
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
+            error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
+        });
+    });
+
+    // The fallback shape, where openPopup() is unavailable and the prompt is
+    // a window the extension opened. Closing it fires windows.onRemoved as
+    // well, on a channel of its own that is ordered against nothing — so the
+    // window event must not be allowed to decide a site approval either.
+    test("approving in the fallback window survives the window event too", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const pending = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+
+        const port = bg.connectApproval(pending.id());
+        port.decide(true, false);
+        bg.closeWindow(1);
+        port.disconnect();
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+    });
+
+    // Same shape, and the same window event arriving before the popup has
+    // said anything at all — which is a user closing the window rather than
+    // deciding, and still has to reach the dApp as a rejection.
+    test("closing the fallback window without deciding is a rejection", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const pending = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+
+        const port = bg.connectApproval(pending.id());
+        bg.closeWindow(1);
+        port.disconnect();
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
+            error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
+        });
+    });
+
+    // The net under the paragraph above: a prompt whose page never got as far
+    // as connecting the port has no disconnect to reject it, so the window
+    // event has to. Otherwise the dApp waits forever on a window that is gone.
+    test("a window that closes before its popup ever connected still rejects", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const pending = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+
+        bg.closeWindow(1);
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
+            error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
+        });
+    });
+});

tests/e2e/firefox/Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# Firefox end-to-end image: stock Firefox plus geckodriver on a node base,
+# built by script/test-e2e-firefox. The repo is bind-mounted at /work; the
+# harness itself has no dependencies, so nothing is installed for it.
+#
+# All three external artifacts are pinned by digest. The Firefox version in
+# particular must not float: -remote-allow-system-access is mandatory on 153
+# and was not on 142, so the flag the harness passes is version-coupled.
+
+# node:22-bookworm-slim, 2026-08-12
+FROM node@sha256:d649c27dae7ba0137b3cef5dd75baa422c08dc3d9e3fc0c23dfb172dc3cc6436
+
+ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+
+# Firefox's shared-library dependencies on a slim base, plus the two tools
+# needed to fetch and unpack the pinned tarballs.
+RUN apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        ca-certificates \
+        curl \
+        libasound2 \
+        libdbus-glib-1-2 \
+        libgtk-3-0 \
+        libx11-xcb1 \
+        libxt6 \
+        libxtst6 \
+        xz-utils \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# Firefox 153.0.3, linux-x86_64, en-US
+ARG FIREFOX_URL=https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/153.0.3/linux-x86_64/en-US/firefox-153.0.3.tar.xz
+ARG FIREFOX_SHA256=22b312280900bfb174b685ece32c7b3c6d72e7f8e53d6d30f21ac41a8dc500a2
+RUN curl -fsSL -o /tmp/firefox.tar.xz "$FIREFOX_URL" \
+    && echo "$FIREFOX_SHA256  /tmp/firefox.tar.xz" | sha256sum -c - \
+    && tar -xJf /tmp/firefox.tar.xz -C /opt \
+    && rm /tmp/firefox.tar.xz \
+    && /opt/firefox/firefox --version
+
+# geckodriver v0.36.0, linux64
+ARG GECKODRIVER_URL=https://github.com/mozilla/geckodriver/releases/download/v0.36.0/geckodriver-v0.36.0-linux64.tar.gz
+ARG GECKODRIVER_SHA256=0bde38707eb0a686a20c6bd50f4adcc7d60d4f73c60eb83ee9e0db8f65823e04
+RUN curl -fsSL -o /tmp/geckodriver.tar.gz "$GECKODRIVER_URL" \
+    && echo "$GECKODRIVER_SHA256  /tmp/geckodriver.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - \
+    && tar -xzf /tmp/geckodriver.tar.gz -C /usr/local/bin \
+    && rm /tmp/geckodriver.tar.gz \
+    && geckodriver --version
+
+ENV FIREFOX_BIN=/opt/firefox/firefox
+ENV GECKODRIVER=/usr/local/bin/geckodriver
+
+WORKDIR /work
+CMD ["node", "tests/e2e/firefox/run.js", "dist/firefox"]

