diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index f6aaa4d..c7cfe85 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -805,7 +805,9 @@ for the views listed in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS` (`src/popup/restorableViews.js`). Every other screen falls back to Home. The screens that display a secret — ExportPrivKey and ShowRecoveryPhrase — are deliberately absent from that list, so the popup can never reopen onto one of them with no password prompt in front -of it. +of it. So are the two that destroy one, DeleteWallet and +DeleteWalletLostPassword: a popup reopened by accident must not land on a screen +whose button erases key material. A reopened popup renders the wallet list and the one screen it restores onto, and nothing else, so every screen on the stack behind that one is still the @@ -828,7 +830,10 @@ exit from that screen rather than only on its "Back" button, so nothing secret survives in a hidden view once the user has navigated away by any route. That covers the revealed private key and recovery phrase, the recovery phrase, private key or extended private key entered on AddWallet, and the password typed -on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign. +on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign. DeleteWalletLostPassword +registers one as well, for the neighbouring reason rather than that one: a +wallet name is not a secret, but a typed confirmation left standing in a hidden +view would leave a wallet one click from deletion. #### Welcome (`welcome`) @@ -889,7 +894,13 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign. - **From xprv**: instruction text and a masked extended private key input - Password + confirm password inputs, with a hint line whose wording depends - on the selected tab + on the selected tab. Every wording says that the password cannot be + recovered or reset and names what the only backup of the wallet is — the + recovery phrase, the private key or the extended private key, according to + the tab. This is the only warning the user gets before the wallet exists; + without it, the lost-password route on DeleteWallet is the first they + would hear of it. The hint line reserves its height, so switching tabs + cannot move the password fields under the pointer. - "Import" button - **Transitions**: - "Import" with a valid entry and a matching password of at least 12 @@ -1244,6 +1255,7 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign. - Error line - Password input - "Confirm Delete" button + - An underlined "I have lost my password" control - **Transitions**: - "Confirm Delete" (correct password, other wallets remain) → deletes the wallet and its site permissions, then → **Settings** with a "Wallet @@ -1253,10 +1265,54 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign. - Either way, the active address moves only if it belonged to the deleted wallet, and `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED` is broadcast when it does (`src/shared/walletDelete.js`) - - "Confirm Delete" (wrong password) → "Wrong password." on the error line, - nothing deleted + - "Confirm Delete" (wrong password) → "That password is incorrect. Please + try again." on the error line, nothing deleted + - "I have lost my password" → **DeleteWalletLostPassword** - "Back" → previous screen (Settings) +#### DeleteWalletLostPassword (`delete-wallet-lost-password`) + +- **When**: User tapped "I have lost my password" on DeleteWallet. +- **Why it exists**: without it, a user who has forgotten the password but still + holds the recovery phrase has no route back into the product at all. Deletion + was password-gated, and importing the phrase again is refused as a duplicate + xpub by `findWalletByXpub()` while the wallet is still stored, so the only + escape was clearing extension storage through browser internals — which takes + every other wallet with it. +- **Elements**: + - "Back" button, "Delete Wallet Without a Password" heading + - A statement that the password cannot be recovered or reset, so the wallet + cannot be unlocked again, and that no password is needed to delete it + - What deletion does and does not do: it erases the copy of the key stored + on this device; nothing on chain changes and no money is moved + - The route back — adding the wallet again with the recovery phrase and a + new password — and, in bold, that without that phrase written down the + deletion loses everything the wallet holds, forever + - That the other wallets are not touched + - The wallet's name, and a text input asking for it to be typed back + - Error line + - "Delete This Wallet Forever" button +- **Transitions**: + - "Delete This Wallet Forever" (name typed correctly) → the same two + outcomes as "Confirm Delete" above, through the same `finishDelete()`, so + the selection repair, permission cleanup and `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED` + broadcast are identical on both routes + - "Delete This Wallet Forever" (name does not match) → "That is not the name + of this wallet. Type <name> to confirm." on the error line, nothing + deleted + - "Back" → **DeleteWallet**, re-entered through its `show()` so the wallet + selection comes back with it. The two delete screens are siblings rather + than parent and child: nothing is pushed on the way here, so both have + Settings as their Back target. +- **Deliberately not password-gated.