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harden: key remembered site permissions by full origin (closes #402)
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allowedSites and deniedSites held the bare hostname, so a grant to
https://dapp.example also authorised http://dapp.example and every port
on that host, and the connection, transaction and signature prompts
named only the hostname. Both lists now store and match the full origin
(scheme://host[:port]), the key the connections approved without
Remember already used. The prompts, the Settings site lists and
AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE use the origin too. Entries saved by hostname
are not migrated (pre-1.0): they match no site.

Model: opus-5-5
This commit is contained in:
sneak
2026-10-04 15:43:58 +00:00
parent f24b5bca19
commit e557f21bb0
29 changed files with 470 additions and 231 deletions
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README.md
+20 -13
View File
@@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ each caught only by a reviewer re-deriving thirty fields by hand.
The `allowedSites` case is why the entry check is not optional. A stored
`{"0x…": "notalist"}` is a well-formed object holding a malformed entry: it
passed the gate, rendered a completely healthy popup, and then threw inside
`saveState()`'s per-hostname merge, so every save from that moment on failed and
`saveState()`'s per-origin merge, so every save from that moment on failed and
the user went on operating a wallet that was persisting nothing
([#362](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362)). A save that fails is
now also reported rather than swallowed: `onSaveFailure()` in
@@ -1631,13 +1631,13 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
a value carrying its unit, hex (`0x10`) or exponent (`1e3`) notation —
is refused with a flash message and the field snaps back to the stored
threshold, so a number the user did not type is never stored.
- Allowed Sites: the hostnames remembered as allowed, under any address,
with remove buttons
- Connected Sites: the hostnames of the sites allowed without "Remember my
- Allowed Sites: the origins (scheme, host and port) remembered as allowed,
under any address, with remove buttons
- Connected Sites: the origins of the sites allowed without "Remember my
choice" that are still connected, with remove buttons. Only the background
holds these, in memory, and Settings asks it for them with
`AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES`
- Denied Sites: the hostnames remembered as denied, under any address, with
- Denied Sites: the origins remembered as denied, under any address, with
remove buttons
- About: project link, license, author, version, release date, and the
commit, which links to the commit in the repository
@@ -1651,10 +1651,11 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
- Tap wallet name → inline rename field (no screen change)
- `[x]` on a tracked token → removes it in place (no screen change)
- `[x]` on an allowed or connected site → disconnects that site, in place:
its hostname is dropped from Allowed Sites under every address, and
its origin is dropped from Allowed Sites under every address, and
`AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE` has the background end every connection approved
without "Remember" from an origin with that hostname, under any address,
and send `accountsChanged` with an empty list to the site's open tabs.
without "Remember" from that origin, under any address, and send
`accountsChanged` with an empty list to the open tabs of that origin. The
same host under another scheme or port is another site and is left alone.
Only the extension's own pages may send either message
- `[x]` on a denied site → forgets the refusal, in place; it connects
nothing and tells the background nothing
@@ -1838,14 +1839,18 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
- **When**: A website requests wallet access via `eth_requestAccounts` or
`wallet_requestPermissions` and is on neither the allowed nor the denied list.
The background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`) and
falls back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
A site is its full origin, `scheme://host[:port]`, on both lists and for a
connection allowed without "Remember": a choice for `https://dapp.example`
says nothing about `http://dapp.example` or another port of that host. The
background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`) and falls
back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
`requestApproval()`).
- **Elements**:
- "Connection Request" heading
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
blocklist)
- Site hostname (bold) + "wants to connect to your wallet"
- Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants to connect to your
wallet"
- Address that will be shared (color dot + full address + etherscan link)
- "Remember my choice for this site" checkbox
- "Allow" / "Deny" buttons
@@ -1875,7 +1880,8 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
- "Transaction Request" heading
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
blocklist)
- Site hostname (bold) + "wants to send a transaction"
- Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants to send a
transaction"
- Decoded action (if calldata is recognized): action name, token details,
amounts, steps, deadline (see Transaction Decoding)
- From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
@@ -1906,7 +1912,8 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
- "Signature Request" heading
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
blocklist)
- Site hostname (bold) + "wants you to sign a message"
- Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants you to sign a
message"
- Danger warning box (shown for `eth_sign`, which signs a raw hash)
- Type: "Personal message" or "Typed data (EIP-712)"
- From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
TODO.md
+12
View File
@@ -45,6 +45,18 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
# Completed Steps
- 2026-10-04: Remembered site permissions are held by full origin
([#402](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402)). `allowedSites` and
`deniedSites` stored the hostname alone, so a grant to `https://dapp.example`
also authorised `http://dapp.example` and every port on that host, and the
prompts named only the hostname. Both lists now store and match the origin
(`scheme://host[:port]`), the key the connections approved without "Remember"
already used, in `src/background/index.js` and in Settings, whose site lists
and `AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE` carry the origin too. The connection, transaction
and signature prompts show the origin. Entries saved by hostname before this
change are not migrated (pre-1.0): they match no site, and Settings lists them
until they are removed.
- 2026-10-04: A page's request is credited only to the site the browser says
sent it ([#407](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/407)). Where the
browser does not give the sender's origin (Firefox before 126), the background
docs/README.md
+5 -3
View File
@@ -285,11 +285,13 @@ not appear and may be permanently lost.
AutistMask injects a standard `window.ethereum` provider (EIP-1193) into web
pages. When a site requests access to your wallet:
1. A popup appears showing the site's hostname and the address that will be
shared.
1. A popup appears showing the site's origin (its scheme, host and port, for
example `https://app.example`) and the address that will be shared.
2. Click "Allow" to connect or "Deny" to reject.
3. Optionally check "Remember my choice for this site" to skip the prompt next
time.
time. The choice applies to that exact origin only: a choice remembered for
`https://app.example` does not cover `http://app.example` or another port of
the same host, which ask again.
When a connected site requests a transaction, a separate approval popup appears
showing the transaction details (from, to, value, data, network fee, network and
src/background/index.js
+36 -47
View File
@@ -57,9 +57,13 @@ const windowsNs = windowsApi();
const actionNs = actionApi();
// Connected sites (in-memory, non-persisted): { "origin:address": true }
//
// A site is its full origin (scheme://host[:port]), here and in the
// remembered allowedSites/deniedSites lists alike: a grant to
// https://dapp.example says nothing about http://dapp.example or another port.
const connectedSites = {};
// Pending approval requests: { id: { origin, hostname, resolve } }
// Pending approval requests: { id: { origin, resolve } }
const pendingApprovals = {};
// One transaction approval at a time, wallet-wide.