tests/e2e/firefox/driver.js

@@ -0,0 +1,464 @@
+// A minimal WebDriver client for geckodriver, plus the privileged console
+// reader the error assertions are built on. No npm dependencies: global
+// fetch and child_process against geckodriver's HTTP API is less code than
+// a driver library and keeps the harness at zero packages.
+//
+// Run through script/test-e2e-firefox, which builds dist/firefox/ and the
+// pinned container around this. FIREFOX_BIN and GECKODRIVER locate the two
+// binaries; the image sets both.
+
+"use strict";
+
+const { spawn } = require("child_process");
+const net = require("net");
+
+const FIREFOX_BIN = process.env.FIREFOX_BIN || "firefox";
+const GECKODRIVER = process.env.GECKODRIVER || "geckodriver";
+
+// The extension id declared in manifest/firefox.json, and the uuid the
+// popup is served from. Firefox normally assigns that uuid randomly per
+// profile, which would make the popup URL undiscoverable without querying
+// privileged state; setting extensions.webextensions.uuids before launch
+// pins it instead. This only works because the manifest declares a fixed
+// browser_specific_settings.gecko.id — without one the mapping has no key.
+const EXTENSION_ID = "autistmask@sneak.berlin";
+const EXTENSION_UUID = "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee";
+const EXTENSION_ORIGIN = "moz-extension://" + EXTENSION_UUID;
+
+// The W3C web element identifier. Getting the last character wrong yields
+// an element reference of "undefined" and a bewildering "element with the
+// reference undefined is not known" from geckodriver, so findElement()
+// below checks for the key rather than indexing blindly.
+const WEB_ELEMENT_KEY = "element-6066-11e4-a52e-4f735466cecf";
+
+const SCRIPT_TIMEOUT_MS = 120000;
+const DEFAULT_WAIT_MS = 20000;
+const POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 100;
+
+function sleep(ms) {
+    return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
+}
+
+// An ephemeral port picked by the kernel, then handed to geckodriver.
+// There is a race between closing this listener and geckodriver binding,
+// but this host runs many sessions at once and a fixed 4444 is a
+// guaranteed collision rather than a possible one.
+function freePort() {
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+        const srv = net.createServer();
+        srv.on("error", reject);
+        srv.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => {
+            const { port } = srv.address();
+            srv.close(() => resolve(port));
+        });
+    });
+}
+
+class WebDriverError extends Error {
+    constructor(command, body) {
+        const v = (body && body.value) || {};
+        super(
+            command +
+                " failed: " +
+                (v.error || "unknown error") +
+                ": " +
+                (v.message || JSON.stringify(body)),
+        );
+        this.name = "WebDriverError";
+        this.error = v.error;
+    }
+}
+
+class Driver {
+    constructor(proc, base) {
+        this.proc = proc;
+        this.base = base;
+        this.sessionId = null;
+        this.context = "content";
+    }
+
+    async send(method, path, body) {
+        const url = this.base + path;
+        const res = await fetch(url, {
+            method,
+            headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+            body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body),
+        });
+        const text = await res.text();
+        let parsed;
+        try {
+            parsed = JSON.parse(text);
+        } catch (_) {
+            throw new Error(
+                method + " " + path + ": non-JSON response: " + text,
+            );
+        }
+        if (!res.ok) throw new WebDriverError(method + " " + path, parsed);
+        return parsed.value;
+    }
+
+    session(method, path, body) {
+        return this.send(method, "/session/" + this.sessionId + path, body);
+    }
+
+    // ------------------------------------------------------------ setup
+
+    async newSession() {
+        const prefs = {
+            // See EXTENSION_UUID above. The pref is a string pref whose
+            // value is itself JSON.
+            "extensions.webextensions.uuids": JSON.stringify({
+                [EXTENSION_ID]: EXTENSION_UUID,
+            }),
+        };
+
+        const value = await this.send("POST", "/session", {
+            capabilities: {
+                alwaysMatch: {
+                    browserName: "firefox",
+                    "moz:firefoxOptions": {
+                        binary: FIREFOX_BIN,
+                        args: [
+                            "-headless",
+                            // Mandatory on Firefox 153: without it,
+                            // navigating to moz-extension:// and running
+                            // chrome-context script both fail with
+                            // "unsupported operation".
+                            //
+                            // It grants the driver FULL CHROME PRIVILEGES
+                            // over this browser. Acceptable only because
+                            // the browser is a throwaway in a CI
+                            // container; never point a session with this
+                            // flag at anything you care about.
+                            "-remote-allow-system-access",
+                        ],
+                        prefs,
+                    },
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        this.sessionId = value.sessionId;
+        await this.session("POST", "/timeouts", { script: SCRIPT_TIMEOUT_MS });
+        return value;
+    }
+
+    // Installs the unpacked MV2 build straight from a directory.
+    // temporary:true bypasses signature checks, so no XPI and no signing
+    // are involved, and the add-on dies with the profile.
+    async installAddon(dir) {
+        return this.session("POST", "/moz/addon/install", {
+            path: dir,
+            temporary: true,
+        });
+    }
+
+    // Classic navigation on purpose. BiDi's browsingContext.navigate
+    // refuses moz-extension:// URLs outright.
+    async navigate(url) {
+        await this.session("POST", "/url", { url });
+    }
+
+    async quit() {
+        if (this.sessionId) {
+            await this.session("DELETE", "").catch(() => {});
+            this.sessionId = null;
+        }
+        this.proc.kill("SIGTERM");
+    }
+
+    // ---------------------------------------------------------- scripts
+
+    async setContext(context) {
+        if (this.context === context) return;
+        await this.session("POST", "/moz/context", { context });
+        this.context = context;
+    }
+
+    async execute(script, args = []) {
+        await this.setContext("content");
+        return this.session("POST", "/execute/sync", { script, args });
+    }
+
+    // Runs in the privileged chrome scope, where Services and Ci exist.
+    async executeChrome(script, args = []) {
+        await this.setContext("chrome");
+        try {
+            return await this.session("POST", "/execute/sync", {
+                script,
+                args,
+            });
+        } finally {
+            await this.setContext("content");
+        }
+    }
+
+    // ------------------------------------------------------- page waits
+
+    // Polls a content-context expression until it returns truthy. Every
+    // wait in the suite goes through here so a timeout always says which
+    // condition it was waiting on rather than "timed out".
+    async waitFor(what, script, args = [], timeout = DEFAULT_WAIT_MS) {
+        const deadline = Date.now() + timeout;
+        let last = null;
+        for (;;) {
+            try {
+                const v = await this.execute(script, args);
+                if (v) return v;
+                last = null;
+            } catch (e) {
+                // A navigation or view swap in flight makes execute
+                // throw; that is a not-yet, not a failure, until the
+                // deadline says otherwise.
+                last = e.message;
+            }
+            if (Date.now() >= deadline) {
+                throw new Error(
+                    "timed out after " +
+                        timeout +
+                        "ms waiting for " +
+                        what +
+                        (last ? " (last error: " + last + ")" : ""),
+                );
+            }
+            await sleep(POLL_INTERVAL_MS);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Shown means shown: in the popup a view is switched by toggling a
+    // "hidden" class, and an element that is present but collapsed is not
+    // the thing a test means by visible.
+    async waitVisible(selector, timeout = DEFAULT_WAIT_MS) {
+        return this.waitFor(
+            "selector " + selector + " to be visible",
+            `const el = document.querySelector(arguments[0]);
+             if (!el) return false;
+             const r = el.getBoundingClientRect();
+             return r.width > 0 && r.height > 0;`,
+            [selector],
+            timeout,
+        );
+    }
+
+    async isVisible(selector) {
+        return this.execute(
+            `const el = document.querySelector(arguments[0]);
+             if (!el) return false;
+             const r = el.getBoundingClientRect();
+             return r.width > 0 && r.height > 0;`,
+            [selector],
+        );
+    }
+
+    async count(selector) {
+        return this.execute(
+            "return document.querySelectorAll(arguments[0]).length;",
+            [selector],
+        );
+    }
+
+    async text(selector) {
+        return this.execute(
+            `const el = document.querySelector(arguments[0]);
+             return el ? el.textContent : null;`,
+            [selector],
+        );
+    }
+
+    async title() {
+        return this.session("GET", "/title");
+    }
+
+    // The id of the view element currently on top, which is what a
+    // failing step needs to report: "the screen did not change" is only
+    // useful if it says which screen it stayed on.
+    async currentView() {
+        return this.execute(
+            `const views = document.querySelectorAll('[id^="view-"]');
+             for (const v of views) {
+                 const r = v.getBoundingClientRect();
+                 if (r.width > 0 && r.height > 0) return v.id;
+             }
+             return null;`,
+        );
+    }
+
+    // ----------------------------------------------------- interactions
+
+    async findElement(selector) {
+        const value = await this.session("POST", "/element", {
+            using: "css selector",
+            value: selector,
+        });
+        const ref = value && value[WEB_ELEMENT_KEY];
+        if (typeof ref !== "string") {
+            throw new Error(
+                "no " +
+                    WEB_ELEMENT_KEY +
+                    " in the element response for " +
+                    selector +
+                    ": " +
+                    JSON.stringify(value),
+            );
+        }
+        return ref;
+    }
+
+    // Real WebDriver clicks and real key events rather than in-page
+    // .click() and value assignment: the popup's handlers are wired to
+    // events, and synthesising them from inside the page would test the
+    // harness's idea of the UI instead of the UI.
+    async click(selector) {
+        await this.waitVisible(selector);
+        const id = await this.findElement(selector);
+        await this.session("POST", "/element/" + id + "/click", {});
+    }
+
+    async fill(selector, value) {
+        await this.waitVisible(selector);
+        const id = await this.findElement(selector);
+        await this.session("POST", "/element/" + id + "/clear", {});
+        await this.session("POST", "/element/" + id + "/value", {
+            text: String(value),
+        });
+    }
+
+    async value(selector) {
+        return this.execute(
+            `const el = document.querySelector(arguments[0]);
+             return el ? el.value : null;`,
+            [selector],
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------- error capture
+
+// Uncaught errors from extension code, read out of the privileged console
+// service.
+//
+// This is not the obvious mechanism, and the obvious one does not work:
+// WebDriver BiDi's log.entryAdded delivers NOTHING for extension pages.
+// Verified on Firefox 142 and 153 against a same-session control — a plain
+// http:// page yields uncaught errors with stack traces, the
+// moz-extension:// popup yields zero events, because the remote agent
+// excludes extension browsing contexts from BiDi observation. A harness
+// built on Playwright-BiDi or Puppeteer-BiDi therefore sees nothing and
+// reports success. Do not "simplify" this back to BiDi.
+//
+// nsIConsoleService is not per-page: it also carries errors from the
+// background page, which BiDi would not have covered even if it worked.
+// Background-page capture is verified by probe — a throw at the top of
+// src/background/index.js, which kills the background page outright, fails
+// the run. Content-script errors should arrive by the same route, but that
+// is UNVERIFIED here and must not be claimed: the container runs with
+// --network none, so there is no http:// page for a content script to be
+// injected into and this suite never exercises one.
+//
+// Warnings are excluded so the semantics match Playwright's pageerror:
+// uncaught errors only.
+//
+// The read and the clear are ONE chrome script on purpose. Splitting them
+// into two round trips leaves a blind window between them in which an
+// error is logged into a buffer that is about to be discarded, and is
+// destroyed unread rather than deferred to the next drain. That was not
+// theoretical: with a separate reset() call, a probe of 100 sequenced
+// throws at 20ms spacing lost one of them outright.
+const DRAIN_ERRORS_SCRIPT = `
+    const origin = arguments[0];
+    const out = [];
+    for (const raw of Services.console.getMessageArray() || []) {
+        let e;
+        try {
+            e = raw.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIScriptError);
+        } catch (_) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (e.flags & Ci.nsIScriptError.warningFlag) continue;
+        const src = e.sourceName || "";
+        if (!src.startsWith(origin)) continue;
+        out.push({
+            msg: e.errorMessage,
+            src: src,
+            line: e.lineNumber,
+            cat: e.category,
+        });
+    }
+    Services.console.reset();
+    return out;
+`;
+
+class ConsoleErrors {
+    constructor(driver, originPrefix) {
+        this.driver = driver;
+        this.originPrefix = originPrefix;
+    }
+
+    // Everything logged since the last take, read and cleared atomically
+    // in a single chrome round trip. Poll-based, so an error is attributed
+    // to the step that was running when it was drained, not to the moment
+    // inside that step at which it happened — see the limitation note in
+    // run.js. An error that arrives mid-drain is not lost — it makes this
+    // batch or the next one — but the console service ring buffer holds
+    // only 250 messages, so more than that between two takes evicts the
+    // oldest unread. A clean run peaks at 4.
+    async take() {
+        const found = await this.driver.executeChrome(DRAIN_ERRORS_SCRIPT, [
+            this.originPrefix,
+        ]);
+        return found || [];
+    }
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------- startup
+
+async function waitForDriverReady(base, timeoutMs) {
+    const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;
+    for (;;) {
+        try {
+            const res = await fetch(base + "/status");
+            if (res.ok) {
+                const body = await res.json();
+                if (body && body.value && body.value.ready !== false) return;
+            }
+        } catch (_) {
+            // not listening yet
+        }
+        if (Date.now() >= deadline) {
+            throw new Error(
+                "geckodriver did not become ready within " + timeoutMs + "ms",
+            );
+        }
+        await sleep(POLL_INTERVAL_MS);
+    }
+}
+
+async function start() {
+    const port = await freePort();
+    const proc = spawn(
+        GECKODRIVER,
+        ["--port", String(port), "--host", "127.0.0.1"],
+        { stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"] },
+    );
+    proc.on("error", (e) => {
+        console.error("geckodriver failed to spawn: " + e.message);
+    });
+
+    const base = "http://127.0.0.1:" + port;
+    try {
+        await waitForDriverReady(base, 30000);
+    } catch (e) {
+        proc.kill("SIGKILL");
+        throw e;
+    }
+    return new Driver(proc, base);
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+    ConsoleErrors,
+    Driver,
+    EXTENSION_ID,
+    EXTENSION_ORIGIN,
+    EXTENSION_UUID,
+    start,
+    sleep,
+};

