fix: drive background refresh and phishing update from alarms (closes #158)
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The Chrome MV3 service worker is terminated after roughly 30 seconds idle, which destroyed both recurring jobs: the 60-second balance refresh and the 24-hour phishing blocklist refresh were setInterval schedules, so in practice each ran only while the worker happened to be alive. The phishing delta was persisted to localStorage, which does not exist in a service worker, so on Chrome it was never persisted at all. Both jobs now run off the extension alarms API in the new src/shared/alarms.js: the browser holds the schedule and wakes the worker to deliver it. The balance refresh is one minute and the phishing refresh is 1440 minutes, both whole minutes at or above the one-minute minimum, so neither is silently clamped. Alarms are created only when missing, because creating one restarts its period and the startup path runs on every wake. The phishing delta and the timestamp of the fetch that produced it now live in extension storage, and updatePhishingList() reloads that record before deciding whether a fetch is due. A revived worker therefore neither re-fetches on every wake nor sleeps through an overdue update. The 256 KiB cap covers the whole record: an oversized delta is dropped together with its timestamp so the next start fetches again. The startup path (ensureRecurringAlarms plus the phishing list init) is registered on onInstalled and onStartup as well as running at the top level of the worker, and is idempotent. Firefox MV2 has a persistent background page where timers would have survived, but both browsers are built from one bundle and both take the alarm path, so there is a single code path; "alarms" is declared in both manifests. src/shared/ens.js keeps its localStorage cache and gains a comment recording that it is popup-only, so it does not get pulled into the worker later.
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README.md
56
README.md
@@ -129,10 +129,11 @@ page, which it does not by default — `script/test-e2e` sets
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`PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1` for it. Because that flag is
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experimental, the harness does not take it on trust. At launch it waits for the
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background worker's **own** startup request — the phishing blocklist fetch that
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`src/background/index.js` issues unconditionally — to arrive in the route
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handler, and aborts the entire suite if none does within 30 seconds
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(`tests/e2e/harness.js`). The check is passive on purpose: a synthetic probe
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fetched from inside the worker via `worker.evaluate()` was tried first and
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`src/background/index.js` issues on startup, which on the suite's throwaway
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profile always happens because no previous fetch timestamp is persisted — to
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arrive in the route handler, and aborts the entire suite if none does within 30
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seconds (`tests/e2e/harness.js`). The check is passive on purpose: a synthetic
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probe fetched from inside the worker via `worker.evaluate()` was tried first and
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rejected, because evaluating in an extension service worker that early kills the
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worker outright, destroying the thing being measured. Observing traffic the
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extension already generates perturbs nothing. Losing the race fails closed — the
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@@ -192,9 +193,10 @@ src/
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styles/main.css — Tailwind source
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views/ — one JS module per screen (home, send, approval, etc.)
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shared/ — modules used by both popup and background
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alarms.js — recurring background jobs (extension alarms API)
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balances.js — ETH + ERC-20 balance fetching via RPC + Blockscout
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constants.js — chain IDs, default RPC endpoint, ERC-20 ABI
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ens.js — ENS forward/reverse resolution
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ens.js — ENS forward/reverse resolution (popup only)
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prices.js — ETH/USD and token/USD via CoinDesk API
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scamlist.js — known fraud contract addresses
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state.js — persisted state (extension storage)
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@@ -208,6 +210,39 @@ manifest/
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firefox.json — Manifest V2 for Firefox
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```
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### Background scheduling
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Chrome runs `src/background/index.js` as a Manifest V3 service worker, which the
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browser terminates after roughly 30 seconds idle and re-evaluates from scratch
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on the next event. Two consequences shape every recurring job in the background:
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- `setInterval` and `setTimeout` are useless. They are destroyed with the
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worker, so a job scheduled that way runs until the first idle period and never
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again. Both recurring jobs — the 60-second balance refresh and the 24-hour
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phishing blocklist refresh — are scheduled through the extension alarms API
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(`src/shared/alarms.js`) instead. The browser holds the schedule and wakes the
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worker to deliver it. Alarm periods are clamped to a one-minute minimum, so
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the balance refresh is expressed as exactly one minute and nothing is silently
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slowed down.
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- Module-level variables do not survive either. Anything that must be remembered
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across a restart goes in extension storage, including the timestamp of the
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last phishing list fetch: without it a revived worker would either re-fetch on
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every wake or, with a naive in-memory guard, never notice that an update is
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due. `localStorage` does not exist in a service worker at all — the one
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remaining user of it, `src/shared/ens.js`, runs only in the popup and is
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marked as such.
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The startup path (`ensureRecurringAlarms()` plus the phishing list init) runs on
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`onInstalled`, on `onStartup`, and at the top level of the worker, so every way
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the background context can start re-establishes the schedule. It is idempotent:
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an alarm that already exists is left alone, because re-creating one restarts its
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period and a busy extension would push the next fire out indefinitely.
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Firefox uses Manifest V2 with a persistent background page, where timers would
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survive. Both browsers are built from one bundle and both take the alarm path,
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so there is a single code path to reason about; `"alarms"` is declared in both
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`manifest/chrome.json` and `manifest/firefox.json`.
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### UI Design Philosophy
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The UI is inspired by _Universal Paperclips_. It's deliberately minimal,
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@@ -707,8 +742,11 @@ CoinDesk price API, and Blockscout API), AutistMask also contacts:
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blocklist is vendored into the extension at build time. At runtime, the
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extension fetches the live list once every 24 hours to detect newly added
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domains. Only the delta (domains not already in the vendored list) is kept in
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memory, keeping runtime memory usage small. The delta is persisted to
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localStorage if it is under 256 KiB.
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memory, keeping runtime memory usage small. The delta and the timestamp of the
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fetch that produced it are persisted to extension storage if the record is
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under 256 KiB; an oversized delta is dropped along with its timestamp, so the
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next start fetches again rather than claiming freshness for data it no longer
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holds.
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- **Etherscan address labels**: When confirming a transaction, the extension
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performs a best-effort lookup of the recipient address on Etherscan to check
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for phishing/scam labels. This is a direct page fetch with no API key; the
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@@ -928,6 +966,10 @@ live list once every 24 hours and keeps only the delta (newly added domains not
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in the vendored list) in memory. This architecture keeps runtime memory usage
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small while ensuring fresh coverage of new phishing domains.
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The 24-hour cadence is an alarm, not a timer, and the fetch timestamp lives in
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extension storage rather than in a module variable — see
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[Background scheduling](#background-scheduling) for why both are required.
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When a dApp on a blocklisted domain requests a wallet connection, transaction
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approval, or signature, the approval popup displays a prominent red warning
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banner alerting the user. The domain checker matches exact hostnames and all
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