@@ -459,10 +463,10 @@ async function openApprovalWindow(id) {
// Open an approval popup and return a promise that resolves with the user decision.
// Prefers the browser-action popup (anchored to toolbar, no macOS Space switch).
function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
function requestApproval(origin) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
pendingApprovals[id] = { id, origin, hostname, resolve };
pendingApprovals[id] = { id, origin, resolve };
if (actionNs && typeof actionNs.openPopup === "function") {
actionNs.setPopup({
@@ -495,13 +499,12 @@ function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
// screen never named.
// `slot` is the transaction-approval slot its caller holds. Handing the
// approval's id to it is what makes retiring the approval free the slot.
function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
function requestTxApproval(origin, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
pendingApprovals[id] = {
id,
origin,
hostname,
approvedTx,
approvedFrom,
resolve,
@@ -517,13 +520,12 @@ function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
// Uses windows.create() directly because sign approvals are triggered programmatically
// (from a dApp RPC call), not from a user gesture, so action.openPopup() is
// unreliable in this context.
function requestSignApproval(origin, hostname, signParams, approvedFrom) {
function requestSignApproval(origin, signParams, approvedFrom) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
pendingApprovals[id] = {
id,
origin,
hostname,
signParams,
approvedFrom,
resolve,
@@ -601,11 +603,11 @@ runtime.onConnect.addListener((port) => {
// in the worker — a balance refresh in flight, another site's approval — has
// gone on running the whole time. Loading here used to replace the very
// objects that work was holding.
async function rememberSiteChoice(field, address, hostname) {
async function rememberSiteChoice(field, address, origin) {
await updateState((s) => {
if (!s[field][address]) s[field][address] = [];
if (!s[field][address].includes(hostname)) {
s[field][address].push(hostname);
if (!s[field][address].includes(origin)) {
s[field][address].push(origin);
}
});
}
@@ -618,12 +620,11 @@ async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
}
const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
const denied = s.deniedSites[activeAddress] || [];
// Check denied list
if (denied.includes(hostname)) {
if (denied.includes(origin)) {
return {
error: {
code: 4001,
@@ -634,25 +635,25 @@ async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
// Check allowed list or in-memory connected
if (
allowed.includes(hostname) ||
allowed.includes(origin) ||
connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
) {
return { result: [activeAddress] };
}
// Open approval popup
const decision = await requestApproval(origin, hostname);
const decision = await requestApproval(origin);
if (decision.approved) {
if (decision.remember) {
await rememberSiteChoice("allowedSites", activeAddress, hostname);
await rememberSiteChoice("allowedSites", activeAddress, origin);
} else {
connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress] = true;
}
return { result: [activeAddress] };
} else {
if (decision.remember) {
await rememberSiteChoice("deniedSites", activeAddress, hostname);
await rememberSiteChoice("deniedSites", activeAddress, origin);
}
return {
error: {
@@ -698,10 +699,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
const s = await getState();
const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
if (!activeAddress) return { result: [] };
const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
if (
allowed.includes(hostname) ||
allowed.includes(origin) ||
connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
) {
return { result: [activeAddress] };
@@ -731,10 +731,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
// [TESTNET] banner under a user who believed they were on Sepolia.
const s = await getState();
const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
if (
!allowed.includes(hostname) &&
!allowed.includes(origin) &&
!connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
) {
return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -806,10 +805,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
if (method === "wallet_getPermissions") {
const s = await getState();
const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
const isConnected =
allowed.includes(hostname) ||
allowed.includes(origin) ||
connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress];
if (!isConnected || !activeAddress) {
return { result: [] };
@@ -835,10 +833,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
if (!activeAddress)
return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
if (
!allowed.includes(hostname) &&
!allowed.includes(origin) &&
!connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
) {
return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -870,7 +867,6 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
const decision = await requestSignApproval(
origin,
hostname,
signParams,
activeAddress,
);
@@ -884,10 +880,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
if (!activeAddress)
return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
if (
!allowed.includes(hostname) &&
!allowed.includes(origin) &&
!connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
) {
return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -905,7 +900,6 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
}
const decision = await requestSignApproval(
origin,
hostname,
signParams,
activeAddress,
);
@@ -946,10 +940,9 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
if (!activeAddress) return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
if (
!allowed.includes(hostname) &&
!allowed.includes(origin) &&
!connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
) {
return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -1023,7 +1016,6 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
const decision = await requestTxApproval(
origin,
hostname,
approvedTx,
activeAddress,
slot,
@@ -1097,10 +1089,9 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
}
for (const tab of tabs) {
const origin = tab.url ? new URL(tab.url).origin : "";
const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
const hasPermission =
activeAddress &&
(allowed.includes(hostname) ||
(allowed.includes(origin) ||
connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]);
// Same as chainChanged above: a tab without our content script
// rejects, and that is expected rather than a fault.
@@ -1113,7 +1104,7 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
}
// Tell every open tab of a site Settings removed that it has no account.
async function broadcastSiteRemoved(hostname) {
async function broadcastSiteRemoved(origin) {
let tabs;
try {
tabs = await tabsQuery({});
@@ -1121,7 +1112,7 @@ async function broadcastSiteRemoved(hostname) {
return;
}
for (const tab of tabs) {
if (!tab.url || extractHostname(tab.url) !== hostname) continue;
if (!tab.url || new URL(tab.url).origin !== origin) continue;
tabsSendMessage(tab.id, {
type: "AUTISTMASK_EVENT",
eventName: "accountsChanged",
@@ -1348,10 +1339,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") {
const approval = pendingApprovals[msg.id];
if (approval) {
const resp = {
hostname: approval.hostname,
origin: approval.origin,
};
const resp = { origin: approval.origin };
if (approval.type === "tx") {
resp.type = "tx";
// The populated transaction, and the address it was raised
@@ -1366,7 +1354,9 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
resp.approvedFrom = approval.approvedFrom;
}
// Flag if the requesting domain is on the phishing blocklist.
resp.isPhishingDomain = isPhishingDomain(approval.hostname);
resp.isPhishingDomain = isPhishingDomain(
extractHostname(approval.origin),
);
sendResponse(resp);
} else {
sendResponse(null);
@@ -1700,23 +1690,22 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES") {
sendResponse(
Object.keys(connectedSites).map((key) =>
extractHostname(key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":"))),
key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":")),
),
);
return false;
}
// Settings removed this site and has already dropped its remembered
// entries. Its connections approved without "Remember" end here, under
// every address, and its open tabs are told it has no account.
