78a5573d860a74dd3d0f7e94f7d33130f4d2a32c
2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 78a5573d86 |
fix: floor the persisted fields a restore dereferences, and make each field's floor an executable claim (closes #362)
A persisted container was checked while its ENTRIES were dereferenced
unchecked. A stored `{"0x…": "notalist"}` in allowedSites passes the state
gate, renders a working popup, and then throws inside saveState()'s per-
hostname merge, so every save from that moment on fails while the UI looks
entirely healthy. deniedSites has the identical shape; fraudContracts is the
same class with a milder consequence.
The sweep for that class found four more:
- selectedToken, dereferenced as text behind a truthiness-only restore gate.
- rpcUrl, handed whole to `new JsonRpcProvider()` by getProvider(), which
throws SYNCHRONOUSLY for a non-string — from txStatus.js and addWallet.js,
neither inside a try, and the first reachable from a stored
`currentView: "wait-tx"` through the unguarded restoreView().
- The ENTRIES of viewData. Four restore branches gate on one truthy field and
hand the rest to a renderer that calls address.toLowerCase(): a stored
`{"currentView":"success-tx","viewData":{"hash":"0x1"}}` throws out of
restoreView(), skipping the rest of popup init.
- selectedWallet / selectedAddress. `wallets` is a real Array, so a stored
"map", "length", "constructor" or "__proto__" is TRUTHY: hasValidAddress()'s
`&&` does not short-circuit and `.addresses[…]` throws. A stale INTEGER index
is the safe case.
Floors, in src/shared/persistedState.js: allowedSites/deniedSites through
siteMap(), fraudContracts and each hostname list through textList(),
selectedToken and activeAddress as text-or-null, rpcUrl and blockscoutUrl as
non-empty text, selectedWallet and selectedAddress as a non-negative integer
or null, and each networkEndpoints pair's two URL fields — which
applyChainSwitchFields() assigns straight onto s.rpcUrl on the next switch.
Guards, in src/popup/viewRouter.js: the four restore branches that gate on one
truthy field now check the entries their renderer dereferences, as
txStatus.restoreWait() has always done for wait-tx. "confirm-tx" joins
ADDRESS_VIEWS, because its Sign button dereferences
state.wallets[state.selectedWallet] behind no guard of its own.
A stored own "__proto__" key is dropped by siteMap(): it can never be a wallet
address, so it grants nothing, and keeping it only keeps a value the next save
would hand to the prototype setter. networkEndpoints keeps unknown keys by
design, so mergeMapByKey() in src/shared/state.js now writes with
defineProperty as well — the guard in the floor was being undone one layer
downstream.
A save that fails is also told, not merely repaired: onSaveFailure() reports
every failed save, awaited or not (the save queue's own rejection handler is
what made a failure vanish), and the popup raises a persistent "NOT SAVED"
banner naming the reason. doRefreshAndRender() no longer rejects, since every
one of its call sites fires it and walks away.
The per-field justification in the header of src/shared/stateSchema.js is
replaced by tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js. That comment shipped a false
claim in three consecutive changes; the artifact was the problem. The test is
one row per persisted field, declaring the property that field's floor is
claimed to have and PROVING it by driving the real code with hostile values —
the gate for a field the gate refuses, normalizePersisted() for a field it
floors, the real JsonRpcProvider constructor for rpcUrl, and a boot of the real
popup entry point for every field whose only defence is that nothing
dereferences it structurally. A field added to PERSISTED_FIELDS with no row
fails the suite; so does a row whose claim is false. The header and the README
mirror now point at it instead of restating it.
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| bd0a626e7b |
harden: stop the background reading the shared state singleton, and enforce it at build time (closes #324)
Five defects, one of which destroyed every wallet, came from src/background reading and writing the module-level state singleton the MV3 worker never populates, which silently served DEFAULT_STATE. Each point fix created the next defect. The background now has its own per-call getState() and a queued read-modify-write updateState(); the singleton is unreachable from it, and an unpopulated read throws instead of serving defaults. The prohibition is enforced by the build, not by review: build.js asserts over esbuild's own metafile that no forbidden module is an input of a background bundle, so every specifier syntax esbuild resolves is covered, and both halves of the table are checked for rot -- a stale key, a stale module, an empty list, or an unlisted entry point under src/background/ all fail the build. The ESLint rule remains as fast local feedback and reads the same shared table. Known bounds are documented where the table lives. Also closes #320: getProvider() now requires a validated network id, so a cold worker no longer prepares a non-mainnet dApp transaction for mainnet and gets refused by the wallet's own verifier. backgroundRefresh() no longer mutates address objects across a network round trip, the broadcast path takes its endpoint and chain id from one snapshot, and eight test storage stubs now structured-clone on get as the real chrome.storage.local does. closes #320 |
