parseHoldersCount used parseInt, which reads "1,000" as 1, "0x10" as 0 and
"1e3" as 1: a reported low count, which hides the token in the transaction
history and the send-screen token selector. It now accepts only a whole
number of zero or more, or a string of digits alone, no larger than
Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER, and returns null for anything else. The balance
list's holders !== null check did nothing, since null >= 1000 is already
false, and is dropped. README.md and docs/README.md say how each filter
treats an unknown count and that the token screen then leaves out its
Holders row; README.md lists src/shared/holders.js.
Model: opus-5-5
allowedSites and deniedSites held the bare hostname, so a grant to
https://dapp.example also authorised http://dapp.example and every port
on that host, and the connection, transaction and signature prompts
named only the hostname. Both lists now store and match the full origin
(scheme://host[:port]), the key the connections approved without
Remember already used. The prompts, the Settings site lists and
AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE use the origin too. Entries saved by hostname
are not migrated (pre-1.0): they match no site.
Model: opus-5-5
Verification compared the signed artifact against the dApp's request object.
For every field the dApp omitted -- normally nonce, gas limit and all the fee
fields, since the popup filled them in -- the number the user actually read on
screen was verified by nothing, and only absolute ceilings stood behind it.
The transaction is now populated in the background before the approval window
opens, and that populated object is both what the popup displays and what the
signed artifact is verified against. Every consequential field becomes an
equality comparison; the ceilings remain as a backstop. Population failing
means no approval and no window, and the error goes to the requesting page --
earlier than before, where the same estimate failed after the password had been
typed.
The account is pinned too: `from` is compared against the address named at
approval time rather than whichever address is active at signing, so switching
accounts mid-flow refuses instead of signing from an account the approval did
not name. The message-signing path had the same defect and gets the same fix.
Nonce selection moves earlier as a consequence; the concurrent-approval case
that follows from it is tracked at #271.
Covers rationale, hard guidelines (always/never), external service
details (RPC, Blockscout, CoinDesk APIs with what data is sent),
encryption model, installation, wallet management, sending/receiving,
web3 site connections, scam protection, settings, and FAQ.
Written for a technical cryptocurrency user who is not a programmer.
clawbot
sneak