** A password in front of _discarding_ a + secret protects nobody: an attacker at the popup who wants the wallet gone can + uninstall the extension, so the only person such a gate stops is the owner who + forgot it. The typed name is a check that the user knows which wallet they are + on, not a secret, so it is matched with surrounding spaces and letter case + ignored. +- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`, alongside `delete-wallet-confirm`: a popup reopened + by accident must not land on a screen whose button erases key material. + #### DeleteAddress (`delete-address-confirm`) - **When**: User tapped the `[x]` next to an address on Home. Offered only on HD @@ -1273,13 +1329,13 @@ on ConfirmTx, DeleteWallet, ApproveTx and ApproveSign. refused: "+" derives the next unused index (`nextIndex` is a high-water mark), and re-importing the wallet's key material is rejected as a duplicate by `findWalletByXpub` while the wallet is still present. What - works is deleting the whole wallet in Settings — password-gated, and it - destroys the stored secret — then importing again, whereupon - `scanForAddresses()` rediscovers the address **only if it has on-chain - activity**. An address that was never used is not found by that scan. The - text is written by `recoveryPathText()` rather than sitting in - `index.html`, so it can name the wallet's own kind of key material: an - xprv wallet has no recovery phrase to re-import. + works is deleting the whole wallet in Settings — which destroys the stored + secret — then importing again, whereupon `scanForAddresses()` rediscovers + the address **only if it has on-chain activity**. An address that was + never used is not found by that scan. The text is written by + `recoveryPathText()` rather than sitting in `index.html`, so it can name + the wallet's own kind of key material: an xprv wallet has no recovery + phrase to re-import. - A warning when the address holds anything, ETH or any tracked ERC-20, followed by the holdings themselves via `balanceLinesForAddress()` and the USD total via `formatAddressTotal()` (see diff --git a/TODO.md b/TODO.md index da94589..15419fd 100644 --- a/TODO.md +++ b/TODO.md @@ -44,6 +44,32 @@ but the review is broader than any of them. # Completed Steps +- 2026-08-20: A forgotten password no longer wedges the wallet + ([#312](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/312)). Deleting a wallet + was password-gated and importing its recovery phrase again was refused as a + duplicate xpub, so a user who had the phrase but not the password could + neither leave nor come back: the only way out was clearing extension storage + through browser internals, which takes every other wallet with it. + DeleteWallet now offers "I have lost my password", a screen that destroys the + wallet after the user types its name back — no password, because requiring one + to _discard_ a secret protects nobody. An attacker at the popup who wants the + wallet gone can uninstall the extension; the only person such a gate stopped + was the owner who forgot it. That was chosen over allowing a duplicate xpub to + re-encrypt in place: re-import would have had to be built three times over + (`hd` and `xprv` by xpub, `key` by address), would make the user retype the + recovery phrase into a live popup to change a password, and reaches no state + that delete-then-import does not already reach through `scanForAddresses()`. + Both routes share one `finishDelete()`, so the selection repair, the + site-permission cleanup and the `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED` broadcast cannot + diverge between them, and the new screen is excluded from `RESTORABLE_VIEWS` — + a popup reopened by accident must not land on a button that erases key + material. AddWallet's password hint now says, per import mode, that the + password cannot be recovered or reset and what the only backup is; the hint + line reserves its height so switching tabs cannot move the password fields. + The test drives the real view against a `chrome.storage.local` stub that + structured-clones on both `set` and `get` and asserts against the read-back, + so it fails on the deletion of `saveState()` and not only on an in-memory + splice. - 2026-08-20: `make build` can no longer hand back a debug build, and `script/verify-build` can no longer be satisfied by bytes the build did not produce ([#309](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/309)). The diff --git a/src/popup/index.html b/src/popup/index.html index 54a696a..74d11fa 100644 --- a/src/popup/index.html +++ b/src/popup/index.html @@ -153,12 +153,28 @@
+

This password encrypts your recovery phrase on this - device. You will need it to send funds. + device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be + recovered or reset, so keep your recovery phrase written + down: it is the only backup of this wallet.

