harden: stop the background reading the shared state singleton, and enforce it at build time (closes #324)
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Five defects, one of which destroyed every wallet, came from src/background reading and writing the module-level state singleton the MV3 worker never populates, which silently served DEFAULT_STATE. Each point fix created the next defect. The background now has its own per-call getState() and a queued read-modify-write updateState(); the singleton is unreachable from it, and an unpopulated read throws instead of serving defaults.

The prohibition is enforced by the build, not by review: build.js asserts over esbuild's own metafile that no forbidden module is an input of a background bundle, so every specifier syntax esbuild resolves is covered, and both halves of the table are checked for rot -- a stale key, a stale module, an empty list, or an unlisted entry point under src/background/ all fail the build. The ESLint rule remains as fast local feedback and reads the same shared table. Known bounds are documented where the table lives.

Also closes #320: getProvider() now requires a validated network id, so a cold worker no longer prepares a non-mainnet dApp transaction for mainnet and gets refused by the wallet's own verifier. backgroundRefresh() no longer mutates address objects across a network round trip, the broadcast path takes its endpoint and chain id from one snapshot, and eight test storage stubs now structured-clone on get as the real chrome.storage.local does.

closes #320
This commit was merged in pull request #344.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-23 17:57:30 +02:00
parent 36bc6bee0e
commit bd0a626e7b
40 changed files with 2959 additions and 653 deletions

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TODO.md
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@@ -45,6 +45,50 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
# Completed Steps
- 2026-08-23: The background no longer reads or writes the shared `state`
singleton ([#324](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/324)), which
also closes the cold-worker wrong-chain send
([#320](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/320)). One in-memory copy
loaded once is the popup's lifetime, not the MV3 worker's: the worker is
killed when idle, nothing loaded state at module scope, and an unpopulated
read was answered out of `DEFAULT_STATE` in silence. Five defects traced to
that, and every point fix added a `loadState()` that created the next one — a
load detaches the objects an in-flight handler is holding. The background now
has its own storage layer (`src/background/state.js`): `getState()` for a
detached per-call read, `updateState()` for a queued read-modify-write.
`backgroundRefresh()` refreshes a private copy and applies the balances that
came back by address, so a wallet added, renamed or deleted during the round
trip survives. The transaction attempt takes its chain id and its endpoint
from one snapshot, so a committed chain switch can no longer move the endpoint
under an artifact already verified against the old chain. `getProvider()` now
REQUIRES the network id, which is what closes
[#320](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/320) at the shape rather
than at the call site. The prohibition is enforced by `build.js`, which fails
the build when esbuild's own metafile reports `src/shared/state.js` as an
input of either background bundle — the resolution the shipped bundle was
actually built from, so no specifier syntax and no resolution rule can slip
past it, and `make build` runs in CI. A bundled entry point under
`src/background/` with no line in the table fails the build too, so a second
worker entry point is protected by default rather than only if whoever adds it
knows the table exists. The assertion itself is pinned by
`tests/buildForbiddenInputs.test.js`, including every way its table can rot: a
key no bundled entry point matched, a forbidden module this build bundled
nowhere, and an entry that lists no modules (which would otherwise empty the
lint rule's forbidden set as well, and is refused at require time). Its bound
is that it is keyed by path, so a COPY of the singleton at another path is
outside it — loud for three of the five defects and silent for the other two;
the bounds are recorded in full where the table lives
(`script/lib/forbiddenBundleInputs.js`). An ESLint rule that walks the require
graph textually gives the same answer in the editor, before a full bundle; it
reads the same table, and it is fast feedback rather than the guarantee. The
shapes it catches are pinned by `tests/backgroundStateLintRule.test.js`, and
so are the two it misses — a computed specifier and a symlink — as asserted
non-reports, which the build fails on. Reading an unloaded singleton now
throws `StateNotLoadedError` instead of serving defaults. The
`chrome.storage.local` stubs in eight test files aliased instead of
structured-cloning, which could let an assertion pass on a build that never
wrote anything; every test that drives real persistence now goes through
`tests/support/storageStub.js`.
- 2026-08-23: A swap always names its output token
([#346](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/346)). The `Token Out`
detail line in `src/shared/uniswap.js` was pushed only when a symbol was