// Settings removed this site (msg.origin) and has already dropped its
// remembered entries. Its connections approved without "Remember" end
// here, under every address, and its open tabs are told it has no account.
if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE") {
for (const key of Object.keys(connectedSites)) {
const origin = key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":"));
if (extractHostname(origin) === msg.hostname) {
if (key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":")) === msg.origin) {
delete connectedSites[key];
}
}
broadcastSiteRemoved(msg.hostname);
broadcastSiteRemoved(msg.origin);
return false;
}
});
src/popup/index.html
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1561,7 +1561,7 @@
with extreme caution.
</div>
<p class="mb-2">
<span id="approve-tx-hostname" class="font-bold"></span>
<span id="approve-tx-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
wants to send a transaction.
</p>
@@ -1662,7 +1662,7 @@
funds. Proceed with extreme caution.
</div>
<p class="mb-2">
<span id="approve-sign-hostname" class="font-bold"></span>
<span id="approve-sign-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
wants you to sign a message.
</p>
@@ -1740,7 +1740,7 @@
</div>
<div class="mb-3">
<p class="mb-2">
<span id="approve-hostname" class="font-bold"></span>
<span id="approve-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
wants to connect to your wallet.
</p>
<div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">
src/popup/views/approval.js
+3 -3
View File
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
};
}
$("approve-tx-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
$("approve-tx-origin").textContent = details.origin;
$("approve-tx-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(details.approvedFrom);
// Show token symbol next to contract address if known
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
pendingSignParams = sp;
pendingSignFrom = details.approvedFrom;
$("approve-sign-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
$("approve-sign-origin").textContent = details.origin;
$("approve-sign-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(
details.approvedFrom,
);
@@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ async function show(id) {
"approve-site-phishing-warning",
details.isPhishingDomain,
);
$("approve-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
$("approve-origin").textContent = details.origin;
$("approve-address").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(state.activeAddress);
attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-site");
$("approve-remember").checked = state.rememberSiteChoice;
src/popup/views/settings.js
+17 -17
View File
@@ -34,35 +34,35 @@ const { notify, sendMessage } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
let versionClickCount = 0;
let versionClickTimer = null;
// One row per hostname, however many addresses or origins it appears under,
// each with an [x] that hands it to onRemove.
function renderSiteList(containerId, hostnames, onRemove) {
// One row per site origin, however many addresses it appears under, each with
// an [x] that hands it to onRemove.
function renderSiteList(containerId, origins, onRemove) {
const container = $(containerId);
const unique = [...new Set(hostnames)];
const unique = [...new Set(origins)];
if (unique.length === 0) {
container.innerHTML = '<p class="text-xs text-muted">None</p>';
return;
}
let html = "";
unique.forEach((hostname) => {
unique.forEach((origin) => {
html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center text-xs py-1 border-b border-border-light">`;
// A hostname the URL parser produced cannot carry a delimiter, so
// An origin the URL parser produced cannot carry a delimiter, so
// this is escaped for the rule rather than for a known hole — the
// rule being that nothing reaches innerHTML unescaped.
html += `<span>${escapeHtml(hostname)}</span>`;
html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-hostname="${escapeHtml(hostname)}">[x]</button>`;
html += `<span>${escapeHtml(origin)}</span>`;
html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-origin="${escapeHtml(origin)}">[x]</button>`;
html += `</div>`;
});
container.innerHTML = html;
container.querySelectorAll(".btn-remove-site").forEach((btn) => {
btn.addEventListener("click", () => onRemove(btn.dataset.hostname));
btn.addEventListener("click", () => onRemove(btn.dataset.origin));
});
}
// Drop a hostname from a remembered site list under every address.
function forgetHostname(siteMap, hostname) {
// Drop a site origin from a remembered site list under every address.
function forgetOrigin(siteMap, origin) {
for (const addr of Object.keys(siteMap)) {
siteMap[addr] = siteMap[addr].filter((h) => h !== hostname);
siteMap[addr] = siteMap[addr].filter((o) => o !== origin);
if (siteMap[addr].length === 0) {
delete siteMap[addr];
}
@@ -72,16 +72,16 @@ function forgetHostname(siteMap, hostname) {
// Removing a site from Allowed Sites or Connected Sites disconnects it: it is
// no longer allowed under any address, and the background ends its
// connections approved without "Remember" and tells its open tabs.
async function removeAllowedSite(hostname) {
forgetHostname(state.allowedSites, hostname);
async function removeAllowedSite(origin) {
forgetOrigin(state.allowedSites, origin);
await saveState();
notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", hostname });
notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", origin });
await renderSiteLists();
}
// Removing a denied site only forgets the refusal; it connects nothing.
async function removeDeniedSite(hostname) {
forgetHostname(state.deniedSites, hostname);
async function removeDeniedSite(origin) {
forgetOrigin(state.deniedSites, origin);
await saveState();
await renderSiteLists();
}
src/shared/persistedState.js
+11 -10
View File
@@ -102,11 +102,11 @@ function tokenRefs(value) {
// A list of strings, for the fields whose entries are dereferenced as text:
// fraudContracts (`a.toLowerCase()` in src/popup/views/send.js and
// src/shared/transactions.js) and each address's hostname list in the site maps
// below (`h !== host` filters, `list.includes(hostname)` in the background).
// src/shared/transactions.js) and each address's origin list in the site maps
// below (`o !== origin` filters, `list.includes(origin)` in the background).
//
// Same rule as tokenRefs(), for the same reason: the container AND the entries,
// with a malformed entry DROPPED rather than repaired. A number in a hostname
// with a malformed entry DROPPED rather than repaired. A number in an origin
// list names no site and a number in fraudContracts names no contract, so there
// is nothing to repair either to, and the empty list is a legitimate value that
// survives. The result is a fresh array of primitives, so it shares no
@@ -116,21 +116,22 @@ function textList(value) {
return value.filter((entry) => typeof entry === "string");
}
// allowedSites / deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }.
// allowedSites / deniedSites: { [address]: [origin, ...] }, each origin the
// full scheme://host[:port] of a site.
//
// The container check these had (truthy and not an array) is not the floor:
// `{"0xabc…": "notalist"}` IS a non-array object, and the dereference is one
// level below it. saveState() merges these maps per key and then per hostname
// level below it. saveState() merges these maps per key and then per origin
// WITHIN each key, so a stored value that is not a list reaches `base.map()` in
// mergeListByIdentity() (src/shared/state.js) and throws — after the popup has
// rendered, which is why every save from then on failed while the UI looked
// healthy (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362). The Settings
// revoke button (`list.filter()`), and the background's
// `allowed.includes(hostname)` gate, dereference it the same way; on that last
// `allowed.includes(origin)` gate, dereference it the same way; on that last
// one a stored string would also answer a SUBSTRING match, so a corrupt map
// could widen a site permission rather than merely throw.