tests/e2e/firefox/run.js

@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+// Firefox end-to-end suite: drives the real popup in a real Firefox with
+// the unpacked MV2 build installed as a temporary add-on, and fails the run
+// on any uncaught error coming from an extension source.
+//
+// Run via script/test-e2e-firefox, which builds dist/firefox/ and the pinned
+// container. The extension directory is the one argument.
+//
+//   node tests/e2e/firefox/run.js [dist/firefox]
+//
+// Deliberately not part of script/check, and deliberately not named
+// *.test.js: REPO_POLICIES.md caps make test at 20 seconds and a browser
+// suite does not fit.
+//
+// This shares no driver layer with the Chrome suite in tests/e2e/, and the
+// UI steps below are written twice on purpose. Chrome runs on Playwright,
+// which cannot see extension-page errors in Firefox at all (see the BiDi
+// note in driver.js), so the two backends have no common substrate to
+// abstract over. Three duplicated steps do not pay for a shim; revisit if
+// this suite grows to where they do.
+//
+// LIMITATION, and the difference from the Chrome suite worth knowing: error
+// capture here is POLL-BASED, not event-streamed. The console service is
+// drained at each step boundary, so an error is attributed to the step it
+// was drained after, never to a moment within that step. What is drained
+// covers the whole run from add-on install to the last drain below, which
+// lands ~1.5s after the last step returns (500ms settle + 1000ms sleep +
+// two drain round trips). That cut-off jitters run to run: three runs of
+// throws at fixed offsets reported everything to +1.5s and one of them
+// also +1.6s, and past it the browser is torn down first. Inside the
+// window there is no race — the drain reads and clears in one chrome
+// round trip — but there is a capacity limit: nsIConsoleService keeps
+// only the newest 250 messages, so 400 throws in one step report as
+// exactly 250. A clean run peaks at 4 of 250, so that is headroom today
+// and not a guarantee for a step that logs heavily. The Chrome harness
+// receives pageerror events as they happen and can say more. Do not read
+// a green Firefox run as the same claim.
+
+"use strict";
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const { ConsoleErrors, EXTENSION_ORIGIN, start, sleep } = require("./driver");
+
+const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "..", "..");
+const POPUP_URL = EXTENSION_ORIGIN + "/src/popup/index.html";
+const PASSWORD = "e2e-harness-password";
+
+// Firefox installs the add-on and starts its background page asynchronously
+// after the install call returns. Nothing observable marks the end of that,
+// so the popup's own first render is the signal we wait on instead.
+const STEP_TIMEOUT_MS = 120000;
+
+const steps = [];
+
+function step(name, fn) {
+    steps.push({ name, fn });
+}
+
+function assert(cond, message) {
+    if (!cond) throw new Error(message);
+}
+
+function withTimeout(promise, name) {
+    let timer;
+    const timeout = new Promise((_, reject) => {
+        timer = setTimeout(
+            () =>
+                reject(
+                    new Error(
+                        name + " timed out after " + STEP_TIMEOUT_MS + "ms",
+                    ),
+                ),
+            STEP_TIMEOUT_MS,
+        );
+    });
+    return Promise.race([promise, timeout]).finally(() => clearTimeout(timer));
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------- steps
+
+step("popup loads and reaches the welcome view", async (env) => {
+    const d = env.driver;
+    await d.navigate(POPUP_URL);
+    await d.waitVisible("#view-welcome", STEP_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    const title = await d.title();
+    assert(title === "AutistMask", "unexpected popup title: " + title);
+});
+
+step("wallet creation through the UI reaches the main view", async (env) => {
+    const d = env.driver;
+    await d.click("#btn-welcome-add");
+    await d.waitVisible("#view-add-wallet");
+    await d.click("#btn-generate-phrase");
+    await d.waitFor(
+        "a generated recovery phrase of at least 12 words",
+        `const el = document.getElementById("wallet-mnemonic");
+         return !!el && el.value.trim().split(/\\s+/).length >= 12;`,
+    );
+    env.phrase = (await d.value("#wallet-mnemonic")).trim();
+
+    await d.fill("#add-wallet-password", PASSWORD);
+    await d.fill("#add-wallet-password-confirm", PASSWORD);
+    await d.click("#btn-add-wallet-confirm");
+    // Argon2id under libsodium, for real, so this is the slow one.
+    await d.waitVisible("#view-main", STEP_TIMEOUT_MS);
+
+    assert(
+        env.phrase.split(/\s+/).length >= 12,
+        "wallet creation did not yield a recovery phrase",
+    );
+    const addrs = await d.count("#wallet-list .btn-addr-info");
+    assert(addrs > 0, "no addresses rendered in the wallet list");
+});
+
+step("add token screen opens from address detail", async (env) => {
+    const d = env.driver;
+    if (!(await d.isVisible("#view-address"))) {
+        await d.waitVisible("#view-main");
+        await d.click("#wallet-list .btn-addr-info");
+    }
+    await d.waitVisible("#view-address");
+
+    await d.click("#btn-add-token");
+    // Reported with the view it actually stayed on: a screen that does
+    // not change is the symptom a missing import produces, and naming
+    // the screen is what makes that diagnosable.
+    try {
+        await d.waitVisible("#view-add-token");
+    } catch (e) {
+        throw new Error(
+            e.message + "; current view is " + (await d.currentView()),
+        );
+    }
+
+    const picks = await d.count("#common-token-list .common-token");
+    assert(picks > 0, "no common-token quick-pick buttons rendered");
+});
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------- runner
+
+function formatError(e) {
+    return (
+        e.msg + " (" + e.src + ":" + e.line + (e.cat ? ", " + e.cat : "") + ")"
+    );
+}
+
+async function main() {
+    // A suite that runs nothing must never report success.
+    if (steps.length === 0) {
+        console.log("1..0");
+        console.log("# FAILED: the Firefox e2e suite registered no steps");
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    const extDir = path.resolve(REPO_ROOT, process.argv[2] || "dist/firefox");
+    if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(extDir, "manifest.json"))) {
+        console.error(
+            "e2e-firefox: no unpacked build at " +
+                extDir +
+                " — run make build first",
+        );
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    let driver;
+    try {
+        driver = await start();
+        await driver.newSession();
+        await driver.installAddon(extDir);
+    } catch (e) {
+        // A browser we cannot start is a failure of the suite, not an
+        // absent suite. Never skip and report success.
+        console.error("e2e-firefox: cannot run the suite: " + e.message);
+        if (driver) await driver.quit().catch(() => {});
+        process.exitCode = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    const errors = new ConsoleErrors(driver, EXTENSION_ORIGIN);
+    const env = { driver, phrase: null };
+
+    console.log("# extension origin: " + EXTENSION_ORIGIN);
+    console.log("1.." + steps.length);
+
+    let failed = 0;
+    let n = 0;
+    try {
+        // Drain, never reset: anything the add-on logged while installing
+        // and starting its background page has no earlier step to belong
+        // to, so it is folded into step 1 below. Services.console.reset()
+        // here would DELETE it instead, and a background page that throws
+        // at the top of the file — a dead background page — would then
+        // produce a fully green run.
+        let installErrors = [];
+        let installFailure = null;
+        try {
+            installErrors = await errors.take();
+        } catch (e) {
+            installFailure =
+                "could not read the console after install: " + e.message;
+        }
+
+        for (const s of steps) {
+            n += 1;
+            let failure = null;
+            try {
+                await withTimeout(s.fn(env), s.name);
+            } catch (e) {
+                failure = e.message;
+            }
+
+            // Let anything the step provoked reach the console service
+            // before draining it. Without this a failure logged on the
+            // way out of the step lands in the next step's drain, which
+            // still fails the run but blames the wrong step.
+            await sleep(500);
+
+            let found = [];
+            try {
+                found = await errors.take();
+            } catch (e) {
+                failure = failure || "could not read the console: " + e.message;
+            }
+
+            if (n === 1) {
+                found = installErrors.concat(found);
+                installErrors = [];
+                failure = failure || installFailure;
+                installFailure = null;
+            }
+
+            // Any uncaught error from an extension source fails the step
+            // that provoked it, whether or not its assertions passed.
+            if (!failure && found.length > 0) {
+                failure =
+                    n === 1
+                        ? "uncaught extension errors during add-on install, " +
+                          "background startup or this step"
+                        : "uncaught extension errors during this step";
+            }
+
+            if (failure) {
+                failed += 1;
+                console.log("not ok " + n + " - " + s.name);
+                console.log("  " + failure);
+                for (const e of found) console.log("  " + formatError(e));
+            } else {
+                console.log("ok " + n + " - " + s.name);
+            }
+        }
+
+        // The tail: errors logged after the last step returned cannot be
+        // blamed on any one step, but they are still reported and they
+        // still fail the run.
+        await sleep(1000);
+        const trailing = await errors.take();
+        console.log(
+            "# " +
+                (steps.length - failed) +
+                "/" +
+                steps.length +
+                " steps passed",
+        );
+        if (trailing.length > 0) {
+            console.log(
+                "# " +
+                    trailing.length +
+                    " extension error(s) recorded after the last step, not " +
+                    "attributable to any single step:",
+            );
+            for (const e of trailing) console.log("#   " + formatError(e));
+        }
+        if (failed > 0 || trailing.length > 0) {
+            console.log("# FAILED");
+            process.exitCode = 1;
+        }
+    } finally {
+        await driver.quit().catch(() => {});
+    }
+}
+
+main().catch((e) => {
+    console.error("e2e-firefox: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+});

tests/e2e/network.js

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
 
 "use strict";
 
+const { Transaction } = require("ethers");
+
 // Fictional ERC-20 used to seed the transaction-detail test. The symbol
 // must not collide with any entry in src/shared/tokenList.js, or
 // isSpoofedSymbol() in src/shared/transactions.js drops the transfer as a
@@ -62,6 +64,87 @@ function word(value) {
     return "0x" + BigInt(value).toString(16).padStart(64, "0");
 }
 
