A hostile ERC-20's symbol() reached an innerHTML string unescaped, and neither
manifest declared default-src, so an attacker deploying a token with 1,000+
holders and airdropping one unit could render a full-viewport cross-origin
iframe over the wallet's own UI, on screens where the user types their
password.
escapeHtml is now a pure string replace over & < > " ' — the old version
round-tripped through textContent, which escapes neither quote, while already
being used inside data-copy="...". All 19 files in src/popup/views/ were
audited: beyond the reported symbol site, the explorer-supplied directionLabel
in all three transaction lists, wallet.name, addr.ensName, the blockie data:
URIs and two ad-hoc quote-only escapes were also unescaped. Explorer URLs now
go through one helper that percent-encodes the path segment.
Both manifests add default-src 'self', frame-src 'none', form-action 'none' and
base-uri 'none'. Three loosenings are pinned in tests/manifest.test.js and
justified in README.md: style-src 'unsafe-inline' (39 static style attributes;
Firefox implements neither style-src-attr nor 'unsafe-hashes'), img-src data:
(blockies), connect-src https: http: (user-configurable RPC).
Note frame-src 'none' blocks a frame loading, not the element existing, so the
zero-iframe assertion is a claim about the escaping alone; the test asserts the
element count and the literal rendered text separately, taking the count before
any click an overlay could intercept.
Verified: make check 39 suites / 811 tests, test-e2e 55/55 including the
WebAssembly-under-CSP assertion, test-e2e-firefox 8/8, zero CSP violations
asserted rather than merely unobserved. Reverting only balanceLine's
interpolation reproduces the attack as 2 iframes on the address screen.
wallet_switchEthereumChain was answered for any origin at all, with no
connection check and no prompt, so any page could move the active chain and
clear the [TESTNET] banner under a user who believed they were on Sepolia. It
now takes the same allowedSites check the signing methods take and returns 4100
for an unconnected origin.
The handler also awaits loadState() before it reads or moves the network. The
MV3 worker populates nothing at module scope, so a worker revived by the page's
own message held DEFAULT_STATE: the same-chain check compared against the wrong
network, and the save wrote empty wallets, empty allowedSites and default
endpoints over the user's stored profile, destroying every wallet in the
extension. Also fixes#316.
Endpoints are now remembered per network in a persisted networkEndpoints map,
so a user running a local or private node no longer loses that url permanently
to a public endpoint on every switch. A stored map must be an actual object; a
primitive previously survived the load and made every switch fall back to the
public default with no self-healing.
Verified failing first: dropping only the added loadState() fails exactly the
two cold-worker cases; reverting only the type guard fails exactly the string
and number cases. Reverting both source files to next gives 12 failed / 751
passed.
The send screen was built from the indexer's decimals while the transfer was
encoded from the contract's decimals() read at signing time, with nothing
comparing them. A token whose scales disagree moved 10^12 times the approved
amount.
The displayed scale is now carried on pendingTx from the same tokenBalances
entry the amount, balance and symbol were rendered from, and both encode sites
use it. transferAmount.js refuses rather than falling back when the two scales
disagree or either is unusable.
Adds the first end-to-end coverage of the popup's own Send -> ConfirmTx ->
Sign & Send path; #btn-confirm-send had never been clicked by any test.
Covers the four DoD items #188 scoped: the AddToken quick-pick populating the address field, Back out of AddToken unwinding the persisted navigation stack exactly once, a native ETH transfer rendering in TransactionDetail with no token contract row, and tap-to-copy reading the real clipboard back.
The native path needed a fixture: the Blockscout normal-transactions endpoint answered [] unconditionally, so there was no non-ERC-20 row to open.
Each assertion demonstrated to discriminate by mutation, one break at a time with the pre-existing tests staying green: a double viewStack push, a no-op quick-pick handler, an un-hidden token contract row, the ERC-20 branch forced onto a native transaction, and a dropped clipboard write each turn exactly the corresponding test red and no other.
Four further DoD items from #150 and #151 remain outside this scope and are tracked in #295.
The provider rebuilt every rejection as a bare Error carrying only a message,
so a dApp checking err.code === 4001 saw undefined and could not tell a user's
deliberate refusal from a failure. Well-behaved sites therefore showed an error
or retried instead of accepting the refusal. The code was produced correctly
and did cross the extension boundary; it was lost in the last hop.