Confirm Delete +

+ I have lost my password +

+
+ + + diff --git a/src/popup/restorableViews.js b/src/popup/restorableViews.js index 9d20495..f6053ad 100644 --- a/src/popup/restorableViews.js +++ b/src/popup/restorableViews.js @@ -10,6 +10,11 @@ // prompt in front of it, on a popup the user may have reopened by accident. // That is why "export-privkey" and "show-phrase" are absent. // +// Nor may a view whose button destroys a wallet be listed, for the mirror +// reason: a popup reopened by accident must not land on the screen that +// erases key material. That is why "delete-wallet-confirm" and +// "delete-wallet-lost-password" are absent. +// // Kept in its own module, with no dependencies, so tests can assert the // exclusion directly rather than trusting a reading of the popup entry // point, which cannot be required outside a browser. diff --git a/src/popup/views/addWallet.js b/src/popup/views/addWallet.js index bb83132..2d54a94 100644 --- a/src/popup/views/addWallet.js +++ b/src/popup/views/addWallet.js @@ -42,12 +42,24 @@ let currentMode = "mnemonic"; const MODES = ["mnemonic", "privkey", "xprv"]; +// Each hint names what this import mode's own backup is, because a key +// wallet and an xprv wallet have no recovery phrase to point the user at. +// All three say the same thing about the password: it is gone for good if +// it is forgotten. That sentence is the only warning the user gets before +// the wallet exists, and without it the lost-password route in +// views/deleteWallet.js is the first they hear of it. +// +// Keep the three within a couple of characters of each other in length. +// The hint sits directly above the password fields and the tabs swap it in +// place, so a wording that wraps to a different number of lines would move +// those fields under the pointer; the reserved height on +// #add-wallet-password-hint is the other half of that guarantee. const PASSWORD_HINTS = { mnemonic: - "This password encrypts your recovery phrase on this device. You will need it to send funds.", + "This password encrypts your recovery phrase on this device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be recovered or reset, so keep your recovery phrase written down: it is the only backup of this wallet.", privkey: - "This password encrypts your private key on this device. You will need it to send funds.", - xprv: "This password encrypts your key on this device. You will need it to send funds.", + "This password encrypts your private key on this device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be recovered or reset, so keep your private key saved somewhere safe: it is the only backup of this wallet.", + xprv: "This password encrypts your key on this device. You will need it to send funds. It cannot be recovered or reset, so keep your extended private key saved somewhere safe: it is the only backup of this wallet.", }; function switchMode(mode) { diff --git a/src/popup/views/deleteAddress.js b/src/popup/views/deleteAddress.js index d3f30ba..ce40e84 100644 --- a/src/popup/views/deleteAddress.js +++ b/src/popup/views/deleteAddress.js @@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ function setFlash(msg) { // wallet.nextIndex is a high-water mark and is deliberately not rewound; and // re-importing this wallet's key material is refused as a duplicate by // findWalletByXpub() for as long as the wallet is here. What remains is to -// delete the whole wallet in Settings — which asks for the password and -// destroys the stored secret — and import again, after which +// delete the whole wallet in Settings — which destroys the stored secret, +// with or without the password — and import again, after which // scanForAddresses() rediscovers the address only if it has on-chain // activity. An address that was never used is not found by that scan, and // the copy must not imply otherwise. @@ -63,8 +63,7 @@ function recoveryPathText(wallet) { "importing this " + secret + " again is refused while this wallet is still here. The way back is " + - "to delete the whole wallet in Settings, which asks for your " + - "password and destroys the stored " + + "to delete the whole wallet in Settings, which destroys the stored " + secret + ", and then import that " + secret + diff --git a/src/popup/views/deleteWallet.js b/src/popup/views/deleteWallet.js index cf68048..e4c6609 100644 --- a/src/popup/views/deleteWallet.js +++ b/src/popup/views/deleteWallet.js @@ -14,8 +14,29 @@ const { } = require("../../shared/walletDelete"); let deleteWalletIndex = null; +let lostPasswordIndex = null; let ctx = null; +// The name shown for a wallet, and on the lost-password screen the string +// the user has to type back. One function so the two cannot disagree: a +// confirmation that asks for a name other than the one on screen is +// unusable. +function displayName(walletIdx) { + const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx]; + return (wallet && wallet.name) || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1); +} + +// What the typed confirmation and the wallet name are compared as. HTML +// collapses runs of whitespace when it renders the name, so a wallet named +// "My Wallet" with two spaces DISPLAYS as "My Wallet": the user cannot +// see the second space and cannot type a string that matches the stored +// name. Comparing collapsed on both sides is what keeps the confirmation +// satisfiable, on the one screen whose whole purpose is unwedging a