//
// An address key whose value is not a list of hostnames is dropped entirely: it
// An address key whose value is not a list of origins is dropped entirely: it
// grants and denies nothing, and dropping it fails closed. A stored own
// "__proto__" key — which JSON can carry — is dropped for the same reason: it
// can never be a wallet address, so it grants nothing either, and keeping it
@@ -143,9 +144,9 @@ function siteMap(value) {
if (!isRecord(value)) return out;
for (const address of Object.keys(value)) {
if (address === "__proto__") continue;
const hostnames = textList(value[address]);
if (hostnames.length === 0) continue;
defineOwn(out, address, hostnames);
const origins = textList(value[address]);
if (origins.length === 0) continue;
defineOwn(out, address, origins);
}
return out;
}
src/shared/state.js
+10 -10
View File
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ function mergeAddress(base, ours, theirs) {
}
// Merge a plain object keyed by string (allowedSites/deniedSites: address ->
// hostname list; networkEndpoints: networkId -> {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl}) the
// origin list; networkEndpoints: networkId -> {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl}) the
// same way mergeListByIdentity() merges an array — by key, not by whole-
// object diff — so a key one page added or removed applies independently of
// a key another page edited. Unlike an array's identity function, an object
@@ -353,25 +353,25 @@ function mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeLeaf) {
return result;
}
// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. The hostname
// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [origin, ...] }. The origin
// list is itself membership, not a leaf — the background appends a newly
// approved/denied hostname to it, and the Settings "revoke" button
// (src/popup/views/settings.js) filters a hostname out of it in place, from a
// approved/denied origin to it, and the Settings "revoke" button
// (src/popup/views/settings.js) filters an origin out of it in place, from a
// different page. Merge it the same way wallets are merged: identity is the
// hostname itself, so a merged pair is always equal and mergeItem is a no-op
// origin itself, so a merged pair is always equal and mergeItem is a no-op
// pick.
function mergeHostnameList(base, ours, theirs) {
function mergeOriginList(base, ours, theirs) {
return mergeListByIdentity(
base,
ours,
theirs,
(hostname) => hostname,
(origin) => origin,
(b, o, t) => t,
);
}
function mergeSiteMap(base, ours, theirs) {
return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeHostnameList);
return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeOriginList);
}
// networkEndpoints: { [networkId]: {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl} }.
@@ -422,8 +422,8 @@ function mergeNetworkEndpoints(base, ours, theirs) {
// address) apply independently instead of colliding as the same field.
//
// `allowedSites` and `deniedSites` get the same treatment (mergeSiteMap(),
// by address key and then by hostname within each address's list), for the
// identical reason: the background appends a newly approved/denied hostname
// by address key and then by origin within each address's list), for the
// identical reason: the background appends a newly approved/denied origin
// to them, and the Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js)
// filters one out in place, from a different page. A whole-field diff here
// doesn't just lose data, it is a security defect — a stale page's save can
tests/approvalOrigin.test.js
+140
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
// The connection, transaction and signature prompts name the site by its full
// origin, scheme and port included, not by its bare hostname
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402). A page served over http,
// or on another port, of a host the user trusts over https must not raise a
// prompt that reads as that trusted site.
//
// Driven against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
// tests/contractCreation.test.js uses.
globalThis.chrome = {
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
};
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
// The site asking, in cleartext and on a port, which is what the hostname
// alone, dapp.example, used to hide.
const ORIGIN = "http://dapp.example:8080";
const FROM = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000a11";
const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
function makeElement(id) {
const classes = new Set();
const el = {
id,
textContent: "",
value: "",
innerHTML: "",
disabled: false,
style: {},
dataset: {},
classList: {
add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
toggle: (n, force) => {
const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
if (on) classes.add(n);
else classes.delete(n);
return on;
},
},
addEventListener: () => {},
querySelectorAll: () => [],
appendChild: () => {},
};
// Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
});
return el;
}
function makeDocument() {
const els = new Map();
return {
getElementById(id) {
// The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
// is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
return els.get(id);
},
createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
body: { prepend: () => {} },
};
}
function node(id) {
return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
}
// Open the prompt the background describes with `details`, the way the popup
// does: it asks for the approval and show() draws it.
async function openApproval(details) {
globalThis.document = makeDocument();
globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" } };
globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
if (!reply) return;
if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
reply({
origin: ORIGIN,
isPhishingDomain: false,
approvedFrom: FROM,
...details,
});
},
};
approval.init({});
await approval.show(1);
}
beforeEach(() => {
state.wallets = [];
state.activeAddress = FROM;
state.viewData = {};
state.viewStack = [];
state.currentView = null;
});
test("the connection prompt shows the origin", async () => {
await openApproval({});
expect(node("approve-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
});
test("the transaction prompt shows the origin", async () => {
await openApproval({
type: "tx",
approvedTx: {
type: 2,
from: FROM,
chainId: "0x1",
nonce: "0x7",
gasLimit: "0x5208",
maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
to: RECIPIENT,
value: "0x0",
data: "0x",
accessList: [],
},
});
expect(node("approve-tx-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
});
test("the signature prompt shows the origin", async () => {
await openApproval({
type: "sign",
// "Hello" as the hex a dApp passes to personal_sign.
signParams: {
method: "personal_sign",
message: "0x48656c6c6f",
from: FROM,
},
});
expect(node("approve-sign-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
});
tests/backgroundApproval.test.js
+85 -17
View File
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ const other = new Wallet(OTHER_KEY);
const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
const ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
const HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
// A page the wallet has never been connected to, whose requests are refused.
const UNCONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
@@ -199,7 +198,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
networkId: "mainnet",
rpcUrl: "https://rpc.invalid",
activeAddress: signer.address,
allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [HOSTNAME] },
allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [ORIGIN] },
deniedSites: {},
};
@@ -2193,12 +2192,54 @@ describe("removing an address ends a site's connection to it", () => {
});
});
// A remembered permission belongs to the origin it was granted to, scheme and
// port included (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402). The stored
// state allows ORIGIN, https://dapp.example. A cleartext page on the same host,
// which a network attacker can serve, and another port on it are other sites.