Rejections now reach the page as a ProviderRpcError carrying code, and data
where present. The code is passed through verbatim rather than matched against
a whitelist, so a code added upstream later needs no change here. An error that
genuinely has no code stays a plain Error with no code property at all, rather
than advertising code: undefined -- 'code' in err is what a careful dApp asks.
Messages are unchanged for every path, verified byte-for-byte against the
previous provider across every background error shape.
The end-to-end assertion that printed the observed code now requires it.
The dApp signing path was the largest unverified surface in the milestone: the
only place where the content script, the inpage provider, the background worker
and the popup all have to work together, with unit tests covering each side in
isolation and none covering the seam.
A page served by the harness speaks EIP-1193 to the real provider -- asserted by
EIP-6963 object identity, not by shape -- and eth_requestAccounts, personal_sign,
eth_signTypedData_v4 and eth_sendTransaction are each driven through to approval
and to rejection.
Every signature is recovered and compared to the approved address; the broadcast
transaction is parsed from the bytes captured at eth_sendRawTransaction and
checked for signer, recipient, value, calldata and chain. A signature that
merely came back would pass against a wrong key, a wrong message or a wrong
chain, so each assertion was demonstrated failing against a variant that is
wrong in exactly one of those ways.
The password is asserted absent from every message crossing the extension
boundary, which gives #157's fix a permanent floor rather than a one-time
review.
Two defects this surfaced are tracked separately: EIP-1193 error codes never
reach the page (#274), and approving a site connection races the popup teardown
(#275). Neither is asserted as correct here. A real dApp with real funds against
mainnet remains an uncovered human pass and is documented as such.
ConfirmTx -- the screen that decides what gets signed -- had no automated
coverage of its own behaviour. The arithmetic underneath was well tested; the
wiring was not, so a mutant making the spend gate read the displayed fee
estimate instead of the reserve would have reintroduced the #154 overspend with
the suite still green.
Nine end-to-end tests now drive it for both the native and ERC-20 paths,
covering the pending, funded, over-balance and estimate-failed states, and
asserting that the gate reads the reserve rather than the estimate. Swapping the
two makes the suite fail. The view height is asserted constant across every
state transition rather than merely printed.
Reaching the screen needs a funded balance and a gas estimate, so the route
interception gains fixtures for both. Testing the estimate-failed state means
provoking the console error the code is supposed to emit, which the harness
otherwise fails a run on; an expectation mechanism consumes exactly one matching
record, is scoped to the declaring test, and fails that test if nothing matched,
so it cannot mask an unrelated error.
The dust-threshold field was the only validated input in Settings that rejected
without saying anything: the value silently changed back to the stored one with
no explanation. It now flashes "Please enter a whole number of gwei, zero or
greater." alongside the existing resync, matching the idiom the RPC URL field
already uses.
The parse moves to its own module and accepts plain decimal digits only, zero
or greater. Hex and exponent notation are refused rather than accepted: Number()
reads "0x10" as 16 and "1e3" as 1000, neither of which the previous parseInt
produced, and storing a number the user did not type is the same silent
substitution this change exists to remove.
The message must fit one line of the reserved flash area -- a wrapped message
pushes the settings view down, which the No Layout Shift policy forbids. That is
pinned by an end-to-end test measuring the rendered line height and the position
of the elements below it, in a single round trip because the flash clears after
two seconds.
Address rows on Home gain an [x] control, on wallets that derive addresses from
an extended key and hold more than one, opening a DeleteAddress confirmation
screen.
Removal cannot destroy anything: the key material stays. Derivation indices are
not renumbered, so the next "+" derives the next unused index rather than
resurrecting the removed one. The confirmation states the real route back --
delete the whole wallet in Settings, which asks for the password and destroys
the stored recovery phrase, then import it again -- and notes that the scan
which follows only finds addresses with on-chain activity. The copy varies by
wallet type, since an xprv wallet has no recovery phrase.
Removing an address that holds a balance is allowed, with a warning naming no
figure; the funds are at the address on-chain and stay there either way.
Selection and active address move only when the removed address was the one
selected, and site permissions are dropped for it alone.
The state transition shares its address comparison, permission cleanup and
active-changed broadcast with the wallet-level removal.
Runs the real popup in a pinned containerized Chrome and fails on any uncaught
page error or console.error. Also fixes the two defects it caught: the missing
showView import in addToken.js and the missing addressDotHtml import in
transactionDetail.js.
closes#150closes#151