+// -------------------------------------------------------- dApp fixture
+//
+// The origin the EIP-1193 test page is served from, and the page itself.
+//
+// It is a fixture like every other one in this file: the route handler
+// fulfils the navigation from the string below, so the page never comes
+// from a remote origin and nothing about the dApp round trips leaves the
+// container. `.test` is reserved by RFC 6761 and has no owner to reach in
+// the first place; the launch arguments map every host to NOTFOUND anyway.
+//
+// What the page deliberately does NOT do is load a provider. window.ethereum
+// is put there by the shipped manifest's MAIN-world content script, exactly
+// as it is on any http(s) page a user visits, so what these tests speak to
+// is the real inpage provider and not a copy the harness wired up.
+const DAPP_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.e2e.test";
+const DAPP_URL = DAPP_ORIGIN + "/";
+
+// Requests are parked rather than awaited. An approval prompt only exists
+// while its call is in flight, so a test that awaited the promise could
+// never drive the popup that has to settle it; start() files the promise
+// under a key and settle() collects it once the prompt has been dealt with.
+//
+// The rejection branch records the whole observable shape of the error as it
+// arrives — name, message, and whether a `code` is present at all as distinct
+// from its value. EIP-1193 says a user rejection is a ProviderRpcError
+// carrying code 4001; what the page can actually see is recorded here rather
+// than assumed, and asserted in run.js.
+//
+// The message log is the page's half of the boundary observation: every
+// AUTISTMASK_* message that crosses between this page and the content
+// script, in both directions, verbatim.
+const DAPP_HTML = [
+    "<!doctype html>",
+    '<html lang="en">',
+    "<head>",
+    '<meta charset="utf-8">',
+    "<title>AutistMask e2e dApp</title>",
+    // Inline and empty: without it Chromium asks for /favicon.ico, which
+    // the unstubbed-request guard would report as escaping traffic.
+    '<link rel="icon" href="data:,">',
+    "</head>",
+    "<body>",
+    "<h1>AutistMask e2e dApp</h1>",
+    "<script>",
+    "window.__dapp = {",
+    "    messages: [],",
+    "    calls: {},",
+    "    start: function (key, method, params) {",
+    "        window.__dapp.calls[key] = window.ethereum",
+    "            .request({ method: method, params: params })",
+    "            .then(",
+    "                function (result) {",
+    "                    return { settled: 'resolved', result: result };",
+    "                },",
+    "                function (error) {",
+    "                    return {",
+    "                        settled: 'rejected',",
+    "                        message: String((error && error.message) || error),",
+    "                        name: error ? error.name : undefined,",
+    "                        hasCode: !!error && 'code' in Object(error),",
+    "                        code: error ? error.code : undefined,",
+    "                    };",
+    "                },",
+    "            );",
+    "    },",
+    "    settle: function (key) {",
+    "        return window.__dapp.calls[key];",
+    "    },",
+    "};",
+    "window.addEventListener('message', function (event) {",
+    "    if (event.source !== window) return;",
+    "    var d = event.data;",
+    "    if (!d || typeof d.type !== 'string') return;",
+    "    if (d.type.indexOf('AUTISTMASK') !== 0) return;",
+    "    window.__dapp.messages.push(d);",
+    "});",
+    "</script>",
+    "</body>",
+    "</html>",
+].join("\n");
+
 // ------------------------------------------------------------ fee fixture
 //
 // The confirmation screen carries two different numbers for the same
@@ -101,6 +184,11 @@ const RPC_RESULTS = {
     eth_estimateGas: hex(GAS_LIMIT),
     eth_getTransactionCount: "0x0",
     eth_maxPriorityFeePerGas: hex(PRIORITY_FEE_WEI),
+    // "not mined yet", which is what a node answers for a transaction it has
+    // only just accepted. The wait screen the dApp transaction approval hands
+    // off to polls this every 10 seconds; leaving it unstubbed would report
+    // the poll as escaping traffic the moment a test outlived one tick.
+    eth_getTransactionReceipt: null,
 };
 
 // The "latest" block, which ethers' getFeeData() reads baseFeePerGas from
@@ -264,6 +352,31 @@ function rpcReply(req, opts, report) {
     if (req.method === "eth_getBlockByNumber") {
         return Object.assign(envelope, { result: latestBlock() });
     }
+    // The end of the dApp transaction round trip: the raw signed transaction
+    // the background hands to the node. It is recorded verbatim so a test can
+    // recover the signer from the exact bytes that were broadcast, rather than
+    // from anything the extension reported about them.
+    //
+    // The reply must be the transaction's real hash. ethers compares the hash
+    // the node returns against the one it computes itself and throws on a
+    // mismatch, so a constant here would fail the broadcast for a reason that
+    // has nothing to do with what is being tested.
+    if (req.method === "eth_sendRawTransaction") {
+        const raw = Array.isArray(req.params) ? req.params[0] : null;
+        let parsed;
+        try {
+            parsed = Transaction.from(raw);
+        } catch {
+            report("eth_sendRawTransaction with an undecodable transaction");
+            return Object.assign(envelope, {
+                error: { code: -32000, message: "undecodable transaction" },
+            });
+        }
+        if (Array.isArray(opts.broadcastTransactions)) {
+            opts.broadcastTransactions.push(raw);
+        }
+        return Object.assign(envelope, { result: parsed.hash });
+    }
     if (req.method === "eth_estimateGas" && opts.failGasEstimate) {
         // A refusal the node itself would produce, not a transport error:
         // this is the shape the confirmation screen has to turn into
@@ -297,17 +410,26 @@ async function handleRpc(route, postData, opts, report) {
     // ethers batches by default, so the body may be an array.
     const batch = Array.isArray(payload) ? payload : [payload];
 
-    // Anything that is not a JSON-RPC object, or a batch of them, is not
-    // RPC at all and must be reported like any other unrecognised
-    // outbound traffic rather than dereferenced. request.postData()
-    // returns null both for a bodyless POST and for a body Playwright
-    // cannot decode as UTF-8 (sendBeacon with a Blob, or any binary
-    // payload), so this is not an empty-string special case: it rejects
-    // every non-object payload, exactly as the catch above rejects every
-    // unparseable one.
+    // Anything that is not a JSON-RPC object, or a NON-EMPTY batch of
+    // them, is not RPC at all and must be reported like any other
+    // unrecognised outbound traffic rather than dereferenced.
+    //
+    // The length check is not decoration: every() is vacuously true on an
+    // empty array, so without it a POST with body [] was answered 200 []
+    // and escaped the guard entirely (issue #187). No real batch is empty,
+    // so nothing legitimate is caught by it.
+    //
+    // Two distinct paths land a non-RPC body here, and neither is an
+    // empty-string special case. playwright-core's postData() is
+    // `buffer.toString("utf-8") || null`, so an absent or empty body
+    // decodes to null, JSON.parse("null") yields null, and the type guard
+    // below reports it. A binary body is instead decoded LOSSILY into
+    // mojibake — not null — which is not valid JSON, so the catch above
+    // reports that one. Both end up reported; only the route differs.
     if (
         payload === null ||
         typeof payload !== "object" ||
+        batch.length === 0 ||
         !batch.every((req) => req !== null && typeof req === "object")
     ) {
         report("unstubbed request: POST " + route.request().url());
@@ -366,6 +488,8 @@ function traceEnabled(raw) {
  *   node-side refusal.
  * @param {boolean} [opts.holdGasEstimate]  hold every batch containing an
  *   eth_estimateGas until this is cleared again.
+ * @param {string[]} [opts.broadcastTransactions]  every raw signed
+ *   transaction handed to eth_sendRawTransaction, appended in order.
  * @returns {Promise<{waitForServiceWorkerTraffic: (ms: number) =>
  *   Promise<string|null>}>}
  */
@@ -411,6 +535,18 @@ async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
             return handleRpc(route, req.postData(), opts, report);
         }
 
+        // The local EIP-1193 test page. Served from here so the dApp round
+        // trips run against a real http(s) origin — which is what makes the
+        // shipped content scripts inject at all — without any remote origin
+        // being involved.
+        if (url.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN && p === "/") {
+            return route.fulfill({
+                status: 200,
+                contentType: "text/html; charset=utf-8",
+                body: DAPP_HTML,
+            });
+        }
+
         // Blockscout v2
         if (p.includes("/api/v2/")) {
             if (/\/addresses\/0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\/transactions$/.test(p)) {
@@ -499,6 +635,8 @@ async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
 
 module.exports = {
     installNetworkStubs,
+    DAPP_ORIGIN,
+    DAPP_URL,
     FEE_ESTIMATE_WEI,
     FEE_RESERVE_WEI,
     STUB_COUNTERPARTY,

tests/exportPrivkey.test.js

@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ describe("a reveal that is not interrupted", () => {
 
         expect(node("export-privkey-value").textContent).toBe("");
         expect(node("export-privkey-flash").textContent).toBe(
-            "That password is not correct. Please try again.",
+            "That password is incorrect. Please try again.",
         );
     });
 });