describe("a remembered permission is held by the full origin", () => {
for (const origin of ["http://dapp.example", "https://dapp.example:8443"]) {
test(`an https grant does not authorise ${origin}`, async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
expect(await siteAccounts(bg, ORIGIN)).toEqual({
result: [signer.address],
});
expect(await siteAccounts(bg, origin)).toEqual({ result: [] });
const send = bg.requestTx(TX_PARAMS, origin);
await settle();
expect(send.result()).toEqual({
error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" },
});
expect(send.id()).toBeNull();
});
}
test("Remember stores the origin, so the cleartext page on that host is asked again", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
const granted = bg.requestSite(FRESH_ORIGIN);
await settle();
const grantedId = granted.id();
bg.connectApproval(grantedId).decide(true, true);
await settle();
expect(granted.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
expect(
bg.storage.read("autistmask").allowedSites[signer.address],
).toEqual([ORIGIN, FRESH_ORIGIN]);
const cleartext = bg.requestSite("http://fresh.example");
await settle();
// Unanswered: it is waiting on a prompt of its own.
expect(cleartext.result()).toBeNull();
expect(cleartext.id()).not.toBe(grantedId);
});
});
// Settings lists the sites allowed without "Remember", which only the
// background holds, and removing a site there, from either list, disconnects
// it. These drive the real Settings view against the real background and
// click the [x] the user clicks.
describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
// FRESH_ORIGIN on another port, so its hostname is FRESH_ORIGIN's.
// The host of FRESH_ORIGIN on another port, which makes it another site.
const FRESH_OTHER_PORT = "https://fresh.example:8443";
// A site list's container. Its [x] buttons, data attributes and all, are
@@ -2226,9 +2267,9 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
return list;
}
// The hostnames a site list shows.
// The origins a site list shows.
function listed(list) {
return [...list.innerHTML.matchAll(/data-hostname="([^"]*)"/g)].map(
return [...list.innerHTML.matchAll(/data-origin="([^"]*)"/g)].map(
(match) => match[1],
);
}
@@ -2259,10 +2300,10 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
allowed: element("settings-allowed-sites"),
connected: element("settings-connected-sites"),
// Click the [x] beside a site, and let what it sends run.
remove: async (list, hostname) => {
expect(listed(list)).toContain(hostname);
remove: async (list, origin) => {
expect(listed(list)).toContain(origin);
const button = list.buttons.find(
(b) => b.dataset.hostname === hostname,
(b) => b.dataset.origin === origin,
);
await button.click();
await settle();
@@ -2274,14 +2315,15 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
delete global.document;
});
test("Settings lists a site connected without Remember", async () => {
test("Settings lists each site by its origin", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, false);
await connect(bg, FRESH_OTHER_PORT, true);
const settings = await openSettings(bg);
expect(listed(settings.connected)).toEqual(["fresh.example"]);
expect(listed(settings.allowed)).toEqual([HOSTNAME]);
expect(listed(settings.connected)).toEqual([FRESH_ORIGIN]);
expect(listed(settings.allowed)).toEqual([ORIGIN, FRESH_OTHER_PORT]);
});
test("removing a site connected without Remember disconnects it and tells its tabs", async () => {
@@ -2293,6 +2335,7 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
cb([
{ id: 1, url: FRESH_ORIGIN + "/app" },
{ id: 2, url: ORIGIN + "/app" },
{ id: 3, url: FRESH_OTHER_PORT + "/app" },
]),
sendMessage: (tabId, msg, cb) => {
sentToTabs.push({ tabId, msg });
@@ -2301,7 +2344,7 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
};
const settings = await openSettings(bg);
await settings.remove(settings.connected, "fresh.example");
await settings.remove(settings.connected, FRESH_ORIGIN);
expect(await siteAccounts(bg)).toEqual({ result: [] });
expect(sentToTabs).toEqual([
@@ -2321,20 +2364,45 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
});
});
// The same hostname can hold both kinds of connection: one origin allowed
// without Remember, then another, on a different port, allowed with it.
// One origin can hold both kinds of connection under two addresses:
// remembered for one, allowed without Remember for the other.
test("removing a remembered site also ends its connection made without Remember", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
const stored = bg.storage.read("autistmask");
stored.wallets[0].addresses.push({
address: other.address,
balance: "0",
tokenBalances: [],
});
bg.storage.write("autistmask", stored);
await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, true);
bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
const pending = bg.requestSite(FRESH_ORIGIN);
await settle();
bg.connectApproval(pending.id()).decide(true, false);
await settle();
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: [other.address] });
const settings = await openSettings(bg);
await settings.remove(settings.allowed, FRESH_ORIGIN);
expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN)).toEqual({ result: [] });
});
test("removing a remembered site leaves the same host on another port connected", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, false);
await connect(bg, FRESH_OTHER_PORT, true);
const settings = await openSettings(bg);
await settings.remove(settings.allowed, "fresh.example");
await settings.remove(settings.allowed, FRESH_OTHER_PORT);
expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_OTHER_PORT)).toEqual({
result: [],
});
expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN)).toEqual({ result: [] });
expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN)).toEqual({
result: [signer.address],
});
});
test("a page can neither remove a site nor list the connected ones", async () => {
@@ -2343,7 +2411,7 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
const page = { url: FRESH_ORIGIN + "/index.html" };
const remove = bg.send(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", hostname: "fresh.example" },
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", origin: FRESH_ORIGIN },
page,
);
const list = bg.send({ type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES" }, page);
tests/backgroundStateIsolation.test.js
+1 -2
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
@@ -81,7 +80,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
networkId,
rpcUrl: net.defaultRpcUrl,
blockscoutUrl: net.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
deniedSites: {},
trackedTokens: [],
lastBalanceRefresh: 0,
tests/chainSwitchGate.test.js
+1 -2
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
// The site the persisted state has connected, and one it has never heard of.