user +// who is already stuck. Case and surrounding space go the same way. +function confirmKey(name) { + return name.trim().replace(/\s+/g, " ").toLowerCase(); +} + // Drop the password from the DOM and the wallet selection from the // closure. Registered as the view-leave handler as well as run on entry, // so the typed password does not sit in the hidden view after the user @@ -27,19 +48,89 @@ function clear() { $("delete-wallet-flash").style.visibility = "hidden"; } +// The lost-password screen holds no secret — a wallet name is not one — +// but it is wiped on leave for the neighbouring reason: a typed +// confirmation left standing in a hidden view is one click away from +// destroying a wallet the user has since navigated off. The button is +// re-enabled here too, so a screen left mid-delete is usable on re-entry. +function clearLostPassword() { + lostPasswordIndex = null; + $("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = ""; + $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent = ""; + $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "hidden"; + const btn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"); + btn.disabled = false; + btn.classList.remove("text-muted"); +} + function show(walletIdx) { clear(); deleteWalletIndex = walletIdx; - const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx]; - $("delete-wallet-name").textContent = - wallet.name || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1); + $("delete-wallet-name").textContent = displayName(walletIdx); showView("delete-wallet-confirm"); } +// The two delete screens are siblings, not parent and child: nothing is +// pushed on the way here, and Back goes to show() rather than goBack(). +// Both then have the same Back target — Settings, the screen that pushed +// delete-wallet-confirm — and re-entering through show() hands the confirm +// screen its wallet selection back, which a bare goBack() onto a view +// whose leave hook has already nulled that selection would not. +function showLostPassword() { + const walletIdx = deleteWalletIndex; + if (walletIdx === null) { + goBack(); + return; + } + const name = displayName(walletIdx); + clearLostPassword(); + $("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent = name; + $("delete-wallet-lost-name-echo").textContent = name; + // showView() runs the leave hook of delete-wallet-confirm, which nulls + // deleteWalletIndex, so this screen's own selection is recorded after + // it and not before. + showView("delete-wallet-lost-password"); + lostPasswordIndex = walletIdx; +} + +// Remove the wallet and put the user somewhere sensible. Shared by both +// routes onto this screen, so the selection repair, the site-permission +// cleanup and the accountsChanged broadcast cannot drift apart between +// them. +async function finishDelete(walletIdx) { + const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(state, walletIdx); + + deleteWalletIndex = null; + lostPasswordIndex = null; + + if (!state.hasWallet) { + clearViewStack(); + await saveState(); + // Save before broadcasting: the background reads the active + // address back out of storage to build accountsChanged. + if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged(); + showView("welcome"); + return; + } + + await saveState(); + if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged(); + // Reset stack to [main] so Settings back goes home. + // Use require() lazily to avoid circular dependency + // (settings.js requires deleteWallet.js). + clearViewStack(); + state.viewStack.push("main"); + ctx.renderWalletList(); + const settings = require("./settings"); + settings.show(); + showFlash("Wallet deleted."); +} + function init(_ctx) { ctx = _ctx; onViewLeave("delete-wallet-confirm", clear); + onViewLeave("delete-wallet-lost-password", clearLostPassword); // No wipe here: goBack() routes through showView(), which runs the // leave hook. @@ -47,6 +138,60 @@ function init(_ctx) { goBack(); }); + // The escape hatch, and deliberately not gated on anything a user who + // has lost the password cannot produce. A password in front of + // DISCARDING a secret protects nobody: an attacker at the popup who + // wants the wallet gone can uninstall the extension, so the only + // person such a gate stops is the owner who forgot it — and before + // this route existed that owner could neither delete the wallet nor + // import its recovery phrase again, because AddWallet refuses the xpub + // as a duplicate while the wallet is still stored. + $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-password").addEventListener("click", () => { + showLostPassword(); + }); + + $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-back").addEventListener("click", () => { + const walletIdx = lostPasswordIndex; + if (walletIdx === null) { + goBack(); + return; + } + show(walletIdx); + }); + + $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => { + if (lostPasswordIndex === null) { + $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent = + "No wallet selected for deletion."; + $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "visible"; + return; + } + + // Case, surrounding spaces and repeated inner spaces are not part + // of the confirmation; see confirmKey(). This asks whether the + // user knows which wallet they are on; it is not a secret, and + // refusing "wallet 2" for "Wallet 2" would only teach the user to + // distrust the control. + const typed = $("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value; + const expected = displayName(lostPasswordIndex); + if (confirmKey(typed) !