fix: filter a fake ETH token from the balance list too (closes #235)
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This commit was merged in pull request #257.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-12 11:10:38 +02:00
parent 78a1cb067e
commit 1f41a07df2
7 changed files with 383 additions and 54 deletions

296
tests/symbolSpoof.test.js Normal file
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// Tests for the known-symbol spoof rule (src/shared/symbolSpoof.js) and for
// its application on all three surfaces that show tokens: the transaction
// history, the Send token selector, and the balance list.
//
// Issue #235: the three surfaces disagreed about what a `null` entry in
// KNOWN_SYMBOLS means. The history and the selector read it as "no contract
// may bear this symbol" and filtered a fake `ETH` ERC-20; the balance list
// read it as "no comparison is possible" and listed the fake token next to
// the user's real ETH, which is where a user forms their belief about what
// they own. The rule now lives in one module, so a fourth surface cannot
// reintroduce a fourth reading, and these tests assert the same attack on
// each surface.
//
// Nothing here touches the network: global.fetch is a throwing stub and the
// only fetch path in the modules under test (debugFetch, from
// src/shared/log) is mocked at the module boundary.
// The RPC provider is replaced so that refreshBalances can be driven end to
// end: the native balance it reports must survive a balance list in which
// every ERC-20 row is a fake ETH. Everything else in ethers is the real
// module, including the formatters the assertions depend on.
jest.mock("ethers", () => {
const actual = jest.requireActual("ethers");
class StubProvider {
async getBalance() {
return 1234500000000000000n;
}
async lookupAddress() {
return null;
}
}
return {
...actual,
JsonRpcProvider: StubProvider,
Network: { from: () => ({}) },
};
});
jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
log: {
debugf: () => {},
infof: () => {},
warnf: () => {},
errorf: () => {},
},
debugFetch: jest.fn(),
setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
isDebug: () => false,
}));
global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
});
global.chrome = {
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
};
const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("../src/shared/symbolSpoof");
const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS } = require("../src/shared/tokenList");
const { filterTransactions } = require("../src/shared/transactions");
const {
fetchTokenBalances,
refreshBalances,
} = require("../src/shared/balances");
const { renderSendTokenSelect } = require("../src/popup/views/send");
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const { debugFetch } = require("../src/shared/log");
// The fake "Ethereum" token with symbol "ETH" from the attack documented in
// README.md, given a holder count high enough to clear every other filter so
// that only the known-symbol rule can catch it.
const FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT = "0xd05339f9ea5ab9d9f03b9d57f671d2abd1f55c82";
const HOLDER = "0x66133e8ea0f5d1d612d2502a968757d1048c214a";
const USDC_CONTRACT = "0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48";
const WETH_CONTRACT = "0xc02aaa39b223fe8d0a0e5c4f27ead9083c756cc2";
const BLOCKSCOUT = "https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2";
describe("the shared rule", () => {
test('"ETH" is still the null-mapped symbol these tests assume', () => {
expect(KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get("ETH")).toBeNull();
});
test("a contract bearing a null-mapped symbol is a spoof", () => {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
});
test("even a genuine contract may not bear a null-mapped symbol", () => {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("ETH", WETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
});
test("the native asset carries no contract and is never a spoof", () => {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("ETH", null)).toBe(false);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("ETH", undefined)).toBe(false);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("ETH", "")).toBe(false);
});
// The native exemption is "has no contract address", not "the symbol is
// ETH". A second null-mapped symbol added to the table later inherits
// both halves of the rule without any call site being revisited.
