A page with an opaque origin, such as one its server sandboxes with a
Content-Security-Policy, is reported to the background with the origin
"null", and Chrome reports a local file as "file://". The background took
either as a site, so every such page was one site: a connection remembered
for one covered them all, and the phishing check never matched. The
background now parses the reported origin and, when it has no host, refuses
the request with 4100 like one with no origin, before any method runs.
tests/rpcOrigin.test.js sends both, and README's SiteApproval says what is
refused.
Model: opus-5-5
allowedSites and deniedSites held the bare hostname, so a grant to
https://dapp.example also authorised http://dapp.example and every port
on that host, and the connection, transaction and signature prompts
named only the hostname. Both lists now store and match the full origin
(scheme://host[:port]), the key the connections approved without
Remember already used. The prompts, the Settings site lists and
AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE use the origin too. Entries saved by hostname
are not migrated (pre-1.0): they match no site.
Model: opus-5-5
Where the browser gives no sender.origin (Firefox before 126), the
background credited a page's request to the tab's page, so a frame from
another site counted as the site embedding it, and with no tab it used
an origin the page wrote into the message. It now uses the origin of
sender.url, the frame that sent the message, and refuses the request
with code 4100 when the browser gives neither. The content script no
longer writes an origin into the message.
Model: opus-5-5