== confirmKey(expected)) { + $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent = + "That is not the name of this wallet. Type " + + expected + + " to confirm."; + $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "visible"; + return; + } + + const btn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"); + btn.disabled = true; + btn.classList.add("text-muted"); + + // finishDelete() navigates, and the leave hook re-enables the + // button and wipes the typed name on the way out. + await finishDelete(lostPasswordIndex); + }); + $("btn-delete-wallet-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => { const pw = $("delete-wallet-password").value; if (!pw) { @@ -82,34 +227,7 @@ function init(_ctx) { return; } - // Remove the wallet and repair selection, permissions and hasWallet - const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState( - state, - walletIdx, - ); - - deleteWalletIndex = null; - - if (!state.hasWallet) { - clearViewStack(); - await saveState(); - // Save before broadcasting: the background reads the active - // address back out of storage to build accountsChanged. - if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged(); - showView("welcome"); - } else { - await saveState(); - if (activeAddressChanged) broadcastActiveChanged(); - // Reset stack to [main] so Settings back goes home. - // Use require() lazily to avoid circular dependency - // (settings.js requires deleteWallet.js). - clearViewStack(); - state.viewStack.push("main"); - ctx.renderWalletList(); - const settings = require("./settings"); - settings.show(); - showFlash("Wallet deleted."); - } + await finishDelete(walletIdx); }); } diff --git a/src/popup/views/helpers.js b/src/popup/views/helpers.js index 88dc17e..a959204 100644 --- a/src/popup/views/helpers.js +++ b/src/popup/views/helpers.js @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ const VIEWS = [ "add-token", "settings", "delete-wallet-confirm", + "delete-wallet-lost-password", "delete-address-confirm", "settings-addtoken", "transaction", diff --git a/tests/deleteWalletLostPassword.test.js b/tests/deleteWalletLostPassword.test.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f020aeb --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/deleteWalletLostPassword.test.js @@ -0,0 +1,503 @@ +// The lost-password route off the delete-wallet screen (issue #312). +// +// What is pinned here is that a user who has forgotten the password can +// still get out — no password is asked for and none is checked — and that +// the escape hatch destroys exactly the wallet it names and nothing else. +// The second half is the dangerous one: this is the only control in the +// product that erases key material without the password that encrypted it, +// so an off-by-one in the wallet it removes would take a wallet whose +// owner never asked for it to be touched. +// +// The assertions are made against what came back OUT of extension storage, +// not against the live `state` object. Deleting a wallet in memory and +// never persisting it looks identical from `state`, and a build that never +// wrote at all would pass a check that only reads `state` back. +// +// That makes the storage stub load-bearing, so it is a real store that +// structured-clones on both `set` and `get`. A stub whose `get` hands back +// the same object its `set` was given aliases the caller's own array: the +// test then reads its own in-memory mutation and calls it persistence, and +// passes against a build that persists nothing (see issue #324). The +// aliasing is closed off explicitly by the first test below rather than +// left as an assumption about `structuredClone`. +// +// The view is driven against a minimal DOM stub, in the same shape as +// tests/exportPrivkey.test.js: the module reads and writes named nodes and +// needs nothing else from a document. + +const mockSettingsShow = jest.fn(); +jest.mock("../src/popup/views/settings", () => ({ + show: mockSettingsShow, +})); +jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({ + decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(), +})); + +const { RESTORABLE_VIEWS } = require("../src/popup/restorableViews"); + +const VIEW = "delete-wallet-lost-password"; + +// Fixed addresses — never used for anything but these tests. +const A0 = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a"; +const A1 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7"; +const B0 = "0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599"; +const C0 = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48"; + +// ------------------------------------------------------------ DOM stub + +function makeElement(id) { + const classes = new Set(); + const el = { + id, + textContent: "", + value: "", + innerHTML: "", + disabled: false, + style: {}, + dataset: {}, + listeners: {}, + classList: { + add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)), + remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)), + contains: (n) => classes.has(n), + toggle: (n, force) => { + const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force; + if (on) classes.add(n); + else classes.delete(n); + return on; + }, + }, + addEventListener: (name, fn) => { + el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || []; + el.listeners[name].push(fn); + }, + appendChild: () => {}, + remove: () => {}, + querySelectorAll: () => [], + }; + return el; +} + +function makeDocument() { + const els = new Map(); + return { + getElementById(id) { + // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent + // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in. + if (id === "debug-banner") return null; + if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id)); + return els.get(id); + }, + createElement: () => makeElement("created"), + addEventListener: () => {}, + body: { prepend: () => {} }, + }; +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------- storage stub + +// A store that behaves the way `chrome.storage.local` does: what goes in is +// serialized, so the caller keeps no handle on what came to rest there, and +// what comes out is a fresh object the caller may mutate freely. +function makeStorage() { + let store = {}; + return { + get: async (keys) => { + const wanted = + keys === undefined || keys === null + ? Object.keys(store) + : [].concat(keys); + const out = {}; + for (const key of wanted) { + if (key in store) out[key] = structuredClone(store[key]); + } + return out; + }, + set: async (items) => { + for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(items)) { + store[key] = structuredClone(value); + } + }, + // Test-only: what the extension would find on a cold start. + _raw: () => structuredClone(store), + }; +} + +// ------------------------------------------------------------ harness + +function wallet(name, secret, addresses) { + return { + type: "hd", + name, + xpub: "xpub-" + name, + encryptedSecret: secret, + nextIndex: addresses.length, + addresses: addresses.map((address) => ({ + address, + balance: "0.0000", + tokenBalances: [], + })), + }; +} + +function load() { + jest.resetModules(); + mockSettingsShow.mockClear(); + + const storage = makeStorage(); + const sent = []; + globalThis.chrome = { + storage: { local: storage }, + runtime: { sendMessage: (msg) => sent.push(msg) }, + }; + globalThis.document = makeDocument(); + + const helpers = require("../src/popup/views/helpers"); + const { state } = require("../src/shared/state"); + const vault = require("../src/shared/vault"); + const deleteWallet = require("../src/popup/views/deleteWallet"); + + state.hasWallet = true; + state.wallets = [ + wallet("Wallet 1", "secret-one", [A0, A1]), + wallet("Wallet 2", "secret-two", [B0]), + wallet("Wallet 3", "secret-three", [C0]), + ]; + state.selectedWallet = 0; + state.selectedAddress = 0; + state.activeAddress = A0; + state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"], [B0]: ["b.example"] }; + state.deniedSites = { [B0]: ["c.example"], [C0]: ["d.example"] }; + state.viewStack = ["main", "settings"]; + state.currentView = "settings"; + + const renderWalletList = jest.fn(); + deleteWallet.init({ renderWalletList }); + + return { helpers, state, vault, deleteWallet, storage, sent }; +} + +function click(id) { + const el = globalThis.document.getElementById(id); + return Promise.all((el.listeners.click || []).map((fn) => fn())); +} + +function node(id) { + return globalThis.document.getElementById(id); +} + +// The wallets as the extension would read them back on a cold start. +async function persistedWallets(storage) { + const result = await storage.get("autistmask"); + return result.autistmask.wallets; +} + +// Open the lost-password screen for a wallet, the way the user does. +async function openLostPassword(deleteWallet, walletIdx) { + deleteWallet.show(walletIdx); + await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-password"); +} + +// ------------------------------------------------------------ tests + +// The stub is what every persistence assertion below rests on, so its one +// dangerous failure mode is closed off first. An aliasing store passes +// every other test in this file against a build that never writes. +describe("the storage stub", () => { + test("does not hand back the object it was given", async () => { + const storage = makeStorage(); + const written = { wallets: [{ name: "Wallet 1" }] }; + + await storage.set({ autistmask: written }); + written.wallets.push({ name: "Wallet 2" }); + written.wallets[0].name = "renamed after the write"; + + const readBack = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask; + expect(readBack.wallets).toHaveLength(1); + expect(readBack.wallets[0].name).toBe("Wallet 1"); + + // And the other direction: mutating what came out must not reach + // back into the store. + readBack.wallets[0].name = "renamed after the read"; + const again = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask; + expect(again.wallets[0].name).toBe("Wallet 1"); + }); +}); + +describe("reaching the screen", () => { + test("the delete screen offers the route", async () => { + const { deleteWallet, state } = load(); + await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1); + + expect(state.currentView).toBe(VIEW); + expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent).toBe("Wallet 2"); + expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name-echo").textContent).toBe( + "Wallet 2", + ); + }); + + // Both delete screens hang off Settings. Pushing one onto the other + // would leave Back on the confirm screen popping onto itself. + test("it does not push the screen it came from", async () => { + const { deleteWallet, state } = load(); + await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1); + + expect(state.viewStack).toEqual(["main", "settings"]); + }); + + test("Back