fix: honour a dust threshold of 0 and compare addresses case-insensitively (closes #179)
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@@ -1108,7 +1108,8 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
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it. AutistMask hides transactions below a configurable dust threshold
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(default: 100,000 gwei / 0.0001 ETH). This is high enough to filter poisoning
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dust while low enough to preserve any transfer a user would plausibly care
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about. The threshold is user-configurable in Settings.
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about. The threshold is user-configurable in Settings; a threshold of `0`
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hides nothing, exactly as clearing the checkbox does.
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- **User-configurable**: All of the above filters (known symbol verification,
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low-holder threshold, fraud contract blocklist, dust threshold) are settings
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5
TODO.md
5
TODO.md
@@ -44,6 +44,11 @@ undefined identifiers, which is how
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# Completed Steps
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- 2026-08-11: A dust threshold of `0` now means "hide nothing" instead of
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falling back to the 100,000 gwei default, and every address comparison in
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`src/shared/transactions.js` goes through one case-normalising helper so a
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checksummed genuine contract is no longer read as a spoof
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([#179](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/179)).
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- 2026-08-11: Policy compliance sweep — conditional verbose test rerun, local
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Tailwind binary instead of `npx`, `--frozen-lockfile` on `make install`, and
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the Makefile-only targets documented in the README
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@@ -304,11 +304,17 @@ function init(ctx) {
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$("settings-dust-threshold").value = state.dustThresholdGwei;
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$("settings-dust-threshold").addEventListener("change", async () => {
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const val = parseInt($("settings-dust-threshold").value, 10);
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if (!isNaN(val) && val >= 0) {
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const raw = $("settings-dust-threshold").value.trim();
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const val = Number(raw);
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// 0 is accepted and means "hide nothing". Empty, negative,
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// fractional and non-numeric input is rejected outright rather than
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// coerced, and the field is put back to the stored threshold so it
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// never shows a value the wallet is not using.
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if (raw !== "" && Number.isInteger(val) && val >= 0) {
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state.dustThresholdGwei = val;
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await saveState();
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}
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$("settings-dust-threshold").value = state.dustThresholdGwei;
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});
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$("settings-utc-timestamps").checked = state.utcTimestamps;
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@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@ const { formatEther, formatUnits } = require("ethers");
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const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
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const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS, TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
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// Ethereum addresses are case-insensitive: EIP-55 mixed case is a checksum
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// over the address, not part of its identity. Every address comparison in
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// this file goes through this helper, so an address arriving in checksummed
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// or upper-case form can never be read as a different address.
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function normalizeAddress(addr) {
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return (addr || "").toLowerCase();
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}
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function formatTxValue(val) {
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const parts = val.split(".");
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if (parts.length === 1) return val + ".0000";
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@@ -30,10 +38,10 @@ function parseTx(tx, addrLower) {
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let exactValue = formatEther(rawWei);
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let rawAmount = rawWei;
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let rawUnit = "wei";
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let direction = from.toLowerCase() === addrLower ? "sent" : "received";
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let direction = normalizeAddress(from) === addrLower ? "sent" : "received";
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let directionLabel = direction === "sent" ? "Sent" : "Received";
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if (toIsContract && method && method !== "transfer") {
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const token = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(to.toLowerCase());
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const token = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(normalizeAddress(to));
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if (token) {
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symbol = token.symbol;
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}
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@@ -87,7 +95,8 @@ function parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower) {
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const to = tt.to?.hash || "";
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const decimals = parseInt(tt.total?.decimals || "18", 10);
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const rawVal = tt.total?.value || "0";
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const direction = from.toLowerCase() === addrLower ? "sent" : "received";
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const direction =
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normalizeAddress(from) === addrLower ? "sent" : "received";
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const sym = tt.token?.symbol || "?";
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return {
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hash: tt.transaction_hash,
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@@ -104,11 +113,9 @@ function parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower) {
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direction: direction,
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directionLabel: direction === "sent" ? "Sent" : "Received",
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isError: false,
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contractAddress: (
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tt.token?.address_hash ||
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tt.token?.address ||
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""
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).toLowerCase(),
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contractAddress: normalizeAddress(
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tt.token?.address_hash || tt.token?.address || "",
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),
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holders: parseInt(tt.token?.holders_count || "0", 10),
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};
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}
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@@ -194,7 +201,7 @@ function mergeTransactions(txs, tokenTransfers) {
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async function fetchRecentTransactions(address, blockscoutUrl, count = 25) {
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log.debugf("fetchRecentTransactions", address);
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const addrLower = address.toLowerCase();
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const addrLower = normalizeAddress(address);
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const [txResp, ttResp] = await Promise.all([
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debugFetch(blockscoutUrl + "/addresses/" + address + "/transactions"),
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@@ -243,34 +250,38 @@ function isSpoofedSymbol(tx) {
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if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(symbol)) return false;
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const legit = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(symbol);
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if (legit === null) return true; // "ETH" as ERC-20 is always fake
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return tx.contractAddress !== legit;
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return normalizeAddress(tx.contractAddress) !== normalizeAddress(legit);
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}
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// Pure filter function. Takes raw transactions and filter settings,
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// returns { transactions, newFraudContracts }.
