7 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
clawbot	bd0a626e7b	harden: stop the background reading the shared state singleton, and enforce it at build time (closes #324) ... Five defects, one of which destroyed every wallet, came from src/background reading and writing the module-level state singleton the MV3 worker never populates, which silently served DEFAULT_STATE. Each point fix created the next defect. The background now has its own per-call getState() and a queued read-modify-write updateState(); the singleton is unreachable from it, and an unpopulated read throws instead of serving defaults. The prohibition is enforced by the build, not by review: build.js asserts over esbuild's own metafile that no forbidden module is an input of a background bundle, so every specifier syntax esbuild resolves is covered, and both halves of the table are checked for rot -- a stale key, a stale module, an empty list, or an unlisted entry point under src/background/ all fail the build. The ESLint rule remains as fast local feedback and reads the same shared table. Known bounds are documented where the table lives. Also closes #320: getProvider() now requires a validated network id, so a cold worker no longer prepares a non-mainnet dApp transaction for mainnet and gets refused by the wallet's own verifier. backgroundRefresh() no longer mutates address objects across a network round trip, the broadcast path takes its endpoint and chain id from one snapshot, and eight test storage stubs now structured-clone on get as the real chrome.storage.local does. closes #320	2026-08-23 17:57:30 +02:00
clawbot	c755a5e944	fix: a shared ticker no longer hides one of its two real tokens (closes #276) ... Seven bundled tokens were filtered as spoofs at their own address, so a user holding FRAX, TON, REUSD, EURE, MSUSD, MUSD or JPYC could not see or spend the one the wallet happened not to pick. The known-symbol table is derived from the bundled token list, first-wins in market-cap order, so a symbol that appears twice silently condemned its second contract. Both are real tokens from the same fetch and neither is stale -- three pairs are one issuer's old and new contract, four are unrelated issuers sharing a ticker. Picking a winner would have been guessing, and dropping the ambiguous symbols would have ended spoof filtering for those tickers entirely. The table now maps a symbol to the set of addresses that legitimately bear it. A contract outside the set is still a spoof, so the check is not weakened: a third contract bearing any of the seven shared tickers is refused, and that is tested. The filter decides what is fake, not what is worth holding, so a legacy contract stays in the set -- it still holds real balances. A test walks the whole bundled list asserting no token is filtered at its own address, which is the guard whose absence let this ship.	2026-08-12 13:31:55 +02:00
clawbot	ce4a0d7b8d	fix: distinguish an unknown holder count from zero so a legitimate token is not filtered (closes #230)	2026-08-12 10:34:45 +02:00
clawbot	74c137dadf	fix: add a Settings toggle for known-symbol spoof verification (closes #176)	2026-08-11 15:38:05 +02:00
clawbot	12acf4dc8c	fix: honour a dust threshold of 0 and compare addresses case-insensitively (closes #179)	2026-08-11 15:16:48 +02:00
clawbot	f271bcd7b4	fix: one transaction history row per value movement (closes #177)	2026-08-11 14:56:30 +02:00
clawbot	188882d635	test: cover the address-poisoning filters in transactions.js (closes #160) ... 47 tests over src/shared/transactions.js: both real address-poisoning attacks as fixtures, each of the four filters on and off, threshold boundaries, no false positives, and the per-address merge/dedup path. No source file changed.	2026-08-10 15:53:15 +02:00