returns to the delete screen with its wallet still chosen", async () => { + const { deleteWallet, state } = load(); + await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1); + await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-back"); + + expect(state.currentView).toBe("delete-wallet-confirm"); + expect(node("delete-wallet-name").textContent).toBe("Wallet 2"); + expect(state.viewStack).toEqual(["main", "settings"]); + + // The confirm screen is usable, not merely on screen: the wallet + // it holds is the one that was chosen, so its own button does not + // answer "No wallet selected for deletion." + node("delete-wallet-password").value = "some password"; + const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault"); + decryptWithPassword.mockRejectedValue(new Error("nope")); + await click("btn-delete-wallet-confirm"); + expect(node("delete-wallet-flash").textContent).toBe( + "That password is incorrect. Please try again.", + ); + }); +}); + +describe("the typed confirmation", () => { + test("a name that is not the wallet's deletes nothing", async () => { + const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load(); + await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1); + + node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 3"; + await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"); + + expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent).toBe( + "That is not the name of this wallet. Type Wallet 2 to confirm.", + ); + expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility).toBe( + "visible", + ); + expect(state.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([ + "Wallet 1", + "Wallet 2", + "Wallet 3", + ]); + expect(state.currentView).toBe(VIEW); + // Nothing was destroyed on disk either. Storage is not empty — + // showView() persists the current screen on the way in — so what + // is asserted is that all three wallets are still in it. + const persisted = await persistedWallets(storage); + expect(persisted.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([ + "secret-one", + "secret-two", + "secret-three", + ]); + }); + + test("an empty field deletes nothing", async () => { + const { deleteWallet, state } = load(); + await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1); + + await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"); + + expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility).toBe( + "visible", + ); + expect(state.wallets).toHaveLength(3); + }); + + // Not a secret and not a password: it asks whether the user knows + // which wallet they are on. Refusing the name they can plainly read, + // over letter case, would only teach them to distrust the control. + test("case and surrounding spaces do not matter", async () => { + const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load(); + await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1); + + node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = " wALLet 2 "; + await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"); + + expect(state.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([ + "Wallet 1", + "Wallet 3", + ]); + expect(await persistedWallets(storage)).toHaveLength(2); + }); + + // A name with a doubled inner space RENDERS with one — HTML collapses + // runs of whitespace — so the string the user can see and type is not + // the string the name is stored as. Comparing the two raw would make + // this wallet's confirmation impossible to satisfy by any typing at + // all, wedging the one screen that exists to unwedge people. + test("a doubled space inside the name is typed back as one", async () => { + const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load(); + state.wallets[1].name = "My Wallet"; + await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1); + + // What the DOM was handed still has both spaces; what the user + // reads off the screen, and therefore types, has one. + expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent).toBe("My Wallet"); + node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "My Wallet"; + await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"); + + expect(state.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([ + "Wallet 1", + "Wallet 3", + ]); + const persisted = await persistedWallets(storage); + expect(persisted.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([ + "secret-one", + "secret-three", + ]); + }); +}); + +describe("deleting without the password", () => { + test("no password is asked for and none is checked", async () => { + const { deleteWallet, vault, storage } = load(); + await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1); + + node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2"; + await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"); + + expect(vault.decryptWithPassword).