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function filterTransactions(txs, filters = {}) {
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const fraudSet = new Set(
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(filters.fraudContracts || []).map((a) => a.toLowerCase()),
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(filters.fraudContracts || []).map(normalizeAddress),
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);
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// The dust threshold defaults only when it is unset (nullish): a
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// threshold of 0 is a real value meaning "hide nothing", since no
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// transaction has a value below 0 gwei. It is therefore equivalent to
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// clearing the hide-dust checkbox, and the two controls cannot override
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// each other in either direction.
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const dustThresholdGwei = filters.dustThresholdGwei ?? 100000;
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const newFraud = [];
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const filtered = [];
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for (const tx of txs) {
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const contract = normalizeAddress(tx.contractAddress);
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// Always filter spoofed known symbols and record the fraud contract
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if (isSpoofedSymbol(tx)) {
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if (tx.contractAddress && !fraudSet.has(tx.contractAddress)) {
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fraudSet.add(tx.contractAddress);
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newFraud.push(tx.contractAddress);
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if (contract && !fraudSet.has(contract)) {
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fraudSet.add(contract);
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newFraud.push(contract);
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}
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continue;
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}
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// Filter fraud contracts if setting is on
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if (
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filters.hideFraudContracts &&
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tx.contractAddress &&
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fraudSet.has(tx.contractAddress)
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) {
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if (filters.hideFraudContracts && contract && fraudSet.has(contract)) {
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continue;
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}
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@@ -291,7 +302,7 @@ function filterTransactions(txs, filters = {}) {
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filters.hideDustTransactions &&
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!tx.isContractCall &&
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tx.valueGwei !== null &&
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tx.valueGwei < (filters.dustThresholdGwei || 100000)
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tx.valueGwei < dustThresholdGwei
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) {
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continue;
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}
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@@ -329,18 +329,42 @@ describe("known-symbol spoof verification", () => {
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expect(result.newFraudContracts).toEqual([]);
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});
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// Documents current behaviour, not desired behaviour: the spoof check
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// compares tx.contractAddress against a lowercased known address with
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// ===, so a caller passing a checksummed address for a genuine token has
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// it treated as a spoof. In the app this cannot happen because
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// parseTokenTransfer lowercases, but the exported function is not
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// defensive about it the way the blocklist check is.
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test("current behaviour: a checksummed genuine contract is treated as a spoof", () => {
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const genuineButChecksummed = tokenTx({
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// Regression guard (#179): EIP-55 mixed case is a checksum over the
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// address, not part of its identity, so the contract comparison must be
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// case-insensitive in both directions — a genuine token in any casing is
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// genuine, and a spoof cannot escape detection by changing its casing.