const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
const STRANGER_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
@@ -86,7 +85,7 @@ function loadBackground() {
tokenHolderCache: {},
fraudContracts: [],
activeAddress: ADDRESS,
allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
deniedSites: {},
};
const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: persisted });
tests/coldWorkerChainId.test.js
+1 -2
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
const UNKNOWN_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
@@ -41,7 +40,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
networkId,
rpcUrl: networkById(networkId).defaultRpcUrl,
blockscoutUrl: networkById(networkId).defaultBlockscoutUrl,
allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
deniedSites: {},
trackedTokens: [],
};
tests/coldWorkerChainSwitch.test.js
+2 -3
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
@@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
networkId,
rpcUrl: CUSTOM_RPC,
blockscoutUrl: CUSTOM_BLOCKSCOUT,
allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
deniedSites: {},
trackedTokens: [{ address: TOKEN, symbol: "DAI", decimals: 18 }],
theme: "dark",
@@ -168,7 +167,7 @@ describe("a chain switch on a worker that never loaded state", () => {
expect(after.wallets).toEqual(walletFixture());
expect(after.hasWallet).toBe(true);
expect(after.activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
expect(after.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] });
expect(after.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] });
expect(after.trackedTokens).toEqual([
{ address: TOKEN, symbol: "DAI", decimals: 18 },
]);
tests/coldWorkerSendTransaction.test.js
+1 -2
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
@@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
networkId,
rpcUrl: net.defaultRpcUrl,
blockscoutUrl: net.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
deniedSites: {},
trackedTokens: [],
};
tests/contractCreation.test.js
+1 -1
View File
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ async function openTxApproval(to, data) {
if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
reply({
type: "tx",
hostname: "dapp.example",
origin: "https://dapp.example",
isPhishingDomain: false,
approvedFrom: FROM,
approvedTx: {
tests/deleteWalletLostPassword.test.js
+11 -5
View File
@@ -140,8 +140,14 @@ function load() {
state.selectedWallet = 0;
state.selectedAddress = 0;
state.activeAddress = A0;
state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"], [B0]: ["b.example"] };
state.deniedSites = { [B0]: ["c.example"], [C0]: ["d.example"] };
state.allowedSites = {
[A0]: ["https://a.example"],
[B0]: ["https://b.example"],
};
state.deniedSites = {
[B0]: ["https://c.example"],
[C0]: ["https://d.example"],
};
state.viewStack = ["main", "settings"];
state.currentView = "settings";
@@ -388,8 +394,8 @@ describe("deleting without the password", () => {
await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["a.example"] });
expect(saved.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["d.example"] });
expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["https://a.example"] });
expect(saved.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["https://d.example"] });
});
// The route shares finishDelete() with the password route, so the
@@ -437,7 +443,7 @@ describe("deleting without the password", () => {
test("deleting the last wallet lands on Welcome with nothing left", async () => {
const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
state.wallets = [wallet("Wallet 1", "secret-one", [A0])];
state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"] };
state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["https://a.example"] };
state.deniedSites = {};
await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 0);
tests/e2e/firefox/run.js
+9 -10
View File
@@ -438,11 +438,10 @@ step(
await d.switchToWindow(popup);
await d.waitVisible("#view-approve-site");
const hostname = await d.text("#approve-hostname");
const origin = await d.text("#approve-origin");
assert(
hostname === "127.0.0.1",
"the site prompt names the wrong origin: " +
JSON.stringify(hostname),
origin === env.server.origin,
"the site prompt names the wrong origin: " + JSON.stringify(origin),
);
const shown = await d.text("#approve-address");
assert(
@@ -494,16 +493,16 @@ step(
const screen = await d.execute(
`return {
hostname: document.getElementById("approve-sign-hostname").textContent,
origin: document.getElementById("approve-sign-origin").textContent,
type: document.getElementById("approve-sign-type").textContent,
message: document.getElementById("approve-sign-message").textContent,
from: document.getElementById("approve-sign-from").textContent,
};`,
);
assert(
screen.hostname === "127.0.0.1",
screen.origin === env.server.origin,
"the sign prompt names the wrong origin: " +
JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
);
assert(
screen.type === "Personal message",
@@ -571,7 +570,7 @@ step(
const screen = await d.execute(
`return {
hostname: document.getElementById("approve-tx-hostname").textContent,
origin: document.getElementById("approve-tx-origin").textContent,
from: document.getElementById("approve-tx-from").textContent,
to: document.getElementById("approve-tx-to").textContent,
value: document.getElementById("approve-tx-value").textContent,
@@ -582,9 +581,9 @@ step(
};`,
);
assert(
screen.hostname === "127.0.0.1",
screen.origin === env.server.origin,
"the transaction prompt names the wrong origin: " +
JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
);
assert(
screen.from.toLowerCase().includes(env.address.toLowerCase()),
tests/e2e/run.js
+16 -19
View File
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ const {
const {
DAPP_ORIGIN,
DAPP_URL,
PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN,
PHISHING_DAPP_URL,
FEE_ESTIMATE_WEI,
FEE_RESERVE_WEI,
@@ -2471,8 +2472,6 @@ test("a token whose symbol() returns markup renders as text (#307)", async (env)
// dApp, with real funds, against a real network. The RPC is stubbed
// throughout. That pass stays on the human list before 1.0.0.
const DAPP_HOSTNAME = new URL(DAPP_URL).hostname;
// The personal_sign payload. Sent as hex, which is what dApps send and what
// the popup requires — it calls getBytes() on the message — and displayed on
// the approval screen as the decoded text, which is what the user is agreeing
@@ -3016,11 +3015,10 @@ test("eth_requestAccounts rejected at the prompt returns a rejection (#183)", as
try {
await visible(popup, "#view-approve-site");
const hostname = await popup.locator("#approve-hostname").innerText();
const origin = await popup.locator("#approve-origin").innerText();
assert(
hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
"the site prompt names the wrong origin: " +
JSON.stringify(hostname),
origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
"the site prompt names the wrong origin: " + JSON.stringify(origin),
);
// The control for the phishing test below: this origin is not on the
@@ -3101,7 +3099,6 @@ test("a connect request from a blocklisted site is flagged (#219)", async (env)
// check and the real approval screen. Nothing about the list is stubbed —
// there is nothing left to stub, since the extension no longer fetches it.
const phishingDapp = await openDapp(env.ctx, PHISHING_DAPP_URL);
const hostname = new URL(PHISHING_DAPP_URL).hostname;
try {
await reserveApprovalTab(env);
await startRequest(
@@ -3114,15 +3111,15 @@ test("a connect request from a blocklisted site is flagged (#219)", async (env)
try {
await visible(popup, "#view-approve-site");
const shown = await popup.locator("#approve-hostname").innerText();
const shown = await popup.locator("#approve-origin").innerText();
assert(
shown === hostname,
shown === PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN,
"the site prompt names the wrong origin: " +
JSON.stringify(shown),
);
await visible(popup, "#approve-site-phishing-warning");
console.log("# phishing warning shown for " + hostname);
console.log("# phishing warning shown for " + PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN);
// Not remembered: a remembered decision for this origin would
// outlive the test.