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + expect(await persistedWallets(storage)).toHaveLength(2); + }); + + // The load-bearing assertion of the whole file, and the one that says + // this control is safe to give a user who cannot prove anything: it + // removes the wallet it named, and every other wallet survives intact, + // key material included. + test("exactly the named wallet is destroyed", async () => { + const { deleteWallet, storage } = load(); + await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1); + + node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2"; + await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"); + + const wallets = await persistedWallets(storage); + expect(wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual(["Wallet 1", "Wallet 3"]); + expect(wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([ + "secret-one", + "secret-three", + ]); + expect(wallets.map((w) => w.xpub)).toEqual([ + "xpub-Wallet 1", + "xpub-Wallet 3", + ]); + expect(wallets[0].addresses.map((a) => a.address)).toEqual([A0, A1]); + expect(wallets[1].addresses.map((a) => a.address)).toEqual([C0]); + + // The deleted wallet's secret is gone from storage entirely, not + // merely unreferenced by the wallet list. + expect(JSON.stringify(storage._raw())).not.toContain("secret-two"); + expect(JSON.stringify(storage._raw())).not.toContain("xpub-Wallet 2"); + }); + + test("only the deleted wallet's site permissions are dropped", async () => { + const { deleteWallet, storage } = load(); + await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1); + + node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2"; + await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"); + + const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask; + expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["a.example"] }); + expect(saved.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["d.example"] }); + }); + + // The route shares finishDelete() with the password route, so the + // selection repair and the accountsChanged broadcast are the same on + // both. Deleting a wallet that did not own the active address must + // leave that address, and the selection, exactly where they were. + test("a selection in another wallet is left alone", async () => { + const { deleteWallet, storage, sent } = load(); + await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1); + + node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2"; + await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"); + + const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask; + expect(saved.activeAddress).toBe(A0); + expect(saved.selectedWallet).toBe(0); + expect(saved.selectedAddress).toBe(0); + expect(sent).toEqual([]); + // Settings is stubbed, so this is where the route hands over, not + // where it renders. + expect(mockSettingsShow).toHaveBeenCalled(); + }); + + test("deleting the wallet holding the active address moves it and says so", async () => { + const { deleteWallet, storage, sent } = load(); + await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 0); + + node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 1"; + await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"); + + const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask; + expect(saved.wallets.map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([ + "Wallet 2", + "Wallet 3", + ]); + expect(saved.activeAddress).toBe(B0); + expect(sent).toEqual([{ type: "AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED" }]); + }); + + test("deleting the last wallet lands on Welcome with nothing left", async () => { + const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load(); + state.wallets = [wallet("Wallet 1", "secret-one", [A0])]; + state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"] }; + state.deniedSites = {}; + + await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 0); + node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 1"; + await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"); + + const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask; + expect(saved.wallets).toEqual([]); + expect(saved.hasWallet).toBe(false); + expect(saved.activeAddress).toBeNull(); + expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({}); + expect(state.currentView).toBe("welcome"); + expect(JSON.stringify(storage._raw())).not.toContain("secret-one"); + }); +}); + +describe("what the screen leaves behind", () => { + test("the typed confirmation is wiped when the screen is left", async () => { + const { helpers, deleteWallet } = load(); + await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1); + + node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2"; + // The Settings gear, which is not this screen's Back button. + helpers.showView("settings"); + + expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value).toBe(""); + expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent).toBe(""); + expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility).toBe( + "hidden", + ); + }); + + // Left mid-delete, the screen has to come back usable. + test("the confirm button is re-enabled on the way out", async () => { + const { helpers, deleteWallet } = load(); + await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1); + + node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").disabled = true; + helpers.showView("settings"); + + expect(node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").disabled).toBe(false); + }); + + // A wallet name is not a secret, so the screen is excluded for the + // other reason: reopening the popup must not land the user on a screen + // whose button erases key material. + test("the popup may not reopen onto it", () => { + expect(RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has(VIEW)).toBe(false); + expect(RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has("delete-wallet-confirm")).toBe(false); + }); +});