tests/inpageErrors.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+// The EIP-1193 error the page actually catches (src/content/inpage.js).
+//
+// The bug this pins down (issue #274): the provider rebuilt every failure as
+// `new Error(error.message)`, so the `code` the background produced and the
+// content script relayed intact was thrown away in the last hop. A dApp
+// checking `err.code === 4001` — the standard way to tell "the user said no"
+// from "the wallet broke" — saw undefined, and well-behaved sites showed an
+// error or retried instead of accepting the refusal.
+//
+// inpage.js is a bare IIFE injected into the page's JS context, not a module:
+// it takes no import and exports nothing, and reaches for `window` at load.
+// So it is evaluated here the way the browser evaluates it, against a stub
+// window, and the provider is collected from `window.ethereum`. The globals it
+// touches are passed in as function parameters rather than assigned to
+// globalThis: nothing leaks between tests, and the source is compiled in this
+// realm, so the errors it constructs are comparable against this file's own
+// `Error` — which a second realm's intrinsics would silently defeat.
+//
+// There is no jsdom in this repo; see tests/txStatus.test.js.
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+const { webcrypto } = require("crypto");
+
+const SOURCE = fs.readFileSync(
+    path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "content", "inpage.js"),
+    "utf8",
+);
+
+const loadInto = new Function(
+    "window",
+    "self",
+    "crypto",
+    "Event",
+    "CustomEvent",
+    SOURCE,
+);
+
+class StubEvent {
+    constructor(type) {
+        this.type = type;
+    }
+}
+
+class StubCustomEvent extends StubEvent {
+    constructor(type, init) {
+        super(type);
+        this.detail = init && init.detail;
+    }
+}
+
+// Every code the background emits on the RPC path today, read out of
+// src/background/index.js. The provider must not know this list — it passes
+// through whatever arrived — but the cases below are the real ones.
+const REJECTED = 4001; // user rejected the request
+const UNAUTHORIZED = 4100; // site not connected / wrong address
+const UNRECOGNIZED_CHAIN = 4902; // switch/add to an unsupported chain
+
+// A stub window with the four things inpage.js touches: message listeners,
+// postMessage out to the content script, window.ethereum, and dispatchEvent
+// for the EIP-6963 announcement.
+function loadProvider() {
+    const messageListeners = [];
+    const posted = [];
+
+    const win = {
+        addEventListener(type, fn) {
+            if (type === "message") messageListeners.push(fn);
+        },
+        removeEventListener(type, fn) {
+            const i = messageListeners.indexOf(fn);
+            if (type === "message" && i !== -1) messageListeners.splice(i, 1);
+        },
+        postMessage(data) {
+            posted.push(data);
+        },
+        dispatchEvent() {
+            return true;
+        },
+    };
+    win.window = win;
+
+    loadInto(win, win, webcrypto, StubEvent, StubCustomEvent);
+
+    // Deliver the content script's answer to an outstanding request. The id is
+    // read back off the wire rather than assumed: inpage.js issues its own
+    // eth_chainId at load, so the first id a test sees is not 1.
+    function respond(response) {
+        const request = posted
+            .filter((m) => m.type === "AUTISTMASK_REQUEST")
+            .pop();
+        expect(request).toBeDefined();
+        const event = {
+            source: win,
+            data: { type: "AUTISTMASK_RESPONSE", id: request.id, ...response },
+        };
+        for (const fn of messageListeners.slice()) fn(event);
+    }
+
+    return { provider: win.ethereum, posted, respond };
+}
+
+// Start a request, answer it with `response`, and hand back the rejection.
+// Fails the test if the call resolves instead.
+async function rejectionFrom(start, response) {
+    const { provider, respond } = loadProvider();
+    const settled = start(provider).then(
+        (result) => ({ resolved: result }),
+        (error) => ({ error }),
+    );
+    // The provider posts synchronously, so the request is already on the wire.
+    respond(response);
+    const outcome = await settled;
+    expect(outcome).not.toHaveProperty("resolved");
+    return outcome.error;
+}
+
+describe("an EIP-1193 code reaches the page", () => {
+    test("a user rejection arrives as code 4001", async () => {
+        const err = await rejectionFrom(
+            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
+            {
+                error: {
+                    code: REJECTED,
+                    message: "User rejected the request.",
+                },
+            },
+        );
+        expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
+        expect(err.message).toBe("User rejected the request.");
+    });
+
+    test("it is a ProviderRpcError, and an Error", async () => {
+        const err = await rejectionFrom(
+            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
+            {
+                error: {
+                    code: REJECTED,
+                    message: "User rejected the request.",
+                },
+            },
+        );
+        expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
+        expect(err.name).toBe("ProviderRpcError");
+    });
+
+    test("4100 unauthorized arrives intact", async () => {
+        const err = await rejectionFrom(
+            (p) => p.request({ method: "personal_sign", params: ["0x00"] }),
+            { error: { code: UNAUTHORIZED, message: "Unauthorized" } },
+        );
+        expect(err.code).toBe(UNAUTHORIZED);
+        expect(err.message).toBe("Unauthorized");
+    });
+
+    test("4902 unrecognized chain arrives intact", async () => {
+        const message =
+            "AutistMask supports Ethereum Mainnet and Sepolia Testnet only.";
+        const err = await rejectionFrom(
+            (p) => p.request({ method: "wallet_switchEthereumChain" }),
+            { error: { code: UNRECOGNIZED_CHAIN, message } },
+        );
+        expect(err.code).toBe(UNRECOGNIZED_CHAIN);
+        expect(err.message).toBe(message);
+    });
+
+    // The provider is not allowed to know the list above: a code added to the
+    // background later must reach the page without this file being edited.
+    test("a code the provider has never heard of is passed through", async () => {
+        const err = await rejectionFrom(
+            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_accounts" }),
+            { error: { code: 4900, message: "Disconnected" } },
+        );
+        expect(err.code).toBe(4900);
+    });
+
+    test("data is carried when the boundary sent it", async () => {
+        const err = await rejectionFrom(
+            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_call" }),
+            {
+                error: {
+                    code: -32000,
+                    message: "execution reverted",
+                    data: "0x08c379a0",
+                },
+            },
+        );
+        expect(err.code).toBe(-32000);
+        expect(err.data).toBe("0x08c379a0");
+    });
+
+    test("no data property is invented when the boundary sent none", async () => {
+        const err = await rejectionFrom(
+            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
+            {
+                error: {
+                    code: REJECTED,
+                    message: "User rejected the request.",
+                },
+            },
+        );
+        expect("data" in err).toBe(false);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the message is untouched", () => {
+    test("a coded error keeps the message byte for byte", async () => {
+        const message =
+            "This site asked to sign as an address that is not " +
+            "the active one.";
+        const err = await rejectionFrom(
+            (p) => p.request({ method: "personal_sign" }),
+            { error: { code: UNAUTHORIZED, message } },
+        );
+        expect(err.message).toBe(message);
+    });
+
+    test("an error the background sent with no code keeps its message", async () => {
+        const err = await rejectionFrom(
+            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_sendTransaction" }),
+            { error: { message: "No accounts available" } },
+        );
+        expect(err.message).toBe("No accounts available");
+    });
+
+    // A ProviderRpcError whose code is undefined would claim a conformance it
+    // does not have, and `'code' in err` is exactly what a careful dApp asks.
+    test("an error with no code gets no code property at all", async () => {
+        const err = await rejectionFrom(
+            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_sendTransaction" }),
+            { error: { message: "No accounts available" } },
+        );
+        expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
+        expect("code" in err).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("an error with no message keeps the generic fallback", async () => {
+        const err = await rejectionFrom(
+            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_sendTransaction" }),
+            { error: { code: REJECTED } },
+        );
+        expect(err.message).toBe("Request failed");
+        expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
+    });
+});
+
+// Every entry point the provider exposes, not just eth_requestAccounts. They
+// all funnel through the same response listener, and this is what says so.
+describe("every request path carries the code", () => {
+    const rejection = {
+        error: { code: REJECTED, message: "User rejected the request." },
+    };
+
+    test("request()", async () => {
+        const err = await rejectionFrom(
+            (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" }),
+            rejection,
+        );
+        expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
+    });
+
+    test("enable()", async () => {
+        const err = await rejectionFrom((p) => p.enable(), rejection);
+        expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
+    });
+
+    test("send(method, params)", async () => {
+        const err = await rejectionFrom(
+            (p) => p.send("eth_requestAccounts", []),
+            rejection,
+        );
+        expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
+    });
+
+    test("send({ method, params })", async () => {
+        const err = await rejectionFrom(
+            (p) => p.send({ method: "personal_sign", params: ["0x00"] }),
+            rejection,
+        );
+        expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
+    });
+
+    test("sendAsync() hands the code to its callback", async () => {
+        const { provider, respond } = loadProvider();
+        const called = new Promise((resolve) => {
+            provider.sendAsync({ id: 1, method: "eth_requestAccounts" }, (e) =>
+                resolve(e),
+            );
+        });
+        respond(rejection);
+        const err = await called;
+        expect(err.name).toBe("ProviderRpcError");
+        expect(err.code).toBe(REJECTED);
+        expect(err.message).toBe("User rejected the request.");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the success path is unchanged", () => {
+    test("a result still resolves", async () => {
+        const { provider, respond } = loadProvider();
+        const settled = provider.request({ method: "eth_requestAccounts" });
+        respond({ result: ["0xb61264DEFB0c4B8afb3D73724be15310036743a5"] });
+        await expect(settled).resolves.toEqual([
+            "0xb61264DEFB0c4B8afb3D73724be15310036743a5",
+        ]);
+        expect(provider.selectedAddress).toBe(
+            "0xb61264DEFB0c4B8afb3D73724be15310036743a5",
+        );
+    });
+});

