feat: vendor and censor the phishing blocklist at build time (closes #219)
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The blocklist URL in shipped code named a competitor and pointed at a moving
ref, and the extension re-fetched from it every 24 hours, which also meant a
third party decided what this wallet warns about. All of that is gone.

script/vendor-blocklist fetches upstream at a pinned commit, verifies the
sha256 of the bytes that commit serves, and writes
src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json. It is build-time tooling, never shipped, and
the one place in the repo that names the upstream project; a source reference
nobody can verify is not a source reference.

The artifact stores truncated sha256 digests rather than domain names. That is
what censors it: the previous file contained the competitor's name 6,475 times,
as phishing domains impersonating them, and not one of those domains is
dropped. It also makes lookups a binary search over a fixed-width string, so
nothing is built at module load — which matters on MV3, where the worker
re-evaluates the module on every wake — and takes the file from 8.7 MB to
1.7 MB.

script/check-censored enforces the rest: it reads the name out of the vendoring
script rather than repeating it, and fails on any occurrence in the working
tree or under dist/ that is not one of the three literals shipped code cannot
avoid — two provider-shim identifiers in src/content/inpage.js and one ERC-20's
on-chain name in src/shared/tokenList.js. Each is permitted only at the path
that carries it, and at the emitted paths that path is bundled into, so a
literal appearing anywhere else fails like any other occurrence. It runs in
make check, which inspects dist/ when there is one and says loudly when there
is not, and again with --require-dist at the end of every make build.

Removing the runtime fetch retires the delta, the extension-storage persistence
and the 24-hour alarm from #158. A retired alarm is now cleared rather than
left waking the worker forever on installs that already have it.

The e2e suite drives the warning end to end from a real blocklisted origin
served as a real http(s) site, with a control asserting the banner stays hidden
for one that is not listed. Its service-worker interception canary needed a new
anchor, since the startup fetch it used to watch for no longer happens: it now
wakes the worker with a message and asks it for one throwaway fetch.

LICENSE no longer cites a repository that returns 404.

eslint.config.js gains one block: script/lib/ holds node programs the shell
entrypoints call, and without it they lint with no globals at all.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-17 07:07:52 +00:00
parent 8fcdd8a053
commit 031a70e0b6
25 changed files with 1354 additions and 232497 deletions

View File

@@ -682,7 +682,14 @@ under their own licenses. They are NOT covered by the GPL-3.0 license above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
File: src/shared/phishingBlocklist.json
Source: https://github.com/AugurProject/eth-phishing-detect (config.json)
Source: the eth-phishing-detect community blocklist (src/config.json).
The file here is derived from it, not a copy of it: only the
blacklist is carried over, and each entry is stored as a truncated
digest rather than a domain name. script/vendor-blocklist records
the exact upstream URL, the commit it is pinned to and the hash of
the bytes that commit serves, and is what regenerates this file.
The URL previously cited here, under a different organisation,
returns 404: that repository is gone.
Copyright: Copyright (c) 2018 kumavis
License: Don't Be a Dick Public License (DBAD), Version 1.2
---------------------------------------------------------------------------