The blocklist URL in shipped code named a competitor and pointed at a moving
ref, and the extension re-fetched from it every 24 hours, which also meant a
third party decided what this wallet warns about. All of that is gone.
script/vendor-blocklist fetches upstream at a pinned commit, verifies the
sha256 of the bytes that commit serves, and writes
src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json. It is build-time tooling, never shipped, and
the one place in the repo that names the upstream project; a source reference
nobody can verify is not a source reference.
The artifact stores truncated sha256 digests rather than domain names. That is
what censors it: the previous file contained the competitor's name 6,475 times,
as phishing domains impersonating them, and not one of those domains is
dropped. It also makes lookups a binary search over a fixed-width string, so
nothing is built at module load — which matters on MV3, where the worker
re-evaluates the module on every wake — and takes the file from 8.7 MB to
1.7 MB.
script/check-censored enforces the rest: it reads the name out of the vendoring
script rather than repeating it, and fails on any occurrence in the working
tree or under dist/ that is not one of the three literals shipped code cannot
avoid — two provider-shim identifiers in src/content/inpage.js and one ERC-20's
on-chain name in src/shared/tokenList.js. Each is permitted only at the path
that carries it, and at the emitted paths that path is bundled into, so a
literal appearing anywhere else fails like any other occurrence. It runs in
make check, which inspects dist/ when there is one and says loudly when there
is not, and again with --require-dist at the end of every make build.
Removing the runtime fetch retires the delta, the extension-storage persistence
and the 24-hour alarm from #158. A retired alarm is now cleared rather than
left waking the worker forever on installs that already have it.
The e2e suite drives the warning end to end from a real blocklisted origin
served as a real http(s) site, with a control asserting the banner stays hidden
for one that is not listed. Its service-worker interception canary needed a new
anchor, since the startup fetch it used to watch for no longer happens: it now
wakes the worker with a message and asks it for one throwaway fetch.
LICENSE no longer cites a repository that returns 404.
eslint.config.js gains one block: script/lib/ holds node programs the shell
entrypoints call, and without it they lint with no globals at all.
ConfirmTx -- the screen that decides what gets signed -- had no automated
coverage of its own behaviour. The arithmetic underneath was well tested; the
wiring was not, so a mutant making the spend gate read the displayed fee
estimate instead of the reserve would have reintroduced the #154 overspend with
the suite still green.
Nine end-to-end tests now drive it for both the native and ERC-20 paths,
covering the pending, funded, over-balance and estimate-failed states, and
asserting that the gate reads the reserve rather than the estimate. Swapping the
two makes the suite fail. The view height is asserted constant across every
state transition rather than merely printed.
Reaching the screen needs a funded balance and a gas estimate, so the route
interception gains fixtures for both. Testing the estimate-failed state means
provoking the console error the code is supposed to emit, which the harness
otherwise fails a run on; an expectation mechanism consumes exactly one matching
record, is scoped to the declaring test, and fails that test if nothing matched,
so it cannot mask an unrelated error.
Runs the real popup in a pinned containerized Chrome and fails on any uncaught
page error or console.error. Also fixes the two defects it caught: the missing
showView import in addToken.js and the missing addressDotHtml import in
transactionDetail.js.
closes#150closes#151