test("a newly null-mapped symbol behaves the same way", () => {
const added = !KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has("XTZTEST");
KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set("XTZTEST", null);
try {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("XTZTEST", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("XTZTEST", null)).toBe(false);
} finally {
if (added) KNOWN_SYMBOLS.delete("XTZTEST");
}
});
test("a known symbol from its own contract is not a spoof", () => {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("USDC", USDC_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("usdc", USDC_CONTRACT.toUpperCase())).toBe(
false,
);
});
test("a known symbol from another contract is a spoof", () => {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("USDC", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
});
test("a symbol that is not in the table is not judged here", () => {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("SPAMTKN", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("surface 1: the transaction history", () => {
function fakeEthTransfer() {
return {
hash: "0x" + "1".repeat(64),
symbol: "ETH",
contractAddress: FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT,
holders: 900000,
valueGwei: null,
isContractCall: false,
};
}
test("a fake ETH token transfer is filtered", () => {
const result = filterTransactions([fakeEthTransfer()], {
hideSpoofedSymbols: true,
hideFraudContracts: true,
hideLowHolderTokens: true,
hideDustTransactions: true,
dustThresholdGwei: 100000,
});
expect(result.transactions).toEqual([]);
});
test("a real native ETH transfer survives", () => {
const native = {
hash: "0x" + "2".repeat(64),
symbol: "ETH",
contractAddress: null,
holders: null,
valueGwei: 5000000,
isContractCall: false,
};
const result = filterTransactions([native], {
hideSpoofedSymbols: true,
hideFraudContracts: true,
hideLowHolderTokens: true,
hideDustTransactions: true,
dustThresholdGwei: 100000,
});
expect(result.transactions).toEqual([native]);
});
});
describe("surface 2: the Send token selector", () => {
let select;
function render(tokenBalances) {
select = { innerHTML: "", children: [] };
select.appendChild = (child) => select.children.push(child);
globalThis.document = {
getElementById: (id) => (id === "send-token" ? select : null),
createElement: () => ({ value: "", textContent: "" }),
};
renderSendTokenSelect({
address: "0x" + "a".repeat(40),
tokenBalances,
});
}
beforeEach(() => {
state.fraudContracts = [];
state.hideLowHolderTokens = true;
});
test("a fake ETH token is not selectable", () => {
render([
{
address: FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT,
symbol: "ETH",
decimals: 18,
balance: "0.005",
holders: 900000,
},
]);
expect(select.children).toEqual([]);
});
test("native ETH remains the always-present option", () => {
render([]);
expect(select.innerHTML).toBe('<option value="ETH">ETH</option>');
});
});
describe("surface 3: the balance list", () => {
function respondWith(items) {
debugFetch.mockImplementation(async () => ({
ok: true,
status: 200,
statusText: "OK",
json: async () => items,
}));
}
function fakeEthItem(overrides = {}) {
return {
value: "5000000000000000",
token: {
type: "ERC-20",
address_hash: FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT,
symbol: "ETH",
name: "Ethereum",
decimals: "18",
holders_count: "900000",
...overrides,
},
};
}
beforeEach(() => {
debugFetch.mockReset();
});
// The bug in issue #235: this token cleared the balance list's own
// 1,000-holder floor and was listed as a holding named ETH.
test("a fake ETH token clearing the holder floor is filtered", async () => {
respondWith([fakeEthItem()]);
expect(await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [])).toEqual([]);
});
test("tracking the fake token manually does not admit it either", async () => {
respondWith([fakeEthItem({ holders_count: "0" })]);
const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [
{ address: FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT },
]);
expect(balances).toEqual([]);
});
test("a genuine token keeps its place in the list", async () => {
respondWith([
fakeEthItem({
address_hash: USDC_CONTRACT,
symbol: "USDC",
name: "USD Coin",
decimals: "6",
}),
]);
const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, []);
expect(balances).toHaveLength(1);
expect(balances[0].symbol).toBe("USDC");
});
// The trap in this change: the user's real ETH balance is not an ERC-20
// and is fetched over RPC in refreshBalances, so it never passes through
// this loop at all. An explorer row that is not an ERC-20 is dropped
// before the symbol rule is consulted.
test("a non-ERC-20 row claiming ETH never reaches the symbol rule", async () => {
respondWith([fakeEthItem({ type: "ERC-721" })]);
expect(await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [])).toEqual([]);
});
// The money test: the user holds real ETH and has been airdropped a fake
// ETH ERC-20. The fake is gone from the list of tokens; the real balance
// is exactly what the node reported.
test("the real native ETH balance survives a fake ETH airdrop", async () => {
respondWith([fakeEthItem()]);
const addr = { address: HOLDER };
await refreshBalances(
[{ addresses: [addr] }],
"https://rpc.example.invalid",
BLOCKSCOUT,
[],
);
expect(addr.balance).toBe("1.2345");
expect(addr.tokenBalances).toEqual([]);
});
test("no test in this file performed a network request", () => {
expect(global.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});