tests/passwordMessages.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+// One wording for one condition (issue #172).
+//
+// Every screen that asks for the password decrypts the vault itself, and
+// each one used to write its own sentence for the same failure: the send
+// confirmation and the delete-wallet confirmation said "Wrong password."
+// (a fragment, which RULES.md Language & Labeling forbids), the reveal
+// screens said "That password is not correct.", and the two dApp approval
+// paths said "That password is incorrect." A user hitting two of those
+// minutes apart had no way to tell whether the wallet meant the same
+// thing.
+//
+// This scans the source rather than driving six views, because the
+// invariant is about the set of call sites and not about any one of them:
+// a seventh screen that decrypts the vault has to join the set, and a
+// DOM test per view cannot notice one that was never written.
+//
+// The assertions are per CALL SITE, not per file. approval.js decrypts in
+// two places and is where the divergence came from; a per-file check that
+// only asks whether the canonical sentence appears somewhere in the file
+// passes while one of those two says something else entirely. So each
+// call site is read back to its own catch handler and the prose that
+// handler shows the user must be the canonical sentence and nothing else
+// — which fails on a novel wording, not only on a known-superseded one.
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+
+const SRC = path.join(__dirname, "..", "src");
+
+const CANONICAL = "That password is incorrect. Please try again.";
+
+// Wordings this repo has actually shipped for the same condition. This is
+// a secondary, whole-file sweep for stragglers outside a decrypt handler;
+// divergence at a call site is caught by the exact-match assertion, which
+// needs no list of phrasings to guess at.
+const SUPERSEDED = [
+    "Wrong password.",
+    "That password is not correct. Please try again.",
+];
+
+function jsFilesUnder(dir) {
+    return fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true }).flatMap((entry) => {
+        const full = path.join(dir, entry.name);
+        if (entry.isDirectory()) return jsFilesUnder(full);
+        return entry.name.endsWith(".js") ? [full] : [];
+    });
+}
+
+// Blank out the interior of every comment and string literal, keeping the
+// offsets and line breaks, so braces can be counted without a quote or a
+// commented-out block throwing the count off. The literals are returned
+// alongside with the offset of their opening quote, which is how a
+// message is later attributed to the handler it sits in.
+function scan(source) {
+    const masked = source.split("");
+    const strings = [];
+    const blank = (from, to) => {
+        for (let k = from; k < to; k++) if (masked[k] !== "\n") masked[k] = " ";
+    };
+    let i = 0;
+    while (i < source.length) {
+        const two = source.slice(i, i + 2);
+        if (two === "//") {
+            const nl = source.indexOf("\n", i);
+            const stop = nl === -1 ? source.length : nl;
+            blank(i, stop);
+            i = stop;
+        } else if (two === "/*") {
+            const close = source.indexOf("*/", i + 2);
+            const stop = close === -1 ? source.length : close + 2;
+            blank(i, stop);
+            i = stop;
+        } else if (
+            source[i] === '"' ||
+            source[i] === "'" ||
+            source[i] === "`"
+        ) {
+            const quote = source[i];
+            let j = i + 1;
+            let value = "";
+            while (j < source.length && source[j] !== quote) {
+                if (source[j] === "\\") {
+                    value += source[j + 1];
+                    j += 2;
+                    continue;
+                }
+                value += source[j];
+                j += 1;
+            }
+            blank(i + 1, j);
+            strings.push({ offset: i, value });
+            i = j + 1;
+        } else {
+            i += 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return { masked: masked.join(""), strings };
+}
+
+// Offset of the `{` that opens the block containing `at`, or -1.
+function enclosingBlockStart(masked, at) {
+    let depth = 0;
+    for (let i = at; i >= 0; i--) {
+        if (masked[i] === "}") depth += 1;
+        else if (masked[i] === "{") {
+            if (depth === 0) return i;
+            depth -= 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+// Offset just past the `}` matching the `{` at `open`.
+function blockEnd(masked, open) {
+    let depth = 0;
+    for (let i = open; i < masked.length; i++) {
+        if (masked[i] === "{") depth += 1;
+        else if (masked[i] === "}") {
+            depth -= 1;
+            if (depth === 0) return i + 1;
+        }
+    }
+    throw new Error("unterminated block");
+}
+
+// The catch handler guarding a given decryptWithPassword call: walk out to
+// the try block the call sits in, then take the catch that follows it.
+function handlerSpan(masked, callOffset, label) {
+    const tryOpen = enclosingBlockStart(masked, callOffset);
+    if (tryOpen === -1 || !/\btry\s*$/.test(masked.slice(0, tryOpen)))
+        throw new Error(`${label}: the decrypt is not inside a try block`);
+    const rest = masked.slice(blockEnd(masked, tryOpen));
+    const catchMatch = /^\s*catch\s*(\([^)]*\)\s*)?\{/.exec(rest);
+    if (!catchMatch)
+        throw new Error(`${label}: the decrypt's try block has no catch`);
+    const catchOpen = blockEnd(masked, tryOpen) + catchMatch[0].length - 1;
+    return [catchOpen, blockEnd(masked, catchOpen)];
+}
+
+// The prose the handler puts in front of the user. Element ids, class
+// names and visibility keywords are single words; a sentence has a space
+// in it, and that is the whole distinction needed here.
+function handlerMessages(file, callOffset, label) {
+    const { masked, strings } = scan(fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8"));
+    const [from, to] = handlerSpan(masked, callOffset, label);
+    return strings
+        .filter((s) => s.offset >= from && s.offset < to)
+        .map((s) => s.value)
+        .filter((v) => v.includes(" "));
+}
+
+// The call sites are found, not listed: the file layout moves (the private
+// key export was in addressDetail.js when #172 was filed and is its own
+// view now), and a hardcoded list would quietly stop covering a screen it
+// no longer names.
+function callSites() {
+    const sites = [];
+    for (const file of jsFilesUnder(SRC)) {
+        if (file === path.join(SRC, "shared", "vault.js")) continue;
+        const { masked } = scan(fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8"));
+        const rel = path.relative(SRC, file).split(path.sep).join("/");
+        let n = 0;
+        let at = masked.indexOf("decryptWithPassword(");
+        while (at !== -1) {
+            n += 1;
+            sites.push({ file, rel, offset: at, label: `${rel} #${n}` });
+            at = masked.indexOf("decryptWithPassword(", at + 1);
+        }
+    }
+    return sites.sort((a, b) => a.label.localeCompare(b.label));
+}
+
+describe("password failure messages", () => {
+    const sites = callSites();
+    const files = [...new Set(sites.map((s) => s.file))].sort();
+
+    test("the call sites are found where they are expected", () => {
+        const counts = {};
+        for (const site of sites)
+            counts[site.rel] = (counts[site.rel] ?? 0) + 1;
+        expect(counts).toEqual({
+            "popup/views/approval.js": 2,
+            "popup/views/confirmTx.js": 1,
+            "popup/views/deleteWallet.js": 1,
+            "popup/views/exportPrivkey.js": 1,
+            "popup/views/showPhrase.js": 1,
+        });
+    });
+
+    test("the canonical message is a full sentence", () => {
+        expect(CANONICAL).toMatch(/^[A-Z][^]*\.$/);
+    });
+
+    // Exact equality, per call site: a message that is merely different
+    // rather than known-obsolete fails here too, which a scan for historic
+    // wordings cannot do.
+    test.each(sites.map((s) => [s.label, s]))(
+        "%s answers a rejected password with the canonical sentence",
+        (label, site) => {
+            expect(handlerMessages(site.file, site.offset, label)).toEqual([
+                CANONICAL,
+            ]);
+        },
+    );
+
+    test.each(files.map((f) => [path.relative(SRC, f), f]))(
+        "%s carries no superseded wording",
+        (_rel, file) => {
+            const source = fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8");
+            for (const old of SUPERSEDED) expect(source).not.toContain(old);
+        },
+    );
+});

tests/state.test.js

@@ -159,3 +159,113 @@ describe("hideSpoofedSymbols persistence", () => {
         expect(second.mod.state.hideSpoofedSymbols).toBe(true);
     });
 });
+
+// restoreView() refuses to reopen ONTO a non-restorable view, but the stack
+// behind it was restored verbatim, so Back could still walk onto a screen
+// whose content is deliberately never re-rendered — and "show-phrase" has no
+// Back control of its own to leave by. The stack is filtered on load, at the
+// first entry the popup would not render, and everything above it goes too:
+// those entries were reached THROUGH the dropped one.
+describe("restored viewStack is filtered against RESTORABLE_VIEWS", () => {
+    const NON_RESTORABLE = ["export-privkey", "show-phrase"];
+
+    function restoredStack(viewStack, currentView = "settings") {
+        return loadModuleWith({
+            wallets: oneWallet(),
+            currentView,
+            viewStack,
+        });
+    }
+
+    test("a non-restorable view at the top of the stack is dropped", async () => {
+        const { mod } = restoredStack(["main", "address", "export-privkey"]);
+        await mod.loadState();
+        expect(mod.state.viewStack).toEqual(["main", "address"]);
+    });
+
+    test("a non-restorable view in the middle truncates the stack there", async () => {
+        const { mod } = restoredStack(["main", "show-phrase", "address"]);
+        await mod.loadState();
+        expect(mod.state.viewStack).toEqual(["main"]);
+    });
+
+    // Truncating a stack rooted at a non-restorable view leaves nothing, and
+    // the restored view still needs somewhere for Back to go.
+    test("a non-restorable view at the bottom leaves main to go back to", async () => {
+        const { mod } = restoredStack(["export-privkey", "address", "receive"]);
+        await mod.loadState();
+        expect(mod.state.viewStack).toEqual(["main"]);
+    });
+
+    test("no restored stack retains a secret-bearing view", async () => {
+        for (const view of NON_RESTORABLE) {
+            const { mod } = restoredStack(["main", "address", view, "receive"]);
+            await mod.loadState();
+            expect(mod.state.viewStack).not.toContain(view);
+        }
+    });
+
+    // The rule is "views the popup will render", not a blocklist of the two
+    // secret screens: a name no longer in the set (or never a view at all)
+    // has to go the same way.
+    test("a name that is not a restorable view at all is dropped", async () => {
+        const { mod } = restoredStack(["main", "welcome", "address"]);
+        await mod.loadState();
+        expect(mod.state.viewStack).toEqual(["main"]);
+    });
+
+    // Restorable entries are kept verbatim. That they are then unhidden
+    // without being re-rendered is a separate defect, tracked in #268; this
+    // filter is only about views the popup declined to restore.
+    test("an ordinary restorable stack is restored unchanged", async () => {
+        const stack = ["main", "address", "address-token"];
+        const { mod } = restoredStack(stack);
+        await mod.loadState();
+        expect(mod.state.viewStack).toEqual(stack);
+    });
+
+    test("restoring onto main keeps the stack empty", async () => {
+        const { mod } = restoredStack(["show-phrase"], "main");
+        await mod.loadState();
+        expect(mod.state.viewStack).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    // main is not the only view that gets no ["main"] beneath it: restoreView()
+    // will not reopen onto a non-restorable view either, so nothing is left for
+    // Back to sit under and the stack stays empty.
+    test("restoring onto a view the popup will not reopen keeps the stack empty", async () => {
+        const { mod } = restoredStack(["export-privkey"], "show-phrase");
+        await mod.loadState();
+        expect(mod.state.viewStack).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    // Not an array means nothing survives, but the never-empty rule still
+    // applies: a corrupt stack must not leave a restored view with no Back
+    // target of its own.
+    test("a stack that is not an array still gets main beneath a restored view", async () => {
+        const { mod } = restoredStack("main");
+        await mod.loadState();
+        expect(mod.state.viewStack).toEqual(["main"]);
+    });
+
+    test("a stack that is not an array loads as empty under main", async () => {
+        const { mod } = restoredStack({ 0: "main" }, "main");
+        await mod.loadState();
+        expect(mod.state.viewStack).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    // Filtering belongs on load, not on save: the live in-session stack is
+    // legitimate — the user really is one Back away from a screen that is
+    // rendered right now — and only a load-side filter also cleans the
+    // stacks already sitting in storage.
+    test("saveState persists the live stack verbatim", async () => {
+        const { mod, set } = loadModuleWith(null);
+        mod.state.viewStack = ["main", "address", "export-privkey"];
+        await mod.saveState();
+        expect(set).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+            autistmask: expect.objectContaining({
+                viewStack: ["main", "address", "export-privkey"],
+            }),
+        });
+    });
+});

