harden: stop the background reading the shared state singleton, and enforce it at build time (closes #324)
Five defects, one of which destroyed every wallet, came from src/background reading and writing the module-level state singleton the MV3 worker never populates, which silently served DEFAULT_STATE. Each point fix created the next defect. The background now has its own per-call getState() and a queued read-modify-write updateState(); the singleton is unreachable from it, and an unpopulated read throws instead of serving defaults. The prohibition is enforced by the build, not by review: build.js asserts over esbuild's own metafile that no forbidden module is an input of a background bundle, so every specifier syntax esbuild resolves is covered, and both halves of the table are checked for rot -- a stale key, a stale module, an empty list, or an unlisted entry point under src/background/ all fail the build. The ESLint rule remains as fast local feedback and reads the same shared table. Known bounds are documented where the table lives. Also closes #320: getProvider() now requires a validated network id, so a cold worker no longer prepares a non-mainnet dApp transaction for mainnet and gets refused by the wallet's own verifier. backgroundRefresh() no longer mutates address objects across a network round trip, the broadcast path takes its endpoint and chain id from one snapshot, and eight test storage stubs now structured-clone on get as the real chrome.storage.local does. closes #320
This commit was merged in pull request #344.
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@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
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renderElapsed();
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}, 1000);
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const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl);
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const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
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let consecutiveFailures = 0;
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async function poll() {
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