5 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
sneak	dfd197b93b	harden: bound the total network fee by gasLimit × fee, on both send paths (closes #399) ... The two per-field ceilings in approvalVerify.js were checked independently, but the fee a validator is paid is gasLimit × fee per gas: a gas limit and a fee each under their own ceiling still multiply to thousands of ETH, which a gas-consuming contract really collects. assertWithinCeilings now also bounds that product against MAX_TOTAL_FEE (1 ETH), so both callers — populating the dApp transaction and verifying the signed artifact — refuse it with a full sentence naming the fee and the limit. The wallet's own send in confirmTx.js pinned no fee fields, so ethers filled them from the node with no bound; it now populates the transaction and runs the same check before signing, showing the same error in the confirmation screen's reserved errors box so nothing on screen moves. Model: opus-4-8	2026-09-21 19:11:40 +00:00
clawbot	c06765ef8f	fix: one transaction approval at a time, and honest copy for a nonce collision (closes #271)	2026-08-17 08:38:26 +02:00
clawbot	918e581ef3	harden: verify the signed transaction against what the popup displayed (closes #216) ... Verification compared the signed artifact against the dApp's request object. For every field the dApp omitted -- normally nonce, gas limit and all the fee fields, since the popup filled them in -- the number the user actually read on screen was verified by nothing, and only absolute ceilings stood behind it. The transaction is now populated in the background before the approval window opens, and that populated object is both what the popup displays and what the signed artifact is verified against. Every consequential field becomes an equality comparison; the ceilings remain as a backstop. Population failing means no approval and no window, and the error goes to the requesting page -- earlier than before, where the same estimate failed after the password had been typed. The account is pinned too: `from` is compared against the address named at approval time rather than whichever address is active at signing, so switching accounts mid-flow refuses instead of signing from an account the approval did not name. The message-signing path had the same defect and gets the same fix. Nonce selection moves earlier as a consequence; the concurrent-approval case that follows from it is tracked at #271.	2026-08-12 12:15:25 +02:00
clawbot	0a1786b406	harden: verify all approval fields and make failed signing retryable (closes #174) ... approvalVerify now compares every field of the signed artifact against the approval, not a subset. Transaction types are allowlisted to 0/1/2 and any field the module does not check is refused outright, so a future transaction type cannot smuggle consequential fields past verification -- an EIP-7702 type-4 artifact that delegates the signer's own EOA while matching every displayed field was accepted before this change. The serialized bytes handed to broadcastTransaction are compared against the parsed artifact, so the guarantee covers the bytes that actually go to the node. Signing failures in the popup are retryable again. To make that safe, an approval is claimed synchronously before the first await and every path that resolves or removes one goes through a single chokepoint that refuses a claimed approval. Without it, closing the approval window, switching the active address or a late reject would report "User rejected the request." to the dApp while the broadcast completed -- the user then redoes the transfer at a fresh nonce and it sends twice. Failure copy distinguishes the stage reached, so a user is never told to start again from the site when the first attempt may already have reached the network.	2026-08-12 11:21:02 +02:00
clawbot	ad9162d057	security: decrypt and sign dApp approvals in the popup (closes #157) ... The password no longer crosses the extension messaging boundary: the popup decrypts and signs, and sends only the raw signed transaction or the signature. The background re-derives the signer from the artifact and checks it against the approval it holds before broadcasting, so it is not a blind relay.	2026-08-10 15:59:30 +02:00