tests/symbolSpoof.test.js

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ global.chrome = {
 };
 
 const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("../src/shared/symbolSpoof");
-const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS } = require("../src/shared/tokenList");
+const { TOKENS, KNOWN_SYMBOLS } = require("../src/shared/tokenList");
 const { filterTransactions } = require("../src/shared/transactions");
 const {
     fetchTokenBalances,
@@ -124,6 +124,301 @@ describe("the shared rule", () => {
     });
 });
 
+// Issue #260: the symbol is whatever the ERC-20 contract returns, and HTML
+// collapses leading and trailing whitespace, so a token calling itself
+// `" ETH "` reaches the user's eye as `ETH` while missing a raw
+// KNOWN_SYMBOLS lookup.  Normalizing inside the shared rule fixes all three
+// surfaces at once, which is what consolidating the rule bought.
+//
+// Every character under test here is built from its code point rather than
+// pasted in: most of them are invisible, and an invisible character in a
+// test file is unreviewable.
+const cp = (...codes) => String.fromCodePoint(...codes);
+const NBSP = cp(0x00a0); // no-break space
+const FIGURE_SPACE = cp(0x2007);
+const IDEOGRAPHIC_SPACE = cp(0x3000);
+const ZWSP = cp(0x200b); // zero-width space
+const BOM = cp(0xfeff); // zero-width no-break space
+const WORD_JOINER = cp(0x2060);
+const SOFT_HYPHEN = cp(0x00ad);
+const LRM = cp(0x200e); // left-to-right mark
+const RLO = cp(0x202e); // right-to-left override
+const HANGUL_FILLER = cp(0x3164);
+const CHOSEONG_FILLER = cp(0x115f);
+const VS16 = cp(0xfe0f); // variation selector-16
+const VS1 = cp(0xfe00); // variation selector-1
+const NEL = cp(0x0085); // next line, a C1 control
+const DEL = cp(0x007f);
+const FULLWIDTH_ETH = cp(0xff25, 0xff34, 0xff28);
+const FULLWIDTH_USDC = cp(0xff55, 0xff53, 0xff44, 0xff43); // lowercase
+const CYRILLIC_CAPITAL_IE = cp(0x0415);
+
+describe("the shared rule: symbols that render as a known symbol", () => {
+    test("ASCII padding does not buy a pass", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(" ETH ", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("\tETH\n", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("  usdc  ", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("non-breaking and other Unicode spaces do not either", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(NBSP + "ETH" + NBSP, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(
+            true,
+        );
+        expect(
+            isSpoofedSymbol(
+                FIGURE_SPACE + "ETH" + IDEOGRAPHIC_SPACE,
+                FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT,
+            ),
+        ).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    // These render as nothing at all, in any position, so they are removed
+    // wherever they sit rather than only at the ends.
+    test("zero-width characters are stripped wherever they sit", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("E" + ZWSP + "TH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(
+            true,
+        );
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(BOM + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
+        expect(
+            isSpoofedSymbol("ET" + WORD_JOINER + "H", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT),
+        ).toBe(true);
+        expect(
+            isSpoofedSymbol("E" + SOFT_HYPHEN + "TH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT),
+        ).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    // An LRM is invisible and, in all-Latin text, moves nothing: dropping it
+    // leaves exactly the string the user saw.
+    test("an invisible bidi mark does not hide a known symbol", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(LRM + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    // Invisibility is not confined to \p{Cf}.  A Hangul filler is Lo and a
+    // variation selector is Mn, yet each of these four measures 32.00px in
+    // the repo's pinned e2e Chromium at 16px sans-serif — exactly the width
+    // of a plain `ETH` — so each reaches the user's eye as `ETH`.  They are
+    // caught by \p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}, not by \p{Cf}.
+    test("invisible non-format characters are stripped too", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(HANGUL_FILLER + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(
+            true,
+        );
+        expect(
+            isSpoofedSymbol(CHOSEONG_FILLER + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT),
+        ).toBe(true);
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("ETH" + VS16, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("E" + VS1 + "TH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    // Nor is it confined to the Unicode classes.  U+007F is a control (Cc)
+    // and is not default-ignorable, so neither class reaches it, but it
+    // measures 32.00px in the same browser — it paints nothing, so a
+    // symbol carrying it reaches the eye as `ETH`.  It is named on its own
+    // in the strip for exactly that reason.
+    test("U+007F paints nothing and is stripped", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(DEL + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    // The other side of the boundary, which is not the class boundary but
+    // the visibility one: the remaining C0 and C1 controls render as a
+    // visible 48.00px box in the same browser, so a symbol carrying one
+    // does not look like `ETH` and must not be judged a spoof.  Widening
+    // the strip to \p{Cc} — the obvious over-correction once U+007F is in
+    // it — fails this test.
+    test("visible control characters do not make a symbol a spoof", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(NEL + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(cp(0x0001) + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(
+            false,
+        );
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(cp(0x0090) + "ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(
+            false,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("compatibility forms fold onto the symbol they imitate", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(FULLWIDTH_ETH, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(FULLWIDTH_USDC, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    // The two knowingly open classes, asserted here so that the boundary is
+    // a fact in the suite and not a claim in a PR body.  A Cyrillic capital
+    // Ie is a distinct letter rather than a compatibility variant, so NFKC
+    // leaves it alone; and a right-to-left override reverses the rendering
+    // of what follows it, which dropping the control character does not
+    // undo.  Closing either needs a confusables table or a bidi resolver,
+    // and both are a separate change from this one.
+    test("a Cyrillic homoglyph is knowingly still not caught", () => {
+        expect(
+            isSpoofedSymbol(CYRILLIC_CAPITAL_IE + "TH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT),
+        ).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("a bidi-reordered symbol is knowingly still not caught", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(RLO + "HTE", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    // Normalization does not reach the native-asset exemption, which turns
+    // on the absence of a contract address and never on the symbol.
+    test("a padded symbol with no contract is still not a spoof", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(" ETH ", null)).toBe(false);
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(NBSP + "ETH", "")).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("a genuine contract still bears its own padded symbol", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(" USDC ", USDC_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol(ZWSP + "WETH", WETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    // Normalization must not invent a match.  Interior ASCII whitespace is
+    // left alone: `E T H` renders as `E T H`, not as `ETH`, so folding it
+    // would filter a token no user could confuse with the native asset.
+    test("a symbol that renders differently is not judged a spoof", () => {
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("E T H", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("ETH2", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
+        expect(isSpoofedSymbol("MY ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    // The false-positive question, answered against the shipped data rather
+    // than by assertion: no bundled symbol carries whitespace or a
+    // non-ASCII character, so the normalization cannot newly filter one.
+    // The character class starts at `!` rather than at the space so that it
+    // asserts the claim it stands for — `[ -~]` would admit an interior
+    // space and let a whitespace-bearing entry through the guard.
+    test("no bundled symbol is touched by the normalization", () => {
+        for (const [symbol, addresses] of KNOWN_SYMBOLS) {
+            expect(symbol).toBe(symbol.trim());
+            expect(symbol).toMatch(/^[!-~]+$/);
+            if (addresses === null) continue;
+            for (const address of addresses) {
+                expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, address)).toBe(false);
+            }
+        }
+    });
+});
+
+// Issue #276: the guard that was missing.  The suite walked KNOWN_SYMBOLS,
+// which is built from TOKENS, so it could only ever assert that the table
+// agrees with itself.  Seven symbols appear twice in the bundled list at two
+// different real contracts, and the table kept whichever came first, so the
+// other seven contracts — tokens in our own shipped list, at their own
+// addresses — were judged spoofs and hidden from the balance list, the
+// history and the send selector.  That is the over-filtering direction: it
+// hides a holding the user cannot then spend.
+//
+// This walk is over TOKENS, the data the wallet actually ships, so it fails
+// whenever a bundled token would be filtered at its own address no matter
+// which side of the table the mistake is on.
+describe("the shipped token list", () => {
+    test("no bundled token is filtered at its own address", () => {
+        const filtered = TOKENS.filter((t) =>
+            isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address),
+        ).map((t) => t.symbol + " @ " + t.address);
+        expect(filtered).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    // The third failure mode the issue asks about: a symbol whose table entry
+    // names an address that is in neither the table nor the list would be a
+    // contract we vouch for and do not ship.  There is none, and the table is
+    // built from the list, so this asserts the derivation has not acquired a
+    // hand-written entry.
+    test("every address the table vouches for is a bundled token", () => {
+        const bundled = new Set(TOKENS.map((t) => t.address.toLowerCase()));
+        for (const [symbol, addresses] of KNOWN_SYMBOLS) {
+            if (addresses === null) continue;
+            expect(addresses.size).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+            for (const address of addresses) {
+                expect(address).toBe(address.toLowerCase());
+                expect(bundled.has(address)).toBe(true);
+                // And it is the token that actually reports that symbol.
+                const token = TOKENS.find(
+                    (t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === address,
+                );
+                expect(token.symbol.toUpperCase()).toBe(symbol);
+            }
+        }
+    });
+
+    // Both contracts behind a shared ticker must pass, from either side: a
+    // rule that admits only the one the table happens to visit first is the
+    // bug, not the fix.
+    test("both contracts behind a shared ticker are admitted", () => {
+        const bySymbol = new Map();
+        for (const t of TOKENS) {
+            const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
+            if (!bySymbol.has(upper)) bySymbol.set(upper, []);
+            bySymbol.get(upper).push(t);
+        }
+        const shared = [...bySymbol].filter(([, list]) => list.length > 1);
+        // The shared tickers are a fact about the shipped data; if a future
+        // list has none, this test would silently assert nothing.
+        expect(shared.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+        for (const [, list] of shared) {
+            for (const t of list) {
+                expect(isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address)).toBe(false);
+            }
+        }
+    });
+
+    // The seven from issue #276, named so that the reconciliation is a fact
+    // in the suite: each is two real contracts from the same source fetch,
+    // and the table now holds both rather than the one that came first.
+    test("the seven shared tickers each name both bundled contracts", () => {
+        const expected = {
+            TON: [
+                "0x582d872a1b094fc48f5de31d3b73f2d9be47def1", // Toncoin
+                "0x2be5e8c109e2197d077d13a82daead6a9b3433c5", // Tokamak Network
+            ],
+            FRAX: [
+                "0x853d955acef822db058eb8505911ed77f175b99e", // Legacy Frax Dollar
+                "0x3432b6a60d23ca0dfca7761b7ab56459d9c964d0", // Frax (prev. FXS)
+            ],
+            REUSD: [
+                "0x5086bf358635b81d8c47c66d1c8b9e567db70c72", // Re Protocol reUSD
+                "0x57ab1e0003f623289cd798b1824be09a793e4bec", // Resupply USD
+            ],
+            EURE: [
+                "0x39b8b6385416f4ca36a20319f70d28621895279d", // Monerium EUR emoney
+                "0x3231cb76718cdef2155fc47b5286d82e6eda273f", // Monerium EUR emoney [OLD]
+            ],
+            MSUSD: [
+                "0x4ba01f22827018b4772cd326c7627fb4956a7c00", // Main Street USD
+                "0xab5eb14c09d416f0ac63661e57edb7aecdb9befa", // Metronome Synth USD
+            ],
+            MUSD: [
+                "0xaca92e438df0b2401ff60da7e4337b687a2435da", // MetaMask USD
+                "0xdd468a1ddc392dcdbef6db6e34e89aa338f9f186", // Mezo USD
+            ],
+            JPYC: [
+                "0x431d5dff03120afa4bdf332c61a6e1766ef37bdb", // JPY Coin
+                "0x2370f9d504c7a6e775bf6e14b3f12846b594cd53", // JPY Coin v1
+            ],
+        };
+        for (const [symbol, addresses] of Object.entries(expected)) {
+            expect([...KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(symbol)].sort()).toEqual(
+                [...addresses].sort(),
+            );
+            for (const address of addresses) {
+                expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, address)).toBe(false);
+            }
+        }
+    });
+
+    // The other direction, on the same symbols: widening the table to hold
+    // every bundled address for a ticker must not turn it into a pass for
+    // any other contract.
+    test("a shared ticker from a third contract is still a spoof", () => {
+        const bySymbol = new Map();
+        for (const t of TOKENS) {
+            const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
+            if (!bySymbol.has(upper)) bySymbol.set(upper, []);
+            bySymbol.get(upper).push(t);
+        }
+        for (const [symbol, list] of bySymbol) {
+            if (list.length < 2) continue;
+            expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
+        }
+    });
+});
+
 describe("surface 1: the transaction history", () => {
     function fakeEthTransfer() {
         return {
@@ -147,6 +442,22 @@ describe("surface 1: the transaction history", () => {
         expect(result.transactions).toEqual([]);
     });
 
