fix: render a hostile token symbol as text, and put a floor under the CSP (closes #307)
A token's symbol is whatever its symbol() returns, the block explorer passes it through unfiltered, and balanceLine() interpolated it into an innerHTML string. A token with the 1,000 holders the spam filter asks for, airdropped to the victim, could therefore paint a full-viewport cross-origin iframe over the wallet's own UI, on the screens where the user is used to typing their password. escapeHtml moves to the new src/shared/html.js as a pure string replace over &, <, >, " and '. The implementation it replaces round-tripped through a detached element's textContent, which escapes neither quote character, and it was already in use inside data-copy="..." and would have been inside href="...". Being pure also makes it testable without a DOM shim. Every interpolation into an innerHTML string across src/popup/views/ was audited rather than only the reported one. Also unescaped: the transaction lists' direction label (the explorer's method name, attacker-chosen for an attacker's contract), the wallet name and ENS name in the Home wallet list, the URL in the explorer link's href, the blockie data: URI, and the confirmation screen's warning line, which carries only fixed strings today but is one wiring change from carrying scraped explorer text. Explorer URLs are now built by one helper that percent-encodes the path segment, so a from/to out of explorer JSON cannot re-point the link. Where a value is a markup fragment this code just built, or a loop index, or a locally computed number, it stays bare; the rule and the reason are stated at the top of helpers.js. Both manifests now declare default-src 'self' with frame-src 'none'. Four directives had to stay looser than 'self' and none of them generalises: style-src needs 'unsafe-inline' because the popup sets presentation through style="..." attributes and Firefox has never implemented style-src-attr; img-src needs data: for the blockies; connect-src needs https: and http: because the RPC endpoint is user-configurable and a local node over http://127.0.0.1 is a supported configuration. frame-src, form-action and base-uri are named rather than inherited, because the last two do not fall back to default-src at all. tests/manifest.test.js now pins the whole directive set exactly, in both directions, and README.md carries the reasoning. Displayed symbols are capped at 12 characters, the bound lookupTokenInfo() already applied to a symbol read straight off a contract; the explorer path had none. The cap is a layout bound and is documented as not being the security control. isSpoofedSymbol() is untouched: it answers whether a symbol collides with a known ticker, which is a different question, and repurposing it here would have been the wrong control. Verified failing first, four ways. Restricting escapeHtml to & < > (the escape the old textContent round trip actually performed) fails 5 unit tests including the data-copy attribute break-out. Removing the length cap fails 3. Dropping default-src from manifest/chrome.json fails 2. Removing both the escape and the cap and running the full Chrome suite fails the new browser test with the attack reproduced: an <iframe id="pwn"> in the popup DOM, intercepting pointer events over the Back button.
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@@ -268,11 +268,15 @@ function ethCallResult(req, opts) {
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return ZERO_WORD;
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}
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function tokenObject() {
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// opts.tokenSymbolOverride is the hostile contract: set it and the explorer
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// reports that string as the token's symbol, exactly as it would for a token
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// whose symbol() returns markup. Read at request time, like every other
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// fixture switch, so a test can flip it and reopen the popup.
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function tokenObject(opts) {
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return {
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address_hash: STUB_TOKEN.address,
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address: STUB_TOKEN.address,
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symbol: STUB_TOKEN.symbol,
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symbol: (opts && opts.tokenSymbolOverride) || STUB_TOKEN.symbol,
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name: STUB_TOKEN.name,
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decimals: STUB_TOKEN.decimals,
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holders_count: STUB_TOKEN.holders,
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@@ -281,7 +285,7 @@ function tokenObject() {
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}
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// One received ERC-20 transfer of 1.5 E2E to the address under test.
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function tokenTransferItems(address) {
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function tokenTransferItems(address, opts) {
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return [
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{
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transaction_hash: STUB_TX_HASH,
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@@ -290,7 +294,7 @@ function tokenTransferItems(address) {
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from: { hash: STUB_COUNTERPARTY },
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to: { hash: address },
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total: { decimals: STUB_TOKEN.decimals, value: "1500000" },
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token: tokenObject(),
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token: tokenObject(opts),
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},
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];
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}
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@@ -317,11 +321,11 @@ function nativeTransactionItems(address) {
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// A holding of 1.5 E2E, in the shape src/shared/balances.js parses. Serving
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// this is what puts an ERC-20 in the send screen's token dropdown, which is
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// the only way the confirmation screen's ERC-20 path can be reached.
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function tokenBalanceItems() {
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function tokenBalanceItems(opts) {
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return [
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{
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value: "1500000",
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token: tokenObject(),
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token: tokenObject(opts),
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},
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];
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}
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@@ -596,6 +600,9 @@ function traceEnabled(raw) {
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* @param {string} [opts.tokenDecimalsOverride] what decimals() answers for
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* the stub token, in place of the value Blockscout reports for it. This is
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* the token that lies about its scale; read at request time.
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* @param {string} [opts.tokenSymbolOverride] what the explorer reports as
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* the stub token's symbol, in place of "E2E". This is the token whose
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* symbol is markup; read at request time.
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* @param {boolean} [opts.seedReceipt] answer eth_getTransactionReceipt with a
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* confirmed receipt instead of null, so a wait screen resolves.
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* @returns {Promise<{waitForServiceWorkerTraffic: (ms: number) =>
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@@ -674,14 +681,14 @@ async function installNetworkStubs(ctx, opts) {
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return jsonResponse(route, {
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items:
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opts.seedTokenTransfer && addr
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? tokenTransferItems(addr)
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? tokenTransferItems(addr, opts)
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: [],
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});
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}
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if (/\/addresses\/0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}\/token-balances$/.test(p)) {
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return jsonResponse(
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route,
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opts.seedTokenBalance ? tokenBalanceItems() : [],
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opts.seedTokenBalance ? tokenBalanceItems(opts) : [],
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);
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}
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for (const hash of [STUB_TX_HASH, STUB_NATIVE_TX_HASH]) {
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