@@ -3152,15 +3149,15 @@ test("personal_sign signs, and the signature recovers to the address (#183)", as
const boundary = await watchApprovalBoundary(popup, env);
const screen = await popup.evaluate(() => ({
hostname: document.getElementById("approve-sign-hostname").textContent,
origin: document.getElementById("approve-sign-origin").textContent,
type: document.getElementById("approve-sign-type").textContent,
message: document.getElementById("approve-sign-message").textContent,
from: document.getElementById("approve-sign-from").textContent,
}));
assert(
screen.hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
screen.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
"the sign prompt names the wrong origin: " +
JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
);
assert(
screen.type === "Personal message",
@@ -3245,15 +3242,15 @@ test("eth_signTypedData_v4 signs, and the signature recovers (#183)", async (env
const boundary = await watchApprovalBoundary(popup, env);
const screen = await popup.evaluate(() => ({
hostname: document.getElementById("approve-sign-hostname").textContent,
origin: document.getElementById("approve-sign-origin").textContent,
type: document.getElementById("approve-sign-type").textContent,
message: document.getElementById("approve-sign-message").innerText,
from: document.getElementById("approve-sign-from").textContent,
}));
assert(
screen.hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
screen.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
"the typed data prompt names the wrong origin: " +
JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
);
assert(
screen.type === "Typed data (EIP-712)",
@@ -3351,7 +3348,7 @@ test("eth_sendTransaction signs the approved transaction and broadcasts it (#183
const boundary = await watchApprovalBoundary(popup, env);
const screen = await popup.evaluate(() => ({
hostname: document.getElementById("approve-tx-hostname").textContent,
origin: document.getElementById("approve-tx-origin").textContent,
from: document.getElementById("approve-tx-from").textContent,
to: document.getElementById("approve-tx-to").textContent,
value: document.getElementById("approve-tx-value").textContent,
@@ -3361,9 +3358,9 @@ test("eth_sendTransaction signs the approved transaction and broadcasts it (#183
.classList.contains("hidden"),
}));
assert(
screen.hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
screen.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
"the transaction prompt names the wrong origin: " +
JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
);
assert(
screen.from.toLowerCase().includes(env.expectedAddress.toLowerCase()),
tests/persistedEntryFloors.test.js
+23 -12
View File
@@ -59,24 +59,32 @@ describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
}
});
test(`an ${field} entry whose value is not a hostname list is dropped`, () => {
for (const bad of ["dapp.example", 42, null, { a: 1 }, true]) {
test(`an ${field} entry whose value is not an origin list is dropped`, () => {
for (const bad of [
"https://dapp.example",
42,
null,
{ a: 1 },
true,
]) {
expect(
normalizePersisted({ [field]: { [ADDRESS]: bad } })[field],
).toEqual({});
}
});
test(`a hostname that is not text is dropped from an ${field} entry`, () => {
test(`an origin that is not text is dropped from an ${field} entry`, () => {
expect(
normalizePersisted({
[field]: { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, "dapp.example", {}] },
[field]: {
[ADDRESS]: [42, null, "https://dapp.example", {}],
},
})[field],
).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] });
});
test(`a real ${field} map survives, copied not shared`, () => {
const saved = { [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] } };
const saved = { [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] } };
const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
@@ -87,10 +95,13 @@ describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
test(`a good ${field} entry beside a malformed one survives`, () => {
const out = normalizePersisted({
[field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"], [TOKEN_ADDRESS]: 42 },
[field]: {
[ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
[TOKEN_ADDRESS]: 42,
},
});
expect(out[field]).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
expect(out[field]).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] });
});
test(`a stored own "__proto__" key in ${field} is dropped`, () => {
@@ -100,7 +111,7 @@ describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
// saveState()'s merge hands to the prototype setter on the next
// write.
const saved = JSON.parse(
'{"' + field + '":{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}}',
'{"' + field + '":{"__proto__":["https://evil.invalid"]}}',
);
const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
@@ -197,7 +208,7 @@ describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
const MALFORMED = [
{ name: "a string", value: "notalist" },
{ name: "a number", value: 42 },
{ name: "a record", value: { hostnames: ["dapp.example"] } },
{ name: "a record", value: { origins: ["https://dapp.example"] } },
];
for (const { name, value } of MALFORMED) {
@@ -231,7 +242,7 @@ describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
const env = await bootPopup(
unversionedValidProfile({
allowedSites: {
[ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"],
[ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
[TOKEN_ADDRESS]: "notalist",
},
}),
@@ -239,7 +250,7 @@ describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
expect(env.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
expect(env.storage.read("autistmask").allowedSites).toEqual({
[ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"],
[ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
});
});
tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js
+2 -2
View File
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ const CONTRACT = [
[ADDRESS],
{ [ADDRESS]: 42 },
{ [ADDRESS]: [42, null, {}] },
JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}'),
JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["https://evil.invalid"]}'),
],
holds: siteMapHolds,
},
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ const CONTRACT = [
[ADDRESS],
{ [ADDRESS]: 42 },
{ [ADDRESS]: [42, null, {}] },
JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}'),
JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["https://evil.invalid"]}'),
],
holds: siteMapHolds,
},
tests/rpcOrigin.test.js
+1 -2
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
// The site the persisted state has connected, and one it has never heard of.
const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
const STRANGER_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
async function settle() {
@@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ function loadBackground() {
},
],
activeAddress: ADDRESS,
allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
deniedSites: {},
},
});
tests/sendDisplayFloor.test.js
+1 -1
View File
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ async function confirmSend(amount, token = "ETH") {
async function approveTxWithFeePerGas(maxFeePerGas) {
approvalDetails = {
type: "tx",
hostname: "dapp.example",
origin: "https://dapp.example",
approvedFrom: HOLDER,
approvedTx: {
to: RECIPIENT,
tests/stateMerge.test.js
+33 -31
View File
@@ -270,31 +270,32 @@ describe("background refresh racing a wallet deleted on another page", () => {
});
});
// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. Mutated in place
// from two different contexts — src/background/index.js:592-599 pushes a
// newly approved hostname onto state.allowedSites[activeAddress], and the
// Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68) filters a
// hostname out of state[key][addr] in place, deleting the address key
// entirely once its list is empty — the exact membership-vs-whole-field
// pattern that made the whole-field `wallets` diff unsafe, on a
// security-relevant field: a stale whole-field save here can resurrect a
// revoked permission or wipe a freshly granted one.
// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [origin, ...] }. Mutated in place
// from two different contexts — rememberSiteChoice() in
// src/background/index.js pushes a newly approved origin onto
// state.allowedSites[activeAddress], and the Settings "revoke" button
// (forgetOrigin() in src/popup/views/settings.js) filters an origin out of
// state[key][addr] in place, deleting the address key entirely once its list
// is empty — the exact membership-vs-whole-field pattern that made the
// whole-field `wallets` diff unsafe, on a security-relevant field: a stale
// whole-field save here can resurrect a revoked permission or wipe a freshly
// granted one.
const ADDR1 = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
const ADDR2 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
function approveSite(pageState, address, hostname) {
function approveSite(pageState, address, origin) {
if (!pageState.allowedSites[address]) {
pageState.allowedSites[address] = [];
}
if (!pageState.allowedSites[address].includes(hostname)) {
pageState.allowedSites[address].push(hostname);
if (!pageState.allowedSites[address].includes(origin)) {
pageState.allowedSites[address].push(origin);
}
}
function revokeSite(pageState, hostname) {
function revokeSite(pageState, origin) {
for (const addr of Object.keys(pageState.allowedSites)) {
pageState.allowedSites[addr] = pageState.allowedSites[addr].filter(
(h) => h !== hostname,
(o) => o !== origin,
);
if (pageState.allowedSites[addr].length === 0) {
delete pageState.allowedSites[addr];
@@ -308,7 +309,7 @@ describe("a dApp approval racing a stale Settings page's later save", () => {
await storage.set({
autistmask: {
wallets: [W1],
allowedSites: { [ADDR2]: ["other.example"] },
allowedSites: { [ADDR2]: ["https://other.example"] },
},
});
@@ -318,24 +319,24 @@ describe("a dApp approval racing a stale Settings page's later save", () => {
await settings.state.loadState();
// A dApp approval window, opened later, approves a new site for a
// different address and saves — the real sequence at
// src/background/index.js:592-599.
// different address and saves — the real sequence in
// rememberSiteChoice(), src/background/index.js.
const approval = loadPage(storage);
await approval.state.loadState();
approveSite(approval.state.state, ADDR1, "dapp.example");
approveSite(approval.state.state, ADDR1, "https://dapp.example");
await approval.state.saveState();
expect(
(await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
).toEqual(["https://dapp.example"]);
// Settings revokes its own, unrelated site — the real sequence at
// src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — and saves from state loaded
// before the dApp approval ever happened.
revokeSite(settings.state.state, "other.example");
// Settings revokes its own, unrelated site — the real sequence in
// forgetOrigin(), src/popup/views/settings.js — and saves from state
// loaded before the dApp approval ever happened.
revokeSite(settings.state.state, "https://other.example");
await settings.state.saveState();
const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toEqual(["https://dapp.example"]);
expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toBeUndefined();
});
});
@@ -346,7 +347,7 @@ describe("a revoked site permission against a stale page's later save", () => {
await storage.set({
autistmask: {
wallets: [W1],
allowedSites: { [ADDR1]: ["evil.example"] },
allowedSites: { [ADDR1]: ["https://evil.example"] },
},
});
@@ -354,23 +355,24 @@ describe("a revoked site permission against a stale page's later save", () => {
const stale = loadPage(storage);
await stale.state.loadState();
// Settings revokes it — src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — from a
// second page.
// Settings revokes it — forgetOrigin(), src/popup/views/settings.js —
// from a second page.
const settings = loadPage(storage);
await settings.state.loadState();
revokeSite(settings.state.state, "evil.example");
revokeSite(settings.state.state, "https://evil.example");
await settings.state.saveState();
expect(
(await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
).toBeUndefined();
// The stale page, unaware of the revoke, approves an unrelated site
// for a different address and saves — src/background/index.js:592-599.
approveSite(stale.state.state, ADDR2, "good.example");
// for a different address and saves — rememberSiteChoice(),
// src/background/index.js.
approveSite(stale.state.state, ADDR2, "https://good.example");
await stale.state.saveState();
const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toEqual(["good.example"]);
expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toEqual(["https://good.example"]);
expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toBeUndefined();
});
});
tests/stateRecovery.test.js
+3 -1
View File
@@ -167,7 +167,9 @@ describe("an unversioned profile that is perfectly valid", () => {
expect(stored.wallets[0].encryptedSecret).toBe("encrypted-secret-1");
expect(stored.wallets[0].addresses[0].address).toBe(ADDRESS);
expect(stored.activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
expect(stored.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
expect(stored.allowedSites).toEqual({
[ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
});
});
});
tests/support/popupBoot.js
+1 -1
View File
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ function unversionedValidProfile(extra) {
networkId: "mainnet",
rpcUrl: "https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com",
blockscoutUrl: "https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2",
allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] },
allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] },
deniedSites: {},
trackedTokens: [],
theme: "system",
tests/typedDataPermit.test.js
+1 -1
View File
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ async function openSignScreen(data) {
if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
reply({
type: "sign",
hostname: "dapp.example",
origin: "https://dapp.example",
isPhishingDomain: false,
approvedFrom: OWNER,
signParams: request(data),
tests/walletDelete.test.js
+20 -11
View File
@@ -28,11 +28,14 @@ function makeState(overrides = {}) {
selectedAddress: 0,
activeAddress: A0,
allowedSites: {
[A0]: ["a.example"],
[A1]: ["b.example"],
[B0]: ["c.example"],
[A0]: ["https://a.example"],
[A1]: ["https://b.example"],
[B0]: ["https://c.example"],
},
deniedSites: {
[A1]: ["https://d.example"],
[C0]: ["https://e.example"],
},
deniedSites: { [A1]: ["d.example"], [C0]: ["e.example"] },
...overrides,
};
}
@@ -41,7 +44,7 @@ describe("removeWalletFromState", () => {
test("deleting the last wallet clears hasWallet", () => {
const state = makeState({
wallets: [wallet("A", [A0])],
allowedSites: { [A0]: ["a.example"] },
allowedSites: { [A0]: ["https://a.example"] },
deniedSites: {},
});
@@ -109,8 +112,8 @@ describe("removeWalletFromState", () => {
removeWalletFromState(state, 0);
expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["c.example"] });
expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["e.example"] });
expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["https://c.example"] });
expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["https://e.example"] });
});
});
@@ -126,8 +129,14 @@ function makeAddressState(overrides = {}) {
selectedWallet: 0,
selectedAddress: 0,
activeAddress: A0,
allowedSites: { [A0]: ["a.example"], [A1]: ["b.example"] },
deniedSites: { [A1]: ["d.example"], [B0]: ["e.example"] },
allowedSites: {
[A0]: ["https://a.example"],
[A1]: ["https://b.example"],
},
deniedSites: {
[A1]: ["https://d.example"],
[B0]: ["https://e.example"],
},
...overrides,
};
}
@@ -273,8 +282,8 @@ describe("removeAddressFromState", () => {
removeAddressFromState(state, 0, 1);
expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["a.example"] });
expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["e.example"] });
expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["https://a.example"] });
expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["https://e.example"] });
});
// The derivation counter is a high-water mark, never rewound: "+" derives