The stored ETH and token balances and the send-confirm screen's fee were each
cut to six decimal places, and a token holding cut to zero was dropped, so a
value below 0.000001 read as zero. Balances are now stored exactly, whatever
decimals a token declares, and every nonzero token holding is kept; the balance
check reads a token balance to its first 18 places. The balance lists, the
send-screen token selector, the address total and the remove-address warning
leave out a holding below 0.000001 themselves, through isBelowOneMillionth().
The send and send-confirm screens' balances, reserve and insufficient-balance
messages go through truncateAmountNeverZero(). The send-confirm and approval
screens both render the fee through formatFee(), which prices the exact fee in
USD.
Model: opus-5-5
parseInt(decimals || "18") ran before writing stored tokenBalances[].decimals, so an explorer reporting no decimals produced a fabricated 18 indistinguishable from a real one at read time. That defeated the resolve-or-refuse guarantees of #306 and #340: their refusal paths were intact but never fired, because the guess was laundered upstream of them.
An absent scale is now stored as unknown, and a holding whose scale nothing knows carries a null balance -- unknown, never zero -- with six reader sites saying so rather than printing 0.0000. The Send screen resolves the display scale rather than reading the stored one, so a bundled token whose explorer row omits decimals still sends; when the scale cannot be resolved the stored quantity is withdrawn too, so the user is told the balance is unknown rather than only that the fee failed.
Existing fabricated 18s cannot be told apart retroactively and are replaced wholesale on the next balance refresh. An explorer-sourced scale stays trusted -- only fabrication is removed; the reasoning is recorded on the issue.
clawbot