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test("a genuine contract in all-lowercase form is not a spoof", () => {
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const tx = tokenTx({ contractAddress: USDC_CONTRACT });
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expect(filterTransactions([tx], filters()).transactions).toEqual([tx]);
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});
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test("a genuine contract in EIP-55 checksummed form is not a spoof", () => {
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const tx = tokenTx({
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contractAddress: "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48",
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});
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const result = filterTransactions([genuineButChecksummed], filters());
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const result = filterTransactions([tx], filters());
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expect(result.transactions).toEqual([tx]);
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expect(result.newFraudContracts).toEqual([]);
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});
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test("a genuine contract in all-uppercase form is not a spoof", () => {
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const tx = tokenTx({
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contractAddress: "0X" + USDC_CONTRACT.slice(2).toUpperCase(),
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});
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const result = filterTransactions([tx], filters());
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expect(result.transactions).toEqual([tx]);
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expect(result.newFraudContracts).toEqual([]);
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});
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test("a genuinely different contract claiming USDC is still a spoof in any casing", () => {
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const tx = tokenTx({
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contractAddress: "0xD05339F9EA5AB9D9F03B9D57F671D2ABD1F55C82",
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});
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const result = filterTransactions([tx], filters());
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expect(result.transactions).toEqual([]);
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// The recorded fraud contract is normalised, so the persisted
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// blocklist matches later transfers whatever casing they arrive in.
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expect(result.newFraudContracts).toEqual([FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT]);
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});
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// Documents current behaviour: README.md:810-814 says all four filters
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@@ -412,6 +436,21 @@ describe("low-holder token filtering (the 1,000-holder rule)", () => {
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expect(tx.holders).toBeNull();
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expect(filterTransactions([tx], filters()).transactions).toEqual([tx]);
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});
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// Regression guard (#179): an unknown holder count on a real token — the
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// explorer rate-limited the call, or a self-hosted instance omits the
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// field — must not be read as zero holders. Reading it that way hides a
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// legitimate transfer from the user's history, the same over-filtering
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// harm as the zero-threshold bug. This pins the `tx.holders !== null`
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// guard, which no fixture previously reached.
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test("a token whose holder count is unknown is not filtered", () => {
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const tx = tokenTx({
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symbol: NOVEL_SPAM_SYMBOL,
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contractAddress: NOVEL_SPAM_CONTRACT,
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holders: null,
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});
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expect(filterTransactions([tx], filters()).transactions).toEqual([tx]);
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});
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});
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describe("fraud contract blocklist", () => {
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@@ -575,16 +614,50 @@ describe("dust threshold filtering", () => {
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expect(filterTransactions([tx], filters()).transactions).toEqual([tx]);
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});
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// Documents current behaviour: the threshold is read as
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// `filters.dustThresholdGwei || 100000`, so a user who sets the threshold
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// to 0 (the natural way to ask for no dust filtering while leaving the
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// toggle on) silently gets the 100,000 gwei default instead.
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test("current behaviour: a threshold of 0 falls back to the 100,000 gwei default", () => {
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const result = filterTransactions(
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[dustOf(50)],
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// Regression guard (#179): 0 is a real threshold meaning "hide nothing",
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// not an absent one. It used to be swallowed by `|| 100000`, so the one
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// value a user would pick to see everything was the one that did not
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// work.
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test("a threshold of 0 hides nothing, leaving the toggle on", () => {
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const dust = dustOf(50);
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const zero = dustOf(0);
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const opts = filters({ dustThresholdGwei: 0 });
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expect(filterTransactions([dust], opts).transactions).toEqual([dust]);
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expect(filterTransactions([zero], opts).transactions).toEqual([zero]);
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});
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test("a threshold of 0 agrees with clearing the hide-dust checkbox", () => {
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const tx = nativeDustTransfer();
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const thresholdZero = filterTransactions(
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[tx],
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filters({ dustThresholdGwei: 0 }),
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);
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expect(result.transactions).toEqual([]);
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const toggleOff = filterTransactions(
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[tx],
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filters({ hideDustTransactions: false }),
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);
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expect(thresholdZero.transactions).toEqual([tx]);
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expect(toggleOff.transactions).toEqual([tx]);
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});
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test("0, unset and a set threshold are three distinct behaviours", () => {
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const tx = dustOf(50);
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expect(
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filterTransactions([tx], filters({ dustThresholdGwei: 0 }))
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.transactions,
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).toEqual([tx]);
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expect(
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filterTransactions([tx], filters({ dustThresholdGwei: undefined }))
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.transactions,
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).toEqual([]);
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expect(
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filterTransactions([tx], filters({ dustThresholdGwei: 40 }))
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.transactions,
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).toEqual([tx]);
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expect(
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filterTransactions([tx], filters({ dustThresholdGwei: 60 }))
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.transactions,
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).toEqual([]);
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});
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});
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