+    // Issue #260 on this surface: the same transfer with a padded symbol.
+    test("a padded fake ETH token transfer is filtered too", () => {
+        const padded = { ...fakeEthTransfer(), symbol: " ETH " };
+        const result = filterTransactions([padded], {
+            hideSpoofedSymbols: true,
+            hideFraudContracts: true,
+            hideLowHolderTokens: true,
+            hideDustTransactions: true,
+            dustThresholdGwei: 100000,
+        });
+        expect(result.transactions).toEqual([]);
+        // The contract is learned as fraudulent, exactly as for the
+        // unpadded symbol: the padding must not cost the blocklist entry.
+        expect(result.newFraudContracts).toEqual([FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT]);
+    });
+
     test("a real native ETH transfer survives", () => {
         const native = {
             hash: "0x" + "2".repeat(64),
@@ -201,6 +512,36 @@ describe("surface 2: the Send token selector", () => {
         expect(select.children).toEqual([]);
     });
 
+    // Issue #260 on this surface: the option text is rendered into HTML,
+    // which collapses the padding, so an unfiltered padded token would sit
+    // in the selector reading exactly `ETH`.
+    test("a padded fake ETH token is not selectable either", () => {
+        render([
+            {
+                address: FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT,
+                symbol: " ETH ",
+                decimals: 18,
+                balance: "0.005",
+                holders: 900000,
+            },
+        ]);
+        expect(select.children).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("a genuine token with a padded symbol stays selectable", () => {
+        render([
+            {
+                address: USDC_CONTRACT,
+                symbol: " USDC ",
+                decimals: 6,
+                balance: "12.5",
+                holders: 900000,
+            },
+        ]);
+        expect(select.children).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(select.children[0].value).toBe(USDC_CONTRACT);
+    });
+
     test("native ETH remains the always-present option", () => {
         render([]);
         expect(select.innerHTML).toBe('<option value="ETH">ETH</option>');
@@ -251,6 +592,35 @@ describe("surface 3: the balance list", () => {
         expect(balances).toEqual([]);
     });
 
+    // Issue #260 on this surface: the balance list is where the user forms
+    // their belief about what they own, and it renders the symbol into HTML.
+    test("a padded fake ETH token is filtered too", async () => {
+        respondWith([fakeEthItem({ symbol: " ETH " })]);
+        expect(await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [])).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("a fake ETH token padded with a no-break space is filtered", async () => {
+        respondWith([fakeEthItem({ symbol: NBSP + "ETH" + NBSP })]);
+        expect(await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [])).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    // The false-positive direction on the surface that matters most: a real
+    // holding whose symbol happens to carry padding is still listed, and the
+    // list still shows the symbol the token actually reports.
+    test("a genuine token with a padded symbol is not newly filtered", async () => {
+        respondWith([
+            fakeEthItem({
+                address_hash: USDC_CONTRACT,
+                symbol: " USDC ",
+                name: "USD Coin",
+                decimals: "6",
+            }),
+        ]);
+        const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, []);
+        expect(balances).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(balances[0].symbol).toBe(" USDC ");
+    });
+
     test("a genuine token keeps its place in the list", async () => {
         respondWith([
             fakeEthItem({
@@ -274,6 +644,33 @@ describe("surface 3: the balance list", () => {
         expect(await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [])).toEqual([]);
     });
 
+    // The adjacent finding from the same review as issue #260: the type gate
+    // compared exactly, so an explorer that ever varied the casing would
+    // silently drop a real holding before any filter ran.  The comparison is
+    // now case-insensitive, which changes nothing about which types are
+    // admitted.
+    test("a differently-cased ERC-20 type still lists a real holding", async () => {
+        respondWith([
+            fakeEthItem({
+                type: "erc-20",
+                address_hash: USDC_CONTRACT,
+                symbol: "USDC",
+                name: "USD Coin",
+                decimals: "6",
+            }),
+        ]);
+        const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, []);
+        expect(balances).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(balances[0].symbol).toBe("USDC");
+    });
+
+    test("case insensitivity does not admit another token type", async () => {
+        respondWith([fakeEthItem({ type: "erc-721" })]);
+        expect(await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [])).toEqual([]);
+        respondWith([fakeEthItem({ type: "ERC-20-EXTRA" })]);
+        expect(await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [])).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
     // The money test: the user holds real ETH and has been airdropped a fake
     // ETH ERC-20.  The fake is gone from the list of tokens; the real balance
     // is exactly what the node reported.

tests/transactions.test.js

@@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ describe("token list assumptions the fixtures rely on", () => {
     });
 
     test("USDC and WETH map to their genuine lowercased contracts", () => {
-        expect(KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("USDC")).toBe(USDC_CONTRACT);
-        expect(KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("WETH")).toBe(WETH_CONTRACT);
+        expect([...KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("USDC")]).toEqual([USDC_CONTRACT]);
+        expect([...KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("WETH")]).toEqual([WETH_CONTRACT]);
     });
 
     test("the spam fixture symbol is not in the known token list", () => {